From ramon.loureiro at upf.edu Thu May 1 00:25:51 2008 From: ramon.loureiro at upf.edu (Ramon Loureiro) Date: Thu, 01 May 2008 00:25:51 +0200 Subject: Revoking keys... Message-ID: <4818F1EF.1020808@upf.edu> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Hi! I'd like to delete one of the two emails asociated to my KEYID Do I need to revoke the KEY? Does it mind that the key is "destroyed"? What will happen with the signed emails I have sent? Thanks in advance ___ ramon -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJIGPHtAAoJEMVZKsuAx9ZH6awH/1ZsXHewui+zz74h8jo2UNkh Fdx5F2zvYx6CQ3HCYvwEcG0VDRjWDbW7dx0SJL5OD3harBheBgLyKqDiLc1sMdZj Zm0PfOw4MHixBLt70Nyw5Ydx+wLdgHngsmquAbMvDdWUXVsZ2q/tuCcHLlMEQtep OKL6BCaWgvJbMpfm+2IS4nbRr+GHTKuWk3Ck+/1yZZwZDtKPoWDIWYSBnuOx6b23 h/zYLiPj5vjk7XoI2NEso7cV5iDzlwW4Rszpg3gY14NhDRKL4zbVEGxJnZXxgeBg 1EdQXeLBbHKgQXYYKUi1tHtaNtkDxeamJBsji/r0ITNWSZinz20vG86627lNWDo= =ihzu -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From JPClizbe at tx.rr.com Thu May 1 00:46:18 2008 From: JPClizbe at tx.rr.com (John Clizbe) Date: Wed, 30 Apr 2008 17:46:18 -0500 Subject: Merging trusts... In-Reply-To: <4818BCFD.9070300@upf.edu> References: <4818BCFD.9070300@upf.edu> Message-ID: <4818F6BA.6040508@tx.rr.com> Ramon Loureiro wrote: > > Hi! > I'm new with GPG so excuse if my question is stupid or ridiculous... > I use to read my IMAP email at home and at work. In both machines I use > Enigmail with Thunderbird Your question is neither stupid nor ridiculous. > Is it possible to have an unique trustdb file, so that I've the same > trusted signatures in both computers? > Is there a way to synchronize them? You can copy trustdb.gpg along with pubring.gpg and secring.gpg. It's a good application for a USB drive: you can copy the files to the USB drive and redirect GnuPG to use the keyring files on that drive. You can copy the first set and then use --import to merge in the keys from the second keyring to form the common keyring. You'll have to set ownertrust individually, I don't believe there's a way to merge trustdb values. You'll want to use strong passphrases and keep a backup copy (or two) in case the USB drive gets lost or damaged. -- John P. Clizbe Inet: JPClizbe (a) tx DAWT rr DAHT con Ginger Bear Networks hkp:/keyserver.gingerbear.net "Be who you are and say what you feel because those who mind don't matter and those who matter don't mind." - Dr Seuss, "Oh the Places You'll Go" -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 677 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From JPClizbe at tx.rr.com Thu May 1 00:54:50 2008 From: JPClizbe at tx.rr.com (John Clizbe) Date: Wed, 30 Apr 2008 17:54:50 -0500 Subject: Revoking keys... In-Reply-To: <4818F1EF.1020808@upf.edu> References: <4818F1EF.1020808@upf.edu> Message-ID: <4818F8BA.5080005@tx.rr.com> Ramon Loureiro wrote: > > Hi! > I'd like to delete one of the two emails asociated to my KEYID > Do I need to revoke the KEY? > Does it mind that the key is "destroyed"? > What will happen with the signed emails I have sent? There is no need to revoke the key. All you need do is revoke the UID with the email address you no longer wish associated with your key. gpg --edit-key 0x80c7d647 enter the number associatied witht he ID you wish to revoke. Then issue the 'revuid' command and answer the confirmation question. 'save' to exit -- John P. Clizbe Inet: JPClizbe (a) tx DAWT rr DAHT con Ginger Bear Networks hkp://keyserver.gingerbear.net "Be who you are and say what you feel because those who mind don't matter and those who matter don't mind." - Dr Seuss, "Oh the Places You'll Go" -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 677 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From jmoore3rd at bellsouth.net Thu May 1 01:00:30 2008 From: jmoore3rd at bellsouth.net (John W. Moore III) Date: Wed, 30 Apr 2008 19:00:30 -0400 Subject: Revoking keys... In-Reply-To: <4818F1EF.1020808@upf.edu> References: <4818F1EF.1020808@upf.edu> Message-ID: <4818FA0E.80901@bellsouth.net> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Ramon Loureiro wrote: > I'd like to delete one of the two emails asociated to my KEYID > Do I need to revoke the KEY? These 2 Questions both require knowing whether You mean the actual Key or User ID's on the Key. It might be important to Note here that a single Key can support many different Email Addresses through the use of multiple UID's. [User ID] There is no reason to create a separate Key for each Email Address. > Does it mind that the key is "destroyed"? Yes, it matters! Without the Secret half of the Key a Revocation Certificate _cannot_ be generated. Best Practice dictates that whenever a Key is created/generated that a Revocation Certificate be immediately created and stored in a Secure Location should the need to use it ever arise. [this is particularly true if the reason revocation is needed is due to a forgotten or compromised passphrase] > What will happen with the signed emails I have sent? Absolutely nothing. JOHN ;) Timestamp: Wednesday 30 Apr 2008, 18:57 --400 (Eastern Daylight Time) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.5.0-svn4748: (MingW32) Comment: Public Key at: http://tinyurl.com/8cpho Comment: Gossamer Spider Web of Trust: https://www.gswot.org Comment: Homepage: http://tinyurl.com/yzhbhx iQEcBAEBCgAGBQJIGPoNAAoJEBCGy9eAtCsPBPAH/2gGYlfygysHeQ3poUV73yyK OR22E71lTFKdjd/NXAZtYPi4AlOxHR6l67+jWuxegw9No3eSBMJtUCYBmetCNkMi NLpkiWNU22eI6aUgIdJNqOHHftdZgR8FpjJDijzihGCOK4+HHts4LfwREDOm/d0W uUy1GijszOpxHdpGuwsi21sZpopzKWXDyV7WYWHpyN9h1XFvtSz6aH1m5UCNlR5D E4keW3ZOUaLHDENP5z/60qNmGT/qz+gOy9f2bf7E2eNBB418+S1LpAbSsfDUmawl 2vubEVD7ZwiIT8UjL/mcNvRJEnOfq2yQx2ciUCLWT5ZAEKKW+wXoY/3U/CY/XIk= =WGxM -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From david at miradoiro.com Thu May 1 00:32:12 2008 From: david at miradoiro.com (=?iso-8859-1?Q?David_Pic=F3n_=C1lvarez?=) Date: Thu, 1 May 2008 00:32:12 +0200 Subject: Revoking keys... References: <4818F1EF.1020808@upf.edu> Message-ID: <002101c8ab12$0bd15b90$0302a8c0@Nautilus> > I'd like to delete one of the two emails asociated to my KEYID > Do I need to revoke the KEY? No, just revoke the ID. From the edit-key menu, choose the ID with uid n, and then revsig iirc. > What will happen with the signed emails I have sent? They'll still verify OK I think. --David. From jmoore3rd at bellsouth.net Thu May 1 01:45:18 2008 From: jmoore3rd at bellsouth.net (John W. Moore III) Date: Wed, 30 Apr 2008 19:45:18 -0400 Subject: Revoking keys... In-Reply-To: <002101c8ab12$0bd15b90$0302a8c0@Nautilus> References: <4818F1EF.1020808@upf.edu> <002101c8ab12$0bd15b90$0302a8c0@Nautilus> Message-ID: <4819048E.6010606@bellsouth.net> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 David Pic?n ?lvarez wrote: > No, just revoke the ID. From the edit-key menu, choose the ID with uid > n, and then revsig iirc. NOPE! The Command is revuid *not* revsig ;) JOHN 8-) Timestamp: Wednesday 30 Apr 2008, 19:44 --400 (Eastern Daylight Time) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.5.0-svn4754: (MingW32) Comment: Public Key at: http://tinyurl.com/8cpho Comment: Gossamer Spider Web of Trust: https://www.gswot.org Comment: Homepage: http://tinyurl.com/yzhbhx iQEcBAEBCgAGBQJIGQSNAAoJEBCGy9eAtCsPof8H/0X+881vP6Y/fIlWc0fywm/D Mza7S0NW6XRqbuKzaLSD31ZztR1YOcd487jfP9sEzMoW7fbM7pb0P+4PbbJcFa/2 uO1g9R5GGd962LBK2wzxUwKjVtzJs5aY0tHn6gBq0F5gTyJDaUC2JkapKHr0cMS8 NgRGsCxQaLtiZpETA9p6cTJOBDWfemDZ7YjWxSSwQMzAJTlThI5wPYtoXAqH1EQP H4b0Ec6otDmtSIB26m+rXrq7R8rhZG0e82XHzRkWcl0NqaMbmKaonQ2I/75/UiNT M6mp7cXokWHH/bIUwSKVZozucQ2Zm0J0z/fLuDujLF1kunjcwHqiYC39RHiIRBg= =COmX -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From laurent.jumet at skynet.be Thu May 1 00:54:47 2008 From: laurent.jumet at skynet.be (Laurent Jumet) Date: Thu, 01 May 2008 00:54:47 +0200 Subject: Revoking keys... In-Reply-To: <4818F1EF.1020808@upf.edu> Message-ID: -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: RIPEMD160 Hello Ramon ! Ramon Loureiro wrote: > I'd like to delete one of the two emails asociated to my KEYID > Do I need to revoke the KEY? > Does it mind that the key is "destroyed"? > What will happen with the signed emails I have sent? In the --edit-key menu, you can use "deluid". Note that it's not possible to delete an uid once it has been sent to the public; you should than use "revuid". The key itself is not affected. It would be in same conditions as above, if you use "delkey" and "revkey". - -- Laurent Jumet KeyID: 0xCFAF704C -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) iHEEAREDADEFAkgY+g8qGGh0dHA6Ly93d3cucG9pbnRkZWNoYXQubmV0LzB4Q0ZB RjcwNEMuYXNjAAoJEPUdbaDPr3BMwNgAnjdU3UA1JBgzpshjuijJaKD+B6CBAJ4u MIyHhdi0ouOJBk25RD+VRLqmqw== =5KwS -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From wk at gnupg.org Thu May 1 14:26:59 2008 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Thu, 01 May 2008 14:26:59 +0200 Subject: Open Pgp Smartcard ssh authentication Woes :( In-Reply-To: <4817665E.1030603@gmail.com> (Edward Robinson's message of "Tue, 29 Apr 2008 19:18:06 +0100") References: <4817665E.1030603@gmail.com> Message-ID: <874p9itdkc.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> On Tue, 29 Apr 2008 20:18, eddrobinson at gmail.com said: > identities'. I have done no end of fiddling to get this working. Here > is a list of things that I think may be relevant and that I have Please try this $ gpg-connect-agent SCD serialno does it return something? Next test is to $ pkill scdaemon $ pkill scdaemon $ scdaemon --server --debug-ccid-driver --debug 2048 serialno You should get a lot of debugging output. Note that if you are suing "log-file" in scdaemon.conf, this will be redirected to that file (or socket). Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Auschnahme regelt ein Bundeschgesetz. From wk at gnupg.org Thu May 1 14:56:08 2008 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Thu, 01 May 2008 14:56:08 +0200 Subject: Merging trusts... In-Reply-To: <4818F6BA.6040508@tx.rr.com> (John Clizbe's message of "Wed, 30 Apr 2008 17:46:18 -0500") References: <4818BCFD.9070300@upf.edu> <4818F6BA.6040508@tx.rr.com> Message-ID: <87zlrarxnb.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> On Thu, 1 May 2008 00:46, JPClizbe at tx.rr.com said: > from the second keyring to form the common keyring. You'll have to set > ownertrust individually, I don't believe there's a way to merge trustdb Tehre is an --export-ownertrust and an --import-ownertrust command. The format they use is very traighforward but not officially documented: 0011223344556677889900112233445566778899:1: fingerprint of the key ownertrust value Merging two files is possible but you need to decide what to do with different ownertrust values. Importing one after the other will oeverwrite existing values. The code for export/import is in g10/dbdump.c. The ownertrust values are: #define TRUST_MASK 15 #define TRUST_UNDEFINED 2 #define TRUST_NEVER 3 #define TRUST_MARGINAL 4 #define TRUST_FULLY 5 #define TRUST_ULTIMATE 6 /* Trust values not covered by the mask. */ #define TRUST_FLAG_REVOKED 32 /* r: revoked */ #define TRUST_FLAG_SUB_REVOKED 64 /* r: revoked but for subkeys */ #define TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED 128 /* d: key/uid disabled */ #define TRUST_FLAG_PENDING_CHECK 256 /* a check-trustdb is pending */ A merge strategy (A,B->R) for the ownertrust value might be: if( and( A , TRUST_MASK ) > and( B, TRUST_MASK ) ) { R = or( A , and( B, compl( TRUST_MASK )) ) } else { R = or( B , and( A, compl( TRUST_MASK )) ) } That keeps the highest assigned ownertrust value as well as any revoked and disabled flags. The above code snippet might work with a decent GNU awk; just add a sort and duplicate fingerprint detection. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Auschnahme regelt ein Bundeschgesetz. From laurent.jumet at skynet.be Thu May 1 16:10:59 2008 From: laurent.jumet at skynet.be (Laurent Jumet) Date: Thu, 01 May 2008 16:10:59 +0200 Subject: Manual GnuPG 1.4.9 ... Message-ID: -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: RIPEMD160 Hello ! Here you can download the manual for GnuPG 1.4.9 in a 14 pages convenient mode for printing: In PDF: http://users.skynet.be/laurent.jumet/MyMan_GnuPG-149.pdf In .DOC: http://users.skynet.be/laurent.jumet/MyMan_GnuPG-149.doc - -- Laurent Jumet KeyID: 0xCFAF704C -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) iHEEAREDADEFAkgZ0IcqGGh0dHA6Ly93d3cucG9pbnRkZWNoYXQubmV0LzB4Q0ZB RjcwNEMuYXNjAAoJEPUdbaDPr3BMy0kAn0uwl2X9dy5NpXm0ijb0fGVL7ZCiAKDS 5cvIXzRnXCfo5vyGekVl+8M0og== =aj7Q -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From sjlopezb at hackindex.com Thu May 1 16:19:39 2008 From: sjlopezb at hackindex.com (=?ISO-8859-15?Q?Santiago_Jos=E9_L=F3pez_Borraz=E1s?=) Date: Thu, 01 May 2008 16:19:39 +0200 Subject: Manual GnuPG 1.4.9 ... In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <4819D17B.8000102@foo.hackindex.es> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 El 01/05/08 16:10, Laurent Jumet escribi?: > In PDF: http://users.skynet.be/laurent.jumet/MyMan_GnuPG-149.pdf > In .DOC: http://users.skynet.be/laurent.jumet/MyMan_GnuPG-149.doc Thank's!!!! :-) - -- Slds de Santiago Jos? L?pez Borraz?s Conocimientos avanzados en seguridad inform?tica. Conocimientos avanzados en redes. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIVAwUBSBnRe7uF9/q6J55WAQqAsg//QuA2RUyVdyRx/ucheIB+Q8BKxQVHPbsA v6fknEmI2Zi+msrcIXDybrNTXGaC2BqrpY+C6LLYke+7fcsRixkvd4FfHSpr3UQM /xTUILd21Uuxvtn/uDhIRoutKE52tOXeRXwpMbZQofCwEDZfF+An83dzBY6z488L +Es3mstiFOvN1rdGy7zzvg7CX804olzcPKeJ5IWh1BUmWhiWDowjmsnSKl7xxn+x tZkj5Hw5zwm19qXO4cr3C92tdenP92IBgB0cUOGpHHqKug7/L/91URvIh8XNsaWg SfjyBKIOoKCBqGNnesKxA0xe+S6F3kBQ2+iutETaDtibqXH6JincAacLLDChc4s5 bVef8O0FKmZWHuT0sq2a3a3zg8+KNfsb4CQSwFZHgBhW1/0txlFDsbzE4aM/eCF1 7tMJbKfhtbkxjmVMJxT3aCMNLatHMeXvYcMVV0EZFw7PZy/DxhcdPt24jNocOxm1 qpJ3QTqPLnTLss/iVf6+L1C1sRAlkhnI75uo4fHLe87TaguKOuVI2SEBwctWMaR4 HGtQEaKiW/efDFYiwo4sdVA94cgZbyjN+xdMwwiQNerJ+tL91FMuUg4+m+X4aVCv TOANMEQYY0nX9H1SA0f7IkOtGdYyUooNuG9nXmin4tSWT+KiSJp2hjElejaOczdL 8yOggUsy2QI= =H4LU -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From mpant at ncsa.uiuc.edu Thu May 1 19:13:34 2008 From: mpant at ncsa.uiuc.edu (Meenal Pant) Date: Thu, 01 May 2008 12:13:34 -0500 Subject: Version 4 / Version 3 keys Message-ID: <4819FA3E.7050701@ncsa.uiuc.edu> Are V3 keys commonly used or do all latest versions of GPG and PGP support V4 keys only? Thanks Meenal From mpant at ncsa.uiuc.edu Thu May 1 19:21:43 2008 From: mpant at ncsa.uiuc.edu (Meenal Pant) Date: Thu, 01 May 2008 12:21:43 -0500 Subject: GPG warning for integrity protection Message-ID: <4819FC27.8060007@ncsa.uiuc.edu> Hello all, When I decrypt a message I sometimes see this warning: gpg: WARNING: message was not integrity protected I read through the Open PGP RFC and understood that using MDC ensures message integrity for encrypted messages. If I use MDC to encrypt messages this warning will go away. How can I use MDC for Public Key Encryption ? Does the key have an MDC flag that needs to be set during key generation ? Thanks Meenal From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Thu May 1 19:22:27 2008 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Thu, 1 May 2008 13:22:27 -0400 Subject: Version 4 / Version 3 keys In-Reply-To: <4819FA3E.7050701@ncsa.uiuc.edu> References: <4819FA3E.7050701@ncsa.uiuc.edu> Message-ID: <6156B98E-3041-4DE4-9DA9-B95F1E8839AC@jabberwocky.com> On May 1, 2008, at 1:13 PM, Meenal Pant wrote: > Are V3 keys commonly used or do all latest versions of GPG and PGP > support V4 keys only? GPG only generates V4 keys. V3 keys are supported, but only for backwards compatibility. It is very strongly recommended that you don't go down the V3 route. V3 is dead. Let it stay dead. David From JPClizbe at tx.rr.com Thu May 1 19:25:51 2008 From: JPClizbe at tx.rr.com (John Clizbe) Date: Thu, 01 May 2008 12:25:51 -0500 Subject: Version 4 / Version 3 keys In-Reply-To: <4819FA3E.7050701@ncsa.uiuc.edu> References: <4819FA3E.7050701@ncsa.uiuc.edu> Message-ID: <4819FD1F.20600@tx.rr.com> Meenal Pant wrote: > Are V3 keys commonly used or do all latest versions of GPG and PGP > support V4 keys only? For the present, V3 keys are still supported though there are strong arguments for migrating away from them and to V4 -- John P. Clizbe Inet: JPClizbe(a)comcast DOT nyet Ginger Bear Networks hkp://keyserver.gingerbear.net "Be who you are and say what you feel because those who mind don't matter and those who matter don't mind." - Dr Seuss, "Oh the Places You'll Go" -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 677 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Thu May 1 19:47:32 2008 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Thu, 1 May 2008 13:47:32 -0400 Subject: GPG warning for integrity protection In-Reply-To: <4819FC27.8060007@ncsa.uiuc.edu> References: <4819FC27.8060007@ncsa.uiuc.edu> Message-ID: <7A2C5DBF-E09A-42EC-96F1-81A6B8B2047A@jabberwocky.com> On May 1, 2008, at 1:21 PM, Meenal Pant wrote: > Hello all, > When I decrypt a message I sometimes see this warning: > > gpg: WARNING: message was not integrity protected > > I read through the Open PGP RFC and understood that using MDC ensures > message integrity for encrypted messages. If I use MDC to encrypt > messages this warning will go away. > > How can I use MDC for Public Key Encryption ? Does the key have an MDC > flag that needs to be set during key generation ? Basically, yes. There is a flag on a key that tells GPG that is it safe to use the MDC. If that flag isn't there, GPG doesn't use MDC as it doesn't know if the recipient can handle it. (There are some exceptions to this rule, but it is basically true). To check if your key has the preference, run "gpg --edit-key (yourkey)" and then "showpref". MDC, if enabled, will be on the line marked "Features". To enable MDC on a key that doesn't have it, you can use "setpref", which allows you to set all your preferences for that key (cipher prefs, hash prefs, compression prefs, MDC, etc). David From wk at gnupg.org Thu May 1 19:52:35 2008 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Thu, 01 May 2008 19:52:35 +0200 Subject: GPG warning for integrity protection In-Reply-To: <4819FC27.8060007@ncsa.uiuc.edu> (Meenal Pant's message of "Thu, 01 May 2008 12:21:43 -0500") References: <4819FC27.8060007@ncsa.uiuc.edu> Message-ID: <87zlr9rjx8.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> On Thu, 1 May 2008 19:21, mpant at ncsa.uiuc.edu said: > How can I use MDC for Public Key Encryption ? Does the key have an MDC > flag that needs to be set during key generation ? Right. Lacking such a flag you may use --force-mdc: @item --force-mdc Force the use of encryption with a modification detection code. This is always used with the newer ciphers (those with a blocksize greater than 64 bits), or if all of the recipient keys indicate MDC support in their feature flags. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Auschnahme regelt ein Bundeschgesetz. From ramon.loureiro at upf.edu Fri May 2 09:14:58 2008 From: ramon.loureiro at upf.edu (Ramon Loureiro) Date: Fri, 02 May 2008 09:14:58 +0200 Subject: can GPG help me with SPAM? Message-ID: <481ABF72.8030308@upf.edu> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Hi, I'm receiving a lot of spam in my old email account... I'm even receiving emails with my own old email as sender!! :-( Is it a way to tell the sysadmin of this email provider to add some kind of scripts for automatic sign all the outgoing emails (in the name of the department)? Or maybe the solution has nothing to do with GPG? Thanks ___ ramon -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJIGr9sAAoJEMVZKsuAx9ZHRMgH/ji/wDTgmahGtROXZFHxnqfM UtwtNs3dXUuKte6U0HHNX74ckvRa3LtRTp6SCYYvgBiadmZAGEtHcMicXD0Mk0cE YK1FcoZLwmUFUw19CyuQ/ftX2LjX9oypIz88ofEqf7NyQjEqn9i/OrWXZcBnemzY jz3N/DM4qvD/es4XdXlzFfMjoj5tTm01+GnY3rDnWLwNZzT2DzIit60SWZyIYGRf XKg0romAZvmVD6AVtqdryPNxpKFEaXhpeWNM/YLmI7CtkAUB0V6IdkAJlltqNldC xyKrpWZq+iC7CeIFoxReHiafq8yzhzdbaLGvfeIuCYJgwMGZu2xN1uzYfc2Ii2o= =8JMB -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From ramon.loureiro at upf.edu Fri May 2 09:38:25 2008 From: ramon.loureiro at upf.edu (Ramon Loureiro) Date: Fri, 02 May 2008 09:38:25 +0200 Subject: my signature does not verify! In-Reply-To: <481ABF72.8030308@upf.edu> References: <481ABF72.8030308@upf.edu> Message-ID: <481AC4F1.90901@upf.edu> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Hi again! I have just posted a msg to the list ~ http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/2008-May/033328.html and when I have received my own email, my signature doesn't verify! :-( Could you help me to see what I'm doing wrong? I'm sending with Enigmail and this is what I'm getting in the console - ----------------------------------------------------------- enigmail> gpg.exe --charset utf8 --batch --no - -tty --status-fd 2 -d gpg: Signature made 05/02/08 09:14:52 using RSA key ID 80C7D647 gpg: BAD signature from "Ramon Loureiro " enigmail.js: Enigmail.decryptMessageEnd: Error in command execution - ------------------------------------------------------------- Thanks again! ___ ramon -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJIGsTtAAoJEMVZKsuAx9ZHujoIAJ+3FtCf8PDizAZgTPPWkaQL IbgLUyDqRK1WIlpePph+XHE4lfgC7fbNzqnulG4tp8++tqg6l62q4pwLQs5Vc1L6 LH0u9PZlDN+54tvXE0iXnENYcca+EN4gReqfj6aivi5svtAUo7dOU8VusvJ88ALq 2q7M8mip+AT18g3X715IMtVsTncwR4ZoXb7VjsotD9Uyflz3A4sX3nVzFUxHVWxh tMP9O88TlN9MqBJXNIWc2ofg7UP/CCL70MAmHX8Rnd1L2w+6qPdnluE/Q7hcDSw+ 6ZBP2U2E7iapojUmdqF8pTGNXozp6VQqXBe8KDT086dkZ5hnTycGq8W5FwXHVOY= =68ak -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From ramon.loureiro at upf.edu Fri May 2 09:52:52 2008 From: ramon.loureiro at upf.edu (Ramon Loureiro) Date: Fri, 02 May 2008 09:52:52 +0200 Subject: playing with cryptography... Message-ID: <481AC854.8060507@upf.edu> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Hi I just have ask for an email certificate to thawte.com thinking that it's handled like a GPG signature (I thought that I'll have something like a GPG certified signature) Now I have the certificate.... I have installed it in Explorer and Firefox...-by the way, I don't understand why it is associated to the browser and not to the email program- I'm certified... but I don't know what can I do with this or how can apply to my emails? Once again, excuse my ignorance. ___ ramon -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJIGshRAAoJEMVZKsuAx9ZHLEwIAJXL2Do+Hlf2YaDlwvRzH6wX /iD2PNsqi2E4QgMeGkfS2BjybfSvPtkDJviIV46hNIB4sbd+pb3DVkaWLsbWJ3jD aNlEt2bWog9E6UJKhcpl3wyG1BitUglTGs6Eay72VH5Zugt+XTq5S1wARtlmhx1Y sLJ5DGwOPDtDgymC0bgZvNWz+Mr9YNF+LP21jE9URlOfPdKvluZfdWM0WBraBrKt VxDje5dTycKyr0psxxV1+0KPyt4SsCAW1oCZZ995b9qJR+WzvWQai9mDNDL3JYMN OGEI2vDD9DW9YVfpbs/U320hIEzNc+Kga5AkcpwXWI2UArISFK3+3VoLLjfc6nY= =haNl -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From shavital at mac.com Fri May 2 09:56:05 2008 From: shavital at mac.com (Charly Avital) Date: Fri, 02 May 2008 03:56:05 -0400 Subject: my signature does not verify! In-Reply-To: <481AC4F1.90901@upf.edu> References: <481ABF72.8030308@upf.edu> <481AC4F1.90901@upf.edu> Message-ID: <481AC915.3020104@mac.com> Ramon Loureiro wrote the following on 5/2/08 3:38 AM: > > Hi again! > I have just posted a msg to the list > ~ http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/2008-May/033328.html > and when I have received my own email, my signature doesn't verify! :-( > Could you help me to see what I'm doing wrong? > > I'm sending with Enigmail and this is what I'm getting in the console > > ----------------------------------------------------------- > enigmail> gpg.exe --charset utf8 --batch --no > -tty --status-fd 2 -d > gpg: Signature made 05/02/08 09:14:52 using RSA key ID 80C7D647 > gpg: BAD signature from "Ramon Loureiro " > enigmail.js: Enigmail.decryptMessageEnd: Error in command execution > ------------------------------------------------------------- > > Thanks again! > > ___ > ramon Ramon, In your above quoted message, your signature verifies: Good signature from Ramon Loureiro Key ID: 0x80C7D647 / Signed on: 5/2/08 3:38 AM Key fingerprint: BE8E 5136 6A32 B5EF 0105 0DFB C559 2ACB 80C7 D647 In your previous message, about receiving a lot of spam, signature does not verify: gpg: Signature made Fri May 2 03:14:52 2008 EDT using RSA key ID 80C7D647 gpg: BAD signature from "Ramon Loureiro " I have compared the raw source of both messages, and couldn't find any significant difference. But there must be some, somewhere :-) By the way, Thunderbird's current stable version is 2.0.0.14 Charly MacOS 10.5.2 - MacBook Intel C2Duo - GnuPG 1.4.9 - GPG2 2.0.9 - Thunderbird 2.0.0.14 - Enigmail 0.95.6 From laurent.jumet at skynet.be Fri May 2 09:50:35 2008 From: laurent.jumet at skynet.be (Laurent Jumet) Date: Fri, 02 May 2008 09:50:35 +0200 Subject: my signature does not verify! In-Reply-To: <481AC4F1.90901@upf.edu> Message-ID: -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: RIPEMD160 Hello Ramon ! Ramon Loureiro wrote: > @X-Mime-proxy: body=us-ascii > @X-Original-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit > @X-Original-Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; Format="flowed" > I have just posted a msg to the list > ~ http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/2008-May/033328.html > and when I have received my own email, my signature doesn't verify! :-( > Could you help me to see what I'm doing wrong? First message doesn't verify; this one has a good signature. It's hard to say why a ClearSign doesn't verify. In the headers above you can see that your message comes to us in 7bit us-ascii, while I can suppose you were writing in something like iso-8859-15. Several charset translations occur during Internet travel. Who knows what exactly happens? I suggested a few months ago, to send ClearSign in Armored form; this mean no encryption but compression, and no problems with charsets. But several people complainted as they reader could not show the message. - -- Laurent Jumet KeyID: 0xCFAF704C -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) iHEEAREDADEFAkgaycQqGGh0dHA6Ly93d3cucG9pbnRkZWNoYXQubmV0LzB4Q0ZB RjcwNEMuYXNjAAoJEPUdbaDPr3BM7T8AoOimCytN2/usEs3wRSZ+Un/MkMejAJsE QEwGPULCwC/qsHMHl9Z6FyK7Dw== =dAwu -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From hidekis at gmail.com Fri May 2 09:27:24 2008 From: hidekis at gmail.com (Hideki Saito) Date: Fri, 02 May 2008 00:27:24 -0700 Subject: can GPG help me with SPAM? In-Reply-To: <481ABF72.8030308@upf.edu> References: <481ABF72.8030308@upf.edu> Message-ID: <481AC25C.4070201@gmail.com> Hello Ramon, GnuPG really won't help you there, unless person other-side has way to verify your signature. As GnuPG is just a standard command line program, technologically speaking, as long as the mail server allows, it should be able to sign the E-mail automatically. So it is probably technically possible, however, if it is useful or not would be another question... -- Hideki Saito > > Hi, > I'm receiving a lot of spam in my old email account... > I'm even receiving emails with my own old email as sender!! :-( > > Is it a way to tell the sysadmin of this email provider to add some > kind of scripts for automatic sign all the outgoing emails (in the > name of the department)? > Or maybe the solution has nothing to do with GPG? > > Thanks > > ___ > ramon > _______________________________________________ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users at gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users From shavital at mac.com Fri May 2 10:27:51 2008 From: shavital at mac.com (Charly Avital) Date: Fri, 02 May 2008 04:27:51 -0400 Subject: playing with cryptography... In-Reply-To: <481AC854.8060507@upf.edu> References: <481AC854.8060507@upf.edu> Message-ID: <481AD087.3020908@mac.com> Ramon Loureiro wrote the following on 5/2/08 3:52 AM: > Hi > I just have ask for an email certificate to thawte.com thinking that > it's handled like a GPG signature (I thought that I'll have something > like a GPG certified signature) > Now I have the certificate.... I have installed it in Explorer and > Firefox...-by the way, I don't understand why it is associated to the > browser and not to the email program- > I'm certified... but I don't know what can I do with this or how can > apply to my emails? > > Once again, excuse my ignorance. > > ___ > ramon Ramon, This message has again a bad signature: gpg: Signature made Fri May 2 03:52:49 2008 EDT using RSA key ID 80C7D647 gpg: BAD signature from "Ramon Loureiro " Thawte's certificates can be used both for signing and for encrypting, using S/MIME, and they are not at all like gpg keys. Your correspondent also must be using S/MIME to be able to verify your signature, and to decrypt/encrypt using those certificates. gpg 2.* is S/MIME compliant. You should be able to import into Thunderbird the e-mail certificate that was issued to you by Thawte: go to Account Settings/Security, and try to use the available options. As far as I am concerned, there's no ignorance here to be excused. I am an ignorant empirical user, and I may be as ignorant, or more than most of this list's learned members. Take care, Charly MacOS 10.5.2 - MacBook Intel C2Duo - GnuPG 1.4.9 - GPG2 2.0.9 - Thunderbird 2.0.0.14 - Enigmail 0.95.6 From ramon.loureiro at upf.edu Fri May 2 10:50:37 2008 From: ramon.loureiro at upf.edu (Ramon Loureiro) Date: Fri, 02 May 2008 10:50:37 +0200 Subject: playing with cryptography... In-Reply-To: <481AD087.3020908@mac.com> References: <481AC854.8060507@upf.edu> <481AD087.3020908@mac.com> Message-ID: <481AD5DD.4020308@upf.edu> Hi again! Charly Avital escribi?: > Ramon Loureiro wrote the following on 5/2/08 3:52 AM: > >> Hi >> I just have ask for an email certificate to thawte.com thinking that >> it's handled like a GPG signature (I thought that I'll have something >> like a GPG certified signature) >> Now I have the certificate.... I have installed it in Explorer and >> Firefox...-by the way, I don't understand why it is associated to the >> browser and not to the email program- >> I'm certified... but I don't know what can I do with this or how can >> apply to my emails? >> >> Once again, excuse my ignorance. >> >> ___ >> ramon >> > > Ramon, > > Thawte's certificates can be used both for signing and for encrypting, > using S/MIME, and they are not at all like gpg keys. > > Your correspondent also must be using S/MIME to be able to verify your > signature, and to decrypt/encrypt using those certificates. > > gpg 2.* is S/MIME compliant. > > You should be able to import into Thunderbird the e-mail certificate > that was issued to you by Thawte: go to Account Settings/Security, and > try to use the available options. > > Great! I think I've got it! (This msg should be MIME-signed with a Thawte certificationx) > As far as I am concerned, there's no ignorance here to be excused. I am > an ignorant empirical user, and I may be as ignorant, or more than most > of this list's learned members. > :-) Thanks ____ ramon -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: smime.p7s Type: application/x-pkcs7-signature Size: 2864 bytes Desc: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature URL: From claws at thewildbeast.co.uk Fri May 2 10:54:34 2008 From: claws at thewildbeast.co.uk (Paul) Date: Fri, 2 May 2008 09:54:34 +0100 Subject: my signature does not verify! In-Reply-To: <481AC4F1.90901@upf.edu> References: <481ABF72.8030308@upf.edu> <481AC4F1.90901@upf.edu> Message-ID: <20080502095434.46d89a60@thewildbeast> On Fri, 02 May 2008 09:38:25 +0200 Ramon Loureiro wrote: > Could you help me to see what I'm doing wrong? Possibly MTA re-encoding broke the sig. It is safer to use BASE64 encoding rather than 7bit when sending msgs with inline sigs. best regards Paul -- It isn't worth a nickel to two guys like you or me, but to a collector it is worth a fortune From david at miradoiro.com Fri May 2 10:19:54 2008 From: david at miradoiro.com (=?iso-8859-1?Q?David_Pic=F3n_=C1lvarez?=) Date: Fri, 2 May 2008 10:19:54 +0200 Subject: playing with cryptography... References: <481AC854.8060507@upf.edu> Message-ID: <000701c8ac2d$4e0e3980$0302a8c0@Nautilus> With a certificate of this kind you can sign e-mail and decrypt e-mail encrypted to you on the basis of S/MIME, which is a different protocol from OpenPGP and incompatible with it. The pros of it is that it is supported by mainstream MUAs, Outlook Express and MS Outlook, and the Web of Trust issues are handled in a less flexible but simpler way (lots of money to become accredited). --David. From ramon.loureiro at upf.edu Fri May 2 11:14:33 2008 From: ramon.loureiro at upf.edu (Ramon Loureiro) Date: Fri, 02 May 2008 11:14:33 +0200 Subject: my signature does not verify! In-Reply-To: <481AD631.2070909@hammernoch.net> References: <481AD0E4.5080608@upf.edu> <481AD631.2070909@hammernoch.net> Message-ID: <481ADB79.6040805@upf.edu> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Ludwig H?gelsch?fer escribi?: > On 02.05.2008 10:29, Ramon Loureiro wrote: >> Hi! >> I have just posted a msg to this list >> ~ http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/2008-May/033328.html >> and when I have received my own email, my signature doesn't verify! :-( >> Could you help me to see what I'm doing wrong? > > Please disable Format="flowed". See FAQ #8 > http://enigmail.mozdev.org/support/troubles.php Great! Solved! THANKS! ___ ramon loureiro -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJIGttxAAoJEMVZKsuAx9ZHUXMH/ijZ0P5pMtp0jP1ZU5XjxxAG nV5Q/pD0J/cFnShqT1HzvYBv5w1Z0h/zQlBm7+6ogMGiOvk8UlIQBT209cuj/O6z qfBSyYUjEFPYisll6khUi4NI7Pn1ndgtMrmXesjDTzimBeQ5i2jcW2CblLHp1RMW eMS5V/QfpK2NZl2jWCu0vvd5fp74fo9WyeXCE1O4mjb3nXXrwjbQyKeK4a6/ScXA 8/0leKaxSNdWg1mMheG7YJKujO94zNxhvN72Zgvf9y5iUBAocEnjAkeLEMJSyF0B T2EHnGT8oVyQiX3Tb4EjhL9Fjx5spqFaQOQbZ8C7x+jPKv5BvfKUNbP0s0pmQrw= =6NZe -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: smime.p7s Type: application/x-pkcs7-signature Size: 2864 bytes Desc: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature URL: From ramon.loureiro at upf.edu Fri May 2 11:31:02 2008 From: ramon.loureiro at upf.edu (Ramon Loureiro) Date: Fri, 02 May 2008 11:31:02 +0200 Subject: my signature does not verify! In-Reply-To: <481ADB79.6040805@upf.edu> References: <481AD0E4.5080608@upf.edu> <481AD631.2070909@hammernoch.net> <481ADB79.6040805@upf.edu> Message-ID: <481ADF56.7050202@upf.edu> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Oh! my God! That's the neverending story! it does not verify once again... - ------------------------------------------------------------- enigmail> gpg.exe --charset utf8 --batch --no - -tty --status-fd 2 -d gpg: invalid armor header: =20\r\n gpg: invalid armor header: =20\r\n enigmail.js: Enigmail.decryptMessageEnd: Error in command execution - ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ This has happened when replying to someone's msg... :-? ...I'm going to crypto-cry... ____ ramon Ramon Loureiro escribi?: > Ludwig H?gelsch?fer escribi?: > > On 02.05.2008 10:29, Ramon Loureiro wrote: > >> Hi! > >> I have just posted a msg to this list > >> ~ http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/2008-May/033328.html > >> and when I have received my own email, my signature doesn't verify! :-( > >> Could you help me to see what I'm doing wrong? > > Please disable Format="flowed". See FAQ #8 > > http://enigmail.mozdev.org/support/troubles.php > Great! Solved! THANKS! > > ___ > ramon loureiro -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJIGt9UAAoJEMVZKsuAx9ZHUXEH/R+Ula28Haxl0xZctQpeeKDc knyfclQTaL7ssZqhFQDW6QjnoQ0HnHFPr5DjYcpWCJ9LyJzKbebR4CeA6BPGcLnZ V5aAr8vRB3mfnbZACm4Q3ExumHvdzTvPhjlLybZkJDfuOeZz4Gx0s6wHQDGJKQvN 0JX1xHKsgafyPp5SDJG5iiaxG50tvHBTQHsnZBVS1NEd54vNcCH4q9swAUrxp4fD ldoWaQ3wThWQfNoS+hbcyVBUKKZtz4mdVkfdI90MGgPv3xewbrKEhyE+ETfUZonX jA81R0nuaFXJdM+MHVt3g1WDxeqHrgjiYau9qIMU6xGSdGPxdu+cUxjDBTA5x80= =yiV6 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: smime.p7s Type: application/x-pkcs7-signature Size: 2864 bytes Desc: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature URL: From shavital at mac.com Fri May 2 11:50:41 2008 From: shavital at mac.com (Charly Avital) Date: Fri, 02 May 2008 05:50:41 -0400 Subject: playing with cryptography... In-Reply-To: <481AD5DD.4020308@upf.edu> References: <481AC854.8060507@upf.edu> <481AD087.3020908@mac.com> <481AD5DD.4020308@upf.edu> Message-ID: <481AE3F1.9020102@mac.com> Ramon Loureiro wrote the following on 5/2/08 4:50 AM: [...] > Great! > I think I've got it! > (This msg should be MIME-signed with a Thawte certificationx) The raw source of your message shows: Content-type: multipart/signed; protocol="application/x-pkcs7-signature"; micalg=sha1; boundary=------------ms080308040504070708000801 "x-pkcs7-signature" refers to Thawte's certificates "pkcs7" I have imported your certificate in my Keychain Access. I have verified your signature with another mail application, Apple's Mail, that reports your message as signed, and displays correctly the details of your certificate. Charly From ramon.loureiro at upf.edu Fri May 2 12:00:28 2008 From: ramon.loureiro at upf.edu (Ramon Loureiro) Date: Fri, 02 May 2008 12:00:28 +0200 Subject: playing with cryptography... In-Reply-To: <481AE3F1.9020102@mac.com> References: <481AC854.8060507@upf.edu> <481AD087.3020908@mac.com> <481AD5DD.4020308@upf.edu> <481AE3F1.9020102@mac.com> Message-ID: <481AE63C.4040109@upf.edu> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Charly Avital escribi?: >> Great! >> I think I've got it! >> (This msg should be MIME-signed with a Thawte certificationx) > > The raw source of your message shows: > Content-type: multipart/signed; protocol="application/x-pkcs7-signature"; > micalg=sha1; boundary=------------ms080308040504070708000801 > > "x-pkcs7-signature" refers to Thawte's certificates "pkcs7" > > I have imported your certificate in my Keychain Access. > > I have verified your signature with another mail application, Apple's > Mail, that reports your message as signed, and displays correctly the > details of your certificate. > > Charly > > Thanks! I have set the "Always sign msgs" option in Thunderbird with the THAWTE certificate So, if I now sign also with GPG, it will be double-signed.... right? I don't know if its useful or not... It must be something like signing the letter and the envelope... At least... is it compatible, both in technical and philosophical aspects?. :-? ___ ramon -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJIGuY5AAoJEMVZKsuAx9ZHSZEIAIxXnHttIHWGscUC1zZH1Hwf OE6SMJaqkiACXNzo7wb96b7LlES3DZpoEjG/QxHqaX3tewjgRM4COQP1b41mptZc 9mF4I0yl3ueMuOWrrnKWkZR+9nQ0ait1o6/imD1uetxl/RIYIDDo9xrNLN3duq2x RDWE8jDirf4bn+OUrMTmtL0lBMCs3DhCeP5mQVHnJDoXwTcgPEDYGmnJGP/FXSyA eysv3HaVQCRV+8aZt5UZr2kYO4D0vQ9cbgnUioNR53v3Zxc1wLZFQX4WKuXvFg4Q aB/Lx0gZKR44zfetJrBhtwExVFzgOBxAZ8JGtDv1pL0Sj8kQFOQbmWLXQJIfPA8= =VKdC -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: smime.p7s Type: application/x-pkcs7-signature Size: 2864 bytes Desc: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature URL: From ramon.loureiro at upf.edu Fri May 2 12:55:56 2008 From: ramon.loureiro at upf.edu (Ramon Loureiro) Date: Fri, 02 May 2008 12:55:56 +0200 Subject: filtering signed email with thunderbird Message-ID: <481AF33C.8000105@upf.edu> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Hi! Is it possible to make a thunderbird filter that save my signed msgs in some folder? What in the email header must the filter check to see it has a (valid) signature? Or must it look for "BEGIN PGP..." strings into the body of the msg? Cheers!!! ___ ramon -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJIGvM2AAoJEMVZKsuAx9ZH1wgH/21dPf9YQYerMXFgIWzt5BRL ZQdndIvE3KCmvmEvD+AZJiP9e5VD6IZhBs824OOzV9mnMpoogmfGWDxJ1PDrONj/ jXLOQUVb5jNzcQ9XQbHKmIb7+SA/HuKVxyFLGkg7jxBwEjU1MfITiPKnJtu3tHST wH/4WgrkyhAsGeqOTD2Lb42otLfTLCVYYCxMWrgstrlnBJEd/08qMUpgpeZrGVPN r6J7NJGVIwc2Bd/3j8kh5ElCrQSfqoMzBcyKZECBD+Pu6jFJUcxIYlRwzpscgzAu U5i+KgBBzlS/B7k5F+kAE/DGbc1n8XbYSnah9G6oV3cbHPeZArN1U7zqu85UHEo= =lkWe -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: smime.p7s Type: application/x-pkcs7-signature Size: 1975 bytes Desc: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature URL: From email at sven-radde.de Fri May 2 13:20:01 2008 From: email at sven-radde.de (Sven Radde) Date: Fri, 02 May 2008 13:20:01 +0200 Subject: filtering signed email with thunderbird In-Reply-To: <481AF33C.8000105@upf.edu> References: <481AF33C.8000105@upf.edu> Message-ID: <1209727201.6339.12.camel@carbon> Hi! Am Freitag, den 02.05.2008, 12:55 +0200 schrieb Ramon Loureiro: > Is it possible to make a thunderbird filter that save my signed msgs > in > some folder? I don't think it's trivially possible (i.e. without coding something yourself), but I think it would be a great feature to add (to Enigmail?). > What in the email header must the filter check to see it has a (valid) > signature? The signature is not just some "valid" flag inserted into the email headers. Your mail client will perform a calculation on the email's body whenever you open it and then decide whether the mail was modified since it was signed. > Or must it look for "BEGIN PGP..." strings into the body of the msg? You can do that, but that filter would apply to every PGP-signed/-encrypted message, no matter whether the signature is valid or not. However, AFAIK you won't get anything that uses PGP/MIME with that filter. You would have to check for the corresponding Content-Type header for these messages. cu, Sven From mwood at IUPUI.Edu Fri May 2 17:54:20 2008 From: mwood at IUPUI.Edu (Mark H. Wood) Date: Fri, 2 May 2008 11:54:20 -0400 Subject: filtering signed email with thunderbird In-Reply-To: <1209727201.6339.12.camel@carbon> References: <481AF33C.8000105@upf.edu> <1209727201.6339.12.camel@carbon> Message-ID: <20080502155420.GB13444@IUPUI.Edu> Better to ask on a Thunderbird list. I think that the best way to tackle this problem will be independent of GnuPG and specific email formats. Thunderbird "knows" quite a lot about a message by the time it is ready to present it, and it is not unreasonable to ask that all of this knowledge be made available to filters. So rather than constructing elaborate match expressions for, what is it? three very different ways of signing mail, I'd suggest finding a way to just ask the guts of Thunderbird whether a message was signed, whether the signature was verified, what public key matched, and anything else your filter needs to make a good decision. If Thunderbird doesn't provide that kind of information to filters then it sounds like a nice subject for an extension. (Sorry, I only use Thunderbird when mutt isn't readily available, and never very elaborately, so I can't be more specific about it.) -- Mark H. Wood, Lead System Programmer mwood at IUPUI.Edu Typically when a software vendor says that a product is "intuitive" he means the exact opposite. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 197 bytes Desc: not available URL: From patrick at mozilla-enigmail.org Fri May 2 19:59:39 2008 From: patrick at mozilla-enigmail.org (Patrick Brunschwig) Date: Fri, 02 May 2008 19:59:39 +0200 Subject: filtering signed email with thunderbird In-Reply-To: <481AF33C.8000105__24121.5692287826$1209725927$gmane$org@upf.edu> References: <481AF33C.8000105__24121.5692287826$1209725927$gmane$org@upf.edu> Message-ID: -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Ramon Loureiro wrote: > Hi! > > Is it possible to make a thunderbird filter that save my signed msgs in > some folder? > What in the email header must the filter check to see it has a (valid) > signature? > Or must it look for "BEGIN PGP..." strings into the body of the msg? Not really. Unfortunately Thunderbird doesn't allow to easily extend message filter for such purposes, that's why there is no such feature in Enigmail. - -Patrick -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.9 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQEVAwUBSBtWiXcOpHodsOiwAQKX1wf+O+mbdUNhE3qJ08bDr5K2A1hvz3dwM6k2 rn5EUNAuMOt0bQictRi2tB8XojktFnzngzNvDPbwBI2XglyV5WAQOkMqwK+3MTxI pxHJlsJPnJPNOEcXhwyVNlFWDRVFp/J/LdmGbW0ov2wF56bhsMsDGpeoMldLmiYW zjHk+TZ+TP0kC/X8z57jYXYp3TrDXI2oriXSxioIjtNHTW2B+UKNrAwaVEBgteHo 1NYu2GF/4FjQDwHdVaI3TA+JyG+Jp4PTEMUYrfTb6ZlbZgMOnpwcgr7fQd1AMjE4 o5aq2tqOa29QXTtR4pHCgESI0fCedBD2e0czuRbXiIUi6j61O6b+dw== =z9iv -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From bill.royds at Royds.net Fri May 2 23:55:17 2008 From: bill.royds at Royds.net (Bill Royds) Date: Fri, 2 May 2008 17:55:17 -0400 Subject: playing with cryptography... In-Reply-To: <481AD5DD.4020308@upf.edu> References: <481AC854.8060507@upf.edu> <481AD087.3020908@mac.com> <481AD5DD.4020308@upf.edu> Message-ID: On 2-May-08, at 04:50 , Ramon Loureiro wrote: > Great! > I think I've got it! > (This msg should be MIME-signed with a Thawte certificationx) Yes, it was signed, by the Thawte issued signature. Basically a PKI-509 type signing is a tree of trust relationship, where the root of the tree is a set of certificate issuers that your browser or email program trusts whether you do or not. These then issue certificates to others who can issue certificates to more people etc. It is simpler because you leave the issue of who do you trust up to Microsoft or Mozilla or Apple. FOr example, your certificate was issued by Thawte whose certificate was embedded in the Apple Mail program that I use. So trusting your certificate means that I trust Apple (for embedding Thawte) and Thawte (who issued your certificate). The signature verifies that the sender is who he/she claims but does not verify that the contents of the message have not been altered. The PGP (GPG) model is that one only trusts certificate that come from someone you already trust or from someone that is trusted by someone who you trust etc. There is no implicit trust so it takes more effort to get that trust. It also verifies that the message has not been altered as well as providing a signing for the sending. I think the GPG model is more secure, but the other model is more profitable for the issuers. That is why it is implemented in browsers and email readers. P.S. Your Thawte certificate reads Signed (ramon.loureiro at upf.edu) Bill Royds From jmoore3rd at bellsouth.net Sat May 3 01:22:39 2008 From: jmoore3rd at bellsouth.net (John W. Moore III) Date: Fri, 02 May 2008 19:22:39 -0400 Subject: playing with cryptography... In-Reply-To: References: <481AC854.8060507@upf.edu> <481AD087.3020908@mac.com> <481AD5DD.4020308@upf.edu> Message-ID: <481BA23F.10700@bellsouth.net> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Bill Royds wrote: > Your Thawte certificate reads Signed (ramon.loureiro at upf.edu) This also doesn't mean that You really are Ramon Loureiro, since the Certificate doesn't carry Your _Name_ indicating that Other People have eyeballed You + Government Issued Documentation affirming that You actually are who You say You are. To accomplish this You will need to accomplish several Face-to-Face meetings with other Thawte Assurers who 'vouch' [by granting points through Thawte] that they have confirmed Your Identity. I only know that I have an x.509 Key that may be used to Send an S/MIME Encrypted to the Email Address on the Certificate. :( Basically, I still have to 'trust' You at face value. All that is certain is that Thawte has confirmed Somebody controls this particular email Address. :-\ JOHN ;) Timestamp: Friday 02 May 2008, 19:22 --400 (Eastern Daylight Time) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.5.0-svn4754: (MingW32) Comment: Public Key at: http://tinyurl.com/8cpho Comment: Gossamer Spider Web of Trust: https://www.gswot.org Comment: Homepage: http://tinyurl.com/yzhbhx iQEcBAEBCgAGBQJIG6I9AAoJEBCGy9eAtCsPv2sH/R6IHq5as61XtPvDlEwmcICJ OcaPqJhIFLUWJhFBm1j9IRL95uihDEBBpNXo2jOv60L4VfyZgkI3GkyeZr27XB9C 1DaZZJ2flsL5r3392GHf97reu0dPgGO2H1rZFyVyjl/A4PuWyz0HGaCwN0NSnTsG Civ6g13GLvogR536ufqjbGCsFl2EcU7LNLUcec0zZYWVDYPVPajaRr6p002oOvHo /EM3+lXlXZX0Xz+wyoYN2cJ7NXZGOmqJ3ZBrbdrCjGSj2l5EHY4PCyRLTmCf0P3X Hl69QosliIuYUBPGvaEkRMqJH0R7hxxUifA8An9qVq/aESWji6GSdguX2sv21ts= =1XK+ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: smime.p7s Type: application/x-pkcs7-signature Size: 5012 bytes Desc: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature URL: From mwood at IUPUI.Edu Sat May 3 02:42:53 2008 From: mwood at IUPUI.Edu (Mark H. Wood) Date: Fri, 2 May 2008 20:42:53 -0400 Subject: playing with cryptography... In-Reply-To: References: <481AC854.8060507@upf.edu> <481AD087.3020908@mac.com> <481AD5DD.4020308@upf.edu> Message-ID: <20080503004253.GA30016@IUPUI.Edu> On Fri, May 02, 2008 at 05:55:17PM -0400, Bill Royds wrote: > Basically a PKI-509 type signing is a tree of trust relationship, where the > root of the tree is a set of certificate issuers that your browser or email > program trusts whether you do or not. These then issue certificates to "whether you do or not" is not strictly correct, I think. It sure looks to me like I could delete some or all of the root certificates that my browser came with, and then keys from certificates which chain back to those removed roots would no longer be implicitly trusted. I've never yet heard of anyone who *did* that, mind you, so in practice the system seems to work as you say. But I don't see why it has to. -- Mark H. Wood, Lead System Programmer mwood at IUPUI.Edu Typically when a software vendor says that a product is "intuitive" he means the exact opposite. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 197 bytes Desc: not available URL: From jmoore3rd at bellsouth.net Sat May 3 05:25:30 2008 From: jmoore3rd at bellsouth.net (John W. Moore III) Date: Fri, 02 May 2008 23:25:30 -0400 Subject: playing with cryptography... In-Reply-To: <20080503004253.GA30016@IUPUI.Edu> References: <481AC854.8060507@upf.edu> <481AD087.3020908@mac.com> <481AD5DD.4020308@upf.edu> <20080503004253.GA30016@IUPUI.Edu> Message-ID: <481BDB2A.80007@bellsouth.net> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Mark H. Wood wrote: > "whether you do or not" is not strictly correct, I think. It sure > looks to me like I could delete some or all of the root certificates > that my browser came with, and then keys from certificates which chain > back to those removed roots would no longer be implicitly trusted. You can also 'Edit' the Trust for any Root Certificate and even decide just what uses You choose to 'Trust' it for. [Software, Messaging, etc.] At least this capability is available within the Firefox Certificate Manager. JOHN ;) Timestamp: Friday 02 May 2008, 23:24 --400 (Eastern Daylight Time) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.5.0-svn4754: (MingW32) Comment: Public Key at: http://tinyurl.com/8cpho Comment: Gossamer Spider Web of Trust: https://www.gswot.org Comment: Homepage: http://tinyurl.com/yzhbhx iQEcBAEBCgAGBQJIG9smAAoJEBCGy9eAtCsPf8IH/RyyqKwiVpayZtWIspFa33qh 0boA6VsY3UOAZUjsvKdr7kxUw7xt1+DwctQenEE+2Sz+I+dMGh/VUE3GXCnUvSG5 W1pEayIs1v1cQEriyoVh4GhS5LjcoytgkB0/Gd+u5SZbcMYvi0e2V+Cll69sk8mn BdaGCoFB7ylnTXBkJM6UyL39oh7t8uRU7PJkl+d38d/UMH4BfiuFYMjN856RiNvi MhDJAy4tLz7y9fOKcJCUBEWI90cqIi+jGWALaYnu2UD2dVf9pQ+nfZi/YxmDaqJk qeTWR71UkeNHN39gkzFr3u4bT1kD5FmC6g1ypanTvqT3Wq3sYoNOVGkgBMuoCo0= =CJJs -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From wk at gnupg.org Sat May 3 09:34:02 2008 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Sat, 03 May 2008 09:34:02 +0200 Subject: playing with cryptography... In-Reply-To: (Bill Royds's message of "Fri, 2 May 2008 17:55:17 -0400") References: <481AC854.8060507@upf.edu> <481AD087.3020908@mac.com> <481AD5DD.4020308@upf.edu> Message-ID: <87od7nn8np.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> On Fri, 2 May 2008 23:55, bill.royds at Royds.net said: > The PGP (GPG) model is that one only trusts certificate that come > from someone you already trust or from someone that is trusted by > someone who you trust etc. There is no implicit trust so it takes more As usual I have to mention that what you mean is the Web of Trust (WoT) as used by default in PGP and GPG. In contrast to X.509, OpenPGP allows the use of any kind of trust model with its framework. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Auschnahme regelt ein Bundeschgesetz. From CronoCloud at mchsi.com Sat May 3 09:49:38 2008 From: CronoCloud at mchsi.com (Ron Rogers Jr.) Date: Sat, 3 May 2008 02:49:38 -0500 Subject: my signature does not verify! In-Reply-To: <481ADF56.7050202@upf.edu> References: <481AD0E4.5080608@upf.edu> <481AD631.2070909@hammernoch.net> <481ADB79.6040805@upf.edu> <481ADF56.7050202@upf.edu> Message-ID: <20080503024938.05effad0@mchsi.com> On Fri, 02 May 2008 11:31:02 +0200 Ramon Loureiro wrote: > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA1 > > Oh! my God! > That's the neverending story! > > it does not verify once again... If you're going to use PGP/Inline make certain that your mail client uses BASE64 encoding for such messages. That will ensure that the MTA doesn't mess up message, preventing verification. Ron Rogers Jr. (CronoCloud) -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 197 bytes Desc: not available URL: From reynt0 at cs.albany.edu Sat May 3 22:05:49 2008 From: reynt0 at cs.albany.edu (reynt0) Date: Sat, 3 May 2008 16:05:49 -0400 (EDT) Subject: playing with cryptography... In-Reply-To: <481BA23F.10700@bellsouth.net> References: <481AC854.8060507@upf.edu> <481AD087.3020908@mac.com> <481AD5DD.4020308@upf.edu> <481BA23F.10700@bellsouth.net> Message-ID: On 02 May 2008 jmoore3rd at bellsouth.net wrote: . . . > This also doesn't mean that You really are Ramon Loureiro, since the > Certificate doesn't carry Your _Name_ indicating that Other People have > eyeballed You + Government Issued Documentation affirming that You > actually are who You say You are. To accomplish this You will need to . . . > still have to 'trust' You at face value. All that is certain is that > Thawte has confirmed Somebody controls this particular email Address. A few minor, picky points, FWIW: 1. Of course, the trustworthyness of anything claiming to be Government Issued Documentation always has to be evaluated (as do governments, too, I suppose). (Maybe the old village midwife who delivered you and can identify your legendary unique secret birthmark can better identify you as the missing Crown Prince than the present government can ;^} .) 2. Is it "certain" that "Thawte has confirmed", or is it *claimed* that Thawte has confirmed? 3. Of course, Thawte's confirmation process is however trustworthy or not as it may be, which has to be evaluated. From Apple at royds.net Sat May 3 22:39:41 2008 From: Apple at royds.net (Bill Royds) Date: Sat, 3 May 2008 16:39:41 -0400 Subject: playing with cryptography... In-Reply-To: <87od7nn8np.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> References: <481AC854.8060507@upf.edu> <481AD087.3020908@mac.com> <481AD5DD.4020308@upf.edu> <87od7nn8np.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> Message-ID: <4760B0FB-E235-470E-B3AB-4A78C9E4B812@royds.net> On 3-May-08, at 03:34 , Werner Koch wrote: > > As usual I have to mention that what you mean is the Web of Trust > (WoT) > as used by default in PGP and GPG. In contrast to X.509, OpenPGP > allows > the use of any kind of trust model with its framework. Yes, you are correct. The WoT model was developed by Phil Zimmerman for PGP but OpenPGP has expanded on it. That is one reason that OpenPGP is better than X.509, which forces you to a single trust model, and to trust unknown certifiers. Are you sure that you trust the Government of Taiwan to certify web sites for SSL as Firefox does by default? From jmoore3rd at bellsouth.net Sat May 3 22:43:28 2008 From: jmoore3rd at bellsouth.net (John W. Moore III) Date: Sat, 03 May 2008 16:43:28 -0400 Subject: playing with cryptography... In-Reply-To: References: <481AC854.8060507@upf.edu> <481AD087.3020908@mac.com> <481AD5DD.4020308@upf.edu> <481BA23F.10700@bellsouth.net> Message-ID: <481CCE70.8020901@bellsouth.net> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 reynt0 wrote: > A few minor, picky points, FWIW: > 1. Of course, the trustworthyness of anything claiming > to be Government Issued Documentation always has to be > evaluated (as do governments, too, I suppose). As a General Rule it is hoped that Passports are checked for Identity Authentication by the issuing Authority. I know that when I am 'confirming' the Identity of an Individual I require that I be shown a narrow selection of Documentation. Documents that I am comfortable with the level of difficulty of forgery. This is why it takes presentation of 'Proof of Identity' to several folks to obtain a Named Certificate. > 2. Is it "certain" that "Thawte has confirmed", or is it > *claimed* that Thawte has confirmed? They 'Ping' the Email Address to confirm control of it. > 3. Of course, Thawte's confirmation process is however > trustworthy or not as it may be, which has to be evaluated. Which is why the level of Trust in any Certificate may be Edited by the End User. But all this discussion of x.509 Certificates is somewhat far afield from the purpose of this particular List. If everyone here was comfortable with S/MIME then We wouldn't be using GnuPG. JOHN ;) Timestamp: Saturday 03 May 2008, 16:42 --400 (Eastern Daylight Time) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.5.0-svn4754: (MingW32) Comment: Public Key at: http://tinyurl.com/8cpho Comment: Gossamer Spider Web of Trust: https://www.gswot.org Comment: Homepage: http://tinyurl.com/yzhbhx iQEcBAEBCgAGBQJIHM5vAAoJEBCGy9eAtCsPiGcH/0+XzHbEewvbylYIgskt5Pj0 V3lfydQjUXAn8INkGz6B+L8WXeN9FlkqHuSGAJs+PKYLfVnz8YQoXRojHfsdOp8F V5Lo78rYe2wNkWZXouW2RutSd9SN0JTmZoWgj+zc17Y7xNsMozm0w4jxFlF7YnOC q/vdn79hYe6blZGmf3G+QXPB+hs3IGsdjxv2qHP03pVXapVzNEz4R/47TFvVQbF5 KB3vS2tuIPhwo3/eK709ioqrCd5I3K1MjeTSXUj5cku71qAXuEKwVBimFs+0yAYF IvyIwXjRkkeIu6afXRCNO88Y/IirXao58F+sX9d8NUr29JTHVVKPKJf7aYIBLXo= =eXt8 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From suluhit at gmail.com Sun May 4 00:51:53 2008 From: suluhit at gmail.com (Su Lu) Date: Sat, 3 May 2008 17:51:53 -0500 Subject: Question about GnuPG Smartcard Message-ID: <481cec8c.0261220a.305d.ffff8470@mx.google.com> Hello All, I am currently working on GnuPG Smartcard, and I am wondering whether it is allowed for a GnuPG Smartcard to store multiple 1024/2048 bit RSA keys. Thanks a lot! Best regards, Su Lu suluhit at gmail.com 2008-05-03 From suluhit at gmail.com Sat May 3 23:58:04 2008 From: suluhit at gmail.com (Su Lu) Date: Sat, 3 May 2008 16:58:04 -0500 Subject: Question about GnuPG Smartcard Message-ID: <481cdfee.2cf0220a.72fd.6185@mx.google.com> Hello All, I am currently working on GnuPG Smartcard, and I am wondering whether it is allowed for a GnuPG Smartcard to store multiple 1024/2048 bit RSA keys. Thanks a lot! Best regards, Su Lu suluhit at gmail.com 2008-05-03 From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Sun May 4 04:00:29 2008 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Sat, 3 May 2008 22:00:29 -0400 Subject: Question about GnuPG Smartcard In-Reply-To: <481cdfee.2cf0220a.72fd.6185@mx.google.com> References: <481cdfee.2cf0220a.72fd.6185@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <4F0B6A06-3155-4887-A9B3-B16FA7ED769D@jabberwocky.com> On May 3, 2008, at 5:58 PM, Su Lu wrote: > Hello All, > > I am currently working on GnuPG Smartcard, and I am wondering > whether it is allowed for a GnuPG Smartcard to store multiple > 1024/2048 bit RSA keys. Thanks a lot! The smartcard can store 3 1024-bit RSA keys. It cannot store a 2048- bit key. David From alon.barlev at gmail.com Sun May 4 07:00:18 2008 From: alon.barlev at gmail.com (Alon Bar-Lev) Date: Sun, 4 May 2008 08:00:18 +0300 Subject: Question about GnuPG Smartcard In-Reply-To: <481cdfee.2cf0220a.72fd.6185@mx.google.com> References: <481cdfee.2cf0220a.72fd.6185@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <9e0cf0bf0805032200p738bce3bh9ab4b1081d5d5f56@mail.gmail.com> Hello, You can check out gnupg-pkcs11-scd [1], it does allow more keys (1024/2048) for gpgsm and 2048 key for gpg. Alon. [1] http://gnupg-pkcs11.sourceforge.net On 5/4/08, Su Lu wrote: > Hello All, > > I am currently working on GnuPG Smartcard, and I am wondering whether it is allowed for a GnuPG Smartcard to store multiple 1024/2048 bit RSA keys. Thanks a lot! > > Best regards, > > Su Lu > suluhit at gmail.com > 2008-05-03 > > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users > From jquinn at cs.oberlin.edu Sun May 4 20:40:48 2008 From: jquinn at cs.oberlin.edu (Jameson "Chema" Quinn) Date: Sun, 4 May 2008 12:40:48 -0600 Subject: RFC4880 format without using keyrings? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: I am programming in python (Sugar/OLPC) and would like to take a private key (-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY-----... in a file) and a file and output a signature of that file using that key, in valid RFC4880 format (including extra signed data). Later, I'd like to check that same signature using the public key - again, just a file, starting with ssh-dss. Is there any way to do this with GPG - that is, to use gpg for signing, without having any keyrings or any "identity", just some keys as generated for ssh? If so, how? If not, can anybody recommend a python module that outputs RFC4880 format, or comment on whether this one can be trusted for security? Jameson -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From wk at gnupg.org Mon May 5 08:45:18 2008 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Mon, 05 May 2008 08:45:18 +0200 Subject: Question about GnuPG Smartcard In-Reply-To: <4F0B6A06-3155-4887-A9B3-B16FA7ED769D@jabberwocky.com> (David Shaw's message of "Sat, 3 May 2008 22:00:29 -0400") References: <481cdfee.2cf0220a.72fd.6185@mx.google.com> <4F0B6A06-3155-4887-A9B3-B16FA7ED769D@jabberwocky.com> Message-ID: <87od7ll05d.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> On Sun, 4 May 2008 04:00, dshaw at jabberwocky.com said: > The smartcard can store 3 1024-bit RSA keys. It cannot store a 2048- > bit key. That depends on the actual card. GnuPG implements a specification and allows all key sizes. There are some restrictions due to the limited size of an APDU. The forthcoming revision of the spec will declare how to work with keyr requiring longer APDUs. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Auschnahme regelt ein Bundeschgesetz. From mkinni at calpoly.edu Mon May 5 09:18:19 2008 From: mkinni at calpoly.edu (Matt Kinni) Date: Mon, 05 May 2008 00:18:19 -0700 Subject: how long should a password be? Message-ID: <481EB4BB.8030209@calpoly.edu> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Everyone says it should be as long as possible, but there comes a point where it's just impossible to remember anything longer than 20 characters. What do you think? -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJIHrS5AAoJELlJAlPUfypQZ+YIALg0rP9o8TmF426DqWq3NZpD rxbaGmv0cqRS9x9puU3sYTcNnRtoau8LeLh8NvyxskMBXyZbdcFUDTJCybCuAImf 1DCCjIF8ifz3QiTVQy5UIyGS9yRjdrtcTa31QPYGrqr4e7cl6/LDqsJPlpoJV4b4 MH1R9RETuaPBVmqFFS0Rysox3NAmt4z+a5Q4qRtPoPT/cRU48SsX378YvtWrko/j Tt3V+KifWYjt/ASBS8B7z15gA7JLOoQxqu4deAOmFaqYPG/B3JZ3jWqFwXMcI20e 3vf2a97b+Ad7LAXLeCQyyT3z/HSUbMUeBKAGCNgaYxKp/JAJLXa1LeDIXQyyT7E= =V6UQ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From noiano at x-privat.org Mon May 5 09:40:03 2008 From: noiano at x-privat.org (Noiano) Date: Mon, 05 May 2008 09:40:03 +0200 Subject: how long should a password be? In-Reply-To: <481EB4BB.8030209__28471.0334883586$1209972138$gmane$org@calpoly.edu> References: <481EB4BB.8030209__28471.0334883586$1209972138$gmane$org@calpoly.edu> Message-ID: -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Matt Kinni wrote: > Everyone says it should be as long as possible, but there comes a point > where it's just impossible to remember anything longer than 20 > characters. What do you think? Well IMHO you should merge together some significant (just for you!) events, hard to forget, and turn them into a password. It should be - - longer >= 25 IMHO - - nonsense in any language to avoid dictionary attack - - contain special character such as !?$?()... Noiano -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.6 (GNU/Linux) iE8DBQFIHrnS+JjGoasQ6NIRCC4yAOCKodHXmpyqfcMl6+jhu5a3ZdzsNnesFfhL pVrPAOCAp6SMeXSFBGduthirWlahq8JIzKkRXWyihnYP =oJln -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From email at sven-radde.de Mon May 5 10:05:07 2008 From: email at sven-radde.de (Sven Radde) Date: Mon, 05 May 2008 10:05:07 +0200 Subject: how long should a password be? In-Reply-To: <481EB4BB.8030209@calpoly.edu> References: <481EB4BB.8030209@calpoly.edu> Message-ID: <481EBFB3.4070107@sven-radde.de> Hi! Matt Kinni schrieb: > Everyone says it should be as long as possible (...) What do you think? You might find this interesting read: Also keep in mind that in order to attack your password, an attacker would first have to access your secret keyring (unless you use GnuPg for symmetric encryption). As to what I think personally, around 15 pretty random characters would be quite enough for my threat model. I don't expect the NSA to throw all their supercomputers at cracking my passphrase, though ;-) HTH, Sven From faramir.cl at gmail.com Mon May 5 10:08:02 2008 From: faramir.cl at gmail.com (Faramir) Date: Mon, 05 May 2008 04:08:02 -0400 Subject: how long should a password be? In-Reply-To: References: <481EB4BB.8030209__28471.0334883586$1209972138$gmane$org@calpoly.edu> Message-ID: <481EC062.605@gmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 > Noiano escribi?: > Matt Kinni wrote: > > Everyone says it should be as long as possible, but there comes a point > > where it's just impossible to remember anything longer than 20 > > characters. What do you think? > > ..... > - longer >= 25 IMHO > - nonsense in any language to avoid dictionary attack > - contain special character such as !?$?()... > That brings another related question: is there any character unsuported by GnuPG? I ask this because once I was using an application, and I tried to use "special" characters in the password, but the app rejected the users saying "wrong password", so I had to use just normal characters. Is there a chance that problem can happen with GnuPG? -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJIHsBhAAoJEIISGkVDGUEOCZEIAKwZ9xTG3FzBiQRtzqi/5hhv 6TZHJC08yXZBVVYMUynJvIp+/hmfkHaL71xqynipCgvNBVxmzWiSp3umFPEdrdyl HrPUA0B5Xps4RWkbEXjqgq8bKtWVPL859n0x/xdTL/QQNRvLDQiWikvG3hpknp/4 gd3y/XONt+QHoThnnmxezOdLlahtYFgLGEW20uIcHkdMkFBhNGMISD2slnU/tTO3 UmxZ9W3Kdo0WWSH9wIij5F+qHOqOVUMunQUyccpc66+g25QW6DUjWpZfWuukj9gJ p/5ptueNwVggqefbAYL+Sa612o0wLQ7rcl4tf6BSWqmDoRb8jmPcLO3bIia4UJs= =gOM8 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From wolf.canis at googlemail.com Mon May 5 10:34:44 2008 From: wolf.canis at googlemail.com (Wolf Canis) Date: Mon, 05 May 2008 10:34:44 +0200 Subject: how long should a password be? In-Reply-To: <481EBFB3.4070107@sven-radde.de> References: <481EB4BB.8030209@calpoly.edu> <481EBFB3.4070107@sven-radde.de> Message-ID: <481EC6A4.9010803@googlemail.com> Sven Radde wrote: > Hi! > > Matt Kinni schrieb: >> Everyone says it should be as long as possible (...) What do you think? > You might find this interesting read: > Interesting article, thanks for the link. :-) > > Also keep in mind that in order to attack your password, an attacker > would first have to access your secret keyring (unless you use GnuPg > for symmetric encryption). > > As to what I think personally, around 15 pretty random characters > would be quite enough for my threat model. I don't expect the NSA to > throw all their supercomputers at cracking my passphrase, though ;-) Don't you think that 8 characters is enough, especially in reference of the article mentioned above? I think one really important factor is that one haven't only one password. The ideal would be for every account a different password. For that to archive, IMHO, you need a system, which would give you the ability to remember those passwords. W. Canis -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 260 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Mon May 5 10:36:16 2008 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Mon, 05 May 2008 03:36:16 -0500 Subject: how long should a password be? In-Reply-To: <481EB4BB.8030209@calpoly.edu> References: <481EB4BB.8030209@calpoly.edu> Message-ID: <481EC700.80305@sixdemonbag.org> Matt Kinni wrote: > Everyone says it should be as long as possible Not at all. At some point the passphrase becomes stronger than the symmetric encryption algorithm. Then it's time to stop. > where it's just impossible to remember anything longer than 20 > characters. What do you think? I think if you can't remember a phrase longer than 20 characters, you should seek immediate psychiatric help. :) Throwing out just a few memorable phrases, all substantially long than 20 characters: * They gave me a medal for dreaming of you. (Leonard Cohen, _Book of Longing_) * Beware the fury of a patient man. (John Dryden, _Absalom and Achitophel_) * The worst are filled with passionate intensity. (William Butler Yeats, _The Second Coming_) * listen: there's a hell of a good universe next door; let's go (e.e. cummings, _pity this busy monster, manunkind_) * Come with me, ladies and gentlemen who are in any wise weary of London: come with me: and those that tire at all of the world we know: for we have new worlds here. (Lord Dunsany, _Prelude to the Book of Wonder_) * Vor allem: pflanze mich nicht in dein Herz. Ich w?chse zu schnell. (Rainer Maria Rilke, _Sonnets to Orpheus_ 16.) As these examples will hopefully show you, there's no shortage of magnificent, easy-to-remember passphrases. ... and why, yes, I _do_ have a liberal-arts degree. Would you like fries with that? :) From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Mon May 5 10:42:19 2008 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Mon, 05 May 2008 03:42:19 -0500 Subject: how long should a password be? In-Reply-To: <481EC062.605@gmail.com> References: <481EB4BB.8030209__28471.0334883586$1209972138$gmane$org@calpoly.edu> <481EC062.605@gmail.com> Message-ID: <481EC86B.4050705@sixdemonbag.org> Faramir wrote: > That brings another related question: is there any character > unsuported by GnuPG? I ask this because once I was using an application, > and I tried to use "special" characters in the password, but the app > rejected the users saying "wrong password", so I had to use just normal > characters. Is there a chance that problem can happen with GnuPG? This is a good question, but unfortunately there's a lot more to it than that. As far as GnuPG goes, you aren't entering characters at all. You're just entering bytes of data which it processes to create a symmetric key. GnuPG can probably accommodate pretty much any character set, as long as it's not _totally_ ridiculous. However, if you're using a front-end (GPGshell, WinPT, Enigmail, etc.), then you might want to ask about what character set the front-end is using. If the front-end is using a Cyrillic character set but your console is using Latin-1, it is possible that things could get a bit messed up as the two applications talk to each other. You might think you're entering the letter R, but is that a Cyrillic or a Latin R? The two don't encode the same way. Moral of the story: character sets aren't a problem, but making sure everything is speaking the charset can be a problem. From wolf.canis at googlemail.com Mon May 5 09:55:06 2008 From: wolf.canis at googlemail.com (Wolf Canis) Date: Mon, 05 May 2008 09:55:06 +0200 Subject: how long should a password be? In-Reply-To: <481EB4BB.8030209@calpoly.edu> References: <481EB4BB.8030209@calpoly.edu> Message-ID: <481EBD5A.1030601@googlemail.com> Matt Kinni wrote: > Everyone says it should be as long as possible, but there comes a point > where it's just impossible to remember anything longer than 20 > characters. What do you think? Hello, I would say a password should be between 8 - 12 characters long. But that isn't that important. Eight characters is long enough if you apply these rules: a) All characters alowed - a-z , A-Z, 0-9, all special characters b) Have a system : For example: Take a sentence as basis for your passphrase: Sentence (Clue): This is my 1st sentence as basis for very long passphrase! The resulting passphrase could be: Tim1ssabfvlp! OR hsysesaoeoa! OR !Tpilmv1fsba and so on You get it? There are infinite possibilities. That's the trick. Not the length of a password is decisive but the quality. The quality of your password decides how much effort is necessary to hack it. Hope that helps. W. Canis -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 260 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From andy.mcknight at gmail.com Mon May 5 10:15:51 2008 From: andy.mcknight at gmail.com (Andy McKnight) Date: Mon, 5 May 2008 09:15:51 +0100 Subject: GPG 1.4.9 false verification Message-ID: Hi Guys, I'm new to GPG so I'm not sure if this is a problem or if it's by design but it's possible to modify a clearsigned message/document and still have it verify. When I sign a document GPG adds the two header lines "-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----" and "Hash: SHA1" followed by a blank line. I can add any text I wish into the blank line without affecting the verification of the signature. Changing anything else breaks verification. Is this behaviour by design? Are GPG users supposed to be aware that this line is untrusted? Andy. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From harakiri_23 at yahoo.com Mon May 5 11:27:43 2008 From: harakiri_23 at yahoo.com (Harakiri) Date: Mon, 5 May 2008 02:27:43 -0700 (PDT) Subject: [REPOST] LDAP Basic Auth not working for key search, keyserver-options ignored! Message-ID: <747136.54469.qm@web52210.mail.re2.yahoo.com> Hello, following the example here : http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/2006-February/028058.html i used the binddn and bindpw option to do a simple auth against an ldap server gpg.exe --keyserver ldap://localhost --keyserver-options "binddn=\"uid=someuser\"" --keyserver-options bindpw=somepw --keyserver-options verbose --search-keys somemail However - neither binddn nor bindpw is passed to the ldap server - my LDAP Server is disabled for anonymous bind so gpg returns an error about insufficant access rights - i debugged the ldap server and gpg never calls a bind/lookup with the credentials just : Search Request Base Object : 'cn=pgpServerInfo' Scope : base object Deref Aliases : never Deref Aliases Size Limit : no limit Time Limit : no limit Types Only : false Filter : '(objectClass=*)' Attributes : pgpBaseKeySpaceDN, software, version What is wrong? LDAP Server Basic Auth is working fine for other clients like outlook, thunderbird etc when searching for x509 from the same server Im using gnupg 1.49 Thanks ____________________________________________________________________________________ Be a better friend, newshound, and know-it-all with Yahoo! Mobile. Try it now. http://mobile.yahoo.com/;_ylt=Ahu06i62sR8HDtDypao8Wcj9tAcJ From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Mon May 5 11:44:32 2008 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Mon, 05 May 2008 04:44:32 -0500 Subject: GPG 1.4.9 false verification In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <481ED700.5060601@sixdemonbag.org> Andy McKnight wrote: > Is this behaviour by design? Are GPG users supposed to be aware that > this line is untrusted? The behavior is specified by RFC4880 and is not a security risk. As an example, I have a small CSS file here that I have clearsigned. The opening looks like: *-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Hello, World! /************************************************************************* Enigmail New Site - Main CSS (for SCREEN display on recent browsers) (I've added an asterisk to the beginning of the -----BEGIN block, to prevent mail clients from misreading it as a real OpenPGP stanza.) Now I try to verify it with: job:~ rjh$ gpg main.css.asc gpg: invalid armor header: Hello, World!\n File `main.css' exists. Overwrite? (y/N) y gpg: Signature made Mon May 5 04:38:51 2008 CDT using RSA key ID FEAF8109 gpg: Good signature from "Robert J. Hansen " gpg: aka "Robert J. Hansen" Looking at the top of main.css, what I see is: /************************************************************************* Enigmail New Site - Main CSS (for SCREEN display on recent browsers) ... The injected text is stripped. It is never presented to the user as verified text. If a mail client presents the original message, rather than the message as GnuPG has verified it, then that is a major HCI issue. I would suggest filing a bug with the maintainer of your mail client. From andy.mcknight at gmail.com Mon May 5 12:03:53 2008 From: andy.mcknight at gmail.com (Andy McKnight) Date: Mon, 5 May 2008 11:03:53 +0100 Subject: GPG 1.4.9 false verification In-Reply-To: <481ED700.5060601@sixdemonbag.org> References: <481ED700.5060601@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: > > The behavior is specified by RFC4880 and is not a security risk. > > Hi, I was testing this with the --verify switch only so I didn't see the final output with the stripped headers. Thanks for clearing this up. Your point regarding my mail client was interesting though. I use the web interface of Gmail with the firegpg plugin. I thought I'd look at this in a bit more detail. Sending the below message to me verifies as good through firegpg. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 This is some tested verification text. - -- key id: 0x6A8BAF97 fingerprint: 0AF9 F0A4 52D2 9775 F996 2027 41AD C31B 6A8B AF97 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) Comment: http://getfiregpg.org iEYEARECAAYFAkge2nUACgkQQa3DG2qLr5f0XwCfaZFqPy/Mx5IcydFkHX2Ytr0k MCMAoIGuwXlUuQo8ZQfBGA/pyXmCPphy =/gr1 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- I then used the same message but modified the last header line after signing but before sending. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Hi, this is my modified line. This is some tested verification text. - -- key id: 0x6A8BAF97 fingerprint: 0AF9 F0A4 52D2 9775 F996 2027 41AD C31B 6A8B AF97 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) Comment: http://getfiregpg.org iEYEARECAAYFAkge2nUACgkQQa3DG2qLr5f0XwCfaZFqPy/Mx5IcydFkHX2Ytr0k MCMAoIGuwXlUuQo8ZQfBGA/pyXmCPphy =/gr1 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- This also verifies good through firegpg with no message regarding an incorrect header. I'd guess as nothing is stripped and no header warning is given this may be more of an issue? Andy. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From ramon.loureiro at upf.edu Mon May 5 12:14:18 2008 From: ramon.loureiro at upf.edu (Ramon Loureiro) Date: Mon, 05 May 2008 12:14:18 +0200 Subject: GPG in several computers In-Reply-To: <481832F9.3010004@sixdemonbag.org> References: <48178DC5.1090509@googlemail.com> <4817AF1C.4080909@bellsouth.net> <48182BEA.7040205@upf.edu> <481832F9.3010004@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <481EDDFA.2040401@upf.edu> hi! En/na Robert J. Hansen ha escrit: > Ramon Loureiro wrote: > >> I'm new with GPG and Enigmail. >> I use my email at home and at work, and there in mora than one computer... >> How can I handle my GPG? > > The first question is, "which operating systems do you use?" The > instructions are a little simpler if they're all the same, but you can > do it across different operating systems without much work. > > For instance, on UNIX and OS X, GnuPG keeps its data in a directory > called $HOME/.gnupg. On Windows, it's somewhere else -- it's in one > place on Vista and one on XP. The Windows guys here will undoubtedly > tell you right where you can find it. :) > > Once you know what directory to look in, copy the files pubring.gpg, > secring.gpg and trustdb.gpg from your first machine to the appropriate > directory on the second machine. Also copy the file gpg.conf if it's there. > > Do not copy the file called random_seed. Copying that file can have > very bad effects on the security of the system. > I think I can't import. Attached you can find an image with the screen capture of the error... buffer shorter than subpacket signature packet without keyid signature packet without timestamp Suggestions are welcome... Thanks! ramon -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: error-importing.jpg Type: image/jpeg Size: 25341 bytes Desc: not available URL: From faramir.cl at gmail.com Mon May 5 12:46:40 2008 From: faramir.cl at gmail.com (Faramir) Date: Mon, 05 May 2008 06:46:40 -0400 Subject: How trust works in gpg... In-Reply-To: <20080415174533.GE56745@jabberwocky.com> References: <200804142205.59132.prlewis@letterboxes.org> <48049BFF.nail56411UIHS@mailshack.com> <4804A994.6020508@sven-radde.de> <200804151433.08557.prlewis@letterboxes.org> <20080415174533.GE56745@jabberwocky.com> Message-ID: <481EE590.5000707@gmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 > David Shaw escribi?: > ..... > If someone wants to sign your key, you then end up with: > > KEY + UID + SELFSIG + SIG > > So SELFSIG is you saying "I bind this KEY and UID together", and SIG > is the other person saying "Me too". > > If you add another UID at this point, you have: > > KEY + UID + SELFSIG + SIG + UID + SELFSIG > > Now, note that the other person hasn't made any statement about > whether the second UID is valid. YOU have, but then, it's your key: > you can make any statement you like. It only becomes believable when > someone else adds their "me too". > I was reading again this message, and I'd like to know: is there any point about signing a key _but not giving any trusted status_ ? -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJIHuWQAAoJEIISGkVDGUEOCIoIAJBWdfUWui/BFeXxt0yizeV1 Osz/O/JonZigQnX4vUkoeroPev4YSE59hIqam13ZQ71tpFFqdo+8mJnbF+hhQBq9 9Im6Cuk1TDiXE9mU9xwJ9klW7Ps0sidOk/cfbX2pE91SL/AJpZjZCgjJ6suxjttv 93YnohGtwUp92ScCWAmn4x/kf1yjOb2hGzK1oi52nMyQGFLg5wCjsIafEcO33zKI eD90jIcjcuZEWKleIHW9sMc778HrZ3tnVJEhnFoTKr5KHSuxZ5YoPwAJH2Y4lzbA sDYp52aVN57H/7l/22M6fLj2/CZVkS05gn7ToH4mR0DuJ4PeI5uukc/wnZr19mg= =Yr4Q -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From email at sven-radde.de Mon May 5 13:20:34 2008 From: email at sven-radde.de (Sven Radde) Date: Mon, 05 May 2008 13:20:34 +0200 Subject: How trust works in gpg... In-Reply-To: <481EE590.5000707@gmail.com> References: <200804142205.59132.prlewis@letterboxes.org> <48049BFF.nail56411UIHS@mailshack.com> <4804A994.6020508@sven-radde.de> <200804151433.08557.prlewis@letterboxes.org> <20080415174533.GE56745@jabberwocky.com> <481EE590.5000707@gmail.com> Message-ID: <481EED82.1080200@sven-radde.de> Faramir schrieb: > I was reading again this message, and I'd like to know: is there any > point about signing a key _but not giving any trusted status_ ? Yes. Signing the key makes it valid for you (i.e. you believe that the person indicated in the key's User-IDs is the person who actually has control over the secret key). Assigning trust to a key means that you believe that the person owning the secret key is careful before he/she signs other people's keys (i.e. you consider other keys valid if they are signed by that person without checking the UID yourself). It can very well be the case that you are sure that a key is valid but you do not trust the owner to make this kind of assertion about other keys. Think of a long time friend whose key you have gotten during a personal meeting but about who you know that he doesn't understand the GnuPG trust concept at all. You can obviously sign his key, but you wouldn't trust any signatures on other people's keys by him. HTH, Sven From wolf.canis at googlemail.com Mon May 5 15:02:39 2008 From: wolf.canis at googlemail.com (Wolf Canis) Date: Mon, 05 May 2008 15:02:39 +0200 Subject: how long should a password be? In-Reply-To: <4C71D221-FB02-4D02-947D-ACCC13C9C248@royds.net> References: <481EB4BB.8030209@calpoly.edu> <481EBD5A.1030601@googlemail.com> <4C71D221-FB02-4D02-947D-ACCC13C9C248@royds.net> Message-ID: <481F056F.2080505@googlemail.com> Bill Royds wrote: > > On 5-May-08, at 03:55 , Wolf Canis wrote: > >> There are infinite possibilities. That's the trick. Not the length of a >> password is >> decisive but the quality. The quality of your password decides how much >> effort is necessary to hack it. > > Unfortunately that is not true. Since most systems use a single byte > for each character in a passphrase There are only 2^(8*n) bits in an n > character passphrase. > So there are only 64 bits in an 8 character password, which can be > cracked quite quickly using rainbow tables for any password. That's right, but I think there is a misunderstanding. The quote on which you refers, refers not to the bit depiction but to the possibilities to create _and_ remember passwords and if one wants a 50 character long password - with the method, which I as example described, it's possible. If you can good remember fairy tales, for example, than I would suggest that you use this ability. What I try to say is, that every user have to develop his/her own individual method. > > The real problem is allowing multiple attempts to crack the passphrase > and this only occurs if your secret keyring is available to the cracker. > > Basically, any password you can remember is easy to crack, so don't > let the keyring ever be in a position for someone to try. That's absolutely true and I assumed that the secret keyring is _not_ available to the cracker. If a cracker has the opportunity to conduct multiple, perhaps unlimited, attempts - than nothing is secure. Hopefully I could clarify this. W. Canis -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 260 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Mon May 5 15:06:02 2008 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Mon, 5 May 2008 09:06:02 -0400 Subject: How trust works in gpg... In-Reply-To: <481EE590.5000707@gmail.com> References: <200804142205.59132.prlewis@letterboxes.org> <48049BFF.nail56411UIHS@mailshack.com> <4804A994.6020508@sven-radde.de> <200804151433.08557.prlewis@letterboxes.org> <20080415174533.GE56745@jabberwocky.com> <481EE590.5000707@gmail.com> Message-ID: On May 5, 2008, at 6:46 AM, Faramir wrote: >> David Shaw escribi?: >> ..... >> If someone wants to sign your key, you then end up with: >> >> KEY + UID + SELFSIG + SIG >> >> So SELFSIG is you saying "I bind this KEY and UID together", and SIG >> is the other person saying "Me too". >> >> If you add another UID at this point, you have: >> >> KEY + UID + SELFSIG + SIG + UID + SELFSIG >> >> Now, note that the other person hasn't made any statement about >> whether the second UID is valid. YOU have, but then, it's your key: >> you can make any statement you like. It only becomes believable when >> someone else adds their "me too". >> > I was reading again this message, and I'd like to know: is there any > point about signing a key _but not giving any trusted status_ ? Absolutely. You signing a key means that you believe the key to belong to who it claims to belong to. You are certifying the mapping between person (or auto-signing robot, or...) and the key. Giving trusted status to the key means that you trust that person/robot/etc to sign other keys. You signing a key makes that key "valid" in GPG. You signing a key and assigning trust to it makes other keys *they* sign (potentially) valid. David From apple at royds.net Mon May 5 14:18:01 2008 From: apple at royds.net (Bill Royds) Date: Mon, 5 May 2008 08:18:01 -0400 Subject: how long should a password be? In-Reply-To: <481EBD5A.1030601@googlemail.com> References: <481EB4BB.8030209@calpoly.edu> <481EBD5A.1030601@googlemail.com> Message-ID: <4C71D221-FB02-4D02-947D-ACCC13C9C248@royds.net> On 5-May-08, at 03:55 , Wolf Canis wrote: > There are infinite possibilities. That's the trick. Not the length > of a > password is > decisive but the quality. The quality of your password decides how > much > effort is necessary to hack it. Unfortunately that is not true. Since most systems use a single byte for each character in a passphrase There are only 2^(8*n) bits in an n character passphrase. So there are only 64 bits in an 8 character password, which can be cracked quite quickly using rainbow tables for any password. The real problem is allowing multiple attempts to crack the passphrase and this only occurs if your secret keyring is available to the cracker. Basically, any password you can remember is easy to crack, so don't let the keyring ever be in a position for someone to try. From faramir.cl at gmail.com Mon May 5 15:19:03 2008 From: faramir.cl at gmail.com (Faramir) Date: Mon, 05 May 2008 09:19:03 -0400 Subject: How trust works in gpg... In-Reply-To: <481EED82.1080200@sven-radde.de> References: <200804142205.59132.prlewis@letterboxes.org> <48049BFF.nail56411UIHS@mailshack.com> <4804A994.6020508@sven-radde.de> <200804151433.08557.prlewis@letterboxes.org> <20080415174533.GE56745@jabberwocky.com> <481EE590.5000707@gmail.com> <481EED82.1080200@sven-radde.de> Message-ID: <481F0947.50309@gmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 > Sven Radde escribi?: > Faramir schrieb: >> I was reading again this message, and I'd like to know: is there any >> point about signing a key _but not giving any trusted status_ ? > Yes. > Signing the key makes it valid for you (i.e. you believe that the person indicated in the key's User-IDs is the person who actually has control over the secret key). > Assigning trust to a key means that you believe that the person owning the secret key is careful before he/she signs other people's keys (i.e. you consider other keys valid if they are signed by that person without checking the UID yourself). > > It can very well be the case that you are sure that a key is valid but you do not trust the owner to make this kind of assertion about other keys. > Think of a long time friend whose key you have gotten during a personal meeting but about who you know that he doesn't understand the GnuPG trust concept at all. You can obviously sign his key, but you wouldn't trust any signatures on other people's keys by him. > > HTH, Sven I got the idea now, thanks. But I still have one more question: there are also some levels of how much valid is the key I am signing... or at least, some levels about how carefully I have checked the key is valid, so, what is the requisite for each level? I am using an email address that clearly doesn't show my real name, and my key's User ID also doesn't give any personal detail about me, but somebody can trust it is "me" the one that is writing this message, and also can trust I am not impersonating someone else, so would it be ok if that person sign my key as 100% valid? What I am really asking about, is what is the "standard" way to chose what level to use when signing a key, and if is "normal" to sign the key of other people in this list. Regards -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJIHwlHAAoJEIISGkVDGUEOBxwH/3RcQDhxypVtk6Lfjhc1PGqk rwFxomfqjFTGiyLH3v0DoqUZK9H7ftV/S/eIj6LiLV44W2LsNjQYnwbRitlah4zX WLL9LxjpI56gcOMviCsRU3RKyV0XVvOFq2D7ROax3AEj+2479yrESGF3IQesEIiE Ufiz2yBBM50wrgTsYWq4MMm439kZ7eDmX4f7fhHPoa9yyvohirJKcQ+1fxnA34zS 06zAU93shk54KtzX27BoX72MHT6UfWvLPGcUvPe+hVPtefFj2nHNL2PS+UiSXbZ6 suzYKLUpvIuwlPniQrHxlfkNegzzclLdjtTN1eZub02AKIxg/6DXnfBpLIsg0K0= =tf2h -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From wk at gnupg.org Mon May 5 16:30:41 2008 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Mon, 05 May 2008 16:30:41 +0200 Subject: how long should a password be? In-Reply-To: <4C71D221-FB02-4D02-947D-ACCC13C9C248@royds.net> (Bill Royds's message of "Mon, 5 May 2008 08:18:01 -0400") References: <481EB4BB.8030209@calpoly.edu> <481EBD5A.1030601@googlemail.com> <4C71D221-FB02-4D02-947D-ACCC13C9C248@royds.net> Message-ID: <871w4gj01a.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> On Mon, 5 May 2008 14:18, apple at royds.net said: > So there are only 64 bits in an 8 character password, which can be > cracked quite quickly using rainbow tables for any password. That is unlikely to work because gpg uses a random 64 bit salt as well as extended hashing. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Auschnahme regelt ein Bundeschgesetz. From vedaal at hush.com Mon May 5 17:41:15 2008 From: vedaal at hush.com (vedaal at hush.com) Date: Mon, 05 May 2008 11:41:15 -0400 Subject: how long should a password be? Message-ID: <20080505154115.DAB8111803E@mailserver5.hushmail.com> Robert J. Hansen rjh at sixdemonbag.org wrote on Mon May 5 10:36:16 CEST 2008 : >> Everyone says it should be as long as possible >Not at all. At some point the passphrase becomes stronger than the >symmetric encryption algorithm. Then it's time to stop. so, assuming 95 keyboard possibilities (excluding special characters, but including 'space' as a possibility) [95^19 = (3.77)(10^37)] < [2^128 = (3.40)(10^38)] < [95^20 = (3.58)(10^39)] and [95^38 = (1.42)(10^75)] < [2^256 = (1.15)(10^77)] < [95^39 = (1.35)(10^77)] (approximate estimations, truncating after 2 significant digits) so, for the passphrase to be as secure as a 128 bit block cipher, it needs to have 20 random keyboard characters and for it to be as secure as a 128 bit cipher, it needs to have 39 random keyboard characters i don't know what the correction factor needs to be if someone uses non-random long passphrases of dictionary words, or a string acronym of memorable sentences --btw a nice way to include special characters, is to use equations or programming notation as part of the passphrase example: e=m(c^2) (here we have a unique luxury :-) the equation doesn't have to be *valid*, just *memorable*) in crypto, RSA c = m^e mod n so e=mc2 becomes: e = m [(m^e)^2 mod n] = m [m^2e mod n] = [e = m^(2e+1) mod n] (not being 'picky' about squaring the mod n in the nonsense equation :-)) many similar memorable nonsense equations as well as obfuscated perl one-liners, can be imagined by the geeky mind ;-) vedaal any ads or links below this message are added by hushmail without my endorsement or awareness of the nature of the link -- What a capital idea! Click now for great vacation packages to Washington DC! http://tagline.hushmail.com/fc/Ioyw6h4eQwZoKYXhIX4jPfFC91a4IN8I9LL8Sq8e3GHyn2izNGWs9p/ From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Mon May 5 19:55:57 2008 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Mon, 5 May 2008 13:55:57 -0400 Subject: how long should a password be? In-Reply-To: <481EBFB3.4070107@sven-radde.de> References: <481EB4BB.8030209@calpoly.edu> <481EBFB3.4070107@sven-radde.de> Message-ID: <8C22CDFF-A4B1-4BC2-BDED-B7BE4FF23E09@jabberwocky.com> On May 5, 2008, at 4:05 AM, Sven Radde wrote: > Hi! > > Matt Kinni schrieb: >> Everyone says it should be as long as possible (...) What do you >> think? > You might find this interesting read: > That's a good article. See this also: . It gives a way of easily generating and (fairly) easily remembering long passphrases. > Also keep in mind that in order to attack your password, an attacker > would first have to access your secret keyring (unless you use GnuPg > for symmetric encryption). This is very true and very important. The passphrase is really the protection of last resort, and only comes into play after the secret key is already lost. Simply locking your front door gives a layer of protection here, and there are many other ways to prevent access to a secret key so the passphrase never even gets tested. David From yalla at fsfe.org Tue May 6 00:09:22 2008 From: yalla at fsfe.org (Alexander W. Janssen) Date: Tue, 06 May 2008 00:09:22 +0200 Subject: Question about GnuPG Smartcard In-Reply-To: <87od7ll05d.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> References: <481cdfee.2cf0220a.72fd.6185@mx.google.com> <4F0B6A06-3155-4887-A9B3-B16FA7ED769D@jabberwocky.com> <87od7ll05d.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> Message-ID: <481F8592.7060709@fsfe.org> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Werner Koch schrieb: > On Sun, 4 May 2008 04:00, dshaw at jabberwocky.com said: > >> The smartcard can store 3 1024-bit RSA keys. It cannot store a 2048- >> bit key. > > That depends on the actual card. GnuPG implements a specification and > allows all key sizes. There are some restrictions due to the limited > size of an APDU. The forthcoming revision of the spec will declare how > to work with keyr requiring longer APDUs. I think I remember that 2048-bit RSA cards might be available soon... Was that by PPC Card? Any news on that? Cheers, Alex. P.S.: The list behaves... er... odd. Sometimes it sets the sender to gnupg-users-bounces+$user at gnupg.org (where user == emailaddress), sometimes it's just set to gnupg-users-bounces at gnupg.org. What's that about? -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.6 (GNU/Linux) iQCVAwUBSB+DlRYlVVSQ3uFxAQLV8AP7BsafDJxVNn9ETIx4JPECvYUC2I1zWU3k tja0bk247ErJ4aTrTBXGSP50hr6xGvO41aDY27QRDtWj8Uvy94lg/YuHDYMvZMPb Nx+Jn1yfv027vshypAHmU2tN4ujY/gVALMSAQirBr7iyiiMYRIwHcrcjwF3TAO7x mcFr+DhakL8= =FQ/c -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From yalla at fsfe.org Tue May 6 00:03:12 2008 From: yalla at fsfe.org (Alexander W. Janssen) Date: Tue, 06 May 2008 00:03:12 +0200 Subject: [Fwd: Re: Question about GnuPG Smartcard] Message-ID: <481F8420.3080700@fsfe.org> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 (Had some very odd message from the MTA... sorry if this is a repost. Not sure if my original posting made it to the list.) Werner Koch schrieb: > On Sun, 4 May 2008 04:00, dshaw at jabberwocky.com said: > >> The smartcard can store 3 1024-bit RSA keys. It cannot store a 2048- >> bit key. > > That depends on the actual card. GnuPG implements a specification and > allows all key sizes. There are some restrictions due to the limited > size of an APDU. The forthcoming revision of the spec will declare how > to work with keyr requiring longer APDUs. I think I remember that 2048-bit RSA cards might be available soon... Was that by PPC Card? Any news on that? Cheers, Alex. P.S.: The list behaves... er... odd. Sometimes it sets the sender to gnupg-users-bounces+$user at gnupg.org (where user == emailaddress), sometimes it's just set to gnupg-users-bounces at gnupg.org. What's that about? -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.6 (GNU/Linux) iQCVAwUBSB+EHhYlVVSQ3uFxAQK4NgP/WVk+q/or/c+JupeGoS7IfR5tcG3hljgd /5Dk6j6kDxMYya9eLOuk/ZME5iMwkOR/pyPG2hln/vUsvOKjggnmNGltF4lvLau5 7myZqWwCEl436wzRDCmOMEbspppj0dXLtEA6A+9R7sxmzEFnmctggNvNI9UpPaJE N1mObdkEYms= =DW0j -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From faramir.cl at gmail.com Tue May 6 04:58:51 2008 From: faramir.cl at gmail.com (Faramir) Date: Mon, 05 May 2008 22:58:51 -0400 Subject: how long should a password be? In-Reply-To: <871w4gj01a.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> References: <481EB4BB.8030209@calpoly.edu> <481EBD5A.1030601@googlemail.com> <4C71D221-FB02-4D02-947D-ACCC13C9C248@royds.net> <871w4gj01a.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> Message-ID: <481FC96B.4010205@gmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 > Werner Koch escribi?: > On Mon, 5 May 2008 14:18, apple at royds.net said: > >> So there are only 64 bits in an 8 character password, which can be >> cracked quite quickly using rainbow tables for any password. > > That is unlikely to work because gpg uses a random 64 bit salt as well > as extended hashing. > > > Salam-Shalom, > > Werner I never knew how does salt work, but I am not sure if I should ask here, or in the PGP-Basics list... -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJIH8lqAAoJEIISGkVDGUEOfJoH/1XDCET6NNzs60R722oXqthY IwPPJf0MU4UFeHDrCpeAtME/CEPQCoZRNVMujalbkAOOf5CW6K8XBg4/imVN/qYv qOyfdEIDkfPoLTkaa2voEVHHYhUkM+z4dTVEPQUO+Ix+oIAvlAuu1d0HuGnNu7/w LVJjkrEhhTiU/JbJ2zbkEghIwRYmW0IBbJQxRd/aotkSd6YQ6tpCK2CkxcTD6wcb 9wh3eB9t+eK+OlsKudV84AboelhSPhMWLmxnSbCJ3nx6d2TgzcfroRGM97FV4ZmQ sFoJpw7T+LFxM8RlCcigXTQN87+wzJKiSxM7ngX2vAy/R4ei6+/WRSXHp92lsj8= =jwCx -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From email at sven-radde.de Tue May 6 07:29:20 2008 From: email at sven-radde.de (Sven Radde) Date: Tue, 06 May 2008 07:29:20 +0200 Subject: how long should a password be? In-Reply-To: <481FC96B.4010205@gmail.com> References: <481EB4BB.8030209@calpoly.edu> <481EBD5A.1030601@googlemail.com> <4C71D221-FB02-4D02-947D-ACCC13C9C248@royds.net> <871w4gj01a.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> <481FC96B.4010205@gmail.com> Message-ID: <1210051760.6354.11.camel@carbon> Hi! Am Montag, den 05.05.2008, 22:58 -0400 schrieb Faramir: > >> So there are only 64 bits in an 8 character password, which can be > >> cracked quite quickly using rainbow tables for any password. > > > > That is unlikely to work because gpg uses a random 64 bit salt as well > > as extended hashing. > > I never knew how does salt work, but I am not sure if I should ask > here, or in the PGP-Basics list... A salt essentially makes precomputed rainbow tables useless. A rainbow table consists of two columns, "password" and "hashed password" and is filled by hashing a great number of passwords. Now, if you know only the hash of a password, just look it up in the rainbow table to get the original password. If a salt is being used, the hash is not computed as, e.g., SHA1(password), but rather SHA1(salt+password). The salt is a random number that does not need to be kept secret. This way, even if you have a rainbow table for SHA1 ready, and even if the password is in there, you cannot find it by looking up the hashed value of the password, as a given password can hash to many different values, depending on the salt used. You would have to extend your rainbow table by a third column that contains salt values, which would tremendously increase the size of the table. Say, if you want 1 million passwords in your rainbow table, a table without salt would simply have 1 million entries. With a 64 bit salt, the table would have to be expanded to 1 million * 2^64 entries, because you need to take every combination of hash+password into account. HTH, Sven From email at sven-radde.de Tue May 6 10:13:39 2008 From: email at sven-radde.de (Sven Radde) Date: Tue, 06 May 2008 10:13:39 +0200 Subject: Duplicity Message-ID: <48201333.10908@sven-radde.de> Hello all, Following, in a way, the discussion about "How long should a passphrase be?", I am currently trying to come up with a sensible backup scheme using duplicity. Duplicity creates full and incremental backups of local files, encrypts them using GnuPG and moves them to a (remote) location. By default, it uses symmetric encryption but it can be set to encrypt to a public key. When using public keys, it can also sign the backups (but, due to a current bug, verification errors are not reported...). My question now is, should I simply use passphrase-based encryption or should I go towards public key signing and encrypting. The problem with public key is that the secret key must be backed up itself and I do not have that many secure locations available where I could store backups (secure in the sense of "unlikely to burn down at the same time my house does" - not "hard for a stranger to access"). Therefore, any backup of the secret key would have to be placed next to the files encrypted with that key and having to give my secret key (even a dedicated one) away does not create a good feeling. So, an attacker would get a) passphrase-encrypted files some Gigabytes in size or b) sessionkey-encrypted files some Gigabytes in size and a passphrase-encrypted secret key. Which approach is more prudent security-wise? To me it looks like it is advantageous that in case b), the passphrase is only used to encrypt a relatively small bit of data, making analysis more difficult. Plus, I would get integrity-protection some time in the futute (once the bug is fixed). Apart from this, given a long enough passphrase, both approaches should be equally secure, aren't they? As a side question, speaking about integrity-protection, how does the MDC come into play here? Wouldn't that be enough protection anyway (as it is a special use-case)? Thanks for some "second opinions" on this, Sven From wk at gnupg.org Tue May 6 10:28:57 2008 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Tue, 06 May 2008 10:28:57 +0200 Subject: [Fwd: Re: Question about GnuPG Smartcard] In-Reply-To: <481F8420.3080700@fsfe.org> (Alexander W. Janssen's message of "Tue, 06 May 2008 00:03:12 +0200") References: <481F8420.3080700@fsfe.org> Message-ID: <87wsm7deeu.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> On Tue, 6 May 2008 00:03, yalla at fsfe.org said: > I think I remember that 2048-bit RSA cards might be available soon... > Was that by PPC Card? Any news on that? We even have a new draft which allows to re-activate blocked card. New cards will be done but that will take several months. > P.S.: The list behaves... er... odd. Sometimes it sets the sender to > gnupg-users-bounces+$user at gnupg.org (where user == emailaddress), > sometimes it's just set to gnupg-users-bounces at gnupg.org. What's that about? Don't know. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Auschnahme regelt ein Bundeschgesetz. From faramir.cl at gmail.com Tue May 6 10:52:31 2008 From: faramir.cl at gmail.com (Faramir) Date: Tue, 06 May 2008 04:52:31 -0400 Subject: how long should a password be? In-Reply-To: <1210051760.6354.11.camel@carbon> References: <481EB4BB.8030209@calpoly.edu> <481EBD5A.1030601@googlemail.com> <4C71D221-FB02-4D02-947D-ACCC13C9C248@royds.net> <871w4gj01a.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> <481FC96B.4010205@gmail.com> <1210051760.6354.11.camel@carbon> Message-ID: <48201C4F.2000701@gmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Sven Radde escribi?: > A salt essentially makes precomputed rainbow tables useless. > > A rainbow table consists of two columns, "password" and "hashed > password" and is filled by hashing a great number of passwords. Now, if > you know only the hash of a password, just look it up in the rainbow > table to get the original password. > > If a salt is being used, the hash is not computed as, e.g., > SHA1(password), but rather SHA1(salt+password). The salt is a random > number that does not need to be kept secret. > This way, even if you have a rainbow table for SHA1 ready, and even if > the password is in there, you cannot find it by looking up the hashed > value of the password, as a given password can hash to many different > values, depending on the salt used. > You would have to extend your rainbow table by a third column that > contains salt values, which would tremendously increase the size of the > table. Say, if you want 1 million passwords in your rainbow table, a > table without salt would simply have 1 million entries. With a 64 bit > salt, the table would have to be expanded to 1 million * 2^64 entries, > because you need to take every combination of hash+password into > account. > > HTH, Sven > Excellent explanation, thanks. But I still miss the point about the salt number doesn't need to be kept secret... I mean: if the salt value is not known to the program that must validate the password, then it can't validate it (since the hash produced by the password will never match the "salted" stored hash). That means the salt used must be stored somewhere... and if I get the stored hash, and the salt, I would just need to generate the rainbow tables adding the salt value I got... Wait, I think I am beginning to get the point... since the salt is random, I figure each user will have his own salt value... and that would mean I would have to generate 1 rainbow table for each user... but then, I would rather try to crack an admin password, and then reset the passwords of the users... I already see the advantage of making pre built rainbow tables useless... but I feel I am missing the main thing.... Regards -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJIIBxPAAoJEIISGkVDGUEOLA0H/2jmMvjphVL8VKxFZOKMDw8o aF59ejrTGBVPK8xUulOziXpf43UBvwF8szRAg9NV/LgrO3knGcOviKkCFsP4vQQ8 jqO81YgTLv/JUwqmOTdpPz5wFwJs90GZln0P5X7c5HH3ZVFE1NkMCAYVX0Kd2tM9 9H8LAFCFpKgSrROzjSsZEI6x/dTLgerP/FtTIT/1qQvXCqkN0j7Rj7xn9lf7WAps wIRsC9/aY57nZMwIKgxdDuvqUW9+MOGa5IXgRL4FAA5Yk11y/OLY5JFillt6WonL szsX11I6+5Ats2clUiNfGOwNXGggZE2DwuHBY/kcxdw0wrTBYhwaNplf7hQdHh4= =ut51 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From eddrobinson at gmail.com Tue May 6 12:39:19 2008 From: eddrobinson at gmail.com (Edward Robinson) Date: Tue, 06 May 2008 11:39:19 +0100 Subject: Open Pgp Smartcard ssh authentication Woes :( In-Reply-To: <874p9itdkc.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> References: <4817665E.1030603@gmail.com> <874p9itdkc.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> Message-ID: <48203557.7010101@gmail.com> For anyone that this may help, It appears I have solved my problems. It turns out that gnome-keying-manager was interfering by taking control of the ssh socket. This was realised because echo $SSH_AUTH_SOCKET returned: /tmp/keyring-XXXXX which was different to the socket that gpg-agent was set to use. To fix this problem I disabled ssh support in gnome-keyring by issuing the following command: $ gconftool-2 --set -t bool /apps/gnome-keyring/daemon-components/ssh false There is more information here: http://live.gnome.org/GnomeKeyring/Ssh I thought this was a seahorse problem, but it turns out it is not. Many thanks to Werner, who helped greatly finding the socket problem. Cheers, e-dard From lopaki at gmail.com Tue May 6 19:26:44 2008 From: lopaki at gmail.com (Scott Lambdin) Date: Tue, 6 May 2008 13:26:44 -0400 Subject: Compile without libiconv or libintl on Solaris Message-ID: <529e76830805061026x4fb624a8m6c1bc7bcb4ce3dc2@mail.gmail.com> Hello - Has anyone been able to compile 1.4.8 or 1.4.9 on Solaris without iconv or intl? The only way I have been able to do it is with --enable-minimal and that disables too much. Or am I going to have to really learn Makefiles? Thanks, --Scott -- CILCIL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Tue May 6 20:47:45 2008 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Tue, 6 May 2008 14:47:45 -0400 Subject: Compile without libiconv or libintl on Solaris In-Reply-To: <529e76830805061026x4fb624a8m6c1bc7bcb4ce3dc2@mail.gmail.com> References: <529e76830805061026x4fb624a8m6c1bc7bcb4ce3dc2@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <20080506184745.GB66135@jabberwocky.com> On Tue, May 06, 2008 at 01:26:44PM -0400, Scott Lambdin wrote: > Hello - > > Has anyone been able to compile 1.4.8 or 1.4.9 on Solaris without iconv or > intl? The only way I have been able to do it is with --enable-minimal and > that disables too much. Or am I going to have to really learn Makefiles? Can you post what happens when you try? Where does it fail? David From mkinni at calpoly.edu Tue May 6 21:26:31 2008 From: mkinni at calpoly.edu (Matt Kinni) Date: Tue, 06 May 2008 12:26:31 -0700 Subject: confused about public key strength Message-ID: <4820B0E7.1040905@calpoly.edu> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Hello, I can't seam to figure out how the different bitstrengh of my public key effects anything. If someone encrypts something to my private key, isn't the strength of the private key that matters? So I have a 1024bit DSA pub and 4096 elgamal key. Isn't the lengh of the elgamal key what determines how strong the file is encrypted? What does the size of the public key even matter? I understand that it can be used as a singing key, but I have an RSA subkey for that instead. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJIILDZAAoJELlJAlPUfypQhywIAKIW1C8i/8psgGUUMNNKLU6k pfjLjfEuJJSLsd+SggKRmzXcaTcnJiQKDy7iVAF/PU5lH/lciwgYkTLYCES3pguA V0CLik1TBOVo9JaJetTeFwfd/slpd83yz8p+FTaBdNdUypQJFf8udWiR+Dzpofxe rDjvhMccxj3ehf5mwK4apfgym/tW7eHH4QYnZlYiVoDvqNZo3YJbo9cf3JDhLr/x iI9onxvVfeLEv8GZwM4Aqdf7Y2cuvOcKwhWeHb60K0F5d4DRSdY9icye2e95DqL0 E2+lLAkqFpt4mdVQn9v1yYbjyT8LJM61FRoSNlGJ48KttoAzJ1fyli+jUHSzzNk= =4NVN -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From lopaki at gmail.com Tue May 6 21:37:03 2008 From: lopaki at gmail.com (Scott Lambdin) Date: Tue, 6 May 2008 15:37:03 -0400 Subject: Compile without libiconv or libintl on Solaris In-Reply-To: <20080506184745.GB66135@jabberwocky.com> References: <529e76830805061026x4fb624a8m6c1bc7bcb4ce3dc2@mail.gmail.com> <20080506184745.GB66135@jabberwocky.com> Message-ID: <529e76830805061237u14be0fb5ic4aadd9db35d41f6@mail.gmail.com> If I do a config like this, and ldd the resulting gpg binary, it still needs libiconv and libintl. ./configure --prefix=/place/gnupg-1.4.8 --without-readline --disable-gnupg-iconv --without-intl --without-iconv I've tried a few variations on this. I would like to compile statically but that fails to compile. OMG I just ran a static compile to get the error and it worked. Someone sacrificed a cat somewhere or something. Well, my question mave have become a lot less urgent. On 5/6/08, David Shaw wrote: > > On Tue, May 06, 2008 at 01:26:44PM -0400, Scott Lambdin wrote: > > Hello - > > > > Has anyone been able to compile 1.4.8 or 1.4.9 on Solaris without iconv > or > > intl? The only way I have been able to do it is with --enable-minimal > and > > that disables too much. Or am I going to have to really learn Makefiles? > > Can you post what happens when you try? Where does it fail? > > David > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users > -- CILCIL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From aolsen at standard.com Tue May 6 21:49:43 2008 From: aolsen at standard.com (Alan Olsen) Date: Tue, 6 May 2008 12:49:43 -0700 Subject: Need recommendation on keyserver code Message-ID: <92A893260738B0408497A64189BC1E620580137D@MSEXCHANGE305.corp.standard.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 I need to build a private keyserver for interanl use. I have tried to get SKS to build, but I have never been able to get it to work. (The project seems to be almost abandoned.) I am using Fedora 9 on an x86_64 box with 4 gigs of ram and Numerix blows up on compile with "out of memory" errors. I have not seen anything else that handles subkeys. Any recommendations? -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 9.5.3 (Build 5003) wsBVAwUBSCC2V2qdmbpu7ejzAQqmjAgAn2fMIVz9Glm2YpE/5FinZZeWXYI1AX9b BMi4cgPdxJGz3f+o8PnUdfbpY4gfwYbD6fQjp06GJF7eKhHv3aH7RGWU3lUwfP/W c3aAihJY1NR5GyEXitYGnEUNsmDMl4z19aYEF2ZWVfOOtl8qTIfN6xc5OZpjBx3J 3+J2S8hx43Ma8KUvvTw+aztKbl/LkhtXNs+dO8o33Bv1LuInFJ7HT+6EW3FLmBXu BsxAtkpk4NybgLuE7/O/vOmdVYDv/rw1gyww3E3a4wSb0nAACkmZvSVmgqedVfON 2Q2NWTnDPQGjgxqVawqKP9XIn7HhN6HvXFIrQByCeBql8j0JtzKd2Q== =WWsQ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From lopaki at gmail.com Tue May 6 21:50:29 2008 From: lopaki at gmail.com (Scott Lambdin) Date: Tue, 6 May 2008 15:50:29 -0400 Subject: Compile without libiconv or libintl on Solaris In-Reply-To: <529e76830805061237u14be0fb5ic4aadd9db35d41f6@mail.gmail.com> References: <529e76830805061026x4fb624a8m6c1bc7bcb4ce3dc2@mail.gmail.com> <20080506184745.GB66135@jabberwocky.com> <529e76830805061237u14be0fb5ic4aadd9db35d41f6@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <529e76830805061250k449b3c85q7c44b9d63397a30@mail.gmail.com> No, I had that pesky --enable-minimal in the configure command. It can compile statically with that. here is the error I get otherwise: /usr/local/bin/gcc -g -O2 -Wall --static -o gpg gpg.o build-packet.o compress.o compress-bz2.o free-packet.o getkey.o keydb.o keyring.o seskey.o kbnode.o mainproc.o armor.o mdfilter.o textfilter.o progress.o misc.o openfile.o keyid.o parse-packet.o status.o plaintext.o sig-check.o keylist.o signal.o pkclist.o skclist.o pubkey-enc.o passphrase.o seckey-cert.o encr-data.o cipher.o encode.o sign.o verify.o revoke.o decrypt.o keyedit.o dearmor.o import.o export.o trustdb.o tdbdump.o tdbio.o delkey.o keygen.o pipemode.o helptext.o keyserver.o photoid.o exec.o ../cipher/libcipher.a ../mpi/libmpi.a ../util/libutil.a ../intl/libintl.a ../zlib/libzlib.a -lbz2 -lsocket Undefined first referenced symbol in file endnetconfig /usr/lib/libsocket.a(_soutil.o) setnetconfig /usr/lib/libsocket.a(_soutil.o) getnetconfig /usr/lib/libsocket.a(_soutil.o) ld: fatal: Symbol referencing errors. No output written to gpg collect2: ld returned 1 exit status make[2]: *** [gpg] Error 1 make[2]: Leaving directory `/usr/local/src/gnupg-1.4.8/g10' make[1]: *** [all-recursive] Error 1 make[1]: Leaving directory `/usr/local/src/gnupg-1.4.8' make: *** [all] Error 2 I see other folks having this problem but no fix worked for me. On 5/6/08, Scott Lambdin wrote: > > If I do a config like this, and ldd the resulting gpg binary, it still > needs libiconv and libintl. > > > ./configure --prefix=/place/gnupg-1.4.8 --without-readline > --disable-gnupg-iconv --without-intl --without-iconv > > I've tried a few variations on this. > > > > I would like to compile statically but that fails to compile. OMG I just > ran a static compile to get the error and it worked. Someone sacrificed a > cat somewhere or something. Well, my question mave have become a lot less > urgent. > > > > > > > On 5/6/08, David Shaw wrote: >> >> On Tue, May 06, 2008 at 01:26:44PM -0400, Scott Lambdin wrote: >> > Hello - >> > >> > Has anyone been able to compile 1.4.8 or 1.4.9 on Solaris without iconv >> or >> > intl? The only way I have been able to do it is with --enable-minimal >> and >> > that disables too much. Or am I going to have to really learn >> Makefiles? >> >> Can you post what happens when you try? Where does it fail? >> >> David >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Gnupg-users mailing list >> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org >> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users >> > > > > -- > CILCIL -- CILCIL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Tue May 6 21:55:19 2008 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Tue, 06 May 2008 14:55:19 -0500 Subject: confused about public key strength In-Reply-To: <4820B0E7.1040905@calpoly.edu> References: <4820B0E7.1040905@calpoly.edu> Message-ID: <4820B7A7.60505@sixdemonbag.org> Matt Kinni wrote: > Hello, I can't seam to figure out how the different bitstrengh of my > public key effects anything. If someone encrypts something to my > private key, isn't the strength of the private key that matters? No. Asymmetric cryptography has keys that come in public and private parts, but that doesn't mean the parts can be evaluated in isolation. It's a system. > So I have a 1024bit DSA pub and 4096 elgamal key. Isn't the lengh of > the elgamal key what determines how strong the file is encrypted? No. The file is encrypted with a symmetric cipher depending on the preferences of you and your respondent. This is anywhere between an effective keystrength of 112 bits (3DES, under a ridiculously pessimistic set of assumptions) all the way up to 256 bits. This is, by the way, a _lot_ of protection against cryptanalysis. Any talk about breaking this by brute force is deluded fantasy. It's not happening, not even with quantum computers and every other staple of the science fiction literature that people assume the NSA has access to. The key used to encrypt the file is chosen at random. You could sit there with a quarter, toss it 256 times, and have a perfectly good AES key. The computer does basically this process. This random, one-time-use key is then encrypted with your recipient's public key. The recipient's public key may be anywhere from 1024 bits up to 4096 bits. Don't be confused by comparing this to the 112- to 256-bit symmetric encryption of the file. It's an apples to oranges comparison: you cannot say "well, one has 1024-bit encryption and one uses 256-bit, so clearly one is four times better than the other." > What does the size of the public key even matter? For 99% of users, it doesn't. Use the defaults GnuPG gives you -- they're good defaults. From email at sven-radde.de Tue May 6 22:04:53 2008 From: email at sven-radde.de (Sven Radde) Date: Tue, 06 May 2008 21:04:53 +0100 Subject: confused about public key strength In-Reply-To: <4820B0E7.1040905@calpoly.edu> References: <4820B0E7.1040905@calpoly.edu> Message-ID: <4820B9E5.3000404@sven-radde.de> Hi! Matt Kinni schrieb: > Hello, I can't seam to figure out how the different bitstrengh of my > public key effects anything. If someone encrypts something to my > private key, isn't the strength of the private key that matters? The length of the public key equals the length of the private key. And there is always a public key corresponding to a private key and vice versa. Essentially, the "strength" of the key determines how hard it is for people to calculate the private key when they only know the public key. > So I have a 1024bit DSA pub and 4096 elgamal key. Isn't the lengh of > the elgamal key what determines how strong the file is encrypted? This means that you have a 1024 bit DSA public key, which people use to verify your signatures. You have a 1024 bit DSA private key, which you use to make those signatures. Then, you have a 4096 bit ElGamal public key, which people use to encrypt data for you. And you have a 4096 bit ElGamal private key which you use to decrypt this data. > What does the size of the public key even matter? I understand that it > can be used as a singing key, but I have an RSA subkey for that instead. Then you will use that subkey (for which again there is a private key and a corresponding public key) to sign data. Commonly, you will still use the DSA key for signing UIDs on your key or to sign other people's keys. The DSA key is commonly called "primary key", while all other keys are called "subkeys". The primary key combined with all of its assigned subkeys constitutes what one commonly calls "one's key". Obviously, there can be "your private key" and "your public key". cu, Sven From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Tue May 6 22:08:55 2008 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Tue, 6 May 2008 16:08:55 -0400 Subject: Compile without libiconv or libintl on Solaris In-Reply-To: <529e76830805061250k449b3c85q7c44b9d63397a30@mail.gmail.com> References: <529e76830805061026x4fb624a8m6c1bc7bcb4ce3dc2@mail.gmail.com> <20080506184745.GB66135@jabberwocky.com> <529e76830805061237u14be0fb5ic4aadd9db35d41f6@mail.gmail.com> <529e76830805061250k449b3c85q7c44b9d63397a30@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <20080506200855.GC66135@jabberwocky.com> On Tue, May 06, 2008 at 03:50:29PM -0400, Scott Lambdin wrote: > No, I had that pesky --enable-minimal in the configure command. It can > compile statically with that. here is the error I get otherwise: > > /usr/local/bin/gcc -g -O2 -Wall --static -o gpg gpg.o build-packet.o > compress.o compress-bz2.o free-packet.o getkey.o keydb.o keyring.o seskey.o > kbnode.o mainproc.o armor.o mdfilter.o textfilter.o progress.o misc.o > openfile.o keyid.o parse-packet.o status.o plaintext.o sig-check.o keylist.o > signal.o pkclist.o skclist.o pubkey-enc.o passphrase.o seckey-cert.o > encr-data.o cipher.o encode.o sign.o verify.o revoke.o decrypt.o keyedit.o > dearmor.o import.o export.o trustdb.o tdbdump.o tdbio.o delkey.o keygen.o > pipemode.o helptext.o keyserver.o photoid.o exec.o ../cipher/libcipher.a > ../mpi/libmpi.a ../util/libutil.a ../intl/libintl.a ../zlib/libzlib.a > -lbz2 -lsocket > Undefined first referenced > symbol in file > endnetconfig /usr/lib/libsocket.a(_soutil.o) > setnetconfig /usr/lib/libsocket.a(_soutil.o) > getnetconfig /usr/lib/libsocket.a(_soutil.o) > ld: fatal: Symbol referencing errors. No output written to gpg > collect2: ld returned 1 exit status Sun doesn't really approve of static linking on Solaris: http://www.sun.com/bigadmin/content/misc/solaris2faq.html#q6.24 That said, what happens if you do this: NETLIBS=-lnsl ./configure David From lopaki at gmail.com Tue May 6 22:29:39 2008 From: lopaki at gmail.com (Scott Lambdin) Date: Tue, 6