From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Fri Jun 1 05:29:28 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Thu, 31 May 2012 23:29:28 -0400 Subject: F17 + smartcards: *not* fixed In-Reply-To: <4FC7A761.4050508@sixdemonbag.org> References: <4FC7A761.4050508@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <4FC83718.8040506@sixdemonbag.org> On 05/31/2012 01:16 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > As a summary and follow-up: And as a follow-up to the follow-up: this fix does not persist after the smartcard device is unplugged and reconnected. This is vexing. Time to look at it again in the morning. From wk at gnupg.org Fri Jun 1 11:15:10 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Fri, 01 Jun 2012 11:15:10 +0200 Subject: F17 + smartcards: *not* fixed In-Reply-To: <4FC83718.8040506@sixdemonbag.org> (Robert J. Hansen's message of "Thu, 31 May 2012 23:29:28 -0400") References: <4FC7A761.4050508@sixdemonbag.org> <4FC83718.8040506@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <8762bbbdgh.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Fri, 1 Jun 2012 05:29, rjh at sixdemonbag.org said: > This is vexing. Time to look at it again in the morning. I hate udev debugging. The udev rules are too hard to maintain. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From wk at gnupg.org Fri Jun 1 11:22:36 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Fri, 01 Jun 2012 11:22:36 +0200 Subject: system migration In-Reply-To: <4FC7C648.50606@sixdemonbag.org> (Robert J. Hansen's message of "Thu, 31 May 2012 15:28:08 -0400") References: <01c901cd3f62$434d3290$c9e797b0$@net> <4FC7C648.50606@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <871ulzbd43.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Thu, 31 May 2012 21:28, rjh at sixdemonbag.org said: > Other people will chime in with precise folder paths. I no longer have > access to any Windows XP machines, so I can't -- but a little > exploration should reveal them. Run gpgconf --list-dirs It shows a list of all directories in the form of a key and a value separated by a colon. The line with the key "homedir" is what you want. The values are percent escaped, for example "C%25\foo" means "C:\foo". If you enter a directory name, you may need to use a backslash instead of a forward slash. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From wk at gnupg.org Fri Jun 1 11:27:42 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Fri, 01 Jun 2012 11:27:42 +0200 Subject: Is there a "-----END PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----" tag? In-Reply-To: (Mauricio Tavares's message of "Thu, 31 May 2012 17:04:20 -0400") References: Message-ID: <87wr3r9yb5.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Thu, 31 May 2012 23:04, raubvogel at gmail.com said: > According to http://www.gnupg.org/gph/en/manual.html#AEN153, > Clearsigned documents do not seem to have a ?"-----END PGP SIGNED > MESSAGE-----" tag. And yet there is a ?"-----END PGP MESSAGE-----" tag > for messages encrypted with gnupg. Am I missing something here? The armor line tags depend on the type of the message. For example a clear signed signature looks like this -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Stay the curse. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.1.0-beta77 (GNU/Linux) iEYEARECAAYFAk/IigcACgkQTwVA1Xf5X5X12ACfbCn1KEkYtUqH6LOWaV7o2pcq yNwAn0caiuKpmJTiiutn+TqMlHsL4c66 =3pzI -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- The two armor lines are required by the special clearsigned format. The first BEGIN introduces the signed text, the second ends the signed text and starts the signature, and the END ends all. The details are, as usual, in RFC-4880. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From wk at gnupg.org Fri Jun 1 11:32:59 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Fri, 01 Jun 2012 11:32:59 +0200 Subject: GnuPG 2 + OpenPGP card on F17 In-Reply-To: <1338478236.1716.7.camel@localhost.localdomain> (Guillaume Lanquepin-Chesnais's message of "Thu, 31 May 2012 11:30:36 -0400") References: <4FC58F0A.7040007@sixdemonbag.org> <1338359860.2896.4.camel@guyome-laptop> <4FC5DB0E.8020800@sixdemonbag.org> <4FC5DF43.2010204@sixdemonbag.org> <87sjeif2w0.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FC5ECC6.6020701@mbm.vn> <87d35lgb9o.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FC6CBDE.6000903@mbm.vn> <4FC6CE7B.8010705@sixdemonbag.org> <1338478236.1716.7.camel@localhost.localdomain> Message-ID: <87sjef9y2c.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Thu, 31 May 2012 17:30, guyome at lechiennoir.net said: > gpg2 --card-status > gpg: can't connect to the agent - trying fall back gpg2 starts a new agent. You may want to correctly install gpg-agent - see the manual or the man page. > gpg: OpenPGP card not available: No SmartCard daemon but when the now started gpg-agent tries to start scdaemon it can't find scdaemon. What is the output of gpgconf --check-programs and gpgconf --list-dirs | grep ^agent-socket ? Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com Fri Jun 1 18:00:04 2012 From: mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com (Mika Suomalainen) Date: Fri, 01 Jun 2012 19:00:04 +0300 Subject: Is there a "-----END PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----" tag? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <4FC8E704.1000706@hotmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 01.06.2012 00:04, Mauricio Tavares wrote: > According to http://www.gnupg.org/gph/en/manual.html#AEN153, > Clearsigned documents do not seem to have a "-----END PGP SIGNED > MESSAGE-----" tag. And yet there is a "-----END PGP MESSAGE-----" > tag for messages encrypted with gnupg. Am I missing something > here? > > _______________________________________________ Gnupg-users mailing > list Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users Do you mean - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ? - -- [Mika Suomalainen](https://mkaysi.github.com/) || [gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net --recv-keys 4DB53CFE82A46728](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/key.txt) || [Why do I sign my emails?](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/WhyDoISignEmails.html) || [Please don't send HTML.](http://mkaysi.github.com/articles/complaining/HTML.html) || [Please don't toppost](http://mkaysi.github.com/articles/complaining/topposting.html) || [This signature](https://gist.github.com/2643070) || -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.19 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Homepage: http://mkaysi.github.com/ Comment: gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net 82A46728 Comment: Public key: http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/key.txt Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJPyOcAAAoJEE21PP6CpGcoCdgQAK92DrYFp/JnlOGPIagwuk00 mF3IrL3rETX/7uOO2uJOT9iunlP3ljHj5ICfnqDcoANcIdUBHua+mBpbGynSy7aZ EJs3fbMth+qSGEOIkIWMU6Bc+C1ipYVRhbNFQ5Ru+iOtzMqi+1bOnblGQMvCNmQh D0QHgZ5zxt2JfocuGawpK/ng5kFpGtSVSdZDy+uBTkFD5CxZ56QlVGVLYS+En47q qrQP2iQYYguW85EOBR1djxMhpBjwLbp2AthsC5sGsP9JZSdnISW6hDNVLVyYYi7b uixeIAAzF1wrrg7MRixWEwQtCQ88rCeizHHODtHRuKRzxut0VnoinNUJDGanvHkL BKuvmT8J6wj5LD9YdkX3AzEs+U9huSxgSpDhmZEE+Du2laF7TGVjN+O1FqMoVWVN LgiJOvHu3UW+5b7n5ocIUWfIxtz70y8hCnqQptnQEO0PRaP7zlMzBWU4XbJgp+IU rV3S7m4sJyr4xaoAEytAdoleBh1K3NEF1KnAfSgl52oqrNnImG91LlYm6lrAVvmr 1PYimaxrwzRmewsS/vHckhtQcY2LbihrbO1S8qW/KkCqeBI18ahyZx8dOD0wvB2v fqN8xEcIiUkfNPPPlIeXhFsselrL3GudMXT632W+Ymp2BxyHCdoQmkmphRwPPbeM wX52P6WywlazFIK8I2BP =wwY0 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From peter at digitalbrains.com Sat Jun 2 00:27:43 2012 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Sat, 02 Jun 2012 00:27:43 +0200 Subject: Is there a "-----END PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----" tag? In-Reply-To: <4FC8E704.1000706@hotmail.com> References: <4FC8E704.1000706@hotmail.com> Message-ID: <4FC941DF.2000009@digitalbrains.com> On 01/06/12 18:00, Mika Suomalainen wrote: > Do you mean -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ? If I had been the one designing the armour format, and I had thought of this little detail, I'd have named the three headers something like: - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ... - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- ... - -----END PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Seems to come out better and avoiding any confusion. But it's nitpicking. And it suggests the signature is part of the message :). Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at http://wwwhome.cs.utwente.nl/~lebbing/pubkey.txt From ingo at euemd.info Fri Jun 1 23:50:24 2012 From: ingo at euemd.info (Ingo) Date: Fri, 01 Jun 2012 23:50:24 +0200 Subject: context menu command "Import OpenPGP Key" Message-ID: <4FC93920.7020801@euemd.info> Hello, please can someone explain when the context menu command "Import OpenPGP Key" (on an attached key) is active or inactive (grayed out)? I cannot see the rule behind. If it is inactive you can import it with the "Decrypt and Open" command. Ingo From expires2012 at rocketmail.com Sat Jun 2 03:06:11 2012 From: expires2012 at rocketmail.com (MFPA) Date: Sat, 2 Jun 2012 02:06:11 +0100 Subject: Some people say longer keys are silly. I think they should be supported by gpg. In-Reply-To: <4FC69190.5000702@sixdemonbag.org> References: <20120522.085848.109.2@GGHJK5> <4FBBC86D.30405@sixdemonbag.org> <409096756.20120527232126@my_localhost> <4FC2DF08.4020507@sixdemonbag.org> <682060881.20120530211442@my_localhost> <4FC69190.5000702@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <394594861.20120602020611@my_localhost> Hi On Wednesday 30 May 2012 at 10:30:56 PM, in , Robert J. Hansen wrote: > And if the planting *is* coordinated, why in the world > would you ever need a 1 in 6 penetration rate? Whilst it would be *possible* for the various different departments and agencies mentioned by the OP to coordinate their efforts, that seemed so far-fetched to me as to not merit consideration. -- Best regards MFPA mailto:expires2012 at rocketmail.com No man ever listened himself out of a job From mlists at robin-kipp.net Sat Jun 2 17:39:31 2012 From: mlists at robin-kipp.net (Robin Kipp) Date: Sat, 2 Jun 2012 17:39:31 +0200 Subject: Problem: cannot generate / copy keys larger than 1024bit on my OpenPGP-compatible card Message-ID: <3A906D98-05B3-4659-B855-DA962AFA0203@robin-kipp.net> Hello all, I'm trying to setup my OpenPGP-compatible SmartCard with 2048-bit subkeys, using GnuPG version 2.0.18. However, it seems that I currently can neither copy nor create keys larger than 1024bit on the SmartCard. When I try to generate a completely new set of keys on the card using gpg --card-edit -> admin -> generate and choosing to overwrite the existing key, GPG will seem to start generating the key, but then exits with a "Card error" but no more details. I then edited my scdaemon.conf file and set the debug-level to expert, then restarted GPG-Agent and SCDaemon and repeated the process, reproducing the same error. Here's what I ended up with in the SCDaemon log file: 2012-06-02 15:46:48 scdaemon[6044] DBG: send apdu: c=00 i=47 p1=80 p2=00 lc=2 le=2048 em=1 2012-06-02 15:46:48 scdaemon[6044] DBG: PCSC_data: 00 47 80 00 00 00 02 B6 00 08 00 2012-06-02 15:46:48 scdaemon[6044] pcsc_transmit failed: not transacted (0x80100016) 2012-06-02 15:46:48 scdaemon[6044] apdu_send_simple(0) failed: general error 2012-06-02 15:46:48 scdaemon[6044] Key generation failed 2012-06-02 15:46:48 scdaemon[6044] operation genkey result: Card error scdaemon[6044]: chan_7 -> ERR 100663404 Card error scdaemon[6044]: chan_7 <- RESTART scdaemon[6044]: chan_7 -> OK This did not result in anything being written to the card, but according to gpg --card-status I now have no keys on the card whatsoever. Just to make sure the problem wasn't specific to my system, I tried going through this process using GRML and Ubuntu Live CDs, however I always ended up with the same issue at all times... Please, can anyone here help me out with this one? I've already tried some googling and came up with some results, however none of them offered any helpful solutions as far as I could tell. Thanks! Robin From peter at digitalbrains.com Sat Jun 2 18:17:42 2012 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Sat, 02 Jun 2012 18:17:42 +0200 Subject: Problem: cannot generate / copy keys larger than 1024bit on my OpenPGP-compatible card In-Reply-To: <3A906D98-05B3-4659-B855-DA962AFA0203@robin-kipp.net> References: <3A906D98-05B3-4659-B855-DA962AFA0203@robin-kipp.net> Message-ID: <4FCA3CA6.8050604@digitalbrains.com> > However, it seems that I currently can neither copy nor create keys larger > than 1024bit on the SmartCard. Which exact OpenPGP-compatible card do you have? The v1.1 card only supports up to 1024 bit. The v2.0 card is capable of larger keys. Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at http://wwwhome.cs.utwente.nl/~lebbing/pubkey.txt From mlists at robin-kipp.net Sat Jun 2 19:54:32 2012 From: mlists at robin-kipp.net (Robin Kipp) Date: Sat, 2 Jun 2012 19:54:32 +0200 Subject: Problem: cannot generate / copy keys larger than 1024bit on my OpenPGP-compatible card In-Reply-To: <4FCA3CA6.8050604@digitalbrains.com> References: <3A906D98-05B3-4659-B855-DA962AFA0203@robin-kipp.net> <4FCA3CA6.8050604@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: Hi Peter, Am 02.06.2012 um 18:17 schrieb Peter Lebbing: >> However, it seems that I currently can neither copy nor create keys larger >> than 1024bit on the SmartCard. > > Which exact OpenPGP-compatible card do you have? The v1.1 card only supports up > to 1024 bit. The v2.0 card is capable of larger keys. It is an OpenGPG v2.0-compatible card. According to its specs, it should be capable of handling keys up to 3072bits... Robin From wk at gnupg.org Sun Jun 3 12:29:56 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Sun, 03 Jun 2012 12:29:56 +0200 Subject: Problem: cannot generate / copy keys larger than 1024bit on my OpenPGP-compatible card In-Reply-To: <3A906D98-05B3-4659-B855-DA962AFA0203@robin-kipp.net> (Robin Kipp's message of "Sat, 2 Jun 2012 17:39:31 +0200") References: <3A906D98-05B3-4659-B855-DA962AFA0203@robin-kipp.net> Message-ID: <87vcj8hemz.fsf@gnupg.org> On Sat, 2 Jun 2012 17:39, mlists at robin-kipp.net said: > 2012-06-02 15:46:48 scdaemon[6044] pcsc_transmit failed: not transacted (0x80100016) What reader are you using? It is possible that your reader does not support extended length APDUs, which are required for v2 cards. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From wk at gnupg.org Sun Jun 3 12:33:05 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Sun, 03 Jun 2012 12:33:05 +0200 Subject: context menu command "Import OpenPGP Key" In-Reply-To: <4FC93920.7020801@euemd.info> (ingo@euemd.info's message of "Fri, 01 Jun 2012 23:50:24 +0200") References: <4FC93920.7020801@euemd.info> Message-ID: <87r4twhehq.fsf@gnupg.org> On Fri, 1 Jun 2012 23:50, ingo at euemd.info said: > please can someone explain when the context menu command "Import OpenPGP > Key" (on an attached key) is active or inactive (grayed out)? I cannot You mean in the Windows file explorer extension GpgEX? IIRC, it works solely by matching on the file suffix. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From mlists at robin-kipp.net Sun Jun 3 15:46:32 2012 From: mlists at robin-kipp.net (Robin Kipp) Date: Sun, 3 Jun 2012 15:46:32 +0200 Subject: Problem: cannot generate / copy keys larger than 1024bit on my OpenPGP-compatible card In-Reply-To: <87vcj8hemz.fsf@gnupg.org> References: <3A906D98-05B3-4659-B855-DA962AFA0203@robin-kipp.net> <87vcj8hemz.fsf@gnupg.org> Message-ID: Hi Werner, Am 03.06.2012 um 12:29 schrieb Werner Koch: > What reader are you using? It is possible that your reader does not > support extended length APDUs, which are required for v2 cards. Hmmm, very interesting. I'm using an OMNIKEY 6121 USB card reader, which I purchased along with my OpenGPG-compatible card. Since the retailer where I bought it (Cryptoshop.com) offers quite a few card readers, I even made sure to contact them about which reader I should choose beforehand, so that I wouldn't end up with anything that was incompatible... Also, I just made sure to check out their website once again to have another look at the reader's specs, however unfortunately I wasn't able to find anything OpenPGP-specific on there... Robin -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From branko at majic.rs Sun Jun 3 16:46:59 2012 From: branko at majic.rs (Branko Majic) Date: Sun, 03 Jun 2012 16:46:59 +0200 Subject: =?UTF-8?Q?Re=3A_Problem=3A_cannot_generate_/_copy_keys_larg?= =?UTF-8?Q?er_than_1024bit_on_my=09OpenPGP-compatible_card?= In-Reply-To: References: <3A906D98-05B3-4659-B855-DA962AFA0203@robin-kipp.net> <87vcj8hemz.fsf@gnupg.org> Message-ID: Well, OmniKey is famous for not working with stock libccid and extended apdus. I had such problems with the OpenSC pkcs#11 and pcscd. Can you try smaller key sizes (never worked with OpenPGP, but it "solved" the issue for me - using 1k keys instead of 2k) Robin Kipp wrote: >Hi Werner, > >Am 03.06.2012 um 12:29 schrieb Werner Koch: > >> What reader are you using? It is possible that your reader does not >> support extended length APDUs, which are required for v2 cards. > >Hmmm, very interesting. I'm using an OMNIKEY 6121 USB card reader, >which I purchased along with my OpenGPG-compatible card. Since the >retailer where I bought it (Cryptoshop.com) offers quite a few card >readers, I even made sure to contact them about which reader I should >choose beforehand, so that I wouldn't end up with anything that was >incompatible... Also, I just made sure to check out their website once >again to have another look at the reader's specs, however unfortunately >I wasn't able to find anything OpenPGP-specific on there... >Robin_______________________________________________ >Gnupg-users mailing list >Gnupg-users at gnupg.org >http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users -- Sent from my Android phone with K-9 Mail. Please excuse my brevity. From lgellert at gmail.com Sun Jun 3 16:46:41 2012 From: lgellert at gmail.com (L G) Date: Sun, 3 Jun 2012 07:46:41 -0700 Subject: GnuPG 2.1 Windows 7, pinentry does not allow paste, no way to bypass? Message-ID: Had a little adventure this morning with GnuPG 2.x on Windows 7 and decided to revert to 1.4. During command line decryption, pinentry opens a popup window for the passphrase. In the pinentry window, paste (Ctl+V) is not supported. Deal breaker. I read through the forums and could not find a way around this. Here are some suggestions: a) Put the 1.4 Windows binary installer on the download page again. b) Allow pinentry to accept a paste command. or, allow gpg 2.x to bypass pinentry and work in 1.4 mode (and make it obvious how to do so). Love the simplicity and speed of gpg 1.4. If 2.1 can work in the same way, that would be much appreciated. It is not fun being stuck on the old version and left out of all the fun of 2.1! By the way, the download gpg4win-vanilla-2.1.1-34299-beta.exe failed to launch, with this message: "Installer integrity check has failed". The download of gpg4win-light-2.1.1-34299-beta.exe did work. Thanks, Laurence -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From mlists at robin-kipp.net Sun Jun 3 17:45:16 2012 From: mlists at robin-kipp.net (Robin Kipp) Date: Sun, 3 Jun 2012 17:45:16 +0200 Subject: Problem: cannot generate / copy keys larger than 1024bit on my OpenPGP-compatible card In-Reply-To: References: <3A906D98-05B3-4659-B855-DA962AFA0203@robin-kipp.net> <87vcj8hemz.fsf@gnupg.org> Message-ID: <2B854453-0489-40AF-A5A2-7E8648C5312E@robin-kipp.net> Hi, Am 03.06.2012 um 16:46 schrieb Branko Majic: > Well, OmniKey is famous for not working with stock libccid and extended apdus. I had such problems with the OpenSC pkcs#11 and pcscd. Can you try smaller key sizes (never worked with OpenPGP, but it "solved" the issue for me - using 1k keys instead of 2k) Wow... That's unfortunate for me... Yes, I can generate keys up to 1024-bit in length on the card. However, as I'd much rather use 2048-bit keys, I guess I'll just have to sort things out with the retailer I got it from... Can you recommend another brand that produces readers which are easier to use? E.g. Gemalto or G&D or anything in that direction. Thanks a lot! Robin From mlists at robin-kipp.net Sun Jun 3 17:50:25 2012 From: mlists at robin-kipp.net (Robin Kipp) Date: Sun, 3 Jun 2012 17:50:25 +0200 Subject: Problem: cannot generate / copy keys larger than 1024bit on my OpenPGP-compatible card In-Reply-To: <87txyspi84.fsf@gnupg.org> References: <3A906D98-05B3-4659-B855-DA962AFA0203@robin-kipp.net> <87vcj8hemz.fsf@gnupg.org> <7B5567A8-BAFA-4275-BA42-81225290FDC1@robin-kipp.net> <87txyspi84.fsf@gnupg.org> Message-ID: <84811345-6701-4615-BEDB-3C6B164FCD18@robin-kipp.net> Hi Werner, Am 03.06.2012 um 16:45 schrieb Werner Koch: > All OMNIKEY based readers don't work with Linux or other free OS when > Extended Length APDUs are required. I did a few hacks to allow the > internal ccid driver to _sometimes_ work. libccid (of libpcsclite) has > a list of supported readers and states that certain readers are not > supported; in particular Omnikey. OK, well, I really didn't expect that *before* buying the reader, but I honestly wasn't aware such compatibility issues existed with Omnikey readers. Oh well, I guess I'll just have to sort things out with my retailer, and end up purchasing a new card reader. So, if you could possibly recommend a brand that produces easier to handle readers I'd definitely appreciate some advice on that! :-) Thanks! Robin From branko at majic.rs Sun Jun 3 17:55:07 2012 From: branko at majic.rs (Branko Majic) Date: Sun, 3 Jun 2012 17:55:07 +0200 Subject: Problem: cannot generate / copy keys larger than 1024bit on my OpenPGP-compatible card In-Reply-To: <2B854453-0489-40AF-A5A2-7E8648C5312E@robin-kipp.net> References: <3A906D98-05B3-4659-B855-DA962AFA0203@robin-kipp.net> <87vcj8hemz.fsf@gnupg.org> <2B854453-0489-40AF-A5A2-7E8648C5312E@robin-kipp.net> Message-ID: <20120603175507.7d8b9c1f@trotsky.home.majic.rs> On Sun, 3 Jun 2012 17:45:16 +0200 Robin Kipp wrote: > Hi, > > Am 03.06.2012 um 16:46 schrieb Branko Majic: > > > Well, OmniKey is famous for not working with stock libccid and > > extended apdus. I had such problems with the OpenSC pkcs#11 and > > pcscd. Can you try smaller key sizes (never worked with OpenPGP, > > but it "solved" the issue for me - using 1k keys instead of 2k) > > Wow... That's unfortunate for me... Yes, I can generate keys up to > 1024-bit in length on the card. However, as I'd much rather use > 2048-bit keys, I guess I'll just have to sort things out with the > retailer I got it from... Can you recommend another brand that > produces readers which are easier to use? E.g. Gemalto or G&D or > anything in that direction. Thanks a lot! Robin One thing I forgot to add (I was typing on a telephone) was that in case of pcscd you can use the extended APDU, but only if you're using the proprietary driver from OmniKey (pcsc-omnikey in Debian/Ubuntu non-free, for example). If gnupg goes through the psccd, this could allow you use of larger keys. A useful page for you should also be (the "CCID/ICCD readers" section): http://pcsclite.alioth.debian.org/ccid.html This driver collides with libccid, btw, so only one of those can be active at the same time. The proprietary driver also provides the contactless reader capability (almost nobody makes CCID-compliant contactless readers unfortunately). Best regards -- Branko Majic Jabber: branko at majic.rs Please use only Free formats when sending attachments to me. ?????? ????? ?????: branko at majic.rs ????? ??? ?? ??????? ?????? ????????? ? ????????? ?????????. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 836 bytes Desc: not available URL: From mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de Sun Jun 3 18:19:43 2012 From: mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de (Hauke Laging) Date: Sun, 03 Jun 2012 18:19:43 +0200 Subject: GnuPG 2.1 Windows 7, pinentry does not allow paste, no way to bypass? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <22315625.HzVucKsfle@inno> Am So 03.06.2012, 07:46:41 schrieb L G: > During command line decryption, pinentry opens a popup window for the > passphrase. In the pinentry window, paste (Ctl+V) is not supported. Deal > breaker. I read through the forums and could not find a way around this. man gpg-agent --no-grab Hauke -- PGP: D44C 6A5B 71B0 427C CED3 025C BD7D 6D27 ECCB 5814 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 555 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From kf at sumptuouscapital.com Sun Jun 3 19:12:11 2012 From: kf at sumptuouscapital.com (Kristian Fiskerstrand) Date: Sun, 03 Jun 2012 19:12:11 +0200 Subject: GnuPG 2.1 Windows 7, pinentry does not allow paste, no way to bypass? In-Reply-To: <22315625.HzVucKsfle__25683.2774998204$1338742498$gmane$org@inno> References: <22315625.HzVucKsfle__25683.2774998204$1338742498$gmane$org@inno> Message-ID: -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 On 2012-06-03 18:19, Hauke Laging wrote: > Am So 03.06.2012, 07:46:41 schrieb L G: > >> During command line decryption, pinentry opens a popup window for >> the passphrase. In the pinentry window, paste (Ctl+V) is not >> supported. Deal breaker. I read through the forums and could not >> find a way around this. > > man gpg-agent --no-grab > That will only prevent pinentry from grabbing the focus. You'd probably want to add "pinentry-program /usr/bin/pinentry-curses" to the config file as well (obviously changing the path to the appropriate directory), iirc pasting is disabled in the GUI varieties shipped in the main trunk, so these will require some patching to allow pasting of passwords (e.g. with password managers). An alternative could be to check out --passphrase-fd in man gpg. - -- - ---------------------------- Kristian Fiskerstrand http://www.sumptuouscapital.com Twitter: @krifisk - ---------------------------- Corruptissima re publica plurim? leges The greater the degeneration of the republic, the more of its laws - ---------------------------- This email was digitally signed using the OpenPGP standard. If you want to read more about this The book: Sending Emails - The Safe Way: An introduction to OpenPGP security is now available in both Amazon Kindle and Paperback format at http://www.amazon.com/dp/B006RSG1S4/ - ---------------------------- Public PGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at http://www.sumptuouscapital.com/pgp/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.19 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQIcBAEBCAAGBQJPy5rrAAoJEBbgz41rC5UITikP/itI5yIJKiR4tGazxbvN4KfG qL+qjhmWsC4SScdvdoSoEG/1o/7kVcM8TqvlUtqKTtH/ah7yOCUIknghR9xFDd4I QcuJpusMjW1CQCEKVVWnCzVDP7nFJ3s7jY7nzLKNH1FB71KXU1eQ/8dznXXA8Hxy IRtZGteDu485yzDB894ytFIxXp0VOZRX3lcJRghOOfrm6pDTBWXnKNdGyPN5eeKT L6cY0nrC7inYDW1TCc7WY6rhJtajLEhoqhBCDeRMeovXZ0/Qyk6hXQF0hWp+jWxR hNYMRJD+Zx5xPFvHcCnC4s+LHW2vMJPrAm1Sc4tnpvyuBdDEBkJPa5x1iQdU2qVo n7V6Rupy0vOtVZG5WsW5bFndJjpKBIlNHJZrDFM8ZC/Qz27WKL5pu47pJ3gnXnG7 v4BOaEL+8r/PubtUsGXy1GimW4GkZU+mDmqDilxgRgdoM4pGLTn/rz+FArDR3z2E DiBh4/YWfF/UVVL3F8SY/I5WK+gKBtHo6isoe8yV17MwcTEpsF9yUarf4kFk+uH2 IcF3n1WaFVwAKqjlpCGOc45tpWwTia7DXUgfPOUrByu6xibENrhEAEHpKCeXAE2O B+nDtM1At2eZgqWEDtoPmPP0ZzYsw2GgnUBkf5CUH7FTHxyYJRM82m1/A56l0Gil s/mMTvavTwBLSNsiVBiw =cK9P -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From venture37 at gmail.com Sun Jun 3 20:17:37 2012 From: venture37 at gmail.com (Sevan / Venture37) Date: Sun, 3 Jun 2012 19:17:37 +0100 Subject: Problem: cannot generate / copy keys larger than 1024bit on my OpenPGP-compatible card In-Reply-To: <20120603175507.7d8b9c1f@trotsky.home.majic.rs> References: <3A906D98-05B3-4659-B855-DA962AFA0203@robin-kipp.net> <87vcj8hemz.fsf@gnupg.org> <2B854453-0489-40AF-A5A2-7E8648C5312E@robin-kipp.net> <20120603175507.7d8b9c1f@trotsky.home.majic.rs> Message-ID: Hi Rob, I was having the same issue on FreeBSD & recently manage to address the issue, it turned out to be the internal CCID driver which was the cause of the problem, what worked for me was to install pcsc-lite & libccid, then set my ~/gnupg/scdaemon.conf as: disable-ccid pcsc-driver libpcsclite.so By disabling the insternal driver I was able to able to generate keys up to 3072 bits on my v2 card using a SCM-335 card reader via pcsclite. Sevan / Venture37 From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Sun Jun 3 22:07:38 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Sun, 03 Jun 2012 16:07:38 -0400 Subject: GnuPG 2.1 Windows 7, pinentry does not allow paste, no way to bypass? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <4FCBC40A.4040007@sixdemonbag.org> On 6/3/2012 10:46 AM, L G wrote: > During command line decryption, pinentry opens a popup window for the > passphrase. In the pinentry window, paste (Ctl+V) is not supported. > Deal breaker. Storing your passphrase in the clipboard is generally considered unwise and harmful. Your passphrase is a high-value secret: putting it on the clipboard makes it visible to every other process on your system (including malware!). Pinentry's refusal to support C&P is not accidental or an oversight. It's a deliberate design decision meant to help shield you from malware, Trojans, and other skulduggery that people may use to discover your passphrase. It's fairly easy to hack the source to support C&P. However, the last it was asked about on this list the answer was "C&P will not be supported and patches to enable C&P will not be accepted." From lgellert at gmail.com Mon Jun 4 00:31:05 2012 From: lgellert at gmail.com (L G) Date: Sun, 3 Jun 2012 15:31:05 -0700 Subject: GnuPG 2.1 Windows 7, pinentry does not allow paste, no way to bypass? In-Reply-To: <4FCBC40A.4040007@sixdemonbag.org> References: <4FCBC40A.4040007@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: > Storing your passphrase in the clipboard is generally considered unwise > and harmful. Your passphrase is a high-value secret: putting it on the > clipboard makes it visible to every other process on your system > (including malware!). I understand the risk, and your point is valid. However, if a machine is infected with malware, then keystrokes can also be captured, screen shots, packets, pretty much everything going on. Considering the low risk nature of the data this particular key addresses, I'm am comfortable with C&P. There are other cases where I don't use C&P on purpose. > Pinentry's refusal to support C&P is not accidental or an oversight. > It's a deliberate design decision meant to help shield you from malware, > Trojans, and other skulduggery that people may use to discover your > passphrase. I would recommend that users be allowed to decide (via config or command line option), and provide a sensible default such as the current behavior. Laurence -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Mon Jun 4 03:40:02 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Sun, 03 Jun 2012 21:40:02 -0400 Subject: FAQ, take two Message-ID: <4FCC11F2.6050303@sixdemonbag.org> The unofficial FAQ is approaching completion. At this point I think it's about two-thirds done. By this I mean most of the writing is complete. Every FAQ entry should have at least a couple of sentences of text. Some will have more, some less. This FAQ is not meant to be a GnuPG tutorial, reference manual, or HOWTO. For that reason most of the FAQs about "how do I..." are really just brief sentences listing commands that are useful, with the intent being people will look those commands up in manuals, HOWTOs, manpages, or whatnot. I'm not interested in bikeshedding over grammar or word choices. If I let everyone on this list play editor then this FAQ will never get completed. For that stuff I've asked a couple of friends with good technical writing skills to look over it, and their proposals are probably going to get adopted. What I *am* interested in, though, are content errors. It is quite likely I have a few in there, and maybe even a few howlers. So please, take a look and see what you think. Also, if there are any questions you feel are missing, throw them out too. Thank you! http://keyservers.org/~rjh/gnupgfaq.xhtml From jw72253 at verizon.net Mon Jun 4 04:35:35 2012 From: jw72253 at verizon.net (John) Date: Sun, 3 Jun 2012 21:35:35 -0500 Subject: system migration In-Reply-To: <4FC7C648.50606__35276.7587443397$1338492522$gmane$org@sixdemonbag.org> References: <01c901cd3f62$434d3290$c9e797b0$@net> <4FC7C648.50606__35276.7587443397$1338492522$gmane$org@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: "Robert J. Hansen" wrote in message news:<4FC7C648.50606__35276.7587443397$1338492522$gmane$org at sixdemonbag.org>... > On 5/31/12 3:19 PM, John A. Wallace wrote: > > Hello. I am moving my system onto another machine, and it will require > > my reinstalling everything, not simply restoring. Are there any > > instructions related to which files need to be moved, and other > > considerations, in order to transfer the capabilities of my gnupg > > application. I am moving it from Windows XP to 64-bit Win 7. > > Other people will chime in with precise folder paths. I no longer have > access to any Windows XP machines, so I can't -- but a little > exploration should reveal them. > > Somewhere on your system you'll have a file called "secring.gpg". In > that directory you'll have some (or all) of -- > > * pubring.gpg > * secring.gpg > * trustdb.gpg > * gpa.conf > * gpg-agent.conf > * gpg.conf > * scdaemon.conf > * random_seed > > Copy over all these files except random_seed. Don't re-use random_seed: > sharing the same random_seed between two different machines can > potentially be unwise. > > On the new machine, just install GnuPG from http://www.gpg4win.org. On > the new machine, find where GnuPG has placed its gpg.conf file. Drop > all the files from the old machine (except random_seed) into that > folder, overwriting if necessary. > > With that, your migration should be complete. Hello, Robert. Your procedure worked perfectly from what I can see. Thank you. From yyy at yyy.id.lv Mon Jun 4 05:50:47 2012 From: yyy at yyy.id.lv (yyy) Date: Mon, 04 Jun 2012 06:50:47 +0300 Subject: GnuPG 2.1 Windows 7, pinentry does not allow paste, no way to bypass? In-Reply-To: <4FCBC40A.4040007@sixdemonbag.org> References: <4FCBC40A.4040007@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <4FCC3097.30705@yyy.id.lv> On 2012.06.03. 23:07, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > On 6/3/2012 10:46 AM, L G wrote: >> During command line decryption, pinentry opens a popup window for the >> passphrase. In the pinentry window, paste (Ctl+V) is not supported. >> Deal breaker. > Storing your passphrase in the clipboard is generally considered unwise > and harmful. Your passphrase is a high-value secret: putting it on the > clipboard makes it visible to every other process on your system > (including malware!). So, if one is incapable of remembering strong passwords (passphrses), this forces them to use either useless passphrase (breakable in less than 5 min using dictionary) or use no passphrase at all. From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Mon Jun 4 07:05:24 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Mon, 04 Jun 2012 01:05:24 -0400 Subject: GnuPG 2.1 Windows 7, pinentry does not allow paste, no way to bypass? In-Reply-To: <4FCC3097.30705@yyy.id.lv> References: <4FCBC40A.4040007@sixdemonbag.org> <4FCC3097.30705@yyy.id.lv> Message-ID: <4FCC4214.5030505@sixdemonbag.org> On 06/03/2012 11:50 PM, yyy wrote: > So, if one is incapable of remembering strong passwords (passphrses), > this forces them to use either useless passphrase (breakable in less > than 5 min using dictionary) or use no passphrase at all. If your passphrase is stored on a file on your computer, then you may as well have no passphrase at all, yes. The only safe place for your passphrase is your memory, and even that one is fairly easy to crack. A top-flight hooker costs $5,000 an hour (according to Eliot Spitzer), a great bottle of Scotch costs $250 (Glenmorangie Signet), and between the two you have a fairly cost-effective way to recover a passphrase. From peter at digitalbrains.com Mon Jun 4 10:13:44 2012 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Mon, 04 Jun 2012 10:13:44 +0200 Subject: GnuPG 2.1 Windows 7, pinentry does not allow paste, no way to bypass? In-Reply-To: <4FCC3097.30705@yyy.id.lv> References: <4FCBC40A.4040007@sixdemonbag.org> <4FCC3097.30705@yyy.id.lv> Message-ID: <4FCC6E38.2020805@digitalbrains.com> On 04/06/12 05:50, yyy wrote: > So, if one is incapable of remembering strong passwords (passphrses), > this forces them to use either useless passphrase (breakable in less > than 5 min using dictionary) or use no passphrase at all. Or use a smart card. BTW, with regard to remembering passphrases, the comic that has been mentioned more often here: http://xkcd.com/936/ Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at http://wwwhome.cs.utwente.nl/~lebbing/pubkey.txt From mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com Mon Jun 4 11:22:58 2012 From: mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com (Mika Suomalainen) Date: Mon, 04 Jun 2012 12:22:58 +0300 Subject: GnuPG 2.1 Windows 7, pinentry does not allow paste, no way to bypass? In-Reply-To: <22315625.HzVucKsfle@inno> References: <22315625.HzVucKsfle@inno> Message-ID: <4FCC7E72.5090006@hotmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 03.06.2012 19:19, Hauke Laging wrote: > Am So 03.06.2012, 07:46:41 schrieb L G: > >> During command line decryption, pinentry opens a popup window for >> the passphrase. In the pinentry window, paste (Ctl+V) is not >> supported. Deal breaker. I read through the forums and could not >> find a way around this. > > man gpg-agent --no-grab > > > Hauke Has Windows finally got "man"? :) - -- [Mika Suomalainen](https://mkaysi.github.com/) || [gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net --recv-keys 4DB53CFE82A46728](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/key.txt) || [Why do I sign my emails?](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/WhyDoISignEmails.html) || [Please don't send HTML.](http://mkaysi.github.com/articles/complaining/HTML.html) || [Please don't toppost](http://mkaysi.github.com/articles/complaining/topposting.html) || [This signature](https://gist.github.com/2643070) || -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.19 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Homepage: http://mkaysi.github.com/ Comment: gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net 82A46728 Comment: Public key: http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/key.txt Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJPzH5vAAoJEE21PP6CpGcoztUQALCJHhYy32ezQ50rUZIPjocY 6qnQcNtVocT3hU2r4r01tNQ0KAv9/Swj0MqDo10t4imU9v7lBfVKrKPGCtSS8DCX /N51CdGNwi27PMMK+F7sAPXbRhLSetwSOju1uLr4KhoF3iA87FGVfzQ9xJ49I+9n gGs2AJtptysIvkZGy2GMVlz68mvM+MYB3U067sToxjW0kOoV29eNWN+7wFUM1JZn Jz9/on4+38kTx+h/t4ZebeExjxwZV0Fv6WcKMvhW8+uA1x3k4NJYmeKpducBCOYV y/AKt9WlFmTuxoBBF9M+sYNvKaiXeU6MKReFYLp5kSocEjoMDS/nxUzPQrWZgotP oQtAT8TPxtw6SYq8Gy3H3X5Bn0+EyfMj+OpnSqAzkyDafBQlXARfxjAU7UdRYfa0 GSXSWrKr9UzWqD78U4dAU+9cemj0WvM7hkPfQuGs2UIvxMS90FjGcIhphs0vw3KD 5jHZg6u/5ggu6X8BhITABYqdFO14FSzbaAViHuP8Vw00rKQGMZBdF/OKEog7xQnd fQZVY6HOMZ4c7CjSV7lu9DrRcPF7hBcby4UUmOMsTo9FjxpULkKepsp1SzhNDRWb GsEQp3+gWgTw4Q6Xp3kuzjXazq8K4FORFqF3Cl4rK2Xff6Hkt96cUEQ7ckS7ZrSD iEnlrXu2Lfw0OAbevf5c =/4/8 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From jerry at seibercom.net Mon Jun 4 12:56:48 2012 From: jerry at seibercom.net (Jerry) Date: Mon, 4 Jun 2012 06:56:48 -0400 Subject: GnuPG 2.1 Windows 7, pinentry does not allow paste, no way to bypass? In-Reply-To: <4FCBC40A.4040007@sixdemonbag.org> References: <4FCBC40A.4040007@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <20120604065648.60321639@scorpio> On Sun, 03 Jun 2012 16:07:38 -0400 Robert J. Hansen articulated: >On 6/3/2012 10:46 AM, L G wrote: >> During command line decryption, pinentry opens a popup window for the >> passphrase. In the pinentry window, paste (Ctl+V) is not supported. >> Deal breaker. > >Storing your passphrase in the clipboard is generally considered unwise >and harmful. Your passphrase is a high-value secret: putting it on the >clipboard makes it visible to every other process on your system >(including malware!). > >Pinentry's refusal to support C&P is not accidental or an oversight. >It's a deliberate design decision meant to help shield you from >malware, Trojans, and other skulduggery that people may use to >discover your passphrase. > >It's fairly easy to hack the source to support C&P. However, the last >it was asked about on this list the answer was "C&P will not be >supported and patches to enable C&P will not be accepted." I believe that ClipCache Pro can capture the passwords. It has been a long time since I had PGP on a Window's machine; however, I thought I use to do it with this utility. By the way, ClipCache Pro is the best text capture program I have ever used. I wish I could find something similar for *nix. -- Jerry ? Disclaimer: off-list followups get on-list replies or get ignored. Please do not ignore the Reply-To header. __________________________________________________________________ From ben at adversary.org Mon Jun 4 10:49:42 2012 From: ben at adversary.org (Ben McGinnes) Date: Mon, 04 Jun 2012 18:49:42 +1000 Subject: PGP interoperability In-Reply-To: <87lik8dcvo.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <4FBEEC66.6090705@sixdemonbag.org> <4FBF4F65.3000809@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <1924331941.20120530204210@my_localhost> <87lik8dcvo.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <4FCC76A6.6080001@adversary.org> On 31/05/12 5:32 PM, Werner Koch wrote: > On Wed, 30 May 2012 21:42, expires2012 at rocketmail.com said: > >> And shared the fact privately with Symantec? > > I heard that it is just a bug introduced by the marketing suits. > The PGP library never dropped support for DSA2. Was there any explanation of why the marketing people dropped or wanted to drop the functionality? Regards, Ben -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 163 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From smickson at hotmail.com Mon Jun 4 16:27:00 2012 From: smickson at hotmail.com (Sam Smith) Date: Mon, 4 Jun 2012 10:27:00 -0400 Subject: no password needed to export secret-keys? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Hi. When I use the command: gpg --armor --output --export-secret-keys shouldn't I be asked for the secret key's password before Export is allowed to complete? I've tried this on both Windows 7 and Ubuntu Linux and I'm never asked for a password. This doesn't seem secure to me. I would think that Export should not be allowed to occur until after the key's password is provided. Do I have something mis-configured? Can you explain how this is secure? Thanks for your assistance. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de Mon Jun 4 17:22:05 2012 From: mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de (Hauke Laging) Date: Mon, 04 Jun 2012 17:22:05 +0200 Subject: no password needed to export secret-keys? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <2242120.9A1egvFbI5@inno> Am Mo 04.06.2012, 10:27:00 schrieb Sam Smith: > When I use the command: gpg --armor --output > --export-secret-keys > > shouldn't I be asked for the secret key's password before Export is allowed > to complete? I've tried this on both Windows 7 and Ubuntu Linux and I'm > never asked for a password. This doesn't seem secure to me. I would think > that Export should not be allowed to occur until after the key's password > is provided. Do I have something mis-configured? Can you explain how this > is secure? The exported file is protected by the passphrase. That is similar to copying the secring. If you want the exported file to have a different passphrase then you have to (make a backup of the secring and then) change the passphrase (--edit-key), export the secret key afterwards and then either change the passphrase back or overwrite the secring with the backup. Hauke -- PGP: D44C 6A5B 71B0 427C CED3 025C BD7D 6D27 ECCB 5814 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 555 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com Mon Jun 4 17:24:29 2012 From: mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com (Mika Suomalainen) Date: Mon, 04 Jun 2012 18:24:29 +0300 Subject: no password needed to export secret-keys? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <4FCCD32D.1090908@hotmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Hi, On 04.06.2012 17:27, Sam Smith wrote: > > Hi. > > When I use the command: gpg --armor --output > --export-secret-keys > > shouldn't I be asked for the secret key's password before Export is > allowed to complete? I've tried this on both Windows 7 and Ubuntu > Linux and I'm never asked for a password. This doesn't seem secure > to me. I would think that Export should not be allowed to occur > until after the key's password is provided. Do I have something > mis-configured? Can you explain how this is secure? > > > Thanks for your assistance. This would be a nice feature to have. If you don't receive any replies about this, you could report bug to Ubuntu about this and mark it as security problem. > ubuntu-bug gnupg - -- [Mika Suomalainen](https://mkaysi.github.com/) || [gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net --recv-keys 4DB53CFE82A46728](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/key.txt) || [Why do I sign my emails?](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/WhyDoISignEmails.html) || [Please don't send HTML.](http://mkaysi.github.com/articles/complaining/HTML.html) || [This signature](https://gist.github.com/2643070#file_icedove.md) || [Please reply below this line](http://mkaysi.github.com/articles/complaining/topposting.html) ____________________________ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.19 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Homepage: http://mkaysi.github.com/ Comment: gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net 82A46728 Comment: Public key: http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/key.txt Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJPzNMpAAoJEE21PP6CpGcoWHQQAMUWn89hMeDiiUEavbQaYBSb BuIxFN2a65jAq/TDLyYrqlwbndCTfwjZk3WSR34VhohxmJCnyqhIBZg/J9Ab/5n0 oCrB25GnxgoTZqirk4EqVT9n/vckcMUtzuu2Gb/RdqgzamEuSDoPCuGco0/iPwtg waqSHHUPOOslzvhkr6K70CVWjOOwT5R/5V2Cf1XLdOFd6gGkRQZU1qbuiZWMY7hI /tO22Ra7pu+gH3o1IDItoiuFNm96CfIMUb8hoREMJDXtyg0bvQrFFPCmplofPQsf LdD6Cz4Q1ju0M4jM7oSzi0BmkioZJjEeH+M/nP4pv6hPV/PPBBxLHnyc/EE3Ofk9 Y3I4QaxlTTtFdrmgo3RmN3ZiD798eLOeC6FX6NlEflJHEHLCcs+y4CG2+ss7Wqqe 1yW29DNRW1dHLEkTApFB7OV+6K5qbA7T1Ga6DsqgAk5ZAA5Z9F99HOTKTWk3EWmf nQ9waL+L3eDYhd4eEcRkaQZtwo2XGsNMEpTZMXZVoxk85F9x5ao/LfiT6kijkUb+ J4V5YQYCEinp39z+Fmrwmt5JZuHi0sxTAmvHX0saEScbcMKhXQC1+i+ufQviNBTn kIjy2GGKUUaSAnuWEpGyQfdaKjxdUHqWNS9rrgHHIRiAZv5FGbZgK0RMcqItUwR/ UfXzHifRiVTbLXQv4HgJ =oM3u -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Mon Jun 4 17:26:31 2012 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Mon, 4 Jun 2012 11:26:31 -0400 Subject: no password needed to export secret-keys? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Jun 4, 2012, at 10:27 AM, Sam Smith wrote: > > Hi. > > When I use the command: gpg --armor --output --export-secret-keys > > shouldn't I be asked for the secret key's password before Export is allowed to complete? I've tried this on both Windows 7 and Ubuntu Linux and I'm never asked for a password. This doesn't seem secure to me. I would think that Export should not be allowed to occur until after the key's password is provided. Do I have something mis-configured? Can you explain how this is secure? The secret key is encrypted via your passphrase, so it is safe to export. GPG is just copying some bytes from a file on disk, and you could copy the whole file yourself via 'cp' just as easily. Still, you can do things with SELinux to prevent any process from reading the secret key file except GPG, and in that case, it might be reasonable to request a passphrase before exporting the key. David From smickson at hotmail.com Mon Jun 4 17:57:02 2012 From: smickson at hotmail.com (Sam Smith) Date: Mon, 4 Jun 2012 11:57:02 -0400 Subject: no password needed to export secret-keys? In-Reply-To: References: , , <2242120.9A1egvFbI5@inno>, Message-ID: No, the exported file is NOT protected by the passphrase. If I export the key. And then delete my secret key from my keyring. And now Import what I exported, I am not asked for a password before the import is allowed to complete. That is, Anyone who gains access to my machine can export my secret key (no password required), take the product of the export to whatever computer they want and then import it (no password required). I do not see where the security lies. Thanks for the help. > From: mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de > To: gnupg-users at gnupg.org > CC: smickson at hotmail.com > Subject: Re: no password needed to export secret-keys? > Date: Mon, 4 Jun 2012 17:22:05 +0200 > > Am Mo 04.06.2012, 10:27:00 schrieb Sam Smith: > > > When I use the command: gpg --armor --output > > --export-secret-keys > > > > shouldn't I be asked for the secret key's password before Export is allowed > > to complete? I've tried this on both Windows 7 and Ubuntu Linux and I'm > > never asked for a password. This doesn't seem secure to me. I would think > > that Export should not be allowed to occur until after the key's password > > is provided. Do I have something mis-configured? Can you explain how this > > is secure? > > The exported file is protected by the passphrase. That is similar to copying > the secring. > > If you want the exported file to have a different passphrase then you have to > (make a backup of the secring and then) change the passphrase (--edit-key), > export the secret key afterwards and then either change the passphrase back or > overwrite the secring with the backup. > > > Hauke > -- > PGP: D44C 6A5B 71B0 427C CED3 025C BD7D 6D27 ECCB 5814 -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de Mon Jun 4 18:06:08 2012 From: mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de (Hauke Laging) Date: Mon, 04 Jun 2012 18:06:08 +0200 Subject: no password needed to export secret-keys? In-Reply-To: References: <2242120.9A1egvFbI5@inno> Message-ID: <4651987.coyjv3sroP@inno> Am Mo 04.06.2012, 11:56:22 schrieb Sam Smith: Please take care that you reply to the list. > No, the exported file is NOT protected by the passphrase. > > If I export the key. And then delete my secret key from my keyring. And now > Import what I exported, I am not asked for a password before the import is > allowed to complete. That is, Anyone who gains access to my machine can > export my secret key (no password required), take the product of the export > to whatever computer they want and then import it (no password required). You obviously have a completely wrong idea what a passphrase is used for. A passphrase is (if used) needed for crypto operations which need the private key (the numbers). The passphrase just encrypts the key material, not the whole exported file. Importing and exporting are not crypto operations. If you want to prevent others from importing or exporting keys then prevent them from accessing the files (a very common IT task that is not related to GnuPG). Hauke -- PGP: D44C 6A5B 71B0 427C CED3 025C BD7D 6D27 ECCB 5814 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 555 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Mon Jun 4 18:14:39 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Mon, 04 Jun 2012 12:14:39 -0400 Subject: no password needed to export secret-keys? In-Reply-To: References: , , <2242120.9A1egvFbI5@inno>, Message-ID: <4FCCDEEF.5020303@sixdemonbag.org> On 6/4/12 11:57 AM, Sam Smith wrote: > No, the exported file is NOT protected by the passphrase. Yes, it is. Try using the newly-imported secret key. :) From Lists.gnupg at mephisto.fastmail.net Mon Jun 4 18:35:25 2012 From: Lists.gnupg at mephisto.fastmail.net (Kevin Kammer) Date: Mon, 4 Jun 2012 12:35:25 -0400 Subject: FAQ, take two In-Reply-To: <4FCC11F2.6050303@sixdemonbag.org> References: <4FCC11F2.6050303@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <20120604163524.GA676@Clarus.mgh.harvard.edu> On Sun, Jun 03, 2012 at 09:40:02PM -0400 Also sprach Robert J. Hansen: > What I *am* interested in, though, are content errors. It is quite > likely I have a few in there, and maybe even a few howlers. So please, > take a look and see what you think. Thanks for taking the time to write this; here are a few minor points I have elected to comment on: Section 2.6: For Solaris 11, gnupg is also available via the default IPS publisher. The version Oracle provides is 2.0.17 vs 2.0.18 from OpenCSW, but it is worth mentioning as it may satisfy parties who are unwilling (or unable) to install via 3rd-party software sources. Section 4.11 Should almost certainly mention GnuPG integration with Evolution, which is still the default Gnome email client on many *nix distros. Also, for Mutt, I believe I can help with some of the "FIXME"s: Plugin? None required, provided both Mutt and GnuPG are installed properly. Supports GnuPG versions: 1.4 and 2.0 Supports pgp/mime? Yes Actively developed? Yes (though the "stable" version is only updated very infrequently, the project's CVS repo is still seeing activity). Project blurb: Mutt's GnuPG interoperability is good, but it may require extensive manual configuration for it to work properly (but if you're using Mutt, you already know that). See http://wiki.mutt.org/?MuttGuide/UseGPG for configuration details. General comment: For users completely new to GnuPG (and encryption in general), the use of the related terms "certificate" and "key" throughout the FAQ may be confusing. Questions like "What's a certificate?" "What's a key?" and "What's the difference?" may deserve an explanation someplace. A good place might be in the "Terminology" section, which itself should perhaps appear earlier in the FAQ. Regards, Kevin From wk at gnupg.org Mon Jun 4 18:44:35 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Mon, 04 Jun 2012 18:44:35 +0200 Subject: Problem: cannot generate / copy keys larger than 1024bit on my OpenPGP-compatible card In-Reply-To: (Sevan's message of "Sun, 3 Jun 2012 19:17:37 +0100") References: <3A906D98-05B3-4659-B855-DA962AFA0203@robin-kipp.net> <87vcj8hemz.fsf@gnupg.org> <2B854453-0489-40AF-A5A2-7E8648C5312E@robin-kipp.net> <20120603175507.7d8b9c1f@trotsky.home.majic.rs> Message-ID: <874nqr9gcs.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Sun, 3 Jun 2012 20:17, venture37 at gmail.com said: > By disabling the insternal driver I was able to able to generate keys > up to 3072 bits on my v2 card using a SCM-335 card reader via > pcsclite. That is a different problem than that with the Omnikey reader. In your case the permissions of the USB device don't allow you access. pcscd however runs as root and thus has no permission problems. Having a daemon running as root is not a good idea however. If you have an very old SCM-335 you should even use the internal CCID driver, because it has a workaround for the buggy USB stack in those old readers. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From wk at gnupg.org Mon Jun 4 18:47:01 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Mon, 04 Jun 2012 18:47:01 +0200 Subject: PGP interoperability In-Reply-To: <4FCC76A6.6080001@adversary.org> (Ben McGinnes's message of "Mon, 04 Jun 2012 18:49:42 +1000") References: <4FBEEC66.6090705@sixdemonbag.org> <4FBF4F65.3000809@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <1924331941.20120530204210@my_localhost> <87lik8dcvo.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FCC76A6.6080001@adversary.org> Message-ID: <87zk8j81oa.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Mon, 4 Jun 2012 10:49, ben at adversary.org said: > Was there any explanation of why the marketing people dropped or > wanted to drop the functionality? Maybe outdated technical specs which made it to the marketing dept. I don't know - you need to ask Symantec. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From smickson at hotmail.com Mon Jun 4 18:31:44 2012 From: smickson at hotmail.com (Sam Smith) Date: Mon, 4 Jun 2012 12:31:44 -0400 Subject: no password needed to export secret-keys? In-Reply-To: <4FCCDEEF.5020303@sixdemonbag.org> References: , , , , <2242120.9A1egvFbI5@inno>, , , , <4FCCDEEF.5020303@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: ah-ha. Thanks guys!! I tried to make a detached signature file with the imported key and it asked for password. I finally see what you guys have been telling me. Sorry I'm so dense :0 Yes, someone can export my secret key from my computer and then they can import my secret key into their computer. But to actually sign anything with my secret key they will have to know the password. This is great. So I see now that even if they can export and import my key they cannot use it. thanks again guys for educating me. > Date: Mon, 4 Jun 2012 12:14:39 -0400 > From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org > To: gnupg-users at gnupg.org > Subject: Re: no password needed to export secret-keys? > > On 6/4/12 11:57 AM, Sam Smith wrote: > > No, the exported file is NOT protected by the passphrase. > > Yes, it is. > > Try using the newly-imported secret key. :) > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From smickson at hotmail.com Mon Jun 4 18:14:31 2012 From: smickson at hotmail.com (Sam Smith) Date: Mon, 4 Jun 2012 12:14:31 -0400 Subject: no password needed to export secret-keys? In-Reply-To: <4651987.coyjv3sroP@inno> References: <2242120.9A1egvFbI5@inno> , <4651987.coyjv3sroP@inno> Message-ID: Okay. So being able to export without password is by design then. I don't have anything misconfigured. This makes it a trivial task to steal someone's secret key. All that's needed is access to the machine for a few seconds when no one is looking. I am not technically know-how enough to configure SELinux or app-armor. Does this mean there is no way to safeguard the Secret Key, other than the obvious of not letting anyone use my user-account? or is there any security measures that you guys use to protect secret key from being exported by someone else? > From: mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de > To: gnupg-users at gnupg.org > CC: smickson at hotmail.com > Subject: Re: no password needed to export secret-keys? > Date: Mon, 4 Jun 2012 18:06:08 +0200 > > Am Mo 04.06.2012, 11:56:22 schrieb Sam Smith: > > Please take care that you reply to the list. > > > No, the exported file is NOT protected by the passphrase. > > > > If I export the key. And then delete my secret key from my keyring. And now > > Import what I exported, I am not asked for a password before the import is > > allowed to complete. That is, Anyone who gains access to my machine can > > export my secret key (no password required), take the product of the export > > to whatever computer they want and then import it (no password required). > > You obviously have a completely wrong idea what a passphrase is used for. > > A passphrase is (if used) needed for crypto operations which need the private > key (the numbers). The passphrase just encrypts the key material, not the > whole exported file. Importing and exporting are not crypto operations. > > If you want to prevent others from importing or exporting keys then prevent > them from accessing the files (a very common IT task that is not related to > GnuPG). > > > Hauke > -- > PGP: D44C 6A5B 71B0 427C CED3 025C BD7D 6D27 ECCB 5814 -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From ben at adversary.org Mon Jun 4 19:11:20 2012 From: ben at adversary.org (Ben McGinnes) Date: Tue, 05 Jun 2012 03:11:20 +1000 Subject: PGP interoperability In-Reply-To: <87zk8j81oa.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <4FBEEC66.6090705@sixdemonbag.org> <4FBF4F65.3000809@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <1924331941.20120530204210@my_localhost> <87lik8dcvo.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FCC76A6.6080001@adversary.org> <87zk8j81oa.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <4FCCEC38.9070006@adversary.org> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 On 5/06/12 2:47 AM, Werner Koch wrote: > On Mon, 4 Jun 2012 10:49, ben at adversary.org said: > >> Was there any explanation of why the marketing people dropped or >> wanted to drop the functionality? > > Maybe outdated technical specs which made it to the marketing > dept. I don't know - you need to ask Symantec. Fair enough. Most people I correspond with use GPG, I'll worry about it if I ever have trouble with someone encrypting to my El-Gamal key. Regards, Ben -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iEYEAREKAAYFAk/M7DgACgkQNxrFv6BK4xMSzQCfU/9j5BT30vntyY+gu4MTnT6a P7AAn1C26VYQVxeeYnDrKLVYNF4N2Kxg =ZucR -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From Lists.gnupg at mephisto.fastmail.net Mon Jun 4 19:16:46 2012 From: Lists.gnupg at mephisto.fastmail.net (Kevin Kammer) Date: Mon, 4 Jun 2012 13:16:46 -0400 Subject: no password needed to export secret-keys? In-Reply-To: References: <2242120.9A1egvFbI5@inno> Message-ID: <20120604171646.GA844@Clarus.mgh.harvard.edu> On Mon, Jun 04, 2012 at 11:57:02AM -0400 Also sprach Sam Smith: > No, the exported file is NOT protected by the passphrase. > > If I export the key. And then delete my secret key from my keyring. > And now Import what I exported, I am not asked for a password before > the import is allowed to complete. That is, Anyone who gains access > to my machine can export my secret key (no password required), take > the product of the export to whatever computer they want and then > import it (no password required). > > I do not see where the security lies. Thanks for the help. > The security lies in the fact that the key you are exporting and importing is itself encrypted. It is encrypted where it resides on your keychain, it is encrypted in the file you export, and it is still encrypted when you import it into another keychain. Adding a password requirement to --export-secret-keys would add a very marginal degree of security, because, as has been noted, anyone with access to your user account on the computer which hosts your keychain (i.e. someone who could presumably run gpg --export-secret-keys on your keychain) could just as easily cp the whole darn keychain; they STILL would not be able to use your key to sign or decrypt without knowing the passphrase of the key. The export command really just provides you with a convenient method of copying a specific key or keys from your keychain, instead of the whole thing. It is almost impossible (or at least not practical) to prevent someone with physical access to your computer from exporting or copying key data which is stored on your hard disk, so the key is always stored in encrypted form, so that even if it is copied, it cannot be used sans passphrase. If you are truly concerned about preventing the possibility that even your encrypted private keys may be copied, consider a solution such as the OpenPGP card, from which it is practically infeasible to export the keys at all. From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Mon Jun 4 20:08:52 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Mon, 04 Jun 2012 14:08:52 -0400 Subject: FAQ, take two In-Reply-To: <20120604163524.GA676@Clarus.mgh.harvard.edu> References: <4FCC11F2.6050303@sixdemonbag.org> <20120604163524.GA676@Clarus.mgh.harvard.edu> Message-ID: <4FCCF9B4.3060606@sixdemonbag.org> On 6/4/12 12:35 PM, Kevin Kammer wrote: > Section 2.6: For Solaris 11, gnupg is also available via the default > IPS publisher. The version Oracle provides is 2.0.17 vs 2.0.18 from > OpenCSW, but it is worth mentioning as it may satisfy parties who are > unwilling (or unable) to install via 3rd-party software sources. I am unfortunately Solaris-impaired: IPS publisher? If you could provide a sentence or two explaining this (preferably in the same general format/wording as the other sections), I'd appreciate it greatly. > Section 4.11 Should almost certainly mention GnuPG integration with > Evolution, which is still the default Gnome email client on many *nix > distros. D'oh, yes. Although I don't know if they support inline signatures yet. I know they support PGP/MIME (rather obsessively) and that inline signatures have been a requested feature, but I'd need someone to confirm the status there -- as well as whether it supports GnuPG 1.4 or 2.0. > Also, for Mutt, I believe I can help with some of the "FIXME"s: Thank you! > General comment: For users completely new to GnuPG (and encryption in > general), the use of the related terms "certificate" and "key" > throughout the FAQ may be confusing. Questions like "What's a > certificate?" "What's a key?" and "What's the difference?" may deserve > an explanation someplace. A good place might be in the "Terminology" > section, which itself should perhaps appear earlier in the FAQ. A good point. I'll introduce it, but for now I'm going to leave the overall numbering intact -- reorgs should take place once the document is stable, not while there's still churn. :) From johnicholas.hines at gmail.com Mon Jun 4 20:37:47 2012 From: johnicholas.hines at gmail.com (Johnicholas Hines) Date: Mon, 4 Jun 2012 14:37:47 -0400 Subject: crypto games Message-ID: Hi. This is perhaps a bit off-topic, but I'm not sure whether there's a better forum. 1. Are there any video games which are educational about public key crypto? I mean the best practices around use of modern crypto, not games focusing on break-classical-encryption puzzles. 2. Are there any moderately-expert crypto users who would enjoy chatting about public-key-crypto-educational video game design? (e.g. via IRC or instant messenger) Johnicholas -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Mon Jun 4 20:50:54 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Mon, 04 Jun 2012 14:50:54 -0400 Subject: crypto games In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <4FCD038E.7070700@sixdemonbag.org> On 6/4/12 2:37 PM, Johnicholas Hines wrote: > 1. Are there any video games which are educational about public key > crypto? I mean the best practices around use of modern crypto, not > games focusing on break-classical-encryption puzzles. There are some serious problems here, not the least of which is there is no canonical set of best practices! There are at best a set of guidelines, many of which are in violent conflict with each other. If it was just a set of rules that had to be followed the field would be much easier, but as it is it's devilishly hard: the practitioner has to balance lots of tradeoffs in order to come up with a policy that maximizes the client's satisfaction. From wk at gnupg.org Mon Jun 4 21:01:39 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Mon, 04 Jun 2012 21:01:39 +0200 Subject: PGP interoperability In-Reply-To: <4FCCEC38.9070006@adversary.org> (Ben McGinnes's message of "Tue, 05 Jun 2012 03:11:20 +1000") References: <4FBEEC66.6090705@sixdemonbag.org> <4FBF4F65.3000809@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <1924331941.20120530204210@my_localhost> <87lik8dcvo.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FCC76A6.6080001@adversary.org> <87zk8j81oa.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FCCEC38.9070006@adversary.org> Message-ID: <87r4tu9a0c.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Mon, 4 Jun 2012 19:11, ben at adversary.org said: > Fair enough. Most people I correspond with use GPG, I'll worry about > it if I ever have trouble with someone encrypting to my El-Gamal key. Not for a compliant OpenPGP implemenations. From RFC-4880: Implementations MUST implement DSA for signatures, and Elgamal for encryption. Implementations SHOULD implement RSA keys (1). RSA Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From wk at gnupg.org Mon Jun 4 21:11:13 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Mon, 04 Jun 2012 21:11:13 +0200 Subject: FAQ, take two In-Reply-To: <20120604163524.GA676@Clarus.mgh.harvard.edu> (Kevin Kammer's message of "Mon, 4 Jun 2012 12:35:25 -0400") References: <4FCC11F2.6050303@sixdemonbag.org> <20120604163524.GA676@Clarus.mgh.harvard.edu> Message-ID: <87mx4i99ke.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Mon, 4 Jun 2012 18:35, Lists.gnupg at mephisto.fastmail.net said: > require extensive manual configuration for it to work properly (but if > you're using Mutt, you already know that). See > http://wiki.mutt.org/?MuttGuide/UseGPG for configuration details. That is not true: Put set crypt_use_gpgme into the ~/.muttrc and you don't need any of the other configure options. Mutt must have been compiled with GPGME support. Check using mutt -v | grep +CRYPT_BACKEND_GPGME Debian builds with gpgme support. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From Lists.gnupg at mephisto.fastmail.net Mon Jun 4 21:35:49 2012 From: Lists.gnupg at mephisto.fastmail.net (Kevin Kammer) Date: Mon, 4 Jun 2012 15:35:49 -0400 Subject: FAQ, take two In-Reply-To: <4FCCF9B4.3060606@sixdemonbag.org> References: <4FCC11F2.6050303@sixdemonbag.org> <20120604163524.GA676@Clarus.mgh.harvard.edu> <4FCCF9B4.3060606@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <20120604193549.GB844@Clarus.mgh.harvard.edu> On Mon, Jun 04, 2012 at 02:08:52PM -0400 Also sprach Robert J. Hansen: > On 6/4/12 12:35 PM, Kevin Kammer wrote: > > Section 2.6: For Solaris 11, gnupg is also available via the default > > IPS publisher. The version Oracle provides is 2.0.17 vs 2.0.18 from > > OpenCSW, but it is worth mentioning as it may satisfy parties who are > > unwilling (or unable) to install via 3rd-party software sources. > > I am unfortunately Solaris-impaired: IPS publisher? If you could > provide a sentence or two explaining this (preferably in the same > general format/wording as the other sections), I'd appreciate it greatly. > IPS is the "Image Packaging System," or simply, the new way that Solaris 11 is managing software distribution. In IPS-speak, a "publisher" is what might be the equivalent of a Linux repository. Solaris 11 installs the default publisher, pkg.oracle.com, which offers GnuPG 2.0.17 as of this writing. That is to say, GnuPG is in the repo, though I'm not sure if it's installed by default or not. However, to install it, one would type (as root, or equivalent): pkg install gnupg So, as you can see, "pkg" is the IPS equivalent of "yum" or "apt-get" or what have you. I would write "a sentence or two explaining this (preferably in the same general format/wording as the other sections)," but upon review of your recent edits to the FAQ, what you have there now looks at least as consistent in detail as the comments for the other OSes, so I would just leave it as it is. You might want to explicitly state that OpenCSW also works with Solaris 10 (and earlier?), since the bullet item begins with "Solaris 11" and makes no mention of other versions. > > Section 4.11 Should almost certainly mention GnuPG integration with > > Evolution, which is still the default Gnome email client on many *nix > > distros. > > D'oh, yes. Although I don't know if they support inline signatures yet. > I know they support PGP/MIME (rather obsessively) and that inline > signatures have been a requested feature, but I'd need someone to > confirm the status there -- as well as whether it supports GnuPG 1.4 or 2.0. > While trying to find answers to these questions via the Gnome Evolution online documentation, I failed to find any useful answers, but I did find the following, misleading information at http://library.gnome.org/users/evolution/stable/mail-encryption-gpg-create-key.html.en "Key servers store your public keys for you so that your friends can decrypt your messages." Yikes! That's not what they're for at all! At least, that's not how I would have phrased it--it sounds like putting your public keys on a keyserver exposes all your encrypted messages to decryption, or am I just reading that strangely? Maybe while we're in the process of updating documentation, someone should file a bug report against that page (assuming I'm not crazy). Oh, and I do have access to a very recent Evolution when I get home, so I suppose I can check these things out (inline signing and GnuPG version compatibility) when I get there. From shavital at gmail.com Mon Jun 4 22:39:15 2012 From: shavital at gmail.com (Charly Avital) Date: Mon, 04 Jun 2012 16:39:15 -0400 Subject: FAQ, take two In-Reply-To: <4FCC11F2.6050303@sixdemonbag.org> References: <4FCC11F2.6050303@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <4FCD1CF3.40502@gmail.com> Robert J. Hansen <4FCC11F2.6050303 at sixdemonbag.org> June 4, 2012 4:22:54 PM wrote: [snip] > Also, if there are any questions you feel are missing, throw them out > too. Thank you! Section "4.7 How do I validate another person?s certificate?" does not deal with what one should do once she/he has signed another person's certificate (after completing the validation process). I believe the etiquette is that the signed key block should be returned to the certificate's owner, for her/him to do what he/she deems convenient, e.g. upload it to a keyserver. The signer himself/herself should not upload the sign key block to a key server, or publish it in any other way, without the certificate's owner explicit authorization or request. That may be hair splitting and not etiquette, but I believe the issue should be clarified. I have had at least two of my certificates signed by someone with whom I had never gone through any kind of validation process, or even discussed the possibility of such a process. The person just signed my certificate and uploaded it to a keyserver. End of rant. Charly. From marco+gnupg at websource.ch Tue Jun 5 02:58:57 2012 From: marco+gnupg at websource.ch (Marco Steinacher) Date: Tue, 05 Jun 2012 02:58:57 +0200 Subject: Problem: cannot generate / copy keys larger than 1024bit on my OpenPGP-compatible card In-Reply-To: <2B854453-0489-40AF-A5A2-7E8648C5312E@robin-kipp.net> References: <3A906D98-05B3-4659-B855-DA962AFA0203@robin-kipp.net> <87vcj8hemz.fsf@gnupg.org> <2B854453-0489-40AF-A5A2-7E8648C5312E@robin-kipp.net> Message-ID: <4FCD59D1.9040502@websource.ch> Hi, Am 03.06.2012 17:45, schrieb Robin Kipp: > However, as I'd much rather use 2048-bit keys, I guess I'll just have > to sort things out with the retailer I got it from... Can you > recommend another brand that produces readers which are easier to > use? E.g. Gemalto or G&D or anything in that direction. Thanks a lot! > Robin I'm using a SCR335 USB Smart Card Reader and a Gemalto USB Shell Token V2 with 2048-bit keys. I haven't had any problems to use it with Linux or Windows. Cheers, Marco From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Tue Jun 5 03:36:30 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Mon, 04 Jun 2012 21:36:30 -0400 Subject: FAQ, take two In-Reply-To: <4FCD1CF3.40502@gmail.com> References: <4FCC11F2.6050303@sixdemonbag.org> <4FCD1CF3.40502@gmail.com> Message-ID: <4FCD629E.8010909@sixdemonbag.org> On 6/4/2012 4:39 PM, Charly Avital wrote: > I believe the etiquette is that the signed key block should be returned > to the certificate's owner, for her/him to do what he/she deems > convenient, e.g. upload it to a keyserver. I haven't found widespread belief this is a community norm. There's a vocal segment that believes one or more of this is a community norm, it must be a community norm, it is morally and/or ethically wrong if it is not a community norm -- but it's a segment, and doesn't seem to be shared by the whole of the community. > The signer himself/herself should not upload the sign key block to a key > server, or publish it in any other way, without the certificate's owner > explicit authorization or request. By what right can I -- or anyone on this list -- claim the authority to declare what members of the community should or shouldn't do? I'm writing a FAQ, not establishing community norms. I don't mind writing the FAQ, but I do mind trying to impose norms. It's not something I'm comfortable with. (Besides. If I tried, people would laugh at me, and deservedly so.) It's reasonable to present the controversy, and I'll make mention of it in the next revision. That's as far as I'll go. Of course, ultimately Werner is the one who gets thumbs-up or thumbs-down on this -- if it's to someday become the official FAQ, then he gets final signoff authority. So if you disagree, feel free to pitch it to him, but you've heard my position on it. :) From shavital at gmail.com Tue Jun 5 04:44:58 2012 From: shavital at gmail.com (Charly Avital) Date: Mon, 04 Jun 2012 22:44:58 -0400 Subject: FAQ, take two In-Reply-To: <4FCD629E.8010909@sixdemonbag.org> References: <4FCC11F2.6050303@sixdemonbag.org> <4FCD1CF3.40502@gmail.com> <4FCD629E.8010909@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <4FCD72AA.5020602@gmail.com> Robert J. Hansen <4FCD629E.8010909 at sixdemonbag.org> June 4, 2012 10:38:58 PM wrote: [...] > It's reasonable to present the controversy, and I'll make mention of it > in the next revision. That's as far as I'll go. Fair enough, and thanks. > Of course, ultimately Werner is the one who gets thumbs-up or > thumbs-down on this -- if it's to someday become the official FAQ, then > he gets final signoff authority. So if you disagree, feel free to pitch > it to him, but you've heard my position on it. :) I agree to your position. Charly From amolp at custom-soft.com Tue Jun 5 06:50:24 2012 From: amolp at custom-soft.com (Amol Patil) Date: Tue, 05 Jun 2012 10:20:24 +0530 Subject: Decryption problems using php Message-ID: <4FCD9010.8080803@custom-soft.com> Hello, Currenlty I am having problem with the decryption of the file my code is like this echo shell_exec("echo $passphrase | $gpg --passphrase-fd 0 -o $unencrypted_file -d $encrypted_file"); when I checked using echo beforer executing it will shown as below passphrase|gpg --output /var/www/directory/directory/directory/Receive/BOEOD840053012142257187.xml --passphrase-fd 0 --decrypt /var/www/directory/directory/directory/Receive/BOEOD840053012142257187.pgp above command is executed correctly using putty but when I tried to use this command using php it is not working. I have set permission to the directory . But it seems it not working $gpg = '/usr/bin/gpg'; $passphrase = 'passphrase'; //$encrypted_file = 'foo.gpg'; //$unencrypted_file = 'foo.txt'; echo shell_exec("echo $passphrase | $gpg --passphrase-fd 0 $unencrypted_file -d $encrypted_file"); Please assist me to work it correctly. I am facing such problems last 2 weeks. We are using ubuntu 12.04 LTS (GNU/Linux 3.2.0-24-generic i686). -- *Thanks & regards,* ** *Amol Patil * *Custom**Soft* *+ 91 -- 020 - 3251 7794 * amolp at custom-soft.com | www.custom-soft.com -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From gnupg at lists.grepular.com Tue Jun 5 11:22:17 2012 From: gnupg at lists.grepular.com (gnupg at lists.grepular.com) Date: Tue, 05 Jun 2012 10:22:17 +0100 Subject: FAQ, take two In-Reply-To: <4FCD629E.8010909@sixdemonbag.org> References: <4FCC11F2.6050303@sixdemonbag.org> <4FCD1CF3.40502@gmail.com> <4FCD629E.8010909@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <4FCDCFC9.6050606@lists.grepular.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 05/06/12 02:36, Robert J. Hansen wrote: >> I believe the etiquette is that the signed key block should be >> returned to the certificate's owner, for her/him to do what >> he/she deems convenient, e.g. upload it to a keyserver. > > I haven't found widespread belief this is a community norm. > There's a vocal segment that believes one or more of this is a > community norm, it must be a community norm, it is morally and/or > ethically wrong if it is not a community norm -- but it's a > segment, and doesn't seem to be shared by the whole of the > community. > >> The signer himself/herself should not upload the sign key block >> to a key server, or publish it in any other way, without the >> certificate's owner explicit authorization or request. > > By what right can I -- or anyone on this list -- claim the > authority to declare what members of the community should or > shouldn't do? I'm writing a FAQ, not establishing community norms. > I don't mind writing the FAQ, but I do mind trying to impose norms. > It's not something I'm comfortable with. (Besides. If I tried, > people would laugh at me, and deservedly so.) > > It's reasonable to present the controversy, and I'll make mention > of it in the next revision. That's as far as I'll go. FWIW, until I read somebody complaining about people uploading key signatures, instead of sending them to the key owner, it never occurred to me that it could possibly be a problem for anyone. My immediate thought on reading it for the first time was that if it's a bad thing, then the keyservers should prevent it. Even if it was obviously a bad thing, people would still do it. So if it's completely morally ambiguous, and possible, it's going to happen. No amount of documentation or education will change that. I mean, technically it should be easy for the keyservers to email the owner of a key to ask if a signature should be accepted. Or to refuse uploaded signatures unless they are themselves signed by the owner of the key. If it really is a problem, then it can be fixed with code. > Of course, ultimately Werner is the one who gets thumbs-up or > thumbs-down on this -- if it's to someday become the official FAQ, > then he gets final signoff authority. So if you disagree, feel > free to pitch it to him, but you've heard my position on it. :) Doesn't matter what the FAQ says in this regard. It will continue to happen unless the key servers actively prevent it. - -- Mike Cardwell https://grepular.com/ http://cardwellit.com/ OpenPGP Key 35BC AF1D 3AA2 1F84 3DC3 B0CF 70A5 F512 0018 461F XMPP OTR Key 8924 B06A 7917 AAF3 DBB1 BF1B 295C 3C78 3EF1 46B4 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQGGBAEBAgBwBQJPzc/JMBSAAAAAACAAB3ByZWZlcnJlZC1lbWFpbC1lbmNvZGlu Z0BwZ3AuY29tcGdwbWltZTgUgAAAAAAVABpwa2EtYWRkcmVzc0BnbnVwZy5vcmdt aWtlLmNhcmR3ZWxsQGdyZXB1bGFyLmNvbQAKCRCdJiMBwdHnBJaOCACjRmIiftT3 1TrQgtsh22xVOCzFJ9rasilQSrIvtZo3yO/S/ov9z37IEn3xeHC3R9xc3jHC2BJ1 9tCrK6OS8SBgWS4o6zzEB9isfULG7466ljeZgc9Oe8kBZONJkHVQ5Tp8x7cCOaHV xhFtO7LX9na4YzL+1ZtwjWTeMR0+H93MKU0KhexhwS0VcU8S5hWu63/xIYB+YrAO mHR/klnTvWym+KEsjUyfBLquLQ+xYZA4iKTBsKBMYHLpp2eDGIru8xDB6a3gzUYB OiiZYXS1sZRZZqd5JbB/SHEM6NMn7U3IpIkLeAAivGoWbPq2ZmAsf/U+jVD9Fv5I HZ2VhX4eEydA =PHqH -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Tue Jun 5 12:36:51 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Tue, 05 Jun 2012 06:36:51 -0400 Subject: FAQ, take two In-Reply-To: <4FCDCFC9.6050606@lists.grepular.com> References: <4FCC11F2.6050303@sixdemonbag.org> <4FCD1CF3.40502@gmail.com> <4FCD629E.8010909@sixdemonbag.org> <4FCDCFC9.6050606@lists.grepular.com> Message-ID: <4FCDE143.4090205@sixdemonbag.org> On 6/5/2012 5:22 AM, gnupg at lists.grepular.com wrote: > FWIW, until I read somebody complaining about people uploading key > signatures, instead of sending them to the key owner, it never > occurred to me that it could possibly be a problem for anyone. I'll go one step further: my personal belief is that this pursuit is a fool's errand. What people are really asking for is a concept the military calls ORCON, for "ORiginator CONtrol" [1]. The idea is that with ORCON data the person or agency that originated the data gets absolute control over how the data is disseminated and how it may be released. To do ORCON within the context of public-key certificates, we would need: 1. Infrastructure. The keyserver-no-modify flag is a nice idea, but no keyserver currently honors it. 2. Training. ORCON is a hard thing to pull off, and requires that the originator and those who come into contact with the data know how to treat ORCON data. That's simply not going to happen. 3. Accountability. There needs to be some way or ways to detect ORCON violations and handle offenders appropriately (social condemnation). But there's no way to tell who uploads a certificate to a keyserver. If Bob signs Alice's key and Charlie, Bob's roommate, who has access to Bob's public keyring, later uploads Alice's certificate to the keyserver, it makes no sense to blame Bob (the signer) for what Charlie did (violate ORCON). But since there's no way to trace it back to Charlie... Once those three are addressed then I'll take the "I want ORCON" crowd seriously. Until then, my response to the ORCON crowd is "I want stronger beer and honest politicians." I think it's foolish to try to establish a social norm which offenders cannot be identified and the norm cannot be enforced. That doesn't mean I think Charly's wishes shouldn't be respected: he's made his wishes clear and I think decent people will respect them. But there's a difference between saying "I'll respect the desires of someone who makes their wishes on this subject clear" and "there is a social norm which must be upheld." [1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Classified_information_in_the_United_States#Handling_caveats From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Tue Jun 5 13:24:54 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Tue, 05 Jun 2012 07:24:54 -0400 Subject: FAQ, take two In-Reply-To: <4FCD1CF3.40502@gmail.com> References: <4FCC11F2.6050303@sixdemonbag.org> <4FCD1CF3.40502@gmail.com> Message-ID: <4FCDEC86.4060208@sixdemonbag.org> > The signer himself/herself should not upload the sign key block to a key > server, or publish it in any other way, without the certificate's owner > explicit authorization or request. The new text reads, "Finally, if you have elected to make a normal signature you may wish to upload the newly-signed certificate to the keyserver network so that other users may benefit from seeing your assurance of the certificate?s authenticity. This may be done by typing gpg2 --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net --send-key certificate ID. However, some people consider it rude or offensive for others to upload their certificates without their express permission. It may be worthwhile to check with the certificate owner before doing this." ... Since the text is now relatively stable, it's time for me to begin doing a detail pass. As part of this, I'm going to be reorganizing the text and layout. If anyone has recommendations about this, please speak up now. With luck, we can have this thing to Werner by the end of the week. :) From mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com Tue Jun 5 13:48:52 2012 From: mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com (Mika Suomalainen) Date: Tue, 05 Jun 2012 14:48:52 +0300 Subject: no password needed to export secret-keys? In-Reply-To: References: , , <2242120.9A1egvFbI5@inno>, Message-ID: <4FCDF224.70201@hotmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 04.06.2012 18:57, Sam Smith wrote: > > No, the exported file is NOT protected by the passphrase. > > If I export the key. And then delete my secret key from my keyring. > And now Import what I exported, I am not asked for a password > before the import is allowed to complete. That is, Anyone who gains > access to my machine can export my secret key (no password > required), take the product of the export to whatever computer they > want and then import it (no password required). > > I do not see where the security lies. Thanks for the help. > >> From: mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de To: gnupg-users at gnupg.org CC: >> smickson at hotmail.com Subject: Re: no password needed to export >> secret-keys? Date: Mon, 4 Jun 2012 17:22:05 +0200 >> >> Am Mo 04.06.2012, 10:27:00 schrieb Sam Smith: >> >>> When I use the command: gpg --armor --output >>> --export-secret-keys >>> >>> shouldn't I be asked for the secret key's password before >>> Export is > allowed >>> to complete? I've tried this on both Windows 7 and Ubuntu Linux >>> and I'm never asked for a password. This doesn't seem secure to >>> me. I would > think >>> that Export should not be allowed to occur until after the >>> key's > password >>> is provided. Do I have something mis-configured? Can you >>> explain how > this >>> is secure? >> >> The exported file is protected by the passphrase. That is similar >> to > copying >> the secring. >> >> If you want the exported file to have a different passphrase then >> you > have to >> (make a backup of the secring and then) change the passphrase > (--edit-key), >> export the secret key afterwards and then either change the >> passphrase > back or >> overwrite the secring with the backup. >> >> >> Hauke -- PGP: D44C 6A5B 71B0 427C CED3 025C BD7D 6D27 ECCB 5814 If you import the key and then sign something with it, you are probably asked for a password. - -- [Mika Suomalainen](https://mkaysi.github.com/) || [gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net --recv-keys 4DB53CFE82A46728](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/key.txt) || [Why do I sign my emails?](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/WhyDoISignEmails.html) || [Please don't send HTML.](http://mkaysi.github.com/articles/complaining/HTML.html) || [This signature](https://gist.github.com/2643070#file_icedove.md) || [Please reply below this line](http://mkaysi.github.com/articles/complaining/topposting.html) ____________________________ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.19 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Homepage: http://mkaysi.github.com/ Comment: gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net 82A46728 Comment: Public key: http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/key.txt Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJPzfIhAAoJEE21PP6CpGcooSEP/Rc+mJaBEOrG+3ImKYzqRcuM Uw3Lxu8lg1MOpOB2xYWKrY1YBMgAqDJvmP6epRwJGooxRkD+skmVOqV5PuX6wZ3T tTiz4lzSvYIEJFOLZhwTYHxzumtmDeY2CLqpj/JNx3NEOeACtch/l2gWnavFxPkz R5oDt5D+HW8Gq743P7nMysC5MdW5LY+t7KMoZzUHFJszT1FNisKueSYXc1CnTrIt HLm4gLoEEk5rQs+ZQeIEIeXCFDjfNbCBP1u8lVok531rAptuGMCvcHxixxKX2Bku IMDjD9A5LpArfP4eV2XSKmfWaDBl9BK3yN+WFu05SsXtmoUdwnx4T7oQXndsSwP0 avEqfQxQVQ8VI95ARaTlhGtytDfGrSrmb+b76+cPK2Bznwdb/2jUw6ssVQXVP6Tm /IC1ywYIZdxwxSTFGA1JvjppfF0aL0/fW1d9BAG3G4AJ6KH4IEQ/QYofQ0vS3Hf/ MtcJL0LZYV/tuacE5k0K9XDoRJHKkGmiY20GKuqzoscjhXMFOfyyV68n3lnH51E6 Gbw9iHsQkgq9HHGhqNwJcIx3lo6CSGaFZvvy3/ccnlfdo1+1M4IpAvgGaF0BGDsO 5otqlgR+zFp5xOGuPN+/5tCNWNnwVlspL1Sq/rlzhtNXn5+lPsZOPu6o94tHoFlu flp//Z2BBUAgPWNiBMdO =zM+R -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From wk at gnupg.org Tue Jun 5 13:45:51 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Tue, 05 Jun 2012 13:45:51 +0200 Subject: FAQ, take two In-Reply-To: <4FCDE143.4090205@sixdemonbag.org> (Robert J. Hansen's message of "Tue, 05 Jun 2012 06:36:51 -0400") References: <4FCC11F2.6050303@sixdemonbag.org> <4FCD1CF3.40502@gmail.com> <4FCD629E.8010909@sixdemonbag.org> <4FCDCFC9.6050606@lists.grepular.com> <4FCDE143.4090205@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <874nqq7zio.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Hi, IMHO (Open)PGP's good repudiation comes to great extend from the fact, that it does not require rigor policies to use the keys. It is an ad-hoc scheme and that is what differences it from S/MIME and PKIX. It was my fault that I once set the no-modify flag for all new keys. In practice this flag is useless. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From lion at lion.leolix.org Tue Jun 5 12:09:22 2012 From: lion at lion.leolix.org (Philipp Schafft) Date: Tue, 05 Jun 2012 12:09:22 +0200 Subject: Decryption problems using php In-Reply-To: <4FCD9010.8080803@custom-soft.com> References: <4FCD9010.8080803@custom-soft.com> Message-ID: <20120605100924.932C079E3F@priderock.keep-cool.org> reflum, On Tue, 2012-06-05 at 10:20 +0530, Amol Patil wrote: > Currenlty I am having problem with the decryption of the file my code > is like this > > echo shell_exec("echo $passphrase | $gpg --passphrase-fd 0 -o > $unencrypted_file -d $encrypted_file"); If you do this the passphrase can be shown by any user on the system (for example using the ps(1) command). The window for this is small yet this adds an attack vector. This attack becomes more easy as you may trigger it via your web application (don't know what kind of webapplication this is so just gussing here). Also if you store the passphrase in your scripts it is plain on your FS. Anyone with FS access can read it. This also includes explits in your and other software running on your webserver. Even worse: of your webserver's config is broken at some point it may handle your files as plain text or something and allowing remote users to just read your passphrase with a web browser. I suggest you to drop the passphrase from the key as it does not add any security in this case but makes stuff like this more complex. You can actually improve the security by only storing the needed subkey(s) on your server and have the primary key protected off-side (for example on your work/devel system). If you need only decrypting on-side this will perfectly protect you from attacks doing signatures or certificates (sigs on other keys) or changing the key's crypto material or options. So if there was a successfull attack somewhere in the future you can just revoke this subkey and add a new one so your clients can update using normal keyservers/... without needing to pass fingerprints around again. Hope I was of at least some help :) PS: another attack which is fully off-topic to this list is injecting something in $unencrypted_file or $encrypted_file. You need to fully trust the content of those vars. -- Philipp. (Rah of PH2) -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 482 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part URL: From wk at gnupg.org Tue Jun 5 14:56:48 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Tue, 05 Jun 2012 14:56:48 +0200 Subject: FAQ, take two In-Reply-To: <4FCDEC86.4060208@sixdemonbag.org> (Robert J. Hansen's message of "Tue, 05 Jun 2012 07:24:54 -0400") References: <4FCC11F2.6050303@sixdemonbag.org> <4FCD1CF3.40502@gmail.com> <4FCDEC86.4060208@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <87lik17w8f.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Tue, 5 Jun 2012 13:24, rjh at sixdemonbag.org said: > text and layout. If anyone has recommendations about this, please speak > up now. With luck, we can have this thing to Werner by the end of the Some time ago I added custom ids to most questions; for example: ** What is the recommended key size? :PROPERTIES: :CUSTOM_ID: what-is-the-recommended-key-size :END: The idea is that we can change the question but keep links to the FAQ intact. I guess it will be my work to re-add them while I convert them to org-mode. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From Lists.gnupg at mephisto.fastmail.net Tue Jun 5 15:24:35 2012 From: Lists.gnupg at mephisto.fastmail.net (Kevin Kammer) Date: Tue, 5 Jun 2012 09:24:35 -0400 Subject: FAQ, take two In-Reply-To: <87mx4i99ke.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <4FCC11F2.6050303@sixdemonbag.org> <20120604163524.GA676@Clarus.mgh.harvard.edu> <87mx4i99ke.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <20120605132435.GA17607@Clarus.mgh.harvard.edu> On Mon, Jun 04, 2012 at 09:11:13PM +0200 Also sprach Werner Koch: > On Mon, 4 Jun 2012 18:35, Lists.gnupg at mephisto.fastmail.net said: > > > require extensive manual configuration for it to work properly (but if > > you're using Mutt, you already know that). See > > http://wiki.mutt.org/?MuttGuide/UseGPG for configuration details. > > That is not true: Put > > set crypt_use_gpgme > > into the ~/.muttrc and you don't need any of the other configure > options. Mutt must have been compiled with GPGME support. Check using > > mutt -v | grep +CRYPT_BACKEND_GPGME > > Debian builds with gpgme support. > Apparently so does Red Hat/Fedora; the mutt package in the repos has this feature included. The default MacPorts configuration, however, did not; I had to recompile (which was easy using the port command). I don't know if this is a coincidence or not, but I will mention that for the first time in a long while, Mutt segfaulted when I tried to open a message on the gnupg mailing list... presumably when it tried to call gnupg to do an automatic signature verification? Other signatures have verified fine since I switched to using gpgme; I'm hoping this will prove to be an isolated incident, related to the structure of that one signature (it does it every time I try to open that message). In any case, thanks for the tip. From klaus.layer at gmx.de Tue Jun 5 15:01:27 2012 From: klaus.layer at gmx.de (Klaus Layer) Date: Tue, 05 Jun 2012 15:01:27 +0200 Subject: scdaemon needs restarting after removing OpenPGP smartcard Message-ID: <3785469.PpAnc3XbCo@slamaq> Hi, when I remove a cryptostick and try to access it with i.e. gpg2 --card-status I get an error gpg: selecting openpgp failed: ec=6.32848 gpg: OpenPGP card not available: general error In this case scdaemon log shows scdaemon[4167]: chan_7 <- SERIALNO openpgp 2012-06-05 14:35:39 scdaemon[4167] PC/SC RESET failed: invalid value (0x80100011) scdaemon[4167]: chan_7 -> ERR 100663404 Card error scdaemon[4167]: chan_7 <- RESTART scdaemon[4167]: chan_7 -> OK I found ticket https://bugs.g10code.com/gnupg/issue1238 which describes this error. Are there any plans to downport the fix described in the ticket to 2.0.X. Thanks, Klaus From wk at gnupg.org Tue Jun 5 16:15:01 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Tue, 05 Jun 2012 16:15:01 +0200 Subject: FAQ, take two In-Reply-To: <20120605132435.GA17607@Clarus.mgh.harvard.edu> (Kevin Kammer's message of "Tue, 5 Jun 2012 09:24:35 -0400") References: <4FCC11F2.6050303@sixdemonbag.org> <20120604163524.GA676@Clarus.mgh.harvard.edu> <87mx4i99ke.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <20120605132435.GA17607@Clarus.mgh.harvard.edu> Message-ID: <87haup7sm2.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Tue, 5 Jun 2012 15:24, Lists.gnupg at mephisto.fastmail.net said: > I don't know if this is a coincidence or not, but I will mention that > for the first time in a long while, Mutt segfaulted when I tried to > open a message on the gnupg mailing list... presumably when it tried I see two reasons for it: - It is many years since I wrote the gpgme backend code and restructured Mutt's crypto stuff. There is certainly some bit rot. - This feature is not well known and thus not anymore well tested. I don't use Mutt anymore for regular mail processing and thus I am not affected (I know, that this is a lame excuse). Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From wk at gnupg.org Tue Jun 5 17:55:12 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Tue, 05 Jun 2012 17:55:12 +0200 Subject: scdaemon needs restarting after removing OpenPGP smartcard In-Reply-To: <3785469.PpAnc3XbCo@slamaq> (Klaus Layer's message of "Tue, 05 Jun 2012 15:01:27 +0200") References: <3785469.PpAnc3XbCo@slamaq> Message-ID: <87d35d7nz3.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Tue, 5 Jun 2012 15:01, klaus.layer at gmx.de said: > I found ticket https://bugs.g10code.com/gnupg/issue1238 which describes this > error. Are there any plans to downport the fix described in the ticket to > 2.0.X. The fix seems to be this: commit 2d91febbd8d30beb7eb33f7aa80ffd5691d1d3cc Author: Werner Koch Date: Wed Dec 14 10:30:01 2011 +0100 scd: Fix resetting and closing of the reader. * scd/command.c (update_card_removed): Do no act on an invalid VRDR. (do_reset): Ignore apdu_reset error codes for no and inactive card. Close the reader before setting the slot to -1. (update_reader_status_file): Notify the application before closing the reader. -- With this change the scd now works as it did in the past. In particular there is no more endless loop trying to open the reader by the update_reader_status_file ticker function. That bug basically blocked all card operations until the scdaemon was killed. However it won't apply directly because we changed other things in 2.1 as well. We should port it back. gniibe: You reported a couple of other possible problems. Do you thing we should go after them for a 2.0.20? Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From mat at spoked.ca Tue Jun 5 18:43:12 2012 From: mat at spoked.ca (Mathieu Jolicoeur) Date: Tue, 05 Jun 2012 12:43:12 -0400 Subject: GnuPG 2.0.19 + Cryptostick - decryption fails with 4096 bit key Message-ID: <4FCE3720.2020504@spoked.ca> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Hello, I have recently generated subkeys to use with a GPF Cryptostick. I decided to make full use of the ability to use 4096 bit keys with recent versions of GnuPG ( > 2.0.18 I think). Everything is working except when trying to decrypt a file or message encrypted to my encryption subkey. On this topic, I have found the following thread on the GPF forums, which lead me back to this list. https://www.privacyfoundation.de/forum/viewtopic.php?f=13&t=1145 The error output is the same as in the above thread, with no more detail than: gpg: public key decryption failed: General error gpg: decryption failed: No secret key Somehow, gpg2 is not able to read the key from the card. Is this a known bug? I have not found anyone else documenting this. Thanks, Mat -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.19 (GNU/Linux) iQIcBAEBCAAGBQJPzjcVAAoJEOb1qSIu+bHnmG4QAIJeqqLkRFhnVnONzFAW36MH 2uXisY/5jGLxaz/tiugFB57j4vOm9WJJ391iEa63quZDjuXnqW5UgKm94WZ7VmTb RJ61B0laKfiOi57liOIYF6Sck83+AarkRy9ohiekyXlE36lQNWQq7rmeq0QUJ51l qaGZkVTX6KFNc29s72EIU0AC7Sqa9649UTVRecfWqmd2HjH5apxS92cIpRphVQj0 r752jRpYR0VuRjwaAJicVeg1A3Vq+BsqptwkqcpGeTILR+6bnRDOxSs/MvpIEK/h mg47BXIeRPMiO3LuWPw0TjfLVNtBet89BZqZ0VY/NVAWNI8n01B/HpGl8T8fApH1 8kfWVgLfinjg4ejlLC9NBz5pj7LI+GzVY+uUXpjLR0zsuCnT+WbsqAVCLmK36UDQ ZN1PsjL/cnjBafyelAyTbe88dFd7PDzvPu0JaHHoyPz90WIfFSFLX9IwTGyGrW/8 rrGxUX0BFyg9hw1kFv4lzwss1tO6SGMrt3adNTt5fx9ZNJ1KAUaq7M03jSs9qEZ/ 4W1dh7EzK3RFDUAbL5NaqcWVjc0KlAj64jUYGpWv7hvIQvZ8WKcIjvUdG98Blpsf vC/d7xNDCc1hfDbcre0CkIueTuTP86+g8PGfURqz2rkz1oYEMe8tuKBKpNIaAxKQ //+eIxetiaUvr8VlsTLa =O7pO -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Tue Jun 5 19:22:09 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Tue, 05 Jun 2012 13:22:09 -0400 Subject: FAQ, take two In-Reply-To: <87lik17w8f.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <4FCC11F2.6050303@sixdemonbag.org> <4FCD1CF3.40502@gmail.com> <4FCDEC86.4060208@sixdemonbag.org> <87lik17w8f.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <4FCE4041.7000502@sixdemonbag.org> On 6/5/12 8:56 AM, Werner Koch wrote: > Some time ago I added custom ids to most questions; for example: I can add these: it shouldn't be a problem. The reason I'm using XHTML, incidentally, is to make it as easy as possible for you to convert it into org-mode: an hour's work with a SAX parser should be able to take care of most of it. If I knew the first thing about org-mode I'd write the script myself. From wk at gnupg.org Tue Jun 5 20:48:57 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Tue, 05 Jun 2012 20:48:57 +0200 Subject: GnuPG 2.0.19 + Cryptostick - decryption fails with 4096 bit key In-Reply-To: <4FCE3720.2020504@spoked.ca> (Mathieu Jolicoeur's message of "Tue, 05 Jun 2012 12:43:12 -0400") References: <4FCE3720.2020504@spoked.ca> Message-ID: <874nqp7fxh.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Tue, 5 Jun 2012 18:43, mat at spoked.ca said: > Somehow, gpg2 is not able to read the key from the card. Is this a > known bug? I have not found anyone else documenting this. I don't have a crypto stick, thus I can't test it. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From kloecker at kde.org Tue Jun 5 22:26:08 2012 From: kloecker at kde.org (Ingo =?iso-8859-1?q?Kl=F6cker?=) Date: Tue, 05 Jun 2012 22:26:08 +0200 Subject: FAQ, take two In-Reply-To: <4FCC11F2.6050303@sixdemonbag.org> References: <4FCC11F2.6050303@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <201206052226.17795@thufir.ingo-kloecker.de> On Monday 04 June 2012, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > Also, if there are any questions you feel are missing, throw them out > too. Thank you! An addition for 4.11: Kontact [http://userbase.kde.org/Kontact]/Kontact Touch [http://userbase.kde.org/Kontact_Touch] Plugin? No (natively supported) Supports GnuPG versions: 1.4, 2.0 Supports pgp/mime? Yes (and inline PGP) Actively developed? Yes Project blurb: Kontact is the integrated Personal Information Manager (mail, address book, calendar, etc.) of KDE. It runs on Linux, various unices, and, as Kontact Touch, on a few mobiles. There is also an alpha version running on Windows [http://wiki.kolab.org/Kontact_for_Windows_(Enterprise-5)]. The GnuPG support is mature and RFC 3156-compliant. Feel free to shorten the blurb (e.g. the bit about the supported platforms). Side note: Support for PGP/MIME (and S/MIME) in Kontact (and Mutt) was developed as part of the Aegypten (http://gnupg.org/aegypten/) and Aegypten2 [http://gnupg.org/aegypten2/] projects among others by the people behind GnuPG. Regards, Ingo -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 198 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From mat at spoked.ca Wed Jun 6 00:32:31 2012 From: mat at spoked.ca (Mathieu Jolicoeur) Date: Tue, 05 Jun 2012 18:32:31 -0400 Subject: GnuPG 2.0.19 + Cryptostick - decryption fails with 4096 bit key In-Reply-To: References: <4FCE3720.2020504@spoked.ca> Message-ID: <4FCE88FF.9080703@spoked.ca> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 On 06/05/2012 05:46 PM, Richard wrote: > > This could be pretty much the same issue which Edmond and Kevin > are experiencing: > > http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/2012-April/044195.html > > http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/2012-May/044335.html Thanks for the references. After reading them, I come to the same conclusion. I enabled the debug log for scdaemon and can attest to the same behavior. There is no interaction with the card in the log when trying to decrypt. Mat -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.19 (GNU/Linux) iQIcBAEBCAAGBQJPzojwAAoJEOb1qSIu+bHnanAP/RDPqsAQTsFyHNzQEZoz8Jnl SWXiUy3bWiIxQC00fkZpRUU9I15WRAFYybqnhO1hzdNkhJ9u+Gq+JUq53tygBee3 dz5YeR9vOyyaPr9hGC9IvpqGVNH5fdvOGZGZ1x3S6k5PYtBi2BGlOS1nbtC9Kf/S PNwO2Gme9QI8+xRCD8mMTcxnRlUjmBpR25exjFF1bnJklSB/ah59x7oHoE98o3iQ EW2gJZEE9fi2Mqnbe11ObevcolBUqP0NUiS+dPLpn1hJUj3d7Eb6zlBhM12Eu+uA SF871BkmAI6Bp0KtaritWaPUPBxmY+fMHvbYINhMu97G1gf3gq2Vsezj7Ddjq6tW lzZKpZc1Uc9PT47pPz5zrieWrxR44YRIZpmAkXyGYrslEdNnH7jkrEwY5u5TlAs+ ETYmwBAmxfFTcejgSW8hh6NXzatGHDBb8p4M7FG3LU8zHEBYHzHamtTLyzo4h1c1 jw7+KxgGVyD2IQVnn9aPUy2fhZuPRF2zBBNA82hMWTlJFL8Ryv2J6iF2To2wXDS0 OcHTfTPU8f6xgXLniO60cy5v50RODBPY8C7Ymr2zdqSjSHWHWiVnOpDBOtTy5h+0 b0Mai+AZvC6enxOjZssCDsQmHbZ2Uv1o5dCWxOE+l4+7p7iJKXpeOxFMYwEXVZYh Mfm/qzzQtlR1ACxc4BhQ =ge8C -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From richard at r-selected.de Tue Jun 5 23:46:37 2012 From: richard at r-selected.de (Richard) Date: Tue, 5 Jun 2012 23:46:37 +0200 Subject: GnuPG 2.0.19 + Cryptostick - decryption fails with 4096 bit key In-Reply-To: <4FCE3720.2020504@spoked.ca> References: <4FCE3720.2020504@spoked.ca> Message-ID: On Tue, Jun 5, 2012 at 6:43 PM, Mathieu Jolicoeur wrote: > On this topic, I have found the following thread on the GPF forums, > which lead me back to this list. > > https://www.privacyfoundation.de/forum/viewtopic.php?f=13&t=1145 This could be pretty much the same issue which Edmond and Kevin are experiencing: http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/2012-April/044195.html http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/2012-May/044335.html From wk at gnupg.org Wed Jun 6 10:51:21 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Wed, 06 Jun 2012 10:51:21 +0200 Subject: FAQ, take two In-Reply-To: <201206052226.17795@thufir.ingo-kloecker.de> ("Ingo =?utf-8?Q?Kl=C3=B6cker=22's?= message of "Tue, 05 Jun 2012 22:26:08 +0200") References: <4FCC11F2.6050303@sixdemonbag.org> <201206052226.17795@thufir.ingo-kloecker.de> Message-ID: <87ipf46cxi.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Tue, 5 Jun 2012 22:26, kloecker at kde.org said: > Supports GnuPG versions: 1.4, 2.0 FWIW: Kontact Touch has been developed against GnuPG 2.1. I am not sure whether it works with 2.0. The Linux version will likely work but the WindowsCE version won't work - but well, nobody is using the latter. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From wk at gnupg.org Wed Jun 6 10:57:37 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Wed, 06 Jun 2012 10:57:37 +0200 Subject: FAQ, take two In-Reply-To: <4FCE4041.7000502@sixdemonbag.org> (Robert J. Hansen's message of "Tue, 05 Jun 2012 13:22:09 -0400") References: <4FCC11F2.6050303@sixdemonbag.org> <4FCD1CF3.40502@gmail.com> <4FCDEC86.4060208@sixdemonbag.org> <87lik17w8f.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FCE4041.7000502@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <87ehps6cn2.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Tue, 5 Jun 2012 19:22, rjh at sixdemonbag.org said: > I can add these: it shouldn't be a problem. The reason I'm using XHTML, > incidentally, is to make it as easy as possible for you to convert it > into org-mode: an hour's work with a SAX parser should be able to take > care of most of it. If I knew the first thing about org-mode I'd write > the script myself. org-mode is pretty easy to understand. The current faq.org should be sufficent as an example. Redering it to txt and html is a quick 10 lines rule in doc/Makefile.am. Add ~4 lines for each other format (PDF, ODT, Latex, XOXO, DocBook). Let me give the conversion a try once you are finished. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From gniibe at fsij.org Wed Jun 6 04:37:06 2012 From: gniibe at fsij.org (NIIBE Yutaka) Date: Wed, 06 Jun 2012 11:37:06 +0900 Subject: scdaemon needs restarting after removing OpenPGP smartcard In-Reply-To: <87d35d7nz3.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <3785469.PpAnc3XbCo@slamaq> <87d35d7nz3.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <1338950226.1968.6.camel@latx1.gniibe.org> On 2012-06-05 at 17:55 +0200, Werner Koch wrote: > gniibe: You reported a couple of other possible problems. Do you thing > we should go after them for a 2.0.20? My changes are basically two areas in master branch. (1) Fix of ccid-driver.c for partial support of extended APDU. This was needed for Gnuk (< version 0.16). (2) Pinpad input enhancement for passphrase modification. Besides, I know there is a problem in scd_update_reader_status_file, which was repoprted the other day, but I haven't fixed yet. I think that access to the object of "struct slot_status_s" should be locked. I'll lock into those for backporting. -- From smickson at hotmail.com Wed Jun 6 14:54:51 2012 From: smickson at hotmail.com (Sam Smith) Date: Wed, 6 Jun 2012 08:54:51 -0400 Subject: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? Message-ID: Can someone please verify that I have the legit public key to verify GnuPG with? I checked the website but the Fingerprint is not given anywhere. I got this Fingerprint for the Public Key I downloaded D869 2123 C406 5DEA 5E0F 3AB5 249B 39D2 4F25 E3B6 -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From shavital at gmail.com Wed Jun 6 15:31:15 2012 From: shavital at gmail.com (Charly Avital) Date: Wed, 06 Jun 2012 09:31:15 -0400 Subject: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <4FCF5BA3.9030501@gmail.com> Sam Smith June 6, 2012 9:25:37 AM wrote: Sam Smith wrote on 6/6/12 8:54 AM: > Can someone please verify that I have the legit public key to verify > GnuPG with? I checked the website but the Fingerprint is not given anywhere. > > I got this Fingerprint for the Public Key I downloaded > > D869 2123 C406 5DEA 5E0F 3AB5 249B 39D2 4F25 E3B6 That's the fingerprint for Werner Koch (dist sig): pub 2048R/4F25E3B6 created: 2011-01-12 expires: 2019-12-31 usage: SC trust: [] validity: [] sub 2048R/AC87C71A created: 2011-01-12 expires: 2019-12-31 usage: A [] (1). Werner Koch (dist sig) pub 2048R/4F25E3B6 2011-01-12 Werner Koch (dist sig) Primary key fingerprint: D869 2123 C406 5DEA 5E0F 3AB5 249B 39D2 4F25 E3B6 Hope this is what you were looking for. Charly Mac OS X 10.7.4 (11E52) MacBook Intel C2Duo MacGPG2-2.0.17-9 Thunderbird 13.0 Enigmail 1.4.2 (20120519-0100) From smickson at hotmail.com Wed Jun 6 15:39:12 2012 From: smickson at hotmail.com (Sam Smith) Date: Wed, 6 Jun 2012 09:39:12 -0400 Subject: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? In-Reply-To: <4FCF5BA3.9030501@gmail.com> References: , <4FCF5BA3.9030501@gmail.com> Message-ID: Yeah, thanks. It's the key that signed the .sig and the one I needed to download to verify. I downloaded it from a Key Server--don't know how else to get the public key. I checked the gpg package legitimacy on a computer that already had gpg installed. But wanted to make sure I had a legit pub key for the new machine i was building. Thanks! Is there another way to verify the legitimacy of a downloaded public key? (assuming you don't know any of the other sigs on the pub key that is, obviously). Or is asking on a user list like this the recommended way? > Date: Wed, 6 Jun 2012 09:31:15 -0400 > From: shavital at gmail.com > To: gnupg-users at gnupg.org > Subject: Re: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? > > Sam Smith June 6, 2012 > 9:25:37 AM wrote: > Sam Smith wrote on 6/6/12 8:54 AM: > > Can someone please verify that I have the legit public key to verify > > GnuPG with? I checked the website but the Fingerprint is not given anywhere. > > > > I got this Fingerprint for the Public Key I downloaded > > > > D869 2123 C406 5DEA 5E0F 3AB5 249B 39D2 4F25 E3B6 > > That's the fingerprint for Werner Koch (dist sig): > > pub 2048R/4F25E3B6 created: 2011-01-12 expires: 2019-12-31 usage: SC > trust: [] validity: [] > sub 2048R/AC87C71A created: 2011-01-12 expires: 2019-12-31 usage: A > [] (1). Werner Koch (dist sig) > pub 2048R/4F25E3B6 2011-01-12 Werner Koch (dist sig) > Primary key fingerprint: D869 2123 C406 5DEA 5E0F 3AB5 249B 39D2 4F25 E3B6 > > > > Hope this is what you were looking for. > Charly > Mac OS X 10.7.4 (11E52) MacBook Intel C2Duo MacGPG2-2.0.17-9 > Thunderbird 13.0 Enigmail 1.4.2 (20120519-0100) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From hka at qbs.com.pl Wed Jun 6 16:33:53 2012 From: hka at qbs.com.pl (Hubert Kario) Date: Wed, 06 Jun 2012 16:33:53 +0200 Subject: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? In-Reply-To: References: <4FCF5BA3.9030501@gmail.com> Message-ID: <1624380.xqmuhXHanR@k85hala03> On Wednesday 06 of June 2012 09:39:12 Sam Smith wrote: > Yeah, thanks. It's the key that signed the .sig and the one I needed to > download to verify. I downloaded it from a Key Server--don't know how else > to get the public key. > > I checked the gpg package legitimacy on a computer that already had gpg > installed. But wanted to make sure I had a legit pub key for the new > machine i was building. Thanks! > > Is there another way to verify the legitimacy of a downloaded public key? > (assuming you don't know any of the other sigs on the pub key that is, > obviously). Or is asking on a user list like this the recommended way? >From security perspective, the public key and (long) fingerprint are synonymous. In other words, as long as the fingerprint matches the certificate, it doesn't matter where you get the certificate from. But this only holds true if you trust the validity of fingerprint. Regards, Hubert Kario > > Date: Wed, 6 Jun 2012 09:31:15 -0400 > > From: shavital at gmail.com > > To: gnupg-users at gnupg.org > > Subject: Re: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? > > > > Sam Smith June 6, 2012 > > 9:25:37 AM wrote: > > > > Sam Smith wrote on 6/6/12 8:54 AM: > > > Can someone please verify that I have the legit public key to verify > > > GnuPG with? I checked the website but the Fingerprint is not given > > > anywhere. > > > > > > I got this Fingerprint for the Public Key I downloaded > > > > > > D869 2123 C406 5DEA 5E0F 3AB5 249B 39D2 4F25 E3B6 > > > > That's the fingerprint for Werner Koch (dist sig): > > > > pub 2048R/4F25E3B6 created: 2011-01-12 expires: 2019-12-31 usage: SC > > > > trust: [] validity: [] > > > > sub 2048R/AC87C71A created: 2011-01-12 expires: 2019-12-31 usage: A > > [] (1). Werner Koch (dist sig) > > pub 2048R/4F25E3B6 2011-01-12 Werner Koch (dist sig) > > Primary key fingerprint: D869 2123 C406 5DEA 5E0F 3AB5 249B 39D2 4F25 E3B6 > > > > > > > > Hope this is what you were looking for. > > Charly > > Mac OS X 10.7.4 (11E52) MacBook Intel C2Duo MacGPG2-2.0.17-9 > > Thunderbird 13.0 Enigmail 1.4.2 (20120519-0100) -- Hubert Kario QBS - Quality Business Software 02-656 Warszawa, ul. Ksawer?w 30/85 tel. +48 (22) 646-61-51, 646-74-24 www.qbs.com.pl From david at gbenet.com Wed Jun 6 17:22:04 2012 From: david at gbenet.com (david at gbenet.com) Date: Wed, 06 Jun 2012 16:22:04 +0100 Subject: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <4FCF759C.5050109@gbenet.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 06/06/12 13:54, Sam Smith wrote: > Can someone please verify that I have the legit public key to verify GnuPG with? I checked > the website but the Fingerprint is not given anywhere. > > I got this Fingerprint for the Public Key I downloaded > > D869 2123 C406 5DEA 5E0F 3AB5 249B 39D2 4F25 E3B6 > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users Hello, You want to go to this link > http://gnupg.org/signature_key.en.html and select the public key block - then copy then open whatever gnupg frontend you have and import from clipboard David - -- ?See the sanity of the man! No gods, no angels, no demons, no body. Nothing of the kind.Stern, sane,every brain-cell perfect and complete even at the moment of death. No delusion.? https://linuxcounter.net/user/512854.html - http://gbenet.com -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJPz3WOAAoJEOJpqm7flREx+oIIAKnveVZkvxaMEqAPNk/cIxrM 7/v56CJ+vDZPz0rL9yBv5F8WxLDmle8oB/RvLsnHR5qGwqgkltDDv5uxn3rq9EHy fTry8ObW45HzkAsS4+DlAXq61eDIwtxCo2dhzVzwWExQf4UKlh2r27Kqi6tV8apG PEwVLo4JC3hVAp6OX1PNo+ydbRERSI/aeCGalhNN8/dBZuHEcguTGGe6WGJcPLU4 pMrSIXwge3czFj8OYj/XQ/OChvZva0UIEpuLZKUQTmdM7aD1GAKgAoFnKWlzGzIW VjO116fyuldvTNkl9mXNqX7lwlZbLPKMWT2YZst/FQCDeq01tTN2G49IzeXEoI4= =Ream -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com Wed Jun 6 17:58:19 2012 From: mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com (Mika Suomalainen) Date: Wed, 06 Jun 2012 18:58:19 +0300 Subject: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <4FCF7E1B.5050502@hotmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 06.06.2012 15:54, Sam Smith wrote: > Can someone please verify that I have the legit public key to > verify GnuPG with? I checked the website but the Fingerprint is not > given anywhere. > > I got this Fingerprint for the Public Key I downloaded > > D869 2123 C406 5DEA 5E0F 3AB5 249B 39D2 4F25 E3B6 Looks correct. ``` % gpg --recv-keys D8692123C4065DEA5E0F3AB5249B39D24F25E3B6 gpg: requesting key 4F25E3B6 from hkp server pool.sks-keyservers.net gpg: key 4F25E3B6: public key "Werner Koch (dist sig)" imported gpg: waiting for lock (held by 9266) ... gpg: waiting for lock (held by 9266) ... gpg: 3 marginal(s) needed, 1 complete(s) needed, PGP trust model gpg: depth: 0 valid: 2 signed: 4 trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 2u gpg: depth: 1 valid: 4 signed: 11 trust: 3-, 0q, 0n, 1m, 0f, 0u gpg: next trustdb check due at 2012-07-29 gpg: Total number processed: 1 gpg: imported: 1 (RSA: 1) ``` - -- [Mika Suomalainen](https://mkaysi.github.com/) || [gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net --recv-keys 4DB53CFE82A46728](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/key.txt) || [Why do I sign my emails?](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/WhyDoISignEmails.html) || [Please don't send HTML.](http://mkaysi.github.com/articles/complaining/HTML.html) || [This signature](https://gist.github.com/2643070#file_icedove.md) || [Please reply below this line](http://mkaysi.github.com/articles/complaining/topposting.html) ____________________________ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.19 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Homepage: http://mkaysi.github.com/ Comment: gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net 82A46728 Comment: Public key: http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/key.txt Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJPz34YAAoJEE21PP6CpGcocvwQAMZAe32LbQoKUC/3EQNrlvMS qUe6RPCfvViMU/idRilrQ/tvbqxu+iF1HiOz3IIphylRH+V46qVnosxn0qFQ5Vdo HvmBM66ILw4EGWBmCFQJHuq7ad3gmCP7fee/Umg1TPE0JSk9Q3tfPIniKdqGlL6t PNjMeQDnCrAyNgfAt39TGU/g5bz6hKdGFMnFCxc5uWOAtOVK+mrjgGV+XH1dtUFC oRa3EYsyEbBrYAXxLwBPRTv2xbGzwHf3y7gzBC8qA3u8YBTrTWWLaN+TQx1H9HM2 CsFtbK0PLkgwMJdPBxr9pNswi8nqKHBUy+g3AyWCTIBH4Sffx2NFMh3pu9x4JJYt wVsT0KBHyjnSQfYuAPjAOyX3/LCRvMJ4JCIOLihIG01F/QR19IrJ79FaSkMnCR9G oXTiA+EJZXtmb1+ivjZz1GCCUzEMZNcRi0xmFQbo3S5RJNT2huB3JJ28mzNbxfxt 4HR5R3CBYFo+EY82Y52vO+sKIWPsK/sbM/umRe5f9xrGDW58W1AweQy3UjDhAuE2 GS7/dYFQo1pD0SmwFBCIycMvAkT64HyjSNDCqTHPr8u0Srjr6pzeRYWnUPrlHLDz Ud3tsNrnP1lRo0Xr/Zz6bXgYaefb1MGGPxSrTesOajbVaf+5I0IRVYoiJiOgN38L tP+CwKfm64DX5WJdcsnt =1WBF -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From peter at digitalbrains.com Wed Jun 6 21:54:01 2012 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Wed, 06 Jun 2012 21:54:01 +0200 Subject: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? In-Reply-To: <4FCF7E1B.5050502@hotmail.com> References: <4FCF7E1B.5050502@hotmail.com> Message-ID: <4FCFB559.6020509@digitalbrains.com> On 06/06/12 17:58, Mika Suomalainen wrote: >> D869 2123 C406 5DEA 5E0F 3AB5 249B 39D2 4F25 E3B6 > Looks correct. > > ``` % gpg --recv-keys D8692123C4065DEA5E0F3AB5249B39D24F25E3B6 gpg: > requesting key 4F25E3B6 from hkp server pool.sks-keyservers.net gpg: key > 4F25E3B6: public key "Werner Koch (dist sig)" imported I agree it appears he has the correct key. I did a local sig on it after what checking I seemed to be able to do without meeting people in person. But it's a bit unclear to me on what basis you decided it looked correct? Your mail suggests to me that you decided that based on the fact that the UID on that key is "Werner Koch (dist sig)". But that would be the very first thing a potential attacker would duplicate in his effort to fool our OP. Even if he's using MITM tricks to subvert his system, he can still post his personally generated key to the keyserver with this UID. Peter. PS: I briefly considered signing this message, because the attacker might MITM my message to the OP. Then I realised what good that signature would do :). -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at http://wwwhome.cs.utwente.nl/~lebbing/pubkey.txt From smickson at hotmail.com Thu Jun 7 01:15:59 2012 From: smickson at hotmail.com (Sam Smith) Date: Wed, 6 Jun 2012 19:15:59 -0400 Subject: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? In-Reply-To: <4FCFB559.6020509@digitalbrains.com> References: , <4FCF7E1B.5050502@hotmail.com>, <4FCFB559.6020509@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: yes, impersonation of the UID [Werner Koch (dist sig)] is what I'm trying to guard against. My efforts to verify the fingerprint are the best way to do this, correct? > Date: Wed, 6 Jun 2012 21:54:01 +0200 > From: peter at digitalbrains.com > To: gnupg-users at gnupg.org > Subject: Re: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? > > On 06/06/12 17:58, Mika Suomalainen wrote: > >> D869 2123 C406 5DEA 5E0F 3AB5 249B 39D2 4F25 E3B6 > > Looks correct. > > > > ``` % gpg --recv-keys D8692123C4065DEA5E0F3AB5249B39D24F25E3B6 gpg: > > requesting key 4F25E3B6 from hkp server pool.sks-keyservers.net gpg: key > > 4F25E3B6: public key "Werner Koch (dist sig)" imported > > I agree it appears he has the correct key. I did a local sig on it after what > checking I seemed to be able to do without meeting people in person. > > But it's a bit unclear to me on what basis you decided it looked correct? Your > mail suggests to me that you decided that based on the fact that the UID on > that key is "Werner Koch (dist sig)". But that would be the very first thing a > potential attacker would duplicate in his effort to fool our OP. Even if he's > using MITM tricks to subvert his system, he can still post his personally > generated key to the keyserver with this UID. > > Peter. > > PS: I briefly considered signing this message, because the attacker might MITM > my message to the OP. Then I realised what good that signature would do :). > > -- > I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. > You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. > My key is available at http://wwwhome.cs.utwente.nl/~lebbing/pubkey.txt > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Thu Jun 7 01:39:05 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Wed, 06 Jun 2012 19:39:05 -0400 Subject: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? In-Reply-To: References: , <4FCF7E1B.5050502@hotmail.com>, <4FCFB559.6020509@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <4FCFEA19.1060603@sixdemonbag.org> On 06/06/2012 07:15 PM, Sam Smith wrote: > My efforts to verify the fingerprint are the best way to do this, correct? "Best" is a relative term. The gold standard for validation involves meeting someone who claims to be Werner Koch, asking him for his passport, checking that his passport identifies him as Werner Koch and that all the anti-forgery measures are in place on the document, and having him tell you directly what his certificate fingerprint is. Of course, this just establishes you have the certificate of *a* Werner Koch, and maybe not the one you want. Certificate validation is a surprisingly hard thing to do. Sorry. :( From david at gbenet.com Thu Jun 7 06:23:43 2012 From: david at gbenet.com (david at gbenet.com) Date: Thu, 07 Jun 2012 05:23:43 +0100 Subject: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? In-Reply-To: References: , <4FCF7E1B.5050502@hotmail.com>, <4FCFB559.6020509@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <4FD02CCF.6080804@gbenet.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 07/06/12 00:15, Sam Smith wrote: > yes, impersonation of the UID [Werner Koch (dist sig)] is what I'm trying to guard against. > > My efforts to verify the fingerprint are the best way to do this, correct? > > > > >> Date: Wed, 6 Jun 2012 21:54:01 +0200 >> From: peter at digitalbrains.com >> To: gnupg-users at gnupg.org >> Subject: Re: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? >> >> On 06/06/12 17:58, Mika Suomalainen wrote: >> >> D869 2123 C406 5DEA 5E0F 3AB5 249B 39D2 4F25 E3B6 >> > Looks correct. >> > >> > ``` % gpg --recv-keys D8692123C4065DEA5E0F3AB5249B39D24F25E3B6 gpg: >> > requesting key 4F25E3B6 from hkp server pool.sks-keyservers.net gpg: key >> > 4F25E3B6: public key "Werner Koch (dist sig)" imported >> >> I agree it appears he has the correct key. I did a local sig on it after what >> checking I seemed to be able to do without meeting people in person. >> >> But it's a bit unclear to me on what basis you decided it looked correct? Your >> mail suggests to me that you decided that based on the fact that the UID on >> that key is "Werner Koch (dist sig)". But that would be the very first thing a >> potential attacker would duplicate in his effort to fool our OP. Even if he's >> using MITM tricks to subvert his system, he can still post his personally >> generated key to the keyserver with this UID. >> >> Peter. >> >> PS: I briefly considered signing this message, because the attacker might MITM >> my message to the OP. Then I realised what good that signature would do :). >> >> -- >> I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. >> You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. >> My key is available at http://wwwhome.cs.utwente.nl/~lebbing/pubkey.txt >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Gnupg-users mailing list >> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org >> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users > > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users Sam, You are a little confused - you ask ask "can some one verify the gnupg fingerprint for pubkey" and you use Verners key to verify gnupg. Then you worry about impersonation - now clearly Verner and gnupg have different keys. Or don't you know that? Clearly you failed to follow my link and clearly you failed to check the public key for gnupg. Now being a little confused try and get a clear question in your mind - is it Verner's key that you have such a passion to verify or gnupg? Verner's had about three keys two of which have expired - to the best of my knowledge he's a real person - he even maintains this list. You could always try encrypting an e-mail to his public key asking him if he's a real person. I'd suggest you not do the same for the public key of gnupg. People generate a private and a public key imaginary people don't do this - granted some one can set up a false ID and create a set of keys - but though they have created a false ID to do so they are nevertheless real people. If you are so concerned about Verner's key why not take a trip to Germany and arrange to meet him? You can't meet the gnupg (as its a bit of software) but you can verify it's running on your computer. All your keys are "untrusted." Everyone of them - apart from your own public key. They all remain so until you actually meet that person and verify that they are who they say they are. You carefully check their passport their driving licence. But gnupg has not got a passport or a driving license. The only way you can check if gnupg is real is to check if it's running on your computer gpg --version - this will tell you if you have the software installed. If it's installed and working correctly it must be real. What if that fails? Well you do the same thing gpg2 --version and hope that Verner does not pop up and say "Hello." David - -- ?See the sanity of the man! No gods, no angels, no demons, no body. Nothing of the kind.Stern, sane,every brain-cell perfect and complete even at the moment of death. No delusion.? https://linuxcounter.net/user/512854.html - http://gbenet.com -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJP0CzCAAoJEOJpqm7flRExrRoH+gIVpmZ+pLRh3iT13AzX7oUn qcJ8F9WT8RvfpTEK4gWPmu6MXmSVLbIvzJPcQswVFCGSgHeisIxkKSdZzXzsV1Ay Yge0MPrZIxR/xA8ZJFC2+Oirx7ERPf615neoIAFwGu6Ern4XHWS7D2iCpfdknFfe B2zmQGHhHmonZG99MOUyAAO9ndDxeXtBMxcTFFPn3ilSqErQ3Xhc9uDOaSWG5uc+ prgXt8E9Ku4sptk7vDnArxri5i5xs6QAxP7JzGYZda/9vqyDfj5ZniIht+8VAu3x eugnoPGyyBiJJ/blmeRoizbqG2xwwxkpb9lE8/cCPKw/4pdUo+638IGd2LXYkp8= =5tt8 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From wk at gnupg.org Thu Jun 7 12:27:00 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Thu, 07 Jun 2012 12:27:00 +0200 Subject: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? In-Reply-To: <4FCFB559.6020509@digitalbrains.com> (Peter Lebbing's message of "Wed, 06 Jun 2012 21:54:01 +0200") References: <4FCF7E1B.5050502@hotmail.com> <4FCFB559.6020509@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <87r4tr2z9n.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Wed, 6 Jun 2012 21:54, peter at digitalbrains.com said: > But it's a bit unclear to me on what basis you decided it looked correct? Your > mail suggests to me that you decided that based on the fact that the UID on > that key is "Werner Koch (dist sig)". But that would be the very first thing a If you look at my OpenPGP mail header you will be pointed to a ?finger? address - enter it into your web browser (in case you don't know what finger is) and you will see pub 2048D/1E42B367 2007-12-31 [expires: 2018-12-31] uid Werner Koch uid Werner Koch sub 2048R/FA8FE1F9 2008-03-21 [expires: 2011-12-30] sub 1024D/77F95F95 2011-11-02 sub 2048R/C193565B 2011-11-07 [expires: 2013-12-31] pub 2048R/4F25E3B6 2011-01-12 [expires: 2019-12-31] uid Werner Koch (dist sig) sub 2048R/AC87C71A 2011-01-12 [expires: 2019-12-31] pub 1024R/1CE0C630 2006-01-01 [expired: 2011-06-30] uid Werner Koch (dist sig) pub 1024D/57548DCD 1998-07-07 [expired: 2005-12-31] uid Werner Koch (gnupg sig) 1E42B367 is my standard key [encrypt and sign; use this one]. 4F25E3B6 is used to sign software distributions [sign only]. 5B0358A2 was used as my key until it expired on 2011-07-11; it has been superseded by 1E42B367 1CE0C630 was used to sign software distributions [sign only]; it has been superseded by 4F25E3B6. 57548DCD was used to sign software distributions [sign only]; it has been superseded by 1CE0C630. Please note that I use a subkey for signing messages; some old OpenPGP implementations may not be able to check such a signature. The primary key is stored at a more or less secure place and only used on a spare laptop which is not connected to any network. If you find a key certified by this one, you can be sure that I personally met this person and checked the name part of the user ID against an official looking passport or another suitable photo id. My signature does not say anything about the email address (I merely check that the address looks plausible). followed by a public key block. If you check the signatures of the current dist signing key (gpg --check-sigs 4F25E3B6): pub 2048R/4F25E3B6 2011-01-12 [expires: 2019-12-31] uid Werner Koch (dist sig) sig!3 4F25E3B6 2011-01-12 Werner Koch (dist sig) sig! 1CE0C630 2011-01-12 Werner Koch (dist sig) sig! 1E42B367 2011-01-12 Werner Koch [...] you will notice that the key has in addition to the required self-signature (note the ?sig!3? line with the same key ID as the ?pub" line) a signature from the former dist signing key (1CE0C630), and one From my regular key 1E42B367. Now check the my regular key and you will notice that it is very well connected in the the Web of Trust. Shalom-Salam, Werner p.s. If you wonder about the subkey of the dist sig key: It is used for ssh and, due to the ?A? usage, ignored by gpg: $ gpg2 --edit-key --batch 4F25E3B6 quit Secret key is available. pub 2048R/4F25E3B6 created: 2011-01-12 expires: 2019-12-31 usage: SC trust: ultimate validity: ultimate sub 2048R/AC87C71A created: 2011-01-12 expires: 2019-12-31 usage: A [ultimate] (1). Werner Koch (dist sig) -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 203 bytes Desc: not available URL: From peter at digitalbrains.com Thu Jun 7 15:17:48 2012 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Thu, 07 Jun 2012 15:17:48 +0200 Subject: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? In-Reply-To: <4FD02CCF.6080804@gbenet.com> References: , <4FCF7E1B.5050502@hotmail.com>, <4FCFB559.6020509@digitalbrains.com> <4FD02CCF.6080804@gbenet.com> Message-ID: <4FD0A9FC.5030704@digitalbrains.com> On 07/06/12 06:23, david at gbenet.com wrote: > Clearly you failed to follow my link and clearly you failed to check the > public key for gnupg. Now being a little confused try and get a clear > question in your mind - is it Verner's key that you have such a passion to > verify or gnupg? I'm sorry, but I'm tech savvy and have some knowledge of OpenPGP and stuff and I'm quite confused about what you are trying to say in this mail. I'm also a bit worried that your mail can be read as quite brusque for no good reason. Perhaps it comes across diferently than you meant. Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at http://wwwhome.cs.utwente.nl/~lebbing/pubkey.txt From david at gbenet.com Thu Jun 7 17:18:33 2012 From: david at gbenet.com (david at gbenet.com) Date: Thu, 07 Jun 2012 16:18:33 +0100 Subject: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? In-Reply-To: <4FD0A9FC.5030704@digitalbrains.com> References: , <4FCF7E1B.5050502@hotmail.com>, <4FCFB559.6020509@digitalbrains.com> <4FD02CCF.6080804@gbenet.com> <4FD0A9FC.5030704@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <4FD0C649.7030006@gbenet.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 07/06/12 14:17, Peter Lebbing wrote: > On 07/06/12 06:23, david at gbenet.com wrote: >> Clearly you failed to follow my link and clearly you failed to check the >> public key for gnupg. Now being a little confused try and get a clear >> question in your mind - is it Verner's key that you have such a passion to >> verify or gnupg? > > I'm sorry, but I'm tech savvy and have some knowledge of OpenPGP and stuff and > I'm quite confused about what you are trying to say in this mail. > > I'm also a bit worried that your mail can be read as quite brusque for no good > reason. Perhaps it comes across diferently than you meant. > > Peter. > Peter, To put matters simply, (1) Verner's key is not the same as gnupg's key (2) You can confirm the validity of Verner's key by meeting him (3) you can confirm that gnupg is running on your computer gpg/2 --version.. The subject of your e-mail is: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? I gave you a direct link to import gnupg's public key - but pointed out to you that the "normal" procedure for verification would not work i.e all your public keys are by default untrustworthy and that the only way to verify a public key is owned by a person is to meet that person. You have no way to verify that the public key belonging to gnupg is valid - but it does exist on your computer. It's entirely up to you whether you trust it or not. It's a question of reality. Verner's key and gnupg's key are two separate keys - you can not confuse the two. Verner's already explained this to you in some detail. To conclude - the only key you can trust ultimately is your own. When you have met some one and confirmed their ID as indicated you can set a level of trust to "fully." It does not matter how many people have signed a public key belonging to someone - they are all untrustedworthy - until that is you meet that person in reality. As to the question: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? The answer is no. Why? It is not a person but a bit of software. I am usually quite good natured :) David - -- ?See the sanity of the man! No gods, no angels, no demons, no body. Nothing of the kind.Stern, sane,every brain-cell perfect and complete even at the moment of death. No delusion.? https://linuxcounter.net/user/512854.html - http://gbenet.com/blog -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJP0MZJAAoJEOJpqm7flRExmHEIAIJhfJF5/H62o2Plrj54/jMi hUb7pyp9e+X1LLazT7R80PEsA03z8xU7N0yOqfp70HmE5y6+RrNYc0hyyCPnaYXB 1sLShpb9bA0DxUknP51QHeWDxp19noDEwCWDUC6xkrQYgj8L8lPkOTAynbm2Wd+f DGQAyxiFd7b5Pglyd+lxAwvcGHKosyfePofI5JJuj+bABmS+RNGzGUiX4ssVl+Ft 63bfDJd+Ow6ew1U0m+e265KcugRe6mlAdCTdRgGTyGBuKL+tbV0yiyc9x7FlpHsz gBjC6b8EmTWJeAk3C9YMtvsonPnkJ2/i2SggYU4WrprEJlexWlD+O1oUJBxA4n8= =Fla8 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com Thu Jun 7 17:59:44 2012 From: mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com (Mika Suomalainen) Date: Thu, 07 Jun 2012 18:59:44 +0300 Subject: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? In-Reply-To: References: , <4FCF7E1B.5050502@hotmail.com>, <4FCFB559.6020509@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <4FD0CFF0.7000109@hotmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 07.06.2012 02:15, Sam Smith wrote: > yes, impersonation of the UID [Werner Koch (dist sig)] is what I'm > trying to guard against. > > My efforts to verify the fingerprint are the best way to do this, > correct? > > > > >> Date: Wed, 6 Jun 2012 21:54:01 +0200 From: >> peter at digitalbrains.com To: gnupg-users at gnupg.org Subject: Re: >> can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? >> >> On 06/06/12 17:58, Mika Suomalainen wrote: >>>> D869 2123 C406 5DEA 5E0F 3AB5 249B 39D2 4F25 E3B6 >>> Looks correct. >>> >>> ``` % gpg --recv-keys D8692123C4065DEA5E0F3AB5249B39D24F25E3B6 >>> gpg: requesting key 4F25E3B6 from hkp server >>> pool.sks-keyservers.net gpg: key 4F25E3B6: public key "Werner >>> Koch (dist sig)" imported >> >> I agree it appears he has the correct key. I did a local sig on >> it > after what >> checking I seemed to be able to do without meeting people in >> person. >> >> But it's a bit unclear to me on what basis you decided it looked > correct? Your >> mail suggests to me that you decided that based on the fact that >> the > UID on >> that key is "Werner Koch (dist sig)". But that would be the very >> first > thing a >> potential attacker would duplicate in his effort to fool our OP. >> Even > if he's >> using MITM tricks to subvert his system, he can still post his >> personally generated key to the keyserver with this UID. >> >> Peter. >> >> PS: I briefly considered signing this message, because the >> attacker > might MITM >> my message to the OP. Then I realised what good that signature >> would > do :). >> >> -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with >> Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some >> privacy. My key is available at >> http://wwwhome.cs.utwente.nl/~lebbing/pubkey.txt >> >> _______________________________________________ Gnupg-users >> mailing list Gnupg-users at gnupg.org >> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users > > > _______________________________________________ Gnupg-users mailing > list Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users Oh, then you are checking wrong thing. You should be checking signatures in key. That key looks valid to me. ``` % gpg --list-sigs D8692123C4065DEA5E0F3AB5249B39D24F25E3B6 pub 2048R/4F25E3B6 2011-01-12 [expires: 2019-12-31] uid Werner Koch (dist sig) sig 58DFC608 2011-06-11 Andrey Samokhvalov sig 30B94B5C 2012-02-29 ??? (Yang Shih-Ching) sig 1E42B367 2011-01-12 Werner Koch sig 3B180E81 2011-02-13 Wolf Windshadow (My personal key) sig 1CE0C630 2011-01-12 Werner Koch (dist sig) sig 2 2AAA5C3B 2011-01-22 Gary de Montigny (HMS) sig 2 E3F1D8F7 2012-01-31 Javier Alonso Fern?ndez Almirall sig 3 4F25E3B6 2011-01-12 Werner Koch (dist sig) sig 1 46EB581F 2011-10-29 Stanislav Sidorenko (email&jabber) sig F80D46AB 2011-06-10 Ulf Linde sig A3B53998 2011-06-14 Daniel Kraft (Graz, Austria) sub 2048R/AC87C71A 2011-01-12 [expires: 2019-12-31] sig 1CE0C630 2011-01-12 Werner Koch (dist sig) sig 4F25E3B6 2011-01-12 Werner Koch (dist sig) ``` - -- [Mika Suomalainen](https://mkaysi.github.com/) || [gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net --recv-keys 4DB53CFE82A46728](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/key.txt) || [Why do I sign my emails?](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/WhyDoISignEmails.html) || [Please don't send HTML.](http://mkaysi.github.com/articles/complaining/HTML.html) || [This signature](https://gist.github.com/2643070#file_icedove.md) || [Please reply below this line](http://mkaysi.github.com/articles/complaining/topposting.html) ____________________________ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.19 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Homepage: http://mkaysi.github.com/ Comment: gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net 82A46728 Comment: Public key: http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/key.txt Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJP0M/tAAoJEE21PP6CpGcolwcQAL/mfm/ZDaU99qwKhmyhBUd4 gs8PmDT2LZQvejiWkTMD+tm2D0yBFRcf/78UHC65RZL2pPd4Ppn9to+gy/9zU618 6KPw08ikzmZKO02Ilmql60kF8D7SQxX8snJ/Y5UkZAKYEuydfz+KWf4SvYeo/Um8 RN3OkfugrcNYT15n03av+1vk1HFtDWA5bDEvgPzkWTsdnCDz4F0jCfsitUECbb3p hX/PMkhitkSkezI9vGTj+7TpeSbgq7QIyjrXMMaKVT8+SnvTtOe0lK0u9YbRmAYH hjISoO+26AmKKfIdlZnGZ5K9pWil5ZjBAvL9zghPnqk6RE/P6HwIGIoJK720qDOt CLcVZo1aO83DwEMqrbpUuoJH4LxTLLV2hlAjQWR2AyVqj64AbtoOPcuPy7Pr1ugJ xbXU2zPbckpXCk9GNyf18uaY2IWACa4yZYdzBLUZKdvi/uIaBFMt6LgdR0X0ErO2 lt8URNYHzpP6SwhAUzqNW3EH0JoitANnUcjPf6fEF412ie+rQoOlc/WWEXaZ30Rx +8r4liDABEHGtsfACwjzhpQUlRpHVnxnP+ZsJc5rSISBRyuH30xit7zr493lSZtH YJVmNYshaEJYmUUaU1hu+GFn2O2ZkBXpqe+pSiHNrvVI5lrzs+QHavaAsJXgKzyQ 6RM6w6TOVtXQEkr1I7Ki =n707 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Thu Jun 7 18:14:11 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Thu, 07 Jun 2012 12:14:11 -0400 Subject: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? In-Reply-To: <4FD0C649.7030006@gbenet.com> References: , <4FCF7E1B.5050502@hotmail.com>, <4FCFB559.6020509@digitalbrains.com> <4FD02CCF.6080804@gbenet.com> <4FD0A9FC.5030704@digitalbrains.com> <4FD0C649.7030006@gbenet.com> Message-ID: <4FD0D353.3050008@sixdemonbag.org> On 6/7/12 11:18 AM, david at gbenet.com wrote: > To put matters simply, (1) Verner's key is not the same as gnupg's > key (2) You can confirm the validity of Verner's key by meeting him > (3) you can confirm that gnupg is running on your computer gpg/2 > --version.. As an FYI, you are consistently misspelling Werner's name. It's Werner, not Verner. > As to the question: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for > pubkey? The answer is no. Why? It is not a person but a bit of > software. The certificate belongs to someone. If Werner were to appear before me with his passport and said "I control the certificates corresponding to these email addresses" and gave me their fingerprints, I would consider those certificates to be fully validated. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 187 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From david at gbenet.com Thu Jun 7 18:29:02 2012 From: david at gbenet.com (david at gbenet.com) Date: Thu, 07 Jun 2012 17:29:02 +0100 Subject: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? In-Reply-To: <4FD0D353.3050008@sixdemonbag.org> References: , <4FCF7E1B.5050502@hotmail.com>, <4FCFB559.6020509@digitalbrains.com> <4FD02CCF.6080804@gbenet.com> <4FD0A9FC.5030704@digitalbrains.com> <4FD0C649.7030006@gbenet.com> <4FD0D353.3050008@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <4FD0D6CE.4010608@gbenet.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 07/06/12 17:14, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > On 6/7/12 11:18 AM, david at gbenet.com wrote: >> To put matters simply, (1) Verner's key is not the same as gnupg's key (2) You can >> confirm the validity of Verner's key by meeting him (3) you can confirm that gnupg is >> running on your computer gpg/2 --version.. > > As an FYI, you are consistently misspelling Werner's name. It's Werner, not Verner. > >> As to the question: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? The answer >> is no. Why? It is not a person but a bit of software. > > The certificate belongs to someone. If Werner were to appear before me with his > passport and said "I control the certificates corresponding to these email addresses" > and gave me their fingerprints, I would consider those certificates to be fully > validated. > > > > > _______________________________________________ Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users It's the German in me :) David - -- ?See the sanity of the man! No gods, no angels, no demons, no body. Nothing of the kind.Stern, sane,every brain-cell perfect and complete even at the moment of death. No delusion.? https://linuxcounter.net/user/512854.html - http://gbenet.com/blog -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJP0NbNAAoJEOJpqm7flRExAUcH/0N0ZwRLAxpd8dzAF7oIlQ3j nYibmtsoUQ/P7Nr6S6nBF9N/butYONXoEa/H69IctCgb28FenrQuq8joamImVEpD g5u70rmsX7T0vqHEE0juuz4jC9Vfmpa8waGcA5WQ8xATTIkf5RS9qElw6yQrbNdS kkoqlb4HTv8L5fiodztgJxXPQ7f1+gkn5CxUe63TT2wZlrqKSULvkIo4wtfrqxbc XY71vZbKdxmgCi41WzaErLQQTswDlHw0HeJhh0+a1itRRVxU4ghRsGP2LOBwuAgg J2CZgzz6u2Dt6ej10j2s+9jYWf53aSHS2bzCdEVly5taDE8crdHKkO1z51aMZ2Q= =RNJU -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From wk at gnupg.org Thu Jun 7 18:32:45 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Thu, 07 Jun 2012 18:32:45 +0200 Subject: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? In-Reply-To: <4FD0CFF0.7000109@hotmail.com> (Mika Suomalainen's message of "Thu, 07 Jun 2012 18:59:44 +0300") References: <4FCF7E1B.5050502@hotmail.com> <4FCFB559.6020509@digitalbrains.com> <4FD0CFF0.7000109@hotmail.com> Message-ID: <87mx4f2ic2.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Thu, 7 Jun 2012 17:59, mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com said: > % gpg --list-sigs D8692123C4065DEA5E0F3AB5249B39D24F25E3B6 > pub 2048R/4F25E3B6 2011-01-12 [expires: 2019-12-31] > uid Werner Koch (dist sig) > sig 58DFC608 2011-06-11 Andrey ... > sig 30B94B5C 2012-02-29 ??? (Yang ... > sig 3B180E81 2011-02-13 Wolf Wi... > sig 2 2AAA5C3B 2011-01-22 Gary de ... > sig 2 E3F1D8F7 2012-01-31 Javier Alo... > sig 1 46EB581F 2011-10-29 Stanislav .. > sig F80D46AB 2011-06-10 Ulf ... > sig A3B53998 2011-06-14 Daniel ... That is actually a bit funny: I never asked anyone to sign that key. Probably they deduced the correctness from my regular key which I used to sign the above key. That is not a surprise; I have seen many signatures on my keys from people I never met. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Thu Jun 7 18:52:56 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Thu, 07 Jun 2012 12:52:56 -0400 Subject: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? In-Reply-To: <87mx4f2ic2.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <4FCF7E1B.5050502@hotmail.com> <4FCFB559.6020509@digitalbrains.com> <4FD0CFF0.7000109@hotmail.com> <87mx4f2ic2.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <4FD0DC68.5040000@sixdemonbag.org> On 6/7/12 12:32 PM, Werner Koch wrote: > That is actually a bit funny: I never asked anyone to sign that key. > Probably they deduced the correctness from my regular key which I > used to sign the above key. That is not a surprise; I have seen > many signatures on my keys from people I never met. Perhaps it would be worthwhile to add a question to the signing process: "Have you met this person face-to-face and verified his/her identity? (y/N)" If the user answers no, display a warning that the user probably wants to lsign, not to sign, and give the option of making an lsign instead. It might cut down on certifications such as these... From sam at samwhited.com Thu Jun 7 19:05:45 2012 From: sam at samwhited.com (Sam Whited) Date: Thu, 7 Jun 2012 13:05:45 -0400 Subject: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? In-Reply-To: <4FD0DC68.5040000@sixdemonbag.org> References: <4FCF7E1B.5050502@hotmail.com> <4FCFB559.6020509@digitalbrains.com> <4FD0CFF0.7000109@hotmail.com> <87mx4f2ic2.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FD0DC68.5040000@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: On Thu, Jun 7, 2012 at 12:52 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > Perhaps it would be worthwhile to add a question to the signing process: > "Have you met this person face-to-face and verified his/her identity? > (y/N)" ?If the user answers no, display a warning that the user probably > wants to lsign, not to sign, and give the option of making an lsign instead. > > It might cut down on certifications such as these... > It would also just be an unwanted extra step for a lot of people. Might be a good idea so long as it could be turned off in the config file. ?Sam -- Sam Whited pub 4096R/FB39BCF7EC2C9934 SamWhited.com sam at samwhited.com 404.492.6008 From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Thu Jun 7 19:22:28 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Thu, 07 Jun 2012 13:22:28 -0400 Subject: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? In-Reply-To: References: <4FCF7E1B.5050502@hotmail.com> <4FCFB559.6020509@digitalbrains.com> <4FD0CFF0.7000109@hotmail.com> <87mx4f2ic2.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FD0DC68.5040000@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <4FD0E354.9090602@sixdemonbag.org> On 6/7/12 1:05 PM, Sam Whited wrote: > It would also just be an unwanted extra step for a lot of people. Yes. And there are doubtless a large number of people who really don't want to have to type in their new passphrase twice, too. We make them do it anyway. Objecting to it on the grounds of "I don't think it will cut down on inappropriate signatures," fine, maybe, yes, it would be worthwhile to consider whether it can actually deliver on what I hope it can. But assuming it can deliver, making people type 'y RETURN' in response to a simple question is hardly an onerous new requirement. I'm having a hard time understanding your objection, honestly. From sam at samwhited.com Thu Jun 7 20:10:53 2012 From: sam at samwhited.com (Sam Whited) Date: Thu, 7 Jun 2012 14:10:53 -0400 Subject: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? In-Reply-To: <4FD0E354.9090602@sixdemonbag.org> References: <4FCF7E1B.5050502@hotmail.com> <4FCFB559.6020509@digitalbrains.com> <4FD0CFF0.7000109@hotmail.com> <87mx4f2ic2.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FD0DC68.5040000@sixdemonbag.org> <4FD0E354.9090602@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: On Thu, Jun 7, 2012 at 1:22 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > Yes. ?And there are doubtless a large number of people who really don't > want to have to type in their new passphrase twice, too. ?We make them > do it anyway. > Yes, but that actually serves a purpose, it prevents people from losing their key when they make a simple typo which is quite easy to do. I'd consider this an important step. > Objecting to it on the grounds of "I don't think it will cut down on > inappropriate signatures," fine, maybe, yes, [...] I think you're probably right, it would cut down on inappropriate signatures and... > assuming it can deliver, making people type 'y RETURN' in response to a > simple question is hardly an onerous new requirement. ?I'm having a hard > time understanding your objection, honestly. > ...yes, it's hardly onerous, but it's still one extra step that does nothing for more advanced users (except perhaps when they haven't had enough coffee early in the morning :) ). Don't get me wrong I think it's a good idea but I also think that (from a basic interface perspective) there should be a way to turn it off. It's the equivalent of the "remember my selection" button that should be on any dialog that's not performing something mission-critical. ?Sam -- Sam Whited pub 4096R/FB39BCF7EC2C9934 SamWhited.com sam at samwhited.com 404.492.6008 From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Thu Jun 7 20:29:38 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Thu, 07 Jun 2012 14:29:38 -0400 Subject: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? In-Reply-To: References: <4FCF7E1B.5050502@hotmail.com> <4FCFB559.6020509@digitalbrains.com> <4FD0CFF0.7000109@hotmail.com> <87mx4f2ic2.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FD0DC68.5040000@sixdemonbag.org> <4FD0E354.9090602@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <4FD0F312.1090607@sixdemonbag.org> On 6/7/12 2:10 PM, Sam Whited wrote: > ...yes, it's hardly onerous, but it's still one extra step that does > nothing for more advanced users (except perhaps when they haven't > had enough coffee early in the morning :) ). Friend of mine, a former law-enforcement officer, is a big believer in checklists ever since he went into a violent drug raid and discovered afterwards they'd forgotten to (a) let the ambulance service know they were about to serve a high-risk warrant, (b) put on his body armor and (c) chamber a round in his Glock. After that he wrote down a checklist on the back of his business card: "Warrant, Correct Address, Backup, Comms, Ambulance Standby, Weapon, Armor." Rest of his career he never went through the door without first breaking out that checklist and confirming that each and every category had been ticked off. The moral of the story is that if it's important something always be done, then it's important enough to add to a routine checklist. Otherwise, you're sooner or later going to wind up like my friend: shaking like a leaf and having nightmares for months about how things could have gone much, much worse. If people want to implement this feature as "--expert --disable-sign-sanity-check", okay, then ... fine, I guess, --expert is quite literally a "don't you dare second guess me just do what I say, damn it!" flag. But there's a very good reason why I don't use --expert and why I've never met anyone whom I think *should* use it. > It's the equivalent of the "remember my selection" button that should > be on any dialog that's not performing something mission-critical. Sanity-checking validation checks *is* mission-critical. IMO, at least. From mick.crane at gmail.com Fri Jun 8 00:01:28 2012 From: mick.crane at gmail.com (michael crane) Date: Thu, 7 Jun 2012 23:01:28 +0100 Subject: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? In-Reply-To: <87r4tr2z9n.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <4FCF7E1B.5050502@hotmail.com> <4FCFB559.6020509@digitalbrains.com> <87r4tr2z9n.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: On Thu, June 7, 2012 11:27 am, Werner Koch wrote: > If you look at my OpenPGP mail header you will be pointed to a > ???finger??? > address - enter it into your web browser (in case you don't know what > finger is) and you will see I see that it would be handy to have this stuff in the header where presumably the client could respond and would take up less space in the message body where it can get cluttered with all the sigs etc. regards mmick -- keyID: 0x4BFEBB31 From gniibe at fsij.org Fri Jun 8 06:38:26 2012 From: gniibe at fsij.org (NIIBE Yutaka) Date: Fri, 08 Jun 2012 13:38:26 +0900 Subject: scdaemon needs restarting after removing OpenPGP smartcard In-Reply-To: <87d35d7nz3.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <3785469.PpAnc3XbCo@slamaq> <87d35d7nz3.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <1339130306.2146.11.camel@latx1.gniibe.org> On Tue, 5 Jun 2012 15:01, klaus.layer at gmx.de said: > I found ticket https://bugs.g10code.com/gnupg/issue1238 which describes this > error. Are there any plans to downport the fix described in the ticket to > 2.0.X. I am currently backporting the SCD changes in master branch to 2.0. For this particular issue, I believe that it has been fixed by the following commit, which was included in 2.0.18 already. commit 576de6e539646f021dafff8d4e3327c115a51ad4 Author: Werner Koch Date: Tue Jan 25 22:03:16 2011 +0100 Fixed problem with unplugging card readers. From Grant Olsons's mail to gnupg-devel@: This is three-quarters NIIBE and one-quarter me, but I though it would be easier to have a single complete patch that applies to STABLE-BRANCH-2-0 than two patches floating around. This is basically NIIBE Yatuka's patch here: http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-devel/2010-November/025828.html Plus another check that closes down the reader explicitly if we get a SW_HOST_NO_READER error, so that an unplugged reader doesn't hold onto the first slot, preventing us from getting to the active plugged reader. -- From jbasso at eplanllc.com Fri Jun 8 19:50:42 2012 From: jbasso at eplanllc.com (Johnathan Basso) Date: Fri, 8 Jun 2012 10:50:42 -0700 Subject: Help with --encrypt-files Message-ID: <9EAF5A9AAAA88F4A991EFA4866FC5F7A32218E@eplan-server.eplanllc.local> I have tried using the -encrypt-files option with limited success. If I write the line like this: D:\GnuPG>gpg --recipient "Client Key" --encrypt-files d:\directory\sub\test_file_1 d:\directory\sub\test_file_2 It encrypts the 2 files without an issue. If I write it the way I see on a few different posts I get an error: D:\GnuPG>gpg --recipient "Client Key" --encrypt-files d:\directory\sub\* The error I get is: gpg: can't open `D:\directory\sub\*': No such file or directory gpg: encryption of `D:\ directory\sub\*' failed: file open error I've tried with just the * and putting the executable in the same directory, putting the path in quotes, etc. Nothing seems to make it work except listing all the files in the directory. Any help would be greatly appreciated. John -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Fri Jun 8 21:04:46 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Fri, 08 Jun 2012 15:04:46 -0400 Subject: Documentation bug Message-ID: <4FD24CCE.2080002@sixdemonbag.org> --no-for-your-eyes-only Set the `for your eyes only' flag in the message. This causes GnuPG to refuse to save the file unless the --output option is given, and PGP to use a "secure viewer" with a claimed Tempest- resistant font to display the message. This option overrides --set-filename. --no-for-your-eyes-only disables this option. The text should read "with a claimed Van Eck-resistant font", not "with a claimed Tempest-resistant font". TEMPEST is the name of a NATO standard for hardening hardware against Van Eck phreaking [1]. Thus, the font is not claimed to be 'Tempest-resistant' because that would mean resisting the countermeasure. Instead it should be 'Van Eck-resistant', because that means the font is the countermeasure. [1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TEMPEST From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Fri Jun 8 21:54:12 2012 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Fri, 8 Jun 2012 15:54:12 -0400 Subject: Documentation bug In-Reply-To: <4FD24CCE.2080002@sixdemonbag.org> References: <4FD24CCE.2080002@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <7B15938F-3671-4411-9FE6-8342C67A2B10@jabberwocky.com> On Jun 8, 2012, at 3:04 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > --no-for-your-eyes-only > Set the `for your eyes only' flag in the message. This causes > GnuPG to refuse to save the file unless the --output option is > given, and PGP to use a "secure viewer" with a claimed Tempest- > resistant font to display the message. This option overrides > --set-filename. --no-for-your-eyes-only disables this option. > > > The text should read "with a claimed Van Eck-resistant font", not "with > a claimed Tempest-resistant font". TEMPEST is the name of a NATO > standard for hardening hardware against Van Eck phreaking [1]. Thus, > the font is not claimed to be 'Tempest-resistant' because that would > mean resisting the countermeasure. Instead it should be 'Van > Eck-resistant', because that means the font is the countermeasure. The fonts in question are actually called "TEMPEST fonts" in the PGP documentation (or at least they were last time I looked - I haven't seen the docs for the Symantec PGP). The bug here would seem to be the word "resistant". TEMPEST should be capitalized, too. Does anyone happen to have Symantec PGP and know if they even still do this? David From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Fri Jun 8 22:23:21 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Fri, 08 Jun 2012 16:23:21 -0400 Subject: A Pact with the Devil Message-ID: <4FD25F39.7080404@sixdemonbag.org> A fascinating paper just crossed my desk: Technical Report 666 from the University of Cambridge's computer science department. Although it has no relevance to GnuPG, it is such a cunningly evil idea -- and presented so clearly, without any sophisticated mathematics -- that I think many people here will find it fascinatingly unsettling reading. It's just a matter of time until someone takes this (very slight parody) of an idea and turns it into something disturbingly real... http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/techreports/UCAM-CL-TR-666.pdf From smickson at hotmail.com Fri Jun 8 23:41:34 2012 From: smickson at hotmail.com (Sam Smith) Date: Fri, 8 Jun 2012 17:41:34 -0400 Subject: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? In-Reply-To: <4FD02CCF.6080804@gbenet.com> References: , , <4FCF7E1B.5050502@hotmail.com>, , <4FCFB559.6020509@digitalbrains.com>, , <4FD02CCF.6080804@gbenet.com> Message-ID: Another thing is that downloading the key from that link you provided is no guarantee of safety in and of itself either because the page is not being hosted over SSL with confirmed identity information. So technically there's no guarantee I'm actually interacting with teh GnuPG.org website. > Date: Thu, 7 Jun 2012 05:23:43 +0100 > From: david at gbenet.com > To: gnupg-users at gnupg.org > Subject: Re: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA1 > > On 07/06/12 00:15, Sam Smith wrote: > > yes, impersonation of the UID [Werner Koch (dist sig)] is what I'm trying to guard against. > > > > My efforts to verify the fingerprint are the best way to do this, correct? > > > > > > > > > >> Date: Wed, 6 Jun 2012 21:54:01 +0200 > >> From: peter at digitalbrains.com > >> To: gnupg-users at gnupg.org > >> Subject: Re: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? > >> > >> On 06/06/12 17:58, Mika Suomalainen wrote: > >> >> D869 2123 C406 5DEA 5E0F 3AB5 249B 39D2 4F25 E3B6 > >> > Looks correct. > >> > > >> > ``` % gpg --recv-keys D8692123C4065DEA5E0F3AB5249B39D24F25E3B6 gpg: > >> > requesting key 4F25E3B6 from hkp server pool.sks-keyservers.net gpg: key > >> > 4F25E3B6: public key "Werner Koch (dist sig)" imported > >> > >> I agree it appears he has the correct key. I did a local sig on it after what > >> checking I seemed to be able to do without meeting people in person. > >> > >> But it's a bit unclear to me on what basis you decided it looked correct? Your > >> mail suggests to me that you decided that based on the fact that the UID on > >> that key is "Werner Koch (dist sig)". But that would be the very first thing a > >> potential attacker would duplicate in his effort to fool our OP. Even if he's > >> using MITM tricks to subvert his system, he can still post his personally > >> generated key to the keyserver with this UID. > >> > >> Peter. > >> > >> PS: I briefly considered signing this message, because the attacker might MITM > >> my message to the OP. Then I realised what good that signature would do :). > >> > >> -- > >> I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. > >> You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. > >> My key is available at http://wwwhome.cs.utwente.nl/~lebbing/pubkey.txt > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> Gnupg-users mailing list > >> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > >> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Gnupg-users mailing list > > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users > > Sam, > > You are a little confused - you ask ask "can some one verify the gnupg fingerprint for > pubkey" and you use Verners key to verify gnupg. Then you worry about impersonation - now > clearly Verner and gnupg have different keys. Or don't you know that? > > Clearly you failed to follow my link and clearly you failed to check the public key for > gnupg. Now being a little confused try and get a clear question in your mind - is it > Verner's key that you have such a passion to verify or gnupg? > > Verner's had about three keys two of which have expired - to the best of my knowledge he's > a real person - he even maintains this list. You could always try encrypting an e-mail to > his public key asking him if he's a real person. I'd suggest you not do the same for the > public key of gnupg. > > People generate a private and a public key imaginary people don't do this - granted some one > can set up a false ID and create a set of keys - but though they have created a false ID to > do so they are nevertheless real people. > > If you are so concerned about Verner's key why not take a trip to Germany and arrange to > meet him? You can't meet the gnupg (as its a bit of software) but you can verify it's > running on your computer. > > All your keys are "untrusted." Everyone of them - apart from your own public key. They all > remain so until you actually meet that person and verify that they are who they say they > are. You carefully check their passport their driving licence. > > But gnupg has not got a passport or a driving license. The only way you can check if gnupg > is real is to check if it's running on your computer gpg --version - this will tell you if > you have the software installed. If it's installed and working correctly it must be real. > > What if that fails? Well you do the same thing gpg2 --version and hope that Verner does not > pop up and say "Hello." > > David > > > - -- > ?See the sanity of the man! No gods, no angels, no demons, no body. Nothing of the > kind.Stern, sane,every brain-cell perfect and complete even at the moment of death. No > delusion.? https://linuxcounter.net/user/512854.html - http://gbenet.com > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux) > Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ > > iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJP0CzCAAoJEOJpqm7flRExrRoH+gIVpmZ+pLRh3iT13AzX7oUn > qcJ8F9WT8RvfpTEK4gWPmu6MXmSVLbIvzJPcQswVFCGSgHeisIxkKSdZzXzsV1Ay > Yge0MPrZIxR/xA8ZJFC2+Oirx7ERPf615neoIAFwGu6Ern4XHWS7D2iCpfdknFfe > B2zmQGHhHmonZG99MOUyAAO9ndDxeXtBMxcTFFPn3ilSqErQ3Xhc9uDOaSWG5uc+ > prgXt8E9Ku4sptk7vDnArxri5i5xs6QAxP7JzGYZda/9vqyDfj5ZniIht+8VAu3x > eugnoPGyyBiJJ/blmeRoizbqG2xwwxkpb9lE8/cCPKw/4pdUo+638IGd2LXYkp8= > =5tt8 > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From smickson at hotmail.com Fri Jun 8 23:37:00 2012 From: smickson at hotmail.com (Sam Smith) Date: Fri, 8 Jun 2012 17:37:00 -0400 Subject: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? In-Reply-To: <4FD02CCF.6080804@gbenet.com> References: , , <4FCF7E1B.5050502@hotmail.com>, , <4FCFB559.6020509@digitalbrains.com>, , <4FD02CCF.6080804@gbenet.com> Message-ID: David, I downloaded the GnuPG program. I then ran --verify and was told that the key was signed with 0x4F25E3B6 key. I download 0x4F25E3B6 key from a key server and then asked people on this mailing list to confirm that I downloaded a legit key. Several people on this mailing list confirmed the fingerprint of this key as a legit key. I then marked the key as trusted because I verified the fingerprint. I then gpg --verify the gnupg program and got a Good Signature. Of course it would be good to meet Werner and look at his passport and all this nonsense. But that is ridiculous because it's never going to happen. I read the GnuPG manual and what I did is what the manual describes as good practice. What you describe is just nonsense. Yes, it is truly secure and everything but you know completely impractical, so why did you even write it? My question was an honest one and made in good faith about trying to learn and be humble that I don't know everything. But I struggle to find what can be learned from your email. I did follow your link to the posted public key. However I had already downloaded from a keyserver the key that was identified as being the one that signed the gnupg program (0x4F25E3B6). And others verified the fingerprint. So do I still need to download the key that you posted a link to, aren't they the same key???? Strangely, before I downloaded key 0x4F25E3B6, I searched the website looking for a public key to download but did not find the link that you provided. > Date: Thu, 7 Jun 2012 05:23:43 +0100 > From: david at gbenet.com > To: gnupg-users at gnupg.org > Subject: Re: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA1 > > On 07/06/12 00:15, Sam Smith wrote: > > yes, impersonation of the UID [Werner Koch (dist sig)] is what I'm trying to guard against. > > > > My efforts to verify the fingerprint are the best way to do this, correct? > > > > > > > > > >> Date: Wed, 6 Jun 2012 21:54:01 +0200 > >> From: peter at digitalbrains.com > >> To: gnupg-users at gnupg.org > >> Subject: Re: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? > >> > >> On 06/06/12 17:58, Mika Suomalainen wrote: > >> >> D869 2123 C406 5DEA 5E0F 3AB5 249B 39D2 4F25 E3B6 > >> > Looks correct. > >> > > >> > ``` % gpg --recv-keys D8692123C4065DEA5E0F3AB5249B39D24F25E3B6 gpg: > >> > requesting key 4F25E3B6 from hkp server pool.sks-keyservers.net gpg: key > >> > 4F25E3B6: public key "Werner Koch (dist sig)" imported > >> > >> I agree it appears he has the correct key. I did a local sig on it after what > >> checking I seemed to be able to do without meeting people in person. > >> > >> But it's a bit unclear to me on what basis you decided it looked correct? Your > >> mail suggests to me that you decided that based on the fact that the UID on > >> that key is "Werner Koch (dist sig)". But that would be the very first thing a > >> potential attacker would duplicate in his effort to fool our OP. Even if he's > >> using MITM tricks to subvert his system, he can still post his personally > >> generated key to the keyserver with this UID. > >> > >> Peter. > >> > >> PS: I briefly considered signing this message, because the attacker might MITM > >> my message to the OP. Then I realised what good that signature would do :). > >> > >> -- > >> I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. > >> You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. > >> My key is available at http://wwwhome.cs.utwente.nl/~lebbing/pubkey.txt > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> Gnupg-users mailing list > >> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > >> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Gnupg-users mailing list > > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users > > Sam, > > You are a little confused - you ask ask "can some one verify the gnupg fingerprint for > pubkey" and you use Verners key to verify gnupg. Then you worry about impersonation - now > clearly Verner and gnupg have different keys. Or don't you know that? > > Clearly you failed to follow my link and clearly you failed to check the public key for > gnupg. Now being a little confused try and get a clear question in your mind - is it > Verner's key that you have such a passion to verify or gnupg? > > Verner's had about three keys two of which have expired - to the best of my knowledge he's > a real person - he even maintains this list. You could always try encrypting an e-mail to > his public key asking him if he's a real person. I'd suggest you not do the same for the > public key of gnupg. > > People generate a private and a public key imaginary people don't do this - granted some one > can set up a false ID and create a set of keys - but though they have created a false ID to > do so they are nevertheless real people. > > If you are so concerned about Verner's key why not take a trip to Germany and arrange to > meet him? You can't meet the gnupg (as its a bit of software) but you can verify it's > running on your computer. > > All your keys are "untrusted." Everyone of them - apart from your own public key. They all > remain so until you actually meet that person and verify that they are who they say they > are. You carefully check their passport their driving licence. > > But gnupg has not got a passport or a driving license. The only way you can check if gnupg > is real is to check if it's running on your computer gpg --version - this will tell you if > you have the software installed. If it's installed and working correctly it must be real. > > What if that fails? Well you do the same thing gpg2 --version and hope that Verner does not > pop up and say "Hello." > > David > > > - -- > ?See the sanity of the man! No gods, no angels, no demons, no body. Nothing of the > kind.Stern, sane,every brain-cell perfect and complete even at the moment of death. No > delusion.? https://linuxcounter.net/user/512854.html - http://gbenet.com > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux) > Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ > > iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJP0CzCAAoJEOJpqm7flRExrRoH+gIVpmZ+pLRh3iT13AzX7oUn > qcJ8F9WT8RvfpTEK4gWPmu6MXmSVLbIvzJPcQswVFCGSgHeisIxkKSdZzXzsV1Ay > Yge0MPrZIxR/xA8ZJFC2+Oirx7ERPf615neoIAFwGu6Ern4XHWS7D2iCpfdknFfe > B2zmQGHhHmonZG99MOUyAAO9ndDxeXtBMxcTFFPn3ilSqErQ3Xhc9uDOaSWG5uc+ > prgXt8E9Ku4sptk7vDnArxri5i5xs6QAxP7JzGYZda/9vqyDfj5ZniIht+8VAu3x > eugnoPGyyBiJJ/blmeRoizbqG2xwwxkpb9lE8/cCPKw/4pdUo+638IGd2LXYkp8= > =5tt8 > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Sat Jun 9 02:22:39 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Fri, 08 Jun 2012 20:22:39 -0400 Subject: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? In-Reply-To: References: , , <4FCF7E1B.5050502@hotmail.com>, , <4FCFB559.6020509@digitalbrains.com>, , <4FD02CCF.6080804@gbenet.com> Message-ID: <4FD2974F.2050507@sixdemonbag.org> On 06/08/2012 05:37 PM, Sam Smith wrote: > I downloaded the GnuPG program. I then ran --verify and was told that > the key was signed with 0x4F25E3B6 key. I download 0x4F25E3B6 key from a > key server and then asked people on this mailing list to confirm that I > downloaded a legit key. Several people on this mailing list confirmed > the fingerprint of this key as a legit key. I then marked the key as > trusted because I verified the fingerprint. I hate to give an unclear answer, but this either is or isn't a proper verification, and there's no in-between. Before you go about thinking that's a pointless answer, please: I promise you that it's a completely accurate answer, and understanding why it's accurate will help you understand the nature of verification. The ancient Greeks had a branch of philosophy that was concerned with the nature of knowledge: not just what did we know, but how is it that we knew it, and on what basis did we trust it? This branch was called epistemology, and verification is an epistemological question. All right, you have a certificate and you know it's truly Werner's release signing certificate: but *how do you know it*? The gold standard of such knowledge involves meeting Werner face-to-face, checking his passport, verifying that it's a real passport and not a forgery, receiving his certificate fingerprint directly from him, emailing him at that address to confirm that he truly has access to the address listed, and so forth. If you were to do this many people on this list would nod appreciatively and say that yes, this is a proper verification. Some might shake their heads and say no, it's not: you only verified you were speaking with *a* Werner Koch who had access to *the* Werner Koch's email address, not that you were speaking to *the* Werner Koch. And, you know what? They'd be absolutely right. Ultimately, whether a given verification process rises to the bar of sufficiency is a personal decision. There is no absolute standard. As a result of this, you can only ever rely on being able to satisfy yourself -- there will always be people out there who believe your verification process is insufficient. And that's why your process either is or isn't a proper verification, and why there's no in-between. If you can honestly say that you understand the risks of asking the list, that you've considered those risks and you're comfortable doing things this way, then sign that certificate with a clear conscience and don't let anybody tell you that you're doing it wrong. Me, I think your process is certifiably crazy and I would never, ever do it that way. But you know what? I don't get to control your decisionmaking process and I don't think you should put any stock in my opinion. After all, I'm just a guy on the internet whom you've never met. You have no idea if I'm a bulwark of sanity or if I bark at the moon on a regular basis. :) From uzimac at da3m0n8t3r.com Sat Jun 9 04:35:29 2012 From: uzimac at da3m0n8t3r.com (Waitman Gobble) Date: Fri, 08 Jun 2012 19:35:29 -0700 (PDT) Subject: A Pact with the Devil In-Reply-To: <4FD25F39.7080404@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <1339209329.88922@da3m0n8t3r.com> Robert J. Hansen wrote .. > A fascinating paper just crossed my desk: Technical Report 666 from the > University of Cambridge's computer science department. Although it has > no relevance to GnuPG, it is such a cunningly evil idea -- and presented > so clearly, without any sophisticated mathematics -- that I think many > people here will find it fascinatingly unsettling reading. It's just a > matter of time until someone takes this (very slight parody) of an idea > and turns it into something disturbingly real... > > http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/techreports/UCAM-CL-TR-666.pdf > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users Hmm I dunno, ...opinion... this presumes an automated script can get 'bob's' attention, and either 'Bob' is dumb as a board or he's so compelled about the juicy details on 'Alice's' computer that he can't help but be naughty. It's presuming that Alice is 'talking' about Bob behind his back or talking to people whom Bob does not appreciate, ie secret cyber lover whatever. I'm brainstorming scenarios here: the email you receive: hey, did you know (alice) was saying 'that stupid jerk' about you, Bob. (but bob does not actually know alice) hey, did you know (alice) was saying 'that stupid dork' about you, Bob. (and in this case maybe bob actually will take the bait) hey, did you know that (bill gates) was just chatting about you, Bob. (ummm. yeah right. or even possibly in 2012 wtf is b.g. lol) I suppose the 'Temptation' bit of this scenario is very weak, as it would take much effort and skill to carry out 'randomly' and the percentage of 'hits' would probably be low, not worth the trouble. {I'm presuming that reading a PDF with gv on FreeBSD is not susceptible to a virus one might possibly contract using Acrobat on a MS system. (I believe there has been at least one instance if memory serves me. If that is not correct then I suppose I fell for the bait.} But maybe it would be a more likely scenario when computer chips are in brains and we are all truly connected, and we can get elaborate computer-brain viruses that pop right through our brain-firewalls. Unfortunately I doubt I'll be around when that stuff is happening. (Hmmm I guess, but you know what, now that I think about it - the guy who showed up this morning to clean the carpets definitely had something going on. Perhaps just a hangover.) Then I suppose the scenarios I listed above might be more effective. (?) -- Waitman Gobble San Jose California USA From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Sat Jun 9 05:49:06 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Fri, 08 Jun 2012 23:49:06 -0400 Subject: A Pact with the Devil In-Reply-To: <1339209329.88922@da3m0n8t3r.com> References: <1339209329.88922@da3m0n8t3r.com> Message-ID: <4FD2C7B2.8060801@sixdemonbag.org> On 06/08/2012 10:35 PM, Waitman Gobble wrote: > Hmm I dunno, ...opinion... this presumes an automated script can get > 'bob's' attention It's remarkably easy. Look at how many people fall for fraudulent "your computer is infected, clean it for $29.95" pop-up ads. Look at how many people click on links in spam mails promising "free access to porn" (with an unspoken sidebar of "if you'll click this link and visit a web page that will do a drive-by hijacking of your PC"). As Einstein is apocryphally held to have said, "Only two things are infinite: the universe and human stupidity. I'm not so sure about the universe." > and either 'Bob' is dumb as a board or he's so > compelled about the juicy details on 'Alice's' computer that he can't > help but be naughty. "Can't help"? No. But just *want* to watch, to feel that kind of power? Yes. At risk of sounding like I have a liberal-arts degree (which I do, and I can ask "would you like fries with that?" in Pashto to prove it), you might want to read Plato's _Republic_, Book 2, particularly about the Ring of Gyges. Book 2 is largely concerned with the question of whether people are moral because they are innately moral, or whether morality emerges from the fear of being punished. I can't do justice to it in a summary, I'm afraid. In my own life, I've found a lot of wisdom in the phrase "character is who you are when you know you can get away with it." From david at gbenet.com Sat Jun 9 07:09:54 2012 From: david at gbenet.com (david at gbenet.com) Date: Sat, 09 Jun 2012 06:09:54 +0100 Subject: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? In-Reply-To: References: , , <4FCF7E1B.5050502@hotmail.com>, , <4FCFB559.6020509@digitalbrains.com>, , <4FD02CCF.6080804@gbenet.com> Message-ID: <4FD2DAA2.2050007@gbenet.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 08/06/12 22:41, Sam Smith wrote: > > Another thing is that downloading the key from that link you provided is no guarantee of safety in and of itself either because the page is not being hosted over SSL with confirmed identity information. So technically there's no guarantee I'm actually interacting with teh GnuPG.org website. > > > >> Date: Thu, 7 Jun 2012 05:23:43 +0100 >> From: david at gbenet.com >> To: gnupg-users at gnupg.org >> Subject: Re: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? >> > On 07/06/12 00:15, Sam Smith wrote: >>>> yes, impersonation of the UID [Werner Koch (dist sig)] is what I'm trying to guard against. >>>> >>>> My efforts to verify the fingerprint are the best way to do this, correct? >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> Date: Wed, 6 Jun 2012 21:54:01 +0200 >>>>> From: peter at digitalbrains.com >>>>> To: gnupg-users at gnupg.org >>>>> Subject: Re: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? >>>>> >>>>> On 06/06/12 17:58, Mika Suomalainen wrote: >>>>>>> D869 2123 C406 5DEA 5E0F 3AB5 249B 39D2 4F25 E3B6 >>>>>> Looks correct. >>>>>> >>>>>> ``` % gpg --recv-keys D8692123C4065DEA5E0F3AB5249B39D24F25E3B6 gpg: >>>>>> requesting key 4F25E3B6 from hkp server pool.sks-keyservers.net gpg: key >>>>>> 4F25E3B6: public key "Werner Koch (dist sig)" imported >>>>> >>>>> I agree it appears he has the correct key. I did a local sig on it after what >>>>> checking I seemed to be able to do without meeting people in person. >>>>> >>>>> But it's a bit unclear to me on what basis you decided it looked correct? Your >>>>> mail suggests to me that you decided that based on the fact that the UID on >>>>> that key is "Werner Koch (dist sig)". But that would be the very first thing a >>>>> potential attacker would duplicate in his effort to fool our OP. Even if he's >>>>> using MITM tricks to subvert his system, he can still post his personally >>>>> generated key to the keyserver with this UID. >>>>> >>>>> Peter. >>>>> >>>>> PS: I briefly considered signing this message, because the attacker might MITM >>>>> my message to the OP. Then I realised what good that signature would do :). >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. >>>>> You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. >>>>> My key is available at http://wwwhome.cs.utwente.nl/~lebbing/pubkey.txt >>>>> >>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>> Gnupg-users mailing list >>>>> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org >>>>> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users >>>> >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> Gnupg-users mailing list >>>> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org >>>> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users > > Sam, > > You are a little confused - you ask ask "can some one verify the gnupg fingerprint for > pubkey" and you use Verners key to verify gnupg. Then you worry about impersonation - now > clearly Verner and gnupg have different keys. Or don't you know that? > > Clearly you failed to follow my link and clearly you failed to check the public key for > gnupg. Now being a little confused try and get a clear question in your mind - is it > Verner's key that you have such a passion to verify or gnupg? > > Verner's had about three keys two of which have expired - to the best of my knowledge he's > a real person - he even maintains this list. You could always try encrypting an e-mail to > his public key asking him if he's a real person. I'd suggest you not do the same for the > public key of gnupg. > > People generate a private and a public key imaginary people don't do this - granted some one > can set up a false ID and create a set of keys - but though they have created a false ID to > do so they are nevertheless real people. > > If you are so concerned about Verner's key why not take a trip to Germany and arrange to > meet him? You can't meet the gnupg (as its a bit of software) but you can verify it's > running on your computer. > > All your keys are "untrusted." Everyone of them - apart from your own public key. They all > remain so until you actually meet that person and verify that they are who they say they > are. You carefully check their passport their driving licence. > > But gnupg has not got a passport or a driving license. The only way you can check if gnupg > is real is to check if it's running on your computer gpg --version - this will tell you if > you have the software installed. If it's installed and working correctly it must be real. > > What if that fails? Well you do the same thing gpg2 --version and hope that Verner does not > pop up and say "Hello." > > David > > >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Gnupg-users mailing list >> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org >> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users > Sam, You have to apply some logic - and some common sense. I have about 180 public keys - all apart from about 5 or 6 are untrusted. Now a lot of people have my public key say 175 and all those people have my public key marked as untrusted. The whole idea behind the web of trust is that you have met "real" people. On the whole most people are who they say they are - but with all systems you get people using fake IDs. Now Werner Koch has a reality - he writes GPG4Win GNUpg and maintains this list - but because I've not met him (though I have exchanged e-mails with him) I have not signed his key. Why? The whole principle underlining the web of trust is that you have met that person in the real world and to the best of your knowledge - they are who they say they are and their public key belongs to them. It is a principle of the whole system that you only sign people's keys. The person comes first - not the key. It's not the validity of keys but the validity of people. So in your every day life you accept that the train driver the bus driver the person behind the bar - your wife and kids are all living real and normal lives. Now, your wife and kids aare somewhat different. You married your wife and thus can trust she presented to you a real ID. You had sexual intercourse with this real person (your wife) and she as a result of that intercourse produced your kids. Your relationship to your wife and kids is special - you trust that they are really real and you believe it to be true. And why not? You wake up in the morning beside her - you watch your kids grow up. Now 20 years into your marriage you discover that your wife's a secret agent - Jane Brown - not the Mary Smith you thought you married - and that were you thought believed your kids sprung from your seed they were in fact from the milkman. The reality - the belief is she's still your wife and they are your kids - they have behaved as such. Most people are bound up with beliefs and behaviours. They interact with others on a daily basis sharing common values beliefs and behaviours. Under normal conditions we don't ask every one we meet for their passport driving license or DNA sequence. We accept it as the norm that people are real and valid - its the IDs they use which may or maybe questionable. A spy may have say 6 IDs - the IDs are fictitious but the person is real. You have lots of family and friends - who they are - what they are changes overtime and changes because of the conditions under which you meet them - they could be a Father a Professor - an Olympic Javelin thrower - then Retired - then dead. All these are IDs - which govern your behavioural interaction with that person. What do you trust? That you hear them speak? You have shaken them by the hand? Gone down the pub with them? In truth we can not say that all these IDs are "real" neither can we say they are "false." But we interact with them and so build a reality of behaviours - sharing common interests and values and beliefs. Just like all these people on this mailing list. People are real. Though they may have many identities. It is common practice to accept people at "face value" - even if you only "know" them from being on a mailing list. It is by common interaction "communication" that one reinforces one's own belief systems and we accept the commonly held belief that we are interacting with a real person - we through our own perception then make judgements about that person - we like them or we don't - we admire and respect them or we don't we trust what they have to say or we don't. We make value judgements about real people - no matter what ID they present to us. It's the "face value" which is the key. Have we met the person? We affirm the reality of people via our social networking. Mary knows Bob - Bob knows Harry and Harry knows Mary. You can ask Bob and Harry to confirm that it is really is Mary that you are talking too. We all can confirm to some degree the reality of Werner Koch - by what he does. But I have not met him in any social network other than this and other mailing lists. So people on this mailing list "know" that Werner Koch is "real." You can send him an encrypted e-mail and if he has your public key reply to you. The "reality" is we make people "personal" to ourselves by interacting with them. If we don't interact we don't build any models in our minds. If say 5 people said that they had actually met Werner in the flesh - at face value - you would accept that Werner Koch was who he said he was. We assign material documents to give validity to real people. People come first not the documentation. A public key is such a document. A person may generate many public keys - the person is the real validity. You do not affirm a level of trust in the public key. You affirm a level of trust in the person. So all your public keys are untrustworthy except for those people that you have met. So even though I and many others have exchanged e-mails with Werner Koch his public key remains untrusted. Likewise you can not meet face to face with a bit of software though you may affirm its on your computer and you may affirm by interacting with it - the fact remains the public key remains untrustworthy. I have lots of keys - 98 per cent are "untrustworthy." It's normal. It is not the same as having the perception of an untrustworthy person - which is based on our perception oof the value system we place on their behaviours. A public key is a static document - whereas people - those that are alive have values belief systems and behaviours that interact with other human beings out of common interests and goals. Some people have a mind set that says "that person is real therefore their documents are real." Then they form value judgements on that documentation - to trust or not to trust - as though they were interacting with real people. In reality we can not judge the value of documents. In reality we can judge the value of people. We make value judgements about people all the time - based on their interaction with us - our mood - how we feel at any given time. We interpretate according to our reality and perceptions. What is our "reality" about public key encryption? The validation of public keys? The validation of real people? We almost forget why we want public key encryption - so that only the recipient can read our e-mails. The "recipient" is a person - their public key is merely a tool to which software on your computer can encrypt to their public key. That's the only reality a public key has. It is not a seal of authenticity - not a rubber stamp. It has no power vested in it as to give "authority." It is merely a means for secure communications over an insecure network. The web of trust - signing people's keys is based on people meeting face to face and interacting in a social network - it is not about the level of trust one has in the public key. A keys "validity" is it works. The validity is the recipient of an encrypted message can decrypt it. All keys are valid in this respect. They are in a sense all trustworthy. All keys do what they say they can do. Without any failure. So you need not set any level of trust on keys because they work perfectly. The "trust" is in the person - not the public key. So some would argue that signing Werner's key is crazy - has no logic and a miss-placed value system. I'd have to agree. David - -- ?See the sanity of the man! No gods, no angels, no demons, no body. Nothing of the kind.Stern, sane,every brain-cell perfect and complete even at the moment of death. No delusion.? https://linuxcounter.net/user/512854.html - http://gbenet.com/blog -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJP0tqUAAoJEOJpqm7flRExg8UH/0XNKxkUwqYWiKVe4tQezfJt VcZ5FCz3aFCSqCys/plxsVXcnE6VHH5PnJO/cHb0x+5MNJqbTP1N6r97P+AQhFUN XknxLE9qfX1KgiDTTZ8euwbMong4zwXxY+Wg0twxQAdnHj73uU32j5SFQ2+VKx6Y PrvK/JSR3aeyN6v/OanBAHjPFIGc3rcSOqFoTAhfkGME/XlNPfzNknk0EO5bERYL maOnopf25iYalqZTfRMBDffb79riIDega+A5hSp12hMmi7XnEFeSN2iAIHmVM8Ht v9NzoRIUW75quJPUotOwUI7O0rVyoggYxhorWhbhQPNPWgkUnMNcon9GK1eZGDM= =flOL -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com Sat Jun 9 09:56:09 2012 From: mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com (Mika Suomalainen) Date: Sat, 09 Jun 2012 10:56:09 +0300 Subject: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? In-Reply-To: <4FD0DC68.5040000@sixdemonbag.org> References: <4FCF7E1B.5050502@hotmail.com> <4FCFB559.6020509@digitalbrains.com> <4FD0CFF0.7000109@hotmail.com> <87mx4f2ic2.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FD0DC68.5040000@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <4FD30199.3080606@hotmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 07.06.2012 19:52, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > On 6/7/12 12:32 PM, Werner Koch wrote: >> That is actually a bit funny: I never asked anyone to sign that >> key. Probably they deduced the correctness from my regular key >> which I used to sign the above key. That is not a surprise; I >> have seen many signatures on my keys from people I never met. > > Perhaps it would be worthwhile to add a question to the signing > process: "Have you met this person face-to-face and verified > his/her identity? (y/N)" If the user answers no, display a warning > that the user probably wants to lsign, not to sign, and give the > option of making an lsign instead. +1 to this idea. > It might cut down on certifications such as these... > > _______________________________________________ Gnupg-users mailing > list Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users - -- [Mika Suomalainen](https://mkaysi.github.com/) || [gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net --recv-keys 4DB53CFE82A46728](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/key.txt) || [Why do I sign my emails?](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/WhyDoISignEmails.html) || [Please don't send HTML.](http://mkaysi.github.com/articles/complaining/HTML.html) || [This signature](https://gist.github.com/2643070#file_icedove.md) || [Please reply below this line](http://mkaysi.github.com/articles/complaining/topposting.html) ____________________________ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.19 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Homepage: http://mkaysi.github.com/ Comment: gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net 82A46728 Comment: Public key: http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/key.txt Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJP0wGXAAoJEE21PP6CpGcoxZQQAKDZ02aQT1wECuXhdKl54wAp O0zQ1XOgur8MpalFV5IUQGJpx9uFLIT5m6+2qsldGOpV1pnM8LPkMf6B9LJfOT9d NgwDhpQQs3KgqWo7s8ZKlNn7Kli95LivwbaTwjfrd/aFQ8etHX7m9ZPS07ALklZA cI5RncyTLJ9SS2XHP5+AXeA15PjvFJKYPUWThF9AtBDaWdTAaETBFvjApeN0vHv8 A+neBFhZaxobHbAilfZbmvV42ZtSXV8ld5+KrIVVaJgczY/kcis+GmZUWFdtHPRL DW72fTVCjnCJ5eUW0/buIDr3nL5Fr0KtkwX9vbVGl1bpS+j9WZviv0P8USW2LoTd aET7cn3ikcqXH7PYjHc7eJjccBcktjFpe9Id3qI2VvT7GGDxtMlrswDSAPbmLcKz 9aJnVjbwUB4blFYPyJrQBZK7Z+yS0dKckLBTNXIktDddbS20Y98ubRwmuNGp8+Kk Ov6kdT7lo4kUt5AuWj80OQDwz/pvcgUka3F+sY4iGPDkhi97LjWmKAr8TVzHIsZ+ inEKXPuL9ti9Kj67JmVfuQC1Ku4ZzknsdGFRd+fOLrTDzkglruIqrFYSa8YBJtsj jaNqjT7jOWRLB2Lk/m+tEMNU6UMFun6gLGA6FdeVMIVHBYbWWkiV9CtsfkZvKXNC YmyP2k9HmHTn3vROoTt3 =KE0X -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From wk at gnupg.org Sat Jun 9 10:19:37 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Sat, 09 Jun 2012 10:19:37 +0200 Subject: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? In-Reply-To: (Sam Smith's message of "Fri, 8 Jun 2012 17:41:34 -0400") References: <4FCF7E1B.5050502@hotmail.com> <4FCFB559.6020509@digitalbrains.com> <4FD02CCF.6080804@gbenet.com> Message-ID: <87boks28yu.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Fri, 8 Jun 2012 23:41, smickson at hotmail.com said: > Another thing is that downloading the key from that link you provided > is no guarantee of safety in and of itself either because the page is > not being hosted over SSL with confirmed identity information. So That is not relevant. The key (correct OpenPGP term is ?keyblock? but sometimes also called ?certificate?) is in itself secure; the included self-signature and signatures from other people shall be used to evaluate the identity of the key owner. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Sat Jun 9 12:25:19 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Sat, 09 Jun 2012 06:25:19 -0400 Subject: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? In-Reply-To: <4FD2DAA2.2050007@gbenet.com> References: , , <4FCF7E1B.5050502@hotmail.com>, , <4FCFB559.6020509@digitalbrains.com>, , <4FD02CCF.6080804@gbenet.com> <4FD2DAA2.2050007@gbenet.com> Message-ID: <4FD3248F.4040600@sixdemonbag.org> Please consider trimming your quotes. The amount that's going on here strikes me as pretty excessive. I'm not standing on a chair and screaming that you're doing it wrong, of course: this is just a friendly request to please trim your quotes. :) > The whole idea behind the web of trust is that you have met "real" > people. Not particularly. The idea behind the Web of Trust is that entities can introduce other entities. Everything above and beyond that is just the projection someone places upon it. > It is a principle of the whole system that you only sign people's > keys. The person comes first - not the key. Not necessarily. For instance, Symantec has a certificate they use to sign PGP releases. That certificate does not belong to a person but to a corporation. *Entities* come first, but an entity is not necessarily a person. Usually it is -- but it's not required to be. > It's not the validity of keys but the validity of people. No, it's definitely the validity of certificates that we're checking. We can agree on how to check the validity of a certificate -- ensure the fingerprint matches the one provided to you by the entity controlling the certificate. We can't agree on how to check the validity of a person, or even what it even means to do this. So instead we handwave it by saying, "prove to your own satisfaction you're talking to the real entity -- whether this means you've known the person for twenty years, you've seen two forms of government ID, or Elvis came to you in a s?ance and vouched for the person and told you he was a swell guy. That last option is every bit as 'valid' as the other two. How you confirm an entity's identity is your choice, and nobody gets to decide that policy except you. > Most people are bound up with beliefs and behaviours. They interact > with others on a daily basis sharing common values beliefs and > behaviours. Under normal conditions we don't ask every one we meet > for their passport driving license or DNA sequence. We accept it as > the norm that people are real and valid - its the IDs they use which > may or maybe questionable. I don't understand what you're talking about here. In fact, it seems quite self-contradictory. If someone presents themselves as being Horace Micklethorpe, shows me ID in that name, and then I later discover this person's real name is Harry Palmer, I'm going to understandably accuse this person of having been inauthentic with me. > So people on this mailing list "know" that Werner Koch is "real." Few of us do. I harbor some suspicion that Werner's real name is Horace Micklethorpe. He might also be Harry Palmer or Bob Howard. I don't know. I also don't particularly *care*, either: what I care about is what he does, not who he is. > A public key is a static document Certificates change over time as UIDs, UATs, signatures and subkeys are added and revoked. Certificates are highly dynamic documents: many of them gain a signature a week. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 187 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From markr-gnupg at signal100.com Sat Jun 9 11:28:04 2012 From: markr-gnupg at signal100.com (Mark Rousell) Date: Sat, 09 Jun 2012 10:28:04 +0100 Subject: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? In-Reply-To: <87r4tr2z9n.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <4FCF7E1B.5050502@hotmail.com> <4FCFB559.6020509@digitalbrains.com> <87r4tr2z9n.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <4FD31724.8000604@signal100.com> On 07/06/2012 11:27, Werner Koch wrote: > On Wed, 6 Jun 2012 21:54, peter at digitalbrains.com said: > > If you look at my OpenPGP mail header you will be pointed to a ?finger? > address - enter it into your web browser (in case you don't know what > finger is) and you will see Just as an aside, I presume you are referring to this header line: OpenPGP: id=1E42B367; url=finger:wk at g10code.com Do you know of any common modern browsers that have finger protocol support built in? I wonder, how many people even have a finger client installed (that their browser would be able to find)? -- MarkR PGP public key: http://www.signal100.com/markr/pgp Key ID: C9C5C162 From mick.crane at gmail.com Sat Jun 9 13:05:12 2012 From: mick.crane at gmail.com (michael crane) Date: Sat, 9 Jun 2012 12:05:12 +0100 Subject: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? In-Reply-To: <4FD31724.8000604@signal100.com> References: <4FCF7E1B.5050502@hotmail.com> <4FCFB559.6020509@digitalbrains.com> <87r4tr2z9n.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FD31724.8000604@signal100.com> Message-ID: <834f2bf0659aabe4b494daa3d5bf82ff.squirrel@192.168.1.50> On Sat, June 9, 2012 10:28 am, Mark Rousell wrote: > On 07/06/2012 11:27, Werner Koch wrote: >> On Wed, 6 Jun 2012 21:54, peter at digitalbrains.com said: >> >> If you look at my OpenPGP mail header you will be pointed to a ?finger? >> address - enter it into your web browser (in case you don't know what >> finger is) and you will see > > Just as an aside, I presume you are referring to this header line: > > OpenPGP: id=1E42B367; url=finger:wk at g10code.com > > Do you know of any common modern browsers that have finger protocol > support built in? I wonder, how many people even have a finger client > installed (that their browser would be able to find)? also What types of processes are forbidden by DreamHost? IRC-related persistent processes of any kind (including, but not limited to, bots, bouncers, etc.) are STRICTLY PROHIBITED, and are in violation of the Terms of Service. BitTorrent-related processes are not allowed. Streaming Audio or Video servers of any kind are not allowed on shared hosting servers. Voice chat or VoIP servers like Asterisk, Ventrilo and TeamSpeak are not permitted. Game servers (CounterStrike, WoW, BF2, etc.) are also not permitted. Proxy style tunnels such as Tor cannot be run. Alternate services and daemons (Finger, OpenLDAP, memcached, etc.) as well as daemonized version of current services (PHP, httpd, etc.) may not be run. Cron Jobs, Crontabs are allowed provided you don't use excessive system resources. mick -- keyID: 0x4BFEBB31 From peter at digitalbrains.com Sat Jun 9 13:21:46 2012 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Sat, 09 Jun 2012 13:21:46 +0200 Subject: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? In-Reply-To: <4FD2974F.2050507@sixdemonbag.org> References: , , <4FCF7E1B.5050502@hotmail.com>, , <4FCFB559.6020509@digitalbrains.com>, , <4FD02CCF.6080804@gbenet.com> <4FD2974F.2050507@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <4FD331CA.8040004@digitalbrains.com> On 09/06/12 02:22, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > Some might shake their heads and say no, it's not: you only verified you were > speaking with *a* Werner Koch who had access to *the* Werner Koch's email > address, not that you were speaking to *the* Werner Koch. So how /do/ you verify that you have the distribution key for GnuPG? Let's not lose sight of this specific instance of verification: that you want to know you have the GnuPG source as distributed by its authors, and not some modified version. It doesn't really matter how many Werner Kochs there are. There is always a bootstrapping problem for the trust. So at some point you'll have to satisfy yourself that you have the correct key. Crowdsourcing the knowledge seems viable, if you make sure the messages from the crowd are not altered by your attacker. And it's always a costs/benefits decision. How sure do you want to be that you have the unmodified sources? So I don't agree that it is as binary as "this is or isn't a proper verification". Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at http://wwwhome.cs.utwente.nl/~lebbing/pubkey.txt From sven at fsfe.org Sat Jun 9 14:03:02 2012 From: sven at fsfe.org (Sven Radde) Date: Sat, 09 Jun 2012 14:03:02 +0200 Subject: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <4FD33B76.7030907@fsfe.org> Hi! >> Perhaps it would be worthwhile to add a question to the signing >> process: "Have you met this person face-to-face and verified >> his/her identity? (y/N)" If the user answers no, display a warning >> that the user probably wants to lsign, not to sign, and give the >> option of making an lsign instead. > > +1 to this idea. Isn't that what --ask-cert-level is for? cu, Paeniteo From markr-gnupg at signal100.com Sat Jun 9 15:29:21 2012 From: markr-gnupg at signal100.com (Mark Rousell) Date: Sat, 09 Jun 2012 14:29:21 +0100 Subject: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? In-Reply-To: <834f2bf0659aabe4b494daa3d5bf82ff.squirrel@192.168.1.50> References: <4FCF7E1B.5050502@hotmail.com> <4FCFB559.6020509@digitalbrains.com> <87r4tr2z9n.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FD31724.8000604@signal100.com> <834f2bf0659aabe4b494daa3d5bf82ff.squirrel@192.168.1.50> Message-ID: <4FD34FB1.3080200@signal100.com> On 09/06/2012 12:05, michael crane wrote: > > On Sat, June 9, 2012 10:28 am, Mark Rousell wrote: >> On 07/06/2012 11:27, Werner Koch wrote: >>> On Wed, 6 Jun 2012 21:54, peter at digitalbrains.com said: >>> >>> If you look at my OpenPGP mail header you will be pointed to a ?finger? >>> address - enter it into your web browser (in case you don't know what >>> finger is) and you will see >> >> Just as an aside, I presume you are referring to this header line: >> >> OpenPGP: id=1E42B367; url=finger:wk at g10code.com >> >> Do you know of any common modern browsers that have finger protocol >> support built in? I wonder, how many people even have a finger client >> installed (that their browser would be able to find)? > also > > What types of processes are forbidden by DreamHost? > [deletia] Err.. sorry, not following you. :-) Who is using Dreamhost and what has it got to do with the finger protocol? Werner doesn't seem to be using Dreamhost for what it's worth. Anyway, I admit that my comment about the finger protocol is not exactly on-topic but I was just curious about Werner's assumption that the protocol would be meaningful to an arbitrary browser. For example, even though I've got a command line finger client on my system none of my installed browsers know about it. I'd have to manually add a system mapping for the finger: protocol (and even then I'd also have to add a wrapper to open the finger client in a persistent shell so I could see the results). -- MarkR PGP public key: http://www.signal100.com/markr/pgp Key ID: C9C5C162 From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Sat Jun 9 15:44:06 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Sat, 09 Jun 2012 09:44:06 -0400 Subject: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? In-Reply-To: <4FD331CA.8040004@digitalbrains.com> References: , , <4FCF7E1B.5050502@hotmail.com>, , <4FCFB559.6020509@digitalbrains.com>, , <4FD02CCF.6080804@gbenet.com> <4FD2974F.2050507@sixdemonbag.org> <4FD331CA.8040004@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <4FD35326.3040001@sixdemonbag.org> On 06/09/2012 07:21 AM, Peter Lebbing wrote: > So how /do/ you verify that you have the distribution key for GnuPG? By fiat. You go through some mechanism and at the completion declare, "I am satisfied that the likelihood of this *not* being the correct distribution key is quite low." I'm not weighing in on what the mechanism should be: I don't get to declare what anyone else's policy should be. > It doesn't really matter how many Werner Kochs there are. Sure it does. As an absurdist thought experiment, let's think of a nation -- call it Kochistan. In Kochistan, everyone is required to have the name Werner Koch. Most people in Kochistan are honest. If you ask them if they're *the* Werner Koch, they'll tell you no, they're not. Some people in Kochistan are dishonest. If you ask them if they're *the* Werner Koch they will quickly tell you yes, create a certificate with the same UID on it as the one which signs GnuPG releases, and give you the fingerprint for *that* certificate. This Werner Koch will then call his cousin (also named Werner Koch) who runs an organized crime outfit, and will tell him that if he can Trojan a copy of GnuPG that you'll be happy to install it because you're under the impression that he (Werner-who-is-not-our-Werner) is him (Werner-who-is-our-Werner). There's a big difference between being *the* person and being *a* person. :) > Crowdsourcing the knowledge seems viable, if you make sure the > messages from the crowd are not altered by your attacker. I'll trust crowdsourcing to find me good restaurants in my neighborhood. If someone (or some group) subverts that system then I'm out a few bucks for a meal that doesn't taste very good and I know not to trust that restaurant review website again. And I learn about this really quickly, too -- all it takes is one or two bad meals and I've moved on to find a better source for restaurant reviews. I don't trust crowdsourcing to verify GnuPG. If someone or some group subverts that system my exposure might be much greater and I might not learn about it for quite some time. > And it's always a costs/benefits decision. How sure do you want to be > that you have the unmodified sources? So I don't agree that it is as > binary as "this is or isn't a proper verification". Well -- not to be rude, but you did. As you said, "at some point you'll have to satisfy yourself that you have the correct key." The process you use to satisfy yourself will by definition satisfy yourself: that makes it a proper verification. But if you satisfy it by a process that other people consider insufficient or deeply unhinged (in the case of the s?ance with Elvis), they will say that it is *not* sufficient and that makes it an improper verification. Verification is inherently subjective. A verification can simultaneously be sufficient and insufficient -- sufficient for yourself but not others, insufficient for yourself but not others, and so on. From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Sat Jun 9 16:29:45 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Sat, 09 Jun 2012 10:29:45 -0400 Subject: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? In-Reply-To: <4FD35326.3040001@sixdemonbag.org> References: , , <4FCF7E1B.5050502@hotmail.com>, , <4FCFB559.6020509@digitalbrains.com>, , <4FD02CCF.6080804@gbenet.com> <4FD2974F.2050507@sixdemonbag.org> <4FD331CA.8040004@digitalbrains.com> <4FD35326.3040001@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <4FD35DD9.3000509@sixdemonbag.org> On 06/09/2012 09:44 AM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: >> It doesn't really matter how many Werner Kochs there are. > > Sure it does. As an absurdist thought experiment... An anecdote might work better than an absurdist thought experiment, come to think of it... ===== In the United States, the collegiate basketball championships are the occasion for a lot of betting. People stake wagers on which teams will make the semifinals (the "Sweet Sixteen") and the playoffs (the "Final Four"). As you might expect, a lot of people try to get some kind of inside information -- they might have a cousin who plays for one team and their cousin says the University of Nevada at Las Vegas is the one to look out for or something. Whenever you've got gamblers you'll have people who try to get inside information or expert advice. The University of Iowa's color-commentator for their basketball games is a great guy -- I met him a couple of times, once when he was playing ball for UI and a couple of times when I was a grad student at UI. He's also a legend in professional basketball, having replaced Michael Jordan in the 1992 NBA Finals while the Bulls were down by 15 and rallying them to a 97-93 win. Anyone who can not only replace Michael Jordan in a game, but replace him *and* rally the score, is a deservedly legendary figure. We have the same name, we're both University of Iowa graduates, and we both have a lot of family in Des Moines. We both answer to "Bob Hansen". (I prefer "Rob," but I'll answer to "Bob" or "Robert".) Even our middle initials are similar: he's Robert L. Hansen and I'm Robert J. Hansen. It doesn't take a bad case of dyslexia to get those initials reversed. So during Final Four season when people look around for the Bob Hansen who attended the University of Iowa... well, sometimes they get me. "Are you Bob Hansen?" Yes, I am. "Did you attend the University of Iowa?" Yep! "Are you *that* Bob Hansen who attended the University of Iowa? Bob Hansen from Des Moines?" Well, I'm not actually from Des Moines, no, but yes, I have a lot of family there. "OH MY GOD I CAN'T BELIEVE I FOUND YOU. Quick! Who are your Final Four picks? And are you still tight with Magic Johnson and Michael Jordan?" Verification is a hard problem. Even when dealing with someone who is giving *completely honest answers*, it's still easy to confuse *a* Bob Hansen for *the* Bob Hansen. And when it comes to getting good Final Four picks, you really want *the* Bob Hansen, and not me. I've seen a total of two basketball games in my life. Likewise, you want *the* Werner Koch, not *a* Werner Koch. When it comes to getting a correct copy of GnuPG, you really want his certificate and not some other Werner Koch's! From peter at digitalbrains.com Sat Jun 9 17:05:05 2012 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Sat, 09 Jun 2012 17:05:05 +0200 Subject: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? In-Reply-To: <4FD35326.3040001@sixdemonbag.org> References: , , <4FCF7E1B.5050502@hotmail.com>, , <4FCFB559.6020509@digitalbrains.com>, , <4FD02CCF.6080804@gbenet.com> <4FD2974F.2050507@sixdemonbag.org> <4FD331CA.8040004@digitalbrains.com> <4FD35326.3040001@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <4FD36621.9060507@digitalbrains.com> On 09/06/12 15:44, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > I'm not weighing in on what the mechanism should be: I don't get to declare > what anyone else's policy should be. I was under the impression you did. I interpreted your mail and particularly the statement > but this either is or isn't a proper verification, and there's no > in-between. as meaning that there is only one correct way to do a proper verification. From your reply, I understand now you did not mean it like that. I was already quite puzzled about my interpretation because it didn't sound like you :). >> It doesn't really matter how many Werner Kochs there are. > > Sure it does. As an absurdist thought experiment, let's think of a nation -- > call it Kochistan. In Kochistan, everyone is required to have the name > Werner Koch. Most people in Kochistan are honest. If you ask them if > they're *the* Werner Koch, they'll tell you no, they're not. Funnily, we're saying the same thing. You yourself said you don't particularly care if Werner Koch is actually called Horace Micklethorpe or Harry Palmer or ... Then why are you interested in the number of Werner Kochs? The thing I'm interested in: is the source of GnuPG I downloaded actually the program we know and love. I'm at this point not interested in the fact that Werner Koch is a main developer of it, or what his proper name is. For all I know his birthname indeed is Horace. He might as well have given the UID "GnuPG dist sig" to the key, instead of "Werner Koch (dist sig)". The only reason we are talking about "the" Werner Koch is that his name is in the UID, which might as easily not have been. As I said, the number of Werner Kochs is insubstantial. > I don't trust crowdsourcing to verify GnuPG. If someone or some group > subverts that system my exposure might be much greater and I might not learn > about it for quite some time. So how did you verify your GnuPG source? If you say "I asked a close friend", my counterquestion is: How did he/she? What I want to know is: what bootstrapped the confidence that the key was the proper GnuPG dist sig? Personally, I did it by checking from a number of locations that the key making the signature is the same from wherever I try. Also, I spread the checks over a substantial period of time. If the website got hacked, I hoped it would come out in that period of time. It did not at any point include the quantity of Werner Kochs. Now, if I wanted more satisfaction, I would indeed turn to this mailing list, ask members whether they see the same fingerprint, and check the replies from several locations to see that from wherever I check, the replies are identical. Again add a little time to allow for members to write to the mailing list "Hey I did not write that reply!" in case of impersonation. Hopefully at least one person would notice and expose the deception. And I do not see this process as, to quote you, "certifiably crazy" at all. It would perhaps be if I only checked it from the same computer as where I downloaded the source and signature and keyblock, but nowhere is it stated this is the case. Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at http://wwwhome.cs.utwente.nl/~lebbing/pubkey.txt From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Sat Jun 9 17:17:25 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Sat, 09 Jun 2012 11:17:25 -0400 Subject: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? In-Reply-To: <4FD36621.9060507@digitalbrains.com> References: , , <4FCF7E1B.5050502@hotmail.com>, , <4FCFB559.6020509@digitalbrains.com>, , <4FD02CCF.6080804@gbenet.com> <4FD2974F.2050507@sixdemonbag.org> <4FD331CA.8040004@digitalbrains.com> <4FD35326.3040001@sixdemonbag.org> <4FD36621.9060507@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <4FD36905.1020501@sixdemonbag.org> On 06/09/2012 11:05 AM, Peter Lebbing wrote: > your reply, I understand now you did not mean it like that. I was > already quite puzzled about my interpretation because it didn't sound > like you :). Thank you for giving me the benefit of the doubt. :) > Funnily, we're saying the same thing. You yourself said you don't > particularly care if Werner Koch is actually called Horace > Micklethorpe or Harry Palmer or ... Then why are you interested in > the number of Werner Kochs? I'm not interested in the number of Werner Kochs. I'm interested in the difference between *the* entity and *an* entity. The entity that signs these releases happens to be Werner. But there are many entities named Werner, so how do we know we have the certificate belonging to the correct entity? It's an identification problem. Werner's only relevance to it _qua_ himself is that we acknowledge him as the definitive authenticator of the code: "yes, that is the code I wrote." If we're going to rely on a definitive authenticator, shouldn't we ensure we're actually talking to the actual authenticating entity? :) > So how did you verify your GnuPG source? If you say "I asked a close > friend", my counterquestion is: How did he/she? What I want to know > is: what bootstrapped the confidence that the key was the proper > GnuPG dist sig? My bootstrap is "I trust my Linux distribution." My distro is a trusted software provider, in the traditional security sense of a "trusted provider". If I receive software from an official Fedora repo and it is signed by the repo release team, that's good enough for me. How did I come to trust that I have the correct certificate for the repo release team? Because it came on the DVD, which is my trusted bootstrap. I fully acknowledge this is validation by fiat. Some people will think it's a perfectly reasonable way of doing things. Others will think I'm crazy. It's up to the individual to decide. :) > And I do not see this process as, to quote you, "certifiably crazy" > at all. And as I said, apparently you and I have completely different opinions on whether crowdsourcing should be trusted for these matters. And, you know, that's okay. :) From peter at digitalbrains.com Sat Jun 9 17:57:04 2012 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Sat, 09 Jun 2012 17:57:04 +0200 Subject: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? In-Reply-To: <4FD36905.1020501@sixdemonbag.org> References: , , <4FCF7E1B.5050502@hotmail.com>, , <4FCFB559.6020509@digitalbrains.com>, , <4FD02CCF.6080804@gbenet.com> <4FD2974F.2050507@sixdemonbag.org> <4FD331CA.8040004@digitalbrains.com> <4FD35326.3040001@sixdemonbag.org> <4FD36621.9060507@digitalbrains.com> <4FD36905.1020501@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <4FD37250.9040104@digitalbrains.com> On 09/06/12 17:17, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > My bootstrap is "I trust my Linux distribution." My distro is a trusted > software provider, in the traditional security sense of a "trusted > provider". If I receive software from an official Fedora repo and it is > signed by the repo release team, that's good enough for me. Suppose you would want to build from the vanilla source downloaded from gnupg.org and signed by "Werner Koch (dist sig)", how would you verify authenticity of that key? I also just trust the Debian repo for my software. Unfortunately, the problem is just transferred to the signature on the ISO I download to install Debian on a new system. I do the same: download the sig from various places and compare the issuer. Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at http://wwwhome.cs.utwente.nl/~lebbing/pubkey.txt From jw72253 at verizon.net Sat Jun 9 18:35:36 2012 From: jw72253 at verizon.net (John) Date: Sat, 9 Jun 2012 11:35:36 -0500 Subject: Gpg4win Message-ID: When I installed Gpg4win, it came with GnuPG v2.0.17. I am not sure when it will be updated to include v2.0.19, but I was wondering whether there would be any problem from substituting the new version of gpgv2.exe for the older one? Thanks. From mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com Sat Jun 9 18:47:21 2012 From: mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com (Mika Suomalainen) Date: Sat, 09 Jun 2012 19:47:21 +0300 Subject: Gpg4win In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <4FD37E19.1000403@hotmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 09.06.2012 19:35, John wrote: > When I installed Gpg4win, it came with GnuPG v2.0.17. I am not sure > when it will be updated to include v2.0.19, but I was wondering > whether there would be any problem from substituting the new > version of gpgv2.exe for the older one? Thanks. > I think that you should ask on gpg4win-users-en at wald.intevation.org . It's linked at http://www.gpg4win.org/community.html . - -- [Mika Suomalainen](https://mkaysi.github.com/) || [gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net --recv-keys 4DB53CFE82A46728](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/key.txt) || [Why do I sign my emails?](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/WhyDoISignEmails.html) || [Please don't send HTML.](http://mkaysi.github.com/articles/complaining/HTML.html) || [This signature](https://gist.github.com/2643070#file_icedove.md) || [Please reply below this line](http://mkaysi.github.com/articles/complaining/topposting.html) ____________________________ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.19 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Homepage: http://mkaysi.github.com/ Comment: gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net --recv-keys 82A46728 Comment: Public key: http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/key.txt Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJP034UAAoJEE21PP6CpGcozQ0P/jQ9SXbmKWciZGcIdqUF23p3 /ZHCfHwN+fNaqg+EP2xamIgbHBwfOV1yocMRmwW0I5b8nd8PYmtSIZR6+VvYmBcs KjYz5V5vNuzKayAMa4A1zeBN7Y1iQOhPUa73LE7lhzsbVtmlbUEhDgQBcggQf8W9 gUHkTkZUTQnjbBvxN9541Z2snVa87+q7mLKI1SUQ5XzUqK9FkZX5oa4F1Zokf3oC vRg2oe7trMG8uSdPmqBUNu0uhwJCj2V4zqfDHosVythQit4hXX4Y07/zG5Q9I7zb HWsjnV+OF0na08H+/5k/TTBuG5zP4YMROR5KDz7LJNdHGTMQZOx0LcLVZ19E/iua 4jx/9aQy+ofmBiqxmNxX7cMs7qVaiMB5GD8jR6P/kEcI0yTiAQcmKZxPyUE0sCS3 /bD/2SmaQa24jmeeLTepvhOti6EH5uiOzppz0NwmDl9Eqyxnc2N2SpDtnylIh2Bd 7n/4aDDq9UAxG2OvgHuqFXzm8z7rUk5QONWhd+6g/6fvfTz7xmOR4L6Eyfuk8cHG mBSyrx2T2+QGRnheuBnMPXNSuvGaujeJDaz/auatRKJqAi3uQlN9pR9zi1Ah2Czr YEdo3u4sJnBlqbo55bcLvcubM042ZFG9uzn5cLOyl0ZLB2q1rU7f1vLQT/5JD7f6 wDHhRoBY+l2LTK2hpyYm =9onp -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From mick.crane at gmail.com Sat Jun 9 20:05:58 2012 From: mick.crane at gmail.com (michael crane) Date: Sat, 9 Jun 2012 19:05:58 +0100 Subject: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? In-Reply-To: <4FD34FB1.3080200@signal100.com> References: <4FCF7E1B.5050502@hotmail.com> <4FCFB559.6020509@digitalbrains.com> <87r4tr2z9n.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FD31724.8000604@signal100.com> <834f2bf0659aabe4b494daa3d5bf82ff.squirrel@192.168.1.50> <4FD34FB1.3080200@signal100.com> Message-ID: <1a14984a99025c9e1712921bb3cd98f4.squirrel@192.168.1.50> On Sat, June 9, 2012 2:29 pm, Mark Rousell wrote: >> What types of processes are forbidden by DreamHost? >> [deletia] > > Err.. sorry, not following you. :-) Who is using Dreamhost and what has > it got to do with the finger protocol? Werner doesn't seem to be using > Dreamhost for what it's worth. I'm using dreamhost. I appreciated that it seems quite handy to have all that random characters stuff outside of the message body and I was pointing out that it it is not universally accepted to have daemon thingys like finger running so limiting the take up. cheers mick -- keyID: 0x4BFEBB31 From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Sat Jun 9 20:47:52 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Sat, 09 Jun 2012 14:47:52 -0400 Subject: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? In-Reply-To: <4FD37250.9040104@digitalbrains.com> References: , , <4FCF7E1B.5050502@hotmail.com>, , <4FCFB559.6020509@digitalbrains.com>, , <4FD02CCF.6080804@gbenet.com> <4FD2974F.2050507@sixdemonbag.org> <4FD331CA.8040004@digitalbrains.com> <4FD35326.3040001@sixdemonbag.org> <4FD36621.9060507@digitalbrains.com> <4FD36905.1020501@sixdemonbag.org> <4FD37250.9040104@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <4FD39A58.6050905@sixdemonbag.org> On 06/09/2012 11:57 AM, Peter Lebbing wrote: > Suppose you would want to build from the vanilla source downloaded from > gnupg.org and signed by "Werner Koch (dist sig)", how would you verify > authenticity of that key? I don't understand where this question is going. I would find some trusted path, obviously. If I contact the maintainer and am told, "I download packages and check they are signed with this fingerprint ID," well, then I'm already transitively validating-by-fiat that fingerprint ID. If instead I'm told, "I've personally met the GnuPG release authority (i.e., Werner) and have signed that certificate," then the release certificate is validated because it is certified by a trusted introducer. If I'm told "beats me, Elvis comes to me in a s?ance and gives me all my answers," then I would have to find some other means. From peter at digitalbrains.com Sat Jun 9 21:54:33 2012 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Sat, 09 Jun 2012 21:54:33 +0200 Subject: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? In-Reply-To: <1a14984a99025c9e1712921bb3cd98f4.squirrel@192.168.1.50> References: <4FCF7E1B.5050502@hotmail.com> <4FCFB559.6020509@digitalbrains.com> <87r4tr2z9n.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FD31724.8000604@signal100.com> <834f2bf0659aabe4b494daa3d5bf82ff.squirrel@192.168.1.50> <4FD34FB1.3080200@signal100.com> <1a14984a99025c9e1712921bb3cd98f4.squirrel@192.168.1.50> Message-ID: <4FD3A9F9.2070608@digitalbrains.com> On 09/06/12 20:05, michael crane wrote: > I'm using dreamhost. I appreciated that it seems quite handy to have all > that random characters stuff outside of the message body and I was > pointing out that it it is not universally accepted to have daemon thingys > like finger running so limiting the take up. To get the public key through finger, you don't need to have a finger daemon running, you only need the finger client. Werner is the one having the finger daemon running. Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at http://wwwhome.cs.utwente.nl/~lebbing/pubkey.txt From peter at digitalbrains.com Sat Jun 9 22:14:27 2012 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Sat, 09 Jun 2012 22:14:27 +0200 Subject: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? In-Reply-To: <4FD39A58.6050905@sixdemonbag.org> References: , , <4FCF7E1B.5050502@hotmail.com>, , <4FCFB559.6020509@digitalbrains.com>, , <4FD02CCF.6080804@gbenet.com> <4FD2974F.2050507@sixdemonbag.org> <4FD331CA.8040004@digitalbrains.com> <4FD35326.3040001@sixdemonbag.org> <4FD36621.9060507@digitalbrains.com> <4FD36905.1020501@sixdemonbag.org> <4FD37250.9040104@digitalbrains.com> <4FD39A58.6050905@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <4FD3AEA3.8040100@digitalbrains.com> On 09/06/12 20:47, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > On 06/09/2012 11:57 AM, Peter Lebbing wrote: >> Suppose you would want to build from the vanilla source downloaded from >> gnupg.org and signed by "Werner Koch (dist sig)", how would you verify >> authenticity of that key? > > I don't understand where this question is going. I would find some > trusted path, obviously. If I contact the maintainer and am told, "I > download packages and check they are signed with this fingerprint ID," > well, then I'm already transitively validating-by-fiat that fingerprint > ID. Where the question is going is rather simple: what would you recommend Joe Average User to do to verify the authenticity of the GnuPG source he downloaded, not questioning his desire to build from that source. Contacting the package maintainer of your Linux distribution seems a good method. You could ask them to sign the dist sig instead, and publish it on the keyserver. Then anybody who trusts the distribution will be able to infer trust for the dist sig. Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at http://wwwhome.cs.utwente.nl/~lebbing/pubkey.txt From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Sat Jun 9 22:55:29 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Sat, 09 Jun 2012 16:55:29 -0400 Subject: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? In-Reply-To: <4FD3AEA3.8040100@digitalbrains.com> References: , , <4FCF7E1B.5050502@hotmail.com>, , <4FCFB559.6020509@digitalbrains.com>, , <4FD02CCF.6080804@gbenet.com> <4FD2974F.2050507@sixdemonbag.org> <4FD331CA.8040004@digitalbrains.com> <4FD35326.3040001@sixdemonbag.org> <4FD36621.9060507@digitalbrains.com> <4FD36905.1020501@sixdemonbag.org> <4FD37250.9040104@digitalbrains.com> <4FD39A58.6050905@sixdemonbag.org> <4FD3AEA3.8040100@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <4FD3B841.7010306@sixdemonbag.org> On 6/9/2012 4:14 PM, Peter Lebbing wrote: > Where the question is going is rather simple: what would you > recommend Joe Average User to do to verify the authenticity of the > GnuPG source he downloaded, not questioning his desire to build from > that source. Ah, I see. I apologize for not understanding sooner: I thought you were trying to illustrate a point. I'm generally not comfortable giving advice about what people should do. I'm comfortable making factual statements, presenting options, talking about my own practices or giving perspectives, but I really want to avoid the recommending-what-people-should-do route. I'm not comfortable with that, not unless I'm billing by the hour and have a liability waiver signed in blood. :) That said, I have found it useful as a general principle to avoid introducing new points of fiat validity. When possible, new sources should be certified through existing validated certificates. Considering my points of fiat validity and minimizing their number has always served me well. From peter at digitalbrains.com Sun Jun 10 11:16:37 2012 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Sun, 10 Jun 2012 11:16:37 +0200 Subject: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? In-Reply-To: <4FD3B841.7010306@sixdemonbag.org> References: , , <4FCF7E1B.5050502@hotmail.com>, , <4FCFB559.6020509@digitalbrains.com>, , <4FD02CCF.6080804@gbenet.com> <4FD2974F.2050507@sixdemonbag.org> <4FD331CA.8040004@digitalbrains.com> <4FD35326.3040001@sixdemonbag.org> <4FD36621.9060507@digitalbrains.com> <4FD36905.1020501@sixdemonbag.org> <4FD37250.9040104@digitalbrains.com> <4FD39A58.6050905@sixdemonbag.org> <4FD3AEA3.8040100@digitalbrains.com> <4FD3B841.7010306@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <4FD465F5.9090208@digitalbrains.com> On 09/06/12 22:55, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > I apologize for not understanding sooner There's no need for that :) Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at http://wwwhome.cs.utwente.nl/~lebbing/pubkey.txt From wk at gnupg.org Sun Jun 10 12:40:46 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Sun, 10 Jun 2012 12:40:46 +0200 Subject: Gpg4win In-Reply-To: (John's message of "Sat, 9 Jun 2012 11:35:36 -0500") References: Message-ID: <877gvf1mc1.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Sat, 9 Jun 2012 18:35, jw72253 at verizon.net said: > When I installed Gpg4win, it came with GnuPG v2.0.17. I am not sure > when it will be updated to include v2.0.19, but I was wondering The new beta has 2.0.19. > whether there would be any problem from substituting the new version > of gpgv2.exe for the older one? Thanks. Why do you want an older version of gpg2 ? It will work to some extend but it is not suggested. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From wk at gnupg.org Sun Jun 10 12:53:40 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Sun, 10 Jun 2012 12:53:40 +0200 Subject: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? In-Reply-To: <4FD31724.8000604@signal100.com> (Mark Rousell's message of "Sat, 09 Jun 2012 10:28:04 +0100") References: <4FCF7E1B.5050502@hotmail.com> <4FCFB559.6020509@digitalbrains.com> <87r4tr2z9n.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FD31724.8000604@signal100.com> Message-ID: <8739631lqj.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Sat, 9 Jun 2012 11:28, markr-gnupg at signal100.com said: > Do you know of any common modern browsers that have finger protocol > support built in? I wonder, how many people even have a finger client Indeed they must have dropped finger recently. I don't known when I checked the last time, but back then Mozilla supported it. It is a bit stupid that they dropped the simplest protocol ever used on the net but keep on supporting the broken stuff (e.g. SSLv2, MD5). Anyway: "gpg --fetch-keys" still supports finger. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From smickson at hotmail.com Sun Jun 10 15:59:00 2012 From: smickson at hotmail.com (Sam Smith) Date: Sun, 10 Jun 2012 09:59:00 -0400 Subject: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? In-Reply-To: <4FD2DAA2.2050007@gbenet.com> References: , , <4FCF7E1B.5050502@hotmail.com>, , <4FCFB559.6020509@digitalbrains.com>, , <4FD02CCF.6080804@gbenet.com> , <4FD2DAA2.2050007@gbenet.com> Message-ID: Okay. So please let me know if I understand correctly what I am supposed to do (or what you guys are recommending be done) with key signing: I downloaded the GnuPG program and ran gpg --verify. I am told the keyID that signed the program. I download that KeyID from a keyserver. I now ask people on this list to verify the fingerprint of the key I got from the keyserver as a legit key. (So far this behavior is okay, right)? Since people on this list verified the fingerprint, I have enough confidence to verify the GnuPG program with the key. BUT I do not have enough confidence to mark the key (the one I got from the keyserver) as Trusted or to Sign the key because I have not met with Werner Koch in person and seen credentials. Summation of Proper Key Signing Behavior: 1.) I should NOT sign a key as trusted unless I have actually met with the person and seen his/her credentials. I can sign if I KNOW the person and verify the fingerprint with that person. But even these situations run the risk of dealing with a "secret agent." Applying this rule, since I have not met Werner Koch, I should not sign his key. Verifying the fingerprint on a downloaded key is enough to use the key to verify software, but it's not enough to actually trust and sign the key. Hence using it to verify runs some risk because the key is not totally trustworthy. Every time I use Werner Koch's key to verify a GnuPG program, I will get the warning that I am verifying with an untrusted key. You guys all get this warning because all of you are also not signing keys (even if you've verified the fingerprint with others) because you have not met with all the people needed in order to sign all the keys you have. Right? You guys all get this warning whenever you "gpg --verify", right? In short, I should always be seeing the notice that I have verified using an untrusted key when using Werner Koch's key unless/until I actually meet him and see credentials. The only time you guys don't see this notice when verifying a key is when you use a key that you have actually met the signer of face to face, right? Do I understand correctly. Is this all accurate? With this behavior, would I be doing Best Practices and what you guys all do? Thanks for the instruction, guys. I appreciate the time and energy you guys spent writing the emails to me. means a lot to me. > Date: Sat, 9 Jun 2012 06:09:54 +0100 > From: david at gbenet.com > To: smickson at hotmail.com > CC: gnupg-users at gnupg.org > Subject: Re: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA1 > > On 08/06/12 22:41, Sam Smith wrote: > > > > Another thing is that downloading the key from that link you provided is no guarantee of safety in and of itself either because the page is not being hosted over SSL with confirmed identity information. So technically there's no guarantee I'm actually interacting with teh GnuPG.org website. > > > > > > > >> Date: Thu, 7 Jun 2012 05:23:43 +0100 > >> From: david at gbenet.com > >> To: gnupg-users at gnupg.org > >> Subject: Re: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? > >> > > On 07/06/12 00:15, Sam Smith wrote: > >>>> yes, impersonation of the UID [Werner Koch (dist sig)] is what I'm trying to guard against. > >>>> > >>>> My efforts to verify the fingerprint are the best way to do this, correct? > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> Date: Wed, 6 Jun 2012 21:54:01 +0200 > >>>>> From: peter at digitalbrains.com > >>>>> To: gnupg-users at gnupg.org > >>>>> Subject: Re: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? > >>>>> > >>>>> On 06/06/12 17:58, Mika Suomalainen wrote: > >>>>>>> D869 2123 C406 5DEA 5E0F 3AB5 249B 39D2 4F25 E3B6 > >>>>>> Looks correct. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> ``` % gpg --recv-keys D8692123C4065DEA5E0F3AB5249B39D24F25E3B6 gpg: > >>>>>> requesting key 4F25E3B6 from hkp server pool.sks-keyservers.net gpg: key > >>>>>> 4F25E3B6: public key "Werner Koch (dist sig)" imported > >>>>> > >>>>> I agree it appears he has the correct key. I did a local sig on it after what > >>>>> checking I seemed to be able to do without meeting people in person. > >>>>> > >>>>> But it's a bit unclear to me on what basis you decided it looked correct? Your > >>>>> mail suggests to me that you decided that based on the fact that the UID on > >>>>> that key is "Werner Koch (dist sig)". But that would be the very first thing a > >>>>> potential attacker would duplicate in his effort to fool our OP. Even if he's > >>>>> using MITM tricks to subvert his system, he can still post his personally > >>>>> generated key to the keyserver with this UID. > >>>>> > >>>>> Peter. > >>>>> > >>>>> PS: I briefly considered signing this message, because the attacker might MITM > >>>>> my message to the OP. Then I realised what good that signature would do :). > >>>>> > >>>>> -- > >>>>> I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. > >>>>> You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. > >>>>> My key is available at http://wwwhome.cs.utwente.nl/~lebbing/pubkey.txt > >>>>> > >>>>> _______________________________________________ > >>>>> Gnupg-users mailing list > >>>>> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > >>>>> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> _______________________________________________ > >>>> Gnupg-users mailing list > >>>> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > >>>> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users > > > > Sam, > > > > You are a little confused - you ask ask "can some one verify the gnupg fingerprint for > > pubkey" and you use Verners key to verify gnupg. Then you worry about impersonation - now > > clearly Verner and gnupg have different keys. Or don't you know that? > > > > Clearly you failed to follow my link and clearly you failed to check the public key for > > gnupg. Now being a little confused try and get a clear question in your mind - is it > > Verner's key that you have such a passion to verify or gnupg? > > > > Verner's had about three keys two of which have expired - to the best of my knowledge he's > > a real person - he even maintains this list. You could always try encrypting an e-mail to > > his public key asking him if he's a real person. I'd suggest you not do the same for the > > public key of gnupg. > > > > People generate a private and a public key imaginary people don't do this - granted some one > > can set up a false ID and create a set of keys - but though they have created a false ID to > > do so they are nevertheless real people. > > > > If you are so concerned about Verner's key why not take a trip to Germany and arrange to > > meet him? You can't meet the gnupg (as its a bit of software) but you can verify it's > > running on your computer. > > > > All your keys are "untrusted." Everyone of them - apart from your own public key. They all > > remain so until you actually meet that person and verify that they are who they say they > > are. You carefully check their passport their driving licence. > > > > But gnupg has not got a passport or a driving license. The only way you can check if gnupg > > is real is to check if it's running on your computer gpg --version - this will tell you if > > you have the software installed. If it's installed and working correctly it must be real. > > > > What if that fails? Well you do the same thing gpg2 --version and hope that Verner does not > > pop up and say "Hello." > > > > David > > > > > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> Gnupg-users mailing list > >> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > >> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users > > > Sam, > > You have to apply some logic - and some common sense. I have about 180 public keys - all > apart from about 5 or 6 are untrusted. Now a lot of people have my public key say 175 and > all those people have my public key marked as untrusted. > > The whole idea behind the web of trust is that you have met "real" people. On the whole most > people are who they say they are - but with all systems you get people using fake IDs. > > Now Werner Koch has a reality - he writes GPG4Win GNUpg and maintains this list - but > because I've not met him (though I have exchanged e-mails with him) I have not signed his key. > > Why? > > The whole principle underlining the web of trust is that you have met that person in the > real world and to the best of your knowledge - they are who they say they are and their > public key belongs to them. > > It is a principle of the whole system that you only sign people's keys. The person comes > first - not the key. > > It's not the validity of keys but the validity of people. So in your every day life you > accept that the train driver the bus driver the person behind the bar - your wife and kids > are all living real and normal lives. Now, your wife and kids aare somewhat different. You > married your wife and thus can trust she presented to you a real ID. You had sexual > intercourse with this real person (your wife) and she as a result of that intercourse > produced your kids. > > Your relationship to your wife and kids is special - you trust that they are really real and > you believe it to be true. And why not? You wake up in the morning beside her - you watch > your kids grow up. Now 20 years into your marriage you discover that your wife's a secret > agent - Jane Brown - not the Mary Smith you thought you married - and that were you thought > believed your kids sprung from your seed they were in fact from the milkman. The reality - > the belief is she's still your wife and they are your kids - they have behaved as such. > > > Most people are bound up with beliefs and behaviours. They interact with others on a daily > basis sharing common values beliefs and behaviours. Under normal conditions we don't ask > every one we meet for their passport driving license or DNA sequence. We accept it as the > norm that people are real and valid - its the IDs they use which may or maybe questionable. > > A spy may have say 6 IDs - the IDs are fictitious but the person is real. You have lots of > family and friends - who they are - what they are changes overtime and changes because of > the conditions under which you meet them - they could be a Father a Professor - an Olympic > Javelin thrower - then Retired - then dead. All these are IDs - which govern your > behavioural interaction with that person. What do you trust? That you hear them speak? You > have shaken them by the hand? Gone down the pub with them? > > In truth we can not say that all these IDs are "real" neither can we say they are "false." > But we interact with them and so build a reality of behaviours - sharing common interests > and values and beliefs. Just like all these people on this mailing list. People are real. > Though they may have many identities. > > It is common practice to accept people at "face value" - even if you only "know" them from > being on a mailing list. It is by common interaction "communication" that one reinforces > one's own belief systems and we accept the commonly held belief that we are interacting with > a real person - we through our own perception then make judgements about that person - we > like them or we don't - we admire and respect them or we don't we trust what they have to > say or we don't. > > We make value judgements about real people - no matter what ID they present to us. It's the > "face value" which is the key. Have we met the person? We affirm the reality of people via > our social networking. Mary knows Bob - Bob knows Harry and Harry knows Mary. You can ask > Bob and Harry to confirm that it is really is Mary that you are talking too. We all can > confirm to some degree the reality of Werner Koch - by what he does. But I have not met him > in any social network other than this and other mailing lists. > > So people on this mailing list "know" that Werner Koch is "real." You can send him an > encrypted e-mail and if he has your public key reply to you. The "reality" is we make people > "personal" to ourselves by interacting with them. If we don't interact we don't build any > models in our minds. If say 5 people said that they had actually met Werner in the flesh - > at face value - you would accept that Werner Koch was who he said he was. > > We assign material documents to give validity to real people. People come first not the > documentation. A public key is such a document. A person may generate many public keys - the > person is the real validity. You do not affirm a level of trust in the public key. You > affirm a level of trust in the person. So all your public keys are untrustworthy except for > those people that you have met. So even though I and many others have exchanged e-mails with > Werner Koch his public key remains untrusted. > > Likewise you can not meet face to face with a bit of software though you may affirm its on > your computer and you may affirm by interacting with it - the fact remains the public key > remains untrustworthy. > > I have lots of keys - 98 per cent are "untrustworthy." It's normal. It is not the same as > having the perception of an untrustworthy person - which is based on our perception oof the > value system we place on their behaviours. A public key is a static document - whereas > people - those that are alive have values belief systems and behaviours that interact with > other human beings out of common interests and goals. Some people have a mind set that says > "that person is real therefore their documents are real." Then they form value judgements on > that documentation - to trust or not to trust - as though they were interacting with real > people. > > In reality we can not judge the value of documents. In reality we can judge the value of > people. We make value judgements about people all the time - based on their interaction with > us - our mood - how we feel at any given time. We interpretate according to our reality and > perceptions. > > What is our "reality" about public key encryption? The validation of public keys? The > validation of real people? We almost forget why we want public key encryption - so that only > the recipient can read our e-mails. The "recipient" is a person - their public key is merely > a tool to which software on your computer can encrypt to their public key. That's the only > reality a public key has. It is not a seal of authenticity - not a rubber stamp. It has no > power vested in it as to give "authority." It is merely a means for secure communications > over an insecure network. > > The web of trust - signing people's keys is based on people meeting face to face and > interacting in a social network - it is not about the level of trust one has in the public > key. A keys "validity" is it works. The validity is the recipient of an encrypted message > can decrypt it. All keys are valid in this respect. They are in a sense all trustworthy. All > keys do what they say they can do. Without any failure. So you need not set any level of > trust on keys because they work perfectly. > > The "trust" is in the person - not the public key. So some would argue that signing Werner's > key is crazy - has no logic and a miss-placed value system. I'd have to agree. > > David > > > - -- > ?See the sanity of the man! No gods, no angels, no demons, no body. Nothing of the > kind.Stern, sane,every brain-cell perfect and complete even at the moment of death. No > delusion.? https://linuxcounter.net/user/512854.html - http://gbenet.com/blog > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux) > Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ > > iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJP0tqUAAoJEOJpqm7flRExg8UH/0XNKxkUwqYWiKVe4tQezfJt > VcZ5FCz3aFCSqCys/plxsVXcnE6VHH5PnJO/cHb0x+5MNJqbTP1N6r97P+AQhFUN > XknxLE9qfX1KgiDTTZ8euwbMong4zwXxY+Wg0twxQAdnHj73uU32j5SFQ2+VKx6Y > PrvK/JSR3aeyN6v/OanBAHjPFIGc3rcSOqFoTAhfkGME/XlNPfzNknk0EO5bERYL > maOnopf25iYalqZTfRMBDffb79riIDega+A5hSp12hMmi7XnEFeSN2iAIHmVM8Ht > v9NzoRIUW75quJPUotOwUI7O0rVyoggYxhorWhbhQPNPWgkUnMNcon9GK1eZGDM= > =flOL > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From smickson at hotmail.com Sun Jun 10 16:03:53 2012 From: smickson at hotmail.com (Sam Smith) Date: Sun, 10 Jun 2012 10:03:53 -0400 Subject: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? In-Reply-To: <4FD31724.8000604@signal100.com> References: , <4FCF7E1B.5050502@hotmail.com> <4FCFB559.6020509@digitalbrains.com>, <87r4tr2z9n.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>, <4FD31724.8000604@signal100.com> Message-ID: I wasn't going to say anything, but I had no idea what Mr. Koch was talking about with that "finger" stuff. I studied his email and the email header looking for clues. Couldn't decipher what he meant. > Date: Sat, 9 Jun 2012 10:28:04 +0100 > From: markr-gnupg at signal100.com > To: gnupg-users at gnupg.org > Subject: Re: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? > > On 07/06/2012 11:27, Werner Koch wrote: > > On Wed, 6 Jun 2012 21:54, peter at digitalbrains.com said: > > > > If you look at my OpenPGP mail header you will be pointed to a ?finger? > > address - enter it into your web browser (in case you don't know what > > finger is) and you will see > > Just as an aside, I presume you are referring to this header line: > > OpenPGP: id=1E42B367; url=finger:wk at g10code.com > > Do you know of any common modern browsers that have finger protocol > support built in? I wonder, how many people even have a finger client > installed (that their browser would be able to find)? > > > -- > MarkR > > PGP public key: http://www.signal100.com/markr/pgp > Key ID: C9C5C162 > > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From smickson at hotmail.com Sun Jun 10 16:14:28 2012 From: smickson at hotmail.com (Sam Smith) Date: Sun, 10 Jun 2012 10:14:28 -0400 Subject: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? In-Reply-To: <4FD36621.9060507@digitalbrains.com> References: , ,,<4FCF7E1B.5050502@hotmail.com>, , , <4FCFB559.6020509@digitalbrains.com>, , , , <4FD02CCF.6080804@gbenet.com>, , <4FD2974F.2050507@sixdemonbag.org>, <4FD331CA.8040004@digitalbrains.com>, <4FD35326.3040001@sixdemonbag.org>, <4FD36621.9060507@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: I have to agree with Peter. I mean, everyone has to trust someone/something at some point. I mean you trust Windows OS or your Linux Distro that it is not doing bad things. It is calling up all these APIs etc. Have your verified everything your OS does? Have your verified every signing key used by your Distro or Windows certificate? At some point you have to trust the integrity of something. And this trust is never going to be perfect. There should be caution and if you want assurance you should check sources. This was what I was trying to do by asking this list. I asked this list after I had already looked other places to verify the fingerprint. If absolute trust was sought for everything, nobody would ever be able to do anything because so few things would be trusted enough to move forward on anything. > Date: Sat, 9 Jun 2012 17:05:05 +0200 > From: peter at digitalbrains.com > To: rjh at sixdemonbag.org > Subject: Re: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? > CC: gnupg-users at gnupg.org > > On 09/06/12 15:44, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > > I'm not weighing in on what the mechanism should be: I don't get to declare > > what anyone else's policy should be. > > I was under the impression you did. I interpreted your mail and particularly the > statement > > > but this either is or isn't a proper verification, and there's no > > in-between. > > as meaning that there is only one correct way to do a proper verification. From > your reply, I understand now you did not mean it like that. I was already quite > puzzled about my interpretation because it didn't sound like you :). > > >> It doesn't really matter how many Werner Kochs there are. > > > > Sure it does. As an absurdist thought experiment, let's think of a nation -- > > call it Kochistan. In Kochistan, everyone is required to have the name > > Werner Koch. Most people in Kochistan are honest. If you ask them if > > they're *the* Werner Koch, they'll tell you no, they're not. > > Funnily, we're saying the same thing. You yourself said you don't particularly > care if Werner Koch is actually called Horace Micklethorpe or Harry Palmer or > ... Then why are you interested in the number of Werner Kochs? > > The thing I'm interested in: is the source of GnuPG I downloaded actually the > program we know and love. I'm at this point not interested in the fact that > Werner Koch is a main developer of it, or what his proper name is. For all I > know his birthname indeed is Horace. He might as well have given the UID "GnuPG > dist sig" to the key, instead of "Werner Koch (dist sig)". The only reason we > are talking about "the" Werner Koch is that his name is in the UID, which might > as easily not have been. As I said, the number of Werner Kochs is insubstantial. > > > I don't trust crowdsourcing to verify GnuPG. If someone or some group > > subverts that system my exposure might be much greater and I might not learn > > about it for quite some time. > > So how did you verify your GnuPG source? If you say "I asked a close friend", my > counterquestion is: How did he/she? What I want to know is: what bootstrapped > the confidence that the key was the proper GnuPG dist sig? > > Personally, I did it by checking from a number of locations that the key making > the signature is the same from wherever I try. Also, I spread the checks over a > substantial period of time. If the website got hacked, I hoped it would come out > in that period of time. It did not at any point include the quantity of Werner > Kochs. > > Now, if I wanted more satisfaction, I would indeed turn to this mailing list, > ask members whether they see the same fingerprint, and check the replies from > several locations to see that from wherever I check, the replies are identical. > > Again add a little time to allow for members to write to the mailing list "Hey I > did not write that reply!" in case of impersonation. Hopefully at least one > person would notice and expose the deception. > > And I do not see this process as, to quote you, "certifiably crazy" at all. It > would perhaps be if I only checked it from the same computer as where I > downloaded the source and signature and keyblock, but nowhere is it stated this > is the case. > > Peter. > > -- > I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. > You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. > My key is available at http://wwwhome.cs.utwente.nl/~lebbing/pubkey.txt > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From smickson at hotmail.com Sun Jun 10 16:36:15 2012 From: smickson at hotmail.com (Sam Smith) Date: Sun, 10 Jun 2012 10:36:15 -0400 Subject: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? In-Reply-To: <87boks28yu.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: , <4FCF7E1B.5050502@hotmail.com> <4FCFB559.6020509@digitalbrains.com>, , <4FD02CCF.6080804@gbenet.com>, , <87boks28yu.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: Mr. Koch, can you (or anyone else) recommend a book that is good for novices like myself that covers GPG public keys and can help me learn how to verify identity based on the chain of trust (self-signatures and other signatures as you said in your email ) and covers other aspects of how GPG works with regards to the PGP model? > From: wk at gnupg.org > To: smickson at hotmail.com > CC: david at gbenet.com; gnupg-users at gnupg.org > Subject: Re: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? > Date: Sat, 9 Jun 2012 10:19:37 +0200 > > On Fri, 8 Jun 2012 23:41, smickson at hotmail.com said: > > > Another thing is that downloading the key from that link you provided > > is no guarantee of safety in and of itself either because the page is > > not being hosted over SSL with confirmed identity information. So > > That is not relevant. The key (correct OpenPGP term is ?keyblock? but > sometimes also called ?certificate?) is in itself secure; the included > self-signature and signatures from other people shall be used to > evaluate the identity of the key owner. > > > Shalom-Salam, > > Werner > > -- > Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From wk at gnupg.org Sun Jun 10 20:17:57 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Sun, 10 Jun 2012 20:17:57 +0200 Subject: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? In-Reply-To: (Sam Smith's message of "Sun, 10 Jun 2012 10:03:53 -0400") References: <4FCF7E1B.5050502@hotmail.com> <4FCFB559.6020509@digitalbrains.com> <87r4tr2z9n.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FD31724.8000604@signal100.com> Message-ID: <87txyjyqsq.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Sun, 10 Jun 2012 16:03, smickson at hotmail.com said: > I wasn't going to say anything, but I had no idea what Mr. Koch was > talking about with that "finger" stuff. I studied his email and the > email header looking for clues. Couldn't decipher what he meant. I am sorry about this. Most of the time I am in hacker mode and thus assume that everyone reading this list is a grey haired or bearded Unix old-timer. Those for sure now what finger is (i.e. a quick check whether someone is online and what his plans and projects are). But you are right: This is a _user_ mailing list and thus I would do a better jobs by briefly explaining such stuff. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From wk at gnupg.org Sun Jun 10 20:21:23 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Sun, 10 Jun 2012 20:21:23 +0200 Subject: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? In-Reply-To: (Sam Smith's message of "Sun, 10 Jun 2012 10:36:15 -0400") References: <4FCF7E1B.5050502@hotmail.com> <4FCFB559.6020509@digitalbrains.com> <4FD02CCF.6080804@gbenet.com> <87boks28yu.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <87pq97yqn0.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Sun, 10 Jun 2012 16:36, smickson at hotmail.com said: > Mr. Koch, can you (or anyone else) recommend a book that is good for > novices like myself that covers GPG public keys and can help me learn > how to verify identity based on the chain of trust (self-signatures > and other signatures as you said in your email ) and covers other > aspects of how GPG works with regards to the PGP model? You may want to read the Gpg4win compendium: http://gpg4win.org/documentation.html It is marked as a beta version but there are no severe flaws in it. There are also a couple of HOWTO documents under http://gnupg.org . In a book store you should also find books on PGP. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Sun Jun 10 23:07:48 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Sun, 10 Jun 2012 17:07:48 -0400 Subject: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? In-Reply-To: References: , <4FCF7E1B.5050502@hotmail.com> <4FCFB559.6020509@digitalbrains.com>, , <4FD02CCF.6080804@gbenet.com>, , <87boks28yu.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <4FD50CA4.10106@sixdemonbag.org> On 06/10/2012 10:36 AM, Sam Smith wrote: > Mr. Koch, can you (or anyone else) recommend a book... Michael W. Lucas, "PGP & GPG: Email for the Practical Paranoid," No Starch Press, 2006. http://www.powells.com/biblio/62-9781593270711-0 http://www.amazon.com/PGP-GPG-Email-Practical-Paranoid/dp/1593270712 Use whichever link you prefer: I use Amazon, but I know some people vastly prefer Powell's. From david at gbenet.com Mon Jun 11 02:31:07 2012 From: david at gbenet.com (david at gbenet.com) Date: Mon, 11 Jun 2012 01:31:07 +0100 Subject: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? In-Reply-To: References: , , <4FCF7E1B.5050502@hotmail.com>, , <4FCFB559.6020509@digitalbrains.com>, , <4FD02CCF.6080804@gbenet.com> , <4FD2DAA2.2050007@gbenet.com> Message-ID: <4FD53C4B.7010004@gbenet.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 10/06/12 14:59, Sam Smith wrote: > > Okay. So please let me know if I understand correctly what I am supposed to do (or what you guys are recommending be done) with key signing: > > I downloaded the GnuPG program and ran gpg --verify. I am told the keyID that signed the program. I download that KeyID from a keyserver. I now ask people on this list to verify the fingerprint of the key I got from the keyserver as a legit key. (So far this behavior is okay, right)? Since people on this list verified the fingerprint, I have enough confidence to verify the GnuPG program with the key. BUT I do not have enough confidence to mark the key (the one I got from the keyserver) as Trusted or to Sign the key because I have not met with Werner Koch in person and seen credentials. > > Summation of Proper Key Signing Behavior: > > 1.) I should NOT sign a key as trusted unless I have actually met with the person and seen his/her credentials. I can sign if I KNOW the person and verify the fingerprint with that person. But even these situations run the risk of dealing with a "secret agent." > > Applying this rule, since I have not met Werner Koch, I should not sign his key. Verifying the fingerprint on a downloaded key is enough to use the key to verify software, but it's not enough to actually trust and sign the key. Hence using it to verify runs some risk because the key is not totally trustworthy. > > Every time I use Werner Koch's key to verify a GnuPG program, I will get the warning that I am verifying with an untrusted key. You guys all get this warning because all of you are also not signing keys (even if you've verified the fingerprint with others) because you have not met with all the people needed in order to sign all the keys you have. Right? You guys all get this warning whenever you "gpg --verify", right? > > In short, I should always be seeing the notice that I have verified using an untrusted key when using Werner Koch's key unless/until I actually meet him and see credentials. The only time you guys don't see this notice when verifying a key is when you use a key that you have actually met the signer of face to face, right? > > > Do I understand correctly. Is this all accurate? With this behavior, would I be doing Best Practices and what you guys all do? > > > Thanks for the instruction, guys. I appreciate the time and energy you guys spent writing the emails to me. means a lot to me. > > >> Date: Sat, 9 Jun 2012 06:09:54 +0100 >> From: david at gbenet.com >> To: smickson at hotmail.com >> CC: gnupg-users at gnupg.org >> Subject: Re: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? >> > On 08/06/12 22:41, Sam Smith wrote: >>>> >>>> Another thing is that downloading the key from that link you provided is no guarantee of safety in and of itself either because the page is not being hosted over SSL with confirmed identity information. So technically there's no guarantee I'm actually interacting with teh GnuPG.org website. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> Date: Thu, 7 Jun 2012 05:23:43 +0100 >>>>> From: david at gbenet.com >>>>> To: gnupg-users at gnupg.org >>>>> Subject: Re: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? >>>>> >>>> On 07/06/12 00:15, Sam Smith wrote: >>>>>>> yes, impersonation of the UID [Werner Koch (dist sig)] is what I'm trying to guard against. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> My efforts to verify the fingerprint are the best way to do this, correct? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Date: Wed, 6 Jun 2012 21:54:01 +0200 >>>>>>>> From: peter at digitalbrains.com >>>>>>>> To: gnupg-users at gnupg.org >>>>>>>> Subject: Re: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 06/06/12 17:58, Mika Suomalainen wrote: >>>>>>>>>> D869 2123 C406 5DEA 5E0F 3AB5 249B 39D2 4F25 E3B6 >>>>>>>>> Looks correct. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> ``` % gpg --recv-keys D8692123C4065DEA5E0F3AB5249B39D24F25E3B6 gpg: >>>>>>>>> requesting key 4F25E3B6 from hkp server pool.sks-keyservers.net gpg: key >>>>>>>>> 4F25E3B6: public key "Werner Koch (dist sig)" imported >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I agree it appears he has the correct key. I did a local sig on it after what >>>>>>>> checking I seemed to be able to do without meeting people in person. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> But it's a bit unclear to me on what basis you decided it looked correct? Your >>>>>>>> mail suggests to me that you decided that based on the fact that the UID on >>>>>>>> that key is "Werner Koch (dist sig)". But that would be the very first thing a >>>>>>>> potential attacker would duplicate in his effort to fool our OP. Even if he's >>>>>>>> using MITM tricks to subvert his system, he can still post his personally >>>>>>>> generated key to the keyserver with this UID. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Peter. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> PS: I briefly considered signing this message, because the attacker might MITM >>>>>>>> my message to the OP. Then I realised what good that signature would do :). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. >>>>>>>> You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. >>>>>>>> My key is available at http://wwwhome.cs.utwente.nl/~lebbing/pubkey.txt >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>>>>> Gnupg-users mailing list >>>>>>>> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org >>>>>>>> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>>>> Gnupg-users mailing list >>>>>>> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org >>>>>>> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users >>>> >>>> Sam, >>>> >>>> You are a little confused - you ask ask "can some one verify the gnupg fingerprint for >>>> pubkey" and you use Verners key to verify gnupg. Then you worry about impersonation - now >>>> clearly Verner and gnupg have different keys. Or don't you know that? >>>> >>>> Clearly you failed to follow my link and clearly you failed to check the public key for >>>> gnupg. Now being a little confused try and get a clear question in your mind - is it >>>> Verner's key that you have such a passion to verify or gnupg? >>>> >>>> Verner's had about three keys two of which have expired - to the best of my knowledge he's >>>> a real person - he even maintains this list. You could always try encrypting an e-mail to >>>> his public key asking him if he's a real person. I'd suggest you not do the same for the >>>> public key of gnupg. >>>> >>>> People generate a private and a public key imaginary people don't do this - granted some one >>>> can set up a false ID and create a set of keys - but though they have created a false ID to >>>> do so they are nevertheless real people. >>>> >>>> If you are so concerned about Verner's key why not take a trip to Germany and arrange to >>>> meet him? You can't meet the gnupg (as its a bit of software) but you can verify it's >>>> running on your computer. >>>> >>>> All your keys are "untrusted." Everyone of them - apart from your own public key. They all >>>> remain so until you actually meet that person and verify that they are who they say they >>>> are. You carefully check their passport their driving licence. >>>> >>>> But gnupg has not got a passport or a driving license. The only way you can check if gnupg >>>> is real is to check if it's running on your computer gpg --version - this will tell you if >>>> you have the software installed. If it's installed and working correctly it must be real. >>>> >>>> What if that fails? Well you do the same thing gpg2 --version and hope that Verner does not >>>> pop up and say "Hello." >>>> >>>> David >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>> Gnupg-users mailing list >>>>> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org >>>>> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users >>>> > Sam, > > You have to apply some logic - and some common sense. I have about 180 public keys - all > apart from about 5 or 6 are untrusted. Now a lot of people have my public key say 175 and > all those people have my public key marked as untrusted. > > The whole idea behind the web of trust is that you have met "real" people. On the whole most > people are who they say they are - but with all systems you get people using fake IDs. > > Now Werner Koch has a reality - he writes GPG4Win GNUpg and maintains this list - but > because I've not met him (though I have exchanged e-mails with him) I have not signed his key. > > Why? > > The whole principle underlining the web of trust is that you have met that person in the > real world and to the best of your knowledge - they are who they say they are and their > public key belongs to them. > > It is a principle of the whole system that you only sign people's keys. The person comes > first - not the key. > > It's not the validity of keys but the validity of people. So in your every day life you > accept that the train driver the bus driver the person behind the bar - your wife and kids > are all living real and normal lives. Now, your wife and kids aare somewhat different. You > married your wife and thus can trust she presented to you a real ID. You had sexual > intercourse with this real person (your wife) and she as a result of that intercourse > produced your kids. > > Your relationship to your wife and kids is special - you trust that they are really real and > you believe it to be true. And why not? You wake up in the morning beside her - you watch > your kids grow up. Now 20 years into your marriage you discover that your wife's a secret > agent - Jane Brown - not the Mary Smith you thought you married - and that were you thought > believed your kids sprung from your seed they were in fact from the milkman. The reality - > the belief is she's still your wife and they are your kids - they have behaved as such. > > > Most people are bound up with beliefs and behaviours. They interact with others on a daily > basis sharing common values beliefs and behaviours. Under normal conditions we don't ask > every one we meet for their passport driving license or DNA sequence. We accept it as the > norm that people are real and valid - its the IDs they use which may or maybe questionable. > > A spy may have say 6 IDs - the IDs are fictitious but the person is real. You have lots of > family and friends - who they are - what they are changes overtime and changes because of > the conditions under which you meet them - they could be a Father a Professor - an Olympic > Javelin thrower - then Retired - then dead. All these are IDs - which govern your > behavioural interaction with that person. What do you trust? That you hear them speak? You > have shaken them by the hand? Gone down the pub with them? > > In truth we can not say that all these IDs are "real" neither can we say they are "false." > But we interact with them and so build a reality of behaviours - sharing common interests > and values and beliefs. Just like all these people on this mailing list. People are real. > Though they may have many identities. > > It is common practice to accept people at "face value" - even if you only "know" them from > being on a mailing list. It is by common interaction "communication" that one reinforces > one's own belief systems and we accept the commonly held belief that we are interacting with > a real person - we through our own perception then make judgements about that person - we > like them or we don't - we admire and respect them or we don't we trust what they have to > say or we don't. > > We make value judgements about real people - no matter what ID they present to us. It's the > "face value" which is the key. Have we met the person? We affirm the reality of people via > our social networking. Mary knows Bob - Bob knows Harry and Harry knows Mary. You can ask > Bob and Harry to confirm that it is really is Mary that you are talking too. We all can > confirm to some degree the reality of Werner Koch - by what he does. But I have not met him > in any social network other than this and other mailing lists. > > So people on this mailing list "know" that Werner Koch is "real." You can send him an > encrypted e-mail and if he has your public key reply to you. The "reality" is we make people > "personal" to ourselves by interacting with them. If we don't interact we don't build any > models in our minds. If say 5 people said that they had actually met Werner in the flesh - > at face value - you would accept that Werner Koch was who he said he was. > > We assign material documents to give validity to real people. People come first not the > documentation. A public key is such a document. A person may generate many public keys - the > person is the real validity. You do not affirm a level of trust in the public key. You > affirm a level of trust in the person. So all your public keys are untrustworthy except for > those people that you have met. So even though I and many others have exchanged e-mails with > Werner Koch his public key remains untrusted. > > Likewise you can not meet face to face with a bit of software though you may affirm its on > your computer and you may affirm by interacting with it - the fact remains the public key > remains untrustworthy. > > I have lots of keys - 98 per cent are "untrustworthy." It's normal. It is not the same as > having the perception of an untrustworthy person - which is based on our perception oof the > value system we place on their behaviours. A public key is a static document - whereas > people - those that are alive have values belief systems and behaviours that interact with > other human beings out of common interests and goals. Some people have a mind set that says > "that person is real therefore their documents are real." Then they form value judgements on > that documentation - to trust or not to trust - as though they were interacting with real > people. > > In reality we can not judge the value of documents. In reality we can judge the value of > people. We make value judgements about people all the time - based on their interaction with > us - our mood - how we feel at any given time. We interpretate according to our reality and > perceptions. > > What is our "reality" about public key encryption? The validation of public keys? The > validation of real people? We almost forget why we want public key encryption - so that only > the recipient can read our e-mails. The "recipient" is a person - their public key is merely > a tool to which software on your computer can encrypt to their public key. That's the only > reality a public key has. It is not a seal of authenticity - not a rubber stamp. It has no > power vested in it as to give "authority." It is merely a means for secure communications > over an insecure network. > > The web of trust - signing people's keys is based on people meeting face to face and > interacting in a social network - it is not about the level of trust one has in the public > key. A keys "validity" is it works. The validity is the recipient of an encrypted message > can decrypt it. All keys are valid in this respect. They are in a sense all trustworthy. All > keys do what they say they can do. Without any failure. So you need not set any level of > trust on keys because they work perfectly. > > The "trust" is in the person - not the public key. So some would argue that signing Werner's > key is crazy - has no logic and a miss-placed value system. I'd have to agree. > > David > > > Hello Sam, First off - it's normal to have most of your keys as "untrusted." It does not matter how many other people have signed that public key - you have not met that person have not verified them vis some photo id and not met them in a social context. Most people are normal users of pgp - I suspect there are few secret government agents - not that they are likely to say so :) though some believe them to be everywhere. Gnupg works perfectly signing and setting a level of trust is to do with building the web of trust - and that is all about people. It is about holding key-signing parties - developing your social network of pgp users - through family friends work colleagues club members - and the wider world. To find out more visit http://gbenet.com/blog David - -- ?See the sanity of the man! No gods, no angels, no demons, no body. Nothing of the kind.Stern, sane,every brain-cell perfect and complete even at the moment of death. No delusion.? https://linuxcounter.net/user/512854.html - http://gbenet.com/blog -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJP1Tw7AAoJEOJpqm7flRExupgH/0VfmtF6CBW6HVbz5nCSrVZA yEhzcSJquJkkEVlZN30poFQA2L6d7krJl5LYY9t5zpYBvN6v0kl/0aaU3aVjxxL7 OIL1OpH3GktUKashbtXPqEpb1N3VtoTeYJaSaguBuQHV3o6g/o+g+7kdauKlQWoq n9fbbdl61mDICn3RrELKVOrPYKz0W22NGHVjEbU8zq/Kvhz1vPD+ZyiwHj4xHx8D 1A7LqRA+yXQ07J5mNQbZt2//Vs7Q8INOXs1sGkbwkHUtQ0V68KpM//FaPaaMfhZz L1WVUMsDdM+c619cKPMNsD+14DhIVNi4hiCvasDRFv+QMclzEYNO9O4mx+lBqsk= =QF1U -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Mon Jun 11 05:25:51 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Sun, 10 Jun 2012 23:25:51 -0400 Subject: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? In-Reply-To: <4FD53C4B.7010004@gbenet.com> References: , , <4FCF7E1B.5050502@hotmail.com>, , <4FCFB559.6020509@digitalbrains.com>, , <4FD02CCF.6080804@gbenet.com> , <4FD2DAA2.2050007@gbenet.com> <4FD53C4B.7010004@gbenet.com> Message-ID: <4FD5653F.6090906@sixdemonbag.org> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 David -- Please consider using clear signatures instead of conventional signatures. If someone looks in the list archives they'll see a huge opaque blob of text they can't read. Likewise if someone tries to read your email on a system that doesn't have GnuPG installed. Secondly, your message was 253 lines of quoted text and 14 of your own text. This means that 94% of the message was quoted. This is a little outr?. I'd appreciate it a great deal if you'd trim your quotes. You are certainly free to ignore me on those two counts, but I hope you'll do me the favor of considering them. Thank you. :) That said -- > I suspect there are few secret government agents - not that they > are likely to say so :) though some believe them to be everywhere. At least one person who has posted to this list is publicly affiliated with intelligence services, yes -- it's right there in his official bio. That said, there's a *huge* difference between "normal guy who happens to be associated with the government is on this list" and "the kind of stuff the conspiracy theorists believe is happening, is actually happening." (I will not say who this person is. I once received a death threat from someone on this list who was convinced I was an FBI plant, threatened my life, declared me to be Satanic, and went so far as to look up my home address and phone number from WHOIS data in order to make the threat more credible. Given people like that exist, I feel being circumspect about this person's identity is the only responsible thing to do.) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iFYEAREIAAYFAk/VZT8ACgkQI4Br5da5jhBsIwDdGTY8tuRi06EL6WTDyKsbvB2p uFq4rNSsmGCGQwDfbtplsGFDNLhaQl27JbGZFv1B7yqBqUAxMDKxUA== =lDBg -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Mon Jun 11 06:03:40 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Mon, 11 Jun 2012 00:03:40 -0400 Subject: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? In-Reply-To: <4FD5653F.6090906@sixdemonbag.org> References: , , <4FCF7E1B.5050502@hotmail.com>, , <4FCFB559.6020509@digitalbrains.com>, , <4FD02CCF.6080804@gbenet.com> , <4FD2DAA2.2050007@gbenet.com> <4FD53C4B.7010004@gbenet.com> <4FD5653F.6090906@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <4FD56E1C.3070201@sixdemonbag.org> On 06/10/2012 11:25 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > Please consider using clear signatures instead of conventional > signatures. My apologies: you're sending it with Base64 encoding instead of as text/plain. With that correction my comment still applies: it's much harder for those viewing the list archives to make sense of. From JPClizbe at tx.rr.com Mon Jun 11 08:34:59 2012 From: JPClizbe at tx.rr.com (John Clizbe) Date: Mon, 11 Jun 2012 01:34:59 -0500 Subject: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? In-Reply-To: <4FD53C4B.7010004@gbenet.com> References: , , <4FCF7E1B.5050502@hotmail.com>, , <4FCFB559.6020509@digitalbrains.com>, , <4FD02CCF.6080804@gbenet.com> , <4FD2DAA2.2050007@gbenet.com> <4FD53C4B.7010004@gbenet.com> Message-ID: <4FD59193.5030503@tx.rr.com> david at gbenet.com wrote: > Hello Sam, > > Most people are normal users of pgp - I suspect there are few secret > government agents - not that they are likely to say so :) > though some believe them to be everywhere. Secret agents may or may not be here. Actual operatives one doesn't know if they're here. It's often said the best way to hide is in plain sight. I can think of a high-level InfoSec official for a branch of the CIA, a former employee of the NSA, and a few folks paid by agencies of, or directly by their gov't to write crypto software. Those folks ain't hiding at all. Poke about on [Cryptography] and [IETF-OpenPGP] you may even find a few more :-) Just because you don't see a nsa.gov or fbi.gov return address, or the English or German equivalents, doesn't mean they're not here. Most are regular folks and like the rest of us, have an interest in crypto and its uses. Sometimes this interest meshes with their "day job", other times it's orthogonal. You don't see them, but they're here and on the other crypto lists. ;-) -John -- John P. Clizbe Inet: John (a) Gingerbear DAWT net John (@) Enigmail DAWT net or: John (@) Keyservers DAWT net FSF Assoc #995 / FSFE Fellow #1797 hkp://keyserver.gingerbear.net or mailto:pgp-public-keys at gingerbear.net?subject=HELP Cowboy Haiku -- Reflections on Rodeo So many Cowboys/Round Wrangler butts drive me nuts/Never enough rope From markr-gnupg at signal100.com Mon Jun 11 08:46:44 2012 From: markr-gnupg at signal100.com (Mark Rousell) Date: Mon, 11 Jun 2012 07:46:44 +0100 Subject: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? In-Reply-To: References: , <4FCF7E1B.5050502@hotmail.com> <4FCFB559.6020509@digitalbrains.com>, <87r4tr2z9n.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>, <4FD31724.8000604@signal100.com> Message-ID: <4FD59454.3030605@signal100.com> On 10/06/2012 15:03, Sam Smith wrote: > I wasn't going to say anything, but I had no idea what Mr. Koch was > talking about with that "finger" stuff. I studied his email and the > email header looking for clues. Couldn't decipher what he meant. > >> Date: Sat, 9 Jun 2012 10:28:04 +0100 >> From: markr-gnupg at signal100.com >> To: gnupg-users at gnupg.org >> Subject: Re: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? >> >> On 07/06/2012 11:27, Werner Koch wrote: >> > On Wed, 6 Jun 2012 21:54, peter at digitalbrains.com said: >> > >> > If you look at my OpenPGP mail header you will be pointed to a ?finger? >> > address - enter it into your web browser (in case you don't know what >> > finger is) and you will see >> >> Just as an aside, I presume you are referring to this header line: >> >> OpenPGP: id=1E42B367; url=finger:wk at g10code.com >> >> Do you know of any common modern browsers that have finger protocol >> support built in? I wonder, how many people even have a finger client >> installed (that their browser would be able to find)? Finger protocol: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Finger_protocol I think that Finger protocol support was removed from Firefox in V4 (or even before). Not sure when it was removed from IE (or if it was ever there). To my great surprise, Windows has a native command line finger client (still there in W7). -- MarkR PGP public key: http://www.signal100.com/markr/pgp Key ID: C9C5C162 From wk at gnupg.org Mon Jun 11 08:59:01 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Mon, 11 Jun 2012 08:59:01 +0200 Subject: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? In-Reply-To: <4FD53C4B.7010004@gbenet.com> (david@gbenet.com's message of "Mon, 11 Jun 2012 01:31:07 +0100") References: <4FCF7E1B.5050502@hotmail.com> <4FCFB559.6020509@digitalbrains.com> <4FD02CCF.6080804@gbenet.com> <4FD2DAA2.2050007@gbenet.com> <4FD53C4B.7010004@gbenet.com> Message-ID: <87lijuz64q.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> David, please trim your quotes! Thanks, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From Look at eBookRing.net Mon Jun 11 14:15:04 2012 From: Look at eBookRing.net (.) Date: Mon, 11 Jun 2012 08:15:04 -0400 Subject: Need a GUI for e ncrypt/decrypt in Ubuntu 11.10 Message-ID: <4FD5E148.6000609@eBookRing.net> I just "upgraded" to Ubuntu 11.10 and lost the "right click to encrypt/decrypt" a file which, I think, Seahorse utilities provided. I'm trying to install KGPG but it Software Center won't download it. I tried apt-get install and that doesn't download the package either. Does anyone have a GUI that will accomplish all key management and also provide for easy file encrypt/decrypt/verify signature etc, etc? From smickson at hotmail.com Mon Jun 11 15:40:42 2012 From: smickson at hotmail.com (Sam Smith) Date: Mon, 11 Jun 2012 09:40:42 -0400 Subject: Need a GUI for e ncrypt/decrypt in Ubuntu 11.10 In-Reply-To: <4FD5E148.6000609@eBookRing.net> References: <4FD5E148.6000609@eBookRing.net> Message-ID: Hi. The GUI I like the best for GnuPG is GNU Privacy Assistant. It is "gpa" in synaptic. [sudo apt-get install gpa]. I don't know if GPA does encrypt/decrypt though (I use command line for most everything). Another option is the plugins for Seahorse ("seahorse-plugins"). You can add [sudo apt-get install seahorse-plugins] to get right-click functionalities for Seahorse. With this you can get OSDnotify displays of verified keys etc. GUI wise though, I'm a huge fan of the GNU Privacy Assistant. > Date: Mon, 11 Jun 2012 08:15:04 -0400 > From: Look at eBookRing.net > To: gnupg-users at gnupg.org > Subject: Need a GUI for e ncrypt/decrypt in Ubuntu 11.10 > > I just "upgraded" to Ubuntu 11.10 and lost the "right click to > encrypt/decrypt" a file which, I think, Seahorse utilities provided. > > I'm trying to install KGPG but it Software Center won't download it. I > tried apt-get install and that doesn't download the package either. > > > > Does anyone have a GUI that will accomplish all key management and also > provide for easy file encrypt/decrypt/verify signature etc, etc? > > > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From smickson at hotmail.com Mon Jun 11 17:11:07 2012 From: smickson at hotmail.com (Sam Smith) Date: Mon, 11 Jun 2012 11:11:07 -0400 Subject: Need a GUI for e ncrypt/decrypt in Ubuntu 11.10 In-Reply-To: <87hauix7o9.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <4FD5E148.6000609@eBookRing.net>, , <87hauix7o9.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: I tried every GUI I could find for GPG over the past 2 years. My absolute favorite is GNU Privacy Assistant (GPA). I do believe I have tried every GUI option there is for Windows and Ubuntu. Originally, I couldn't find anything I liked on Windows and consequently was forced to learn the command line (which is probably not a bad thing). Later, on Ubuntu I discovered GPA and Seahorse. Seahorse is good app, but GPA is much much better IMHO and I always find myself using GPA as default app for dealing with keys. I could not figure out how to get GPA onto Windows. It looked like it was available for Windows but in the end I could not figure it out. Regardless, I mostly use Ubuntu now and I am always happy to be able to use GPA. When on Windows, I always have to use the command line because I do not like any of the other options. This is wonderful app and you have done fantastic job with it! I do encourage you most fervently to not abandon it because I think it's the best. You really do great work and it is so appreciated by all of us so much! Thank you so much! > From: wk at gnupg.org > To: smickson at hotmail.com > Subject: Re: Need a GUI for e ncrypt/decrypt in Ubuntu 11.10 > Date: Mon, 11 Jun 2012 16:08:38 +0200 > > On Mon, 11 Jun 2012 15:40, smickson at hotmail.com said: > > > GUI wise though, I'm a huge fan of the GNU Privacy Assistant. > > Thanks. That is an incentive for me to start working on it again. > > > Salam-Shalom, > > Werner > > -- > Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com Mon Jun 11 17:32:10 2012 From: mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com (Mika Suomalainen) Date: Mon, 11 Jun 2012 18:32:10 +0300 Subject: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? In-Reply-To: References: , <4FCF7E1B.5050502@hotmail.com> <4FCFB559.6020509@digitalbrains.com>, , <4FD02CCF.6080804@gbenet.com>, , <87boks28yu.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <4FD60F7A.5040204@hotmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 10.06.2012 17:36, Sam Smith wrote: > Mr. Koch, can you (or anyone else) recommend a book that is good > for novices like myself that covers GPG public keys and can help me > learn how to verify identity based on the chain of trust > (self-signatures and other signatures as you said in your email ) > and covers other aspects of how GPG works with regards to the PGP > model? I cannot recommend a book, but I can link to this Wikipedia article, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Web_of_trust . - -- [Mika Suomalainen](https://mkaysi.github.com/) || [gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net --recv-keys 4DB53CFE82A46728](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/key.txt) || [Why do I sign my emails?](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/WhyDoISignEmails.html) || [Please don't send HTML.](http://mkaysi.github.com/articles/complaining/HTML.html) || [This signature](https://gist.github.com/2643070#file_icedove.md) || [Please reply below this line](http://mkaysi.github.com/articles/complaining/topposting.html) ____________________________ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.19 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Homepage: http://mkaysi.github.com/ Comment: gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net --recv-keys 82A46728 Comment: Public key: http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/key.txt Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJP1g93AAoJEE21PP6CpGco2wEP/1mFG4dW1/pFqYcWKBNltKL3 d3mSVB3KvuCnK/RRMgGCcdnexKGHuTQGrOzmAjCMJmwt2Uhx3MAekSC2pCh7/gJ8 5205KSYBvsM8RVe5/BcwWog4DA2bdBk79wuttXBv3gcwfNOGWuUUayiIGXTtlamo hFf/0JLgoJyv/Y1NIWF/gbolwK9XBLI7Sjy1EMWkRSDTde1ZWxciNCaG8nZlQ69R NM2sm67ePtoD6i6/KQ4lYsxREnSr92WqQzG2Oxmz8Rimsu5QlDQRnFfB3ISwDIVD 0w1BXJtb6bb6AjROTdk8VH7Y4AvLe9aZM8AIoGVcg3jZr3SWtC/hT5QtLI8w9P/q Jd9CrNiXMAiBTYyXC0ULjAr+ubHnGNFS4w7FHlKfXWzGoNDKeEroOtGSYv4XsSTx rnqN28wedrcy3A+eg2hA/js++tj/YJsoBtwJJz//KnGljjN7TO9GBRG2lJsmGExT 5kNOfhHJrCHzOUBj4hpx5XJjlgqUngGZPVzqjV8cE1vao0AeHGR94e5HANMBxOAW E2ZqOKPNdC2Cs0108mSY2RbAKNWinz2+2IdJY9TWM9YFuHgkOURjBnJyPaQapYDj AAtgF5VOtQzVFNBsJXAXZ8g6XIclrx42sQiRanQ1Xjlz3AqhKr5UmRsAdfj9Yuub O3+jtEDKUdjeZKk9iYVr =gw1m -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com Mon Jun 11 17:48:41 2012 From: mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com (Mika Suomalainen) Date: Mon, 11 Jun 2012 18:48:41 +0300 Subject: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? In-Reply-To: <87txyjyqsq.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <4FCF7E1B.5050502@hotmail.com> <4FCFB559.6020509@digitalbrains.com> <87r4tr2z9n.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FD31724.8000604@signal100.com> <87txyjyqsq.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <4FD61359.5010706@hotmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 10.06.2012 21:17, Werner Koch wrote: > On Sun, 10 Jun 2012 16:03, smickson at hotmail.com said: >> I wasn't going to say anything, but I had no idea what Mr. Koch >> was talking about with that "finger" stuff. I studied his email >> and the email header looking for clues. Couldn't decipher what he >> meant. > > I am sorry about this. Most of the time I am in hacker mode and > thus assume that everyone reading this list is a grey haired or > bearded Unix old-timer. Those for sure now what finger is (i.e. a > quick check whether someone is online and what his plans and > projects are). 16, Linux user since 2008 :) > But you are right: This is a _user_ mailing list and thus I would > do a better jobs by briefly explaining such stuff. > > > Salam-Shalom, > > Werner > - -- [Mika Suomalainen](https://mkaysi.github.com/) || [gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net --recv-keys 4DB53CFE82A46728](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/key.txt) || [Why do I sign my emails?](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/WhyDoISignEmails.html) || [Please don't send HTML.](http://mkaysi.github.com/articles/complaining/HTML.html) || [This signature](https://gist.github.com/2643070#file_icedove.md) || [Please reply below this line](http://mkaysi.github.com/articles/complaining/topposting.html) ____________________________ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.19 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Homepage: http://mkaysi.github.com/ Comment: gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net --recv-keys 82A46728 Comment: Public key: http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/key.txt Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJP1hNXAAoJEE21PP6CpGcoDX0QAKPL6xfmSjWmRRj7Wfs3xu9A SsOOJV2aFHVCgAPWPz6gAsHDjfXxZENlcbWlhO8uHtFgOGZuaucwrN2FJfkZk/FH TRWDFOcXZIrZH7i2kkwIbkM6f0y3r53CBT1tBSc9q2TmFqdHppwOofDRo5HrWzrT MmxXbPJYCh4yTzky66sP0Q3DSrzqfA8v+xibMJlIvFrL0zSEgEc86fIjvaW4VDfZ lx2SMoLHYkiPxy2z2cHZWKZOtiBBB0NoEY6TmXlzQNZyQ264mCCA2IipaNp3wDqb IUiiPugHPw3Bq5cTagtQUk+rL+0WnDBT16q0UMmykVXrI3YBNeeObi9wu4RKwK1Y tk7TCbIuazfp7jqDty7RJ4/Z8ScTRwB8OttjFRkyrEMcx8AFFWzOjrMV+0qMwbgK P3jPeilMPE3bTvVk9gAIQyfjw5c+EQgmBbM8j07qNH2hsGzwqdkCGuFL26yXlApR to7Y1MFdTJA39q98h1d8YrkeycHr8pIVZc/i8AdHtkJqmVaFeiI/6o0nubWuxJ6k I2G2uCloj4kEPcx7URegAwJvtsa5393PMo6bL+7lqRUscP1iAPtgPxZHBvXpkkci +A9lQs8WtZDJZ73YOzv2iV2aHtJ19rOAq3R6ZqttxqARwVRYcXt9/RZcp7K+Gd92 ywCqAGPCaFLtFpKmHTOr =GexE -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From mick.crane at gmail.com Mon Jun 11 17:29:09 2012 From: mick.crane at gmail.com (michael crane) Date: Mon, 11 Jun 2012 16:29:09 +0100 Subject: Need a GUI for e ncrypt/decrypt in Ubuntu 11.10 In-Reply-To: References: <4FD5E148.6000609@eBookRing.net>, , <87hauix7o9.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <2047f24b4445d39189e70f5fc60715c8.squirrel@192.168.1.50> On Mon, June 11, 2012 4:11 pm, Sam Smith wrote: > > I tried every GUI I could find for GPG over the past 2 years. My absolute > favorite is GNU Privacy Assistant (GPA). > > I do believe I have tried every GUI option there is for Windows and > Ubuntu. Originally, I couldn't find anything I liked on Windows and > consequently was forced to learn the command line (which is probably not a > bad thing). what's wrong with GnuPg shell ? mick -- keyID: 0x4BFEBB31 From smickson at hotmail.com Mon Jun 11 22:29:02 2012 From: smickson at hotmail.com (Sam Smith) Date: Mon, 11 Jun 2012 16:29:02 -0400 Subject: Need a GUI for e ncrypt/decrypt in Ubuntu 11.10 In-Reply-To: <2047f24b4445d39189e70f5fc60715c8.squirrel@192.168.1.50> References: <4FD5E148.6000609@eBookRing.net>, , , , <87hauix7o9.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>, , <2047f24b4445d39189e70f5fc60715c8.squirrel@192.168.1.50> Message-ID: I did not mean to imply that all other GPG GUIs are no good. GnuPG Shell is a fine app and there is much to like about it. I did (if I remember correctly) have trouble figuring out how to use it to list signatures on keys. And how to sign keys. Overall, I found GPA to be a better experience. > Date: Mon, 11 Jun 2012 16:29:09 +0100 > Subject: RE: Need a GUI for e ncrypt/decrypt in Ubuntu 11.10 > From: mick.crane at gmail.com > To: gnupg-users at gnupg.org > > > On Mon, June 11, 2012 4:11 pm, Sam Smith wrote: > > > > I tried every GUI I could find for GPG over the past 2 years. My absolute > > favorite is GNU Privacy Assistant (GPA). > > > > I do believe I have tried every GUI option there is for Windows and > > Ubuntu. Originally, I couldn't find anything I liked on Windows and > > consequently was forced to learn the command line (which is probably not a > > bad thing). > > what's wrong with GnuPg shell ? > > > mick > -- > keyID: 0x4BFEBB31 > > > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From david at gbenet.com Mon Jun 11 22:59:22 2012 From: david at gbenet.com (david at gbenet.com) Date: Mon, 11 Jun 2012 21:59:22 +0100 Subject: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? In-Reply-To: References: , <4FCF7E1B.5050502@hotmail.com> <4FCFB559.6020509@digitalbrains.com>, , <4FD02CCF.6080804@gbenet.com>, , <87boks28yu.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <4FD65C2A.9040300@gbenet.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 10/06/12 15:36, Sam Smith wrote: > > Mr. Koch, can you (or anyone else) recommend a book that is good for novices like myself that covers GPG public keys and can help me learn how to verify identity based on the chain of trust (self-signatures and other signatures as you said in your email ) and covers other aspects of how GPG works with regards to the PGP model? > > > >> From: wk at gnupg.org >> To: smickson at hotmail.com >> CC: david at gbenet.com; gnupg-users at gnupg.org >> Subject: Re: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey? >> Date: Sat, 9 Jun 2012 10:19:37 +0200 >> >> On Fri, 8 Jun 2012 23:41, smickson at hotmail.com said: >> >>> Another thing is that downloading the key from that link you provided >>> is no guarantee of safety in and of itself either because the page is >>> not being hosted over SSL with confirmed identity information. So >> >> That is not relevant. The key (correct OpenPGP term is ?keyblock? but >> sometimes also called ?certificate?) is in itself secure; the included >> self-signature and signatures from other people shall be used to >> evaluate the identity of the key owner. >> >> >> Shalom-Salam, >> >> Werner >> >> -- >> Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. >> > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users Hello Sam, I am constantly adding books to my web site - take a look at my web site - see link below. David - -- https://linuxcounter.net/user/512854.html - http://gbenet.com/blog - cryptology - for books how-to's - mailing lists and more -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJP1lwcAAoJEOJpqm7flRExMpIIAKl0XejEx4i9TvMEMHnm/pA4 Tara9UeIFagIgRIMXc9eLd8qYk1ylogF5SYdEklGAlT4RaCABxyLMM3HbnNCJv+R +UDoFOkNgqmmBXNWbWQE+zO2Z1E9pAhmVLc1oSp2x0JsgC8KAQr8V5Vz6zRhxmd+ NPfrmRAeRqZg1Z6GvfFMEFeds6JyR7QapbRTNrNZqzl6uC17SyABNHfafuYuTflp f+9RJEsfMZ+F1PNZSLf7dcDLSgMtdfa2hi3eOCZEJXNMdPJ49mXg0Nco2Y5BdTOB YOrDbvAMApJ/tBdl+cCqoI7V0eVwU8/ZGluY6hboOtkyHxMxJEDTpEcg2i/veLs= =ph8b -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From david at gbenet.com Mon Jun 11 23:11:51 2012 From: david at gbenet.com (david at gbenet.com) Date: Mon, 11 Jun 2012 22:11:51 +0100 Subject: Need a GUI for e ncrypt/decrypt in Ubuntu 11.10 In-Reply-To: <4FD5E148.6000609@eBookRing.net> References: <4FD5E148.6000609@eBookRing.net> Message-ID: <4FD65F17.8020801@gbenet.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 11/06/12 13:15, . wrote: > Does anyone have a GUI that will accomplish all key management and also > provide for easy file encrypt/decrypt/verify signature etc, etc? You could try Kleopatra or GPA but Enigmail/Openpgp does all that the others can do - - if you install Thunderbird e-mail client that is David https://linuxcounter.net/user/512854.html - http://gbenet.com/blog - cryptology - for books how-to's - mailing lists and more -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJP1l8XAAoJEOJpqm7flRExgR8IAKl4spAMUULAlQ26wbraTicv TyRHC+3vaVyPEh9wGFRt0P4AhfSA+3vjN52ALPYhNyX+BgHeK9PKE5rF1hARXybF hhgx4CckARukoCXBWlbgStXAesAqxJ0DDI7MTCSH8UyZieSPJPx1edRpOvWIGjF6 YNgjWfn3KIkRVJY2hq/JP3/5ls8z67/78psDjuNSwczJywicNaYDSHc1nEYilEjj sjNmWAvfWGzmijnyU4FpeZH88j/PguA1nRKUVFeORMVILaHQfb6yq1+gUtth0N5l jDtdqEjJmHvOZNgFUzPcvvnKa0HRTXjHZUVGHutmkQbFJmPLkLuQeiNL+O6Z6DQ= =3bQ3 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From mkaysi at users.sourceforge.net Wed Jun 13 17:29:17 2012 From: mkaysi at users.sourceforge.net (Mika Suomalainen) Date: Wed, 13 Jun 2012 18:29:17 +0300 Subject: Need a GUI for e ncrypt/decrypt in Ubuntu 11.10 In-Reply-To: <2047f24b4445d39189e70f5fc60715c8.squirrel@192.168.1.50> References: <4FD5E148.6000609@eBookRing.net>, , <87hauix7o9.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <2047f24b4445d39189e70f5fc60715c8.squirrel@192.168.1.50> Message-ID: <4FD8B1CD.2070400@users.sourceforge.net> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 11.06.2012 18:29, michael crane wrote: > On Mon, June 11, 2012 4:11 pm, Sam Smith wrote: >>> >>> I tried every GUI I could find for GPG over the past 2 years. >>> My absolute favorite is GNU Privacy Assistant (GPA). >>> >>> I do believe I have tried every GUI option there is for Windows >>> and Ubuntu. Originally, I couldn't find anything I liked on >>> Windows and consequently was forced to learn the command line >>> (which is probably not a bad thing). > what's wrong with GnuPg shell ? +1, I do almost everything with gpg shell. The only things, which I don't do with it are signing and encrypting of emails, which Enigmail does. - -- [Mika Suomalainen](https://mkaysi.github.com/) || [gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net --recv-keys 4DB53CFE82A46728](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/key.txt) || [Why do I sign my emails?](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/WhyDoISignEmails.html) || [Please don't send HTML.](http://mkaysi.github.com/articles/complaining/HTML.html) || [This signature](https://gist.github.com/2643070#file_icedove.md) || [Please reply below this line](http://mkaysi.github.com/articles/complaining/topposting.html) ____________________________ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.19 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Homepage: http://mkaysi.github.com/ Comment: gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net --recv-keys 82A46728 Comment: Public key: http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/key.txt Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJP2LHLAAoJEE21PP6CpGco6i0QAKJ1MnwQ5b1+TB89I/0Let91 JRuqUjZNAr5n7QnRY+RNWFUTg7x3GFQKHePhBmv51vP9JXIHSBTLgEqg6NiMAkDM /2iWaS2rtskr7wgCnujfEfJqUXKpb4La6y4byZRGffA5nvLx8VV9VddcmCVxgGvu 2+8ayphh+pbuTULnZ45YrwVHxjQYkdc8WVGi1qM7aSVl49WkPVZvkZWUA1Ahi7oP TJpPYOj/S8YYiCUTyoHMArf9gxB9jCkQfKUMJlZptQpL+xPsoL5YHacSmsriBwrv AkUGy7qdS1Pz62WM1i+68ZwxWWd61kM4Zq+r1U4U8Nrq/E0XNfkAQJGwO5K6NY2r LBf9WzuvLZDuSKwz3eKyyuBWiDYawS5akJcjalaq5TILr4Udlg1f4aRLA/ebLsHj Iv1PWHjFJGgz1ZEo0YcGLfgBFmSHQAd55bQ7CoeSCLmqHtzm1nHF+AYUbI7OXWUM qR0rpDOS04B9lryJEgA+tinCUgYdWgg13nLVRove6tRlppi/ybor5dUXRQfUJLl1 AVy29e8pz4XxneBUWNMKBpLOk2WgtUkFtSrd/Sf5ESHW1W4hAgQaT2WQV97YXuLP SKu9UyaYuceUF3DHYHN2dfJxbTKrjI2xb/eNzYGBgPioPi+LF8qgoIcgGMmCCchV 7xxuWmV1V1X6HWRqrPwj =Mik8 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From samtuke at fsfe.org Thu Jun 14 12:40:55 2012 From: samtuke at fsfe.org (Sam Tuke) Date: Thu, 14 Jun 2012 11:40:55 +0100 Subject: STEED Message-ID: <1339670455.7723.0.camel@jack-laptop> How is STEED progressing? What is the current status of the project? Best, Sam. -- Sam Tuke British Team Coordinator Free Software Foundation Europe IM : samtuke at jabber.fsfe.org Latest UK Free Software news: uk.fsfe.org Is freedom important to you? Join the fellowship.fsfe.org -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 230 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part URL: From mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com Thu Jun 14 17:33:21 2012 From: mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com (Mika Suomalainen) Date: Thu, 14 Jun 2012 18:33:21 +0300 Subject: Need a GUI for e ncrypt/decrypt in Ubuntu 11.10 In-Reply-To: References: <4FD5E148.6000609@eBookRing.net>, , , , <87hauix7o9.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>, , <2047f24b4445d39189e70f5fc60715c8.squirrel@192.168.1.50> Message-ID: <4FDA0441.4060903@hotmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 11.06.2012 23:29, Sam Smith wrote: > I did not mean to imply that all other GPG GUIs are no good. GnuPG > Shell is a fine app and there is much to like about it. I did (if I > remember correctly) have trouble figuring out how to use it to list > signatures on keys. And how to sign keys. Overall, I found GPA to > be a better experience. > To list signatures: > gpg2 --list-sigs KEYID To sign > gpg2 --edit-key KEYID sign - -- [Mika Suomalainen](https://mkaysi.github.com/) || NOTICE! I am on mobile broadband with very limited time, so I cannot read emails very much. The best time to contact me is probably week ends when I have better connectivity with good luck. [gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net --recv-keys 4DB53CFE82A46728](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/key.txt) || [Why do I sign my emails?](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/WhyDoISignEmails.html) || [Please don't send HTML.](http://mkaysi.github.com/articles/complaining/HTML.html) || [This signature](https://gist.github.com/2643070#file_icedove.md) || [Please reply below this line](http://mkaysi.github.com/articles/complaining/topposting.html) ____________________________ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.19 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Homepage: http://mkaysi.github.com/ Comment: gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net --recv-keys 82A46728 Comment: Public key: http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/key.txt Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJP2gQ+AAoJEE21PP6CpGcotMwQAIVA0pcknCrkZSrP2Nt1ht4R FjnXD8ABV84lAU1ME+MpJxpsnjpDELd1K4p9zG68CUmXLz/pxgk+GXN/37iyJN+d zdRWv9va2I/SlyZ0If7nyXu0DWip3OmS/c1D6Q+pIfmXWuccA7TOz/ngOWpWMQkh C4U5NngZT6nPrhOE3f2tfT02EcUikbL+cGrBIkmsoeCr9slx1vbRcuaUgUYiAA7F uGxdH0DJWKp/bduR1oaYKGhz8qw6ILHxvzy4NT9QRxEMJtqqTwXCwTbl6B/wVAbe IVQMpr85FGSva78Tao/zZWEr2U41MaIdrbIF8sWZOtSdUoeRVU+MtJ4Y1HKRukKS TAH7Iyqu5awT8r6rbWZ09dxqsmMdn3f78kbkkfczXYs+X5ciEwdEkwIt4hWeNkNF pN0/4siAmJgrdDi4WOW6bMf9qnJHHuvjkLasf5JFLUoMFYNLEAuPKYzmY8gIVqSu osbUVJg4Vu7QCKh3FaJrBbUo1ZwDE7P7tKFIKYhwesFv6t6QOkJ/NYuW/rLxcYVo yN/6hbIbD6erSsE6vOrqi8So7BxUb0gWAEjBj786sgXrMy+Cm7s2hIoel2KUIyy4 Anux8ps0HdBm6r/wKUuQj8Jbjqrc7xsfWKTgWO1tDjH++Cs6TQvilOfbtNdMTdV6 2PxV81HyIc37ip+SY4cq =pJwi -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From avi.wiki at gmail.com Thu Jun 14 18:06:55 2012 From: avi.wiki at gmail.com (Avi) Date: Thu, 14 Jun 2012 12:06:55 -0400 Subject: Need a GUI for e ncrypt/decrypt in Ubuntu 11.10 Message-ID: -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 On Thu, Jun 14, 2012 at 11:33 AM, wrote: > > From: Mika Suomalainen > To: gnupg-users at gnupg.org > Cc: > Date: Wed, 13 Jun 2012 18:29:17 +0300 > Subject: Re: Need a GUI for e ncrypt/decrypt in Ubuntu 11.10 > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA1 > > +1, I do almost everything with gpg shell. The only things, which I > don't do with it are signing and encrypting of emails, which Enigmail > does. For what it is worth GPGShell <> GnuPGShell. GPGShell, written by Roger Sondermann (0x11061961), is freeware but closed-source. GnuPGShell is FOSS (I do not know who the coder(s) are, sorry. If I remember correctly, Werner prefers that this list restrict itself to the discussion of FOSS only, although I must admit I find myself using GPGShell in preference to all other GUIs. Avi -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (MingW32) - GPGshell v3.78 Comment: Most recent key: Click show in box @ http://is.gd/4xJrs iL4EAREKAGYFAk/aC/JfGGh0dHA6Ly9rZXlzZXJ2ZXIudWJ1bnR1LmNvbS9wa3Mv bG9va3VwP29wPWdldCZoYXNoPW9uJmZpbmdlcnByaW50PW9uJnNlYXJjaD0weDBE NjJCMDE5RjgwRTI5RjkACgkQDWKwGfgOKfnO+gD+MEoDUTlslSgWJC11THxFw7sj Ll1OoMST8BQSJG/168UA/i3AtOwogl1NCNkuewNjquN5JZfuQ2mU2EXB9I+j8WNP =a/1D -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Thu Jun 14 19:09:51 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Thu, 14 Jun 2012 13:09:51 -0400 Subject: Need a GUI for e ncrypt/decrypt in Ubuntu 11.10 In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <4FDA1ADF.8090809@sixdemonbag.org> On 6/14/12 12:06 PM, Avi wrote: > If I remember correctly, Werner prefers that this list restrict > itself to the discussion of FOSS only... Not exactly. He's never voiced any dissatisfaction with my mentioning of Symantec's PGP product, for instance, but that may be because I'm use PGP in a spirit of compare-and-contrast rather than advocating people use it. I believe Werner objects to people advocating proprietary programs, but saying "proprietary program X does Y and the FOSS alternative doesn't, I really like Y, I'd like it if we could do Y" is just fine. So, let's move this discussion about proprietary programs (GPGShell) into a direction that's useful to FOSS programs. What is it about GPGShell that you really like? What makes it superior to the FOSS alternatives? How can the FOSS alternatives be made superior to GPGShell? Inquiring minds very much want to know. :) From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Thu Jun 14 19:39:01 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Thu, 14 Jun 2012 13:39:01 -0400 Subject: GPGME C# bindings? Message-ID: <4FDA21B5.8050109@sixdemonbag.org> I'm looking at putting together a mockup of something (if all goes well, it will ultimately be ISC-licensed), and find myself needing C# bindings for GPGME. Now, there already exist a handful of projects that claim to provide this but they all seem to have the same problems: they're dormant projects, they have no user community, they haven't been tested to work with the latest GPGME releases, and they have rarely *ever* been tested to work on Windows. So, before I go about embarking on a day's work to download and check all of them, etc., I figured I'd ask around here. Does there exist a GPGME binding for C# which supports the latest version of GPGME, works on Windows, etc.? From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Thu Jun 14 19:48:51 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Thu, 14 Jun 2012 13:48:51 -0400 Subject: RFE: --update-before-use Message-ID: <4FDA2403.3070606@sixdemonbag.org> Currently, users have a public keyring containing certificates acquired from many different sources. These certificates are often out of date, sometimes in minor ways, sometimes in large ones. Since many users now have always-on and fairly reliable internet connectivity, perhaps it makes sense to add a new option: "update-before-use" (and its corresponding "no-update-before-use"). This option would only be effective if a --keyserver option is also in use. When the update-before-use option is in effect, GnuPG will, before any encryption or verification, attempt to download the latest version of that certificate from the keyserver. If one cannot be downloaded, GnuPG will display a warning message and continue to encrypt and/or verify using the certificate on the local keyring. We already have something similar to this in --auto-key-retrieve, and the same warnings about that option probably also apply here. The principal difference would seem to be that auto-key-retrieve only fetches certificates that are not on the local keyring, while update-before-use would always fetch certificates. Thoughts? Objections? "Sounds good, now write the patch?" From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Thu Jun 14 20:54:47 2012 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Thu, 14 Jun 2012 14:54:47 -0400 Subject: RFE: --update-before-use In-Reply-To: <4FDA2403.3070606@sixdemonbag.org> References: <4FDA2403.3070606@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: On Jun 14, 2012, at 1:48 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > Currently, users have a public keyring containing certificates acquired from many different sources. These certificates are often out of date, sometimes in minor ways, sometimes in large ones. Since many users now have always-on and fairly reliable internet connectivity, perhaps it makes sense to add a new option: "update-before-use" (and its "no-update-before-use"). > > This option would only be effective if a --keyserver option is also in use. > > When the update-before-use option is in effect, GnuPG will, before any encryption or verification, attempt to download the latest version of that certificate from the keyserver. If one cannot be downloaded, GnuPG will display a warning message and continue to encrypt and/or verify using the certificate on the local keyring. > > We already have something similar to this in --auto-key-retrieve, and the same warnings about that option probably also apply here. The principal difference would seem to be that auto-key-retrieve only fetches certificates that are not on the local keyring, while update-before-use would always fetch certificates. This comes up every now and then. A recent go-round on the subject is at http://www.gossamer-threads.com/lists/gnupg/users/50850 See also bug https://bugs.g10code.com/gnupg/issue1235 I actually started down this road once (when I was doing auto-key-locate, as it happens - they share a lot of similar backend concepts). I didn't pursue it for a few reasons: 1) If the keyserver (of whatever type) isn't reachable at that moment, simple GPG operations can take a long time (multiple minutes) to allow for the fetch to fail and fall back to the current copy of the key. 2) Concern that enough people turning this feature on would add significant load to the keyserver network, which is run as a public service. I was hoping to get some keyserver operators to weigh in on the subject. 3) It leaks information more than auto-key-retrieve or auto-key-locate does. AKR only fires when verifying signatures, and only fires once (if you have the key, it isn't re-fetched). AKL only fires when trying to communicate with someone who you do not have a key for, and it also only fires once. An auto-key-refresh would refresh on every use, which essentially tells the keyserver operator every time you communicate with someone, and who. #1 can be handled by configuration - a "how long am I willing to wait for automatic updates" variable that can be set lower than the current keyserver-option "timeout". #2 can be handled by asking ;) #3 is a problem? obviously documenting the leakage is a start, and having the feature off by default is important. If someone wants to pick this up again, it would be nice if this could be done on particular keys, rather than globally. That helps with all three problems, to varying degrees. It would also be nice if the basic concept could be used to refresh at different intervals (i.e. "refresh on every use" vs "refresh on every use but not more than once a week", etc). David From wk at gnupg.org Thu Jun 14 21:06:39 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Thu, 14 Jun 2012 21:06:39 +0200 Subject: RFE: --update-before-use In-Reply-To: <4FDA2403.3070606@sixdemonbag.org> (Robert J. Hansen's message of "Thu, 14 Jun 2012 13:48:51 -0400") References: <4FDA2403.3070606@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <87aa05ww5c.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Thu, 14 Jun 2012 19:48, rjh at sixdemonbag.org said: > We already have something similar to this in --auto-key-retrieve, and > the same warnings about that option probably also apply here. The > principal difference would seem to be that auto-key-retrieve only > fetches certificates that are not on the local keyring, while That is not quite true: You should be able to use --auto-key-locate nodefault,keyserver -r foo at example.org and the key will be looked up only at the keyserver. It might be required to clear the auto-key-locate list first by using --no-auto-key-locate --auto-key-locate nodefault,keyserver -r foo at example.org The documentation needs some examples, though. IIRC, I implemented it for the generic kdns keyserver helper. The goal was to always retrieve a fresh copy of the key from the DNS. However, it should also work with other methods. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From wk at gnupg.org Thu Jun 14 21:12:12 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Thu, 14 Jun 2012 21:12:12 +0200 Subject: Need a GUI for e ncrypt/decrypt in Ubuntu 11.10 In-Reply-To: <4FDA1ADF.8090809@sixdemonbag.org> (Robert J. Hansen's message of "Thu, 14 Jun 2012 13:09:51 -0400") References: <4FDA1ADF.8090809@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <8762atwvw3.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Thu, 14 Jun 2012 19:09, rjh at sixdemonbag.org said: > proprietary programs, but saying "proprietary program X does Y and the > FOSS alternative doesn't, I really like Y, I'd like it if we could do > Y" is just fine. Right. Note that the FSF actually forbids us maintainers to mention proprietary software. However, I don't follow all of their rules (e.g. GnuPG still uses the GPL and not the GFDL for documentation). Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Thu Jun 14 22:34:42 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Thu, 14 Jun 2012 16:34:42 -0400 Subject: RFE: --update-before-use In-Reply-To: References: <4FDA2403.3070606@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <4FDA4AE2.7090206@sixdemonbag.org> > 1) If the keyserver (of whatever type) isn't reachable... As you say, easy to solve: agreed. > 2) Concern that enough people turning this feature on would add > significant load to the keyserver network... An open question and one we'd need to address: agreed. > 3) It leaks information more than auto-key-retrieve or > auto-key-locate does. I'm not entirely sure this is a problem. If you're concerned about the keyserver operator knowing that you're acquiring certificates, why would you use that keyserver? Why not use a different keyserver instead? If there were a single centralized keyserver, or a keyserver hierarchy where individual nodes took marching orders from those above them, this would be much more of a problem -- but here, the decentralized nature of the keyserver network seems to work in our favor. From avi.wiki at gmail.com Fri Jun 15 02:45:22 2012 From: avi.wiki at gmail.com (Avi) Date: Thu, 14 Jun 2012 20:45:22 -0400 Subject: GnuPG GUIs (was Need a GUI for e ncrypt/decrypt in Ubuntu 11.10) Message-ID: -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 On 6/14/12 12:09 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > > So, let's move this discussion about proprietary programs (GPGShell) > into a direction that's useful to FOSS programs. What is it about > GPGShell that you really like? What makes it superior to the FOSS > alternatives? How can the FOSS alternatives be made superior to > GPGShell? Inquiring minds very much want to know. :) Here is one immediate issue. It seems that I cannot install GnuPGShell at all, as my GnuPG is 1.4.12, and GnuPGShell does not seem to recognize it. I guess I can install GPG4win on my home computer and see if that works. Perhaps I am an exception, but I use GnuPG most often when composing webmail. Which means I type the email in a browser window or in a text file, copy the text to memory, perform the signatures/encryption on the clipboard, and paste the results into the browser window. On the other hand, being somewhat geeky, I want the ability to do most anything that the command line can do when needed. When I started looking at GUIs, the options for Windows were GPGShell, WinPT, and GPA. Here are some things I like about GPGShell which were either lacking, or less robust in the others. 1) It has a bundled program, Copy2USB, which can take an existing GnuPG install and copy the needed files and settings to a USB stick, making for a portable installation. 2) It has a tray program, GPGTray, from which I can launch the key manager, encrypt/decrypt/sign/import the clipboard, launch a app that allows me to drag files onto a taskbar to encrypt/decrypt/sign. 3) It has many options for key management "right clickable" in the key management GUI (sign, lsign, clean, minimize, check UID, update from keyserver, export to clipboard, etc.), yet can launch the command-line edit allowing for complete control in a DOS-window 4) It allows for a central place to update gpg.conf without having to launch text editors, and while most of the main options are either checkboxes or radioboxes, there is a free- form area where any option (such as "expert" or "bzip2-compress- level") can be added 5) It does not require registry settings to use (see #1) which allows for a truly portable installation 6) It makes navigating GnuPG's configurations easier (at least for 1.4.x) so that the program files are easily placed on one drive and the certificates/keyrings on another without issue. When I tried WinPT and GPA, none of them had the combination of robustness, completeness, and ease-of-use that GPGShell demonstrated, which is why I have stayed with it for the time being. Perhaps GnuPGShell has all of these properties as well, I guess I can try GnuPG 2.0.x and see, but until such time as a portable installation of GnuPG 2.0.x for Windows exists, I'll likely stay with the working combination of 1.4.12 + GPGShell. More information can be found here: I hope that helps, Avi -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (MingW32) - GPGshell v3.78 Comment: Most recent key: Click show in box @ http://is.gd/4xJrs iL4EAREKAGYFAk/ahXBfGGh0dHA6Ly9rZXlzZXJ2ZXIudWJ1bnR1LmNvbS9wa3Mv bG9va3VwP29wPWdldCZoYXNoPW9uJmZpbmdlcnByaW50PW9uJnNlYXJjaD0weDBE NjJCMDE5RjgwRTI5RjkACgkQDWKwGfgOKflV8QD/QSUtLqFFfOR7uiEtNt+/yvkN hAW22wEk+DKqq0Ld+9gBAJXylD704ILyqtR7BJtdY+7GxHXCcvi+gXxrIQcF679j =C8+C -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ---- User:Avraham pub 3072D/F80E29F9 1/30/2009 Avi (Wikimedia-related key) ?? Primary key fingerprint: 167C 063F 7981 A1F6 71EC ABAA 0D62 B019 F80E 29F9 From avi.wiki at gmail.com Fri Jun 15 03:45:08 2012 From: avi.wiki at gmail.com (Avi) Date: Thu, 14 Jun 2012 21:45:08 -0400 Subject: GnuPG GUIs (was Need a GUI for e ncrypt/decrypt in Ubuntu 11.10) Message-ID: I installed GPG4Win 2.1.1beta, GPA, and GnuPGShell. GnuPGShell cannot read my keyrings; I don't even see an option where I can point to a keyring, only import ASCII or PGP style individual keys. GPA has more flexibility, but there isn't the full suite of options (clean, minimize, or just plain-old edit). For example, I see no way to disable a key using GPA (let alone GnuPGShell which cannot read my keys), but it is the simple matter of two clicks in the other program. Perhaps there are options of which I am unaware, but I could not find them. Thank you, --Avi ---- User:Avraham pub 3072D/F80E29F9 1/30/2009 Avi (Wikimedia-related key) ?? Primary key fingerprint: 167C 063F 7981 A1F6 71EC ABAA 0D62 B019 F80E 29F9 From avi.wiki at gmail.com Fri Jun 15 04:08:00 2012 From: avi.wiki at gmail.com (Avi) Date: Thu, 14 Jun 2012 22:08:00 -0400 Subject: GnuPG GUIs (was Need a GUI for e ncrypt/decrypt in Ubuntu 11.10) In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 GPA does not allow me to edit gpg.conf; then again, the system seems to be rather different from 1.4.x, so my difficulties may be due more to my lack of education than any shortcomings in software. Another, minor, issue is that GPA does not seem to have an option to minimize to the tray; not as big a deal obviously. Note that this email is signed with GnuPG 2.0.x and GPA, so at least I have something working :) Avi -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.19 (MingW32) Comment: Most recent key: Click show in box @ http://is.gd/4xJrs iL4EAREKAGYFAk/amMJfGGh0dHA6Ly9rZXlzZXJ2ZXIudWJ1bnR1LmNvbS9wa3Mv bG9va3VwP29wPWdldCZoYXNoPW9uJmZpbmdlcnByaW50PW9uJnNlYXJjaD0weDBE NjJCMDE5RjgwRTI5RjkACgkQDWKwGfgOKfkOWQD/TfpaQmw3GT8vD6LIHKkzupF5 GoQV4+Aviu6sqt30SEMA/3aldYq8BvKafBxCEbasCMUvu0bJqOEIt18ZMYfSvKSS =Vo7e -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ---- User:Avraham pub 3072D/F80E29F9 1/30/2009 Avi (Wikimedia-related key) ?? Primary key fingerprint: 167C 063F 7981 A1F6 71EC ABAA 0D62 B019 F80E 29F9 From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Fri Jun 15 05:10:52 2012 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Thu, 14 Jun 2012 23:10:52 -0400 Subject: RFE: --update-before-use In-Reply-To: <4FDA4AE2.7090206@sixdemonbag.org> References: <4FDA2403.3070606@sixdemonbag.org> <4FDA4AE2.7090206@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <98FE9A87-3FB8-441B-9803-7909A25CF1BA@jabberwocky.com> On Jun 14, 2012, at 4:34 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: >> 1) If the keyserver (of whatever type) isn't reachable... > > As you say, easy to solve: agreed. > >> 2) Concern that enough people turning this feature on would add >> significant load to the keyserver network... > > An open question and one we'd need to address: agreed. > >> 3) It leaks information more than auto-key-retrieve or >> auto-key-locate does. > > I'm not entirely sure this is a problem. If you're concerned about the > keyserver operator knowing that you're acquiring certificates, why would > you use that keyserver? Why not use a different keyserver instead? If > there were a single centralized keyserver, or a keyserver hierarchy > where individual nodes took marching orders from those above them, this > would be much more of a problem -- but here, the decentralized nature of > the keyserver network seems to work in our favor. It's a similar problem in type as auto-key-retrieve or auto-key-locate, but it's a different problem in degree: both AKR and AKL fire only as needed (either when a key is needed for sig verification, or when a key is needed to encrypt to). That's a single fetch for the life of the key (you might fetch it more via other means, but AKR and AKL (barring special configuration) will never fetch a key you already have). Fetching the key on each usage means it leaks each time you use the key. Plus remember that by default, GPG honors keyserver URLs on the key, which if combined with this new feature enables IP-address tracking of a person encrypting to a particular key (it's the same web-bug trick as AKR, but with encryption). I don't think this should prevent such a feature from being added. As with many tools, one person's foolish usage is another person's useful feature. Like I said earlier, though, it does need to be off by default, as AKR and AKL are, and also like AKR and AKL, documented so people can make an informed decision on whether to use it or not. Werner also showed a way to configure AKL to always fetch a key from a keyserver, which can be done with today's code. David From wk at gnupg.org Fri Jun 15 09:04:50 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Fri, 15 Jun 2012 09:04:50 +0200 Subject: GnuPG GUIs In-Reply-To: (Avi's message of "Thu, 14 Jun 2012 22:08:00 -0400") References: Message-ID: <87zk85ukbx.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Fri, 15 Jun 2012 04:08, avi.wiki at gmail.com said: > GPA does not allow me to edit gpg.conf; then again, the system seems Sure it does. You may edit most of the options: Edit->Backed_Preferences. This uses gpgme to edit the conf files in a reliable way. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From avi.wiki at gmail.com Fri Jun 15 15:01:55 2012 From: avi.wiki at gmail.com (Avi) Date: Fri, 15 Jun 2012 09:01:55 -0400 Subject: GnuPG GUIs In-Reply-To: <87zk85ukbx.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <87zk85ukbx.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 On Fri, Jun 15, 2012 at 3:04 AM, Werner Koch wrote: > On Fri, 15 Jun 2012 04:08, avi.wiki at gmail.com said: >> GPA does not allow me to edit gpg.conf; then again, the system seems > > Sure it does. You may edit most of the options: > Edit->Backed_Preferences. This uses gpgme to edit the conf files in a > reliable way. Thank you, Werner. I saw that and used it for the preferences it shows. But where do I address options such as s2k-digest-algo and bzip2-compress-level? How do I change the Home directory (it's using the settings I set when I installed GnuPG 1.4.12, as it seems to share that information somehow)? Does GPA have an option to set word-wrap width? It doesn't seem so. Thanks, Avi -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.19 (MingW32) Comment: Most recent key: Click show in box @ http://is.gd/4xJrs iL4EAREKAGYFAk/bMhVfGGh0dHA6Ly9rZXlzZXJ2ZXIudWJ1bnR1LmNvbS9wa3Mv bG9va3VwP29wPWdldCZoYXNoPW9uJmZpbmdlcnByaW50PW9uJnNlYXJjaD0weDBE NjJCMDE5RjgwRTI5RjkACgkQDWKwGfgOKfkFgwD/RgtslbsaKndH1Gr19W7h04Xs k119abQTFpOyRLTSoDwA/0UmUHzWTmJFaG3222YTwG/1JEkjo4krPOdMzqQEtvv8 =PaT+ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ---- User:Avraham pub 3072D/F80E29F9 1/30/2009 Avi (Wikimedia-related key) ?? Primary key fingerprint: 167C 063F 7981 A1F6 71EC ABAA 0D62 B019 F80E 29F9 From smickson at hotmail.com Fri Jun 15 15:53:43 2012 From: smickson at hotmail.com (Sam Smith) Date: Fri, 15 Jun 2012 09:53:43 -0400 Subject: FW: GnuPG GUIs (was Need a GUI for e ncrypt/decrypt in Ubuntu 11.10) In-Reply-To: References: , Message-ID: Gnu Privacy Guard has everything I want and need. Unfortunately it's not available in Ubuntu 12.04. So I'd say all that needs to be done is make GPA available for Ubuntu 12.04 :) Then a GPG GUI that does everything is available. or is the discussion about a GUI for use on Windows? > From: avi.wiki at gmail.com > Date: Thu, 14 Jun 2012 20:45:22 -0400 > Subject: GnuPG GUIs (was Need a GUI for e ncrypt/decrypt in Ubuntu 11.10) > To: gnupg-users at gnupg.org > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA512 > > On 6/14/12 12:09 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > > > > So, let's move this discussion about proprietary programs > (GPGShell) > > into a direction that's useful to FOSS programs. What is it > about > > GPGShell that you really like? What makes it superior to the > FOSS > > alternatives? How can the FOSS alternatives be made superior > to > > GPGShell? Inquiring minds very much want to know. :) > > Here is one immediate issue. It seems that I cannot install > GnuPGShell at all, as my GnuPG is 1.4.12, and GnuPGShell does > not seem to recognize it. I guess I can install GPG4win on my > home computer and see if that works. > > Perhaps I am an exception, but I use GnuPG most often when > composing webmail. Which means I type the email in a browser > window or in a text file, copy the text to memory, perform the > signatures/encryption on the clipboard, and paste the results > into the browser window. On the other hand, being somewhat > geeky, I want the ability to do most anything that the command > line can do when needed. When I started looking at GUIs, the > options for Windows were GPGShell, WinPT, and GPA. Here are some > things I like about GPGShell which were either lacking, or less > robust in the others. > > 1) It has a bundled program, Copy2USB, which can take an > existing GnuPG install and copy the needed files and settings to > a USB stick, making for a portable installation. > 2) It has a tray program, GPGTray, from which I can launch the > key manager, encrypt/decrypt/sign/import the clipboard, launch a > app that allows me to drag files onto a taskbar to > encrypt/decrypt/sign. > 3) It has many options for key management "right clickable" in > the key management GUI (sign, lsign, clean, minimize, check UID, > update from keyserver, export to clipboard, etc.), yet can > launch the command-line edit allowing for complete control in a > DOS-window > 4) It allows for a central place to update gpg.conf without > having to launch text editors, and while most of the main > options are either checkboxes or radioboxes, there is a free- > form area where any option (such as "expert" or "bzip2-compress- > level") can be added > 5) It does not require registry settings to use (see #1) which > allows for a truly portable installation > 6) It makes navigating GnuPG's configurations easier (at least > for 1.4.x) so that the program files are easily placed on one > drive and the certificates/keyrings on another without issue. > > When I tried WinPT and GPA, none of them had the combination of > robustness, completeness, and ease-of-use that GPGShell > demonstrated, which is why I have stayed with it for the time > being. Perhaps GnuPGShell has all of these properties as well, I > guess I can try GnuPG 2.0.x and see, but until such time as a > portable installation of GnuPG 2.0.x for Windows exists, I'll > likely stay with the working combination of 1.4.12 + GPGShell. > More information can be found here: > > > I hope that helps, > > Avi > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (MingW32) - GPGshell v3.78 > Comment: Most recent key: Click show in box @ http://is.gd/4xJrs > > iL4EAREKAGYFAk/ahXBfGGh0dHA6Ly9rZXlzZXJ2ZXIudWJ1bnR1LmNvbS9wa3Mv > bG9va3VwP29wPWdldCZoYXNoPW9uJmZpbmdlcnByaW50PW9uJnNlYXJjaD0weDBE > NjJCMDE5RjgwRTI5RjkACgkQDWKwGfgOKflV8QD/QSUtLqFFfOR7uiEtNt+/yvkN > hAW22wEk+DKqq0Ld+9gBAJXylD704ILyqtR7BJtdY+7GxHXCcvi+gXxrIQcF679j > =C8+C > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > > > ---- > User:Avraham > > pub 3072D/F80E29F9 1/30/2009 Avi (Wikimedia-related key) > Primary key fingerprint: 167C 063F 7981 A1F6 71EC ABAA 0D62 B019 F80E 29F9 > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From wk at gnupg.org Fri Jun 15 17:58:02 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Fri, 15 Jun 2012 17:58:02 +0200 Subject: GnuPG GUIs In-Reply-To: (Avi's message of "Fri, 15 Jun 2012 09:01:55 -0400") References: <87zk85ukbx.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <87ipestvn9.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Fri, 15 Jun 2012 15:01, avi.wiki at gmail.com said: > shows. But where do I address options such as s2k-digest-algo and > bzip2-compress-level? How do I change the Home directory (it's using You are not supposed to change these options :-). We include in the GUI only those options which are likely interesting for some people. All geeky options require the use of a text editor. You can't change the home directory from the GUI because that would be a cacth-22. The options are stored in the home directory. The manual explains how to change them: [... command line options. It also overrides any home directory stated through the environment variable GNUPGHOME or (on W32 systems) by means of the Registry entry HKCU\Software\GNU\GnuPG:HomeDir. > that information somehow)? Does GPA have an option to set word-wrap > width? It doesn't seem so. I don't think so. Easy to add, though. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From JPClizbe at tx.rr.com Fri Jun 15 18:33:59 2012 From: JPClizbe at tx.rr.com (John Clizbe) Date: Fri, 15 Jun 2012 11:33:59 -0500 Subject: RFE: --update-before-use In-Reply-To: <98FE9A87-3FB8-441B-9803-7909A25CF1BA@jabberwocky.com> References: <4FDA2403.3070606@sixdemonbag.org> <4FDA4AE2.7090206@sixdemonbag.org> <98FE9A87-3FB8-441B-9803-7909A25CF1BA@jabberwocky.com> Message-ID: <4FDB63F7.1070402@tx.rr.com> David Shaw wrote: > On Jun 14, 2012, at 4:34 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > >>> 1) If the keyserver (of whatever type) isn't reachable... >> >> As you say, easy to solve: agreed. >> >>> 2) Concern that enough people turning this feature on would add >>> significant load to the keyserver network... I don't think the network as a whole would be adversely impacted. Where the slamming would occur is well-known servers that "everybody" uses, e.g., pgp.mit.edu. >> An open question and one we'd need to address: agreed. >> >>> 3) It leaks information more than auto-key-retrieve or auto-key-locate >>> does. See logging/leak discussion below. >> I'm not entirely sure this is a problem. If you're concerned about the >> keyserver operator knowing that you're acquiring certificates, why would >> you use that keyserver? Why not use a different keyserver instead? If >> there were a single centralized keyserver, or a keyserver hierarchy where >> individual nodes took marching orders from those above them, this would >> be much more of a problem -- but here, the decentralized nature of the >> keyserver network seems to work in our favor. Which is why we suggest folks us one of the sks-keyservers.net pools. There are multiple pools to choose from besides the basic pool.sks-keyservers.net. See http://www.sks-keyservers.net/overview-of-pools.php for a description of the various pools. > It's a similar problem in type as auto-key-retrieve or auto-key-locate, but > it's a different problem in degree: both AKR and AKL fire only as needed > (either when a key is needed for sig verification, or when a key is needed > to encrypt to). That's a single fetch for the life of the key (you might > fetch it more via other means, but AKR and AKL (barring special > configuration) will never fetch a key you already have). Fetching the key > on each usage means it leaks each time you use the key. Plus remember that > by default, GPG honors keyserver URLs on the key, which if combined with > this new feature enables IP-address tracking of a person encrypting to a > particular key (it's the same web-bug trick as AKR, but with encryption). Another good reason to use one of the round-robin pool addresses rather than a single keyserver. I have to go back and check but I believe that that level of logging is a 5. SKS defaults to 4 and most operators never change it. Only we crazy developers go for logging that detailed > Werner also showed a way to configure AKL to always fetch a key from a > keyserver, which can be done with today's code. You remember where that was? Sounds interesting, and I have plenty of keyservers here at home to choose from. -John -- John P. Clizbe Inet: John (a) Gingerbear DAWT net SKS/Enigmail/PGP-EKP or: John ( @ ) Enigmail DAWT net FSF Assoc #995 / FSFE Fellow #1797 hkp://keyserver.gingerbear.net or mailto:pgp-public-keys at gingerbear.net?subject=HELP Q:"Just how do the residents of Haiku, Hawai'i hold conversations?" A:"An odd melody / island voices on the winds / surplus of vowels" From mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com Fri Jun 15 18:39:52 2012 From: mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com (Mika Suomalainen) Date: Fri, 15 Jun 2012 19:39:52 +0300 Subject: Need a GUI for e ncrypt/decrypt in Ubuntu 11.10 In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <4FDB6558.8060200@hotmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 14.06.2012 19:06, Avi wrote: > On Thu, Jun 14, 2012 at 11:33 AM, > wrote: > >> From: Mika Suomalainen To: >> gnupg-users at gnupg.org Cc: Date: Wed, 13 Jun 2012 18:29:17 +0300 >> Subject: Re: Need a GUI for e ncrypt/decrypt in Ubuntu 11.10 >> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 > >> +1, I do almost everything with gpg shell. The only things, > which I >> don't do with it are signing and encrypting of emails, which > Enigmail >> does. > > For what it is worth GPGShell <> GnuPGShell. GPGShell, written by > Roger Sondermann (0x11061961), is freeware but closed-source. > GnuPGShell is FOSS (I do not know who the coder(s) are, sorry. If I > remember correctly, Werner prefers that this list restrict itself > to the discussion of FOSS only, although I must admit I find myself > using GPGShell in preference to all other GUIs. > > Avi Err, are gpg shell and "gpg --edit-key" two different things? I have always thought that "gpg --edit-key" is this shell, which we are talking about- - -- [Mika Suomalainen](https://mkaysi.github.com/) || NOTICE! I am on mobile broadband with very limited time, so I cannot read emails very much. The best time to contact me is probably week ends when I have better connectivity with good luck. [gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net --recv-keys 4DB53CFE82A46728](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/key.txt) || [Why do I sign my emails?](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/WhyDoISignEmails.html) || [Please don't send HTML.](http://mkaysi.github.com/articles/complaining/HTML.html) || [This signature](https://gist.github.com/2643070#file_icedove.md) || [Please reply below this line](http://mkaysi.github.com/articles/complaining/topposting.html) ____________________________ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.19 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Homepage: http://mkaysi.github.com/ Comment: gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net --recv-keys 82A46728 Comment: Public key: http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/key.txt Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJP22VVAAoJEE21PP6CpGcoFcwQAKugZxHMyuw8i8JPX2gtYwtC kFuRFWEPbupJ0hoeNFMwJ2aga11WCNFKSODdHGQF8Qjg0k6sYh7qufQFgeg11xu4 ST7oFPVgURkUSXonM26grYT8UjatB+Hx53WeC7TdQWJqjzISPJntdzY3VEQOQa0n 1FLvM7DqQP1MB3eOSTMyTGf+QKWUYUXORdS9AMuPIgOqsp0+bKau45fGh1Sv4+nk tGcZvDlQW7Iij3KLm9ngRZWM5BTnoWsSCa9tCRDmG8XnhHxxhV7hJASjSPhNaJmc rXH6wv7aTcejwFatgOvWsIvxEeWmTa397Jq+9aR5lR4SUh6rb7OiAtb82wMP+IKU /PLG0/Ed7y1f4mxnYnrxvQBbb9hRl5CbSevvQT5LBasZmhfxXzvAmRBDKZ8GO6cu SUx9ZU+XiauiYopF5Wh8pOjivOHMnbqXbnlO9mNYOe+7sWfWNXAiozEy3QUSJclB vr7KaexkQPqap59kre49ZX4FuVrC1FMn6CGZis78tsfp3sRfbMHfRE9TeMNhoz+2 G6O5w4FWz3wiywo7ciLDgvSwVpDo9nqVyyzIGpSmpwQC1k33vBwYkOyUVKD76VTA 1UFndCkVR1OlrdBpcYicDonpbxB44PUXnNUdcN0nE3xxJNhuGPvxgWrc90598TVl VnmFRzC7sjnRxQjUSlGD =2Tuf -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From peter at digitalbrains.com Sat Jun 16 12:14:05 2012 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Sat, 16 Jun 2012 12:14:05 +0200 Subject: RFE: --update-before-use In-Reply-To: <4FDB63F7.1070402@tx.rr.com> References: <4FDA2403.3070606@sixdemonbag.org> <4FDA4AE2.7090206@sixdemonbag.org> <98FE9A87-3FB8-441B-9803-7909A25CF1BA@jabberwocky.com> <4FDB63F7.1070402@tx.rr.com> Message-ID: <4FDC5C6D.4040006@digitalbrains.com> On 15/06/12 18:33, John Clizbe wrote: > You remember where that was? Sounds interesting, and I have plenty of > keyservers here at home to choose from. Werner mentioned it[1] in his reply to this thread: > You should be able to use > > --auto-key-locate nodefault,keyserver -r foo at example.org > > and the key will be looked up only at the keyserver. (Refer to that message for more information) Peter. [1] -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at http://wwwhome.cs.utwente.nl/~lebbing/pubkey.txt From peter at digitalbrains.com Sat Jun 16 12:18:35 2012 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Sat, 16 Jun 2012 12:18:35 +0200 Subject: Need a GUI for e ncrypt/decrypt in Ubuntu 11.10 In-Reply-To: <4FDB6558.8060200@hotmail.com> References: <4FDB6558.8060200@hotmail.com> Message-ID: <4FDC5D7B.1090609@digitalbrains.com> On 15/06/12 18:39, Mika Suomalainen wrote: > Err, are gpg shell and "gpg --edit-key" two different things? You can use GnuPG from a shell by issuing (f.e.) the command "gpg --edit-key". And then there is a GUI program which is called GPGShell. And apparently another GUI program called GnuPGShell. It's pretty confusing :) Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at http://wwwhome.cs.utwente.nl/~lebbing/pubkey.txt From mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com Sat Jun 16 12:55:16 2012 From: mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com (Mika Suomalainen) Date: Sat, 16 Jun 2012 13:55:16 +0300 Subject: Need a GUI for e ncrypt/decrypt in Ubuntu 11.10 In-Reply-To: <4FDC5D7B.1090609@digitalbrains.com> References: <4FDB6558.8060200@hotmail.com> <4FDC5D7B.1090609@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <4FDC6614.7010305@hotmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 16.06.2012 13:18, Peter Lebbing wrote: > On 15/06/12 18:39, Mika Suomalainen wrote: >> Err, are gpg shell and "gpg --edit-key" two different things? > > You can use GnuPG from a shell by issuing (f.e.) the command "gpg > --edit-key". > > And then there is a GUI program which is called GPGShell. And > apparently another GUI program called GnuPGShell. > > It's pretty confusing :) > > Peter. > Ok, so they are different. Does the "gpg --edit-key" have a name? I have called it as "gpg key editing shell" or something similar in my gpg guide. - -- [Mika Suomalainen](https://mkaysi.github.com/) || NOTICE! I am on mobile broadband with very limited time, so I cannot read emails very much. The best time to contact me is probably week ends when I have better connectivity with good luck. [gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net --recv-keys 4DB53CFE82A46728](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/key.txt) || [Why do I sign my emails?](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/WhyDoISignEmails.html) || [Please don't send HTML.](http://mkaysi.github.com/articles/complaining/HTML.html) || [This signature](https://gist.github.com/2643070#file_icedove.md) || [Please reply below this line](http://mkaysi.github.com/articles/complaining/topposting.html) ____________________________ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.19 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Homepage: http://mkaysi.github.com/ Comment: gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net --recv-keys 82A46728 Comment: Public key: http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/key.txt Comment: Fingerprint = 24BC 1573 B8EE D666 D10A AA65 4DB5 3CFE 82A4 6728 Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJP3GYRAAoJEE21PP6CpGcoRQkQAKBYIJaW9xAF44+5HSF+4EGG imSH8V6l2eNZoKiN37hDkmkE4bF48wIUoHy8r2gmURTl4OSC9QX6TZo4e8aV8k7q gSVbtKIT+Sm2fRCgKb+ITOBIgWzVyXSMEQ68Xbta7gb2uB/W7Vfgl27KGuYB5zv2 vog0yK2n0K1eltZmHaXGGtMxjVGiqeW04UJBi9Zga3RKkRR+hBGfMQ4dX4wZj+gQ I5SzVE6DUBe72//ydMqqBWE42Ckw+8BDR7h6hDvYkxdG/uBRVgaVXFjYndakYMx0 BQPWJTUpG80I4Wf3yIZDPLvq6O/Ttf6J0VtsLk0MsIs8GgawOvFclWl1yzUsRLGc PNSBys6YBeSw5vtVNHl8GxGBUtQh4Ge+8tKwwi/UQzPrdQO8Ualf3/LATuPvx1Ut jAlru5RCOvqQPTXJ7ZOI0jB/086UrhRnwC/Vedu28bSyYbQMQzo2+ioICAJnBDNa PY4yFObVYKyOnUPl21GefkOO8aoaoCENdQtThSgAL5pHcNVmnfZaXuBraXYDDedK WjgYd2N9+2Jvko435ueG0znsT/oe5j/6xGy6j8XfJ62VddkHvhOYbJmFnSwhQXyv tw3QQ/PT2qX5nbi4cpKBCmhMrCsmTYcDc9vnaDKn6tcwGBL9yoGz07tKEBCz84RZ kdw9Das3jB6MW5SM4l/u =fktj -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From aaron.toponce at gmail.com Sat Jun 16 16:15:05 2012 From: aaron.toponce at gmail.com (Aaron Toponce) Date: Sat, 16 Jun 2012 08:15:05 -0600 Subject: GPG with GPUs Message-ID: <20120616141504.GP16689@eightyeight.xmission.com> I'm curious what progress, if any, has been made towards supporting GPUs for encryption, decryption, signatures and verifications. I recently just purchased two Zotac 32-bit PCI cards with 96 CUDA cores (I'm out of PCIe slots) for the sole purpose of GPGPU research and sandboxing. We use GPG at work for internal passwords. There are 3 XML files based on the role that they employee fills at work (techs, domains, admins). With about 50 exmployees' GPG keys, encrypting the 3 files is a bit daunting. It takes a few seconds to complete. Not too terribly inconvenient, and it's fully automated, but enough to be annoying when the XML files get updated a lot. There are other purposes I use GPG for, where the work that needs to be done takes long enough to notice, such as signing 100 keys after a key signing party, or generating a new throw-away symmetric key. Anyway, just curious if offloading the work to the GPU is something that is being considered, or has already been discussed. Thanks, -- . o . o . o . . o o . . . o . . . o . o o o . o . o o . . o o o o . o . . o o o o . o o o -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 519 bytes Desc: not available URL: From mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de Sat Jun 16 19:54:46 2012 From: mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de (Hauke Laging) Date: Sat, 16 Jun 2012 19:54:46 +0200 Subject: GPG with GPUs In-Reply-To: <20120616141504.GP16689@eightyeight.xmission.com> References: <20120616141504.GP16689@eightyeight.xmission.com> Message-ID: <3731197.1K8LFmhrWC@inno> Am Sa 16.06.2012, 08:15:05 schrieb Aaron Toponce: > We use GPG at work for internal passwords. There are 3 XML files based on > the role that they employee fills at work (techs, domains, admins). With > about 50 exmployees' GPG keys, encrypting the 3 files is a bit daunting. It > takes a few seconds to complete. Not too terribly inconvenient, and it's > fully automated, but enough to be annoying when the XML files get updated a > lot. Are these files huge? It's hard for me to believe that this takes seconds. What I would easily believe is that the system gets an entropy problem. The delay would not be related to CPU performance then. So maybe a hardware RNG improves your situation. > There are other purposes I use GPG for, where the work that needs to be > done takes long enough to notice, such as signing 100 keys after a key > signing party, or generating a new throw-away symmetric key. > > Anyway, just curious if offloading the work to the GPU is something that is > being considered, or has already been discussed. This reminds me of something I never dared mention of this list because obviously certain people may freak out... If the same file is quite often encrypted, decrypted, encrypted again one might question the value of generating new session keys every time. I would really like a feature like --override-session-key but not for decryption but encryption. OK, this alone would not solve your performance problem. Additionally it would be required that the session key packet could be reused. This raises the question whether it is possible to create just the encrypted data packet (without the pubkey enc packet). This is not possible by gpg I guess but perhaps by gpgme. Shouldn't be hard to add an option which does this to gpg as no new operation is required but just the leaving out of one. If you get the data part created you can combine it with the old pubkey enc packet. Symmetric encryption can easily be optimized for such hardware but considering how many MiB per second you get through a simple CPU based hard disk encryption I really doubt that this may be a bottleneck. So you would save the time waiting for entropy and the time of the asymmetric encryption. This would leave optimization potential for the signing process (if you sign the files). Hauke -- PGP: D44C 6A5B 71B0 427C CED3 025C BD7D 6D27 ECCB 5814 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 555 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Sat Jun 16 21:44:04 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Sat, 16 Jun 2012 15:44:04 -0400 Subject: GPG with GPUs In-Reply-To: <3731197.1K8LFmhrWC@inno> References: <20120616141504.GP16689@eightyeight.xmission.com> <3731197.1K8LFmhrWC@inno> Message-ID: <4FDCE204.7090108@sixdemonbag.org> On 06/16/2012 01:54 PM, Hauke Laging wrote: > Are these files huge? It's hard for me to believe that this takes > seconds. What I would easily believe is that the system gets an > entropy problem... So maybe a hardware RNG improves your situation. Be careful about saying this without learning what OS and hardware the other fellow is running on. On Windows, for instance, RNGs are provided by ADVAPI32!RtlGenRandom. (For those who think it should of course be ADVAPI32!CryptGenRandom, well, rest easy, ADVAPI32!CryptGenRandom calls ADVAPI32!RtlGenRandom to do its heavy lifting.) This is, per MSDN, a PRNG. He's not hitting an entropy problem with that. On Linux, the default implementation uses /dev/random, which may potentially run into an entropy problem, and your advice to invest in a hardware RNG might make sense... unless he's running on an Ivy Bridge or later, in which case it already has a hardware RNG built in. From papillion at gmail.com Sat Jun 16 22:06:53 2012 From: papillion at gmail.com (Anthony Papillion) Date: Sat, 16 Jun 2012 15:06:53 -0500 Subject: Is the git repo down? Message-ID: <4FDCE75D.6040702@gmail.com> Hey Everyone, Just tried to fetch the source using git clone git://git.gnupg.org/gnupg.git and my connection was refused. Is the server down? Thanks! Anthony From papillion at gmail.com Sat Jun 16 22:42:31 2012 From: papillion at gmail.com (Anthony Papillion) Date: Sat, 16 Jun 2012 15:42:31 -0500 Subject: Stumped and need some help with agent Message-ID: <4FDCEFB7.4090409@gmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Hello Everyone, I'm having a devil of a time with Ubuntu 11.04 with GnuPG and need a bit of help. This MIGHT be a problem with the Enigmail plugin but I think it's probably something to do with my GnuPG configuration so I'm asking here first. Basically, I have GPG 1.4.11 installed. For some reason, I also have the binary for gpg2 at /usr/bin/gpg2. However, my Enigmail is picking up /usr/bin/gpg so all should be fine (I think). For some reason, every time I do anything to an encrypted message, I have to re-enter my passphrase. If I open a message, I enter my passphrase, then, when I reply to it, I have to enter it again. And to send that reply? Yep, enter it again! Obviously, something is amiss. Can anyone lend me a hand and help me figure this out? I've even gone as far as to rename the gpg2 binary so it couldn't be found by the system, renamed the gpa.conf file (just in case) and added the "no-use-agent" entry to my gpg.conf file with no result. Help?!? Please! Anthony -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJP3O+yAAoJEE8yDBL3zdVpbT4QAKEC7YGvBbv1s5flFc4qMlXx 4a9RG6cmHNf6P03xBRTwJxo98+RgxIxRSF+62NPRf2X8SPlzKKMgyW++lUX3Qijf aC+zsUANLioAxHlEkcixtepCjFQQGGW9PJwHEEu0AVjY819gvywBVz37CKIQ+VWj PbfjM/0LkVvwLTGRQnJ3v11LIjNBGpiR0Df+47pxp9nvpfl0xKimfqfSe7TwHddx kKWGyUPMCkpHuLXIRycbH637LLe+CV/GwsRxGd2xZUvhSouDPXN30wKsBOyAffeO VxJjoy5EE8JcUflWbJOLhTVZYUCY+gzCmosYugYi0tDgqmLRSVNqUCrL29ltJWnb oZGsffYLincRlY0jwWc4DLCj4Tg8zAmZmtiC1JYqDUAPxVuKaoWX1OV5u3ySmPNo 8Of/UKr4jT9SluHaEVlZP2QaItzxQX4t0/9w8vxmQqaxtaR+D9UqhuVIJd5eaCee t10YLE2Tlus6MYh1IScLpgorKT2TZOa+hmugJ3KlsTLSY/vjDuwdXRxXlqo/RP49 /FXKyMwcx1aHR0xowiKHu1VJpNG+NmyUkK1Gwux185QMyUgmfr0dajfGjZWhin1g MBLZXZB7SPu5zfG4InIJAUE92hb/vsKe9g58bKBc7Tx2N9/+W6aNiNf0uXrq4nsz 7IRG8xa+3NiunLwwox6a =7/5c -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Sat Jun 16 23:32:36 2012 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Sat, 16 Jun 2012 17:32:36 -0400 Subject: RFE: --update-before-use In-Reply-To: <4FDB63F7.1070402@tx.rr.com> References: <4FDA2403.3070606@sixdemonbag.org> <4FDA4AE2.7090206@sixdemonbag.org> <98FE9A87-3FB8-441B-9803-7909A25CF1BA@jabberwocky.com> <4FDB63F7.1070402@tx.rr.com> Message-ID: On Jun 15, 2012, at 12:33 PM, John Clizbe wrote: >> It's a similar problem in type as auto-key-retrieve or auto-key-locate, but >> it's a different problem in degree: both AKR and AKL fire only as needed >> (either when a key is needed for sig verification, or when a key is needed >> to encrypt to). That's a single fetch for the life of the key (you might >> fetch it more via other means, but AKR and AKL (barring special >> configuration) will never fetch a key you already have). Fetching the key >> on each usage means it leaks each time you use the key. Plus remember that >> by default, GPG honors keyserver URLs on the key, which if combined with >> this new feature enables IP-address tracking of a person encrypting to a >> particular key (it's the same web-bug trick as AKR, but with encryption). > > Another good reason to use one of the round-robin pool addresses rather than a > single keyserver. I have to go back and check but I believe that that level > of logging is a 5. SKS defaults to 4 and most operators never change it. Only > we crazy developers go for logging that detailed Yes, I understand that spreading out keyserver requests can help avoid this sort of tracking, but remember that the keyserver URL feature allows the keyholder to bypass the keyserver chosen by the user, and send the requests anywhere they like. I don't care how the keyserver round-robins are run if I can get a target GPG to not use them. To really combat tracking, you need to route your keyserver requests through TOR or something similar. David From david at gbenet.com Sun Jun 17 00:37:06 2012 From: david at gbenet.com (david at gbenet.com) Date: Sat, 16 Jun 2012 23:37:06 +0100 Subject: Stumped and need some help with agent In-Reply-To: <4FDCEFB7.4090409@gmail.com> References: <4FDCEFB7.4090409@gmail.com> Message-ID: <4FDD0A92.1090708@gbenet.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 16/06/12 21:42, Anthony Papillion wrote: > Hello Everyone, > > I'm having a devil of a time with Ubuntu 11.04 with GnuPG and need a bit > of help. This MIGHT be a problem with the Enigmail plugin but I think > it's probably something to do with my GnuPG configuration so I'm asking > here first. > > Basically, I have GPG 1.4.11 installed. For some reason, I also have the > binary for gpg2 at /usr/bin/gpg2. However, my Enigmail is picking up > /usr/bin/gpg so all should be fine (I think). > > For some reason, every time I do anything to an encrypted message, I > have to re-enter my passphrase. If I open a message, I enter my > passphrase, then, when I reply to it, I have to enter it again. And to > send that reply? Yep, enter it again! > > Obviously, something is amiss. > > Can anyone lend me a hand and help me figure this out? I've even gone > as far as to rename the gpg2 binary so it couldn't be found by the > system, renamed the gpa.conf file (just in case) and added the > "no-use-agent" entry to my gpg.conf file with no result. > > Help?!? Please! > > Anthony > > > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users > Hello Anthony, In your .gnupg directory you want to edit the file (or create one) gpg-agent.conf and add the lines default-cache-ttl 9000 default-cache-ttl-ssh 1800 You can install the programme GPA and it will under preferences edit it for you. If I recall Ubuntu does not have it so go to ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/gpa// download gpa - you have to ./configure - make - make install. Also make sure gpg-agent's running. David - -- https://linuxcounter.net/user/512854.html - http://gbenet.com/blog - cryptology - for books how-to's - mailing lists and more -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJP3QqEAAoJEOJpqm7flRExAFEH+wTSqxeM9z4+yxKHJ55dszfZ f3lBLSZaae1U0Ij21TY4pAa1kEW9y0bSMZwcAwFijmmj2ACiK26+jDinA9A/9zO7 I5XOCLyzyaCKSL73CEh/zoySII/u5KBHJbCA8lDY2dmbRBCYbXwYwj59D6cnmPDW 6/le/wy/mQrweymo63sSDLQ6HrhdcOhYMDp6hHCZNYbc2w6tCtSh00KI99WvVk7l ZC6sDm/x3PAZL7EeRR7i+78xrMzGCBQHjoSIOfzHaYsrdaMJPEVOtJrUZScu3ojQ iLAg8Oi4UynznDJJxzBZ/mDtcJyR+FlRtF4TGSSDL5/x2A7ZUggc0nsY3b9SQwE= =YD/g -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From papillion at gmail.com Sun Jun 17 01:04:33 2012 From: papillion at gmail.com (Anthony Papillion) Date: Sat, 16 Jun 2012 18:04:33 -0500 Subject: Stumped and need some help with agent In-Reply-To: <4FDD0A92.1090708@gbenet.com> References: <4FDCEFB7.4090409@gmail.com> <4FDD0A92.1090708@gbenet.com> Message-ID: <4FDD1101.8060405@gmail.com> On 06/16/2012 05:37 PM, david at gbenet.com wrote: > On 16/06/12 21:42, Anthony Papillion wrote: >> Hello Everyone, >> >> Can anyone lend me a hand and help me figure this out? I've even >> gone as far as to rename the gpg2 binary so it couldn't be found >> by the system, renamed the gpa.conf file (just in case) and >> added the "no-use-agent" entry to my gpg.conf file with no >> result. > > Hello Anthony, > > In your .gnupg directory you want to edit the file (or create one) > gpg-agent.conf and add the lines default-cache-ttl 9000 > default-cache-ttl-ssh 1800 > > You can install the programme GPA and it will under preferences > edit it for you. If I recall Ubuntu does not have it so go to > ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/gpa// download gpa - you have to > ./configure - make - make install. Also make sure gpg-agent's > running. Hi David, Thank you for the help! So I went ahead and I downloaded gpa (thankfully, I didn't need to compile it. It was in my distro's repository) and installed it. I made the changes to the .conf file as suggested. When I typed 'which gpg-agent' to make sure I had agent installed it told me it was in /usr/bin/gpg-agent. When I executed it, I get the message 'gpg-agent is installed and running'. Everything looks fine. Then... When I look in my process list, I don't see gpg-agent. And when I go to Thunderbird and try to access encrypted messages, I still get Enigmail's passphrase manager instead of pinentry. Note that I've told Enigmail to use gpg-agent instead of its own manager but that makes no difference. The problem of having to enter my passphrase at every step continues. Does this look more like a problem with Enigmail than GnuPG? Understand, I am not using GPG2 but rather 1.4.11. However, it looks like I have gpg2 installed (/usr/bin/gpg2). Any other suggestions? Thanks, Anthony From lists at michel-messerschmidt.de Sun Jun 17 13:36:00 2012 From: lists at michel-messerschmidt.de (Michel Messerschmidt) Date: Sun, 17 Jun 2012 13:36:00 +0200 Subject: RFE: --update-before-use In-Reply-To: References: <4FDA2403.3070606@sixdemonbag.org> <4FDA4AE2.7090206@sixdemonbag.org> <98FE9A87-3FB8-441B-9803-7909A25CF1BA@jabberwocky.com> <4FDB63F7.1070402@tx.rr.com> Message-ID: <20120617113600.GA5389@ryu.matrix> On Sat, Jun 16, 2012 at 05:32:36PM -0400, David Shaw wrote: > Yes, I understand that spreading out keyserver requests can help avoid this sort of tracking, but remember that the keyserver URL feature allows the keyholder to bypass the keyserver chosen by the user, and send the requests anywhere they like. I don't care how the keyserver round-robins are run if I can get a target GPG to not use them. > > To really combat tracking, you need to route your keyserver requests through TOR or something similar. Even that addresses not all issues. The target keyserver still receives a connection whenever the public key is used by someone. A keyholder may set the keyserver URL to a server under his control to monitor the usa of its public key. If that is a good or bad idea certainly depends on your point of view. But is does not seem to be a wise default configuration in my mind. If such an "automatic update" is added, I'd like to have an additional option to define the maximum update interval. This allows everybody to define his own tradeoff. With a default value of for example 24 hours, public keys are still kept fairly up to date while frequent key usage will not trigger a keyserver request for most crypto operations. Michel -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 490 bytes Desc: Digital signature URL: From wk at gnupg.org Sun Jun 17 14:04:03 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Sun, 17 Jun 2012 14:04:03 +0200 Subject: Is the git repo down? In-Reply-To: <4FDCE75D.6040702@gmail.com> (Anthony Papillion's message of "Sat, 16 Jun 2012 15:06:53 -0500") References: <4FDCE75D.6040702@gmail.com> Message-ID: <87mx42rvpo.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Sat, 16 Jun 2012 22:06, papillion at gmail.com said: > git clone git://git.gnupg.org/gnupg.git > Is the server down? No. I had to restart the server for maintenance reasons and forgot to check the git daemon. Sorry. For unknown reason it was not in the runlevel.conf. Started git-daemon and fixed the latter too. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From wk at gnupg.org Sun Jun 17 14:10:47 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Sun, 17 Jun 2012 14:10:47 +0200 Subject: Stumped and need some help with agent In-Reply-To: <4FDCEFB7.4090409@gmail.com> (Anthony Papillion's message of "Sat, 16 Jun 2012 15:42:31 -0500") References: <4FDCEFB7.4090409@gmail.com> Message-ID: <87ipeqrveg.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Sat, 16 Jun 2012 22:42, papillion at gmail.com said: > For some reason, every time I do anything to an encrypted message, I > have to re-enter my passphrase. If I open a message, I enter my > passphrase, then, when I reply to it, I have to enter it again. And to > send that reply? Yep, enter it again! Your gpg-agent is not installed properly. man gpg-agent to see how it is to be started. If there is no gpg-agent it will only be started as needed and then can't act as a passphrase cache. Ubuntu should have handled this for you. We will change gpg-agent in the next version to automagically start itself as a daemon on the first access - this allow to use gpg-agent without any additional system setup. > system, renamed the gpa.conf file (just in case) and added the > "no-use-agent" entry to my gpg.conf file with no result. gpg2 ignores this option because gpg-agent is a required part of the GnuPG-2 system. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From smickson at hotmail.com Sun Jun 17 15:16:46 2012 From: smickson at hotmail.com (Sam Smith) Date: Sun, 17 Jun 2012 09:16:46 -0400 Subject: way to see what cipher/algo was used to create your key? Message-ID: I see that --edit-key > pref lists out preferences. I'm assuming the first S is default cipher, first H is default algo, etc? so if a key is generated it will use the first S, first H, etc. But why are all those other S and H options listed? when would they ever be used to create keys? Lastly, if you created your key some time ago (on a different machine) and don't know what the default cipher/hash was at the time, is there a way to find out what cipher and hash was used in the creation of your key? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From aaron.toponce at gmail.com Sun Jun 17 16:04:09 2012 From: aaron.toponce at gmail.com (Aaron Toponce) Date: Sun, 17 Jun 2012 08:04:09 -0600 Subject: GPG with GPUs In-Reply-To: <3731197.1K8LFmhrWC@inno> References: <20120616141504.GP16689@eightyeight.xmission.com> <3731197.1K8LFmhrWC@inno> Message-ID: <20120617140407.GA12150@eightyeight.xmission.com> On Sat, Jun 16, 2012 at 07:54:46PM +0200, Hauke Laging wrote: > Are these files huge? It's hard for me to believe that this takes seconds. > What I would easily believe is that the system gets an entropy problem. The > delay would not be related to CPU performance then. So maybe a hardware RNG > improves your situation. These files are about 200KB in size. We have a Perl script that handles the encryption/decryption for us. It could be the RNG slowing the process down. I won't disagree with that, but each time I need to encrypt the file, it takes about 2s. This is on fairly modern hardware running Debian GNU/Linux unstable. Intel Xeon quad-core with 6 GB DDR3 RAM. Regardless, I would love to research and play with cryptogprahpy on GPUs, so I'm curious what progress GnuPG has made in this area, if any. Things like ECB mode or parallel stream ciphers. Thanks, -- . o . o . o . . o o . . . o . . . o . o o o . o . o o . . o o o o . o . . o o o o . o o o -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 519 bytes Desc: not available URL: From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Sun Jun 17 17:47:24 2012 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Sun, 17 Jun 2012 11:47:24 -0400 Subject: way to see what cipher/algo was used to create your key? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <787CD327-E9B5-4016-9BD6-D3CFADCD5269@jabberwocky.com> On Jun 17, 2012, at 9:16 AM, Sam Smith wrote: > I see that --edit-key > pref lists out preferences. I'm assuming the first S is default cipher, first H is default algo, etc? so if a key is generated it will use the first S, first H, etc. But why are all those other S and H options listed? when would they ever be used to create keys? > > Lastly, if you created your key some time ago (on a different machine) and don't know what the default cipher/hash was at the time, is there a way to find out what cipher and hash was used in the creation of your key? --edit-key -> pref shows you the preferences on that specific key (try using "showpref" instead for a more user friendly display). It does not show what what ciphers are chosen for generating a new key. You can change the preferences whenever you like via --edit-key -> setpref OpenPGP doesn't really have the notion of a default cipher (or other preference). Rather, it has lists, ranked in order of preference, for ciphers, hashes, and compression algorithms. These do double duty, in that they tell someone encrypting to your key both what algorithms you can handle (i.e. if your implementation couldn't handle CAST5, it wouldn't be on your list at all), and also which algorithms you prefer to use (i.e. if you like AES more than CAST5, you'd list AES before CAST5 in the list). Here's how it works - when encrypting to a bunch of keys, GPG needs to send a message that is usable by all recipients (as what's the point of sending a message to someone that they can't read?). To do this, it has to find a set of algorithms (cipher, compression, etc) that every recipient can handle. The method is simple: read everyone's preference lists, and find the intersection of the preferences. This intersection is a list of algorithms that every recipient can handle. Pick an algorithm from this list, and you are safe that no recipient won't be able to read the message. To deal with the case where there is no intersection (say, Alice put CAST5 and AES in her list, and Baker put TWOFISH and BLOWFISH in his list), the standard requires that all cipher lists have 3DES in them somewhere, all hash lists have SHA-1 in there somewhere, and all compression lists have "uncompressed" in there somewhere. If the user doesn't explicitly put it in, it is assumed to be there at the end of the list. This guarantees that there will aways be at least one algorithm in the intersection (and also requires all OpenPGP programs to implement these algorithms). Methods vary in how to pick an algorithm from the list - all the standard requires is that it comes from the list at all. GPG actually ranks each algorithm so that more "votes" for that algorithm can increase the chance of it being chosen, but it is equally correct (though perhaps not particularly friendly) for an implementation to always pick 3DES, for example. David From smickson at hotmail.com Sun Jun 17 17:56:57 2012 From: smickson at hotmail.com (Sam Smith) Date: Sun, 17 Jun 2012 11:56:57 -0400 Subject: why is CAST5 used instead of AES for seckey encryption? Message-ID: Curious as to why the encryption standard AES is not used to encrypt secret keys for GPG? It appears users have the option to use AES for sec key encryption, but it's not default. Do people generally change the cipher to AES when generating their secret key? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Sun Jun 17 19:02:11 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Sun, 17 Jun 2012 13:02:11 -0400 Subject: why is CAST5 used instead of AES for seckey encryption? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <4FDE0D93.7060202@sixdemonbag.org> On 06/17/2012 11:56 AM, Sam Smith wrote: > Curious as to why the encryption standard AES is not used to encrypt > secret keys for GPG? Because GnuPG predates AES. When GnuPG 1.0 came out AES has yet to be invented. CAST5-128 was the choice back then, and nobody's changed it yet -- at least partially because it doesn't need to be changed: there are no known attacks on CAST5-128. > Do people generally change the cipher to AES when generating their > secret key? This is impossible to answer definitively, because nobody has a perspective on what the whole of the GnuPG community is doing with our gpg.conf files. That said, I think you will find only a minority of users do this. I don't, and I've never heard any of my correspondents say that they do. From mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de Sun Jun 17 19:26:27 2012 From: mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de (Hauke Laging) Date: Sun, 17 Jun 2012 19:26:27 +0200 Subject: GPG with GPUs In-Reply-To: <20120617140407.GA12150@eightyeight.xmission.com> References: <20120616141504.GP16689@eightyeight.xmission.com> <3731197.1K8LFmhrWC@inno> <20120617140407.GA12150@eightyeight.xmission.com> Message-ID: <4398582.8s5FS7KSWn@inno> Am So 17.06.2012, 08:04:09 schrieb Aaron Toponce: > These files are about 200KB in size. We have a Perl script that handles the > encryption/decryption for us. It could be the RNG slowing the process down. > I won't disagree with that, but each time I need to encrypt the file, it > takes about 2s. This is on fairly modern hardware running Debian GNU/Linux > unstable. Intel Xeon quad-core with 6 GB DDR3 RAM. start cmd:> time gpg --encrypt --sign 200k-file Sie ben?tigen eine Passphrase, um den geheimen Schl?ssel zu entsperren. Benutzer: "Hauke Laging " 2048-Bit RSA Schl?ssel, ID 0x3A403251, erzeugt 2010-03-04 (Hauptschl?ssel-ID 0xECCB5814) real 0m0.143s user 0m0.086s sys 0m0.008s start cmd:> time gpg --encrypt 200k-file real 0m0.024s user 0m0.013s sys 0m0.005s This are the result (with a caches passphrase, of course). It's the same for a zeros file and a urandom file. And this is on a power efficient CPU... (E-450, which I guess doesn't have AES acceleration) probably without parallelization. So there's obviously a serious problem with your setup. A problem slowing the process down two to three orders of magnitude which will hardly be solved by adding a GPU. Hauke -- PGP: D44C 6A5B 71B0 427C CED3 025C BD7D 6D27 ECCB 5814 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 555 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From peter at digitalbrains.com Sun Jun 17 20:50:15 2012 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Sun, 17 Jun 2012 20:50:15 +0200 Subject: GPG with GPUs In-Reply-To: <4398582.8s5FS7KSWn@inno> References: <20120616141504.GP16689@eightyeight.xmission.com> <3731197.1K8LFmhrWC@inno> <20120617140407.GA12150@eightyeight.xmission.com> <4398582.8s5FS7KSWn@inno> Message-ID: <4FDE26E7.2040307@digitalbrains.com> On 17/06/12 19:26, Hauke Laging wrote: > start cmd:> time gpg --encrypt --sign 200k-file > > Sie ben?tigen eine Passphrase, um den geheimen Schl?ssel zu entsperren. > Benutzer: "Hauke Laging " > 2048-Bit RSA Schl?ssel, ID 0x3A403251, erzeugt 2010-03-04 (Hauptschl?ssel-ID > 0xECCB5814) > > > real 0m0.143s > user 0m0.086s > sys 0m0.008s The OP said he encrypted to about 50 recipients. With such a small file, the asymmetric operation will be way more significant in the total time than if the file were much larger. You seem to be encrypting to only one recipient (you have a default-recipient?), so the comparison is way off. Furthermore, you'll need to establish the key size and asym cipher used for the recipients before you can do a fair comparison. Because a tin-foil hat RSA 16k key will be a bit more intensive than a 1k DSA key ;). Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at http://wwwhome.cs.utwente.nl/~lebbing/pubkey.txt From kf at sumptuouscapital.com Sun Jun 17 21:10:14 2012 From: kf at sumptuouscapital.com (Kristian Fiskerstrand) Date: Sun, 17 Jun 2012 21:10:14 +0200 Subject: GPG with GPUs In-Reply-To: <4FDE26E7.2040307__46591.8946000331$1339959094$gmane$org@digitalbrains.com> References: <20120616141504.GP16689@eightyeight.xmission.com> <3731197.1K8LFmhrWC@inno> <20120617140407.GA12150@eightyeight.xmission.com> <4398582.8s5FS7KSWn@inno> <4FDE26E7.2040307__46591.8946000331$1339959094$gmane$org@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 On 2012-06-17 20:50, Peter Lebbing wrote: > On 17/06/12 19:26, Hauke Laging wrote: >> start cmd:> time gpg --encrypt --sign 200k-file >> >> Sie ben?tigen eine Passphrase, um den geheimen Schl?ssel zu >> entsperren. Benutzer: "Hauke Laging " 2048-Bit >> RSA Schl?ssel, ID 0x3A403251, erzeugt 2010-03-04 >> (Hauptschl?ssel-ID 0xECCB5814) >> >> >> real 0m0.143s user 0m0.086s sys 0m0.008s > > The OP said he encrypted to about 50 recipients. With such a small > file, the asymmetric operation will be way more significant in the > total time than if the file were much larger. You seem to be > encrypting to only one recipient (you have a default-recipient?), > so the comparison is way off. > > Furthermore, you'll need to establish the key size and asym cipher > used for the recipients before you can do a fair comparison. > Because a tin-foil hat RSA 16k key will be a bit more intensive > than a 1k DSA key ;). > Indeed, the number of recipients and their key parameters will be significant for the time to encrypt. Somewhat off-topic, but to provide a measurement for an encryption and signing using a tin-foil hat key of 15360 bit key, since I for various reasons keep one around in the first place, and don't really get to use it too often; On my email VM, which has 4 cores and 4 GB of RAM, the measurements are as follows: kristianf at ubuntu:~$ dd if=/dev/urandom bs=1024 count=200 > 200kfile kristianf at ubuntu:~$ time gpg2 -aser 43E67CF7 200kfile real 0m2.321s user 0m2.310s sys 0m0.000s where: kristianf at ubuntu:~$ gpg --list-key 43e67cf7 pub 15360R/43E67CF7 2006-12-15 uid Kristian Fiskerstrand uid Kristian Fiskerstrand (Large key) sub 15360g/7CC80A28 2006-12-18 - -- - ---------------------------- Kristian Fiskerstrand http://www.sumptuouscapital.com Twitter: @krifisk - ---------------------------- Corruptissima re publica plurim? leges The greater the degeneration of the republic, the more of its laws - ---------------------------- This email was digitally signed using the OpenPGP standard. If you want to read more about this The book: Sending Emails - The Safe Way: An introduction to OpenPGP security is now available in both Amazon Kindle and Paperback format at http://www.amazon.com/dp/B006RSG1S4/ - ---------------------------- Public PGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at http://www.sumptuouscapital.com/pgp/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.19 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQIcBAEBCAAGBQJP3iuVAAoJEBbgz41rC5UIATMQAIaMb3wVxAvjuCDPV/v3LXXS Ql7J/w9M0m8ngq4CdU84t2g+6PhENHfL0yvq5xNJwgVAtCHWd1oGtD+WRQx4w9hH 7xsvuQUPTRDL/UTUatNZECYIWFSAj0jzihimBlSJNfaLqWd34RkAgYPzy4vm5pKR acXVvGCrUH3DFfPKo4/ITV/nIiAT6pawvQZBd1qHRSpWp1fzg6TwDnnEapnHva6Z v0/5Z5aaHlxoVsMnb9EnA1DqBTWhGRRMn6L5v/95aIK18C5oYwtawBDLzXF+xpIW iQgwTHkjdXa9z/dEWlzOjSfKG3jlSAFiNDizKLhgFrD0TPrxuuyYgGWPIvNh16tG GlpxeHoiJ0ot0KARXFu1IwTYOG0usxUBDwVW45amwViUkAwVqQTu/ND/Nq1xxUst rZW3zgO56/F2KJ94gMsqverSs24JlagnDnipuUHKb7JDE39FbkLQ8nAHYCw29JZs /Wux1lHgJqKsCRdqNECzZFCcbr8YMiv/bxPi+2xHBJxadrFHhYyiPrxw6ilUfOCN hx/81j46m0VVwfaEl/ZgbGZJeGku3X6YWlPqrlOXzdgnvvD6MnIHMp8fnChMf6qd C/lF9u+EVJqGvLetI6IHEdGqDwrSgvFPgmLZyTs1zpdoQj4raFWKnPb2dVI39V8w 2eUVuSQyRfBJx3IMLev6 =Gfdf -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From smickson at hotmail.com Sun Jun 17 22:13:52 2012 From: smickson at hotmail.com (Sam Smith) Date: Sun, 17 Jun 2012 16:13:52 -0400 Subject: what key-bit length is the TWOFISH cipher in GnuPG? Message-ID: Doesn't the IETF openPGP standard call for 256-bit key for TWOFISH? Could someone verify that the TWOFISH cipher uses 256-bit key length in GnuPG? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Sun Jun 17 22:18:04 2012 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Sun, 17 Jun 2012 16:18:04 -0400 Subject: RFE: --update-before-use In-Reply-To: <20120617113600.GA5389@ryu.matrix> References: <4FDA2403.3070606@sixdemonbag.org> <4FDA4AE2.7090206@sixdemonbag.org> <98FE9A87-3FB8-441B-9803-7909A25CF1BA@jabberwocky.com> <4FDB63F7.1070402@tx.rr.com> <20120617113600.GA5389@ryu.matrix> Message-ID: <51E001E8-A42D-42F9-BE1D-4A544C665ECF@jabberwocky.com> On Jun 17, 2012, at 7:36 AM, Michel Messerschmidt wrote: > On Sat, Jun 16, 2012 at 05:32:36PM -0400, David Shaw wrote: >> Yes, I understand that spreading out keyserver requests can help avoid this sort of tracking, but remember that the keyserver URL feature allows the keyholder to bypass the keyserver chosen by the user, and send the requests anywhere they like. I don't care how the keyserver round-robins are run if I can get a target GPG to not use them. >> >> To really combat tracking, you need to route your keyserver requests through TOR or something similar. > > Even that addresses not all issues. > The target keyserver still receives a connection whenever the public > key is used by someone. A keyholder may set the keyserver URL to a > server under his control to monitor the usa of its public key. Yes, hence the suggestion to route keyserver requests through TOR. Then the keyholder knows that someone is requesting his key (and can probably make a fairly good guess matching the request up to a given encrypted message if there are a small number of requests and after each request he gets an encrypted message), but does not know the real IP of the person making the request. > If that is a good or bad idea certainly depends on your point of view. > But is does not seem to be a wise default configuration in my mind. It's the default because without it, the person encrypting to the key may not know that the key has been compromised and should not be used. If someone does not keep their key on the keyserver network, without a keyserver URL there is no (in band) way for people to know where to get updates from. Users of course have the ability to turn it off: keyserver-options no-honor-keyserver-url But then of course, the user is responsible for finding updates themselves. > If such an "automatic update" is added, I'd like to have an additional > option to define the maximum update interval. This allows everybody to > define his own tradeoff. With a default value of for example 24 hours, > public keys are still kept fairly up to date while frequent key usage > will not trigger a keyserver request for most crypto operations. Yes. I suggested this as well - a "update on each use, but no more often than once a day/week/etc". It cuts down on the leakage. David From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Sun Jun 17 23:06:00 2012 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Sun, 17 Jun 2012 17:06:00 -0400 Subject: what key-bit length is the TWOFISH cipher in GnuPG? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Jun 17, 2012, at 4:13 PM, Sam Smith wrote: > Doesn't the IETF openPGP standard call for 256-bit key for TWOFISH? > > Could someone verify that the TWOFISH cipher uses 256-bit key length in GnuPG? Yes. See section 9.2 of RFC-4880 for confirmation. David From papillion at gmail.com Mon Jun 18 02:43:32 2012 From: papillion at gmail.com (Anthony Papillion) Date: Sun, 17 Jun 2012 19:43:32 -0500 Subject: Stumped and need some help with agent In-Reply-To: <87ipeqrveg.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <4FDCEFB7.4090409@gmail.com> <87ipeqrveg.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <4FDE79B4.70901@gmail.com> On 6/17/2012 7:10 AM, Werner Koch wrote: > On Sat, 16 Jun 2012 22:42, papillion at gmail.com said: > >> For some reason, every time I do anything to an encrypted message, I >> have to re-enter my passphrase. If I open a message, I enter my >> passphrase, then, when I reply to it, I have to enter it again. And to >> send that reply? Yep, enter it again! > > Your gpg-agent is not installed properly. man gpg-agent to see how it > is to be started. If there is no gpg-agent it will only be started as > needed and then can't act as a passphrase cache. Ubuntu should have > handled this for you. Wait...you expect me to read the man page? What kind of barbarian are you, anyway?!? lol Just kidding. For some reason, with all my troubleshooting, I never even considered reading the man page. I'll do that and see what I can find. Thank you for the help! > We will change gpg-agent in the next version to automagically start > itself as a daemon on the first access - this allow to use gpg-agent > without any additional system setup. Sounds good. I assume the way it's started now is on an 'as needed' basis? >> system, renamed the gpa.conf file (just in case) and added the >> "no-use-agent" entry to my gpg.conf file with no result. > > gpg2 ignores this option because gpg-agent is a required part of the > GnuPG-2 system. I figured that out while going through some of the posts relating to gpg-agent. Is this a permanent change? I know pinentry is supposed to be a safer way to enter passphrases so I'm assuming that the mandatory use of gpg-agent will continue on into future versions? Let me ask this: are there any major security implications (aside from sacrificing the security of pinentry) to hacking gpg2 to not use agent? I'm not considering doing this as I don't see a real need but I'm curious. Thanks! Anthony From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Mon Jun 18 05:31:40 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Sun, 17 Jun 2012 23:31:40 -0400 Subject: GPG with GPUs In-Reply-To: <4398582.8s5FS7KSWn@inno> References: <20120616141504.GP16689@eightyeight.xmission.com> <3731197.1K8LFmhrWC@inno> <20120617140407.GA12150@eightyeight.xmission.com> <4398582.8s5FS7KSWn@inno> Message-ID: <4FDEA11C.2060605@sixdemonbag.org> On 06/17/2012 01:26 PM, Hauke Laging wrote: > start cmd:> time gpg --encrypt --sign 200k-file Unless you're testing with 50 certificates, this isn't exactly a fair comparison. Here's what I came up with: System: Intel i7-2600K @ 3.4GHz, 32Gb RAM Methodology: * A 256k random file was created [1] * This file was encrypted with 50 certificates [2] * The time was reported (see below) * The file was checked [3] to ensure all 50 certs were present Results: 0.31 seconds to encrypt a 256k file containing random binary data to 51 certificates (my own + 50 others) Conclusions: there's something amiss here that neither a new GPU nor an RNG will fix. I'm including the Python script (works with 2.7 and 3.2) I used for testing, so that other people who are interested in recreating my results can check for themselves. Warning: if you ever write Python code like this in the real world your programming team will beat you to death. [1] dd if=/dev/urandom of=rand.bin bs=262144 count=1 [2] The script to run GnuPG with the huge recipient list is: ===== #!/usr/bin/python from __future__ import print_function from re import compile as compile_re from subprocess import check_output as run_cmd rx = compile_re("^pub:[f-]:.*:([0-9A-F]{16}):") print(run_cmd( ( "/usr/bin/time /usr/bin/gpg2 " + "--trust-model always --armor --recipient " + "--recipient ".join( [Y.group(1) + " " for Y in [ rx.search(X) for X in run_cmd( [ "/usr/bin/gpg2", "--fixed-list-mode", "--with-colons", "--list-keys" ] ).decode("UTF-8").split("\n") ] if Y != None][:50] ) + "--encrypt rand.bin" ).split() ).decode("ASCII")) ===== [3] /usr/bin/gpg2 --list-packets rand.bin.asc|grep keyid|wc -l From mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de Mon Jun 18 07:07:54 2012 From: mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de (Hauke Laging) Date: Mon, 18 Jun 2012 07:07:54 +0200 Subject: conditional config file entries (bound to e.g. sender and recipient keys) Message-ID: <10913925.z0ApkXHYgl@inno> Hello, has there already been a discussion about it whether it would make sense to have conditional entries in the gpg config file (like e.g. SSH for different destinations)? Depending on the key to which is encrypted, the key by which is signed and maybe even the application which calls gpg different settings may be selected. This is quite obvious with the policy url setting. If no single document covers all keys then it is preferable to set this value in dependency of the signing key. Hauke -- PGP: D44C 6A5B 71B0 427C CED3 025C BD7D 6D27 ECCB 5814 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 555 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From quannguyen at mbm.vn Mon Jun 18 10:08:36 2012 From: quannguyen at mbm.vn (=?UTF-8?B?Tmd1eeG7hW4gSOG7k25nIFF1w6Ju?=) Date: Mon, 18 Jun 2012 15:08:36 +0700 Subject: Import private key from PEM file? Message-ID: <4FDEE204.9090103@mbm.vn> Hi all, Is it possible to import private key from PEM file (which I exported from p12 file using OpenSSL: openssl pkcs12 -in secret-gpg-key.p12 -nocerts -out gpg-key.pem)? Is it possible to import pairs of certificate/private key from p12 file using gpgsm? I tried doing this, but then the command gpgsm --list-secret-keys returned nothing. -- Regards, Qu?n From wk at gnupg.org Mon Jun 18 10:49:09 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Mon, 18 Jun 2012 10:49:09 +0200 Subject: GPG with GPUs In-Reply-To: <4FDEA11C.2060605@sixdemonbag.org> (Robert J. Hansen's message of "Sun, 17 Jun 2012 23:31:40 -0400") References: <20120616141504.GP16689@eightyeight.xmission.com> <3731197.1K8LFmhrWC@inno> <20120617140407.GA12150@eightyeight.xmission.com> <4398582.8s5FS7KSWn@inno> <4FDEA11C.2060605@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <87d34xromy.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Mon, 18 Jun 2012 05:31, rjh at sixdemonbag.org said: > results can check for themselves. Warning: if you ever write Python > code like this in the real world your programming team will beat you to > death. To me this awk script is more readable, although most other will disagree: $ gpg2 --gen-random 0 262144 | time gpg2 --always-trust --batch -ea \ $(gpg2 --with-colons -k | awk -F: \ '$1=="pub" && $2~/[fmu]/ && $12~/[E]/ {print "-r "$5;if(++cnt>50){exit}}')\ >/dev/null resulting in 0.32user 0.03system 0:01.00elapsed On a slower machine but likely with another state of the entropy pool. I use only keys which are usable as indicated by the "$2~/[fmu]/" condition and which have at least one encryption subkey ("$12~/[E]/"). I need this test because I have some invalid keys (Elgamal signatures) in my ring. I actually found a bug in GPG: If a key has been disabled, it is not flagged as disabled in the --with-colons key listing. I need to investigate that closer - might be the reason for bugs reported to GUI frontends. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From wk at gnupg.org Mon Jun 18 11:00:53 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Mon, 18 Jun 2012 11:00:53 +0200 Subject: GPG with GPUs In-Reply-To: <87d34xromy.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> (Werner Koch's message of "Mon, 18 Jun 2012 10:49:09 +0200") References: <20120616141504.GP16689@eightyeight.xmission.com> <3731197.1K8LFmhrWC@inno> <20120617140407.GA12150@eightyeight.xmission.com> <4398582.8s5FS7KSWn@inno> <4FDEA11C.2060605@sixdemonbag.org> <87d34xromy.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <877gv5ro3e.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Mon, 18 Jun 2012 10:49, wk at gnupg.org said: > I actually found a bug in GPG: If a key has been disabled, it is not > flagged as disabled in the --with-colons key listing. I need to Ooops, the API provided to be pretty complicated. I forgot the condition term "$12!~/D/". Thus using $ gpg2 --gen-random 0 262144 | time gpg2 --always-trust --batch -ea \ $(gpg2 --with-colons -k | awk -F: \ '$1=="pub" && $2~/[fmu]/ && $12~/[E]/ && $12!~/[D]/ \ {print "-r "$5;if(++cnt>50){exit}}')\ >/dev/null it picks only the usable keys. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From wk at gnupg.org Mon Jun 18 11:04:56 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Mon, 18 Jun 2012 11:04:56 +0200 Subject: Import private key from PEM file? In-Reply-To: <4FDEE204.9090103@mbm.vn> (=?utf-8?Q?=22Nguy=E1=BB=85n_H?= =?utf-8?Q?=E1=BB=93ng_Qu=C3=A2n=22's?= message of "Mon, 18 Jun 2012 15:08:36 +0700") References: <4FDEE204.9090103@mbm.vn> Message-ID: <87395trnwn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Mon, 18 Jun 2012 10:08, quannguyen at mbm.vn said: > Is it possible to import pairs of certificate/private key from p12 file > using gpgsm? Sure, you may import pkcs#12 files. The pinentry will ask you for the transport passphrases and for the new passphrase under which gpg-agent will store the key. The code even tries several passphrase encodings to work around common encoding problems. gpgsm -v --import foo.p12 is all you need. Watch out for the pinentry and any error messages you may see. In case of problems, it is useful to enable gpg-agent debugging. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From wk at gnupg.org Mon Jun 18 11:09:12 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Mon, 18 Jun 2012 11:09:12 +0200 Subject: Stumped and need some help with agent In-Reply-To: <4FDE79B4.70901@gmail.com> (Anthony Papillion's message of "Sun, 17 Jun 2012 19:43:32 -0500") References: <4FDCEFB7.4090409@gmail.com> <87ipeqrveg.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FDE79B4.70901@gmail.com> Message-ID: <87y5nlq953.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Mon, 18 Jun 2012 02:43, papillion at gmail.com said: > Let me ask this: are there any major security implications (aside from > sacrificing the security of pinentry) to hacking gpg2 to not use agent? You simply can't use gpg2 without gpg-agent. It is a part of GnuPG and required. Yes, these changes are permanent. gpg-agent is designed to take care of all private key operations. Thus gpg and gpgsm only need to care about public key and the per messages session keys. Modularizing a system in this way is much safer; it is similar to what you do with a smartcard or a HSM. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From quannguyen at mbm.vn Mon Jun 18 11:16:22 2012 From: quannguyen at mbm.vn (=?UTF-8?B?Tmd1eeG7hW4gSOG7k25nIFF1w6Ju?=) Date: Mon, 18 Jun 2012 16:16:22 +0700 Subject: Import private key from PEM file? In-Reply-To: <87395trnwn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <4FDEE204.9090103@mbm.vn> <87395trnwn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <4FDEF1E6.10300@mbm.vn> Hi, I tried again but "gpgsm --list-secrret-keys" still return nothing: hongquan at Pangolin ~/Works/Certificates/StartCom $ gpgsm -v --import quannguyen at mbm.vn.p12 gpgsm: gpgsm: GPG_TTY has not been set - using maybe bogus default gpgsm: gpg-protect-tool: 1224 bytes of 3DES encrypted text gpgsm: gpg-protect-tool: 5904 bytes of RC2 encrypted text gpgsm: gpg-protect-tool: processing certBag gpgsm: gpg-protect-tool: processing certBag gpgsm: gpg-protect-tool: processing certBag gpgsm: gpg-protect-tool: keygrip: 89E5CF0B2581EE779B2CF2D849EE991DEE0E1A17 gpgsm: gpg-protect-tool: secret key file `/home/hongquan/.gnupg/private-keys-v1.d/89E5CF0B2581EE779B2CF2D849EE991DEE0E1A17.key' already exists gpgsm: certificate is good gpgsm: certificate is good gpgsm: certificate is good gpgsm: total number processed: 4 gpgsm: unchanged: 3 gpgsm: secret keys read: 1 gpgsm: secret keys unchanged: 1 hongquan at Pangolin ~/Works/Certificates/StartCom $ gpgsm --list-secret-key /home/hongquan/.gnupg/pubring.kbx --------------------------------- hongquan at Pangolin ~/Works/Certificates/StartCom $ gpgsm --list-secret-keys /home/hongquan/.gnupg/pubring.kbx --------------------------------- How about importing from PEM file? Is there a command to do that? On Mon 18 Jun 2012 04:04:56 PM ICT, Werner Koch wrote: > On Mon, 18 Jun 2012 10:08, quannguyen at mbm.vn said: > >> Is it possible to import pairs of certificate/private key from p12 file >> using gpgsm? > > Sure, you may import pkcs#12 files. The pinentry will ask you for the > transport passphrases and for the new passphrase under which gpg-agent > will store the key. The code even tries several passphrase encodings to > work around common encoding problems. > > gpgsm -v --import foo.p12 > > is all you need. Watch out for the pinentry and any error messages you > may see. In case of problems, it is useful to enable gpg-agent > debugging. > > > Salam-Shalom, > > Werner > -- Regards, Qu?n From wk at gnupg.org Mon Jun 18 11:31:22 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Mon, 18 Jun 2012 11:31:22 +0200 Subject: Import private key from PEM file? In-Reply-To: <4FDEF1E6.10300@mbm.vn> (=?utf-8?Q?=22Nguy=E1=BB=85n_H?= =?utf-8?Q?=E1=BB=93ng_Qu=C3=A2n=22's?= message of "Mon, 18 Jun 2012 16:16:22 +0700") References: <4FDEE204.9090103@mbm.vn> <87395trnwn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FDEF1E6.10300@mbm.vn> Message-ID: <87sjdtq845.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Mon, 18 Jun 2012 11:16, quannguyen at mbm.vn said: > gpgsm: gpgsm: GPG_TTY has not been set - using maybe bogus default Fix this! See the manual or the man page. > `/home/hongquan/.gnupg/private-keys-v1.d/89E5CF0B2581EE779B2CF2D849EE991DEE0E1A17.key' > already exists Well, you already imported the private key. > gpgsm: total number processed: 4 > gpgsm: unchanged: 3 > gpgsm: secret keys read: 1 > gpgsm: secret keys unchanged: 1 Why do you think you will see a new entry in the secret key listing, if nothing changed? > How about importing from PEM file? Is there a command to do that? gpgsm detects armor or binary itself. If you want to tell it explicitly, use one of --assume-{armor,binary,base64}. It is all in the manual. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From quannguyen at mbm.vn Mon Jun 18 12:09:26 2012 From: quannguyen at mbm.vn (=?UTF-8?B?Tmd1eeG7hW4gSOG7k25nIFF1w6Ju?=) Date: Mon, 18 Jun 2012 17:09:26 +0700 Subject: Import private key from PEM file? In-Reply-To: <87sjdtq845.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <4FDEE204.9090103@mbm.vn> <87395trnwn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FDEF1E6.10300@mbm.vn> <87sjdtq845.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <4FDEFE56.6080800@mbm.vn> Hi, On Mon 18 Jun 2012 04:31:22 PM ICT, Werner Koch wrote: > > Why do you think you will see a new entry in the secret key listing, if > nothing changed? > I don't need new entry, I just need 'existing' entry. But none is shown. hongquan at Pangolin ~ $ gpgsm --list-secret-keys /home/hongquan/.gnupg/pubring.kbx --------------------------------- -- Regards, Qu?n From quannguyen at mbm.vn Mon Jun 18 12:16:25 2012 From: quannguyen at mbm.vn (=?UTF-8?B?Tmd1eeG7hW4gSOG7k25nIFF1w6Ju?=) Date: Mon, 18 Jun 2012 17:16:25 +0700 Subject: Import private key from PEM file? In-Reply-To: <87sjdtq845.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <4FDEE204.9090103@mbm.vn> <87395trnwn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FDEF1E6.10300@mbm.vn> <87sjdtq845.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <4FDEFFF9.1070908@mbm.vn> Hi, On 06/18/2012 04:31 PM, Werner Koch wrote: >> How about importing from PEM file? Is there a command to do that? > gpgsm detects armor or binary itself. If you want to tell it > explicitly, use one of --assume-{armor,binary,base64}. It is all in the > manual. > I meant I want to import the PEM file that contains only private key (the file is exported with the command openssl pkcs12 -in secret-gpg-key.p12 -nocerts -out gpg-key.pem With this file, the "gpgsm --import" complains about the absence of certificate: $gpgsm -v --import quan-key.pem gpgsm: no issuer found in certificate gpgsm: basic certificate checks failed - not imported gpgsm: no issuer found in certificate gpgsm: basic certificate checks failed - not imported gpgsm: no issuer found in certificate gpgsm: basic certificate checks failed - not imported gpgsm: ksba_cert_hash failed: No value gpgsm: total number processed: 3 gpgsm: not imported: 3 -- Regards, Qu?n From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Mon Jun 18 12:41:15 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Mon, 18 Jun 2012 06:41:15 -0400 Subject: GPG with GPUs In-Reply-To: <87d34xromy.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <20120616141504.GP16689@eightyeight.xmission.com> <3731197.1K8LFmhrWC@inno> <20120617140407.GA12150@eightyeight.xmission.com> <4398582.8s5FS7KSWn@inno> <4FDEA11C.2060605@sixdemonbag.org> <87d34xromy.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <4FDF05CB.4000109@sixdemonbag.org> On 06/18/2012 04:49 AM, Werner Koch wrote: > To me this awk script is more readable, although most other will > disagree: My secret shame is that I know neither sed nor awk, which is why I do so many of these tasks in Python. :) From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Mon Jun 18 12:42:53 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Mon, 18 Jun 2012 06:42:53 -0400 Subject: conditional config file entries (bound to e.g. sender and recipient keys) In-Reply-To: <10913925.z0ApkXHYgl@inno> References: <10913925.z0ApkXHYgl@inno> Message-ID: <4FDF062D.1010600@sixdemonbag.org> On 06/18/2012 01:07 AM, Hauke Laging wrote: > has there already been a discussion about it whether it would make > sense to have conditional entries in the gpg config file (like e.g. > SSH for different destinations)? Not to my knowledge. > Depending on the key to which is encrypted, the key by which is > signed and maybe even the application which calls gpg different > settings may be selected. Show me a use case. When would this be useful, and to whom? How are these people currently being impacted by the lack of such a feature? From wk at gnupg.org Mon Jun 18 15:39:18 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Mon, 18 Jun 2012 15:39:18 +0200 Subject: conditional config file entries (bound to e.g. sender and recipient keys) In-Reply-To: <4FDF062D.1010600@sixdemonbag.org> (Robert J. Hansen's message of "Mon, 18 Jun 2012 06:42:53 -0400") References: <10913925.z0ApkXHYgl@inno> <4FDF062D.1010600@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <87fw9srb7d.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Mon, 18 Jun 2012 12:42, rjh at sixdemonbag.org said: >> sense to have conditional entries in the gpg config file (like e.g. >> SSH for different destinations)? > > Not to my knowledge. My response would be: You should write a wrapper for this feature. This is the way tools should be used under Unix (and Windows). Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From wk at gnupg.org Mon Jun 18 15:47:14 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Mon, 18 Jun 2012 15:47:14 +0200 Subject: Import private key from PEM file? In-Reply-To: <4FDEFE56.6080800@mbm.vn> (=?utf-8?Q?=22Nguy=E1=BB=85n_H?= =?utf-8?Q?=E1=BB=93ng_Qu=C3=A2n=22's?= message of "Mon, 18 Jun 2012 17:09:26 +0700") References: <4FDEE204.9090103@mbm.vn> <87395trnwn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FDEF1E6.10300@mbm.vn> <87sjdtq845.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FDEFE56.6080800@mbm.vn> Message-ID: <87bokgrau5.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Mon, 18 Jun 2012 12:09, quannguyen at mbm.vn said: > I don't need new entry, I just need 'existing' entry. But none is shown. > hongquan at Pangolin ~ $ gpgsm --list-secret-keys You need to have a matching certificate. The way --list-secret-keys works is to iterate over all certificates (as shown with --list-keys) and print only those where a matching private key is available. You don't have any matching certificates. Try --with-ephemeral-keys to really show all certificates in the pubring.kbx. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From wk at gnupg.org Mon Jun 18 15:49:52 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Mon, 18 Jun 2012 15:49:52 +0200 Subject: Import private key from PEM file? In-Reply-To: <4FDEFFF9.1070908@mbm.vn> (=?utf-8?Q?=22Nguy=E1=BB=85n_H?= =?utf-8?Q?=E1=BB=93ng_Qu=C3=A2n=22's?= message of "Mon, 18 Jun 2012 17:16:25 +0700") References: <4FDEE204.9090103@mbm.vn> <87395trnwn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FDEF1E6.10300@mbm.vn> <87sjdtq845.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FDEFFF9.1070908@mbm.vn> Message-ID: <877gv4rapr.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Mon, 18 Jun 2012 12:16, quannguyen at mbm.vn said: > $gpgsm -v --import quan-key.pem > gpgsm: no issuer found in certificate > gpgsm: basic certificate checks failed - not imported You may want to create correct certificates first so to bypass this test. Salam-Shalom, Werner p.s. Maybe http://gnupg.org/service.html is of help to you. -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From christophe.brocas at cnamts.fr Mon Jun 18 14:54:29 2012 From: christophe.brocas at cnamts.fr (Christophe Brocas) Date: Mon, 18 Jun 2012 14:54:29 +0200 Subject: [RMLL 2012] Interview with Werner Koch on GnuPG, steed, browserid and privacy Message-ID: <4FDF2505.4090306@cnamts.fr> Hello, This short post is almost an advertisement ... but please try to read it anyway :) Werner has kindly accepted to come to give a talk [1] on STEED during the Security track of 2012 RMLL in Geneva, next July 10th. Come to see him : the entrance is free as in freedom and ... as in beer :) In order to introduce this talk, we have done an interview with Werner Koch on GnuPG, steed, browserid and privacy : http://schedule2012.rmll.info/Entretien-avec-Werner-Koch-sur-STEED-et-GnuPG?lang=en . Enjoy ! Christophe 2012 RMLL security topic co chairman [1] http://schedule2012.rmll.info/OpenPGP-and-S-MIME-are-both-on-the-STEED?lang=en ***************************************************** "Le contenu de ce courriel et ses eventuelles pi?ces jointes sont confidentiels. Ils s'adressent exclusivement ? la personne destinataire. Si cet envoi ne vous est pas destin?, ou si vous l'avez re?u par erreur, et afin de ne pas violer le secret des correspondances, vous ne devez pas le transmettre ? d'autres personnes ni le reproduire. Merci de le renvoyer ? l'?metteur et de le d?truire. Attention : L'Organisme de l'?metteur du message ne pourra ?tre tenu responsable de l'alt?ration du pr?sent courriel. Il appartient au destinataire de v?rifier que les messages et pi?ces jointes re?us ne contiennent pas de virus. Les opinions contenues dans ce courriel et ses ?ventuelles pi?ces jointes sont celles de l'?metteur. Elles ne refl?tent pas la position de l'Organisme sauf s'il en est dispos? autrement dans le pr?sent courriel." ****************************************************** From Lists.gnupg at mephisto.fastmail.net Mon Jun 18 16:00:28 2012 From: Lists.gnupg at mephisto.fastmail.net (Kevin Kammer) Date: Mon, 18 Jun 2012 10:00:28 -0400 Subject: GPG with GPUs In-Reply-To: <4FDCE204.7090108@sixdemonbag.org> References: <20120616141504.GP16689@eightyeight.xmission.com> <3731197.1K8LFmhrWC@inno> <4FDCE204.7090108@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <20120618140027.GB963@Clarus.mgh.harvard.edu> On Sat, Jun 16, 2012 at 03:44:04PM -0400 Also sprach Robert J. Hansen: > ... unless he's running on an Ivy Bridge or later, in which case it > already has a hardware RNG built in. If he's currently running on hardware later than Ivy Bridge, then he's either an Intel engineer or a time traveler, and in either case would probably not need help sorting out hardware features :P -- "Le hasard favorise l'esprit pr?par?." --Louis Pasteur From peter at digitalbrains.com Mon Jun 18 17:37:41 2012 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Mon, 18 Jun 2012 17:37:41 +0200 Subject: GPG with GPUs In-Reply-To: <87d34xromy.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <20120616141504.GP16689@eightyeight.xmission.com> <3731197.1K8LFmhrWC@inno> <20120617140407.GA12150@eightyeight.xmission.com> <4398582.8s5FS7KSWn@inno> <4FDEA11C.2060605@sixdemonbag.org> <87d34xromy.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <4FDF4B45.8090107@digitalbrains.com> On 18/06/12 10:49, Werner Koch wrote: > On Mon, 18 Jun 2012 05:31, rjh at sixdemonbag.org said: > >> results can check for themselves. Warning: if you ever write Python >> code like this in the real world your programming team will beat you to >> death. > > To me this awk script is more readable, although most other will > disagree: > > $ gpg2 --gen-random 0 262144 | time gpg2 --always-trust --batch -ea \ > $(gpg2 --with-colons -k | awk -F: \ > '$1=="pub" && $2~/[fmu]/ && $12~/[E]/ {print "-r "$5;if(++cnt>50){exit}}')\ > >/dev/null > > resulting in > > 0.32user 0.03system 0:01.00elapsed > > On a slower machine but likely with another state of the entropy pool. Just as a datapoint: I have a VIA Nano L2200 @ 1.6 GHz, which is a slow processor (competition for the Intel Atom), but which has a hardware RNG hooked up to /dev/random through rngd. I'm fairly sure that it's configured correctly and that /dev/random will not starve. It encrypts to the first 50 pubkeys in my ring as follows: 1.51user 0.14system 0:02.02elapsed 81%CPU (0avgtext+0avgdata 12992maxresident)k 0inputs+16outputs (0major+894minor)pagefaults 0swaps It's a 64-bit Debian testing. I had to install the "time" package[1]. I also had to remove the "$2~/[fmu]/" test as I have only 47 valid keys :). System load was low when performing the test. Less than 10 percent CPU usage by other processes. Peter. [1] The bash keyword "time" can only be at the start of a command line. It can't be used in the middle of a pipe. It's a keyword, not a builtin. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at http://wwwhome.cs.utwente.nl/~lebbing/pubkey.txt From aaron.toponce at gmail.com Mon Jun 18 17:49:43 2012 From: aaron.toponce at gmail.com (Aaron Toponce) Date: Mon, 18 Jun 2012 09:49:43 -0600 Subject: GPG with GPUs In-Reply-To: <4398582.8s5FS7KSWn@inno> References: <20120616141504.GP16689@eightyeight.xmission.com> <3731197.1K8LFmhrWC@inno> <20120617140407.GA12150@eightyeight.xmission.com> <4398582.8s5FS7KSWn@inno> Message-ID: <20120618154942.GA16699@eightyeight.xmission.com> On Sun, Jun 17, 2012 at 07:26:27PM +0200, Hauke Laging wrote: > This are the result (with a caches passphrase, of course). It's the same for a > zeros file and a urandom file. And this is on a power efficient CPU... (E-450, > which I guess doesn't have AES acceleration) probably without parallelization. > > So there's obviously a serious problem with your setup. A problem slowing the > process down two to three orders of magnitude which will hardly be solved by > adding a GPU. I'm not trying to troubleshoot a problem. I think this thread is getting a bit off-topic. I'm only curious if work has been done is getting GPU support into GnuPG. Nothing more. Thanks, -- . o . o . o . . o o . . . o . . . o . o o o . o . o o . . o o o o . o . . o o o o . o o o -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 519 bytes Desc: not available URL: From wk at gnupg.org Mon Jun 18 20:39:33 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Mon, 18 Jun 2012 20:39:33 +0200 Subject: GPG with GPUs In-Reply-To: <4FDF4B45.8090107@digitalbrains.com> (Peter Lebbing's message of "Mon, 18 Jun 2012 17:37:41 +0200") References: <20120616141504.GP16689@eightyeight.xmission.com> <3731197.1K8LFmhrWC@inno> <20120617140407.GA12150@eightyeight.xmission.com> <4398582.8s5FS7KSWn@inno> <4FDEA11C.2060605@sixdemonbag.org> <87d34xromy.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FDF4B45.8090107@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <87mx40piqi.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Mon, 18 Jun 2012 17:37, peter at digitalbrains.com said: > Just as a datapoint: I have a VIA Nano L2200 @ 1.6 GHz, which is a slow > processor (competition for the Intel Atom), but which has a hardware RNG hooked > up to /dev/random through rngd. I'm fairly sure that it's configured correctly FWIW, Libgcrypt uses this RNG directly in addition to other sources. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From mhannemann at meperia.com Mon Jun 18 21:37:27 2012 From: mhannemann at meperia.com (Michael Hannemann) Date: Mon, 18 Jun 2012 15:37:27 -0400 Subject: decryption trouble - primary/subkey confusion, maybe version issues? Message-ID: Hi all, I've searched the FAQ and the mailing list archives, and I don't see an answer to this question, so I will ask it here... I'm having trouble sending an encrypted file to a collaborator -- even though they've sent me files that I've been able to decrypt. Here's what they see, with their keys replaced -- TsTs = their subkey, TpTp = their primary key. My keys: pub 2048R/F7A48B98 2012-05-22 usage: SC sub 2048R/BE7A105E 2012-05-22 usage: E And my collaborator: pub 1024D/TpTpTpTp 1999-04-08 usage: SCA sub 2048g/TsTstsTs 1999-04-08 usage: E =========================================== gpg: public key is TsTsTsTs [GNUPG:] ENC_TO xxxxxx--TsTsTsTs 16 0 gpg: using subkey TsTsTsTs instead of primary key TpTpTpTp gpg: encrypted with 2048-bit ELG-E key, ID TsTsTsTs, created 1999-04-08 [my collaborator] [GNUPG:] NO_SECKEY xxxxxx--TsTsTsTs [GNUPG:] BEGIN_DECRYPTION [GNUPG:] DECRYPTION_FAILED gpg: decryption failed: secret key not available [GNUPG:] END_DECRYPTION =========================================== My question is ... what is going on here? Why can't they decrypt this file, when they were able to send me a file that I could decrypt? Their technical guy wrote me to say that when sending files, I should be using primary key ID TpTpTpTp. But, so far as I can tell, everything here is working as designed, and there's no way I *can* specifically say "use TpTpTpTp". However, they say they haven't had any problems with anyone else, and the system has been working for years. Data I've gathered: 1. Using --edit-key, I did compare fingerprints and have validated the fingerprint they sent me. 2. Early on, it appears that they had somehow used the wrong key for me. I don't know where that came from, but once identified, I resent my key and they processed it, and I've been able to decrypt files they've sent to me since then. 3. I have a suspicion there are two pathways for them -- an automated system which picks up files & decrypts them, and their IT group trying to debug issues on the other side of the connection. 4. When they sent me their key, I noticed it was exported with GnuPG 1.0.6 (SunOS). I'm using 1.4.12 on Mac and 1.4.10 on Ubuntu. 5. I accepted the default (RSA + RSA) version for key generation. Is that a problem with an older GnuPG variant? I wouldn't think that's the issue. What questions can I ask them which will help shed light on this situation? Is it possible that I'm doing something wrong? I've created a test account with its own gpg keys, and have successfully sent files both directions on my own machine. Many thanks, Michael From mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de Tue Jun 19 00:38:16 2012 From: mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de (Hauke Laging) Date: Tue, 19 Jun 2012 00:38:16 +0200 Subject: decryption trouble - primary/subkey confusion, maybe version issues? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <1489011.BL1Y7StHOX@inno> Am Mo 18.06.2012, 15:37:27 schrieb Michael Hannemann: > I'm having trouble sending an encrypted file to a collaborator -- even > though they've sent me files that I've been able to decrypt. That means nothing. I can send you an encrypted file without even having a key myself. Have they signed the encrypted files they have sent to you? > Here's what they see, with their keys replaced -- TsTs = their subkey, TpTp > = their primary key. > > My keys: > > pub 2048R/F7A48B98 2012-05-22 usage: SC > sub 2048R/BE7A105E 2012-05-22 usage: E > > And my collaborator: > > pub 1024D/TpTpTpTp 1999-04-08 usage: SCA > sub 2048g/TsTstsTs 1999-04-08 usage: E > > =========================================== > gpg: public key is TsTsTsTs > [GNUPG:] ENC_TO xxxxxx--TsTsTsTs 16 0 > gpg: using subkey TsTsTsTs instead of primary key TpTpTpTp > gpg: encrypted with 2048-bit ELG-E key, ID TsTsTsTs, created 1999-04-08 > [my collaborator] > [GNUPG:] NO_SECKEY xxxxxx--TsTsTsTs > [GNUPG:] BEGIN_DECRYPTION > [GNUPG:] DECRYPTION_FAILED > gpg: decryption failed: secret key not available [GNUPG:] END_DECRYPTION > =========================================== This is the error message they sent to you? > My question is ... what is going on here? Why can't they decrypt this file, > when they were able to send me a file that I could decrypt? That's not the question. The question is whether you encrypt to the correct key (and how you KNOW it's the correct one). > Their technical guy wrote me to say that when sending files, I should be > using primary key ID TpTpTpTp. But, so far as I can tell, everything here > is working as designed, and there's no way I *can* specifically say "use > TpTpTpTp". What is the output of gpg --with-colons --list-keys 0xTpTpTpTp ? This is about the second but last field for pub and sub only. Output for my key for example: pub:...:scaESCA: sub:...:e: sub:...:e: sub:...:s: sub:...:a: These are the keys' capabilities. The main key can certify (always), sign and authenticate. The subkeys can be used for encryption, signing and authentication, each one only. If you encrypt to the ID of the main key then gpg recognizes the encryption subkey and uses it instead. If your (main) key is really correct then I guess there is a problem with the subkeys. Maybe you have an old version of the key containing a subkey they don't (and can't) use any more. So you should check that you have the newest version of the key. You can enforce the usage of the main key though: gpg --encrypt --recipient 0xeccb5814\! (the \ is due to history expansion in the shell; I am not familiar with that, maybe the quoting is not necessary) This works only if the main key has the encryption capability. When reading my mail just before sending I noticed that your above output reveals that the main key has no encryption capability (as usual). > 1. Using --edit-key, I did compare fingerprints and have validated the > fingerprint they sent me. This can be easier done by gpg --fingerprint 0xeccb5814 gpg --fingerprint --fingerprint 0xeccb5814 shows the subkeys' fingerptints, too. > 5. I accepted the default (RSA + RSA) version for key generation. Your key has most probably nothing to do with this problem. > What questions can I ask them which will help shed light on this situation? Ask them for the output of gpg --with-colons --fingerprint --fingerprint --list-keys 0xTpTpTpTp on the system which does (tries) the encryption. And ask them to export the public key on that system and send that new version of the key to you: gpg --armor --export 0xTpTpTpTp > 0xTpTpTpTp.asc And you may ask for an encrypted file which they can decrypt. Hauke -- PGP: D44C 6A5B 71B0 427C CED3 025C BD7D 6D27 ECCB 5814 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 555 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From smickson at hotmail.com Tue Jun 19 01:30:44 2012 From: smickson at hotmail.com (Sam Smith) Date: Mon, 18 Jun 2012 19:30:44 -0400 Subject: way to see what cipher/algo was used to create your key? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Does anybody know a way to learn what cipher & hash was used to create the secret key? Also, does anyone know a way to make AES256 & SHA256 the default cipher/hash combo for --symmetric encryption? I can create these using --cipher-algo etc but is there a way to make them default for if I use this command: gpg -a -o file-encrypted -c file From: smickson at hotmail.com To: gnupg-users at gnupg.org Subject: way to see what cipher/algo was used to create your key? Date: Sun, 17 Jun 2012 09:16:46 -0400 I see that --edit-key > pref lists out preferences. I'm assuming the first S is default cipher, first H is default algo, etc? so if a key is generated it will use the first S, first H, etc. But why are all those other S and H options listed? when would they ever be used to create keys? Lastly, if you created your key some time ago (on a different machine) and don't know what the default cipher/hash was at the time, is there a way to find out what cipher and hash was used in the creation of your key? _______________________________________________ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users at gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de Tue Jun 19 05:21:11 2012 From: mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de (Hauke Laging) Date: Tue, 19 Jun 2012 05:21:11 +0200 Subject: way to see what cipher/algo was used to create your key? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <3072213.W2rCYomeD8@inno> Am Mo 18.06.2012, 19:30:44 schrieb Sam Smith: > Does anybody know a way to learn what cipher & hash was used to create the > secret key? May it be you mix up things? The key is just a random number. It can be used with ciphers but you don't use ciphers to generate a key. Neither a symmetric nor an asymmetric one. There are algorithms (no ciphers) which determine whether a random number is suitable as asymmetric key but that's probably not what you mean. > Also, does anyone know a way to make AES256 & SHA256 the default cipher/hash > combo for --symmetric encryption? I can create these using --cipher-algo > etc but is there a way to make them default for if I use this command: gpg > -a -o file-encrypted -c file You mean except for putting cipher-algo in your config file...? Hauke -- PGP: D44C 6A5B 71B0 427C CED3 025C BD7D 6D27 ECCB 5814 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 555 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Tue Jun 19 05:31:12 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Mon, 18 Jun 2012 23:31:12 -0400 Subject: way to see what cipher/algo was used to create your key? In-Reply-To: <3072213.W2rCYomeD8@inno> References: <3072213.W2rCYomeD8@inno> Message-ID: <4FDFF280.8010309@sixdemonbag.org> On 06/18/2012 11:21 PM, Hauke Laging wrote: > You mean except for putting cipher-algo in your config file...? Please don't advocate this. cipher-algo and digest-algo can potentially wreck interoperability with other OpenPGP clients. For this reason most users will be best-served by leaving those options out of their gpg.conf file. Specify it on the command line each time if you must. From quannguyen at mbm.vn Tue Jun 19 05:38:40 2012 From: quannguyen at mbm.vn (=?UTF-8?B?Tmd1eeG7hW4gSOG7k25nIFF1w6Ju?=) Date: Tue, 19 Jun 2012 10:38:40 +0700 Subject: Import private key from PEM file? In-Reply-To: <87bokgrau5.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <4FDEE204.9090103@mbm.vn> <87395trnwn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FDEF1E6.10300@mbm.vn> <87sjdtq845.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FDEFE56.6080800@mbm.vn> <87bokgrau5.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <4FDFF440.3080107@mbm.vn> So, do you think the private key and the certificate in the same p12 file don't match? The private key I expect to see was imported (in companion with certificate) earlier from a p12 file. I checked with OpenSSL and make sure that the p12 file contain both private key and certificate. On 06/18/2012 08:47 PM, Werner Koch wrote: > On Mon, 18 Jun 2012 12:09, quannguyen at mbm.vn said: > >> I don't need new entry, I just need 'existing' entry. But none is shown. >> hongquan at Pangolin ~ $ gpgsm --list-secret-keys > You need to have a matching certificate. The way --list-secret-keys > works is to iterate over all certificates (as shown with --list-keys) > and print only those where a matching private key is available. > > You don't have any matching certificates. Try --with-ephemeral-keys to > really show all certificates in the pubring.kbx. > > > Shalom-Salam, > > Werner > -- Regards, Qu?n From quannguyen at mbm.vn Tue Jun 19 05:43:02 2012 From: quannguyen at mbm.vn (=?UTF-8?B?Tmd1eeG7hW4gSOG7k25nIFF1w6Ju?=) Date: Tue, 19 Jun 2012 10:43:02 +0700 Subject: Import private key from PEM file? In-Reply-To: <877gv4rapr.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <4FDEE204.9090103@mbm.vn> <87395trnwn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FDEF1E6.10300@mbm.vn> <87sjdtq845.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FDEFFF9.1070908@mbm.vn> <877gv4rapr.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <4FDFF546.3060506@mbm.vn> So, the gpgsm won't work with PEM file which contain only private key? (Maybe you forgot that I asked 2 questions in the first email 1: About PEM file which contains only private key. 2: About P12 file which contains both private key and certificate). On Mon 18 Jun 2012 08:49:52 PM ICT, Werner Koch wrote: > On Mon, 18 Jun 2012 12:16, quannguyen at mbm.vn said: > >> $gpgsm -v --import quan-key.pem >> gpgsm: no issuer found in certificate >> gpgsm: basic certificate checks failed - not imported > > You may want to create correct certificates first so to bypass this > test. > > > Salam-Shalom, > > Werner > > > p.s. > Maybe http://gnupg.org/service.html is of help to you. > -- Regards, Qu?n From mhannemann at meperia.com Tue Jun 19 07:03:26 2012 From: mhannemann at meperia.com (Michael Hannemann) Date: Tue, 19 Jun 2012 01:03:26 -0400 Subject: decryption trouble - primary/subkey confusion, maybe version issues? In-Reply-To: <1489011.BL1Y7StHOX@inno> References: <1489011.BL1Y7StHOX@inno> Message-ID: On Jun 18, 2012, at 6:38 PM, Hauke Laging wrote: > Am Mo 18.06.2012, 15:37:27 schrieb Michael Hannemann: > >> I'm having trouble sending an encrypted file to a collaborator -- even >> though they've sent me files that I've been able to decrypt. > > That means nothing. I can send you an encrypted file without even having a key > myself. I'd begun to suspect that, after digging through files I'd encrypted for any hint of my key. Thanks for the confirmation. > Have they signed the encrypted files they have sent to you? No, they have not. I can ask them to do so. > >> Here's what they see, with their keys replaced -- TsTs = their subkey, TpTp >> = their primary key. >> >> My keys: >> >> pub 2048R/F7A48B98 2012-05-22 usage: SC >> sub 2048R/BE7A105E 2012-05-22 usage: E >> >> And my collaborator: >> >> pub 1024D/TpTpTpTp 1999-04-08 usage: SCA >> sub 2048g/TsTstsTs 1999-04-08 usage: E >> >> =========================================== >> gpg: public key is TsTsTsTs >> [GNUPG:] ENC_TO xxxxxx--TsTsTsTs 16 0 >> gpg: using subkey TsTsTsTs instead of primary key TpTpTpTp >> gpg: encrypted with 2048-bit ELG-E key, ID TsTsTsTs, created 1999-04-08 >> [my collaborator] >> [GNUPG:] NO_SECKEY xxxxxx--TsTsTsTs >> [GNUPG:] BEGIN_DECRYPTION >> [GNUPG:] DECRYPTION_FAILED >> gpg: decryption failed: secret key not available [GNUPG:] END_DECRYPTION >> =========================================== > > This is the error message they sent to you? Almost -- I substituted the "xxxx-TsTsTs" gibberish in place of the real keys to protect the innocent here, just making sure I did it carefully & consistently, and re-verifying the fingerprint vs what they sent me again. >> My question is ... what is going on here? Why can't they decrypt this file, >> when they were able to send me a file that I could decrypt? > > That's not the question. The question is whether you encrypt to the correct > key (and how you KNOW it's the correct one). > > >> Their technical guy wrote me to say that when sending files, I should be >> using primary key ID TpTpTpTp. But, so far as I can tell, everything here >> is working as designed, and there's no way I *can* specifically say "use >> TpTpTpTp". > > What is the output of > gpg --with-colons --list-keys 0xTpTpTpTp > ? This is about the second but last field for pub and sub only. Output for my > key for example: > > pub:...:scaESCA: > sub:...:e: > sub:...:e: > sub:...:s: > sub:...:a: > > These are the keys' capabilities. The main key can certify (always), sign and > authenticate. The subkeys can be used for encryption, signing and > authentication, each one only. If you encrypt to the ID of the main key then > gpg recognizes the encryption subkey and uses it instead. > > If your (main) key is really correct then I guess there is a problem with the > subkeys. Maybe you have an old version of the key containing a subkey they > don't (and can't) use any more. So you should check that you have the newest > version of the key. > > You can enforce the usage of the main key though: > gpg --encrypt --recipient 0xeccb5814\! > (the \ is due to history expansion in the shell; I am not familiar with that, > maybe the quoting is not necessary) > > This works only if the main key has the encryption capability. > > When reading my mail just before sending I noticed that your above output > reveals that the main key has no encryption capability (as usual). Right, that's what I keep seeing and trying to reconcile with their statement that this has been working without issue for other users and I'm the only one who has problems. Here's the output of your requested command above: pub:f:1024:17:xxxxxx--TpTpTpTp:1999-04-08:::-:[my collaborator]::scaESCA: sub:f:2048:16:xxxxxx--TsTsTsTs:1999-04-08::::::e: >> 1. Using --edit-key, I did compare fingerprints and have validated the >> fingerprint they sent me. > > This can be easier done by > gpg --fingerprint 0xeccb5814 > > gpg --fingerprint --fingerprint 0xeccb5814 > shows the subkeys' fingerptints, too. Useful, thanks! I would've never thought to specify --fingerprint twice. >> 5. I accepted the default (RSA + RSA) version for key generation. > > Your key has most probably nothing to do with this problem. Understood. >> What questions can I ask them which will help shed light on this situation? > > Ask them for the output of > gpg --with-colons --fingerprint --fingerprint --list-keys 0xTpTpTpTp > on the system which does (tries) the encryption. And ask them to export the > public key on that system and send that new version of the key to you: > > gpg --armor --export 0xTpTpTpTp > 0xTpTpTpTp.asc > > And you may ask for an encrypted file which they can decrypt. Good suggestions, thank you. I can ask them to encrypt a file for themselves and send that to me, and then look to see what keys they're using there. The others are good suggestions as well; I just want to make sure to them that I'm not asking for someone else's private data. This seems better than my request that they send me the results of "gpg --vv --list-secret-keys ...", which I suggested because I read somewhere that if the passphrase is somehow disconnected, the "sec" header on that will show up with a # or some other indicator indicating a broken key. thanks, Michael From mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de Tue Jun 19 07:50:09 2012 From: mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de (Hauke Laging) Date: Tue, 19 Jun 2012 07:50:09 +0200 Subject: decryption trouble - primary/subkey confusion, maybe version issues? In-Reply-To: References: <1489011.BL1Y7StHOX@inno> Message-ID: <1401178.MA2GKomWlg@inno> Am Di 19.06.2012, 01:03:26 schrieb Michael Hannemann: > pub:f:1024:17:xxxxxx--TpTpTpTp:1999-04-08:::-:[my collaborator]::scaESCA: > sub:f:2048:16:xxxxxx--TsTsTsTs:1999-04-08::::::e: This seems not to leave any room for ambiguity: One key only which can be encrypted to. Does the long ID (field 5) match the value you get on your system? > I just want to make > sure to them that I'm not asking for someone else's private data. Even if so. Isn't the sense of all this that you can give the encrypted data to just anyone without havong to be worried? 8-) But they may, of course, encrypt some dummy data to themselves for giving to you. They shall just check that they can decrypt it. > This seems better than my request that they send me the results of "gpg --vv > --list-secret-keys ...", which I suggested because I read somewhere that if > the passphrase is somehow disconnected, the "sec" header on that will show > up with a # or some other indicator indicating a broken key. That has nothing to do with the passphrase. "#" indicates a stub (key has been there but kind of removed; --export-secret-subkeys), ">" indicates that the key is on a smartcard. Hauke -- PGP: D44C 6A5B 71B0 427C CED3 025C BD7D 6D27 ECCB 5814 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 555 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From wk at gnupg.org Tue Jun 19 09:25:13 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Tue, 19 Jun 2012 09:25:13 +0200 Subject: Import private key from PEM file? In-Reply-To: <4FDFF546.3060506@mbm.vn> (=?utf-8?Q?=22Nguy=E1=BB=85n_H?= =?utf-8?Q?=E1=BB=93ng_Qu=C3=A2n=22's?= message of "Tue, 19 Jun 2012 10:43:02 +0700") References: <4FDEE204.9090103@mbm.vn> <87395trnwn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FDEF1E6.10300@mbm.vn> <87sjdtq845.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FDEFFF9.1070908@mbm.vn> <877gv4rapr.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FDFF546.3060506@mbm.vn> Message-ID: <874nq7pxuu.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Tue, 19 Jun 2012 05:43, quannguyen at mbm.vn said: > (Maybe you forgot that I asked 2 questions in the first email No. >> p.s. >> Maybe http://gnupg.org/service.html is of help to you. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From peter at digitalbrains.com Tue Jun 19 10:55:11 2012 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Tue, 19 Jun 2012 10:55:11 +0200 Subject: VIA padlock (was: Re: GPG with GPUs) In-Reply-To: <87mx40piqi.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <20120616141504.GP16689@eightyeight.xmission.com> <3731197.1K8LFmhrWC@inno> <20120617140407.GA12150@eightyeight.xmission.com> <4398582.8s5FS7KSWn@inno> <4FDEA11C.2060605@sixdemonbag.org> <87d34xromy.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FDF4B45.8090107@digitalbrains.com> <87mx40piqi.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <4FE03E6F.5070008@digitalbrains.com> On 18/06/12 20:39, Werner Koch wrote: > FWIW, Libgcrypt uses this RNG directly in addition to other sources. Actually... I just checked git.gnupg.org, and I see these lines in Libgcrypt, file random/rndhw.c: # if defined (__i386__) && SIZEOF_UNSIGNED_LONG == 4 && defined (__GNUC__) # define USE_PADLOCK # endif I'm running x86_64: the VIA Nano is a 64-bits processor. So I think Libgcrypt doesn't recognise it can use the padlock from the VIA Nano. It's the same with OpenSSL in Debian. I don't particularly care about support for the HWRNG (since it's already seeding /dev/random through rngd), but I do definitely like hardware AES on this modestly powered beast. It runs a TOR node; I think that is the main user of the hardware AES. So I patch Debian's OpenSSL with a patch I based on a code repository from upstream OpenSSL, so I can use the padlock AES under x86_64. I'd submit the patch to Debian if I could still remember from where it came... Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at http://wwwhome.cs.utwente.nl/~lebbing/pubkey.txt From wk at gnupg.org Tue Jun 19 11:39:52 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Tue, 19 Jun 2012 11:39:52 +0200 Subject: VIA padlock In-Reply-To: <4FE03E6F.5070008@digitalbrains.com> (Peter Lebbing's message of "Tue, 19 Jun 2012 10:55:11 +0200") References: <20120616141504.GP16689@eightyeight.xmission.com> <3731197.1K8LFmhrWC@inno> <20120617140407.GA12150@eightyeight.xmission.com> <4398582.8s5FS7KSWn@inno> <4FDEA11C.2060605@sixdemonbag.org> <87d34xromy.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FDF4B45.8090107@digitalbrains.com> <87mx40piqi.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FE03E6F.5070008@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <878vfjod1z.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Tue, 19 Jun 2012 10:55, peter at digitalbrains.com said: > I'm running x86_64: the VIA Nano is a 64-bits processor. So I think Libgcrypt > doesn't recognise it can use the padlock from the VIA Nano. I have a patch in the queue and even a woodware note at my monitor. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From MichaelQuigley at TheWay.Org Tue Jun 19 15:05:41 2012 From: MichaelQuigley at TheWay.Org (MichaelQuigley at TheWay.Org) Date: Tue, 19 Jun 2012 09:05:41 -0400 Subject: way to see what cipher/algo was used to create your key? In-Reply-To: Message-ID: gnupg-users-bounces at gnupg.org wrote on 06/19/2012 01:50:04 AM: > ----- Message from Sam Smith on Mon, 18 Jun > 2012 19:30:44 -0400 ----- > > To: > > Gnupg > > Subject: > > RE: way to see what cipher/algo was used to create your key? > > Does anybody know a way to learn what cipher & hash was used to > create the secret key? The details file documents using the --list-keys command with the and specifying the --with-fingerprint option twice. This produces a list which shows the algorithm used for the key. This can also be used with the --list-secret-keys command. e.g., enter the following command: gpg --with-fingerprint --with-fingerprint --with-colons --list-secret-keys Description from DETAILS: 4. Field: Algorithm: 1 = RSA 16 = Elgamal (encrypt only) 17 = DSA (sometimes called DH, sign only) 20 = Elgamal (sign and encrypt - don't use them!) (for other id's see include/cipher.h) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de Tue Jun 19 15:59:11 2012 From: mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de (Hauke Laging) Date: Tue, 19 Jun 2012 15:59:11 +0200 Subject: way to see what cipher/algo was used to create your key? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <1891316.EJtObk1RfG@inno> Am Di 19.06.2012, 09:05:41 schrieb MichaelQuigley at TheWay.Org: > The details file documents using the --list-keys command with the and > specifying the --with-fingerprint option twice. This produces a list > which shows the algorithm used for the key. This can also be used with > the --list-secret-keys command. The key type is shown even by the most simple form of --list-keys: start cmd:> gpg --list-keys pub 1024D sub 2048g sub 2048R sub 2048R sub 2048R Hauke -- PGP: D44C 6A5B 71B0 427C CED3 025C BD7D 6D27 ECCB 5814 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 555 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From mhannemann at meperia.com Tue Jun 19 17:37:25 2012 From: mhannemann at meperia.com (Michael Hannemann) Date: Tue, 19 Jun 2012 11:37:25 -0400 Subject: decryption trouble - primary/subkey confusion, maybe version issues? In-Reply-To: <1401178.MA2GKomWlg@inno> References: <1489011.BL1Y7StHOX@inno> <1401178.MA2GKomWlg@inno> Message-ID: <49AC56B9-D061-4151-BCDF-E69154EFC0D0@meperia.com> On Jun 19, 2012, at 1:50 AM, Hauke Laging wrote: > Am Di 19.06.2012, 01:03:26 schrieb Michael Hannemann: > >> pub:f:1024:17:xxxxxx--TpTpTpTp:1999-04-08:::-:[my collaborator]::scaESCA: >> sub:f:2048:16:xxxxxx--TsTsTsTs:1999-04-08::::::e: > > This seems not to leave any room for ambiguity: One key only which can be > encrypted to. Does the long ID (field 5) match the value you get on your > system? I will check that when I get the response back from them. I've been cautious, since I'm getting back into GPG use after 10 years away, while they say this is a system they've been using with other people. But the closer I've looked, the more it's seemed like this can't be any other way. If, as you suggested, the key I have matches the key they're using. >> I just want to make >> sure to them that I'm not asking for someone else's private data. > > Even if so. Isn't the sense of all this that you can give the encrypted data > to just anyone without havong to be worried? 8-) > > But they may, of course, encrypt some dummy data to themselves for giving to > you. They shall just check that they can decrypt it. > > >> This seems better than my request that they send me the results of "gpg --vv >> --list-secret-keys ...", which I suggested because I read somewhere that if >> the passphrase is somehow disconnected, the "sec" header on that will show >> up with a # or some other indicator indicating a broken key. > > That has nothing to do with the passphrase. "#" indicates a stub (key has been > there but kind of removed; --export-secret-subkeys), ">" indicates that the > key is on a smartcard. Sorry, thanks for the correction. I knew there was a way that the secret key could be removed, and I wondered if somehow this has been done to their system, perhaps without the knowledge of the particular person I'm working with. I just wanted to rule that out as a possibility. thanks, Michael From vedaal at nym.hush.com Tue Jun 19 19:50:47 2012 From: vedaal at nym.hush.com (vedaal at nym.hush.com) Date: Tue, 19 Jun 2012 13:50:47 -0400 Subject: way to see what cipher/algo was used to create your key? Message-ID: <20120619175047.943EAA6E42@smtp.hushmail.com> Sam Smith smickson at hotmail.com wrote on: Tue Jun 19 01:30:44 CEST 2012 >a way to learn what cipher & hash was used to create the secret key? export your secret key as seckey.asc then do gpg --list-packets seckey.asc here is an example of one of mine: V:\z\>gpg --list-packets v:\seckey.asc gpg: armor: BEGIN PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK gpg: armor header: Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (MingW32) gpg: armor header: Comment: Acts of Kindness better the World, and protect the Soul :secret key packet: version 4, algo 1, created 1201031494, expires 0 skey[0]: [4096 bits] skey[1]: [17 bits] iter+salt S2K, algo: 10, SHA1 protection, hash: 8, salt: 'version 4' describes the key-version (all current gnupg keys are v4, older keys from pgp were v3, maybe when elliptic curve crypto gets done, there might be a v5 ;-) ) 'algo 1' describes the 'type' of key (RSA, ELG, DSA, etc.) and the 1 refers to RSA the line beginning 'iter+salt' describes the algorithm used to encrypt the secret key, and the hash used. 'algo: 10' is Twofish 'hash 8' is SHA256 (not the 'defaults') your key will probably show 'algo: 9' (AES256) and 'hash: 2' (SHA1) (btw, Should a listing explaining these things be in the FAQ ? ) vedaal From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Tue Jun 19 20:09:14 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Tue, 19 Jun 2012 14:09:14 -0400 Subject: way to see what cipher/algo was used to create your key? In-Reply-To: <20120619175047.943EAA6E42@smtp.hushmail.com> References: <20120619175047.943EAA6E42@smtp.hushmail.com> Message-ID: <4FE0C04A.2050107@sixdemonbag.org> On 06/19/2012 01:50 PM, vedaal at nym.hush.com wrote: > (btw, Should a listing explaining these things be in the FAQ ? ) I won't put it in there. Once you open the door to that, then you have to answer questions about "so how do I change these settings?" and then you're explaining half of the edit-key interface. You have to draw the line somewhere. I draw it at explaining politely and reasonably that the defaults are safe for the overwhelming majority of users and there's no need to change them. From wk at gnupg.org Tue Jun 19 22:27:32 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Tue, 19 Jun 2012 22:27:32 +0200 Subject: way to see what cipher/algo was used to create your key? In-Reply-To: <20120619175047.943EAA6E42@smtp.hushmail.com> (vedaal@nym.hush.com's message of "Tue, 19 Jun 2012 13:50:47 -0400") References: <20120619175047.943EAA6E42@smtp.hushmail.com> Message-ID: <87vcinm4i3.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Tue, 19 Jun 2012 19:50, vedaal at nym.hush.com said: > (all current gnupg keys are v4, older keys from pgp were v3, maybe > when elliptic curve crypto gets done, there might be a v5 ;-) ) 2.1beta has ECC support as described by RFC6637. Still using v4. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From quannguyen at mbm.vn Wed Jun 20 03:32:56 2012 From: quannguyen at mbm.vn (Quan Nguyen) Date: Wed, 20 Jun 2012 08:32:56 +0700 Subject: Import private key from PEM file? In-Reply-To: <874nq7pxuu.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <4FDEE204.9090103@mbm.vn> <87395trnwn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FDEF1E6.10300@mbm.vn> <87sjdtq845.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FDEFFF9.1070908@mbm.vn> <877gv4rapr.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FDFF546.3060506@mbm.vn> <874nq7pxuu.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: Thanks for your help. On Tue, Jun 19, 2012 at 2:25 PM, Werner Koch wrote: > On Tue, 19 Jun 2012 05:43, quannguyen at mbm.vn said: > > > (Maybe you forgot that I asked 2 questions in the first email > > No. > > >> p.s. > >> Maybe http://gnupg.org/service.html is of help to you. > > > Salam-Shalom, > > Werner > > -- > Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. > > -- Regards, Qu?n -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jw72253 at verizon.net Wed Jun 20 06:45:44 2012 From: jw72253 at verizon.net (John) Date: Tue, 19 Jun 2012 23:45:44 -0500 Subject: idea.dll Message-ID: Hello. When I had a 32-bit version of Windows XP, I was able to utilize both the newer version of Gpg 2.0.X and the older 1.4.X version of it at the same time, and I would like to do the same thing now that I have a 64-bit version of Win7. I have installed the newer version, as well as the GPA gui for it, and it appears to be working well. Along with the 1.4.X version on Windows XP, I also made use of the "idea.dll" extension, and it worked just fine. I am wondering now whether the same "idea.dll" file would work on a 64-bit Windows OS. If so, where exactly should I put it? The instructions I followed for XP had me put it into the bin directory and to reference it like so: load-extension C:\Progra~1\GNU\GnuPG\lib\idea.dll However, in Win 7 there is no such directory with the installation of Gpg. Should I create one below the current program installation directory or simply put it into the program's installation directory where the "exe" is placed? Thanks. From laurent.jumet at skynet.be Wed Jun 20 07:56:04 2012 From: laurent.jumet at skynet.be (Laurent Jumet) Date: Wed, 20 Jun 2012 07:56:04 +0200 Subject: idea.dll In-Reply-To: Message-ID: Hello John ! "John" wrote: > load-extension C:\Progra~1\GNU\GnuPG\lib\idea.dll > However, in Win 7 there is no such directory with the installation of Gpg. > Should I create one below the current program installation directory or > simply put it into the program's installation directory where the "exe" is > placed? Thanks. It's defined in GPG.CONF: load-extension c:\lib\gnupg\idea.dll -- Laurent Jumet KeyID: 0xCFAF704C From wk at gnupg.org Wed Jun 20 10:29:28 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Wed, 20 Jun 2012 10:29:28 +0200 Subject: idea.dll In-Reply-To: (Laurent Jumet's message of "Wed, 20 Jun 2012 07:56:04 +0200") References: Message-ID: <87r4tamlnb.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Wed, 20 Jun 2012 07:56, laurent.jumet at skynet.be said: > It's defined in GPG.CONF: Nope. GnuPG-2 does not support loading of extensions. the option is a dummy option. The reason for this is that crypto operations are done by Libgcrypt and not by gpg.exe. The next version of Libgcrypt will support IDEA and thus GnuPG 2.1 will be able to decrypt old (i.e. PGP 2) files, directly. However, using IDEA is not a good idea, we have far better algorithms for ages. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From peter at digitalbrains.com Wed Jun 20 10:56:11 2012 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Wed, 20 Jun 2012 10:56:11 +0200 Subject: Need a GUI for e ncrypt/decrypt in Ubuntu 11.10 In-Reply-To: <4FDC6614.7010305@hotmail.com> References: <4FDB6558.8060200@hotmail.com> <4FDC5D7B.1090609@digitalbrains.com> <4FDC6614.7010305@hotmail.com> Message-ID: <4FE1902B.4010604@digitalbrains.com> On 16/06/12 12:55, Mika Suomalainen wrote: > Does the "gpg --edit-key" have a name? I just call it using GnuPG from the command line... Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at http://wwwhome.cs.utwente.nl/~lebbing/pubkey.txt From jw72253 at verizon.net Wed Jun 20 19:10:15 2012 From: jw72253 at verizon.net (John) Date: Wed, 20 Jun 2012 12:10:15 -0500 Subject: choice of encryption algorithms Message-ID: Hello. When someone uses my public key to encrypt a message to me, what prevents them from trying to use an encryption algorithm of his choice. In other words, does the public key itself limit the options available to the person sending the message? Thanks. John From jw72253 at verizon.net Wed Jun 20 19:03:23 2012 From: jw72253 at verizon.net (John) Date: Wed, 20 Jun 2012 12:03:23 -0500 Subject: idea.dll In-Reply-To: <87r4tamlnb.fsf__2553.46998242221$1340181117$gmane$org@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <87r4tamlnb.fsf__2553.46998242221$1340181117$gmane$org@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: "Werner Koch" wrote in message news:<87r4tamlnb.fsf__2553.46998242221$1340181117$gmane$org at vigenere.g10code.de>... > On Wed, 20 Jun 2012 07:56, laurent.jumet at skynet.be said: > > > It's defined in GPG.CONF: > > Nope. GnuPG-2 does not support loading of extensions. the option is a > dummy option. The reason for this is that crypto operations are done by > Libgcrypt and not by gpg.exe. > > The next version of Libgcrypt will support IDEA and thus GnuPG 2.1 will > be able to decrypt old (i.e. PGP 2) files, directly. However, using > IDEA is not a good idea, we have far better algorithms for ages. Hi, Werner. When I have to make use of "idea.dll" so that I can decrypt messages that were encrypted with it, I then use Gpg 1.4.x, and I have it in an altogether separate folder from the real installation of Gpg 2.0.x. I could not agree with you more in regard to its comparatively inferior algorithms, but that does not preclude my needing it from time to time. Is there any reason I should not place it in the same folder as the gpg.exe version 1.4.x and then make reference to it there? Thanks. From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Wed Jun 20 19:18:28 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Wed, 20 Jun 2012 13:18:28 -0400 Subject: choice of encryption algorithms In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <4FE205E4.5020401@sixdemonbag.org> On 6/20/12 1:10 PM, John wrote: > When someone uses my public key to encrypt a message to me, what > prevents them from trying to use an encryption algorithm of his choice. Nothing. They can use --cipher-algo to force whatever symmetric algorithm they wish. This may wind up with a message that you're unable to read -- for instance, if your recipient forces AES256 and you're using PGP 7.0, you'll be unable to read it. (This is why most of us advise against using --cipher-algo.) The certificate does list what algorithms you're capable of reading, and most well-behaved OpenPGP applications will interpret that as ranked preferences ("I most prefer this, then that, then the other"). However, this is purely advisory and the sender can easily ignore it. From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Wed Jun 20 19:33:29 2012 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Wed, 20 Jun 2012 13:33:29 -0400 Subject: choice of encryption algorithms In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <4D6E19FA-34D7-43A5-BBFC-136888CB2C7F@jabberwocky.com> On Jun 20, 2012, at 1:10 PM, John wrote: > Hello. > > When someone uses my public key to encrypt a message to me, what prevents them from trying to use an encryption algorithm of his choice. In other words, does the public key itself limit the options available to the person sending the message? Thanks. Yes, it does. The public key contains a list of all algorithms that you can (or are willing to) accept (you can see your own list with --edit-key and the "showpref" command). By default, the sending GPG consults this list when picking an algorithm to ensure it does not pick one that you can't/won't handle. However, note that the sender (if they choose to), can override this default and pick whatever they like. This is not recommended as it can result in a message that you, the recipient, can't read, but senders do have that power. David From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Wed Jun 20 20:30:20 2012 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Wed, 20 Jun 2012 14:30:20 -0400 Subject: choice of encryption algorithms In-Reply-To: <4FE205E4.5020401@sixdemonbag.org> References: <4FE205E4.5020401@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <0496B190-AE0B-4713-AFC5-DD33CC1198D2@jabberwocky.com> On Jun 20, 2012, at 1:18 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > On 6/20/12 1:10 PM, John wrote: >> When someone uses my public key to encrypt a message to me, what >> prevents them from trying to use an encryption algorithm of his choice. > > Nothing. They can use --cipher-algo to force whatever symmetric algorithm they wish. This may wind up with a message that you're unable to read -- for instance, if your recipient forces AES256 and you're using PGP 7.0, you'll be unable to read it. (This is why most of us advise against using --cipher-algo.) > > The certificate does list what algorithms you're capable of reading, and most well-behaved OpenPGP applications will interpret that as ranked preferences ("I most prefer this, then that, then the other"). However, this is purely advisory and the sender can easily ignore it. Note that just the ranking of preferences is advisory. The use of algorithms that are on the list, however, is required by the spec: An implementation MUST NOT use a symmetric algorithm that is not in the recipient's preference list. and later If an implementation can decrypt a message that a keyholder doesn't have in their preferences, the implementation SHOULD decrypt the message anyway, but MUST warn the keyholder that the protocol has been violated. So if you ever get a warning message like: gpg: WARNING: cipher algorithm AES256 not found in recipient preferences That means the sender violated the spec (perhaps most likely by having an old copy of your key with a pref that you removed at some point, but you never know). David From wk at gnupg.org Wed Jun 20 20:42:27 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Wed, 20 Jun 2012 20:42:27 +0200 Subject: idea.dll In-Reply-To: (John's message of "Wed, 20 Jun 2012 12:03:23 -0500") References: <87r4tamlnb.fsf__2553.46998242221$1340181117$gmane$org@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <8762aln7u4.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Wed, 20 Jun 2012 19:03, jw72253 at verizon.net said: > Is there any reason I should not place it in the same folder as the > gpg.exe version 1.4.x and then make reference to it there? Thanks. I think this is okay. -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From laurent.jumet at skynet.be Thu Jun 21 06:03:37 2012 From: laurent.jumet at skynet.be (Laurent Jumet) Date: Thu, 21 Jun 2012 06:03:37 +0200 Subject: choice of encryption algorithms In-Reply-To: Message-ID: Hello John ! "John" wrote: > When someone uses my public key to encrypt a message to me, what prevents > them from trying to use an encryption algorithm of his choice. In other > words, does the public key itself limit the options available to the person > sending the message? Thanks. First of all, you can list all the allowed protocols on your system using: GPG --version --verbose It looks like this: ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ? Cipher-Algos: ? Digest-Algos: ? Compress-Algos: ? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ? ? ? Z0 Uncompressed ? ? S1 IDEA ? H1 MD5 ? Z1 ZIP ? ? S2 3DES ? H2 SHA1 ? Z2 ZLIB ? ? S3 CAST5 ? H3 RIPEMD160 ? Z3 BZIP2 ? ? S4 BLOWFISH ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? S7 AES ? ? ? ? S8 AES192 ? H8 SHA256 ? ? ? S9 AES256 ? H9 SHA384 ? ? ? S10 TWOFISH ? H10 SHA512 ? ? ? S11 CAMELLIA128 ? H11 SHA224 ? ? ? S12 CAMELLIA192 ? ? ? ? S13 CAMELLIA256 ? ? ? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Using the EditKey command with "pref" and "showpref" on your own key, shows you what are the actual settings. Using the list above, you can choose the order you want those algorithms to be used. You can establish your own list that means "I'd like that one first if possible, and if not the 2nd; and if not the 3rd; and so on". GPG compares your wishes to the receipient ones, and chooses the first that match. So, using the board above, you can set GPG.CONF with something like this: default-preference-list S7 S11 S12 S13 S1 S10 S3 S4 S2 S9 S8 H3 H8 H9 H10 H11 H2 H1 Z1 Z2 Z3 Z0 personal-cipher-preferences S7 S11 S12 S13 S1 S10 S3 S4 S2 S9 S8 personal-digest-preferences H3 H8 H9 H10 H11 H2 H1 personal-compress-preferences Z1 Z2 Z3 Z0 If you set an unsupported preference, GPG complaints. When you made all your choices, you can brand your public key with them, using the EditKey menu and "setpref default-preference-list"; after that, you can send your public key to servers in order to update them. From that moment, anybody who wants to send you a message knows what algorithms you are preferently using, and he will take the first of your choices that matches his choices. That works, as I experimented it: a previous version of GPG didn't accepted algorithm Z3 (BZIP2) and as I had it branded in my public key on servers, I couldnt decrypt messages any more... Changing my "setpref" without Z3 an uploading my key on servers, restored the functionality as no more messages came in Z3. -- Laurent Jumet KeyID: 0xCFAF704C From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Thu Jun 21 06:52:25 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Thu, 21 Jun 2012 00:52:25 -0400 Subject: choice of encryption algorithms In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <4FE2A889.9080800@sixdemonbag.org> On 06/21/2012 12:03 AM, Laurent Jumet wrote: > default-preference-list S7 S11 S12 S13... > personal-cipher-preferences S7 S11 S12... > personal-digest-preferences H3 H8 H9 H10... > personal-compress-preferences Z1 Z2 Z3 Z0 Please don't do this. It's error-prone. Those are machine-readable numbers, not human-readable ones. Use the human-readable ones: for instance, default-preference-list TWOFISH 3DES SHA256 SHA224 RIPEMD160 ... will set both digest and cipher preferences. You can also set compress prefs in that line, too. Also, default-preference-list is redundant with the other -preferences. From laurent.jumet at skynet.be Thu Jun 21 07:36:09 2012 From: laurent.jumet at skynet.be (Laurent Jumet) Date: Thu, 21 Jun 2012 07:36:09 +0200 Subject: choice of encryption algorithms In-Reply-To: <4FE2A889.9080800@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: Hello Robert ! "Robert J. Hansen" wrote: > On 06/21/2012 12:03 AM, Laurent Jumet wrote: >> default-preference-list S7 S11 S12 S13... >> personal-cipher-preferences S7 S11 S12... >> personal-digest-preferences H3 H8 H9 H10... >> personal-compress-preferences Z1 Z2 Z3 Z0 > Please don't do this. It's error-prone. Those are machine-readable > numbers, not human-readable ones. Use the human-readable ones: for > instance, > default-preference-list TWOFISH 3DES SHA256 SHA224 RIPEMD160 > ... will set both digest and cipher preferences. You can also set > compress prefs in that line, too. Don't you think that the command line could be too long, using the algorithms names instead of their tags? > Also, default-preference-list is redundant with the other -preferences. I was wondering about that. -- Laurent Jumet KeyID: 0xCFAF704C From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Thu Jun 21 07:47:26 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Thu, 21 Jun 2012 01:47:26 -0400 Subject: choice of encryption algorithms In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <4FE2B56E.4010008@sixdemonbag.org> On 06/21/2012 01:36 AM, Laurent Jumet wrote: > Don't you think that the command line could be too long, using the > algorithms names instead of their tags? No, because this is the sort of thing that usually goes in a gpg.conf file. I can't think of a use case for default-preference-list on the command line -- not saying none exist, mind you, but only that I can't think of one. From johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl Thu Jun 21 12:31:15 2012 From: johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl (Johan Wevers) Date: Thu, 21 Jun 2012 12:31:15 +0200 Subject: choice of encryption algorithms In-Reply-To: <4FE2B56E.4010008@sixdemonbag.org> References: <4FE2B56E.4010008@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <4FE2F7F3.7090300@vulcan.xs4all.nl> On 21-06-2012 7:47, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > No, because this is the sort of thing that usually goes in a gpg.conf > file. I can't think of a use case for default-preference-list on the > command line -- not saying none exist, mind you, but only that I can't > think of one. I have met one in practice: to override an invalid list on the key itself. The key in queston was generated with PGP and said it supported IDEA, that being my algorithm of first choice at the time I used that. However, the key owner could not read my message because she had imported the key in GnuPG (done by someone else more computer literated), did not have the idea plugin installed and also didn't know how to do that or how to manually change preferences on the key. So I had to override locally. -- ir. J.C.A. Wevers PGP/GPG public keys at http://www.xs4all.nl/~johanw/pgpkeys.html From smickson at hotmail.com Thu Jun 21 15:00:04 2012 From: smickson at hotmail.com (Sam Smith) Date: Thu, 21 Jun 2012 09:00:04 -0400 Subject: "SHA1 Protection" from way to see what cipher/algo was used to create your key? In-Reply-To: <20120619175047.943EAA6E42@smtp.hushmail.com> References: <20120619175047.943EAA6E42@smtp.hushmail.com> Message-ID: when running the command: gpg --list-packets there is an outputted line that reads: "SHA1 protection" I did some looking online and saw that this line stays even when people change their hash algorithm to something else (like SHA2). If the "SHA1 protection" is not indicating the use of SHA1 hash, what is it communicating? If a SHA2 hash is being used to mangle the passphrase of the secret key being stored on the disk, why is the line "SHA1 protection" being shown? > Date: Tue, 19 Jun 2012 13:50:47 -0400 > To: gnupg-users at gnupg.org > Subject: way to see what cipher/algo was used to create your key? > From: vedaal at nym.hush.com > > Sam Smith smickson at hotmail.com wrote on: > Tue Jun 19 01:30:44 CEST 2012 > > >a way to learn what cipher & hash was used to create the secret > key? > > > export your secret key as seckey.asc > then do gpg --list-packets seckey.asc > > > here is an example of one of mine: > > V:\z\>gpg --list-packets v:\seckey.asc > gpg: armor: BEGIN PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK > gpg: armor header: Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (MingW32) > gpg: armor header: Comment: Acts of Kindness better the World, and > protect the Soul > :secret key packet: > version 4, algo 1, created 1201031494, expires 0 > skey[0]: [4096 bits] > skey[1]: [17 bits] > iter+salt S2K, algo: 10, SHA1 protection, hash: 8, salt: > > 'version 4' describes the key-version > (all current gnupg keys are v4, older keys from pgp were v3, maybe > when elliptic curve crypto gets done, there might be a v5 ;-) ) > > 'algo 1' describes the 'type' of key (RSA, ELG, DSA, etc.) and the > 1 > refers to RSA > > the line beginning 'iter+salt' describes the algorithm used to > encrypt the secret key, and the hash used. > > 'algo: 10' is Twofish > 'hash 8' is SHA256 > > (not the 'defaults') > your key will probably show 'algo: 9' (AES256) and 'hash: 2' (SHA1) > > > (btw, Should a listing explaining these things be in the FAQ ? ) > > > vedaal > > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Thu Jun 21 15:15:24 2012 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Thu, 21 Jun 2012 09:15:24 -0400 Subject: "SHA1 Protection" from way to see what cipher/algo was used to create your key? In-Reply-To: References: <20120619175047.943EAA6E42@smtp.hushmail.com> Message-ID: <310C0492-EAA4-453A-99B9-2ABFCA699E33@jabberwocky.com> On Jun 21, 2012, at 9:00 AM, Sam Smith wrote: > when running the command: gpg --list-packets > > there is an outputted line that reads: "SHA1 protection" > > I did some looking online and saw that this line stays even when people change their hash algorithm to something else (like SHA2). > > If the "SHA1 protection" is not indicating the use of SHA1 hash, what is it communicating? If a SHA2 hash is being used to mangle the passphrase of the secret key being stored on the disk, why is the line "SHA1 protection" being shown? It means that the secret key is has (in addition to the passphrase) an internal SHA-1 hash to detect tampering. It's basically a large checksum, used to foil attacks that involve modifying the secret key. It's not related to the hash algorithm you use when signing things. David From peter at digitalbrains.com Thu Jun 21 15:57:28 2012 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Thu, 21 Jun 2012 15:57:28 +0200 Subject: "SHA1 Protection" from way to see what cipher/algo was used to create your key? In-Reply-To: References: <20120619175047.943EAA6E42@smtp.hushmail.com> Message-ID: <4FE32848.1060402@digitalbrains.com> On 21/06/12 15:00, Sam Smith wrote: > when running the command: gpg --list-packets > > there is an outputted line that reads: "SHA1 protection" First of all, it seems you understand it, but let me emphasize this: the algorithms you get when using the inspection method vedaal showed you, are /not/ the algorithms used to create your secret key, as you asked. There is no cipher or hashing involved in creating a key; it's just a random number which must satisfy some mathematical properties. Key creation is determining random numbers that satisfy the needed properties. The symmetric cipher and hash algorithm are used to encrypt and protect the secret key; protection is via a password. All the details are in RFC 4880; you could read it at, e.g., [1]. It's a very technical document. I'll take the output vedaal gave as an example: > :secret key packet: > version 4, algo 1, created 1201031494, expires 0 > skey[0]: [4096 bits] > skey[1]: [17 bits] > iter+salt S2K, algo: 10, SHA1 protection, hash: 8, salt: A password is used to protect this key. This password, along with a known, but random "salting" value, is repeatedly fed through SHA256 hashing (hash: 8). This is what "iter+salt S2K" means: A String-To-Key method that iteratively hashes, with a salt. The result of this S2K is a symmetric encryption key. The actual secret part of the secret key is protected by a symmetric cipher, TWOFISH (algo: 10). The secret material is encrypted with TWOFISH using the key the S2K gave. However, there is the possibility for an attacker to modify this secret material. If you don't notice, he has an attack vector on you as he can modify the key you are using to sign and decrypt. To prevent modification, the secret key material is hashed using the SHA1 algorithm, and this hash is stored in the encrypted part. If the attacker modifies the encrypted part, the hash won't check out anymore, and an OpenPGP implementation will reject the key as corrupted. So that's the purpose of the "SHA1 protection". The hashing algorithm you can choose is the one used to create a key with the S2K specifier. The hashing algorithm to protect against modification of the encrypted material is fixed. Note that since it is all inside the encrypted part, a lot of attacks that are possible on hashing algorithms won't work anymore. SHA1 would have to be extremely broken to be problematic for this application. Peter. PS: BTW, the absolute worst possible checksum to use to protect integrity, when put inside a streaming-mode cipher, is a cyclic redundancy check. Which they used in WEP wireless LAN protection. My mouth fell open when I learned about this :). [1] -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at http://wwwhome.cs.utwente.nl/~lebbing/pubkey.txt From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Thu Jun 21 16:27:23 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Thu, 21 Jun 2012 10:27:23 -0400 Subject: "SHA1 Protection" from way to see what cipher/algo was used to create your key? In-Reply-To: <4FE32848.1060402@digitalbrains.com> References: <20120619175047.943EAA6E42@smtp.hushmail.com> <4FE32848.1060402@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <4FE32F4B.3010600@sixdemonbag.org> On 06/21/2012 09:57 AM, Peter Lebbing wrote: > There is no cipher > or hashing involved in creating a key... This may or may not be true, depending on what method of random number generation is being used. ANSI X9.17, Yarrow and Fortuna are three examples of pseudorandom number generators that are built out of cryptographic algorithms. libgcrypt supports at least the former: Linux's /dev/urandom is (I think) Yarrow-based. Nine in ten says the OP doesn't care about this and was operating under a misconception, which you and others have ably corrected. One in ten says we've been misunderstanding what the OP has been asking, and the OP's really asking a technical question about PRNG operation. :) From smickson at hotmail.com Thu Jun 21 16:39:54 2012 From: smickson at hotmail.com (Sam Smith) Date: Thu, 21 Jun 2012 10:39:54 -0400 Subject: "SHA1 Protection" from way to see what cipher/algo was used to create your key? In-Reply-To: <4FE32848.1060402@digitalbrains.com> References: <20120619175047.943EAA6E42@smtp.hushmail.com> , <4FE32848.1060402@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: Thanks for this detailed explanation. I really appreciate it. I've read of theoretical attacks against SHA1. whenever I hear of such things I start to be leery when using such Hash. Seeing the advanced attack capabilities demonstrated by Flame/Stuxnet leads me to believe theoretical is only temporary. I agree though that "SHA1 protection" implementation sounds good. But seems to me it would be safer to use SHA2 for the hash used in producing the symmetric key. > Date: Thu, 21 Jun 2012 15:57:28 +0200 > From: peter at digitalbrains.com > To: smickson at hotmail.com > CC: vedaal at nym.hush.com; gnupg-users at gnupg.org > Subject: Re: "SHA1 Protection" from way to see what cipher/algo was used to create your key? > > On 21/06/12 15:00, Sam Smith wrote: > > when running the command: gpg --list-packets > > > > there is an outputted line that reads: "SHA1 protection" > > First of all, it seems you understand it, but let me emphasize this: the > algorithms you get when using the inspection method vedaal showed you, are /not/ > the algorithms used to create your secret key, as you asked. There is no cipher > or hashing involved in creating a key; it's just a random number which must > satisfy some mathematical properties. Key creation is determining random numbers > that satisfy the needed properties. > > The symmetric cipher and hash algorithm are used to encrypt and protect the > secret key; protection is via a password. > > All the details are in RFC 4880; you could read it at, e.g., [1]. It's a very > technical document. > > I'll take the output vedaal gave as an example: > > > :secret key packet: > > version 4, algo 1, created 1201031494, expires 0 > > skey[0]: [4096 bits] > > skey[1]: [17 bits] > > iter+salt S2K, algo: 10, SHA1 protection, hash: 8, salt: > > A password is used to protect this key. This password, along with a known, but > random "salting" value, is repeatedly fed through SHA256 hashing (hash: 8). This > is what "iter+salt S2K" means: A String-To-Key method that iteratively hashes, > with a salt. The result of this S2K is a symmetric encryption key. > > The actual secret part of the secret key is protected by a symmetric cipher, > TWOFISH (algo: 10). The secret material is encrypted with TWOFISH using the key > the S2K gave. > > However, there is the possibility for an attacker to modify this secret > material. If you don't notice, he has an attack vector on you as he can modify > the key you are using to sign and decrypt. To prevent modification, the secret > key material is hashed using the SHA1 algorithm, and this hash is stored in the > encrypted part. If the attacker modifies the encrypted part, the hash won't > check out anymore, and an OpenPGP implementation will reject the key as corrupted. > > So that's the purpose of the "SHA1 protection". > > The hashing algorithm you can choose is the one used to create a key with the > S2K specifier. The hashing algorithm to protect against modification of the > encrypted material is fixed. Note that since it is all inside the encrypted > part, a lot of attacks that are possible on hashing algorithms won't work > anymore. SHA1 would have to be extremely broken to be problematic for this > application. > > Peter. > > PS: BTW, the absolute worst possible checksum to use to protect integrity, when > put inside a streaming-mode cipher, is a cyclic redundancy check. Which they > used in WEP wireless LAN protection. My mouth fell open when I learned about > this :). > > [1] > > -- > I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. > You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. > My key is available at http://wwwhome.cs.utwente.nl/~lebbing/pubkey.txt -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From dkg at fifthhorseman.net Thu Jun 21 18:39:33 2012 From: dkg at fifthhorseman.net (Daniel Kahn Gillmor) Date: Thu, 21 Jun 2012 12:39:33 -0400 Subject: choice of encryption algorithms In-Reply-To: <4FE2A889.9080800@sixdemonbag.org> References: <4FE2A889.9080800@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <4FE34E45.5000804@fifthhorseman.net> On 06/21/2012 12:52 AM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > Please don't do this. It's error-prone. Those are machine-readable > numbers, not human-readable ones. Use the human-readable ones: for > instance, > > default-preference-list TWOFISH 3DES SHA256 SHA224 RIPEMD160 completely agreed. > Also, default-preference-list is redundant with the other -preferences. i don't think this is the case. default-preference-list describes the default preferences used for new keys. That is, for keys created by the local installation of gpg, the embedded preference list stored in the self-sig is chosen by this value. The personal-*-preferences settings, on the other hand, allow the user of gpg to override the recipient's self-sig's stated preferences, allowing to use the highest-personally-ranked algorithm that the recipient has stated that they can handle. The description in the gpg man page for these options describes them quite well, and it doesn't mention any relationship between them. If there is indeed a relationship, the manual probably needs to change to reflect it. Regards, --dkg -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 1030 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Thu Jun 21 18:54:06 2012 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Thu, 21 Jun 2012 12:54:06 -0400 Subject: choice of encryption algorithms In-Reply-To: <4FE34E45.5000804@fifthhorseman.net> References: <4FE2A889.9080800@sixdemonbag.org> <4FE34E45.5000804@fifthhorseman.net> Message-ID: <886A29EC-B8AA-48BA-82C6-884E34EB871D@jabberwocky.com> On Jun 21, 2012, at 12:39 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: > On 06/21/2012 12:52 AM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: >> Please don't do this. It's error-prone. Those are machine-readable >> numbers, not human-readable ones. Use the human-readable ones: for >> instance, >> >> default-preference-list TWOFISH 3DES SHA256 SHA224 RIPEMD160 > > completely agreed. > >> Also, default-preference-list is redundant with the other -preferences. > > i don't think this is the case. default-preference-list describes the > default preferences used for new keys. That is, for keys created by the > local installation of gpg, the embedded preference list stored in the > self-sig is chosen by this value. You are correct. default-preference-list is to give the, well, default preference list for new keys or the list that is set when you do "updpref" in --edit-key and don't give an explicit list. David From vedaal at nym.hush.com Thu Jun 21 19:05:06 2012 From: vedaal at nym.hush.com (vedaal at nym.hush.com) Date: Thu, 21 Jun 2012 13:05:06 -0400 Subject: idea.dll Message-ID: <20120621170507.0DC0DE6751@smtp.hushmail.com> Werner Koch wk at gnupg.org wrote on Wed Jun 20 10:29:28 CEST 2012 : >The next version of Libgcrypt will support IDEA and thus GnuPG 2.1 >will be able to decrypt old (i.e. PGP 2) files, directly. Will GnuPG 2.x then allow importation of v3 keys? (main reason I still prefer 1.4.x over 2.x) Thanks, vedaal From vedaal at nym.hush.com Thu Jun 21 19:21:28 2012 From: vedaal at nym.hush.com (vedaal at nym.hush.com) Date: Thu, 21 Jun 2012 13:21:28 -0400 Subject: idea.dll Message-ID: <20120621172128.C3D73E674A@smtp.hushmail.com> vedaal at nym.hush.com vedaal at nym.hush.com wrote on Thu Jun 21 19:05:06 CEST 2012 : >Will GnuPG 2.x then allow importation of v3 keys? >(main reason I still prefer 1.4.x over 2.x) Sorry, my mistake, gnupg 2.x does import v3 keys, haven't looked at this aspect for a while, as I couldn't use my old v3 key in gnupg 2, without changing the algorithm protecting it, looking forward to the idea support in 2.x, Thanks From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Thu Jun 21 20:19:05 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Thu, 21 Jun 2012 14:19:05 -0400 Subject: choice of encryption algorithms In-Reply-To: <4FE34E45.5000804@fifthhorseman.net> References: <4FE2A889.9080800@sixdemonbag.org> <4FE34E45.5000804@fifthhorseman.net> Message-ID: <4FE36599.3000800@sixdemonbag.org> On 6/21/2012 12:39 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: > i don't think this is the case. You and David are completely right, and I have no idea what I was thinking. Thank you both for the correction! From dkg at fifthhorseman.net Thu Jun 21 22:38:31 2012 From: dkg at fifthhorseman.net (Daniel Kahn Gillmor) Date: Thu, 21 Jun 2012 16:38:31 -0400 Subject: idea.dll In-Reply-To: <20120621172128.C3D73E674A@smtp.hushmail.com> References: <20120621172128.C3D73E674A@smtp.hushmail.com> Message-ID: <4FE38647.8090306@fifthhorseman.net> On 06/21/2012 01:21 PM, vedaal at nym.hush.com wrote: > vedaal at nym.hush.com vedaal at nym.hush.com wrote on > Thu Jun 21 19:05:06 CEST 2012 : > >> Will GnuPG 2.x then allow importation of v3 keys? >> (main reason I still prefer 1.4.x over 2.x) > > Sorry, > my mistake, gnupg 2.x does import v3 keys, unfortunately, this is indeed the case. v3 keys have a serious vulnerability in that their fingerprint mechanism is trivially gamable, so long keyid collisions are easy. You should retire your v3 key, as should anyone else with such a key. Please! --dkg -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 1030 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Thu Jun 21 23:06:33 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Thu, 21 Jun 2012 17:06:33 -0400 Subject: idea.dll In-Reply-To: <4FE38647.8090306@fifthhorseman.net> References: <20120621172128.C3D73E674A@smtp.hushmail.com> <4FE38647.8090306@fifthhorseman.net> Message-ID: <4FE38CD9.80900@sixdemonbag.org> On 06/21/2012 04:38 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: > unfortunately, this is indeed the case. v3 keys have a serious > vulnerability in that their fingerprint mechanism is trivially gamable, > so long keyid collisions are easy. It's quite a bit worse than that, really. If I understand things correctly, the news media and antivirus companies are reporting that the Flame malware used an MD5 collision to get their malware to report that it had been signed by Microsoft. If true, that's a clear sign that MD5-based signatures of all sorts are now suspect. I wish I could say that this puts the final nail in PGP 2.6's coffin, but the reality is there's a huge installed userbase that won't change for love or money. All we can do is encourage people to not join them. From vedaal at nym.hush.com Fri Jun 22 16:21:35 2012 From: vedaal at nym.hush.com (vedaal at nym.hush.com) Date: Fri, 22 Jun 2012 10:21:35 -0400 Subject: ideal.dll Message-ID: <20120622142135.84E5EE6740@smtp.hushmail.com> Daniel Kahn Gillmor dkg at fifthhorseman.net wrote on Thu Jun 21 22:38:31 CEST 2012 : >v3 keys have a serious vulnerability in that their fingerprint mechanism is trivially gamable, so long keyid collisions are easy. The 'serious vulnerability' you refer to, is trivially countered by simply listing the keysize together with the fingerprint. The 'long keyid collisions' (which consist of generating new keys over and over again, until getting one whose fingerprint matches the target figerprint, is only possible with today's resources, by *not constraining the size of the key* (e.g. the 'fake key' might have 2791 bits, and so, won't fool any of the remailer crowd that persists in using pgp 2.x.) If you have any evidence that such collisions are possible with the resultant keysize being the same as the target keysize, please post, thanks. >You should retire your v3 key, as should anyone else with such a key. Please! Have made 'minimal' headway in trying to convince remailer people to use gnupg and give up v3 keys. Some remailers do use gnupg. Main user arguments in holding onto pgp 2.x, isn't some bizarre nostalgia, (they are willing to use Diastry's version which accepts all hashes gnupg accepts (not just md5) and , except for Camellia, all symmetric algorithms that gnupg accepts). ( I haven't used classic pgp2 since the first Disastry verion came out.) These are people who actually read each line of the source code of pgp2.x. I've asked in the past, if there could be a 'minimalist' gnupg version, (e.g., using only RSA, 3DES, SHA1, and SHA 256 and maybe only vintage necessary gnupg options) so that the source code is small enough that someone can read it from scratch in a reasonable amount of time (and not dependent on 'just keeping up with the 'diffs'.) It would still be compatible with current gnupg, which would, by default, honor the 3DES preferences in the 'minimalist' version. ( I wish I were fluent in C, and could write patches myself, and cannibalize the early versions of gnupg, and come up with a draft of code that just needs to be audited, fixed, and vetted, instead of begging for features, but I'm not anywhere near ready :-((( , so I understand the futility/arrogance of asking for so much work to be done, and for free, and am 'not pushing' it. ) In any event, I have other newer keys, and rarely use my v3 key except for people who insist on it. vedaal From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Fri Jun 22 17:23:11 2012 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Fri, 22 Jun 2012 11:23:11 -0400 Subject: ideal.dll In-Reply-To: <20120622142135.84E5EE6740@smtp.hushmail.com> References: <20120622142135.84E5EE6740@smtp.hushmail.com> Message-ID: On Jun 22, 2012, at 10:21 AM, vedaal at nym.hush.com wrote: > Daniel Kahn Gillmor dkg at fifthhorseman.net wrote on > Thu Jun 21 22:38:31 CEST 2012 : > >> v3 keys have a serious > vulnerability in that their fingerprint mechanism is trivially > gamable, > so long keyid collisions are easy. > > The 'serious vulnerability' you refer to, is trivially countered by > simply listing the keysize together with the fingerprint. There is more than one attack against V3. There is the "bit sliding" attack, where you can forge the whole fingerprint, but as a side effect it changes the keysize, and there is the DEADBEEF attack where you can forge the key ID, but not the fingerprint. I believe Daniel is referring to DEADBEEF here. Using DEADBEEF, I can make a V3 key with a 64-bit key ID without affecting the keysize. It's an old attack, but is receiving more interest recently for some reason. > If you have any evidence that such collisions are possible with the > resultant keysize being the same as the target keysize, please > post, thanks. I just sent you a private mail containing a key with your key ID ;) David From aaron.toponce at gmail.com Fri Jun 22 17:42:36 2012 From: aaron.toponce at gmail.com (Aaron Toponce) Date: Fri, 22 Jun 2012 09:42:36 -0600 Subject: ideal.dll In-Reply-To: <20120622142135.84E5EE6740@smtp.hushmail.com> References: <20120622142135.84E5EE6740@smtp.hushmail.com> Message-ID: <20120622154235.GW14908@eightyeight.xmission.com> On Fri, Jun 22, 2012 at 10:21:35AM -0400, vedaal at nym.hush.com wrote: > vulnerability in that their fingerprint mechanism is trivially > gamable, > so long keyid collisions are easy. [snip] Please fix your mail client. It is breaking threads. Thanks, -- . o . o . o . . o o . . . o . . . o . o o o . o . o o . . o o o o . o . . o o o o . o o o -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 519 bytes Desc: not available URL: From d.w.chadwick at kent.ac.uk Fri Jun 22 17:54:35 2012 From: d.w.chadwick at kent.ac.uk (David Chadwick) Date: Fri, 22 Jun 2012 16:54:35 +0100 Subject: Visible Password Message-ID: <4FE4953B.7020701@kent.ac.uk> Hi All I was demonstrating GPA for the first time to a class of students yesterday and a very strange thing happened. (Note that I am new to GPA, having used OpenPGP for the last 10 years, so I am not familiar with its "normal" behaviour). When I signed a message in the clipboard and was asked for my private key password, I typed it in, and to my horror saw that the password was displayed in the clear in another small window at the bottom left hand side of the screen, instead of showing as **** in the normal password window. The class thought this was very humorous. This small window then disappeared (without me doing anything). Later on in class I decided to change my password, and this time, when the new password screen appeared, and I typed in my new password, and it also appeared in a new small window, in the clear, at the bottom left hand side of the screen. Then it disappeared. Has anyone every come across anything like this before? I have tried to repeat this several times since the class, and am unable to. My PC was running very slowly at the time of the demo and I initially wondered if it was a timing issue. Otherwise I can only think that a very clever student in the class had hacked into my PC (which was connected to the wireless Internet the whole time) during the lecture, and had placed the key pop-up window there on cue to capture my passwords as I typed. But this would seem to be a very difficult thing to do, and a very clever student regards David -- ***************************************************************** David W. Chadwick, BSc PhD Professor of Information Systems Security School of Computing, University of Kent, Canterbury, CT2 7NF Skype Name: davidwchadwick Tel: +44 1227 82 3221 Fax +44 1227 762 811 Mobile: +44 77 96 44 7184 Email: D.W.Chadwick at kent.ac.uk Home Page: http://www.cs.kent.ac.uk/people/staff/dwc8/index.html Research Web site: http://www.cs.kent.ac.uk/research/groups/iss/index.html Entrust key validation string: MLJ9-DU5T-HV8J PGP Key ID is 0xBC238DE5 ***************************************************************** From david at gbenet.com Fri Jun 22 18:04:40 2012 From: david at gbenet.com (david at gbenet.com) Date: Fri, 22 Jun 2012 17:04:40 +0100 Subject: Visible Password In-Reply-To: <4FE4953B.7020701@kent.ac.uk> References: <4FE4953B.7020701@kent.ac.uk> Message-ID: <4FE49798.6070302@gbenet.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 22/06/12 16:54, David Chadwick wrote: > Hi All > > I was demonstrating GPA for the first time to a class of students yesterday and a very > strange thing happened. (Note that I am new to GPA, having used OpenPGP for the last > 10 years, so I am not familiar with its "normal" behaviour). When I signed a message in > the clipboard and was asked for my private key password, I typed it in, and to my > horror saw that the password was displayed in the clear in another small window at the > bottom left hand side of the screen, instead of showing as **** in the normal password > window. The class thought this was very humorous. This small window then disappeared > (without me doing anything). Later on in class I decided to change my password, and > this time, when the new password screen appeared, and I typed in my new password, and > it also appeared in a new small window, in the clear, at the bottom left hand side of > the screen. Then it disappeared. > > Has anyone every come across anything like this before? > > I have tried to repeat this several times since the class, and am unable to. My PC was > running very slowly at the time of the demo and I initially wondered if it was a timing > issue. > > Otherwise I can only think that a very clever student in the class had hacked into my > PC (which was connected to the wireless Internet the whole time) during the lecture, > and had placed the key pop-up window ther braine on cue to capture my passwords as I > typed. But this would seem to be a very difficult thing to do, and a very clever > student > > regardst > > David > Hello David, GPA on Linux has not done this - is it Windows? What other applications were running at the time? Perhaps one of them "captured" it - your passphrase? All I can think of is that you started a programme or a log-in that required a password - that programme was still running and captured your passphrase - but their are better brains then me :) David - -- https://linuxcounter.net/user/512854.html - http://gbenet.com/blog - cryptology - for books how-to's - mailing lists and more -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJP5JeYAAoJEOJpqm7flRExFY8H/2hR73oDIRNDTCkDimFB0BWi LrEnUSmseDNf5OGYOFZqyLnFvSEAz0/BnzvWfoQZWELmZJkeHvHTg9F1reatircU Ty7yRZvILtc8xnpvkKw06drcm4hQ9ZX5ReNgmX74ak3jTKUUorURP6FRKuCGI27y hC+8u/LXkYt4fUpJhbjGoFQvf9FGTqyVjJqtT+xnRc2bMGvcScdlpOjhaX3Z8krS FqRqkBSG4LnduhD3HBQj0MIWNnKcE+kttT8nrs9t+eYhD9xToEApG+D57YnnZH/V wKCMpFE/vdAm/vho6eHsUKQETyChoaZOvLVQkZF2zm4wJlhhTr3peRmTcM3URsM= =e/KO -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From vedaal at nym.hush.com Fri Jun 22 18:39:12 2012 From: vedaal at nym.hush.com (vedaal at nym.hush.com) Date: Fri, 22 Jun 2012 12:39:12 -0400 Subject: ideal.dll Message-ID: <20120622163912.EFC0BE673F@smtp.hushmail.com> On Fri, 22 Jun 2012 11:23:27 -0400 David Shaw wrote: >There is more than one attack against V3. There is the "bit >sliding" attack, where you can forge the whole fingerprint, but as >a side effect it changes the keysize, and there is the DEADBEEF >attack where you can forge the key ID, but not the fingerprint. I >believe Daniel is referring to DEADBEEF here. > >Using DEADBEEF, I can make a V3 key with a 64-bit key ID without >affecting the keysize. >I just sent you a private mail containing a key with your key ID >;) Thanks, Cute ;-) but as I posted earlier, " trivially countered by simply listing the keysize together with the fingerprint." vedaal From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Fri Jun 22 18:57:06 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Fri, 22 Jun 2012 12:57:06 -0400 Subject: ideal.dll In-Reply-To: <20120622163912.EFC0BE673F@smtp.hushmail.com> References: <20120622163912.EFC0BE673F@smtp.hushmail.com> Message-ID: <4FE4A3E2.2020402@sixdemonbag.org> On 6/22/2012 12:39 PM, vedaal at nym.hush.com wrote: > " trivially countered by > simply listing the keysize together with the fingerprint." This is, unfortunately, not a trivial fix. Already people don't pay attention to proper validation because the idea of checking the fingerprint is alien to them, they don't understand it, don't understand why it's necessary. Adding another step of "verify the keysize, too" will just compound the problem. If your solution takes the worst part of key validity checking and makes it even worse, then that's not a fix: that's an emergency stopgap measure while people move to a better cryptosystem, such as V4 keys. If you want to call it a stopgap, sure, I'll agree with you. But I can't agree that what you're calling a "fix" actually fixes anything. From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Fri Jun 22 19:04:14 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Fri, 22 Jun 2012 13:04:14 -0400 Subject: Visible Password In-Reply-To: <4FE4953B.7020701@kent.ac.uk> References: <4FE4953B.7020701@kent.ac.uk> Message-ID: <4FE4A58E.7000800@sixdemonbag.org> On 6/22/2012 11:54 AM, David Chadwick wrote: > I was demonstrating GPA for the first time to a class of students > yesterday and a very strange thing happened. I was able to recreate this on GPG4WIN Win7/64, incidentally. The problem does not appear to be in GPA, but in pinentry. It can be recreated with a stock GPG4WIN installation. Steps: 1. Open a command window and launch a gpg --edit-key session 2. Execute a command that requires passphrase entry 3. *Do not* shift focus from the command window 4. Type your passphrase. Nothing is visible. 5. Shift focus to pinentry 6. Type your passphrase and complete the passphrase 7. When focus returns to the command window, you'll see your passphrase has been entered This seems to be caused by pinentry not grabbing keyboard focus. It's a serious bug, all right. From vedaal at nym.hush.com Fri Jun 22 19:44:35 2012 From: vedaal at nym.hush.com (vedaal at nym.hush.com) Date: Fri, 22 Jun 2012 13:44:35 -0400 Subject: ideal.dll Message-ID: <20120622174436.2A8DFE673F@smtp.hushmail.com> On Fri, 22 Jun 2012 12:56:46 -0400 Robert J. Hansen wrote: >On 6/22/2012 12:39 PM, vedaal at nym.hush.com wrote: >> " trivially countered by >> simply listing the keysize together with the fingerprint." > >This is, unfortunately, not a trivial fix. > >Already people don't pay attention to proper validation because >the idea >of checking the fingerprint is alien to them, they don't >understand it, >don't understand why it's necessary. Adding another step of >"verify the >keysize, too" will just compound the problem. I'm not now, (and have not been since the ADK v4 bug was fixed ;-) ), advocating that people should generate v3 keys as a choice. Anyone new to crypto, should definitely use only a v4 key. As you mentioned earlier, the v3 people have an entrenched user- base, and are hardly novices, and 'for them', listing the keysize with the fingerprint, really is trivial. (I never called it a 'fix'. It's an easily describable and do-able workaround for people who need their v3's for their preferred cryptosystem.) vedaal From d.w.chadwick at kent.ac.uk Fri Jun 22 19:54:17 2012 From: d.w.chadwick at kent.ac.uk (David Chadwick) Date: Fri, 22 Jun 2012 18:54:17 +0100 Subject: Visible Password In-Reply-To: <4FE4A58E.7000800@sixdemonbag.org> References: <4FE4953B.7020701@kent.ac.uk> <4FE4A58E.7000800@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <4FE4B149.5070502@kent.ac.uk> Hi Robert yes you are right. It does indeed reveal your passphrase. I also tried to repeat my problem again with GPA, and this time most of my passphrase appeared in a thunderbird window that had not popped up when I started to use GPA after immediately reading your email. Something (I did?) made this window popup in Thunderbird whilst I was working with GPA. But I not sure I fully agree with your diagnostic. Say a PC is running slowly and another window appears just before you start to enter your passphrase, say due to a slow action that had not finished when you started GPA, then this new window will grab the keyboard focus without you realising it (and without pinentry being able to do anything about it). So your passphrase will go to the new window and should be visible there straight away. So I think the problem you mention is slightly different, in that you are working in the command line mode, you type in your password to the command line window, but it is not echoed back to you for some reason. Then you switch to pinentry and it works just fine and exits, then when the focus returns to the command line, your passphrase is echoed back to it. My problem was somewhat different, in that a new window appeared in the GPA window and my password was entered and echoed to it, then the window disappeared again. What I do not know is what caused this new window to pop up. I suspect it was a hacker regards David On 22/06/2012 18:04, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > On 6/22/2012 11:54 AM, David Chadwick wrote: >> I was demonstrating GPA for the first time to a class of students >> yesterday and a very strange thing happened. > > I was able to recreate this on GPG4WIN Win7/64, incidentally. The > problem does not appear to be in GPA, but in pinentry. It can be > recreated with a stock GPG4WIN installation. > > Steps: > > 1. Open a command window and launch a gpg --edit-key session > 2. Execute a command that requires passphrase entry > 3. *Do not* shift focus from the command window > 4. Type your passphrase. Nothing is visible. > 5. Shift focus to pinentry > 6. Type your passphrase and complete the passphrase > 7. When focus returns to the command window, you'll see your > passphrase has been entered > > This seems to be caused by pinentry not grabbing keyboard focus. It's a > serious bug, all right. > > -- ***************************************************************** David W. Chadwick, BSc PhD Professor of Information Systems Security School of Computing, University of Kent, Canterbury, CT2 7NF Skype Name: davidwchadwick Tel: +44 1227 82 3221 Fax +44 1227 762 811 Mobile: +44 77 96 44 7184 Email: D.W.Chadwick at kent.ac.uk Home Page: http://www.cs.kent.ac.uk/people/staff/dwc8/index.html Research Web site: http://www.cs.kent.ac.uk/research/groups/iss/index.html Entrust key validation string: MLJ9-DU5T-HV8J PGP Key ID is 0xBC238DE5 ***************************************************************** From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Fri Jun 22 20:18:13 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Fri, 22 Jun 2012 14:18:13 -0400 Subject: ideal.dll In-Reply-To: <20120622174436.2A8DFE673F@smtp.hushmail.com> References: <20120622174436.2A8DFE673F@smtp.hushmail.com> Message-ID: <4FE4B6E5.2020803@sixdemonbag.org> On 6/22/2012 1:44 PM, vedaal at nym.hush.com wrote: > As you mentioned earlier, the v3 people have an entrenched user- > base, and are hardly novices, and 'for them', listing the keysize > with the fingerprint, really is trivial. If people want to keep using PGP 2.6, let them, but I'm not going to help them do it. If people want an emergency stopgap while they migrate to OpenPGP, I'll happily help. Unfortunately, at this point essentially all the people who would migrate have already migrated. PGP 2.6 is dead, dead, dead, dead, dead, dead, dead, dead, dead, dead. PGP 2.6 is highly dependent on MD5, for which *we have already seen in-the-wild signature forgeries*. That deserves to be underlined and highlighted and carved in twelve-foot-high flaming letters. Anyone using PGP 2.6 today is either in resolute denial of the facts or totally clueless. For this reason, I have no interest in helping out PGP 2.6 users. If they really want to migrate to OpenPGP, then yes, let's do what we can to help in the migration. But anything that lets them continue to stick their heads in the sand and deny reality is -- well, without passing moral judgment on that, I have zero interest in helping. Were it up to me, PGP 2.6 support in GnuPG would be reduced to read-only. So be thankful Werner isn't paying attention to my preferences. :) From d.w.chadwick at kent.ac.uk Fri Jun 22 13:04:10 2012 From: d.w.chadwick at kent.ac.uk (David Chadwick) Date: Fri, 22 Jun 2012 12:04:10 +0100 Subject: Visible Password Message-ID: <4FE4512A.30601@kent.ac.uk> Hi All I was demonstrating GPA for the first time to a class of students yesterday and a very strange thing happened. (Note that I am new to GPA, having used OpenPGP for the last 10 years, so I am not familiar with its "normal" behaviour). When I signed a message in the clipboard and was asked for my private key password, I typed it in, and to my horror saw that the password was displayed in the clear in another small window at the bottom left hand side of the screen, instead of showing as **** in the normal password window. The class thought this was very humorous. This small window then disappeared (without me doing anything). Later on in class I decided to change my password, and this time, when the new password screen appeared, and I typed in my new password, and it also appeared in a new small window, in the clear, at the bottom left hand side of the screen. Then it disappeared. Has anyone every come across anything like this before? I have tried to repeat this several times since the class, and am unable to. My PC was running very slowly at the time of the demo and I initially wondered if it was a timing issue. Otherwise I can only think that a very clever student in the class had hacked into my PC (which was connected to the wireless Internet the whole time) during the lecture, and had placed the key pop-up window there on cue to capture my passwords as I typed. But this would seem to be a very difficult thing to do, and a very clever student regards David -- ***************************************************************** David W. Chadwick, BSc PhD Professor of Information Systems Security School of Computing, University of Kent, Canterbury, CT2 7NF Skype Name: davidwchadwick Tel: +44 1227 82 3221 Fax +44 1227 762 811 Mobile: +44 77 96 44 7184 Email: D.W.Chadwick at kent.ac.uk Home Page: http://www.cs.kent.ac.uk/people/staff/dwc8/index.html Research Web site: http://www.cs.kent.ac.uk/research/groups/iss/index.html Entrust key validation string: MLJ9-DU5T-HV8J PGP Key ID is 0xBC238DE5 ***************************************************************** From vedaal at nym.hush.com Fri Jun 22 20:52:57 2012 From: vedaal at nym.hush.com (vedaal at nym.hush.com) Date: Fri, 22 Jun 2012 14:52:57 -0400 Subject: ideal.dll Message-ID: <20120622185258.1FE1EE673F@smtp.hushmail.com> On Fri, 22 Jun 2012 14:18:25 -0400 Robert J. Hansen wrote: >If people want to keep using PGP 2.6, let them, but I'm not going >to >help them do it. >Were it up to me, PGP 2.6 support in GnuPG would be reduced to >read-only. So be thankful Werner isn't paying attention to my >preferences. :) Actually, I don't mind 'read only' ;-) (The vast majority of v3 users have little interest in anything other than pgp 2.x, and aren't asking for anyone's support, and can always be reached with pgp 2.x. (You might be interested to 'just look' at Disastry's multi 6 version, not necessary to use md5 or idea) WK said that the new libcrypt will support idea. Gnupg 2.x allows importing v3 keys. I have a great many encrypted e-mails and files that were done with v3 keys, (some of them by people no longer in the land of the living ;-(( ) It is useful to be able to decrypt them, and nostalgic to see their verified signatures, and am thankful to WK for allowing this in gnupg 1.x, and soon in gnupg 2.x. Am somewhat surprised by the unprovoked V3 rants, when I asked for nothing from anyone, and only thanked WK for allowing it to happen. vedaal From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Fri Jun 22 21:40:54 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Fri, 22 Jun 2012 15:40:54 -0400 Subject: ideal.dll In-Reply-To: <20120622185258.1FE1EE673F@smtp.hushmail.com> References: <20120622185258.1FE1EE673F@smtp.hushmail.com> Message-ID: <4FE4CA46.5010705@sixdemonbag.org> On 06/22/2012 02:52 PM, vedaal at nym.hush.com wrote: > Am somewhat surprised by the unprovoked V3 rants, when I asked for > nothing from anyone, and only thanked WK for allowing it to happen. Your characterization of "adding the key length is a trivial [something]" is what irritated me. As I mentioned, it's not trivial, it doesn't fix the real underlying problem, it complicates things, and we should be pushing people to move to v4 keys anyway. IMO, any time spent talking about how to 'fix' PGP 2.6 is unserious and wasted. You can't fix it. You can't even mitigate the damage, since forged MD5 signatures are now known to be in the wild. From jw72253 at verizon.net Fri Jun 22 23:22:22 2012 From: jw72253 at verizon.net (John) Date: Fri, 22 Jun 2012 16:22:22 -0500 Subject: GPA and hkps Message-ID: Hello. In this instance I am running 64-bit Win7, and I have GPA installed with Gpg 2.0.17, which came from here: http://www.gpg4win.org/. In my configuration file are these two lines: keyserver hkps://zimmermann.mayfirst.org keyserver-options verbose ca-cert-file=%appdata%\gnupg\mfpl.crt And I do have that certificate in the folder. However, I get an error message when I use GPA to try retrieving a key. The message states this: "There is no plugin available for the keyserver protocol you specified." What am I missing? Thanks. John From sandals at crustytoothpaste.net Sat Jun 23 00:39:19 2012 From: sandals at crustytoothpaste.net (brian m. carlson) Date: Fri, 22 Jun 2012 22:39:19 +0000 Subject: ideal.dll In-Reply-To: <4FE4B6E5.2020803@sixdemonbag.org> References: <20120622174436.2A8DFE673F@smtp.hushmail.com> <4FE4B6E5.2020803@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <20120622223919.GD51014@crustytoothpaste.ath.cx> On Fri, Jun 22, 2012 at 02:18:13PM -0400, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > On 6/22/2012 1:44 PM, vedaal at nym.hush.com wrote: > > As you mentioned earlier, the v3 people have an entrenched user- > > base, and are hardly novices, and 'for them', listing the keysize > > with the fingerprint, really is trivial. > > If people want to keep using PGP 2.6, let them, but I'm not going to > help them do it. If people want an emergency stopgap while they migrate > to OpenPGP, I'll happily help. Unfortunately, at this point essentially > all the people who would migrate have already migrated. There are people using v3 keys that are not using MD5 (other than the fingerprint, obviously). I am one of them. My v3 key (0x560553e7) has v4 self-signatures on it, none of which recommend MD5. All of the preferences are for algorithms presently considered strong (except SHA-1, but removing that isn't possible, unfortunately). Obviously, I'm not using PGP 2.6, since it won't read my key. I have moved to using a v4 key for everyday usage, but my v3 key still has more signatures on it than my v4 key, and I am not planning on revoking it by any means. I still accept signatures on it and data encrypted to it, just like I do with my v4 key. -- brian m. carlson / brian with sandals: Houston, Texas, US +1 832 623 2791 | http://www.crustytoothpaste.net/~bmc | My opinion only OpenPGP: RSA v4 4096b: 88AC E9B2 9196 305B A994 7552 F1BA 225C 0223 B187 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 836 bytes Desc: Digital signature URL: From mailinglists at gusnan.se Sun Jun 24 14:36:02 2012 From: mailinglists at gusnan.se (Andreas =?UTF-8?B?UsO2bm5xdWlzdA==?=) Date: Sun, 24 Jun 2012 14:36:02 +0200 Subject: GPA and users starting with /CN Message-ID: <20120624143602.6d7cf5fe@debian.localdomain> Hi Running GPA lists way more keys than running both gpg --list-keys or gpg --list-secret-keys. Why is this? These keys look a bit suspicious, with user names with stuff like /CN=S-TRUST /CN=10R-CA 1:PN/O=Bundesnetzagentur/C=DE - and I am not able to delete them. Using Debian unstable, I get >The GPGME library returned an unexpected error. The error was: > >No public key > >This is probably a bug in GPA. >GPA will now try to recover from this error. These keys are listed as expired, but I am still not able to delete them - I don't see the point to having them on my system... Could anyone shed some light on the mystery? Is it some bug in GPA that interprets the data in the keys in an incorrect way? best regards /Andreas R?nnquist (still learning GPG / GPA) gusnan at gusnan.se mailinglists at gusnan.se -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 836 bytes Desc: not available URL: From Mike_Acker at charter.net Sun Jun 24 17:48:07 2012 From: Mike_Acker at charter.net (Mike Acker) Date: Sun, 24 Jun 2012 11:48:07 -0400 Subject: Gnupg-users Digest, Vol 105, Issue 38 In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <4FE736B7.8090409@charter.net> On 06/24/2012 09:53, gnupg-users-request at gnupg.org wrote: > Has anyone every come across anything like this before? > > I have tried to repeat this several times since the class, and am > unable to. My PC was running very slowly at the time of the demo and I > initially wondered if it was a timing issue. windows never seems to run quite the same 2 days in a row :-( i only recently learned about its construction around remote procedure calls this essay was insightful http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/10/22/security_report_windows_vs_linux/ all I could say was 'hmmmmmmm' so that's the problem -- /MIKE -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 552 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From wk at gnupg.org Sun Jun 24 22:42:07 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Sun, 24 Jun 2012 22:42:07 +0200 Subject: GPA and users starting with /CN In-Reply-To: <20120624143602.6d7cf5fe@debian.localdomain> ("Andreas =?utf-8?Q?R=C3=B6nnquist=22's?= message of "Sun, 24 Jun 2012 14:36:02 +0200") References: <20120624143602.6d7cf5fe@debian.localdomain> Message-ID: <87y5ncigrk.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Sun, 24 Jun 2012 14:36, mailinglists at gusnan.se said: > /CN=S-TRUST These are X.509 root certificates (e.g. for S/MIME). You may run gpa with the option --disable-x509 if you don't need them. To delete these certificates, use "gpgsm" - it works similar to "gpg". Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From wk at gnupg.org Mon Jun 25 00:11:57 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Mon, 25 Jun 2012 00:11:57 +0200 Subject: ideal.dll In-Reply-To: <20120622185258.1FE1EE673F@smtp.hushmail.com> (vedaal@nym.hush.com's message of "Fri, 22 Jun 2012 14:52:57 -0400") References: <20120622185258.1FE1EE673F@smtp.hushmail.com> Message-ID: <87txy0iclu.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Fri, 22 Jun 2012 20:52, vedaal at nym.hush.com said: > Am somewhat surprised by the unprovoked V3 rants, when I asked for > nothing from anyone, and only thanked WK for allowing it to happen. I am telling for more than a decade that PGP 2 should not be used anymore. The rationale for this was that OpenPGP is a standard and fixes great many problems of PGP 2. GnuPG supports PGP 2 only because this provides a way to migrate away from PGP 2. But: We are now in 2012 - 20 years after PGP 2. A few years later it was obvious that MD5 is broken in practice. I can't understand anyone suggesting to use PGP2. I have heard of people keep on using and suggesting >=4k keys but still being bounded to the broken MD5 and the flawed PGP public key packet and protection. This is plain stupid. The RNG in PGP2 is also questionable because it has not been designed to cope with modern OSes. Mouse and keyboard interrupts are not anymore a good source of entropy - they are not traight hardware interrupts as they used to be on MSDOS or early BSDs. Now some claim that PGP 2 is better because it is so easy to audit the code. Okay, that might be the case for the PGP 2 source. However, who is going to audit the libc, WM (note keyboard interrupts!), kernel, msvc, gcc or hypervisor code. That is far more complex than PGP 2. If I had to write malware I would never directly attack PGP or GPG but go for other components (D-Bus services anyone?). Subvert the most invisible part of the system and not what script kiddies will do. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Mon Jun 25 03:05:08 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Sun, 24 Jun 2012 21:05:08 -0400 Subject: ideal.dll In-Reply-To: <87txy0iclu.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <20120622185258.1FE1EE673F@smtp.hushmail.com> <87txy0iclu.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <4FE7B944.6070209@sixdemonbag.org> On 06/24/2012 06:11 PM, Werner Koch wrote: > I am telling for more than a decade that PGP 2 should not be used > anymore. The list may find my own timeline of MD5 to be worth reading -- it might give some insight into why PGP 2 (in particular the MD5 vulnerabilities) tend to engender such passionate responses. ===== 1993: Bosselaers and Den Boer present a theoretical break on MD5. 1996: Hans Dobbertin breaks MD5. His results are immediately dismissed as "theoretical" when they are nothing but. The security of a Merkle-Damgard hash (such as MD5) cannot be greater than the collision resistance of its compression function. Dobbertin is able to break MD5's compression function in *seconds* on desktop hardware. The MD5 death clock begins ticking down: we know (thanks to Dobbertin) that collisions can be generated against the full MD5 in seconds, but we don't yet know how. 1997: As an undergraduate, I read Dobbertin's paper and get shocked. I start advocating migration to SHA-1 and/or RIPEMD160. Nobody listens to me, and maybe rightfully so: after all, I'm just an undergrad. That said, I'm in good company: lots of other very serious cryppies are advocating the same. 1998: Internal debates begin at PGP Security over whether MD5 should be considered "deprecated" (technically valid, but advised against) or "obsolete" (no longer valid). (This is according to Len Sassaman.) 2001: People are still using MD5 in applications that need a collision-resistant hash function. I begin to get irritated: we've had five years to do migrations. Some important people within the community at that time (e.g., Imad Faiad) proclaim that MD5 is still secure and the vulnerabilities against it are still only theoretical and may never come to pass. I begin to tell people that if we don't see real MD5 collisions within five years to never again believe anything I say. 2002: I enter graduate school for computer science and begin working in electronic voting. I see systems being developed at that time which rely on the collision-resistance of MD5. I begin to get unhinged. In order to prove the ineffectiveness of MD5, I begin to work on MD5 collisions for my Master's thesis. 2004: Shengdong University publishes the first MD5 collisions. I have a very long and dejected talk with my advisor about my degree plans. I take a Master's without thesis, but I tell my advisor I'm looking on the bright side: no one can claim MD5 is still safe, right? 2004: People continue to say MD5 is still safe, claiming that the Shengdong University attacks are impractical -- they can only produce collisions in random data, which means you can't forge a particular signature on particular data. 2005: At Black Hat, Dan Kaminsky starts off with the EFF's website and the NSA's website. Dan is able to, in realtime, tweak the EFF's website with nondisplaying characters in order to make it look unchanged from the original but have the same MD5 hash as the NSA's website. I was there in the audience and my jaw was on the floor. 2005: People continue to say MD5 is still safe, claiming that... oh, God, I lose track at this point, honestly. At this point my brain shuts down and I begin to believe anyone advocating MD5 where collision resistance is necessary is living in resolute denial of the facts. 2008: The first public disclosure of a forged MD5-based SSL certificate. 2008: US-CERT issues a Vulnerability Notice which says in plain language, "Software developers, Certification Authorities, website owners and users should avoid using the MD5 algorithm in any capacity." (Ref: http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/836068 ) 2012: News reports circulate that the Flame virus propagated by forging an MD5-based Microsoft signature. 2012: On this mailing list, 16 years after experts recommended migrating away from MD5 and four years after US-CERT categorically declared MD5 to be a "do not use" algorithm, we're having a discussion about PGP 2.6, which is deeply married to MD5. After reviewing the past 19 years of results on MD5 and the community's reaction to them, all I can say is ... nothing, really. I used to be able to get a lot of outrage summoned up over this subject, but now I've been reduced to making faint whimpering noises. From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Mon Jun 25 03:13:50 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Sun, 24 Jun 2012 21:13:50 -0400 Subject: ideal.dll In-Reply-To: <4FE7B944.6070209@sixdemonbag.org> References: <20120622185258.1FE1EE673F@smtp.hushmail.com> <87txy0iclu.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FE7B944.6070209@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <4FE7BB4E.5050406@sixdemonbag.org> On 06/24/2012 09:05 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > 2005: At Black Hat, Dan Kaminsky starts off with the EFF's website and > the NSA's website. Dan is able to, in realtime, tweak the EFF's > website with nondisplaying characters in order to make it look > unchanged from the original but have the same MD5 hash as the > NSA's website. I was there in the audience and my jaw was on the > floor. Forgot to footnote: the slides from this talk are available on the Web. http://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-jp-05/bh-jp-05-kaminsky/bh-jp-05-kaminsky.pdf From johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl Mon Jun 25 16:18:08 2012 From: johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl (Johan Wevers) Date: Mon, 25 Jun 2012 16:18:08 +0200 Subject: ideal.dll In-Reply-To: <87txy0iclu.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <20120622185258.1FE1EE673F@smtp.hushmail.com> <87txy0iclu.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <4FE87320.5050704@vulcan.xs4all.nl> On 25-06-2012 0:11, Werner Koch wrote: > A few years later it was obvious that MD5 is broken in practice. I can't > understand anyone suggesting to use PGP2. I have heard of people keep > on using and suggesting >=4k keys but still being bounded to the broken > MD5 and the flawed PGP public key packet and protection. This is plain > stupid. That depends on your threat model. If signing messages is not so important to you but encrypting is, this advice is understandable. So let MD5 be broken, it matters not for encryption. Not that I would suggest to start using pgp 2 now, but I have no issues using my old pgp 2 key with GnuPG. > The RNG in PGP2 is also questionable because it has not been designed to > cope with modern OSes. Did anyone study the effect this has in using pgp 2 on modern Linux of windows systems? I have the impression that very serious bugs, like the one in the RNG for pgp 5 for Unix, will eventually surface anyway. > Now some claim that PGP 2 is better because it is so easy to audit the > code. Okay, that might be the case for the PGP 2 source. However, who > is going to audit the libc, WM (note keyboard interrupts!), kernel, > msvc, gcc or hypervisor code. That is far more complex than PGP 2. If > I had to write malware I would never directly attack PGP or GPG but go > for other components (D-Bus services anyone?). Subvert the most > invisible part of the system and not what script kiddies will do. This suggests a threat model where your oponent has almost Stuxnet like capabilities. Since the pgp 2 days we get warnings about adapted compilers, but I've never seen something like that surfacing. I'm not saying it is impossible but I doubt it is practically doable on a large scale. -- ir. J.C.A. Wevers PGP/GPG public keys at http://www.xs4all.nl/~johanw/pgpkeys.html From wk at gnupg.org Mon Jun 25 16:50:17 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Mon, 25 Jun 2012 16:50:17 +0200 Subject: ideal.dll In-Reply-To: <4FE87320.5050704@vulcan.xs4all.nl> (Johan Wevers's message of "Mon, 25 Jun 2012 16:18:08 +0200") References: <20120622185258.1FE1EE673F@smtp.hushmail.com> <87txy0iclu.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FE87320.5050704@vulcan.xs4all.nl> Message-ID: <87zk7rfnti.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Mon, 25 Jun 2012 16:18, johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl said: > That depends on your threat model. If signing messages is not so > important to you but encrypting is, this advice is understandable. So > let MD5 be broken, it matters not for encryption. Not that I would Sure it matters. The self-signatures are bound using MD5 based signatures and thus the user id and the web of trust signatures are prone to MD5 attacks. > Did anyone study the effect this has in using pgp 2 on modern Linux of I don't care about PGP2 nor do the majority of crypto users. The RNG from PGP2 is usually used as an early example on the design of a RNG. > This suggests a threat model where your oponent has almost Stuxnet like > capabilities. Since the pgp 2 days we get warnings about adapted You seem to have that threat model: You created a 2k RSA key back in 2000. Even today it is not possible for any public institution to break a 1024 bit key. Thus why are you still advocationg MD5? > compilers, but I've never seen something like that surfacing. I'm not > saying it is impossible but I doubt it is practically doable on a large The business is that it shall not be visible on the surface. Kernel based key loggers are a standard feature of most trojans. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From Lists.gnupg at mephisto.fastmail.net Mon Jun 25 17:08:23 2012 From: Lists.gnupg at mephisto.fastmail.net (Kevin Kammer) Date: Mon, 25 Jun 2012 11:08:23 -0400 Subject: private key protection In-Reply-To: <20111018131514.GB13421@IUPUI.Edu> References: <87ty774hf2.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4E9C7300.1050901@jeromebaum.com> <20111017211802.182810@gmx.net> <4E9CA1A7.9050305@jeromebaum.com> <4E9CC392.3020002@dougbarton.us> <4E9D6C9F.8000501@jeromebaum.com> <20111018131514.GB13421@IUPUI.Edu> Message-ID: <20120625150822.GA11950@Clarus.mgh.harvard.edu> On Tue, Oct 18, 2011 at 09:15:14AM -0400 Also sprach Mark H. Wood: > On Tue, Oct 18, 2011 at 02:10:07PM +0200, Jerome Baum wrote: > > >> I'm going to lean very far out the window and assume he meant the actual > > >> private key, not the private key-ring/-file/... > > > > > > I'm not sure I understand the distinction you're making there. > > > > One is protected with a passphrase (i.e. it's encrypted), the other is > > in the clear. > > > > If I manage to steal your private keyring, then yes the very strong > > passphrase should grind my attempts to steal your key to a halt. > > Well, not quite. Eventually you would get it. Eventually being... the age of the Earth? Provided one's private key is protected by a suitably "good" passphrase, then the problem of cracking the symmetric encryption used to protect the private key is comparable to the problem of cracking an encrypted message's session key. That is to say, if an attacker has the resources to break the encryption used to protect a private key, in a practical span of time, that implies that they can apply the same techniques to reading your encrypted messages without the private key, which makes stealing it less than essential. From wk at gnupg.org Mon Jun 25 17:44:07 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Mon, 25 Jun 2012 17:44:07 +0200 Subject: private key protection In-Reply-To: <20120625150822.GA11950@Clarus.mgh.harvard.edu> (Kevin Kammer's message of "Mon, 25 Jun 2012 11:08:23 -0400") References: <87ty774hf2.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4E9C7300.1050901@jeromebaum.com> <20111017211802.182810@gmx.net> <4E9CA1A7.9050305@jeromebaum.com> <4E9CC392.3020002@dougbarton.us> <4E9D6C9F.8000501@jeromebaum.com> <20111018131514.GB13421@IUPUI.Edu> <20120625150822.GA11950@Clarus.mgh.harvard.edu> Message-ID: <87vcifflbs.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Mon, 25 Jun 2012 17:08, Lists.gnupg at mephisto.fastmail.net said: > cracking the symmetric encryption used to protect the private key is > comparable to the problem of cracking an encrypted message's session > key. No, it is not. The entropy in a session key matches the size of the session key. The key used to protect the private key is commonly much weaker. A passphrase providing an adequate amount of entropy is not useful because a user won't be able to remember it correctly. Further, a brute force attempt on the protected private keys needs to be done only once, whereas it has to be done for each encrypted message, if you want to target the session key. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Mon Jun 25 17:55:23 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Mon, 25 Jun 2012 11:55:23 -0400 Subject: private key protection In-Reply-To: <20120625150822.GA11950@Clarus.mgh.harvard.edu> References: <87ty774hf2.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4E9C7300.1050901@jeromebaum.com> <20111017211802.182810@gmx.net> <4E9CA1A7.9050305@jeromebaum.com> <4E9CC392.3020002@dougbarton.us> <4E9D6C9F.8000501@jeromebaum.com> <20111018131514.GB13421@IUPUI.Edu> <20120625150822.GA11950@Clarus.mgh.harvard.edu> Message-ID: <4FE889EB.1080108@sixdemonbag.org> On 06/25/2012 11:08 AM, Kevin Kammer wrote: > Eventually being... the age of the Earth? (I do not disagree with Kevin: this is an emphatic agreement.) There is a minimum energy associated with flipping a bit -- something so small that a single proton has the energy to flip about a trillion bits. Let's say you have a remarkably efficient OS that can test a given key while only flipping 10,000 bits. Multiply that times the number of attempts you'd have to make to brute-force a 128-bit key and you get a really big number, so big that it no longer makes sense to describe it in terms of nuclear warheads. The best, most visceral way of saying it is, "You must have 340 kilos of antimatter to run your computer." If you happen to have 340 kilos of antimatter lying around, then yes, brute-forcing is certainly possible. I deeply hope you don't. I like Earth: all my stuff is here. From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Mon Jun 25 17:56:03 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Mon, 25 Jun 2012 11:56:03 -0400 Subject: ideal.dll In-Reply-To: <4FE87320.5050704@vulcan.xs4all.nl> References: <20120622185258.1FE1EE673F@smtp.hushmail.com> <87txy0iclu.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FE87320.5050704@vulcan.xs4all.nl> Message-ID: <4FE88A13.10903@sixdemonbag.org> On 06/25/2012 10:18 AM, Johan Wevers wrote: > That depends on your threat model. If signing messages is not so > important to you but encrypting is, this advice is understandable. > So let MD5 be broken, it matters not for encryption. If MD5 signatures can be forged (and news reports strongly indicate they can be), that means the self-signature on certificates is now susceptible to forgery. > This suggests a threat model where your opponent has almost Stuxnet > like capabilities. It may make sense to talk about specific things we've discovered about those two pieces of work (Flame being the other), but let's be careful using them as adjectives. We genuinely don't know enough about them: it will take the public antivirus community years to discover exactly what and how they do what they do. > Since the pgp 2 days we get warnings about adapted compilers, but > I've never seen something like that surfacing. "Lieutenant, when you see Indians, be careful. When you don't see Indians, be more careful." -- _Ride Ranger Ride_, a 1936 Gene Autry film Competent malware hides better than Lamont Cranston. From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Mon Jun 25 18:00:50 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Mon, 25 Jun 2012 12:00:50 -0400 Subject: private key protection In-Reply-To: <87vcifflbs.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <87ty774hf2.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4E9C7300.1050901@jeromebaum.com> <20111017211802.182810@gmx.net> <4E9CA1A7.9050305@jeromebaum.com> <4E9CC392.3020002@dougbarton.us> <4E9D6C9F.8000501@jeromebaum.com> <20111018131514.GB13421@IUPUI.Edu> <20120625150822.GA11950@Clarus.mgh.harvard.edu> <87vcifflbs.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <4FE88B32.4090408@sixdemonbag.org> On 06/25/2012 11:44 AM, Werner Koch wrote: >> cracking the symmetric encryption used to protect the private key is >> comparable to the problem of cracking an encrypted message's session >> key. > > No, it is not. The entropy in a session key matches the size of the > session key. The key used to protect the private key is commonly much > weaker. A passphrase providing an adequate amount of entropy is not > useful because a user won't be able to remember it correctly. Speaking purely for myself, my passphrase is 16 bytes from /dev/urandom dropped into base64. It took me a weekend to memorize it, but the peace of mind has been well worth it. It is possible, though, that I'm demented. :) From aaron.toponce at gmail.com Mon Jun 25 20:12:57 2012 From: aaron.toponce at gmail.com (Aaron Toponce) Date: Mon, 25 Jun 2012 12:12:57 -0600 Subject: ideal.dll In-Reply-To: <87txy0iclu.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <20120622185258.1FE1EE673F@smtp.hushmail.com> <87txy0iclu.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <20120625181255.GQ4683@pinyin.ae7.st> On Mon, Jun 25, 2012 at 12:11:57AM +0200, Werner Koch wrote: > I am telling for more than a decade that PGP 2 should not be used > anymore. The rationale for this was that OpenPGP is a standard and > fixes great many problems of PGP 2. GnuPG supports PGP 2 only because > this provides a way to migrate away from PGP 2. But: We are now in 2012 > - 20 years after PGP 2. So, if the system can be improved by removing support for PGP2, which includes cleaning up code, squashing bugs, and tightening security, then why is it still around? 20 years later? -- . o . o . o . . o o . . . o . . . o . o o o . o . o o . . o o o o . o . . o o o o . o o o -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 519 bytes Desc: not available URL: From jeandavid8 at verizon.net Mon Jun 25 20:13:59 2012 From: jeandavid8 at verizon.net (Jean-David Beyer) Date: Mon, 25 Jun 2012 14:13:59 -0400 Subject: ideal.dll In-Reply-To: <4FE7B944.6070209@sixdemonbag.org> References: <20120622185258.1FE1EE673F@smtp.hushmail.com> <87txy0iclu.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FE7B944.6070209@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <4FE8AA67.2080104@verizon.net> Robert J. Hansen wrote: > On 06/24/2012 06:11 PM, Werner Koch wrote: >> I am telling for more than a decade that PGP 2 should not be used >> anymore. > > The list may find my own timeline of MD5 to be worth reading -- it might > give some insight into why PGP 2 (in particular the MD5 vulnerabilities) > tend to engender such passionate responses. > > ===== > > 1993: Bosselaers and Den Boer present a theoretical break on MD5. > > 1996: Hans Dobbertin breaks MD5. His results are immediately dismissed > as "theoretical" when they are nothing but. The security of a > Merkle-Damgard hash (such as MD5) cannot be greater than the > collision resistance of its compression function. Dobbertin is > able to break MD5's compression function in *seconds* on desktop > hardware. The MD5 death clock begins ticking down: we know > (thanks to Dobbertin) that collisions can be generated against > the full MD5 in seconds, but we don't yet know how. > > 1997: As an undergraduate, I read Dobbertin's paper and get shocked. > I start advocating migration to SHA-1 and/or RIPEMD160. Nobody > listens to me, and maybe rightfully so: after all, I'm just an > undergrad. That said, I'm in good company: lots of other very > serious cryppies are advocating the same. > > 1998: Internal debates begin at PGP Security over whether MD5 should > be considered "deprecated" (technically valid, but advised > against) or "obsolete" (no longer valid). (This is according > to Len Sassaman.) > > 2001: People are still using MD5 in applications that need a > collision-resistant hash function. I begin to get irritated: > we've had five years to do migrations. Some important people > within the community at that time (e.g., Imad Faiad) proclaim > that MD5 is still secure and the vulnerabilities against it > are still only theoretical and may never come to pass. I begin > to tell people that if we don't see real MD5 collisions within > five years to never again believe anything I say. > > 2002: I enter graduate school for computer science and begin working > in electronic voting. I see systems being developed at that time > which rely on the collision-resistance of MD5. I begin to get > unhinged. In order to prove the ineffectiveness of MD5, I begin > to work on MD5 collisions for my Master's thesis. > > 2004: Shengdong University publishes the first MD5 collisions. I have a > very long and dejected talk with my advisor about my degree > plans. I take a Master's without thesis, but I tell my advisor > I'm looking on the bright side: no one can claim MD5 is still > safe, right? > > 2004: People continue to say MD5 is still safe, claiming that the > Shengdong University attacks are impractical -- they can only > produce collisions in random data, which means you can't forge a > particular signature on particular data. > > 2005: At Black Hat, Dan Kaminsky starts off with the EFF's website and > the NSA's website. Dan is able to, in realtime, tweak the EFF's > website with nondisplaying characters in order to make it look > unchanged from the original but have the same MD5 hash as the > NSA's website. I was there in the audience and my jaw was on the > floor. > > 2005: People continue to say MD5 is still safe, claiming that... oh, > God, I lose track at this point, honestly. At this point my > brain shuts down and I begin to believe anyone advocating MD5 > where collision resistance is necessary is living in resolute > denial of the facts. > > 2008: The first public disclosure of a forged MD5-based SSL certificate. > > 2008: US-CERT issues a Vulnerability Notice which says in plain > language, "Software developers, Certification Authorities, > website owners and users should avoid using the MD5 algorithm in > any capacity." (Ref: http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/836068 ) > > 2012: News reports circulate that the Flame virus propagated by forging > an MD5-based Microsoft signature. > > 2012: On this mailing list, 16 years after experts recommended migrating > away from MD5 and four years after US-CERT categorically declared > MD5 to be a "do not use" algorithm, we're having a discussion > about PGP 2.6, which is deeply married to MD5. > > > > After reviewing the past 19 years of results on MD5 and the community's > reaction to them, all I can say is ... nothing, really. I used to be > able to get a lot of outrage summoned up over this subject, but now I've > been reduced to making faint whimpering noises. ?A new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it. ? -- Max Planck -- .~. Jean-David Beyer Registered Linux User 85642. /V\ PGP-Key:3EDBB65E 9A2FC99A Registered Machine 241939. /( )\ Shrewsbury, New Jersey http://counter.li.org ^^-^^ 14:10:01 up 13 days, 24 min, 3 users, load average: 4.28, 4.34, 4.24 From mick.crane at gmail.com Mon Jun 25 20:37:51 2012 From: mick.crane at gmail.com (michael crane) Date: Mon, 25 Jun 2012 19:37:51 +0100 Subject: private key protection In-Reply-To: <4FE88B32.4090408@sixdemonbag.org> References: <87ty774hf2.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4E9C7300.1050901@jeromebaum.com> <20111017211802.182810@gmx.net> <4E9CA1A7.9050305@jeromebaum.com> <4E9CC392.3020002@dougbarton.us> <4E9D6C9F.8000501@jeromebaum.com> <20111018131514.GB13421@IUPUI.Edu> <20120625150822.GA11950@Clarus.mgh.harvard.edu> <87vcifflbs.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FE88B32.4090408@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: On Mon, June 25, 2012 5:00 pm, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > On 06/25/2012 11:44 AM, Werner Koch wrote: >>> cracking the symmetric encryption used to protect the private key is >>> comparable to the problem of cracking an encrypted message's session >>> key. >> >> No, it is not. The entropy in a session key matches the size of the >> session key. The key used to protect the private key is commonly much >> weaker. A passphrase providing an adequate amount of entropy is not >> useful because a user won't be able to remember it correctly. > > Speaking purely for myself, my passphrase is 16 bytes from /dev/urandom > dropped into base64. It took me a weekend to memorize it, but the peace > of mind has been well worth it. > > It is possible, though, that I'm demented. :) reading this it occurs it me that keyboards are cheap so it would be reasonable to swap all the keys about on a keyboard and then use some easily memorably combination of real words to save on so much memorizing. mick -- keyID: 0x4BFEBB31 From wk at gnupg.org Mon Jun 25 20:44:11 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Mon, 25 Jun 2012 20:44:11 +0200 Subject: ideal.dll In-Reply-To: <20120625181255.GQ4683@pinyin.ae7.st> (Aaron Toponce's message of "Mon, 25 Jun 2012 12:12:57 -0600") References: <20120622185258.1FE1EE673F@smtp.hushmail.com> <87txy0iclu.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <20120625181255.GQ4683@pinyin.ae7.st> Message-ID: <87pq8nfczo.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Mon, 25 Jun 2012 20:12, aaron.toponce at gmail.com said: > So, if the system can be improved by removing support for PGP2, which > includes cleaning up code, squashing bugs, and tightening security, then > why is it still around? 20 years later? Because you still want to be able to decrypt your 20 year old files. Meanwhile this is even legally possible due to the expiration of the IDEA patent. We probably need to keep this kind of support for all time. Keeping the ability to encrypt using v3 keys will likely be removed in one of the next GnuPG versions. I don't have an answer to your actual question. The reason might be that there are a few load voices who tell everyone that they need IDEA and v3 keys to save the world. I don't understand it. However, it is often easier to allow people to shoot into their feet than spending a lot of time with fruitless discussions. BTW, removing the v3 support will not make the code magically less complex. Removing mature code may actually introduce more bugs than keeping it. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From wk at gnupg.org Mon Jun 25 21:05:51 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Mon, 25 Jun 2012 21:05:51 +0200 Subject: GPA and hkps In-Reply-To: (John's message of "Fri, 22 Jun 2012 16:22:22 -0500") References: Message-ID: <87lijbfbzk.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Fri, 22 Jun 2012 23:22, jw72253 at verizon.net said: > message when I use GPA to try retrieving a key. The message states > this: "There is no plugin available for the keyserver protocol you > specified." What am I missing? Thanks. IIRC, GPA has no support for "hpks". You need to use "hkp". For historical reasons GPA uses GnuPG's key server helper programs directly and has not been updated to allow for TLS encrypted connections. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From vedaal at nym.hush.com Tue Jun 26 07:12:12 2012 From: vedaal at nym.hush.com (vedaal at nym.hush.com) Date: Tue, 26 Jun 2012 01:12:12 -0400 Subject: idea.dll Message-ID: <20120626051212.9292314DBD8@smtp.hushmail.com> >Robert J. Hansen wrote: >> On 06/24/2012 06:11 PM, Werner Koch wrote: >>> I am telling for more than a decade that PGP 2 should not be >used >>> anymore. >> >> The list may find my own timeline of MD5 to be worth reading -- >it might >> give some insight into why PGP 2 (in particular the MD5 >vulnerabilities) >> tend to engender such passionate responses. it will be interesting to see if V4 keys will be gracefully abandoned as SHA1 becomes as broken as MD5, or if there will be die-hards holding onto they their V4 keys no matter what ... vedaal From wk at gnupg.org Tue Jun 26 09:22:03 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Tue, 26 Jun 2012 09:22:03 +0200 Subject: idea.dll In-Reply-To: <20120626051212.9292314DBD8@smtp.hushmail.com> (vedaal@nym.hush.com's message of "Tue, 26 Jun 2012 01:12:12 -0400") References: <20120626051212.9292314DBD8@smtp.hushmail.com> Message-ID: <87d34mfsh0.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Tue, 26 Jun 2012 07:12, vedaal at nym.hush.com said: > it will be interesting to see if V4 keys will be gracefully > abandoned as SHA1 becomes as broken as MD5, This is very different in OpenPGP. SHA-1 is not used everywhere; its main use is for the fingerprint, this will eventually be a problem. The use of SHA-1 in the MDC is not problematic. Everywhere else we are already using SHA-2. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From jw72253 at verizon.net Tue Jun 26 21:27:37 2012 From: jw72253 at verizon.net (John) Date: Tue, 26 Jun 2012 14:27:37 -0500 Subject: GPA and hkps In-Reply-To: <87lijbfbzk.fsf__7982.15741892836$1340651488$gmane$org@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <87lijbfbzk.fsf__7982.15741892836$1340651488$gmane$org@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: "Werner Koch" wrote in message news:<87lijbfbzk.fsf__7982.15741892836$1340651488$gmane$org at vigenere.g10code.de>... > On Fri, 22 Jun 2012 23:22, jw72253 at verizon.net said: > > > message when I use GPA to try retrieving a key. The message states > > this: "There is no plugin available for the keyserver protocol you > > specified." What am I missing? Thanks. > > IIRC, GPA has no support for "hpks". You need to use "hkp". For > historical reasons GPA uses GnuPG's key server helper programs directly > and has not been updated to allow for TLS encrypted connections. Werner, hello. If GPA has no support for hkps, what commands should be used on the command line with gpg, given what I have already indicated? Thanks. John From lenharo at gmail.com Wed Jun 27 04:36:59 2012 From: lenharo at gmail.com (Marcos Aurelio Lenharo) Date: Tue, 26 Jun 2012 23:36:59 -0300 Subject: Card fails to decrypt using 4096-bit key In-Reply-To: <20120520024516.GA573@clarus.smellysneakers.net> References: <20120520024516.GA573@clarus.smellysneakers.net> Message-ID: <4FEA71CB.6030405@gmail.com> Hi, the problem seems to be on libassuan ASSUAN_LINELENGTH define (today is 1002). On g10/call-agent.c:998 (agent_scd_pksign) there is the following line: if (indatalen*2 + 50 > DIM(line)) return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL); and indatalen happens to be 512 for a 4096-bit key, which leads to a value greater then 1002 (1074 on this case). Applying the following patch solved the problem to me: diff -Nru libassuan-2.0.3.orig/src/assuan.h.in libassuan-2.0.3/src/assuan.h.in --- libassuan-2.0.3.orig/src/assuan.h.in 2011-12-20 08:17:53.000000000 -0200 +++ libassuan-2.0.3/src/assuan.h.in 2012-06-26 22:58:47.483626831 -0300 @@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ #endif -#define ASSUAN_LINELENGTH 1002 /* 1000 + [CR,]LF */ +#define ASSUAN_LINELENGTH 1076 /* 1074 + [CR,]LF */ struct assuan_context_s; typedef struct assuan_context_s *assuan_context_t; @Werner: any comments on this change? Best Regards, -- Marcos A. Lenharo From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Wed Jun 27 15:11:11 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Wed, 27 Jun 2012 09:11:11 -0400 Subject: idea.dll In-Reply-To: <87d34mfsh0.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <20120626051212.9292314DBD8@smtp.hushmail.com> <87d34mfsh0.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <4FEB066F.5030805@sixdemonbag.org> On 6/26/2012 3:22 AM, Werner Koch wrote: > This is very different in OpenPGP. SHA-1 is not used everywhere; its > main use is for the fingerprint, this will eventually be a problem. I am not so sanguine. Marc Stevens claims [1] he has a working collision requiring 2**57 compressions: that number is low enough to make my hair stand on end. He also says he knows how to make it faster, and he's been curiously silent on the subject for the last year and a half. I think "eventually" is going to come sooner than we think. [1] http://code.google.com/p/hashclash/ From aaron.toponce at gmail.com Wed Jun 27 15:32:17 2012 From: aaron.toponce at gmail.com (Aaron Toponce) Date: Wed, 27 Jun 2012 07:32:17 -0600 Subject: idea.dll In-Reply-To: <20120626051212.9292314DBD8@smtp.hushmail.com> References: <20120626051212.9292314DBD8@smtp.hushmail.com> Message-ID: <20120627133215.GJ7958@pinyin.ae7.st> On Tue, Jun 26, 2012 at 01:12:12AM -0400, vedaal at nym.hush.com wrote: > it will be interesting to see if V4 keys will be gracefully > abandoned as SHA1 becomes as broken as MD5, > > or if there will be die-hards holding onto they their V4 keys no > matter what ... Please fix your client. I don't know if you can tell, but you are breaking the threads. Your client should support the 'in-reply-to' and 'references' header fields. Please see if this is the case, and make the necessary adjustments to your MTA. Thanks, -- . o . o . o . . o o . . . o . . . o . o o o . o . o o . . o o o o . o . . o o o o . o o o -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 519 bytes Desc: not available URL: From aaron.toponce at gmail.com Wed Jun 27 15:33:26 2012 From: aaron.toponce at gmail.com (Aaron Toponce) Date: Wed, 27 Jun 2012 07:33:26 -0600 Subject: ideal.dll In-Reply-To: <87pq8nfczo.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <20120622185258.1FE1EE673F@smtp.hushmail.com> <87txy0iclu.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <20120625181255.GQ4683@pinyin.ae7.st> <87pq8nfczo.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <20120627133323.GK7958@pinyin.ae7.st> On Mon, Jun 25, 2012 at 08:44:11PM +0200, Werner Koch wrote: > On Mon, 25 Jun 2012 20:12, aaron.toponce at gmail.com said: > > So, if the system can be improved by removing support for PGP2, which > > includes cleaning up code, squashing bugs, and tightening security, then > > why is it still around? 20 years later? > > BTW, removing the v3 support will not make the code magically less > complex. Removing mature code may actually introduce more bugs than > keeping it. Thus, the reason I began with 'if'. :) -- . o . o . o . . o o . . . o . . . o . o o o . o . o o . . o o o o . o . . o o o o . o o o -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 519 bytes Desc: not available URL: From dkg at fifthhorseman.net Wed Jun 27 16:24:54 2012 From: dkg at fifthhorseman.net (Daniel Kahn Gillmor) Date: Wed, 27 Jun 2012 10:24:54 -0400 Subject: migration paths from SHA-1 [was: Re: idea.dll] In-Reply-To: <4FEB066F.5030805@sixdemonbag.org> References: <20120626051212.9292314DBD8@smtp.hushmail.com> <87d34mfsh0.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FEB066F.5030805@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <4FEB17B6.9070200@fifthhorseman.net> On 06/27/2012 09:11 AM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > On 6/26/2012 3:22 AM, Werner Koch wrote: >> This is very different in OpenPGP. SHA-1 is not used everywhere; its >> main use is for the fingerprint, this will eventually be a problem. > > I am not so sanguine. Marc Stevens claims [1] he has a working > collision requiring 2**57 compressions: that number is low enough to > make my hair stand on end. He also says he knows how to make it faster, > and he's been curiously silent on the subject for the last year and a > half. I think "eventually" is going to come sooner than we think. For the key's fingerprint specifically, a pre-image (where the attacker crafts a new text that shares a digest with the victim's key material) is the thing to worry about, not a crafted collision (where the attacker generates two texts that share a digest). My read of [1] is that the attack is a collision technique, not a pre-image technique, which would imply that "eventually" is still actually a little ways off for fingerprints at least. > Werner wrote: >> Everywhere else we are already using SHA-2. Not by default. In testing today with an empty profile, gpg 1.4.12 still defaults to making key certifications (where the attacker controls the digested material completely) and data signature with SHA1. These are areas where a successful collision attack can do serious harm. i'd be happy to see gpg migrate to defaults of SHA-256 for data signatures and key certifications; these digests have been available to users (of both GPG and PGP) for many years now. I've been using SHA-512 for my data signatures and key certifications for a few years and have never gotten a complaint. --dkg [1] http://code.google.com/p/hashclash/ -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 1030 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From vedaal at nym.hush.com Wed Jun 27 16:30:30 2012 From: vedaal at nym.hush.com (vedaal at nym.hush.com) Date: Wed, 27 Jun 2012 10:30:30 -0400 Subject: ideal.dll // fixing thread breaking Message-ID: <20120627143030.99D05E6739@smtp.hushmail.com> On Wed, 27 Jun 2012 09:33:38 -0400 Aaron Toponce wrote: >On Mon, Jun 25, 2012 at 08:44:11PM +0200, Werner Koch wrote: >> On Mon, 25 Jun 2012 20:12, aaron.toponce at gmail.com said: >> > So, if >Thus, the reason I began with 'if'. :) Am using Hushmail (have been using it since it came out) and am replying to the above gnupg message to try to see how to fix the 'thread-breaking' problem. I get the gnupg as a 'digest', and as an individual e-mail when the poster cc's me. This post is currently a reply to the original poster and cc'd to the list. I hope it does * not* break the thread, but am afraid it probably will. The only fix I can think of, is to get the gnupg posts as individual e-mails, not as a digest, and reply to them. If anyone has an idea of how to fix it, am willing to try. btw, how do I change from 'digest-mode' to 'individual-list mode'? does it require unsubscribing and re-subscribing, or is there an easier way? Thanks, vedaal From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Wed Jun 27 16:32:03 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Wed, 27 Jun 2012 10:32:03 -0400 Subject: migration paths from SHA-1 [was: Re: idea.dll] In-Reply-To: <4FEB17B6.9070200@fifthhorseman.net> References: <20120626051212.9292314DBD8@smtp.hushmail.com> <87d34mfsh0.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FEB066F.5030805@sixdemonbag.org> <4FEB17B6.9070200@fifthhorseman.net> Message-ID: <4FEB1963.8070300@sixdemonbag.org> On 6/27/2012 10:24 AM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: > For the key's fingerprint specifically, a pre-image (where the attacker > crafts a new text that shares a digest with the victim's key material) > is the thing to worry about, not a crafted collision (where the attacker > generates two texts that share a digest). Yes. And this is exactly what I heard in 2005 from people who were dismissing the MD5 collision attacks as, "well, you know, they're not preimages." It didn't take long to go from that to full-on attacks on MD5. I expect the same will occur here. > My read of [1] is that the attack is a collision technique, not a > pre-image technique, which would imply that "eventually" is still > actually a little ways off for fingerprints at least. If by "a little ways off" you mean anywhere between six months to a few years, then yes, that's reasonable. I don't expect SHA-1 to fall over dead this afternoon, but the chaplain's been summoned to its room to deliver the Last Rites. From brad at fineby.me.uk Wed Jun 27 17:13:18 2012 From: brad at fineby.me.uk (Brad Rogers) Date: Wed, 27 Jun 2012 16:13:18 +0100 Subject: idea.dll In-Reply-To: <20120627133215.GJ7958@pinyin.ae7.st> References: <20120626051212.9292314DBD8@smtp.hushmail.com> <20120627133215.GJ7958@pinyin.ae7.st> Message-ID: <20120627161318.47b75ed1@abydos.stargate.org.uk> On Wed, 27 Jun 2012 07:32:17 -0600 Aaron Toponce wrote: Hello Aaron, >Please fix your client. I don't know if you can tell, but you are >breaking the threads. Your client should support the 'in-reply-to' and vedaa is using Hushmail; A web mail system. -- Regards _ / ) "The blindingly obvious is / _)rad never immediately apparent" If Adolf Hitler flew in today, they'd send a limousine anyway (White Man) In Hammersmith Palais - The Clash -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 490 bytes Desc: not available URL: From brad at fineby.me.uk Wed Jun 27 17:14:46 2012 From: brad at fineby.me.uk (Brad Rogers) Date: Wed, 27 Jun 2012 16:14:46 +0100 Subject: ideal.dll // fixing thread breaking In-Reply-To: <20120627143030.99D05E6739@smtp.hushmail.com> References: <20120627143030.99D05E6739@smtp.hushmail.com> Message-ID: <20120627161446.058c6da8@abydos.stargate.org.uk> On Wed, 27 Jun 2012 10:30:30 -0400 vedaal at nym.hush.com wrote: Hello vedaal at nym.hush.com, Unfortunately, as you suspected, the message I'm replying to did break threading. It's Hushmail that's at fault, I believe. >does it require unsubscribing and re-subscribing, >or is there an easier way? Sadly, with mailman, unsubbing and resubbing is the only way for a regular user to change their subscription format. -- Regards _ / ) "The blindingly obvious is / _)rad never immediately apparent" Go away, come back, go away, come back Leave Me Alone (I'm Lonely) - P!nk -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 490 bytes Desc: not available URL: From peter at digitalbrains.com Wed Jun 27 17:33:43 2012 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Wed, 27 Jun 2012 17:33:43 +0200 Subject: ideal.dll // fixing thread breaking In-Reply-To: <20120627143030.99D05E6739@smtp.hushmail.com> References: <20120627143030.99D05E6739@smtp.hushmail.com> Message-ID: <4FEB27D7.80902@digitalbrains.com> On 27/06/12 16:30, vedaal at nym.hush.com wrote: > btw, > how do I change from 'digest-mode' to 'individual-list mode'? Go to , enter your e-mail address and password you subscribed with, and you get an interface where you can change such settings. For future reference, that URL is in the headers of every mail you get from the list, btw. HTH, Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at http://wwwhome.cs.utwente.nl/~lebbing/pubkey.txt From peter at digitalbrains.com Wed Jun 27 17:45:31 2012 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Wed, 27 Jun 2012 17:45:31 +0200 Subject: ideal.dll // fixing thread breaking In-Reply-To: <20120627161446.058c6da8@abydos.stargate.org.uk> References: <20120627143030.99D05E6739@smtp.hushmail.com> <20120627161446.058c6da8@abydos.stargate.org.uk> Message-ID: <4FEB2A9B.4080603@digitalbrains.com> On 27/06/12 17:14, Brad Rogers wrote: > Sadly, with mailman, unsubbing and resubbing is the only way for a > regular user to change their subscription format. Having switched from digest to individual message mode myself about a year ago, I can tell you you are mistaken. I did it succesfully in the options web interface as described in my other mail. Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at http://wwwhome.cs.utwente.nl/~lebbing/pubkey.txt From vedaal at nym.hush.com Wed Jun 27 18:19:38 2012 From: vedaal at nym.hush.com (vedaal at nym.hush.com) Date: Wed, 27 Jun 2012 12:19:38 -0400 Subject: ideal.dll // fixing thread breaking Message-ID: <20120627161939.15889E6740@smtp.hushmail.com> On Wed, 27 Jun 2012 11:34:02 -0400 Peter Lebbing wrote: >and you get an interface where you can change such settings. ok changed to individual digest mode, and replying directly (hushmail default of 'reply' is to individual user and cc to list) hope it works, if not, any other suggestions to try in hushmail? TIA vedaal From andy.ruddock at rainydayz.org Wed Jun 27 18:54:16 2012 From: andy.ruddock at rainydayz.org (Andy Ruddock) Date: Wed, 27 Jun 2012 17:54:16 +0100 Subject: ideal.dll // fixing thread breaking In-Reply-To: <20120627161939.15889E6740@smtp.hushmail.com> References: <20120627161939.15889E6740@smtp.hushmail.com> Message-ID: <4FEB3AB8.2000503@rainydayz.org> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 vedaal at nym.hush.com wrote: > > ok > > changed to individual digest mode, and replying directly > (hushmail default of 'reply' is to individual user and cc to list) > > hope it works, > > if not, any other suggestions to try in hushmail? > > TIA > > vedaal > I just set up a free hushmail account, using the web interface you don't get an In-Reply-To field in the header. I couldn't find any settings which would enable this. So, if you're using a free hushmail account then I guess you're going to continue breaking threads. If you're a premium user then you can use pop and/or imap and a different mail client. - -- Andy Ruddock - ------------ andy.ruddock at rainydayz.org (GPG Key ID 0xB0324245) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.14 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJP6zq4AAoJECqtbbewMkJFTBYP/j1PuZPmanl4a3JwYFqsfoMz glaFefOykEaeIGafaEd8ZiYbDJvULST3HkqLG/Odxl9yhFiBwC+wruAu8bmPs2qp 6wooXyfmeTzns3CENyl07+3jwmBobTGfeG+Ast4FxOXjEWfrCliBtIDTJsnH/17Z Hu95hQxQjLDEh14YxqapezW5Ve3q37B8vL/mSgoPr9B3sf16YLGcpz5jcebwFtvv Uyxw4HVILtfABd0tLWpCG6DKeyXZHcaL3Qg4PqhR6sObR8ycxVxy6eNFDVd5GeI1 aOJu81tMKSNXMehrh4xodG/WIZgMSUGw/Ho+mTTm5psw5aG2PM3j0qoPgbJVqsf9 xH4OE1Z2RJjMGXNRrVHhH2f8B2eXObPfHYYB4BmDhXSg+y22lSgjJfKT3q7Hpjaz loiNMUorN+OXXxomNFbGbkR0WJT5/apePKkPwSGRI9OxCFKE23xi4X34pWfjB8fY cFKksUcdtbYorXS33/M1o5+fEP0Zxo1e8Ugi1uTu6kRNKkFTZtqP/rzJR1z1RdPe pkYxG4Jl/ehe+5L7qCsnprIEaWOhWg2gGF3ujK30XVAEEbBe0EbWcvP2Zr+5bG2c vFdx4tDyV7iQpfCrmhvjbomQKF5JsCmyc4cALnBoDRyyWkypZrdhsN2J7tgQmv2N VeEmO6NVMk11+cUWBJeT =c2Cy -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From falazemi at gmail.com Wed Jun 27 19:42:26 2012 From: falazemi at gmail.com (Face) Date: Wed, 27 Jun 2012 20:42:26 +0300 Subject: pipe passphrase to unlock key Message-ID: Hell all, I am trying to pipe my passphrase to unlock the key. my problem is like this, when I use git to sign a tag gnupg ask for the passphrase and i need to pipe the passphrase. I try echo "my long passphrase" | git tag -s 1.0.0.42 -m 'version 1.0.0.1' however it did not work. i also try writing a program to do the same thing #include #include #include int my_pipe[2]; void ErrorAndExit(char* message) { fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", message); exit(1); } void WriteToPipe(char* s) { write(my_pipe[1], s, strlen(s)); } int main(int argc, char* argv[]) { int pid; char* my_argv[]= {"/usr/bin/git", "tag", "-s", "1.0.0.2", "-m", "'version 1.0.0.2'", 0 }; if (pipe(my_pipe) == -1) ErrorAndExit("pipe failed."); pid=fork(); if (pid==-1) ErrorAndExit("fork failed."); if (pid==0) { /* son process */ close(0); dup(my_pipe[0]); close(my_pipe[0]); close(my_pipe[1]); execv(my_argv[0], my_argv); ErrorAndExit("Program not found."); } /* father process */ WriteToPipe("My Really Really Really Really Long passphrase \n"); WriteToPipe("\n"); return 0; } The problem with this code it keep writing to the pipe and would not exit. is there is any workaround for my problem ? Any help would be much appreciated. Sincerely, falazemi note: using pinentry-curses From vedaal at nym.hush.com Wed Jun 27 20:51:07 2012 From: vedaal at nym.hush.com (vedaal at nym.hush.com) Date: Wed, 27 Jun 2012 14:51:07 -0400 Subject: ideal.dll // fixing thread breaking (Andy Ruddock) Message-ID: <20120627185107.B5CA3E673F@smtp.hushmail.com> >Date: Wed, 27 Jun 2012 17:54:16 +0100 >From: Andy Ruddock >I just set up a free hushmail account, using the web interface you >don't >get an In-Reply-To field in the header. >I couldn't find any settings which would enable this. >So, if you're using a free hushmail account then I guess you're >going to >continue breaking threads. >If you're a premium user then you can use pop and/or imap and a >different mail client. am a premium user (btw, free hushmail has very little space, and doesn't allow for nym's, so any hush user whose e-mail address ends in 'nym.hush.com' is a premium user) Usually access gnupg during downtime at work, and cannot use a 'nym' on my work-based e-mail clients. Will think about setting up a 'non-thread breaker' thunderbird arrangement on my laptop, and send messages from there Thanks vedaal From JPClizbe at tx.rr.com Thu Jun 28 00:57:44 2012 From: JPClizbe at tx.rr.com (John Clizbe) Date: Wed, 27 Jun 2012 17:57:44 -0500 Subject: GPA and hkps In-Reply-To: References: <87lijbfbzk.fsf__7982.15741892836$1340651488$gmane$org@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <4FEB8FE8.4000608@tx.rr.com> John wrote: > "Werner Koch" wrote in message > news:<87lijbfbzk.fsf__7982.15741892836$1340651488$gmane$org at vigenere.g10code.de>... >> On Fri, 22 Jun 2012 23:22, jw72253 at verizon.net said: >> >> > message when I use GPA to try retrieving a key. The message states >> > this: "There is no plugin available for the keyserver protocol you >> > specified." What am I missing? Thanks. >> >> IIRC, GPA has no support for "hpks". You need to use "hkp". For >> historical reasons GPA uses GnuPG's key server helper programs directly >> and has not been updated to allow for TLS encrypted connections. > > Werner, hello. > > If GPA has no support for hkps, what commands should be used on the command > line with gpg, given what I have already indicated? Thanks. The real problems here is that there is no agreement on which port HKPS should be served, and few if any keyservers are supporting TLS/SSL encypted connections. Unless you know the details of the keyserver you are trying to use, your best bet is https:// -John -- John P. Clizbe Inet: John (a) Gingerbear DAWT net SKS/Enigmail/PGP-EKP or: John ( @ ) Enigmail DAWT net FSF Assoc #995 / FSFE Fellow #1797 hkp://keyserver.gingerbear.net or mailto:pgp-public-keys at gingerbear.net?subject=HELP Q:"Just how do the residents of Haiku, Hawai'i hold conversations?" A:"An odd melody / island voices on the winds / surplus of vowels" From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Thu Jun 28 06:40:36 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Thu, 28 Jun 2012 00:40:36 -0400 Subject: Cross-compiling GPGME Message-ID: <4FEBE044.9070508@sixdemonbag.org> I have a small Qt application that uses GPGME. It compiles cleanly under Linux (on a Fedora 17/x64 setup). Although F17 has a really lovely mingw32 cross-compiler, and a pre-built libgpg-error for Win32 that I can use, it's missing gpgme -- meaning I need to cross-compile my own, so that the mingw32 linker can operate correctly. This has been a frustrating experience. Particularly, libassuan is refusing to build, and since that's a dependency for libgpgme... Before I go further: I'm calling the configure scripts through the mingw32-configure wrapper, in accordance with Fedora's guidelines for cross-compiling. Likewise, make is called through mingw32-make. Anyway, regarding libassuan: everything compiles fine, but at the link stage I'm getting: libtool: link: i686-w64-mingw32-gcc -shared .libs/libassuan-0.dll.def .libs/libassuan_la-assuan.o .libs/libassuan_la-context.o .libs/libassuan_la-system.o .libs/libassuan_la-debug.o .libs/libassuan_la-conversion.o .libs/libassuan_la-sysutils.o .libs/libassuan_la-client.o .libs/libassuan_la-server.o .libs/libassuan_la-assuan-error.o .libs/libassuan_la-assuan-buffer.o .libs/libassuan_la-assuan-handler.o .libs/libassuan_la-assuan-inquire.o .libs/libassuan_la-assuan-listen.o .libs/libassuan_la-assuan-pipe-server.o .libs/libassuan_la-assuan-socket-server.o .libs/libassuan_la-assuan-pipe-connect.o .libs/libassuan_la-assuan-socket-connect.o .libs/libassuan_la-assuan-uds.o .libs/libassuan_la-assuan-logging.o .libs/libassuan_la-assuan-socket.o .libs/libassuan_la-system-w32.o .libs/libassuan_la-assuan-io.o .libs/putc_unlocked.o .libs/memrchr.o .libs/stpcpy.o .libs/setenv.o .libs/vasprintf.o -lws2_32 -L/usr/i686-w64-mingw32/sys-root/mingw/lib -lgpg-error -O2 -Wl,.libs/versioninfo.o -o .libs/libassuan-0.dll -Wl,--enable-auto-image-base -Xlinker --out-implib -Xlinker .libs/libassuan.dll.a /usr/lib64/gcc/i686-w64-mingw32/4.7.0/../../../../i686-w64-mingw32/bin/ld: .libs/libassuan-0.dll.def:5: syntax error /usr/lib64/gcc/i686-w64-mingw32/4.7.0/../../../../i686-w64-mingw32/bin/ld:.libs/libassuan-0.dll.def: file format not recognized; treating as linker script /usr/lib64/gcc/i686-w64-mingw32/4.7.0/../../../../i686-w64-mingw32/bin/ld:.libs/libassuan-0.dll.def:2: syntax error collect2: error: ld returned 1 exit status make[3]: *** [libassuan.la] Error 1 make[3]: Leaving directory `/home/rjh/Downloads/libassuan-2.0.3/src' make[2]: *** [all] Error 2 make[2]: Leaving directory `/home/rjh/Downloads/libassuan-2.0.3/src' make[1]: *** [all-recursive] Error 1 make[1]: Leaving directory `/home/rjh/Downloads/libassuan-2.0.3' make: *** [all] Error 2 ... Does anyone have any guidance for me here? I know that GPG4WIN is built on a Linux system with a cross-compiler: how do the maintainers build GPGME (and libassuan)? From mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com Thu Jun 28 12:40:18 2012 From: mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com (Mika Suomalainen) Date: Thu, 28 Jun 2012 13:40:18 +0300 Subject: ideal.dll // fixing thread breaking In-Reply-To: <4FEB27D7.80902@digitalbrains.com> References: <20120627143030.99D05E6739@smtp.hushmail.com> <4FEB27D7.80902@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <4FEC3492.7000405@hotmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 27.06.2012 18:33, Peter Lebbing wrote: > For future reference, that URL is in the headers of every mail you > get from the list, btw. I think that it's not on those, which are PGP/MIME signed. - -- [Mika Suomalainen](https://mkaysi.github.com/) || NOTICE! I am on mobile broadband with very limited time, so I cannot read emails very much. The best time to contact me is probably weekends when I have better connectivity with good luck. [gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net --recv-keys 4DB53CFE82A46728](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/key.txt) || [Why do I sign my emails?](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/WhyDoISignEmails.html) || [Do you have problems verifying my PGP/MIME signature on mailing list?](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/PGP-MIME.html) || [Please don't send HTML.](http://mkaysi.github.com/articles/complaining/HTML.html) || [This signature](https://gist.github.com/2643070#file_icedove.md) [Please reply below this line](http://mkaysi.github.com/articles/complaining/topposting.html) ____________________________ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.19 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Homepage: http://mkaysi.github.com/ Comment: gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net --recv-keys 82A46728 Comment: Public key: http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/key.txt Comment: Fingerprint = 24BC 1573 B8EE D666 D10A AA65 4DB5 3CFE 82A4 6728 Comment: See my Icedove / Thunderbird guide here http://git.io/YUDk8g Comment: See my GPG guide here http://git.io/5KWssQ Comment: See my Enigmail guide here http://git.io/bXla3g Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJP7DSOAAoJEE21PP6CpGcoj0wQAJ7jhKESXtXSXDayKRdqwDrK qTzIsjNm4SyQZ6+AHOO0i+oCi/Qc3sk5bWzj0jXby93pK65Y+eWswjdoNw3Dd1K2 dEaH5WEGUzJpeizzPwZCXlT5NXI7ISNIcKTWYaapgPMh3u8txPy3/y3Qr82vrgwY MkBj08Y01NTtz6ZFnt4TOACzNFeTIlKMyd3sID0i9w2QhAkfOvubFN32Kiip78ep JjQ8GMA2KdGyUO1+RXWv718x1VjGEOSudZF8MRGj8UO+vP5ny+ElH8r9EjYtcBQT cCOhDq97ZkRgYs6Qkn3bAXafiwDwy1e9qB/bHQj0OMp60dSI5tcHeTNAsO/4HTXq 9HBdpaYG/wUS74GMNuNsKRcvHytdBz3KKZpA0agWDY6ZCjL3/1uamlqxv+XMDktU cxOIzkH5MmNfXa5kJcZkKxsTYiSk2pOG9+bViiqyIwzubxRG/6MgHqEpyzXwybAu 3Bz+A+sBbmsq00IBUhqrnrV2AE0bFBHrTFSzArowUCMHx5cZ8ROO8+lIBN9AyQx4 Mw2dCqbl9oYSvsUo7VQ6LXUD1+327FKVTg4P4yNAt9i42PeAkNemyTct6C+xXX16 vH5NCTonaU9CY99SSaPRo6UbDPrVqspuyBrEui9ps9Y7R8laNxbf2cYFha97LAwl 7Xg2cIovqcG1gQNyKZcG =oLUB -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From peter at digitalbrains.com Thu Jun 28 13:52:37 2012 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Thu, 28 Jun 2012 13:52:37 +0200 Subject: ideal.dll // fixing thread breaking In-Reply-To: <4FEC3492.7000405@hotmail.com> References: <20120627143030.99D05E6739@smtp.hushmail.com> <4FEB27D7.80902@digitalbrains.com> <4FEC3492.7000405@hotmail.com> Message-ID: <4FEC4585.20002@digitalbrains.com> On 28/06/12 12:40, Mika Suomalainen wrote: > I think that it's not on those, which are PGP/MIME signed. The PGP/MIME signed mail by Brad Rogers in this very thread does include the headers: > [...] > Date: Wed, 27 Jun 2012 16:14:46 +0100 > From: Brad Rogers > To: gnupg-users at gnupg.org > Subject: Re: ideal.dll // fixing thread breaking > Message-ID: <20120627161446.058c6da8 at abydos.stargate.org.uk> > In-Reply-To: <20120627143030.99D05E6739 at smtp.hushmail.com> > References: <20120627143030.99D05E6739 at smtp.hushmail.com> > [...] > List-Id: Help and discussion among users of GnuPG > List-Unsubscribe: , > > List-Archive: > List-Post: > List-Help: > List-Subscribe: , > > Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="===============0701166120==" > Sender: gnupg-users-bounces at gnupg.org > Errors-To: gnupg-users-bounces at gnupg.org > > --===============0701166120== > Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=PGP-SHA256; > boundary="Sig_/4hiLgDJgDUgTfM4CV5h8JMn"; > protocol="application/pgp-signature" Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at http://wwwhome.cs.utwente.nl/~lebbing/pubkey.txt From mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com Thu Jun 28 17:24:32 2012 From: mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com (Mika Suomalainen) Date: Thu, 28 Jun 2012 18:24:32 +0300 Subject: ideal.dll // fixing thread breaking In-Reply-To: <4FEC4585.20002@digitalbrains.com> References: <20120627143030.99D05E6739@smtp.hushmail.com> <4FEB27D7.80902@digitalbrains.com> <4FEC3492.7000405@hotmail.com> <4FEC4585.20002@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <4FEC7730.2030004@hotmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 28.06.2012 14:52, Peter Lebbing wrote: > On 28/06/12 12:40, Mika Suomalainen wrote: >>> I think that it's not on those, which are PGP/MIME signed. > The PGP/MIME signed mail by Brad Rogers in this very thread does > include the headers: > >>> [...] Date: Wed, 27 Jun 2012 16:14:46 +0100 From: Brad Rogers >>> To: gnupg-users at gnupg.org Subject: Re: >>> ideal.dll // fixing thread breaking Message-ID: >>> <20120627161446.058c6da8 at abydos.stargate.org.uk> In-Reply-To: >>> <20120627143030.99D05E6739 at smtp.hushmail.com> References: >>> <20120627143030.99D05E6739 at smtp.hushmail.com> [...] List-Id: >>> Help and discussion among users of GnuPG >>> List-Unsubscribe: >>> , >>> >>> List-Archive: List-Post: >>> List-Help: >>> >>> List-Subscribe: >>> , >>> >>> Content-Type: multipart/mixed; >>> boundary="===============0701166120==" Sender: >>> gnupg-users-bounces at gnupg.org Errors-To: >>> gnupg-users-bounces at gnupg.org >>> >>> --===============0701166120== Content-Type: multipart/signed; >>> micalg=PGP-SHA256; boundary="Sig_/4hiLgDJgDUgTfM4CV5h8JMn"; >>> protocol="application/pgp-signature" Were you able to verify that signature? - -- [Mika Suomalainen](https://mkaysi.github.com/) || NOTICE! I am on mobile broadband with very limited time, so I cannot read emails very much. The best time to contact me is probably weekends when I have better connectivity with good luck. [gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net --recv-keys 4DB53CFE82A46728](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/key.txt) || [Why do I sign my emails?](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/WhyDoISignEmails.html) || [Do you have problems verifying my PGP/MIME signature on mailing list?](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/PGP-MIME.html) || [Please don't send HTML.](http://mkaysi.github.com/articles/complaining/HTML.html) || [This signature](https://gist.github.com/2643070#file_icedove.md) [Please reply below this line](http://mkaysi.github.com/articles/complaining/topposting.html) ____________________________ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.19 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Homepage: http://mkaysi.github.com/ Comment: gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net --recv-keys 82A46728 Comment: Public key: http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/key.txt Comment: Fingerprint = 24BC 1573 B8EE D666 D10A AA65 4DB5 3CFE 82A4 6728 Comment: See my Icedove / Thunderbird guide here http://git.io/YUDk8g Comment: See my GPG guide here http://git.io/5KWssQ Comment: See my Enigmail guide here http://git.io/bXla3g Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJP7HcsAAoJEE21PP6CpGcoikMP/0WRk81ygqvHlvqetvLkLg+T JmvXH6ZeHTkZtpGEWpnXRDo27zsPTChgT5LWXZbmK3+4Cu64MvGnls0HD21Xdnc+ X9MsUOW5cNkMShMVaZY//IPbA9mmiVgfxKhPUmUk3HvLeVkgiDLfHP74+biybEWa NuyRRsP0I5HR6A6r9KX+Ob9YaGygE1rRkqXYPIK+2goO8epPGu6knzqqU6oA/c6Z dlBy4bvzCqJzhmQQlxONf3wKY96WDwjQUluohzNDFi3nagNs7sN4D4XNgEayEOsA T73+JjKztnbu6CqFtgrs1dkVciZxN+yxhO7BsSCEPdeFikHim4jCes8sA+GBmQqK 5HRT9eZKT1etwq12fqLgrMuzKHw7XwlO+9tRiD9rmc6jG0ow1jQHCsV4JbS6RpdE tDHS2JcPBFakijqbcZWYuPD0gAYIxayUfcYZzbBJdwyR1lQ/DLV95FefWX+rmarC /UWz20JONXfCJS/798iBSoXbgqd6UK+e+0UuXSC+/MMLbcz5BbQUNzjhrkhJRAJ+ BjGN1bl/tVlYodOkwLSxKW/ZZA2JMz/A8e0mKF5rmCsyrZ+Upraz5wDq9MDwAMOd OG49lSqyGPvRUPtSlKVoC5CKtPj3p5v/CoeILmF4Smf1yC4wbcuZzlRjrivslM9a fMgs/sRhTZH/vvz5QYbG =JS1W -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From brad at fineby.me.uk Thu Jun 28 17:55:10 2012 From: brad at fineby.me.uk (Brad Rogers) Date: Thu, 28 Jun 2012 16:55:10 +0100 Subject: ideal.dll // fixing thread breaking In-Reply-To: <4FEC7730.2030004@hotmail.com> References: <20120627143030.99D05E6739@smtp.hushmail.com> <4FEB27D7.80902@digitalbrains.com> <4FEC3492.7000405@hotmail.com> <4FEC4585.20002@digitalbrains.com> <4FEC7730.2030004@hotmail.com> Message-ID: <20120628165510.2ccea1a3@abydos.stargate.org.uk> On Thu, 28 Jun 2012 18:24:32 +0300 Mika Suomalainen wrote: Hello Mika, >Were you able to verify that signature? Several people use PGP/MIME, all of which verify here, and include the list headers you seem to be saying get removed. Not only on this list, but many other lists, too. I have seen weirdness with *footers* and PGP signed messages, but that is with footers not being displayed, rather than being removed. Checking message source shows that they are still there. -- Regards _ / ) "The blindingly obvious is / _)rad never immediately apparent" Does she always shout at you, does she tell you what to do Family Life - Sham 69 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 490 bytes Desc: not available URL: From gnupg at oneiroi.net Thu Jun 28 19:07:22 2012 From: gnupg at oneiroi.net (Milo) Date: Thu, 28 Jun 2012 19:07:22 +0200 Subject: Cross-compiling GPGME In-Reply-To: <4FEBE044.9070508@sixdemonbag.org> References: <4FEBE044.9070508@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <4FEC8F4A.6050900@oneiroi.net> Hi Robert. On 06/28/2012 06:40 AM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > > (...) > > ... Does anyone have any guidance for me here? I know that GPG4WIN is > built on a Linux system with a cross-compiler: how do the maintainers > build GPGME (and libassuan)? Went well in my case. Little help but...: libtool: link: i686-w64-mingw32-gcc -shared .libs/libassuan-0.dll.def .libs/libassuan_la-assuan.o .libs/libassuan_la-context.o .libs/libassuan_la-system.o .libs/libassuan_la-debug.o .libs/libassuan_la-conversion.o .libs/libassuan_la-sysutils.o .libs/libassuan_la-client.o .libs/libassuan_la-server.o .libs/libassuan_la-assuan-error.o .libs/libassuan_la-assuan-buffer.o .libs/libassuan_la-assuan-handler.o .libs/libassuan_la-assuan-inquire.o .libs/libassuan_la-assuan-listen.o .libs/libassuan_la-assuan-pipe-server.o .libs/libassuan_la-assuan-socket-server.o .libs/libassuan_la-assuan-pipe-connect.o .libs/libassuan_la-assuan-socket-connect.o .libs/libassuan_la-assuan-uds.o .libs/libassuan_la-assuan-logging.o .libs/libassuan_la-assuan-socket.o .libs/libassuan_la-system-w32.o .libs/libassuan_la-assuan-io.o .libs/putc_unlocked.o .libs/memrchr.o .libs/stpcpy.o .libs/setenv.o .libs/vasprintf.o -L/srcs/libgpg-error-1.10/build/lib -lws2_32 /srcs/libgpg-error-1.10/build/lib/libgpg-error.dll.a -O2 -Wl,.libs/versioninfo.o -o .libs/libassuan-0.dll -Wl,--enable-auto-image-base -Xlinker --out-implib -Xlinker .libs/libassuan.dll.a This (not mentioning `prefix') was given for cross-compilation of libgpg-error-1.10: --host=i686-w64-mingw32 --target=mingw and this for libassuan-2.0.3: ./configure --host=i686-w64-mingw32 --target=mingw For last I also exported to PATH bin directory with gpg-error-config from build mentioned above. Tools used: binutils-mingw-w64-i686 2.22-2ubuntu1+1 binutils-mingw-w64-x86-64 2.22-2ubuntu1+1 gcc-mingw-w64 4.6.3-1ubuntu5+5ubuntu1 gcc-mingw-w64-base 4.6.3-1ubuntu5+5ubuntu1 gcc-mingw-w64-i686 4.6.3-1ubuntu5+5ubuntu1 gcc-mingw-w64-x86-64 4.6.3-1ubuntu5+5ubuntu1 mingw-w64 2.0.1-1 mingw-w64-dev 2.0.1-1 mingw-w64-tools 2.0.1-1 mingw32-runtime 3.15.2-0ubuntu1 > (...) > -- Regards, Milo From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Thu Jun 28 19:17:38 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Thu, 28 Jun 2012 13:17:38 -0400 Subject: Cross-compiling GPGME In-Reply-To: <4FEC8F4A.6050900@oneiroi.net> References: <4FEBE044.9070508@sixdemonbag.org> <4FEC8F4A.6050900@oneiroi.net> Message-ID: <4FEC91B2.3030709@sixdemonbag.org> On 06/28/2012 01:07 PM, Milo wrote: > Went well in my case. Little help but...: First, thank you for your response. I appreciate it. :) Second, unfortunately this witchcraft doesn't work on Fedora. Using your same --host and --target specifiers, I'm getting the same problems as before, in the same place as before. Perhaps it's a bug in Fedora's Mingw? From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Thu Jun 28 19:23:50 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Thu, 28 Jun 2012 13:23:50 -0400 Subject: Cross-compiling GPGME In-Reply-To: <4FEC8F4A.6050900@oneiroi.net> References: <4FEBE044.9070508@sixdemonbag.org> <4FEC8F4A.6050900@oneiroi.net> Message-ID: <4FEC9326.1030605@sixdemonbag.org> Further, if it's any interest, here's the contents of src/.libs/libassuan-0.dll.def: EXPORTS ; assuan.def - List of symbols to export. ; Copyright (C) 2005, 2009 g10 Code GmbH ; ; This file is part of ASSUAN. ; ; ASSUAN is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify ; it under the terms of the GNU Lesser general Public License as ; published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of ; the License, or (at your option) any later version. ; ; ASSUAN is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, ; but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of ; MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the ; GNU Lesser General Public License for more details. ; ; You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public ; License along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software ; Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, ; USA EXPORTS assuan_accept @1 assuan_begin_confidential @2 assuan_close_input_fd @3 I have tweaked the above *very* slightly: originally, 'USA' was not on a single comment line by itself, but was instead part of the preceding line. Word-wrap put it onto a new line when I C&Ped it into email, so I figured to comment it out in order to make it clear that it wasn't being processed. What I note immediately is EXPORTS is declared twice. Now, I'm hardly a libtool expert, but this seems ... incorrect. Any ideas? From peter at digitalbrains.com Thu Jun 28 20:50:12 2012 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Thu, 28 Jun 2012 20:50:12 +0200 Subject: ideal.dll // fixing thread breaking In-Reply-To: <4FEC7730.2030004@hotmail.com> References: <20120627143030.99D05E6739@smtp.hushmail.com> <4FEB27D7.80902@digitalbrains.com> <4FEC3492.7000405@hotmail.com> <4FEC4585.20002@digitalbrains.com> <4FEC7730.2030004@hotmail.com> Message-ID: <4FECA764.1050301@digitalbrains.com> On 28/06/12 17:24, Mika Suomalainen wrote: > Were you able to verify that signature? I don't believe my Enigmail is willing to check any PGP/MIME signatures for me... must be something broken with the installation. I don't really pay attention to signatures on this mailing list, and this is the only place I come across PGP/MIME. Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at http://wwwhome.cs.utwente.nl/~lebbing/pubkey.txt From mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com Fri Jun 29 09:26:11 2012 From: mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com (Mika Suomalainen) Date: Fri, 29 Jun 2012 10:26:11 +0300 Subject: ideal.dll // fixing thread breaking In-Reply-To: <20120628165510.2ccea1a3@abydos.stargate.org.uk> References: <20120627143030.99D05E6739@smtp.hushmail.com> <4FEB27D7.80902@digitalbrains.com> <4FEC3492.7000405@hotmail.com> <4FEC4585.20002@digitalbrains.com> <4FEC7730.2030004@hotmail.com> <20120628165510.2ccea1a3@abydos.stargate.org.uk> Message-ID: <4FED5893.2030600@hotmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Hi, On 28.06.2012 18:55, Brad Rogers wrote: > On Thu, 28 Jun 2012 18:24:32 +0300 Mika Suomalainen > wrote: > > Hello Mika, > >>> Were you able to verify that signature? > Several people use PGP/MIME, all of which verify here, and include > the list headers you seem to be saying get removed. Not only on > this list, but many other lists, too. > > I have seen weirdness with *footers* and PGP signed messages, but > that is with footers not being displayed, rather than being > removed. Checking message source shows that they are still there. I am using Enigmail and I cannot verify any PGP/MIME signatures on this list. They just appear as attachment: signature.asc and aren't recognizes as PGP/MIME signatures. This is why I have P-R rule to use PGP/INLINE on this list and others which I know to fail with PGP/MIME. - -- [Mika Suomalainen](https://mkaysi.github.com/) || NOTICE! I am on mobile broadband with very limited time, so I cannot read emails very much. The best time to contact me is probably weekends when I have better connectivity with good luck. [gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net --recv-keys 4DB53CFE82A46728](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/key.txt) || [Why do I sign my emails?](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/WhyDoISignEmails.html) || [Do you have problems verifying my PGP/MIME signature on mailing list?](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/PGP-MIME.html) || [Please don't send HTML.](http://mkaysi.github.com/articles/complaining/HTML.html) || [This signature](https://gist.github.com/2643070#file_icedove.md) [Please reply below this line](http://mkaysi.github.com/articles/complaining/topposting.html) ____________________________ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.19 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Homepage: http://mkaysi.github.com/ Comment: gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net --recv-keys 82A46728 Comment: Public key: http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/key.txt Comment: Fingerprint = 24BC 1573 B8EE D666 D10A AA65 4DB5 3CFE 82A4 6728 Comment: See my Icedove / Thunderbird guide here http://git.io/YUDk8g Comment: See my GPG guide here http://git.io/5KWssQ Comment: See my Enigmail guide here http://git.io/bXla3g Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJP7ViQAAoJEE21PP6CpGcoKAIP/0kwEeZ3OEZaRY5hLCgozt6E dnil3lxthW5Y1c4+m166CP10wnaVlAvx5LK/ZOaLZ8rt34NXzeQ6jWTCjXb+imSG KJb74YhKTfZ/d6L45+e9Bt/AZLTUJTPt6/TFPZnkESCN3SIhPkio1F1LVgSvqani OTepkHd7E3wnGBJhkpeHcNDnQ0DjFTNrpIMY4OooU/9sBZFu+0+QHuhiO5UKShcI curBpuQRZnEx8qS9+ihi991mNv3zkGP57HLcphq4pY8BuDfH+hd91cAyXmhrDiH6 fhdMR2x46/9Nw1Il7OZ+1odsoSR3n0Y8F/xDoFJla/Rr061WFjVzJqZk7htJh/Yo GMK3SWK8FUx0/wiAnO2WN/kl0fRl57jmx6BXm+picLOWcX/uYi6TrnXynOZnLCDa X/uRVihrfmh3vhd+14NXoskln5JQVGS04sSWlLPsjjQNkyHtPG1bRjG496NujYT3 lZzXaucqCZxtIqebr9Q7UtbnBRCIxH7HQmJHeayuYj/c5xeFZpqzzIEZ54Ez0Pa4 NziwzZVzvhkcjQ0/C293tAgniYBYjA75PYKsZz7MiDmsJrhLeAXdYkLWta5UIHMd XFUBUV8Y2ThejlO6EZ2ZFDmvVEKwrkJHNUy2ZdSgHv3HBEdTjMV2nvqeHVHH6mUH Dj2gmnhAxpWIWuFrUCNx =pdN/ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com Fri Jun 29 09:31:09 2012 From: mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com (Mika Suomalainen) Date: Fri, 29 Jun 2012 10:31:09 +0300 Subject: ideal.dll // fixing thread breaking In-Reply-To: <4FECA764.1050301@digitalbrains.com> References: <20120627143030.99D05E6739@smtp.hushmail.com> <4FEB27D7.80902@digitalbrains.com> <4FEC3492.7000405@hotmail.com> <4FEC4585.20002@digitalbrains.com> <4FEC7730.2030004@hotmail.com> <4FECA764.1050301@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <4FED59BD.5070703@hotmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 28.06.2012 21:50, Peter Lebbing wrote: > On 28/06/12 17:24, Mika Suomalainen wrote: >>> Were you able to verify that signature? > I don't believe my Enigmail is willing to check any PGP/MIME > signatures for me... must be something broken with the > installation. I don't really pay attention to signatures on this > mailing list, and this is the only place I come across PGP/MIME. If you ask on Enigmail mailing list, they will tell you that that issue is with Mailman (or other mailing list software) which messes up with headers and makes PGP/MIME unverifiable. They will also say that this is why they recommend PGP/INLINE, it's more resistant to messing by mailing list software. - -- [Mika Suomalainen](https://mkaysi.github.com/) || NOTICE! I am on mobile broadband with very limited time, so I cannot read emails very much. The best time to contact me is probably weekends when I have better connectivity with good luck. [gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net --recv-keys 4DB53CFE82A46728](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/key.txt) || [Why do I sign my emails?](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/WhyDoISignEmails.html) || [Do you have problems verifying my PGP/MIME signature on mailing list?](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/PGP-MIME.html) || [Please don't send HTML.](http://mkaysi.github.com/articles/complaining/HTML.html) || [This signature](https://gist.github.com/2643070#file_icedove.md) [Please reply below this line](http://mkaysi.github.com/articles/complaining/topposting.html) ____________________________ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.19 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Homepage: http://mkaysi.github.com/ Comment: gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net --recv-keys 82A46728 Comment: Public key: http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/key.txt Comment: Fingerprint = 24BC 1573 B8EE D666 D10A AA65 4DB5 3CFE 82A4 6728 Comment: See my Icedove / Thunderbird guide here http://git.io/YUDk8g Comment: See my GPG guide here http://git.io/5KWssQ Comment: See my Enigmail guide here http://git.io/bXla3g Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJP7Vm6AAoJEE21PP6CpGcoSk0QAJDohRivi3DXfcqaabQ8vbYZ ax+sATQiTo2waMtLres0Qq4Vr/+a6x0Audu8xMpdsbLgG14FCNX+pOhuw2iw6ujD l4WQZoN5kWDCCrlHeImdIemC3bsVJyIN6p/YDCpl7MuHFOEJ+1ePSAphMjGSyT32 WVuorRJ9jil89/oCHmwnX2iWbIUwU4Vtm4j9G6tctDtS5/pGzga5YWDKqkGG6A2D LYYTYACBjPUmp6BHsMDURmMfCnCWVoRZQG2lG7TLrx7HIsfP1fHQkKL1jQdmfWjN GweC5CQtzl+BZJcYa/coppL9gBTbEzr7/n46139H/TaQCktU8Kbc760VObkF70n5 EOHxDHkqhJLEq3aHkxu8S2KMWo1PEh2ZPAHE2GXvC/ghdz7yFBWmnvKAP8cDdDaB PPBmMpKg5LD6GRu3zpwwgvWKvxTiNvO+NIVKlBy9RTEDr4Y2GKpW0V2Qk4jHEVbj 9Vy6301e0YNev3knEuDghwjo8kkG5AXz4ir0R0+qdTzLchnfr2KZxZMK5BepxKAM G5emgFLl3bJAb/Cf9JlI/M8VPmRyUZDXPIeh+ND7q8JgR95lcWeoaZ8dU6A0HJfO O8y+rkb926fIuSkT0gLQBtYf9wTLX6W5vwmqfn1LkJBWgRY/97bw+PjPrn7tXq77 RtcBg7rEfsjR0Fuvo1YU =yeiO -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From s.mika95 at gmail.com Thu Jun 28 12:39:40 2012 From: s.mika95 at gmail.com (Mika Suomalainen) Date: Thu, 28 Jun 2012 13:39:40 +0300 Subject: ideal.dll // fixing thread breaking In-Reply-To: <4FEB27D7.80902@digitalbrains.com> References: <20120627143030.99D05E6739@smtp.hushmail.com> <4FEB27D7.80902@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <4FEC346C.6000802@gmail.com> On 27.06.2012 18:33, Peter Lebbing wrote: > For future reference, that URL is in the headers of every mail you get from the > list, btw. -- [Mika Suomalainen](https://mkaysi.github.com/) || NOTICE! I am on mobile broadband with very limited time, so I cannot read emails very much. The best time to contact me is probably weekends when I have better connectivity with good luck. [gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net --recv-keys 4DB53CFE82A46728](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/key.txt) || [Why do I sign my emails?](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/WhyDoISignEmails.html) || [Do you have problems verifying my PGP/MIME signature on mailing list?](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/PGP-MIME.html) || [Please don't send HTML.](http://mkaysi.github.com/articles/complaining/HTML.html) || [This signature](https://gist.github.com/2643070#file_icedove.md) [Please reply below this line](http://mkaysi.github.com/articles/complaining/topposting.html) ____________________________ From brad at fineby.me.uk Fri Jun 29 14:06:20 2012 From: brad at fineby.me.uk (Brad Rogers) Date: Fri, 29 Jun 2012 13:06:20 +0100 Subject: ideal.dll // fixing thread breaking In-Reply-To: <4FED59BD.5070703@hotmail.com> References: <20120627143030.99D05E6739@smtp.hushmail.com> <4FEB27D7.80902@digitalbrains.com> <4FEC3492.7000405@hotmail.com> <4FEC4585.20002@digitalbrains.com> <4FEC7730.2030004@hotmail.com> <4FECA764.1050301@digitalbrains.com> <4FED59BD.5070703@hotmail.com> Message-ID: <20120629130620.7e1df026@abydos.stargate.org.uk> On Fri, 29 Jun 2012 10:31:09 +0300 Mika Suomalainen wrote: Hello Mika, >If you ask on Enigmail mailing list, they will tell you that that >issue is with Mailman (or other mailing list software) which messes up >with headers and makes PGP/MIME unverifiable. They will also say that Headers are outside what is signed, surely? Changing, adding or removing headers should have no bearing on the validity of PGP signatures. If header changes were involved, nothing would be verifiable, because every mail server an email passes through adds at least on more piece of info to those headers. TBH, I'd have thought the issues you're experiencing are more likely to be caused by Hotmail. -- Regards _ / ) "The blindingly obvious is / _)rad never immediately apparent" Your life is like a schedule, you run to meet the bills Life Kills - Human League -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 490 bytes Desc: not available URL: From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Fri Jun 29 17:48:28 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Fri, 29 Jun 2012 11:48:28 -0400 Subject: ideal.dll // fixing thread breaking In-Reply-To: <20120629130620.7e1df026@abydos.stargate.org.uk> References: <20120627143030.99D05E6739@smtp.hushmail.com> <4FEB27D7.80902@digitalbrains.com> <4FEC3492.7000405@hotmail.com> <4FEC4585.20002@digitalbrains.com> <4FEC7730.2030004@hotmail.com> <4FECA764.1050301@digitalbrains.com> <4FED59BD.5070703@hotmail.com> <20120629130620.7e1df026@abydos.stargate.org.uk> Message-ID: <4FEDCE4C.3060903@sixdemonbag.org> On 06/29/2012 08:06 AM, Brad Rogers wrote: >> If you ask on Enigmail mailing list, they will tell you that that >> issue is with Mailman (or other mailing list software) which messes up >> with headers and makes PGP/MIME unverifiable. They will also say that > > Headers are outside what is signed, surely? Mika is more or less right, except it isn't headers -- it's the PGP/MIME attachment separator. Mailman makes a very slight tweak and that's enough to bollix up the signature. This mailing list does not play nice with PGP/MIME, the last time I checked. (For a long time Enigmail's list didn't, either, but that problem has since been fixed.) In general, PGP/MIME with GNU Mailman is always a roll of the dice. And yes, Mika is right: that's why Enigmail recommends inline OpenPGP. We've all seen PGP/MIME break in too many different contexts. For instance, I've seen MTAs that strip off attachments, inspect the attachments for malware, then re-attach them but with very slight differences that break PGP/MIME. I've seen MUAs that can't understand it, mailing list software that breaks it, and so on. PGP/MIME is a superior technical standard, but it's quite fragile. We believe PGP/MIME is the clear choice *if possible*, but given how often it's not possible we recommend inline OpenPGP by default. (This message is PGP/MIME signed. I know my system works correctly with PGP/MIME and that neither my MUA nor MTA mangle it. If it's not coming through, the most likely culprit is the list's GNU Mailman installation.) -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 187 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From steve at gpgtools.org Fri Jun 29 18:00:03 2012 From: steve at gpgtools.org (Steve) Date: Fri, 29 Jun 2012 18:00:03 +0200 Subject: ideal.dll // fixing thread breaking In-Reply-To: <4FEDCE4C.3060903@sixdemonbag.org> References: <20120627143030.99D05E6739@smtp.hushmail.com> <4FEB27D7.80902@digitalbrains.com> <4FEC3492.7000405@hotmail.com> <4FEC4585.20002@digitalbrains.com> <4FEC7730.2030004@hotmail.com> <4FECA764.1050301@digitalbrains.com> <4FED59BD.5070703@hotmail.com> <20120629130620.7e1df026@abydos.stargate.org.uk> <4FEDCE4C.3060903@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: Hey all, not meaning to spark up new discussions about this issue (we've had that before). But I really think, the energy invested in this discussion would be better invested in writing mailman tweaks. Also, someone mentioned, that there already in fact *is* a mailman patch for PGP/MIME to work properly? Do I recall that memory correctly? I'm stunned that this issue keeps coming up. http://www.gnu.org/software/mailman/ says Mailman 2.1.15 has been released on 13-June-2012. Is the patch in question included in that release? Imo, things should rather move forward than stagnate and arguing that a mailing list software breaks PGP/MIME is fine. But as a consequence arguing for a non documented standard (OpenPGP Inline) is strange. I'd rather argue, that mailman needs a fix. Let's not start a war over this. But could someone please elaborate why mailman after such a long time still breaks PGP/MIME? All the best and kind regards, steve Am 29.06.2012 um 17:48 schrieb Robert J. Hansen: > On 06/29/2012 08:06 AM, Brad Rogers wrote: >>> If you ask on Enigmail mailing list, they will tell you that that >>> issue is with Mailman (or other mailing list software) which messes up >>> with headers and makes PGP/MIME unverifiable. They will also say that >> >> Headers are outside what is signed, surely? > > Mika is more or less right, except it isn't headers -- it's the PGP/MIME > attachment separator. Mailman makes a very slight tweak and that's > enough to bollix up the signature. > > This mailing list does not play nice with PGP/MIME, the last time I > checked. (For a long time Enigmail's list didn't, either, but that > problem has since been fixed.) In general, PGP/MIME with GNU Mailman is > always a roll of the dice. > > > > And yes, Mika is right: that's why Enigmail recommends inline OpenPGP. > We've all seen PGP/MIME break in too many different contexts. For > instance, I've seen MTAs that strip off attachments, inspect the > attachments for malware, then re-attach them but with very slight > differences that break PGP/MIME. I've seen MUAs that can't understand > it, mailing list software that breaks it, and so on. > > PGP/MIME is a superior technical standard, but it's quite fragile. We > believe PGP/MIME is the clear choice *if possible*, but given how often > it's not possible we recommend inline OpenPGP by default. > > > > (This message is PGP/MIME signed. I know my system works correctly with > PGP/MIME and that neither my MUA nor MTA mangle it. If it's not coming > through, the most likely culprit is the list's GNU Mailman installation.) > > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 841 bytes Desc: Message signed with OpenPGP using GPGMail URL: From steve at gpgtools.org Fri Jun 29 18:02:08 2012 From: steve at gpgtools.org (Steve) Date: Fri, 29 Jun 2012 18:02:08 +0200 Subject: ideal.dll // fixing thread breaking In-Reply-To: <4FEDCE4C.3060903@sixdemonbag.org> References: <20120627143030.99D05E6739@smtp.hushmail.com> <4FEB27D7.80902@digitalbrains.com> <4FEC3492.7000405@hotmail.com> <4FEC4585.20002@digitalbrains.com> <4FEC7730.2030004@hotmail.com> <4FECA764.1050301@digitalbrains.com> <4FED59BD.5070703@hotmail.com> <20120629130620.7e1df026@abydos.stargate.org.uk> <4FEDCE4C.3060903@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: Oh dear. I found it. The bug has been reported 2003: https://bugs.launchpad.net/mailman/+bug/265961 I wish I had better coding skills, but I don't. Sorry I can't code the fix... -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 841 bytes Desc: Message signed with OpenPGP using GPGMail URL: From brad at fineby.me.uk Fri Jun 29 18:26:43 2012 From: brad at fineby.me.uk (Brad Rogers) Date: Fri, 29 Jun 2012 17:26:43 +0100 Subject: ideal.dll // fixing thread breaking In-Reply-To: <4FEDCE4C.3060903@sixdemonbag.org> References: <20120627143030.99D05E6739@smtp.hushmail.com> <4FEB27D7.80902@digitalbrains.com> <4FEC3492.7000405@hotmail.com> <4FEC4585.20002@digitalbrains.com> <4FEC7730.2030004@hotmail.com> <4FECA764.1050301@digitalbrains.com> <4FED59BD.5070703@hotmail.com> <20120629130620.7e1df026@abydos.stargate.org.uk> <4FEDCE4C.3060903@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <20120629172643.2f01185d@abydos.stargate.org.uk> On Fri, 29 Jun 2012 11:48:28 -0400 "Robert J. Hansen" wrote: Hello Robert, >Mika is more or less right, except it isn't headers -- it's the PGP/MIME >attachment separator. Mailman makes a very slight tweak and that's That makes more sense. I thought I must have been going mad. :-) >This mailing list does not play nice with PGP/MIME, the last time I >checked. (For a long time Enigmail's list didn't, either, but that Seems okay here; Most messages check out, be they inline or MIME signed. As I said before (IIRC) it's something else that borks the PGP sig. Thanks for the explanations, Robert. -- Regards _ / ) "The blindingly obvious is / _)rad never immediately apparent" I must be hallucinating, watching angels celebrating There Must Be An Angel (Playing With My Heart) - Eurythmics -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 490 bytes Desc: not available URL: From brad at fineby.me.uk Fri Jun 29 18:29:37 2012 From: brad at fineby.me.uk (Brad Rogers) Date: Fri, 29 Jun 2012 17:29:37 +0100 Subject: ideal.dll // fixing thread breaking In-Reply-To: References: <20120627143030.99D05E6739@smtp.hushmail.com> <4FEB27D7.80902@digitalbrains.com> <4FEC3492.7000405@hotmail.com> <4FEC4585.20002@digitalbrains.com> <4FEC7730.2030004@hotmail.com> <4FECA764.1050301@digitalbrains.com> <4FED59BD.5070703@hotmail.com> <20120629130620.7e1df026@abydos.stargate.org.uk> <4FEDCE4C.3060903@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <20120629172937.4aa5ae8d@abydos.stargate.org.uk> On Fri, 29 Jun 2012 18:00:03 +0200 Steve wrote: Hello Steve, >not meaning to spark up new discussions about this issue (we've had >that before). But I really think, the energy invested in this It was not my intention to "open old wounds" as it were. I was curious about Mika's statement, which made no sense to me. Robert's explained things. Curiosity satisfied. >discussion would be better invested in writing mailman tweaks. Would that I could. I had trouble with "Hello World". In BASIC. :-( -- Regards _ / ) "The blindingly obvious is / _)rad never immediately apparent" Watching the people get lairy I Predict A Riot - Kaiser Chiefs -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 490 bytes Desc: not available URL: From mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com Fri Jun 29 18:02:57 2012 From: mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com (Mika Suomalainen) Date: Fri, 29 Jun 2012 19:02:57 +0300 Subject: ideal.dll // fixing thread breaking In-Reply-To: <20120629130620.7e1df026@abydos.stargate.org.uk> References: <20120627143030.99D05E6739@smtp.hushmail.com> <4FEB27D7.80902@digitalbrains.com> <4FEC3492.7000405@hotmail.com> <4FEC4585.20002@digitalbrains.com> <4FEC7730.2030004@hotmail.com> <4FECA764.1050301@digitalbrains.com> <4FED59BD.5070703@hotmail.com> <20120629130620.7e1df026@abydos.stargate.org.uk> Message-ID: <4FEDD1B1.1080408@hotmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 29.06.2012 15:06, Brad Rogers kirjoitti: > Headers are outside what is signed, surely? > > Changing, adding or removing headers should have no bearing on the > validity of PGP signatures. If header changes were involved, > nothing would be verifiable, because every mail server an email > passes through adds at least on more piece of info to those > headers. Ask Enigmail developers, they are giving me this explaining. > TBH, I'd have thought the issues you're experiencing are more > likely to be caused by Hotmail. I am using GMail as headers probably say if you look at them. PS. Could you install and setup Enigmail and try to verify PGP/MIME by yourself? - -- [Mika Suomalainen](https://mkaysi.github.com/) || NOTICE! I am on mobile broadband with very limited time, so I cannot read emails very much. The best time to contact me is probably weekends when I have better connectivity with good luck. [gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net --recv-keys 4DB53CFE82A46728](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/key.txt) || [Why do I sign my emails?](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/WhyDoISignEmails.html) || [Do you have problems verifying my PGP/MIME signature on mailing list?](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/PGP-MIME.html) || [Please don't send HTML.](http://mkaysi.github.com/articles/complaining/HTML.html) || [This signature](https://gist.github.com/2643070#file_icedove.md) [Please reply below this line](http://mkaysi.github.com/articles/complaining/topposting.html) ____________________________ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.19 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Homepage: http://mkaysi.github.com/ Comment: gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net --recv-keys 82A46728 Comment: Public key: http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/key.txt Comment: Fingerprint = 24BC 1573 B8EE D666 D10A AA65 4DB5 3CFE 82A4 6728 Comment: See my Icedove / Thunderbird guide here http://git.io/YUDk8g Comment: See my GPG guide here http://git.io/5KWssQ Comment: See my Enigmail guide here http://git.io/bXla3g Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJP7dGvAAoJEE21PP6CpGcofCYP/2mR8/owjJcKAgqRdLaFvwqg V1i3lFqtJn3WUpvp2J5iLll3aWkl9B0AuchE3hn7Z3qgweDLtNQDIRNBK47UgVP+ TlAV0NnuYfsAU2ep6rDyFOwOFe/uJWqOQTOXi1LlT3f89kh8HOXyB/JAMkAOi509 ceMPPZAUs4szIftPmGJDJitQAIGHK+6GdVZfK5KfGJ222D1gx9Cw6572pGmWCoYa 63yWui8RmTGyTasDJyU+GmMA95KeG4AQmd1PK8Zsa9/PS+vMZew+/bQgrpQKI0RD wls7Q/+LDB7gFS8RVdwIy0PYb0UbOlOPrdd32O41YYFtwU0btXzQljxr8nL2+6C3 7Zi/H0Mwz1lS7LweywuIfQIZcnkB6xe7DjNWMillmn58vQIcA7DBAbbU1FZeLhnf 9XOYVgSjfMif5KRZLJaBPnUYNaHIFLjiTeY+Vvwo/d5J+PEPsJ9T63+0XXJ43WIf ANzwKWB6fSItW4OxaKt9kG8nFRtQdhyJwKfiAarYum9El4iaM3h+OglaT2zXP4J6 CGPkGjCyYCImTIxACehUJf2BwK2sABpNoAhPpwOl6QSFZFPHMdkKpjaqIduzimEJ GkRSlklqm9+6nyJdRrtG76Tjj5oBAEF3d8mlifISMQ+0h1rffHpUSYiMC9ypzXAp xi/ZjgDo2Yd1CZnix+Dl =3j4k -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Fri Jun 29 19:39:22 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Fri, 29 Jun 2012 13:39:22 -0400 Subject: ideal.dll // fixing thread breaking In-Reply-To: References: <20120627143030.99D05E6739@smtp.hushmail.com> <4FEB27D7.80902@digitalbrains.com> <4FEC3492.7000405@hotmail.com> <4FEC4585.20002@digitalbrains.com> <4FEC7730.2030004@hotmail.com> <4FECA764.1050301@digitalbrains.com> <4FED59BD.5070703@hotmail.com> <20120629130620.7e1df026@abydos.stargate.org.uk> <4FEDCE4C.3060903@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <4FEDE84A.3040608@sixdemonbag.org> On 06/29/2012 12:00 PM, Steve wrote: > not meaning to spark up new discussions about this issue (we've had that > before). But I really think, the energy invested in this discussion > would be better invested in writing mailman tweaks. In the language of software engineering, this has moved from a defect to fix to a lifecycle issue. "Defect" is the stage where a bug is reported: "fix" is the stage where the fix is available: "lifecycle" is the often years-long process of getting the fix out to people who need it. If I understand things correctly (and I may not be), Werner does not host gnupg.org himself. He rents a box in a colo facility for that, and he's more or less stuck with whatever versions of software the provider offers. The provider hasn't offered an updated GNU Mailman, so GnuPG-Users has this unfortunate situation where PGP/MIME doesn't reliably work on it. For what it's worth, my message left here as a correctly-signed PGP/MIME message. I received it back from the list as just 'signature.asc'. A (partial) diff of the two emails reveals: > > This is an OpenPGP/MIME signed message (RFC 2440 and 3156) > --===============1821215289== 12,13c61,62 < protocol="application/pgp-signature"; < boundary="------------enigBE03611A84F54D493777EBD6" --- > protocol="application/pgp-signature"; > boundary="------------enigBE03611A84F54D493777EBD6" 71a121,135 > > > --===============1821215289== > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" > MIME-Version: 1.0 > Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit > Content-Disposition: inline > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users That should hopefully make it clear exactly what the problem is. From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Fri Jun 29 19:45:17 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Fri, 29 Jun 2012 13:45:17 -0400 Subject: ideal.dll // fixing thread breaking In-Reply-To: <20120629172643.2f01185d@abydos.stargate.org.uk> References: <20120627143030.99D05E6739@smtp.hushmail.com> <4FEB27D7.80902@digitalbrains.com> <4FEC3492.7000405@hotmail.com> <4FEC4585.20002@digitalbrains.com> <4FEC7730.2030004@hotmail.com> <4FECA764.1050301@digitalbrains.com> <4FED59BD.5070703@hotmail.com> <20120629130620.7e1df026@abydos.stargate.org.uk> <4FEDCE4C.3060903@sixdemonbag.org> <20120629172643.2f01185d@abydos.stargate.org.uk> Message-ID: <4FEDE9AD.1020306@sixdemonbag.org> On 06/29/2012 12:26 PM, Brad Rogers wrote: > Seems okay here; Most messages check out, be they inline or MIME > signed. IMO, if your client is showing correct PGP/MIME signatures on this list, you should file a defect report about your client. The message has been changed in transit and is no longer in the exact same state as it was when the sender issued it. The change may be trivial, but it's still a change, and IMO it is not the job of the MUA to try and fix the botchery inflicted by GNU Mailman. The correct thing to do, IMO, is to report to the user the true state of affairs: "the signature is not correct and the message appears to have been altered in transit." From brad at fineby.me.uk Fri Jun 29 19:48:00 2012 From: brad at fineby.me.uk (Brad Rogers) Date: Fri, 29 Jun 2012 18:48:00 +0100 Subject: ideal.dll // fixing thread breaking In-Reply-To: <4FEDD1B1.1080408@hotmail.com> References: <20120627143030.99D05E6739@smtp.hushmail.com> <4FEB27D7.80902@digitalbrains.com> <4FEC3492.7000405@hotmail.com> <4FEC4585.20002@digitalbrains.com> <4FEC7730.2030004@hotmail.com> <4FECA764.1050301@digitalbrains.com> <4FED59BD.5070703@hotmail.com> <20120629130620.7e1df026@abydos.stargate.org.uk> <4FEDD1B1.1080408@hotmail.com> Message-ID: <20120629184800.465b14cc@abydos.stargate.org.uk> On Fri, 29 Jun 2012 19:02:57 +0300 Mika Suomalainen wrote: Hello Mika, >I am using GMail as headers probably say if you look at them. The form address is hotmail. Message ID is hotmail, too. gmail *is* mentioned, but not in any of the transport headers. Anyhow, Robert has explained where and how the breakage occurs. > PS. Could you install and setup Enigmail and try to verify PGP/MIME by > yourself? Short answer; No. Longer answer; I'm not inclined to install another MUA (Thunderbird), set it up for use, install enigmail and set that up, just to test for this breakage. -- Regards _ / ) "The blindingly obvious is / _)rad never immediately apparent" You're only 29 got a lot to learn Seventeen - Sex Pistols -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 490 bytes Desc: not available URL: From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Fri Jun 29 20:01:39 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Fri, 29 Jun 2012 14:01:39 -0400 Subject: ideal.dll // fixing thread breaking In-Reply-To: References: <20120627143030.99D05E6739@smtp.hushmail.com> <4FEB27D7.80902@digitalbrains.com> <4FEC3492.7000405@hotmail.com> <4FEC4585.20002@digitalbrains.com> <4FEC7730.2030004@hotmail.com> <4FECA764.1050301@digitalbrains.com> <4FED59BD.5070703@hotmail.com> <20120629130620.7e1df026@abydos.stargate.org.uk> <4FEDCE4C.3060903@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <4FEDED83.1020908@sixdemonbag.org> On 06/29/2012 12:02 PM, Steve wrote: > Oh dear. I found it. The bug has been reported > 2003: https://bugs.launchpad.net/mailman/+bug/265961 That bug turned out to be in Enigmail, not Mailman. Mailman was repackaging the attachment in a way that was technically valid but which Enigmail wasn't expecting. Patrick fixed that bug about a decade ago: I think the fix predates the 0.9 release. There was a different PGP/MIME bug that Daniel Kahn Gillmor [1] reported to Mailman a while ago, and discovered it had been fixed and was now a lifecycle issue. The bug affecting GnuPG-Users may either of those two older ones, or something completely new -- I've barely looked into it at all. [1] Daniel, if I'm misspelling your last name please accept my apologies. I seem to never remember the correct spelling, and I assume you like seeing your name misspelled about as much as I like being called "Rob Hanson." :) From brad at fineby.me.uk Sat Jun 30 15:43:56 2012 From: brad at fineby.me.uk (Brad Rogers) Date: Sat, 30 Jun 2012 14:43:56 +0100 Subject: ideal.dll // fixing thread breaking In-Reply-To: <4FEDE9AD.1020306@sixdemonbag.org> References: <20120627143030.99D05E6739@smtp.hushmail.com> <4FEB27D7.80902@digitalbrains.com> <4FEC3492.7000405@hotmail.com> <4FEC4585.20002@digitalbrains.com> <4FEC7730.2030004@hotmail.com> <4FECA764.1050301@digitalbrains.com> <4FED59BD.5070703@hotmail.com> <20120629130620.7e1df026@abydos.stargate.org.uk> <4FEDCE4C.3060903@sixdemonbag.org> <20120629172643.2f01185d@abydos.stargate.org.uk> <4FEDE9AD.1020306@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <20120630144356.31b44e9f@abydos.stargate.org.uk> On Fri, 29 Jun 2012 13:45:17 -0400 "Robert J. Hansen" wrote: Hello Robert, >IMO, if your client is showing correct PGP/MIME signatures on this list, >you should file a defect report about your client. It certainly warrants investigation. I'll check bug tracker and ML archives to see if it's known first. -- Regards _ / ) "The blindingly obvious is / _)rad never immediately apparent" What do you call that noise, that you put on? This Is Pop - XTC -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 490 bytes Desc: not available URL: