[PATCH] MD2 for libgcrypt

[Daniel Kahn Gillmor]

On 07/19/2010 02:15 PM, Stephan Mueller wrote:
> Both, there is the root cert (and I concur with your assessment), but there 
> are also intermediate certs with MD2 too.

intermediate certs using MD2 should themselves be considered broken, as
certifications from root CAs over MD2 are susceptible to a preimage attack:

  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MD2_%28cryptography%29#Security

It would be a bad thing to accept intermediate certificates over the
network that were certified with MD2.

If you're talking about shipping certs of known intermediate authorities
as part of a package of trusted authorities, then those are actually
equivalent to root authorities, not intermediate authorities (even if
their own certs are not self-signed).

> Well, Werner already told me that he is not integrating the patches. However, 
> as the patches only enable the signature verification of an already existing 
> signature, I cannot fully understand the decision.

Are the patches rejected due to poor implementation?  due to licensing
reasons?  or due to a desire to not ship the MD2 functionality in
libgcrypt?  or due to some other reason?

sorry for having to ask, but i never saw a response on the list, so i'm
in the dark.

	--dkg

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