From remi.favier at finances.gouv.fr Wed May 2 18:04:59 2012 From: remi.favier at finances.gouv.fr (FAVIER Remi) Date: Wed, 2 May 2012 18:04:59 +0200 Subject: GPG on Windows 7? Message-ID: You posted in 2010 a message on GPG on Windows 7. As you may now know, GnuPG and WinPT work fine with 32 or 64 bits OSs. In fact GPGee also works fine on Windows 7 32 bits (except for the HLP file if you don't have a special add on to use it since Vista). The only way to use GPGee on Windows 7 64 bits is to add an explorer like Windows Explorer that is a 32 bits, like QDir (the Windows Explorer 32 bits seems not to be able to run on Windows 7 64 bits), as GPGee is a dll 32 bits. Cordialement R?mi Favier Minist?re du Budget, des Comptes Publics et de la R?forme de l'Etat -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com Wed May 2 20:40:56 2012 From: mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com (Mika Suomalainen) Date: Wed, 02 May 2012 21:40:56 +0300 Subject: GPG on Windows 7? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <4FA17FB8.4000205@hotmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 02.05.2012 19:04, FAVIER Remi kirjoitti: > You posted in 2010 a message on GPG on Windows 7. > > As you may now know, GnuPG and WinPT work fine with 32 or 64 bits > OSs. > > In fact GPGee also works fine on Windows 7 32 bits (except for the > HLP file if you don't have a special add on to use it since > Vista). > > The only way to use GPGee on Windows 7 64 bits is to add an > explorer like Windows Explorer that is a 32 bits, like QDir (the > Windows Explorer 32 bits seems not to be able to run on Windows 7 > 64 bits), as GPGee is a dll 32 bits. > > Cordialement > > R?mi Favier Minist?re du Budget, des Comptes Publics et de la > R?forme de l'Etat > > > _______________________________________________ Gnupg-users mailing > list Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users GPG4Win works on Windows 7 too. http://gpg4win.org/ - -- Mika Suomalainen gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net --recv-keys 4DB53CFE82A46728 Key fingerprint = 24BC 1573 B8EE D666 D10A AA65 4DB5 3CFE 82A4 6728 I use GPG/INLINE, because some mailing list programs modify the headers of messages and this way make signature.asc files (PGP/MIME) unverifiable. Please remove lines about beginning and ending GPG signature blocks in your replies to messages, which are sent by me. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.19 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJPoX+2AAoJEE21PP6CpGcoGnUP/juIeuGwX8TPPJwC4lIvH0TV RisauBuujJvGM/IjVD/O2ybgkrtawiGmTEcdWrGo5DH+xEJ9Dg/eWeQfmzrUC0ci 1yNyw6/qaLa5hweeRrZviAt/nN0N0oo5g99iB9FjmLR19AtKCo7RCkG6T6Gm8fyu 9WIH7XT2LlITh9XtgiYHguNlZG5PLB1MXDDrMZYrsxZn6jrVN2JwpE0kuIBT3PMe TRa6pzyFfHRSkbtGgWDKqG0Ygga+Tt8Sqms2d/aYtXP5/2LGPY7QZsUxFUCgSugC 0Z1y3YyzYgp72pG16qls6BzletJHXlrR0PP/i37YZs4X+iM8tLNcZp22PTLbbRyQ DNJsaGohFDycWIYmYK/upjumC4xkG04b13/b0o7f3vXYWytJB7kAuBZdc0roVhAv IUxFbtvCD88NuGHSj3TRIJsgod/VyWiggmTtWf9S7OwdZ8ZZnMymeTFus1eq2/Uq XrogsihF+V4+f+kjoa8xUPl9tj+cBBH4vUnM667/8HCO51pMqSCQ7fmEYahmabXe X7FSrzSQ6FqtmMVNl5RC4jBdnoGygEWieyEBRIHsLUdYtav1uHk3IZzyDy1/wa3D Hf0zS0JtSLlV1VdzsbEph2vDyS/LUPKPmSumlXsBAGGrPlr4uPJ06ywHg+vGdvzU D3wZya2UaJJi+rW9p8A1 =1O2W -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: 0x82A46728.asc Type: application/pgp-keys Size: 5920 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: 0x82A46728.asc.sig Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 543 bytes Desc: not available URL: From pradipta.dutta at citi.com Wed May 2 17:05:41 2012 From: pradipta.dutta at citi.com (Dutta, Pradipta ) Date: Wed, 2 May 2012 10:05:41 -0500 Subject: gnu pg Message-ID: <92CFA9C3E0E27242A49C4831AB0E91A416B7E5EBEA@extxmb34.nam.nsroot.net> Hi I will appreciate your help in understanding the encryption and decryption of GNUPG by using Java in Windows environment. Please let me know if you have any jar files or sample java code to accomplish the same. My requirement is as follows: We get one encrypted file from the user and using java in Windows environment we need to encrypt the file and store it In one directory. The below code when I try to run in windows I got the Error. import com.freiheit.gnupg.GnuPGContext; import com.freiheit.gnupg.GnuPGData; import com.freiheit.gnupg.GnuPGKey; public class TestMain { /** * @param args */ public static void main(String[] args) { TestMain t = new TestMain(); t.encryp(); } public void encryp() { GnuPGContext ctx = new GnuPGContext(); GnuPGKey[] recipient = new GnuPGKey[1]; recipient[0] = ctx.getKeyByFingerprint("gpg-fingerprint of recipient (must be from your keyring)"); GnuPGData plain = ctx.createDataObject("I am a secret message."); GnuPGData cipher = ctx.createDataObject();//this will contain the cipher after encryption ctx.encrypt(recipient, plain, cipher); System.out.println("Plain text: " + plain); System.out.println("Cipher text: " + cipher); } } Exception: Exception in thread "main" java.lang.UnsatisfiedLinkError: C:\Users\pd68403\AppData\Local\Temp\libjavagnupg15415.so: Can't load this .dll (machine code=0x101) on a IA 32-bit platform at java.lang.ClassLoader$NativeLibrary.load(Native Method) at java.lang.ClassLoader.loadLibrary0(ClassLoader.java:1751) at java.lang.ClassLoader.loadLibrary(ClassLoader.java:1647) at java.lang.Runtime.load0(Runtime.java:769) at java.lang.System.load(System.java:968) at com.freiheit.gnupg.GnuPGContext.(GnuPGContext.java:465) at com.citi.encryp.TestMain.encryp(TestMain.java:20) at com.citi.encryp.TestMain.main(TestMain.java:14) Thanks and Regards Pradipta Dutta Desk no: 908 563 0274 mail id: pradipta.dutta at citi.com -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From wk at gnupg.org Thu May 3 09:44:20 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Thu, 03 May 2012 09:44:20 +0200 Subject: GPG on Windows 7? In-Reply-To: <4FA17FB8.4000205@hotmail.com> (Mika Suomalainen's message of "Wed, 02 May 2012 21:40:56 +0300") References: <4FA17FB8.4000205@hotmail.com> Message-ID: <87ipgdbtez.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Wed, 2 May 2012 20:40, mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com said: > GPG4Win works on Windows 7 too. http://gpg4win.org/ Except for the explorer extension gpgex, which does not work with the 64 bit explorer. We are planning an update, though. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From papillion at gmail.com Thu May 3 10:12:57 2012 From: papillion at gmail.com (Anthony Papillon) Date: Thu, 3 May 2012 03:12:57 -0500 Subject: Gpg4Win and GnuPG Message-ID: <5FF43F5D-B87B-4497-B488-9B2FE989A842@gmail.com> Quick question: are there any security concerns with running GnuPG and GPG4Win on the same system? Thanks! -- Sent from my mobile device From wk at gnupg.org Thu May 3 10:45:00 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Thu, 03 May 2012 10:45:00 +0200 Subject: Gpg4Win and GnuPG In-Reply-To: <5FF43F5D-B87B-4497-B488-9B2FE989A842@gmail.com> (Anthony Papillon's message of "Thu, 3 May 2012 03:12:57 -0500") References: <5FF43F5D-B87B-4497-B488-9B2FE989A842@gmail.com> Message-ID: <87aa1pbqlv.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Thu, 3 May 2012 10:12, papillion at gmail.com said: > Quick question: are there any security concerns with running GnuPG and > GPG4Win on the same system? Gpg4win is an installer which includes GnuPG as its crypto engine. In fact, Gpg4win is the suggested way to install GnuPG on Windows. In case your question is whether you can use the GnuPG 1.4 installer along with Gpg4win (which comes with GnuPG 2): This is not suggested but should not pose a security problem. Note, that you will end up with two programs named gpg on your box - this may lead to some confusion. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From papillion at gmail.com Thu May 3 10:57:14 2012 From: papillion at gmail.com (Anthony Papillon) Date: Thu, 3 May 2012 03:57:14 -0500 Subject: Gpg4Win and GnuPG In-Reply-To: <87aa1pbqlv.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <5FF43F5D-B87B-4497-B488-9B2FE989A842@gmail.com> <87aa1pbqlv.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: Thank you, Werner. The system already has GPG installed and they won't want a second copy, I'm sure. I thought GPG4Win added a new context menu item that would allow easier file encryption. If not then they don't need anything else. Thanks! Anthony -- Sent from my mobile device On May 3, 2012, at 3:45 AM, Werner Koch wrote: > On Thu, 3 May 2012 10:12, papillion at gmail.com said: >> Quick question: are there any security concerns with running GnuPG >> and >> GPG4Win on the same system? > > Gpg4win is an installer which includes GnuPG as its crypto engine. In > fact, Gpg4win is the suggested way to install GnuPG on Windows. > > In case your question is whether you can use the GnuPG 1.4 installer > along with Gpg4win (which comes with GnuPG 2): This is not suggested > but > should not pose a security problem. Note, that you will end up with > two > programs named gpg on your box - this may lead to some confusion. > > > Shalom-Salam, > > Werner > > -- > Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. > From mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com Thu May 3 13:28:48 2012 From: mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com (Mika Suomalainen) Date: Thu, 03 May 2012 14:28:48 +0300 Subject: Gpg4Win and GnuPG In-Reply-To: <5FF43F5D-B87B-4497-B488-9B2FE989A842@gmail.com> References: <5FF43F5D-B87B-4497-B488-9B2FE989A842@gmail.com> Message-ID: <4FA26BF0.8000908@hotmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 03.05.2012 11:12, Anthony Papillon kirjoitti: > Quick question: are there any security concerns with running GnuPG > and GPG4Win on the same system? > > Thanks! I don't think that there are. GPG4Win includes GnuPG and some other programs. - -- Mika Suomalainen gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net --recv-keys 4DB53CFE82A46728 Key fingerprint = 24BC 1573 B8EE D666 D10A AA65 4DB5 3CFE 82A4 6728 I use GPG/INLINE, because some mailing list programs modify the headers of messages and this way make signature.asc files (PGP/MIME) unverifiable. Please remove lines about beginning and ending GPG signature blocks in your replies to messages, which are sent by me. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.19 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJPomvuAAoJEE21PP6CpGcoW5UP/isThXHIGUD0BxF4syrTuyEL Ub2UDZpbvJ01Cosw46JvsrYdXmnd+QE9N3imGaPzEUk42TpPOIZJuF1Jf7BGlYiF ARg7hUp+L15lECpFBho9yF1ilvNRD+Uumt5IGfCTOSezOA5AT4SwoHQHXRQvmiPf WLC7YPvHzCBVeBHtLT4ndlv0Dv/FpjKIk3CMIT4Zd/RrtnWHpenKjkq3IEQ0Fg4r mOr+AbdbSgBlHT+Z2UEPD8VkhYW6eqXUPQx7W4Xf8oRVmWK1vHKwIYNt8GlF7BLd 9Zwx1TLHtZm6qHhpVz9QjYqHNLN1PLhpfMdUTRawJ5Kr00f/awWe/huQopqAcgs/ GHHTjsMshtYtOn7zr5vzyvrPrfkWvUzADu1je7xn0cyhGeeOxgXEHyBonXsf6Tjp LGP9n1nKlcsA2zKORhg7Ji+ZNNiohzqDOTqYoMU/JiyokKcD87qK7tMJMlMpgDoW CxKMQDj93VXFsCOvNP2ioQ+VX3QuQcLG4neRdT0qjDPYEPGCIHpcZ3Dir/G2JeAC CMUE2XmoYHjFwbLCKL8iD3iJEPCVxLsZLJSX3f/dduDHlOd7SR0x6m8mq6727Jlj 9mZlACmTb3hCwG4I3yYZBfLPF5E3/UrH6D8XsrS1qZJ421yYrhuAvs2L4DuOoRZ2 C2qWDT9SWJvgKR9JwLw1 =rBL2 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com Thu May 3 13:31:36 2012 From: mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com (Mika Suomalainen) Date: Thu, 03 May 2012 14:31:36 +0300 Subject: Gpg4Win and GnuPG In-Reply-To: References: <5FF43F5D-B87B-4497-B488-9B2FE989A842@gmail.com> <87aa1pbqlv.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <4FA26C98.80000@hotmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 03.05.2012 11:57, Anthony Papillon kirjoitti: > Thank you, Werner. The system already has GPG installed and they > won't want a second copy, I'm sure. I thought GPG4Win added a new > context menu item that would allow easier file encryption. If not > then they don't need anything else. > > Thanks! Anthony > > -- Sent from my mobile device > > On May 3, 2012, at 3:45 AM, Werner Koch wrote: > >> On Thu, 3 May 2012 10:12, papillion at gmail.com said: >>> Quick question: are there any security concerns with running >>> GnuPG and GPG4Win on the same system? >> >> Gpg4win is an installer which includes GnuPG as its crypto >> engine. In fact, Gpg4win is the suggested way to install GnuPG >> on Windows. >> >> In case your question is whether you can use the GnuPG 1.4 >> installer along with Gpg4win (which comes with GnuPG 2): This is >> not suggested but should not pose a security problem. Note, that >> you will end up with two programs named gpg on your box - this >> may lead to some confusion. >> >> >> Shalom-Salam, >> >> Werner >> >> -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. >> > > _______________________________________________ Gnupg-users mailing > list Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users GPG4Win has some program which includes the context menu. I think that GPG4Win doesn't offer to install GnuPG if you have up-to-date version already. - -- Mika Suomalainen gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net --recv-keys 4DB53CFE82A46728 Key fingerprint = 24BC 1573 B8EE D666 D10A AA65 4DB5 3CFE 82A4 6728 I use GPG/INLINE, because some mailing list programs modify the headers of messages and this way make signature.asc files (PGP/MIME) unverifiable. Please remove lines about beginning and ending GPG signature blocks in your replies to messages, which are sent by me. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.19 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJPomyWAAoJEE21PP6CpGcoD6YP/Rq/ZcmB6DZEEIrmiDcVmSbo HKc5wGUQ4pRyMq9BZ/eF3PXXkyiwbgB8PD+jmCWSKwC/2diA0ZTDAtrX5HboRJg5 0SjlACj6BDPCpbTct+ZTHug2d8sTJga8imdNyABrlTnwbLRf9SMmzRqVhH6ajCbH Vpp731mOG1Rbn2pojEdTGnbpKCu3tpLTJeryg1aCfdQCufgWzEOEseQE/WCtJSgL IAyyZ3bzef6C0j4rBowe2fvCJGHQmL7rOP0ofw31ZMQNy9j3kFnXG1a1omQzvN6d D+49AEwwg0+7F/Ci9SVBcIGA34XVRQL02Z0JK7QP4jZ8S2e4MfKEbPY6Er7LT+T5 mCz235l9w+V7sdNjr87pW49TYqrDQo9vO3GB60LYaR7qaG11nOojYt+8Yr24uMx2 7Wbwhyp6A0A7FSxoZ3xRhOCt6B66BTUfYRvsZN7IgOp8p5Og80FNzKg6D/eGATxS Dvzuq1IG6kwBbb8/mFg//HTTxlYcoRmDhxCbSyt+DxfszXla4ldUxiRmtH6mMbq6 FJ8WqpaZIx61/pkNXRUDwuCeC/tay7yiWewdY+XPUiFQ6gxNoix7gavGnakLfCVL Fo19LDjpPSnWxrcRs9D6951Ue/nqoe56dP7IsH14Qrzi3i40T9vZjuCIRHajkYKC 0lhNtpgLRJ6Cc2ROlhrG =IhAw -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From wk at gnupg.org Thu May 3 16:52:49 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Thu, 03 May 2012 16:52:49 +0200 Subject: Gpg4Win and GnuPG In-Reply-To: (Anthony Papillon's message of "Thu, 3 May 2012 03:57:14 -0500") References: <5FF43F5D-B87B-4497-B488-9B2FE989A842@gmail.com> <87aa1pbqlv.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <874nrxb9ku.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Thu, 3 May 2012 10:57, papillion at gmail.com said: > Thank you, Werner. The system already has GPG installed and they > won't want a second copy, I'm sure. I thought GPG4Win added a new > context menu item that would allow easier file encryption. If not then Right. However, you can select which components you want to install. BTW, I just prepared a beta version for 2.1.1, which will be a maintenance update. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From scrader at carrollu.edu Thu May 3 17:19:38 2012 From: scrader at carrollu.edu (Shannon Crader) Date: Thu, 3 May 2012 10:19:38 -0500 Subject: HP-UX installation error of gnupg version 1.4.12 Message-ID: <2033D7483935D1489B3E5AA56FBAE681010D47CA83AA@CMAIL.carrollu.edu> Good Morning! I am attempting to install gnupg-1.4.12 on an HP-UX box. I have been able to do the "./configure" and "make" steps of the installation. However, I am getting the error below when attempting to do the make install step (as SU), which seems to indicate that the process can not locate bison. However, I have bison installed. Running a whereis command for bison lists it in the normal directories... Has anyone else attempted the installation on an HP-UX? Do I need to edit a file or two to point it to the installation of bison? Thanks ever so much! Shannon Crader Carroll University, Wisconsin, USA ====================================== # whereis bison bison: /usr/local/bin/bison /opt/gnu/bin/bison /opt/gnu/man/man1/bison.1 /usr/local/share/man/man1/bison.1 ====================================== ... ... ... Making install in tools make[1]: Entering directory `/home/carsids/scrader/pgp/gnupg-1.4.12/tools' make[2]: Entering directory `/home/carsids/scrader/pgp/gnupg-1.4.12/tools' test -z "/usr/local/bin" || ../scripts/install-sh -c -d "/usr/local/bin" ../scripts/install-sh -c gpgsplit '/usr/local/bin' cp: cannot create /usr/local/bin/_inst.9612_: Permission denied make[2]: *** [install-binPROGRAMS] Error 1 make[2]: Leaving directory `/home/carsids/scrader/pgp/gnupg-1.4.12/tools' make[1]: *** [install-am] Error 2 make[1]: Leaving directory `/home/carsids/scrader/pgp/gnupg-1.4.12/tools' make: *** [install-recursive] Error 1 cars(db) /home/carsids/scrader/pgp/gnupg-1.4.12/: SU su Password for scrader: # make install No suffix list. Making install in m4 No suffix list. No suffix list. No suffix list. Making install in intl bison -y -d --name-prefix=__gettext --output plural.c plural.y sh: bison: not found. *** Error exit code 127 Stop. *** Error exit code 1 Stop. ====================================== -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jw72253 at verizon.net Thu May 3 19:18:20 2012 From: jw72253 at verizon.net (John A. Wallace) Date: Thu, 03 May 2012 12:18:20 -0500 Subject: Gpg4Win and GnuPG In-Reply-To: <874nrxb9ku.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <5FF43F5D-B87B-4497-B488-9B2FE989A842@gmail.com> <87aa1pbqlv.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <874nrxb9ku.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <005b01cd2950$bcba4960$362edc20$@net> Any issues with installing gpg or GPA on Windows Server 2008? Thanks. > -----Original Message----- > From: gnupg-users-bounces at gnupg.org [mailto:gnupg-users-bounces at gnupg.org] On > Behalf Of Werner Koch > Sent: Thursday, May 03, 2012 9:53 AM > To: Anthony Papillon > Cc: gnupg-users at gnupg.org > Subject: Re: Gpg4Win and GnuPG > > On Thu, 3 May 2012 10:57, papillion at gmail.com said: > > Thank you, Werner. The system already has GPG installed and they > > won't want a second copy, I'm sure. I thought GPG4Win added a new > > context menu item that would allow easier file encryption. If not then > > Right. However, you can select which components you want to install. > > BTW, I just prepared a beta version for 2.1.1, which will be a maintenance > update. > > > Salam-Shalom, > > Werner > > > -- > Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. > > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users From wk at gnupg.org Thu May 3 19:21:58 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Thu, 03 May 2012 19:21:58 +0200 Subject: HP-UX installation error of gnupg version 1.4.12 In-Reply-To: <2033D7483935D1489B3E5AA56FBAE681010D47CA83AA@CMAIL.carrollu.edu> (Shannon Crader's message of "Thu, 3 May 2012 10:19:38 -0500") References: <2033D7483935D1489B3E5AA56FBAE681010D47CA83AA@CMAIL.carrollu.edu> Message-ID: <87vckd9o3t.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Thu, 3 May 2012 17:19, scrader at carrollu.edu said: > installation. However, I am getting the error below when attempting to > do the make install step (as SU), which seems to indicate that the This might be a timestamp/make problem. If you don't care about i18n you may simply do ./configure --disable-nls Bison is only required for gettext and should not be called unless there is a problem with timestamps etc. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com Thu May 3 19:37:43 2012 From: mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com (Mika Suomalainen) Date: Thu, 03 May 2012 20:37:43 +0300 Subject: Gpg4Win and GnuPG In-Reply-To: <005b01cd2950$bcba4960$362edc20$@net> References: <5FF43F5D-B87B-4497-B488-9B2FE989A842@gmail.com> <87aa1pbqlv.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <874nrxb9ku.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <005b01cd2950$bcba4960$362edc20$@net> Message-ID: <4FA2C267.3020607@hotmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 03.05.2012 20:18, John A. Wallace kirjoitti: > Any issues with installing gpg or GPA on Windows Server 2008? > Thanks. > > >> -----Original Message----- From: gnupg-users-bounces at gnupg.org >> [mailto:gnupg-users-bounces at gnupg.org] On Behalf Of Werner Koch >> Sent: Thursday, May 03, 2012 9:53 AM To: Anthony Papillon Cc: >> gnupg-users at gnupg.org Subject: Re: Gpg4Win and GnuPG >> >> On Thu, 3 May 2012 10:57, papillion at gmail.com said: >>> Thank you, Werner. The system already has GPG installed and >>> they won't want a second copy, I'm sure. I thought GPG4Win >>> added a new context menu item that would allow easier file >>> encryption. If not then >> >> Right. However, you can select which components you want to >> install. >> >> BTW, I just prepared a beta version for 2.1.1, which will be a >> maintenance update. >> >> >> Salam-Shalom, >> >> Werner >> >> >> -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. >> >> >> _______________________________________________ Gnupg-users >> mailing list Gnupg-users at gnupg.org >> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users > > > > _______________________________________________ Gnupg-users mailing > list Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users Isn't Windows Server 2008 only for servers? If it allows installing normal programs there probably aren't, but I am not sure as I haven't ever used Windows servers. PS. Please don't top post if possible. - -- Mika Suomalainen gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net --recv-keys 4DB53CFE82A46728 Key fingerprint = 24BC 1573 B8EE D666 D10A AA65 4DB5 3CFE 82A4 6728 I use GPG/INLINE, because some mailing list programs modify the headers of messages and this way make signature.asc files (PGP/MIME) unverifiable. Please remove lines about beginning and ending GPG signature blocks in your replies to messages, which are sent by me. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.19 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJPosJkAAoJEE21PP6CpGcofhcQAJBCgwiyWRfWke1HmIqYkvvC vprdOxfOG3TEWk8SWe1hm6xczCwFzpnAE85mQtlv5awuc5kIQl0XyWnMNkttltha OuOboSwMpsBkfOmOC6WV1r0HsuDNNwbzNS1RHXaOyuuNbWfEtfxf5vsmTUHGKY1w QTdoBnyi261jXbFBMDi1QIpmVtIu9V8oobnl9gvnrmh77aQhvSAQrfXXZ8yUUXdA OnSVg5w9U9ekDT9USmZ6+LQqe1L84Mu7S2w+KRwjNP5+hv5bOndM/7t4UMT1B5ou snc/pV60Itdhe+JPz+IVD053ukeljnrA9PtiEzBWybWNB2nVIV5fRtiUV3cp2dzS a2Q9faPr+iD4uIFSZHJUxdnXmiBpzvawqrVg1qyCdXxmKlEFTJMjnYq/9eCYjqrZ YZAWlVtgQ5rzA5LHKn1fDu99ERQpvBjYNX/USrjfW9iELSaC3pMgDNTf0FKZIJAy uUAfnGEXbMWVl1X3g781MPIp0lAzycZKQv3hAIT2CnWV6Zr+7Ll7lXXS+rkqTxb1 xLBnt0N64JhedSCZmd4l3X3K4sFZdq/Y9zpE1A+jFJ/0HXiLhD8nb/L+SHGIMBFN hrGQzHnuAi2fJU6fZmCWs7JOHcH86nLBlzBa4j19N7U/AYN9xeUf0zGb3vmMzCsh 3aZz/hmuSIgNVuGlQhCw =GGrG -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From kf at sumptuouscapital.com Thu May 3 19:49:46 2012 From: kf at sumptuouscapital.com (Kristian Fiskerstrand) Date: Thu, 03 May 2012 19:49:46 +0200 Subject: Gpg4Win and GnuPG In-Reply-To: <005b01cd2950$bcba4960$362edc20$__27276.8182600432$1336065587$gmane$org@net> References: <5FF43F5D-B87B-4497-B488-9B2FE989A842@gmail.com> <87aa1pbqlv.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <874nrxb9ku.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <005b01cd2950$bcba4960$362edc20$__27276.8182600432$1336065587$gmane$org@net> Message-ID: -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 On 03.05.2012 19:18, John A. Wallace wrote: > Any issues with installing gpg or GPA on Windows Server 2008? > Thanks. > Hi John, I'm using GnuPG (from the 2.x branch) on some servers running Windows Server 2008 and 2008 R2 without issue. GPA not so frequently, but not encountered issues in the little use I've had from it. As previously mentioned though, there isn't a 64 bit version of GpgEx (shell extension). - -- - ---------------------------- Kristian Fiskerstrand http://www.sumptuouscapital.com Twitter: @krifisk - ---------------------------- Corruptissima re publica plurim? leges The greater the degeneration of the republic, the more of its laws - ---------------------------- This email was digitally signed using the OpenPGP standard. If you want to read more about this The book: Sending Emails - The Safe Way: An introduction to OpenPGP security is now available in both Amazon Kindle and Paperback format at http://www.amazon.com/dp/B006RSG1S4/ - ---------------------------- Public PGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at http://www.sumptuouscapital.com/pgp/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.19 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQIcBAEBCAAGBQJPosU5AAoJEBbgz41rC5UIGl0P/AhlkadmIuEgQiml85aIWfTK kZOK4Ic6QlTlMui5pyHy0XRWK4tLmCV62421G5bghjpzc9T4B82u8uwuBANnZRjI zlkrYD7/nap3Q45Cyq5clk8LDg50nmkRnlS1gisQCbbF8Hv3bABBp/0Fr+X+aRRG q/RJi98GNjBjtpUyvaUPFeY9Rkvv0EWDClGhC+AMoQvhFMXQdjc+aJUJKZwH7xYe JQba4Er1QpiiUJUtYvo+y8zi195RS+w9gKuUQf59dRcI96mNFCWFBDYy+Iqq3kOT 94qshZhAArCe+/vxuCGm0IzWmACkNgxMTKcrT3NTWN89k/x4kK12puLU1XAWSkCn qNBrjAUCXGvnEjyUUZS2Ienff2JREo3uknXBlU/o4Y9qQrBTDuZudGUWzP581NSl 32X/Rv8+3R9OVWOHphd3Lsx/ScaPyNc4jF5olZqKaAC97RYAykNFkTYM5Zw/tyFR zvBe4efQmREmezcBEJeCeCf4B84VIHpyadP5gFVXCt8Ya/D5NYt3mF4nuRSGXWix 99GFKciBEMpykiUDnD3KRzNl9K7s1dAKrj5dwFtReZ7ETYWFZYjYFhwm0gVsPmIl m6qa4j2QTohNydwa6Fc8lfDRO9q5rrvPa2UfgH+2XyF2qZHY42oC1x1tOspLDeSK 9HqFpDMFJQAM/kwYFeEg =UHGK -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From scrader at carrollu.edu Thu May 3 19:56:49 2012 From: scrader at carrollu.edu (Shannon Crader) Date: Thu, 3 May 2012 12:56:49 -0500 Subject: HP-UX installation error of gnupg version 1.4.12 In-Reply-To: <87vckd9o3t.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <2033D7483935D1489B3E5AA56FBAE681010D47CA83AA@CMAIL.carrollu.edu> <87vckd9o3t.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <2033D7483935D1489B3E5AA56FBAE681010D47CA84E3@CMAIL.carrollu.edu> On Thu, 3 May 2012 17:19, scrader at carrollu.edu said: > installation. However, I am getting the error below when attempting to > do the make install step (as SU), which seems to indicate that the This might be a timestamp/make problem. If you don't care about i18n you may simply do ./configure --disable-nls Bison is only required for gettext and should not be called unless there is a problem with timestamps etc. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. Thank you, that is all it took! From david at gbenet.com Thu May 3 20:45:51 2012 From: david at gbenet.com (david at gbenet.com) Date: Thu, 03 May 2012 19:45:51 +0100 Subject: gpg.conf Message-ID: <4FA2D25F.9020409@gbenet.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Hi All, I wonder if someone can help me. I'm running opensuse 11.1 lxde I have no gpa-agent running and the following commands in my gpg.conf file produce error messages when I remove the hash (#) ###+++--- GPGConf ---+++### ###+++--- GPGConf ---+++### Wed 11 Apr 2012 01:55:18 BST # GPGConf edited this configuration file. # It will disable options before this marked block, but it will # never change anything below these lines. # --pgp2 # cert-digest-algo SHA256 # --rfc1991 # -- use-agent # --max-cache-ttl 7200 # --max-cache-ttl-ssh 7200 # --use-standard-socket #-- agent-awareness gpg2 # --homedir dir /.gnupg # --auto-check-trustdb # --no-permission-warning # --force-v4-certs # --trust-model pgp classic # utf8-strings keyserver hkp://keys.gnupg.net the keyserver is the only one not to produce any error messages. David - -- ?See the sanity of the man! No gods, no angels, no demons, no body. Nothing of the kind.Stern, sane,every brain-cell perfect and complete even at the moment of death. No delusion.? https://linuxcounter.net/user/512854.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.16 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJPotJfAAoJEOJpqm7flREx6uMH/0liAkEgulIZA2Wxd0ye9xY/ yTSghJQfPUtIBF97NFZxILlYskFJME+qQfDowwPg7PtbjKgbjb3+mUGNhqZwQ/Ti PY5hnCkO54QlpTdFN5zDt6NtDNskkYjfxDe1alVkNZpwTxCQd57SPyZ/NzyJyFRf GPbFGHpuKR075XsCcXA/92PYUkpZWwaotDoC1MwlLv2Ig+Xe1sFDc2N2iGKD9WEN Yp9f57BEyTvB1/uNmV5XhNRjIKqUq54FSeykrwOGInzmj3ihrdN/ZPEX4YajNV0Z HG9HyWOvpTGchPMPh5IIZntVwnncFezxi75Z/R6FVGf3faZI1ksIWB36YSxnkLw= =RWjY -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From ali at lown.me.uk Thu May 3 19:14:52 2012 From: ali at lown.me.uk (Ali Lown) Date: Thu, 3 May 2012 18:14:52 +0100 Subject: SSH Agent keys >4096 bit? Message-ID: I am trying to use gpg-agent for my ssh keys as well as my gpg keys, but am unable to add my 8192 bit ssh key to the agent. Agent log reports: "2012-05-03 17:48:02 gpg-agent[2190] ssh keys greater than 4096 bits are not supported" The limit appears to be arbitarily set in agent/command-ssh.c following a max mpi_data_size. Does anyone know why the limit is set at 4096 bits, and whether there are any plans for supporting SSH keys of lengths greater than 4096bit in the gpg-agent? Thanks. Ali From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Thu May 3 21:09:42 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Thu, 03 May 2012 15:09:42 -0400 Subject: SSH Agent keys >4096 bit? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <4FA2D7F6.8050304@sixdemonbag.org> On 05/03/2012 01:14 PM, Ali Lown wrote: > Does anyone know why the limit is set at 4096 bits The consensus of the cryptographic community is that beyond 3K keys you really need to be switching to elliptical-curve cryptography. A 3K RSA or Elgamal key is roughly as difficult to break by brute-force as AES128, and that one's so hard that nobody with two brain cells to rub together is going to try it. Although I am not a GnuPG developer, I have never heard anything from the core devs which would make me think they are planning on revisiting this limit to allow for extraordinarily large keys. From kf at sumptuouscapital.com Thu May 3 21:24:18 2012 From: kf at sumptuouscapital.com (Kristian Fiskerstrand) Date: Thu, 03 May 2012 21:24:18 +0200 Subject: SSH Agent keys >4096 bit? In-Reply-To: <4FA2D7F6.8050304__26980.0619026229$1336072234$gmane$org@sixdemonbag.org> References: <4FA2D7F6.8050304__26980.0619026229$1336072234$gmane$org@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 On 03.05.2012 21:09, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > On 05/03/2012 01:14 PM, Ali Lown wrote: >> Does anyone know why the limit is set at 4096 bits > > The consensus of the cryptographic community is that beyond 3K keys > you really need to be switching to elliptical-curve cryptography. > A 3K RSA or Elgamal key is roughly as difficult to break by > brute-force as AES128, and that one's so hard that nobody with two > brain cells to rub together is going to try it. > > Although I am not a GnuPG developer, I have never heard anything > from the core devs which would make me think they are planning on > revisiting this limit to allow for extraordinarily large keys. Although GnuPG won't allow generation for larger keys than 4096 bits without some hacking it will actually import and use such keys without any modifications being needed (could try to import e.g. [1] from [2]). So in that sense there seems to be some difference to the reported behavior to ssh-agent. Now, whether such a large key is really useful, that is indeed another question. [1] https://www.kfwebs.net/pgp/pubkey-large.txt [2] http://www.kfwebs.net/news/603/15360-bit-OpenPGP-key - -- - ---------------------------- Kristian Fiskerstrand http://www.sumptuouscapital.com Twitter: @krifisk - ---------------------------- Corruptissima re publica plurim? leges The greater the degeneration of the republic, the more of its laws - ---------------------------- This email was digitally signed using the OpenPGP standard. If you want to read more about this The book: Sending Emails - The Safe Way: An introduction to OpenPGP security is now available in both Amazon Kindle and Paperback format at http://www.amazon.com/dp/B006RSG1S4/ - ---------------------------- Public PGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at http://www.sumptuouscapital.com/pgp/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.19 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQIcBAEBCAAGBQJPotthAAoJEBbgz41rC5UIdSkQAIZ7h8aRF+pYjeOC1coPcnnP 6ZzU8gbYHlxD8V5nqgv09eQZ8R7iqSz2nXCW3uT4SYrNFs4dLQWqC64IGW419mfv 3RD66lEZx0iKukzmzSWeLhjGBECyhbQfSoKG8i78OXZPP8eUFziddheQMQix7yyK wRcMNl1Rk0FoytlL7/DJOIzVrGJkwMeeZ+kgYunNlk+KokavW66eH0F837y3TmNi M08JAgSXbogoDTP4y8opmnRjES8WdkvZHaOUkYN3YSPpMet7hCX8uyfGyJXDV+gi l79f0ltLiEFj7IYYSXVKsJ2c28tEkDBMcz/meYoy4W0kEReuAKM5Kn+OJoSrMTHI 8pfNeBMiYmvpJjHptvxtQNT8G/OEsXQfzsJl34FrWxrHFqHH8v445L+yryDRJzNd Xy/AWPqpz51RuLYpcLnYmBKt4630hdmnCJf5DSPh4mrnpDFry/ekL5nFXjKPTEq8 AdsyK9JVGKtxerS+OEGeHc6zKIcM6edZNiByyDMwwf8SsJeoq92N/4fO839FapZj nmlow5lqGPMotrO2im4HzgWDXnRzmUbJJfsDsCRZYzIewT1Y9F313RQdP4taMQhB lr1aDM5xrft4mnkKRMwHvNVBpWFdP04P1DaOdV5FTj1kJpDqmzD6U+bvKf6Sh/W4 e21RSyf988sHPzn93GGg =FS9I -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com Thu May 3 21:28:08 2012 From: mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com (Mika Suomalainen) Date: Thu, 03 May 2012 22:28:08 +0300 Subject: SSH Agent keys >4096 bit? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <4FA2DC48.7050901@hotmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 03.05.2012 20:14, Ali Lown kirjoitti: > I am trying to use gpg-agent for my ssh keys as well as my gpg > keys, but am unable to add my 8192 bit ssh key to the agent. > > Agent log reports: "2012-05-03 17:48:02 gpg-agent[2190] ssh keys > greater than 4096 bits are not supported" > > The limit appears to be arbitarily set in agent/command-ssh.c > following a max mpi_data_size. > > Does anyone know why the limit is set at 4096 bits, and whether > there are any plans for supporting SSH keys of lengths greater than > 4096bit in the gpg-agent? > > Thanks. Ali > > _______________________________________________ Gnupg-users mailing > list Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users Use SSH agent instead of GPG agent for ssh keys. See the manual page "ssh-add" (and "ssh-agent"). The ssh-agent should usually start when you login. - -- Mika Suomalainen gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net --recv-keys 4DB53CFE82A46728 Key fingerprint = 24BC 1573 B8EE D666 D10A AA65 4DB5 3CFE 82A4 6728 Please don't toppost, if possible https://wiki.debian.org/FAQsFromDebianUser#What_is_top-posting_.28and_why_shouldn.27t_I_do_it.29.3F Please don't send HTML, if possible. It's possible with most of clients, even with webmails, see: https://wiki.debian.org/DebianMailingLists#HowTo_send_plain_text_emails_to_the_list I use GPG/INLINE, because some mailing list programs modify the headers of messages and this way make signature.asc files (PGP/MIME) unverifiable. Please remove lines about beginning and ending GPG signature blocks in your replies to messages, which are sent by me. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.19 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJPotxGAAoJEE21PP6CpGcoxjkP/2beQQAl2duihGDiF767lIqK tox9RdRrh7Afh0Q03VmHaTHzDb4XegzIc//3SY9bGcOLtXaeefqJ2AHxGyj1fsGq +r84qW0ClAKvlqQF3OY/PMfmTBllUFR4T27C1xmWvU6khTlK+cC+aapSIlSdp8XI Vtbw+naJ/kUO0BXxDJdK8RwmoXR8qeBRGjB+HLx3G+f2xmKIYCjrzMs4TopEecBz n+Vt9DA3aqnhoXZzE49zhKOrBiLM/GLTPtWbXccVicIZxVB72/GASw1mLntJZ62Z g1D+L64C75cI4NgZivUKjLdw7KEZZryrjffJTx4Z9vEfV82+ohkJxUZmDSP+9wBB XxOUY7v4wy36/rU59U62mGBFFRd8bw1X8PoZNBY4K4BfGXtU4XZIlbhNlLzyYiYd 1pgJObu6mQpubwj5E4s2jOlpSNw9QaxQxFJYq6YiNGD5AdCpB+cC7aUldf3wX4yG /PEsv9YVZ/lH3JmgRhaevFTV21XZAZMnVnTT8yWqNodLIS9llSg2mKFJs20mfTrK bvnrjZFUO4JiFppIHN7YShDN7Tj0p5Ha8J8y4s3w1DzSCmVHP3AU4ynakGtnhqiz GLjouApDe90GV2evdf9dx8lGJCY18sqfcAjlQ93ImPC2Qt/QbCsF9h0aTe1VELC6 EZAEBjU/3fXzxywoemPW =6xJh -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com Thu May 3 21:33:06 2012 From: mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com (Mika Suomalainen) Date: Thu, 03 May 2012 22:33:06 +0300 Subject: gpg.conf In-Reply-To: <4FA2D25F.9020409@gbenet.com> References: <4FA2D25F.9020409@gbenet.com> Message-ID: <4FA2DD72.9050007@hotmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Hi, 03.05.2012 21:45, david at gbenet.com kirjoitti: > Hi All, > > I wonder if someone can help me. I'm running opensuse 11.1 lxde I > have no gpa-agent running and the following commands in my gpg.conf > file produce error messages when I remove the hash (#) > > ###+++--- GPGConf ---+++### > > ###+++--- GPGConf ---+++### Wed 11 Apr 2012 01:55:18 BST # GPGConf > edited this configuration file. # It will disable options before > this marked block, but it will # never change anything below these > lines. # --pgp2 # cert-digest-algo SHA256 # --rfc1991 # -- > use-agent # --max-cache-ttl 7200 # --max-cache-ttl-ssh 7200 # > --use-standard-socket #-- agent-awareness gpg2 # --homedir dir > /.gnupg # --auto-check-trustdb # --no-permission-warning # > --force-v4-certs # --trust-model pgp classic # utf8-strings > keyserver hkp://keys.gnupg.net > > the keyserver is the only one not to produce any error messages. > > David > > > > _______________________________________________ Gnupg-users mailing > list Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users I think that your issue is, because you are uncommenting flags. See manual page gpg for correct configuration flags. I will attach my gpg.conf to this message for example in case you find it useful. - -- Mika Suomalainen gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net --recv-keys 4DB53CFE82A46728 Key fingerprint = 24BC 1573 B8EE D666 D10A AA65 4DB5 3CFE 82A4 6728 Please don't toppost, if possible https://wiki.debian.org/FAQsFromDebianUser#What_is_top-posting_.28and_why_shouldn.27t_I_do_it.29.3F Please don't send HTML, if possible. It's possible with most of clients, even with webmails, see: https://wiki.debian.org/DebianMailingLists#HowTo_send_plain_text_emails_to_the_list I use GPG/INLINE, because some mailing list programs modify the headers of messages and this way make signature.asc files (PGP/MIME) unverifiable. Please remove lines about beginning and ending GPG signature blocks in your replies to messages, which are sent by me. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.19 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJPot1uAAoJEE21PP6CpGco8HsP/1GFz/VL/HfJeNPQvhHxV1Wg ajrHXMdmX3Q/uvXxrkRONJDGdGZFvEaM02qodDaeLzf2ACFIYFqwNz4/+JmuvwZp 1ZbXx3oNsOjNOR+tpwLMUgFQP/IJTwAlfcPgVoj1O3RTCbnczUeJJLE+MaGva2PB PncAMFjsV0RbUJuFZD1dEnce6Mk8UhH7pIw2k51n7e+6l/96UXhcip3jLwJpLkZo /BDBJLa9GT0fld5TypPLCMuYiODtK8fETZZ0TQysUdKuM12p8B/+2FAR5pKHVTr/ 5iYORtbEVlb9ubQh3C1UxQdrdYBFciESOUgtj8eEyuynXjjJBuhUO6afe34lkwPR SswIyW6VRvfhgHTtKuNJr8WMRap24+3w0hpmB6nrKYxmQZN90sI9HKDdJMR7G+Ea fWPa9UsXOdjurw6Sd16kkUAgTGnV3r8aOeJiyJZJ2Mo5XGQg99EZ6G8SH9qozsbg AgRjstzg8iqhpNIHHvRqLug198vAzijSZj2Yo1xUj+mQBU1ITnwjiLLlptCIfSdU pj5bt/Ghz7x6mNa+TtGu2GkHjgrJVHvWqVqyeZQbrdW5l8GxONmqWR06ELzAWdw/ iF4RbcKdLQ9tUH2yj4W4gQ+ZqX20MbIpdkcS1j201e2oLa+k1gqnfZs80gVp/r0m 5fu49C/Bi1eyktIahAHB =NDU4 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -------------- next part -------------- An embedded and charset-unspecified text was scrubbed... Name: gpg.conf URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: gpg.conf.sig Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 543 bytes Desc: not available URL: From david at gbenet.com Thu May 3 23:15:53 2012 From: david at gbenet.com (david at gbenet.com) Date: Thu, 03 May 2012 22:15:53 +0100 Subject: gpg.conf In-Reply-To: <4FA2DD72.9050007@hotmail.com> References: <4FA2D25F.9020409@gbenet.com> <4FA2DD72.9050007@hotmail.com> Message-ID: <4FA2F589.30506@gbenet.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 03/05/12 20:33, Mika Suomalainen wrote: > Hi, > > 03.05.2012 21:45, david at gbenet.com kirjoitti: >> Hi All, > >> I wonder if someone can help me. I'm running opensuse 11.1 lxde I >> have no gpa-agent running and the following commands in my gpg.conf >> file produce error messages when I remove the hash (#) > >> ###+++--- GPGConf ---+++### > >> ###+++--- GPGConf ---+++### Wed 11 Apr 2012 01:55:18 BST # GPGConf >> edited this configuration file. # It will disable options before >> this marked block, but it will # never change anything below these >> lines. # --pgp2 # cert-digest-algo SHA256 # --rfc1991 # -- >> use-agent # --max-cache-ttl 7200 # --max-cache-ttl-ssh 7200 # >> --use-standard-socket #-- agent-awareness gpg2 # --homedir dir >> /.gnupg # --auto-check-trustdb # --no-permission-warning # >> --force-v4-certs # --trust-model pgp classic # utf8-strings >> keyserver hkp://keys.gnupg.net > >> the keyserver is the only one not to produce any error messages. > >> David > > > >> _______________________________________________ Gnupg-users mailing >> list Gnupg-users at gnupg.org >> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users > > I think that your issue is, because you are uncommenting flags. See > manual page gpg for correct configuration flags. I will attach my > gpg.conf to this message for example in case you find it useful. > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users Hello Mika, Having read gnupg.pdf I added a number of variables to my gpg.conf file. Most of the listed functions cause pgp2 to generate errors. I have listed these below. GPG2 is supposed to support all these options - but all fail. The list: # GnuPG config file created by KGpg default-key F521F3585F0D2C868DAD44E1E269AA6EDF951131 encrypt-to F521F3585F0D2C868DAD44E1E269AA6EDF951131 ###+++--- GPGConf ---+++### Wed 11 Apr 2012 01:55:18 BST # GPGConf edited this configuration file. # It will disable options before this marked block, but it will # never change anything below these lines. pgp2 # check-trustdb # trust-model classic keyid-format 0xshort cert-digest-algo SHA256 rfc1991 use-agent # max-cache-ttl 7200 # max-cache-ttl-ssh 7200 # use-standard-socket # agent-awareness gpg2 # homedir dir /.gnupg # auto-check-trustdb # no-permission-warning # force-v4-certs # trust-model pgp classic utf8-strings # auto-key-retrieve # honor-keyserver-url # honor-pka-record # timeout 160 no-permission-warning armor textmode personal-cipher-preferences SHA512 keyserver-options auto-key-retrieve no-include-revoked verbose keyserver hkp://keys.gnupg.net A re-think of valid user options are required by the developers I think :) David - -- ?See the sanity of the man! No gods, no angels, no demons, no body. Nothing of the kind.Stern, sane,every brain-cell perfect and complete even at the moment of death. No delusion.? https://linuxcounter.net/user/512854.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.16 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQEVAwUBT6L1ieJpqm7flRExAQLxcAgAkD6o6M0aJ/vOgYRGhqNLi1F2Budb5M2p rJ5+U1Qi5r689x5eCnEBU/fEF9umF/sHiti23W+nDVuz/wjQswf7YwN6k4R/jXSe nqEpMv3/qwY7ymQl1Nbaknlw4qSQESu2+C8AKzZhMqEPwuS7YSXNDWu79EpXlcZE vjExp95kDtK/h4mCsuGKtmp5AjObyXQWbwqNoESjXNn6q3AT5cIXW0cEDaGSEfCb gLPDddJhzAyUWKfEWC6o8zi3ssplVRZRvoz/hjdxvrIMnTPTw7mT9+cRfL/7/d1Q 5HPQTnRh1iCuXQf08DmHnUBrPVoAoMQywZvFwV5yoIQAjuuG4wtiuw== =cK2s -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From wk at gnupg.org Thu May 3 23:37:25 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Thu, 03 May 2012 23:37:25 +0200 Subject: gpg.conf In-Reply-To: <4FA2D25F.9020409@gbenet.com> (david@gbenet.com's message of "Thu, 03 May 2012 19:45:51 +0100") References: <4FA2D25F.9020409@gbenet.com> Message-ID: <87pqal9ca2.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Thu, 3 May 2012 20:45, david at gbenet.com said: > and the following commands in my gpg.conf file produce error messages when I remove the hash (#) > # --pgp2 Don't use the two dashes in the config file. They are only needed on the command line. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From hka at qbs.com.pl Fri May 4 00:27:10 2012 From: hka at qbs.com.pl (Hubert Kario) Date: Fri, 04 May 2012 00:27:10 +0200 Subject: SSH Agent keys >4096 bit? In-Reply-To: <4FA2D7F6.8050304@sixdemonbag.org> References: <4FA2D7F6.8050304@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <1434887.kcK6zIOEg5@bursa01> On Thursday 03 of May 2012 15:09:42 Robert J. Hansen wrote: > On 05/03/2012 01:14 PM, Ali Lown wrote: > > Does anyone know why the limit is set at 4096 bits > > The consensus of the cryptographic community is that beyond 3K keys you > really need to be switching to elliptical-curve cryptography. A 3K RSA > or Elgamal key is roughly as difficult to break by brute-force as > AES128, and that one's so hard that nobody with two brain cells to rub > together is going to try it. It all depends on who you're talking to. French[1] suggest 4k for AES128. But if you've got data that needs to be protected for 30-40 years, using AES256 is basically a no-brainer. Using just 4k RSA with that is not a smart decision, and that's agreed by basically anybody (NIST, ECRYPT II). Especially when the cost of establishing the link with 8k RSA is insignificant for any session over 5min in length (as is common in SSH). Besides that, Schneier and Ferguson[2] say that basically any RSA based crypto system should support 8k keys. Switching to ECC is not easy, you need to change your whole infrastructure, protocols, management systems, etc. to allow this. Generating extemely large keys is very easy in comparision. Using large keys would be stupid only if you need low latency/high IOPS system that can't use long lasting secure channels: web servers. But that's not our use case. Regards, Hubert Kario [1]: http://www.ssi.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/RGS_B_1.pdf [2]: Practical Cryptography, Chapter: RSA Defined, section "The size of n", p233 -- Hubert Kario QBS - Quality Business Software 02-656 Warszawa, ul. Ksawer?w 30/85 tel. +48 (22) 646-61-51, 646-74-24 www.qbs.com.pl From John at enigmail.net Fri May 4 03:03:24 2012 From: John at enigmail.net (John Clizbe) Date: Thu, 03 May 2012 20:03:24 -0500 Subject: SSH Agent keys >4096 bit? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <4FA32ADC.8080607@enigmail.net> Ali Lown wrote: > I am trying to use gpg-agent for my ssh keys as well as my gpg keys, > but am unable to add my 8192 bit ssh key to the agent. > > Agent log reports: "2012-05-03 17:48:02 gpg-agent[2190] ssh keys > greater than 4096 bits are not supported" > > The limit appears to be arbitarily set in agent/command-ssh.c > following a max mpi_data_size. > > Does anyone know why the limit is set at 4096 bits, and whether there > are any plans for supporting SSH keys of lengths greater than 4096bit > in the gpg-agent? [I think I write this same email on one list or another at least once per year] Because past RSA key sizes of 2048-3072, the migration is to Elliptic Curve Crypto (ECC). Huge RSA keys does not scale for most Internet usages (PKI/TLS/SSL). NO ONE is recommending 4096 RSA or DSA, not because it's unsafe but it's computationally unwieldy, especially on small devices. At asymmetric key sizes of 3072 bits, the smart money is moving to Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). How does ECC compare to RSA _today_? >From the National Institutes of Science and Technology (one of the gold standards for engineering know-how): RSA ECC Sym 1024 160 80 2048 224 112 3072 256 128 7680 384 192 15360 512 256 (One may add a 'Hash' column by doubling the values in the Symmetric Encryption column.) These recommendations can be found on page 63 of NIST Special Publication 800-57, Recommendations for Key Management, Part I. 2nd Revision, 8 Mar, 2007. [http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-57/sp800-57-Part1-revised2_Mar08-2007.pdf] All three parts of SP800-57 are available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsSPs.html The NSA's 2010 Suite-B [http://www.nsa.gov/ia/programs/suiteb_cryptography/index.shtml] recommendations are: Type Symmetric Elliptic Curve Hash Secret 128 256 256 Top Secret 256 384 384 A key aspect of Suite B is its use of elliptic curve technology instead of classical public key technology. During the transition to the use of elliptic curve cryptography in ECDH and ECDSA, DH, DSA and RSA can be used with a 2048-bit modulus to protect classified information up to the _secret_ level [http://www.keylength.com/en/6/]. So, depending on the source, a consensus seems to be forming that beyond a 2048 or 3072 bit modulus for DSA2 or RSA, folks need to switch to ECC. 2048-RSA is the current default in GnuPG. OpenPGP cards will support up to 3072-bit RSA; GnuPG up to 4096-bit RSA and 3072-bit DSA2. ECC in OpenPGP is on its way toward becoming a RFC and being included in OpenPGP. Larger and larger RSA keys aren't the solution, ECC is. The balance of power has tipped away from RSA and toward ECC. The Internet Draft for ECC in OpenPGP [https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jivsov-openpgp-ecc-11] is in the Final Comment period with comments due by 2012-04-09. I suspect WK has ECC ready to go in both GnuPG 1.4 and 2.0 as soon as the ID is approved. I know it's already present in the 2.1 beta code. Feel free to ignore everything I've told you. There's no reason you should trust me. But by all means, keep asking questions and read the authoritative articles and documents. -John -- John P. Clizbe Inet: John (a) Gingerbear DAWT net SKS/Enigmail/PGP-EKP or: John ( @ ) Enigmail DAWT net FSF Assoc #995 / FSFE Fellow #1797 hkp://keyserver.gingerbear.net or mailto:pgp-public-keys at gingerbear.net?subject=HELP Q:"Just how do the residents of Haiku, Hawai'i hold conversations?" A:"An odd melody / island voices on the winds / surplus of vowels" From wk at gnupg.org Fri May 4 10:03:29 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Fri, 04 May 2012 10:03:29 +0200 Subject: gpg.conf In-Reply-To: <4FA2F589.30506@gbenet.com> (david@gbenet.com's message of "Thu, 03 May 2012 22:15:53 +0100") References: <4FA2D25F.9020409@gbenet.com> <4FA2DD72.9050007@hotmail.com> <4FA2F589.30506@gbenet.com> Message-ID: <87lil89xv2.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Thu, 3 May 2012 23:15, david at gbenet.com said: > A re-think of valid user options are required by the developers I think :) I suggest that you use GPA or Kleopatra to modify the options. To a large extend they make sure that the options are correct (via gpgconf). Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From wk at gnupg.org Fri May 4 10:37:21 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Fri, 04 May 2012 10:37:21 +0200 Subject: SSH Agent keys >4096 bit? In-Reply-To: <1434887.kcK6zIOEg5@bursa01> (Hubert Kario's message of "Fri, 04 May 2012 00:27:10 +0200") References: <4FA2D7F6.8050304@sixdemonbag.org> <1434887.kcK6zIOEg5@bursa01> Message-ID: <87havw9wam.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Fri, 4 May 2012 00:27, hka at qbs.com.pl said: > decision, and that's agreed by basically anybody (NIST, ECRYPT II). Especially > when the cost of establishing the link with 8k RSA is insignificant for any > session over 5min in length (as is common in SSH). Sorry, but that is plain nonsense. Maybe not with your desktop box, but my N900 takes quite some time to compute with 4k RSA keys. > Besides that, Schneier and Ferguson[2] say that basically any RSA based crypto > system should support 8k keys. Switching to ECC is not easy, you need to I can't locate my copy right now. Anyway, such suggestions depend largely on the context. It might be true in theory for US or French govt security but not for any practical purposes. Brian Snow of the NSA once told during lunch that they don't care to break the crypto - "we cheat". What he meant is that it is way easier and cheaper to exploit software bugs or RNG peculiarities than to build for example Twinkle devices. If the NSA is worth its money, you should assume that they have a bunch of zero day exploits available for all kind of software - including GnuPG. In particular SSH, which by its nature can't be used on a dedicated offline box, the use of even a 4k key is ridiculous. Such use reminds me more of security policies which demand the use of passphrases but allow that the passphrase be stored on the same box in a file. Current practice is the use of 2k RSA keys and you simply do that just because everyone is happy if you follow this rule. Using a lower key size might be justifiable but it is not worth to spend the time to explain the reason why it is okay to use only, say, 1536 bit. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From wk at gnupg.org Fri May 4 10:45:30 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Fri, 04 May 2012 10:45:30 +0200 Subject: SSH Agent keys >4096 bit? In-Reply-To: <4FA32ADC.8080607@enigmail.net> (John Clizbe's message of "Thu, 03 May 2012 20:03:24 -0500") References: <4FA32ADC.8080607@enigmail.net> Message-ID: <87d36k9vx1.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Fri, 4 May 2012 03:03, John at enigmail.net said: > I suspect WK has ECC ready to go in both GnuPG 1.4 and 2.0 as soon as the ID > is approved. I know it's already present in the 2.1 beta code. No, we don't plan to port it back to 1.4. It will actually take years until ECC keys are in wide use and by then 2.1 will be the stable release. I even hope to declare 2.1 stable sometime this year. BTW, the draft is already in the rfc editors's publication queue. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From hka at qbs.com.pl Fri May 4 12:07:25 2012 From: hka at qbs.com.pl (Hubert Kario) Date: Fri, 04 May 2012 12:07:25 +0200 Subject: SSH Agent keys >4096 bit? In-Reply-To: <87havw9wam.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <1434887.kcK6zIOEg5@bursa01> <87havw9wam.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <3327457.JrFl41MfE4@bursa01> On Friday 04 of May 2012 10:37:21 Werner Koch wrote: > On Fri, 4 May 2012 00:27, hka at qbs.com.pl said: > > decision, and that's agreed by basically anybody (NIST, ECRYPT II). > > Especially when the cost of establishing the link with 8k RSA is > > insignificant for any session over 5min in length (as is common in SSH). > > Sorry, but that is plain nonsense. Maybe not with your desktop box, but > my N900 takes quite some time to compute with 4k RSA keys. OK, so the use of 8k RSA keys won't work with low power embedded devices. It still doesn't change the overall picture: 1. migrating to ECC is hard and complicated 2. using 8k RSA is easy > > Besides that, Schneier and Ferguson[2] say that basically any RSA based > > crypto system should support 8k keys. Switching to ECC is not easy, you > > need to > I can't locate my copy right now. Anyway, such suggestions depend > largely on the context. Quote from the book: "The absolute minimum size for n is 2048 bits or so if you want to protect your data for 20 years. This minimum slowly increases as compiters get faster. If you can afford it in your application, let n be 4096 bit long or as close to this size as you can get it. Furthermore, make sure that your software supports values of n up to 8192 bits long." That was written in 2003, nearly 10 years ago. They suggested using current day minimums when GPGPU didn't even exist and FPGAs with large memories were just surfacing. > It might be true in theory for US or French > govt security but not for any practical purposes. Brian Snow of the NSA > once told during lunch that they don't care to break the crypto - "we > cheat". What he meant is that it is way easier and cheaper to exploit > software bugs or RNG peculiarities than to build for example Twinkle > devices. If the NSA is worth its money, you should assume that they > have a bunch of zero day exploits available for all kind of software - > including GnuPG. possibly, still I'd guess that most of them are active, online attacks but now we're in the hypothetical realm of vague possibility, such discussion is useless and suggest more that we "just have to throw away cryto as it's useless anyway" than anything else. Which, frankly, is bollocks. > In particular SSH, which by its nature can't be used on a dedicated > offline box, the use of even a 4k key is ridiculous. Such use reminds > me more of security policies which demand the use of passphrases but > allow that the passphrase be stored on the same box in a file. What has online/offline net connection anything to do with that? Storing acquired information for 20 years is nothing extraordinary as far as intelligence agencies and highly motivated individuals are concerned. Hell, I've got files on my hard drive that are around 15 years old. Computing in 20 years may be very different than it is today. > Current practice is the use of 2k RSA keys and you simply do that just > because everyone is happy if you follow this rule. Using a lower key > size might be justifiable but it is not worth to spend the time to > explain the reason why it is okay to use only, say, 1536 bit. Current practice is for data that hardly never has to deal with secrets that have to be kept for 40 years (like I noted before). As regularly the most valuable information being passed over secure links are passwords and http cookies. Which basically never have validity of over 10 years and 1 year respecitvely. Thing is, that is not the only use-case of crypto systems. Regards, -- Hubert Kario QBS - Quality Business Software 02-656 Warszawa, ul. Ksawer?w 30/85 tel. +48 (22) 646-61-51, 646-74-24 www.qbs.com.pl From wk at gnupg.org Fri May 4 12:40:53 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Fri, 04 May 2012 12:40:53 +0200 Subject: SSH Agent keys >4096 bit? In-Reply-To: <3327457.JrFl41MfE4@bursa01> (Hubert Kario's message of "Fri, 04 May 2012 12:07:25 +0200") References: <1434887.kcK6zIOEg5@bursa01> <87havw9wam.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <3327457.JrFl41MfE4@bursa01> Message-ID: <87r4v08c0a.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Fri, 4 May 2012 12:07, hka at qbs.com.pl said: > It still doesn't change the overall picture: > 1. migrating to ECC is hard and complicated Right, it will take years. But that is not a problem. > 2. using 8k RSA is easy I already told my opinion on this. > That was written in 2003, nearly 10 years ago. They suggested using current > day minimums when GPGPU didn't even exist and FPGAs with large memories were > just surfacing. A point that they don't consider is that the weakest link defines the security of the system. They evaluate this only in terms of algorithms but not from a software engineering POV. If you look at this this you see that errors in the software (and hardware) are a far weaker link than any theory on how long it will take to break a certain algorithm. > possibly, still I'd guess that most of them are active, online attacks We have been talking about SSH - this is online. Whether active or passive doesn't matter. Email can also be considered online. Backups are often offline and then you won't target the encryption but the plaintext - having access to the hardware (which you need for offline attacks) opens a long list of attack vectors and cryptography is just one of them. > but now we're in the hypothetical realm of vague possibility, such discussion > is useless and suggest more that we "just have to throw away cryto as it's > useless anyway" than anything else. Which, frankly, is bollocks. Nobody said this. > What has online/offline net connection anything to do with that? Storing A lot. Online connections allow for active attacks on the participating software. For off-line it is harder to mount attacks; but still possible (cf. Stuxnet). > have to be kept for 40 years (like I noted before). As regularly the most > valuable information being passed over secure links are passwords and http > cookies. Which basically never have validity of over 10 years and 1 year > respecitvely. Well, then I can't follow your arguments - we need 8k RSA despite that the data needs to be protected only for a short term? Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Fri May 4 14:40:31 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Fri, 04 May 2012 08:40:31 -0400 Subject: SSH Agent keys >4096 bit? In-Reply-To: <3327457.JrFl41MfE4@bursa01> References: <1434887.kcK6zIOEg5@bursa01> <87havw9wam.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <3327457.JrFl41MfE4@bursa01> Message-ID: <4FA3CE3F.3000804@sixdemonbag.org> On 05/04/2012 06:07 AM, Hubert Kario wrote: > It still doesn't change the overall picture: > 1. migrating to ECC is hard and complicated > 2. using 8k RSA is easy Nor does it change 3. using 8K RSA gives a modest increase to an already formidable margin of security Breaking a 128-bit keyspace is hard. Like, really, really hard. The power analysis on that one is eye-popping: to break a 128-bit keyspace in anything approaching a reasonable length of time requires an energy output on the level of a hypernova. If you want to break a 128-bit keyspace, please do it in a galaxy far, far away. So why do we need to increase a 128-bit keyspace (RSA-3K) to a 192-bit-plus-a-small-amount keyspace (RSA-8K)? The obvious response is "to defend against enhanced attacks against RSA, such as quantum computing and Shor's Algorithm." But that's just crazy. Shor's Algorithm requires 2N qubits to break an N-bit key. Right now we've got quantum computers that have, what, eight qubits? Any RSA modulus smaller than sixteen is in trouble now, let me tell you. An effective quantum computer with the 6144 qubits required to break a 3072-bit RSA key is straight out of science fiction. This quantum computer would be more powerful than any conventional computer could ever be: a conventional computer would require 10**1850 bytes of storage -- and no, that is not a typo -- to compete against it: that should give you a sense of the outrageous scale involved. There is no other way to describe this than science fiction. If you want to defend against science fiction, well, go right ahead. But I think you should also defend against other sorts of fiction, and I look forward to hearing how your security model will incorporate G.I. Joe to fight off the hordes of blue-suited terrorists sent by Cobra Commander. And yes, I really do believe that worrying about the development of large-scale quantum computers is on the same level of seriousness as worrying about Cobra Commander. > What has online/offline net connection anything to do with that? Storing > acquired information for 20 years is nothing extraordinary as far as > intelligence agencies and highly motivated individuals are concerned. How many petabytes are sent across the wire each day? Do you really think people will be storing all of today's traffic for twenty years, just so some analyst not even born yet will someday be able to say, "wow, I really want to see what's in this random guy's porn stash!"? If you have reason to believe you're a person of such interest to such professionals as would be likely to monitor and store your communications for twenty years, here's the only effective way to secure your communications: stop using any technology more sophisticated than a frying pan. bin Laden didn't keep his communications secure by using large RSA keys. He kept his communications secure by abandoning technology and using cut-outs to do his online transactions for him, and making them travel hundreds of kilometers away from Abottabad before checking into an internet cafe to send his traffic. From mwood at IUPUI.Edu Fri May 4 14:53:37 2012 From: mwood at IUPUI.Edu (Mark H. Wood) Date: Fri, 4 May 2012 08:53:37 -0400 Subject: SSH Agent keys >4096 bit? In-Reply-To: <87havw9wam.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <4FA2D7F6.8050304@sixdemonbag.org> <1434887.kcK6zIOEg5@bursa01> <87havw9wam.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <20120504125337.GB23954@IUPUI.Edu> Let me turn things around. Other than providing opportunities to discuss the practicalities of large RSA keys, is there any reason why the agent should care what size key it is storing? -- Mark H. Wood, Lead System Programmer mwood at IUPUI.Edu Asking whether markets are efficient is like asking whether people are smart. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 198 bytes Desc: not available URL: From gnupg at oneiroi.net Fri May 4 16:17:59 2012 From: gnupg at oneiroi.net (Milo) Date: Fri, 04 May 2012 16:17:59 +0200 Subject: SSH Agent keys >4096 bit? In-Reply-To: <4FA3CE3F.3000804@sixdemonbag.org> References: <1434887.kcK6zIOEg5@bursa01> <87havw9wam.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <3327457.JrFl41MfE4@bursa01> <4FA3CE3F.3000804@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <4FA3E517.7070408@oneiroi.net> Hello Robert, Hello all. On 05/04/2012 02:40 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > On 05/04/2012 06:07 AM, Hubert Kario wrote: >> It still doesn't change the overall picture: >> 1. migrating to ECC is hard and complicated >> 2. using 8k RSA is easy > > Nor does it change > > 3. using 8K RSA gives a modest increase to an already formidable > margin of security > > Breaking a 128-bit keyspace is hard. Like, really, really hard. The > power analysis on that one is eye-popping: to break a 128-bit keyspace > in anything approaching a reasonable length of time requires an energy > output on the level of a hypernova. If you want to break a 128-bit > keyspace, please do it in a galaxy far, far away. So why do we need to > increase a 128-bit keyspace (RSA-3K) to a 192-bit-plus-a-small-amount > keyspace (RSA-8K)? Well, many expect rise of the quantum computing during lives of most of us. This can trash most (if not all) asymmetric algorithms (Shor's algorithm) and reduce strength of symmetric ciphers in half (with for example Grover's algorithm). Beside this consider widespread usage of 256-bit symmetric ciphers. If things you are writing are all the truth behind key length security we are dealing with huge, mass overkill or even scam perhaps. But I think we aren't. > The obvious response is "to defend against enhanced attacks against RSA, > such as quantum computing and Shor's Algorithm." But that's just crazy. > Shor's Algorithm requires 2N qubits to break an N-bit key. Right now > we've got quantum computers that have, what, eight qubits? Any RSA > modulus smaller than sixteen is in trouble now, let me tell you. > > An effective quantum computer with the 6144 qubits required to break a > 3072-bit RSA key is straight out of science fiction. This quantum > computer would be more powerful than any conventional computer could > ever be: a conventional computer would require 10**1850 bytes of storage > -- and no, that is not a typo -- to compete against it: that should give > you a sense of the outrageous scale involved. There is no other way to > describe this than science fiction. Just like modern cellphones' CPU/GPUs are s-f from Apollo mission's engineers' perspective, just like "640K ought to be enough for anybody" and like 32-bit address space for IP protocol is more then enough. History is showing quite clearly that such speculations despite - ofte high - competencies of the authors are missed. > If you want to defend against science fiction, well, go right ahead. > But I think you should also defend against other sorts of fiction, and I > look forward to hearing how your security model will incorporate G.I. > Joe to fight off the hordes of blue-suited terrorists sent by Cobra > Commander. > > And yes, I really do believe that worrying about the development of > large-scale quantum computers is on the same level of seriousness as > worrying about Cobra Commander. "Believe" is good term when talking about aesthetics for example. This isn't the same as being convinced about proper approach to technical problems. If you have proper background in genetics, fresh stream of information from covert labs, bio black markets (is there such thing anyway?) its worth to take your opinion into account. Please try to avoid comedic undertone of your statements and comparisons if you want to keep discussion's level sane. >> What has online/offline net connection anything to do with that? Storing >> acquired information for 20 years is nothing extraordinary as far as >> intelligence agencies and highly motivated individuals are concerned. > > How many petabytes are sent across the wire each day? Do you really > think people will be storing all of today's traffic for twenty years, > just so some analyst not even born yet will someday be able to say, > "wow, I really want to see what's in this random guy's porn stash!"? Yeah, then leave your home open because "Wow, who want to check every door in the world. So many of them". Yeah, let's drop all the crypto (encryption) for common folk because . > If you have reason to believe you're a person of such interest to such > professionals as would be likely to monitor and store your > communications for twenty years, here's the only effective way to secure > your communications: stop using any technology more sophisticated than a > frying pan. > > bin Laden didn't keep his communications secure by using large RSA keys. > He kept his communications secure by abandoning technology and using > cut-outs to do his online transactions for him, and making them travel > hundreds of kilometers away from Abottabad before checking into an > internet cafe to send his traffic. And this isn't proof for anything (especially guy is down now). At the best this can be interesting case study. If someone was never caught driving without driving license (where this is forbidden) this doesn't mean that it doesn't make sens to have such license. This is a common trap - you think it's not worth investing your time and effort (if any) in some kind of approach/tools/procedures because you believe there will be no incident in which they'll provided you protection. Giving users easier-then-hacking-through-sources way of setting bigger key size isn't a crime. I think I should give Werner much faster phone now ;) (on my own using 8192-bit RSA key takes about 2-4 seconds to successfully auth; phone was made in 2010 and is simply _average_ smartphone) -- Kind regards, Milo From rychitre at yahoo.com Fri May 4 15:48:31 2012 From: rychitre at yahoo.com (Rupali Chitre) Date: Fri, 4 May 2012 06:48:31 -0700 (PDT) Subject: Welcome to the "Gnupg-users" mailing list In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <1336139311.70495.YahooMailClassic@web160904.mail.bf1.yahoo.com> I am trying to decrypt file from command prompt as below and it works fine. echo paraphase|gpg --batch --passphrase-fd 0 --decrypt-files *data*.txt.gpg ? But the same command when I call from application (Informatica), it gives below error. >>Secret file not found. ? ? Is that I need to give some other details ? ? --- On Fri, 5/4/12, gnupg-users-request at gnupg.org wrote: From: gnupg-users-request at gnupg.org Subject: Welcome to the "Gnupg-users" mailing list To: rychitre at yahoo.com Date: Friday, May 4, 2012, 8:44 AM Welcome to the Gnupg-users at gnupg.org mailing list! To post to this list, send your email to: ? gnupg-users at gnupg.org General information about the mailing list is at: ? http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users If you ever want to unsubscribe or change your options (eg, switch to or from digest mode, change your password, etc.), visit your subscription page at: ? http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/options/gnupg-users/rychitre%40yahoo.com You can also make such adjustments via email by sending a message to: ? Gnupg-users-request at gnupg.org with the word `help' in the subject or body (don't include the quotes), and you will get back a message with instructions. You must know your password to change your options (including changing the password, itself) or to unsubscribe.? It is: ? hondacivic Normally, Mailman will remind you of your gnupg.org mailing list passwords once every month, although you can disable this if you prefer.? This reminder will also include instructions on how to unsubscribe or change your account options.? There is also a button on your options page that will email your current password to you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From dougb at dougbarton.us Fri May 4 16:59:56 2012 From: dougb at dougbarton.us (Doug Barton) Date: Fri, 04 May 2012 07:59:56 -0700 Subject: SSH Agent keys >4096 bit? In-Reply-To: <87d36k9vx1.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <4FA32ADC.8080607@enigmail.net> <87d36k9vx1.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <4FA3EEEC.9070702@dougbarton.us> On 05/04/2012 01:45 AM, Werner Koch wrote: > On Fri, 4 May 2012 03:03, John at enigmail.net said: > >> I suspect WK has ECC ready to go in both GnuPG 1.4 and 2.0 as soon as the ID >> is approved. I know it's already present in the 2.1 beta code. > > No, we don't plan to port it back to 1.4. It will actually take years > until ECC keys are in wide use and by then 2.1 will be the stable > release. I even hope to declare 2.1 stable sometime this year. I hope you reconsider backporting ECC to 1.4. Given some of the changes you've announced for 2.1 I think there are a non-trivial number of users who will be dropping 2.x altogether. Doug From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Fri May 4 17:13:45 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Fri, 04 May 2012 11:13:45 -0400 Subject: SSH Agent keys >4096 bit? In-Reply-To: <4FA3E517.7070408@oneiroi.net> References: <1434887.kcK6zIOEg5@bursa01> <87havw9wam.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <3327457.JrFl41MfE4@bursa01> <4FA3CE3F.3000804@sixdemonbag.org> <4FA3E517.7070408@oneiroi.net> Message-ID: <4FA3F229.9000501@sixdemonbag.org> On 05/04/2012 10:17 AM, Milo wrote: > Well, many expect rise of the quantum computing during lives of most > of us. This can trash most (if not all) asymmetric algorithms > (Shor's algorithm) No. It can trash *some* asymmetric algorithms. There are a good number of asymmetric algorithms whose decision problem exists outside of BQP. (McEliece, for instance. For those wondering what BQP is, it's the quantum computing analogue to P: it describes those problems you can solve in a reasonable time with a quantum computer.) I do not understand how, if you're concerned about quantum computing, you can believe "it will all be better if we just use larger keys!", rather than "it will be better if we use algorithms that cannot be efficiently solved by a quantum computer." > and reduce strength of symmetric ciphers in half (with for example > Grover's algorithm). Not half, reduce the strength of symmetric ciphers by a square root. A 128-bit cipher's strength is not halved (which would make it 127-bit); it's reduced to the equivalent of 64 bits (the square root of 128 bits). > Beside this consider widespread usage of 256-bit symmetric ciphers. > If things you are writing are all the truth behind key length > security we are dealing with huge, mass overkill or even scam > perhaps. But I think we aren't. It's worth noting that, per Suite B, 256-bit crypto is only required for material that's at the top of the classification pyramid: things like nuclear weapon release codes and other things that might cause 300 million people to have a really bad day. 128-bit crypto is considered quite sufficient for the rest of the nation's secrets. Also, some people are using symmetric crypto for secrets that must be preserved for 50+ years -- census data, for instance. If you're concerned about 50+ years of confidentiality, then yes, it makes sense to go hog-wild on key lengths. But for the rest of us, the confidentiality of our communications will be better-served by many other measures than just adding more bits to the key. > Just like modern cellphones' CPU/GPUs are s-f from Apollo mission's > engineers' perspective, just like "640K ought to be enough for > anybody" and like 32-bit address space for IP protocol is more then > enough. History is showing quite clearly that such speculations > despite - ofte high - competencies of the authors are missed. An Apollo engineer would be unlikely to view a tablet PC as something indistinguishable from magic. Nothing about it would be unknown to them: only the size, the power and the integration would be new. This is pretty much the norm in the field: from a pure computer science perspective there's almost no difference between a Burroughs 5000 and a modern x86_64. Introduce quantum algorithms, though, and suddenly quite respectable computer scientists suddenly start sweating bullets and saying, "uh, I don't quite know about this, umm, *in theory* it will be kind of like this, but the practical ramifications are ... hey, look at the time, gotta go." 6000-qubit quantum computers are a magic so subtle they are indistinguishable from high technology. They might, if we are fortunate, be invented in our lifetimes -- but let's not go about saying we need 8K RSA keys to defend against 6000-bit quantum computers. If quantum computers bother you that much, use McEliece. > Please try to avoid comedic undertone of your statements and > comparisons if you want to keep discussion's level sane. The discussion was already profoundly silly: the overt comedic statements drew attention to this. Successfully, apparently. > Yeah, then leave your home open because "Wow, who want to check > every door in the world. So many of them". Non sequitur. > Yeah, let's drop all the crypto (encryption) for common folk because > . Non sequitur. > Giving users easier-then-hacking-through-sources way of setting > bigger key size isn't a crime. No, but there's no point in it, either. Frankly, I'd rather the GnuPG developers spent their time on pursuits that are more reasonable and will give a better return on investment. From ali at lown.me.uk Fri May 4 18:21:50 2012 From: ali at lown.me.uk (Ali Lown) Date: Fri, 4 May 2012 17:21:50 +0100 Subject: SSH Agent keys >4096 bit? In-Reply-To: References: <4FA2D7F6.8050304@sixdemonbag.org> <1434887.kcK6zIOEg5@bursa01> <87havw9wam.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <20120504125337.GB23954@IUPUI.Edu> Message-ID: > Let me turn things around. ?Other than providing opportunities to > discuss the practicalities of large RSA keys, is there any reason why > the agent should care what size key it is storing? Thank you for trying to return this discussion to the original topic. My intention as OP was to ask how difficult it would be to implement (it seems to just be a magic-value in the code), rather than the discussion on the (non?)merits of 8k keys this thread appears to have become. (Which seems to have a split opinion amongst the more-knowledgeable-than-me residents of this list). Ali From wk at gnupg.org Fri May 4 19:08:32 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Fri, 04 May 2012 19:08:32 +0200 Subject: SSH Agent keys >4096 bit? In-Reply-To: <4FA3EEEC.9070702@dougbarton.us> (Doug Barton's message of "Fri, 04 May 2012 07:59:56 -0700") References: <4FA32ADC.8080607@enigmail.net> <87d36k9vx1.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FA3EEEC.9070702@dougbarton.us> Message-ID: <87ipgb98mn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Fri, 4 May 2012 16:59, dougb at dougbarton.us said: > I hope you reconsider backporting ECC to 1.4. Given some of the changes It would be a lot of work and I doubt that we can find anyone to finance that. In fact, finding financial support for any kind of work on GnuPG is very hard. > you've announced for 2.1 I think there are a non-trivial number of users > who will be dropping 2.x altogether. Really? The only major change users might notice is the dropping of secring.gpg - something I am announcing for more than 10 years ("Please always use --export or --import and don't use the keyring files directly"). Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From wk at gnupg.org Fri May 4 19:14:24 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Fri, 04 May 2012 19:14:24 +0200 Subject: SSH Agent keys >4096 bit? In-Reply-To: <20120504125337.GB23954@IUPUI.Edu> (Mark H. Wood's message of "Fri, 4 May 2012 08:53:37 -0400") References: <4FA2D7F6.8050304@sixdemonbag.org> <1434887.kcK6zIOEg5@bursa01> <87havw9wam.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <20120504125337.GB23954@IUPUI.Edu> Message-ID: <87ehqz98cv.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Fri, 4 May 2012 14:53, mwood at IUPUI.Edu said: > Let me turn things around. Other than providing opportunities to > discuss the practicalities of large RSA keys, is there any reason why > the agent should care what size key it is storing? The OpenPGP parser has a limit on the size of the MPI which is at 16k bits. This is required to avoid DoS attacks. Key generation is limited in the way we allocate memory for prime generation and well, the arbitrary limit of 4k RSA modulus. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From wk at gnupg.org Fri May 4 20:40:37 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Fri, 04 May 2012 20:40:37 +0200 Subject: SSH Agent keys >4096 bit? In-Reply-To: <4FA3E517.7070408@oneiroi.net> (Milo's message of "Fri, 04 May 2012 16:17:59 +0200") References: <1434887.kcK6zIOEg5@bursa01> <87havw9wam.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <3327457.JrFl41MfE4@bursa01> <4FA3CE3F.3000804@sixdemonbag.org> <4FA3E517.7070408@oneiroi.net> Message-ID: <87aa1n94d6.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Fri, 4 May 2012 16:17, gnupg at oneiroi.net said: > I think I should give Werner much faster phone now ;) (on my own using > 8192-bit RSA key takes about 2-4 seconds to successfully auth; phone was 2 seconds are way too long. I look at most mails not even for a second; if I need to wait 2 seconds for decryption and another 2 for verifying the signature, this will be a very noticeable delay. From a UI design point of view, any noticeable delay is a no go. And for sure I need to make sure a power socket is close to me if my device is constantly crunching numbers. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From ali at lown.me.uk Fri May 4 20:54:03 2012 From: ali at lown.me.uk (Ali Lown) Date: Fri, 4 May 2012 19:54:03 +0100 Subject: SSH Agent keys >4096 bit? In-Reply-To: <87aa1n94d6.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <1434887.kcK6zIOEg5@bursa01> <87havw9wam.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <3327457.JrFl41MfE4@bursa01> <4FA3CE3F.3000804@sixdemonbag.org> <4FA3E517.7070408@oneiroi.net> <87aa1n94d6.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: >> I think I should give Werner much faster phone now ;) (on my own using >> 8192-bit RSA key takes about 2-4 seconds to successfully auth; phone was > > 2 seconds are way too long. ?I look at most mails not even for a second; > if I need to wait 2 seconds for decryption and another 2 for verifying > the signature, this will be a very noticeable delay. ?From a UI design > point of view, any noticeable delay is a no go. Might I point out that discussion is with respect to an 8k RSA SSH key for SSH authentication, not for email. A 2 second delay during the initialization of an SSH connection is not a problem. > And for sure I need to make sure a power socket is close to me if my > device is constantly crunching numbers. Find one with a better battery/more-efficient processor if these sorts of calculations would really be an issue, compared to the general radio use of the phone. From wk at gnupg.org Fri May 4 21:24:07 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Fri, 04 May 2012 21:24:07 +0200 Subject: SSH Agent keys >4096 bit? In-Reply-To: (Ali Lown's message of "Fri, 4 May 2012 19:54:03 +0100") References: <1434887.kcK6zIOEg5@bursa01> <87havw9wam.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <3327457.JrFl41MfE4@bursa01> <4FA3CE3F.3000804@sixdemonbag.org> <4FA3E517.7070408@oneiroi.net> <87aa1n94d6.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <8762cb92co.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Fri, 4 May 2012 20:54, ali at lown.me.uk said: > Might I point out that discussion is with respect to an 8k RSA SSH key > for SSH authentication, not for email. A 2 second delay during the > initialization of an SSH connection is not a problem. The delay with SSH would even be longer. Again, it is plain stupid to assume that you can reach any security improvments on mobile phone (or to a lttle lesser degree on servers) by increasing the key sizes. The security gain is bug bound and not bound to the key size. > Find one with a better battery/more-efficient processor if these sorts > of calculations would really be an issue, compared to the general > radio use of the phone. Radios are very well optimized. CPUs also very energy efficient - but only if they are idle. On most smartphones you can already notice that by playing a Vorbis file compared to playing a MP3 file; the latter use the DSP (instead of the general purpose CPU) and will play a lot more music before charging is required. Right, you may gain a similar battery life boost by using a crypto accelerator - however they are only designed for 2048 bit and I don't know whether they are available on SoCs Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From peter at digitalbrains.com Fri May 4 21:41:25 2012 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Fri, 04 May 2012 21:41:25 +0200 Subject: SSH Agent keys >4096 bit? In-Reply-To: References: <1434887.kcK6zIOEg5@bursa01> <87havw9wam.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <3327457.JrFl41MfE4@bursa01> <4FA3CE3F.3000804@sixdemonbag.org> <4FA3E517.7070408@oneiroi.net> <87aa1n94d6.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <4FA430E5.8030104@digitalbrains.com> On 04/05/12 20:54, Ali Lown wrote: > Might I point out that discussion is with respect to an 8k RSA SSH key > for SSH authentication, not for email. A 2 second delay during the > initialization of an SSH connection is not a problem. And here is precisely something interesting: 8k RSA is discussed as a method to keep messages confidential for decades. I haven't looked into it, but I'm under the impression RSA is used purely for authentication in SSH, not for key exchange[1]. What are you protecting decades against here? A server reusing a random challenge? That seems quite far fetched. Oh, by the way, only the computational load for the client was discussed. There's also the server (although the public side of the computation is quicker than the private side). The server gets logins from potentially a lot of clients. Peter. [1] I get this impression because there is a configuration option for OpenSSH sshd that selects which key exchange methods to use, and they all have DH (Diffie-Helmann) in their name. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at http://wwwhome.cs.utwente.nl/~lebbing/pubkey.txt From dougb at dougbarton.us Fri May 4 21:47:17 2012 From: dougb at dougbarton.us (Doug Barton) Date: Fri, 04 May 2012 12:47:17 -0700 Subject: SSH Agent keys >4096 bit? In-Reply-To: <87ipgb98mn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <4FA32ADC.8080607@enigmail.net> <87d36k9vx1.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FA3EEEC.9070702@dougbarton.us> <87ipgb98mn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <4FA43245.1030209@dougbarton.us> On 05/04/2012 10:08 AM, Werner Koch wrote: > On Fri, 4 May 2012 16:59, dougb at dougbarton.us said: > >> I hope you reconsider backporting ECC to 1.4. Given some of the changes > > It would be a lot of work and I doubt that we can find anyone to finance > that. In fact, finding financial support for any kind of work on GnuPG > is very hard. Understood. >> you've announced for 2.1 I think there are a non-trivial number of users >> who will be dropping 2.x altogether. > > Really? The only major change users might notice is the dropping of > secring.gpg - something I am announcing for more than 10 years ("Please > always use --export or --import and don't use the keyring files > directly"). I think a lot of people are frustrated with the agent generally, and only use 1.4 as a result already. The thing that will kill 2.1 for me is the removal of the multiple public keyring functionality. Doug From ali at lown.me.uk Fri May 4 21:54:08 2012 From: ali at lown.me.uk (Ali Lown) Date: Fri, 4 May 2012 20:54:08 +0100 Subject: SSH Agent keys >4096 bit? In-Reply-To: References: <1434887.kcK6zIOEg5@bursa01> <87havw9wam.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <3327457.JrFl41MfE4@bursa01> <4FA3CE3F.3000804@sixdemonbag.org> <4FA3E517.7070408@oneiroi.net> <87aa1n94d6.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FA430E5.8030104@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: >> Might I point out that discussion is with respect to an 8k RSA SSH key >> for SSH authentication, not for email. A 2 second delay during the >> initialization of an SSH connection is not a problem. > > And here is precisely something interesting: 8k RSA is discussed as a method > to keep messages confidential for decades. I haven't looked into it, but I'm > under the impression RSA is used purely for authentication in SSH, not for > key exchange[1]. What are you protecting decades against here? A server > reusing a random challenge? That seems quite far fetched. I created the 8k keys prior to understanding the full effects reasoning behind a 1k/2k key simply because it was't particularly computationally expensive for me to do, and I saw no harm in being overly cautious with a longer key than average. I see no purpose though (at this stage, with my public key spread around a variety of locations without issue) in generating a new 'smaller' key for the sole purpose of being able to use GPG's SSH agent, requiring me to change the public key in every location. > Oh, by the way, only the computational load for the client was discussed. > There's also the server (although the public side of the computation is > quicker than the private side). The server gets logins from potentially a > lot of clients. I think this is fairly irrelevant to the discussion. Yes there is an overhead, but performing the calculations is not a significant concern. (If a server is getting lots of fake logon attempts, you need to sort out your firewall instead). From dougb at dougbarton.us Fri May 4 21:57:41 2012 From: dougb at dougbarton.us (Doug Barton) Date: Fri, 04 May 2012 12:57:41 -0700 Subject: SSH Agent keys >4096 bit? In-Reply-To: References: <1434887.kcK6zIOEg5@bursa01> <87havw9wam.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <3327457.JrFl41MfE4@bursa01> <4FA3CE3F.3000804@sixdemonbag.org> <4FA3E517.7070408@oneiroi.net> <87aa1n94d6.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FA430E5.8030104@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <4FA434B5.40406@dougbarton.us> On 05/04/2012 12:54 PM, Ali Lown wrote: > I see no purpose though (at this stage, with my public key spread > around a variety of locations without issue) in generating a new > 'smaller' key for the sole purpose of being able to use GPG's SSH > agent, requiring me to change the public key in every location. So then your choices are to use 1.4, or patch the agent code to use 8k keys. Doug From rychitre at yahoo.com Fri May 4 21:18:40 2012 From: rychitre at yahoo.com (Rupali Chitre) Date: Fri, 4 May 2012 12:18:40 -0700 (PDT) Subject: secret key not found In-Reply-To: <1336139311.70495.YahooMailClassic@web160904.mail.bf1.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <1336159120.91599.YahooMailClassic@web160905.mail.bf1.yahoo.com> I am trying to decrypt file from command prompt as below and it works fine. echo paraphase|gpg --batch --passphrase-fd 0 --decrypt-files *data*.txt.gpg ? But the same command when I call from application (Informatica), it gives below error. >>gpg: encrypted with RSA key, ID AAAAAA ??? gpg: decryption failed: No secret key Is that I need to give some other details ? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From gnupg at oneiroi.net Fri May 4 22:35:01 2012 From: gnupg at oneiroi.net (Milo) Date: Fri, 04 May 2012 22:35:01 +0200 Subject: SSH Agent keys >4096 bit? In-Reply-To: <4FA3F229.9000501@sixdemonbag.org> References: <1434887.kcK6zIOEg5@bursa01> <87havw9wam.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <3327457.JrFl41MfE4@bursa01> <4FA3CE3F.3000804@sixdemonbag.org> <4FA3E517.7070408@oneiroi.net> <4FA3F229.9000501@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <4FA43D75.8030200@oneiroi.net> On 05/04/2012 05:13 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > On 05/04/2012 10:17 AM, Milo wrote: >> Well, many expect rise of the quantum computing during lives of most >> of us. This can trash most (if not all) asymmetric algorithms >> (Shor's algorithm) > > No. It can trash *some* asymmetric algorithms. There are a good number > of asymmetric algorithms whose decision problem exists outside of BQP. > (McEliece, for instance. For those wondering what BQP is, it's the > quantum computing analogue to P: it describes those problems you can > solve in a reasonable time with a quantum computer.) Yes - niche, proof-of-concept, poorly analyzed ciphers. Let's talk about those widely used and considered mainstream. Those are our biggest concern. > I do not understand how, if you're concerned about quantum computing, > you can believe "it will all be better if we just use larger keys!", > rather than "it will be better if we use algorithms that cannot be > efficiently solved by a quantum computer." I'm not suggesting that longer key for asymmetric ciphers is a cure for quantum computing backed cryptanalysis. I wrote about possible, future way of circumventing need of sucking nova's energy to successfully attack cipher(text). >> and reduce strength of symmetric ciphers in half (with for example >> Grover's algorithm). > > Not half, reduce the strength of symmetric ciphers by a square root. A > 128-bit cipher's strength is not halved (which would make it 127-bit); > it's reduced to the equivalent of 64 bits (the square root of 128 bits). Thanks for pointing that but in considered situations this is slight difference. >> Beside this consider widespread usage of 256-bit symmetric ciphers. >> If things you are writing are all the truth behind key length >> security we are dealing with huge, mass overkill or even scam >> perhaps. But I think we aren't. > > It's worth noting that, per Suite B, 256-bit crypto is only required for > material that's at the top of the classification pyramid: things like > nuclear weapon release codes and other things that might cause 300 > million people to have a really bad day. You can't tell consumer or end-user that he can't use 256-bit, symmetric cipher for his (even!) porn stash because this is some kind of faux pas and he is iconoclast because of this. It's up to him. Especially he can get this for almost same price (We can easily count CPU cycles, electricity used and so on, but from practical point of view difference is slight). > 128-bit crypto is considered quite sufficient for the rest of the > nation's secrets. Really? Then what's the reason behind 256-bit hw-supproted crypto (e.g. AES instructions for amd64 and x86), widely accessible on consumer market which has nothing to do with nuclear weapons? > Also, some people are using symmetric crypto for secrets that must be > preserved for 50+ years -- census data, for instance. If you're > concerned about 50+ years of confidentiality, then yes, it makes sense > to go hog-wild on key lengths. But for the rest of us, the > confidentiality of our communications will be better-served by many > other measures than just adding more bits to the key. One more time - this is not up to you or software authors to decide what's the value behind encrypted data. Even if reason of encrypting it is silly. >> Just like modern cellphones' CPU/GPUs are s-f from Apollo mission's >> engineers' perspective, just like "640K ought to be enough for >> anybody" and like 32-bit address space for IP protocol is more then >> enough. History is showing quite clearly that such speculations >> despite - ofte high - competencies of the authors are missed. > > (...) > > Introduce quantum algorithms, though, and suddenly quite respectable > computer scientists suddenly start sweating bullets and saying, "uh, I > don't quite know about this, umm, *in theory* it will be kind of like > this, but the practical ramifications are ... hey, look at the time, > gotta go." > > 6000-qubit quantum computers are a magic so subtle they are > indistinguishable from high technology. They might, if we are > fortunate, be invented in our lifetimes -- but let's not go about saying > we need 8K RSA keys to defend against 6000-bit quantum computers. If > quantum computers bother you that much, use McEliece. > >> Please try to avoid comedic undertone of your statements and >> comparisons if you want to keep discussion's level sane. > > The discussion was already profoundly silly: the overt comedic > statements drew attention to this. Successfully, apparently. > > (...) > >> Giving users easier-then-hacking-through-sources way of setting >> bigger key size isn't a crime. > > No, but there's no point in it, either. Frankly, I'd rather the GnuPG > developers spent their time on pursuits that are more reasonable and > will give a better return on investment. Well, this could be won-won approach for both "camps" because of the outcome/effects of devs' work. -- Regards, Milo From dkg at fifthhorseman.net Sat May 5 00:38:54 2012 From: dkg at fifthhorseman.net (Daniel Kahn Gillmor) Date: Fri, 04 May 2012 18:38:54 -0400 Subject: non-interactive expiration of a key using --batch? Message-ID: <87lil7d11d.fsf@pip.fifthhorseman.net> Hi folks-- I'm having trouble setting up non-interactive expiration updates of a key with a passphrase. I think i should use the --batch argument because i want to ensure that gpg doesn't try to hang waiting on user interaction, but when i use the --batch argument, the update isn't saved. let's say the passphrase is contained in the file "pw". As you can see below, saving an update to 12 weeks without --batch advances the expiration date to 2012-07-27, and a following --list-keys shows the update. Subsequently, saving it to 13 weeks with --batch shows the change to 2012-08-03, but a following --list-keys shows the expiration date reverted to 2012-07-27. this is with gnupg 1.4.12-4, from debian testing. Any ideas what's going on here? Am i wrong to try to use --batch in this instance? --dkg 0 wt215 at pip:~$ gpg --list-keys /home/wt215/testexpiry/pubring.gpg ---------------------------------- pub 1024R/20819466 2012-05-03 [expires: 2012-07-20] uid blab blab (DO NOT USE!) 0 wt215 at pip:~$ printf "12w\nsave\n" | gpg --passphrase-fd 3 --command-fd 0 --edit-key test at example.org 3 Changing expiration time for the primary key. Please specify how long the key should be valid. 0 = key does not expire = key expires in n days w = key expires in n weeks m = key expires in n months y = key expires in n years Key expires at Fri 27 Jul 2012 04:37:23 PM EDT You need a passphrase to unlock the secret key for user: "blab blab (DO NOT USE!) " 1024-bit RSA key, ID 20819466, created 2012-05-03 pub 1024R/20819466 created: 2012-05-03 expires: 2012-07-27 usage: SC trust: ultimate validity: ultimate [ultimate] (1). blab blab (DO NOT USE!) 0 wt215 at pip:~$ gpg --list-keys gpg: checking the trustdb gpg: 3 marginal(s) needed, 1 complete(s) needed, PGP trust model gpg: depth: 0 valid: 1 signed: 0 trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 1u gpg: next trustdb check due at 2012-07-27 /home/wt215/testexpiry/pubring.gpg ---------------------------------- pub 1024R/20819466 2012-05-03 [expires: 2012-07-27] uid blab blab (DO NOT USE!) 0 wt215 at pip:~$ printf "13w\nsave\n" | gpg --batch --passphrase-fd 3 --command-fd 0 --edit-key test at example.org 3 Changing expiration time for the primary key. Please specify how long the key should be valid. 0 = key does not expire = key expires in n days w = key expires in n weeks m = key expires in n months y = key expires in n years Key expires at Fri 03 Aug 2012 04:37:34 PM EDT pub 1024R/20819466 created: 2012-05-03 expires: 2012-08-03 usage: SC trust: ultimate validity: ultimate [ultimate] (1). blab blab (DO NOT USE!) 0 wt215 at pip:~$ gpg --list-keys /home/wt215/testexpiry/pubring.gpg ---------------------------------- pub 1024R/20819466 2012-05-03 [expires: 2012-07-27] uid blab blab (DO NOT USE!) 0 wt215 at pip:~$ -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 965 bytes Desc: not available URL: From mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de Sat May 5 00:48:25 2012 From: mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de (Hauke Laging) Date: Sat, 05 May 2012 00:48:25 +0200 Subject: secret key not found In-Reply-To: <1336159120.91599.YahooMailClassic@web160905.mail.bf1.yahoo.com> References: <1336159120.91599.YahooMailClassic@web160905.mail.bf1.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <1548094.gxIjctC3Yr@inno> Am Fr 04.05.2012, 12:18:40 schrieb Rupali Chitre: > But the same command when I call from application (Informatica), it gives > below error. > >>gpg: encrypted with RSA key, ID AAAAAA > > gpg: decryption failed: No secret key Does the application run under the same user ID or in a chroot environment? Hauke -- PGP: D44C 6A5B 71B0 427C CED3 025C BD7D 6D27 ECCB 5814 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 555 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Sat May 5 01:57:20 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Fri, 04 May 2012 19:57:20 -0400 Subject: SSH Agent keys >4096 bit? In-Reply-To: <4FA43D75.8030200@oneiroi.net> References: <1434887.kcK6zIOEg5@bursa01> <87havw9wam.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <3327457.JrFl41MfE4@bursa01> <4FA3CE3F.3000804@sixdemonbag.org> <4FA3E517.7070408@oneiroi.net> <4FA3F229.9000501@sixdemonbag.org> <4FA43D75.8030200@oneiroi.net> Message-ID: <4FA46CE0.2050609@sixdemonbag.org> On 05/04/2012 04:35 PM, Milo wrote: > Yes - niche, proof-of-concept, poorly analyzed ciphers. Let's talk > about those widely used and considered mainstream. Those are our > biggest concern. McEliece is almost as old as RSA. Generations of graduate students have tackled it in cryptanalysis courses. Almost a thousand academic papers have been published on it. None have shown any significant weaknesses in McEliece. Its inventor, Robert McEliece, received the Claude E. Shannon Award a few years ago. What the Fields Medal is to mathematics, or the Turing Prize is to pure computer science, the Shannon Award is to information theory. On the one hand, we have a cipher designed by a Shannon recipient which has had almost a thousand papers published about it without any really significant results. On the other hand, we have you calling it a niche, proof-of-concept, poorly-analyzed cipher. > I'm not suggesting that longer key for asymmetric ciphers is a cure > for quantum computing backed cryptanalysis. > > I wrote about possible, future way of circumventing need of sucking > nova's energy to successfully attack cipher(text). The power and time requirements for computation are well-known. Circumventing either would require (a) invention of completely adiabatic computing (b) repeal of the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle (c) repeal of the Second Law of Thermodynamics (d) ridiculously large quantum computers running at unheard-of efficiencies Any of the four puts us back into the realm of science fiction. If you're advocating making keys larger, I'd like to know which of the four science fiction breakthroughs you expect might happen. And no matter which of the four you choose, I'll point out that should your chosen breakthrough come to pass, we will all have much bigger things to worry about than whether our 20-year-old communications are still safe. > Thanks for pointing that but in considered situations this is slight > difference. Halving the strength of a 128-bit cipher leaves you with 127 effective bits of security. Rooting the strength of a 128-bit cipher leaves you with 64 effective bits of security. The former is still well beyond our ability to brute-force: the latter is well within our ability to brute force. I don't consider this to be a slight difference. > You can't tell consumer or end-user that he can't use 256-bit, > symmetric cipher for his (even!) porn stash because this is some kind > of faux pas and he is iconoclast because of this. I cannot force someone to not use a 256-bit cipher, true. I can certainly point and laugh at people who believe using one makes them more secure, though. Nobody has the right to be taken seriously. That's a privilege that must be earned. > Really? Then what's the reason behind 256-bit hw-supproted crypto > (e.g. AES instructions for amd64 and x86), widely accessible on > consumer market which has nothing to do with nuclear weapons? Marketing. The dirty little secret of crypto is that we've had a *great* symmetric cipher ever since the mid-1970s: 3DES. It's big. It's ungainly. It's slow. It has all the aesthetics of the Soviet Realism school of art. It's very hard to code up because there are so many fiddly bits. And yet, 3DES has been turning the best minds in crypto into burned-out alcoholic wrecks for the last 35 years. It has been undergoing constant attack for 35 *years*. Entire new branches of cryptanalysis have been invented just to try and dent it. These approaches have all failed miserably. There are a few niches where 3DES doesn't work very well. If you need a cipher that can encrypt a 1000baseT connection, you're better off using something faster. If you need it on a smartcard, you're better off using something more space-efficient. But for the rest of the problem space, 3DES has been rocking the house for almost as long as I've been alive. So here's the question: why isn't 3DES used in more places? Marketing. Because people -- both in the private sector and in the Free Software world -- want to be able to say they support the latest and greatest and best thing. From faramir.cl at gmail.com Sat May 5 10:13:26 2012 From: faramir.cl at gmail.com (Faramir) Date: Sat, 05 May 2012 04:13:26 -0400 Subject: SSH Agent keys >4096 bit? In-Reply-To: <4FA3E517.7070408@oneiroi.net> References: <1434887.kcK6zIOEg5@bursa01> <87havw9wam.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <3327457.JrFl41MfE4@bursa01> <4FA3CE3F.3000804@sixdemonbag.org> <4FA3E517.7070408@oneiroi.net> Message-ID: <4FA4E126.6000409@gmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 El 04-05-2012 10:17, Milo escribi?: > Hello Robert, Hello all. ... >> How many petabytes are sent across the wire each day? Do you >> really think people will be storing all of today's traffic for >> twenty years, just so some analyst not even born yet will someday >> be able to say, "wow, I really want to see what's in this random >> guy's porn stash!"? > > Yeah, then leave your home open because "Wow, who want to check > every door in the world. So many of them". The difference is you don't need to store doors before checking them. Best Regards -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJPpOEmAAoJEMV4f6PvczxAONUH/jIkisFOFHc/soX+uiqfWbU1 GUOVjo+kFqRmXxAZy4BM1+k50fI2DGekwTgOinTnu4T+EymPUsdIHC7RVTTvwak7 fKqCJ8HWhLeZxBxguiicfeYELBHbcXqODdQDl5UqEC3jLxhhHClFpi5nTigyjv0c fm1QmwoiHHM/J2G6rKo2dEwB3uTUuysf4jsublONE+x1NKYgW7y7UfpUjLK47Pzf 6OfJSB5gM+3LObnuj4blZTiQcWWMeAe/Wu250S0xme7EWnLrAXK2Qk/ZJEFx03kG 8VIQ2aEbEqTfHCFk8dYuXkbeIboLJ1LR4DtIi6vdUst7s0msIrU129LV/MbD4F8= =w0rK -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From gnupg at oneiroi.net Sat May 5 10:37:35 2012 From: gnupg at oneiroi.net (Milo) Date: Sat, 05 May 2012 10:37:35 +0200 Subject: SSH Agent keys >4096 bit? In-Reply-To: <4FA46CE0.2050609@sixdemonbag.org> References: <1434887.kcK6zIOEg5@bursa01> <87havw9wam.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <3327457.JrFl41MfE4@bursa01> <4FA3CE3F.3000804@sixdemonbag.org> <4FA3E517.7070408@oneiroi.net> <4FA3F229.9000501@sixdemonbag.org> <4FA43D75.8030200@oneiroi.net> <4FA46CE0.2050609@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <4FA4E6CF.1030701@oneiroi.net> On 05/05/2012 01:57 AM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > On 05/04/2012 04:35 PM, Milo wrote: >> Yes - niche, proof-of-concept, poorly analyzed ciphers. Let's talk >> about those widely used and considered mainstream. Those are our >> biggest concern. > > McEliece is almost as old as RSA. Generations of graduate students have > tackled it in cryptanalysis courses. Almost a thousand academic papers > have been published on it. None have shown any significant weaknesses > in McEliece. > > Its inventor, Robert McEliece, received the Claude E. Shannon Award a > few years ago. What the Fields Medal is to mathematics, or the Turing > Prize is to pure computer science, the Shannon Award is to information > theory. > > On the one hand, we have a cipher designed by a Shannon recipient which > has had almost a thousand papers published about it without any really > significant results. On the other hand, we have you calling it a niche, > proof-of-concept, poorly-analyzed cipher. This is futile. I'm reminding you that you are giving one example of rarely used algo (so _niche_ and _out_of_mainsteam_) to back your statement "that there is good amount of them". >> I'm not suggesting that longer key for asymmetric ciphers is a cure >> for quantum computing backed cryptanalysis. >> >> I wrote about possible, future way of circumventing need of sucking >> nova's energy to successfully attack cipher(text). > > (...) > > Any of the four puts us back into the realm of science fiction. If > you're advocating making keys larger, I'd like to know which of the four > science fiction breakthroughs you expect might happen. And no matter > which of the four you choose, I'll point out that should your chosen > breakthrough come to pass, we will all have much bigger things to worry > about than whether our 20-year-old communications are still safe. This is possibly really big thing to worry. Especially in countries where pizza is vegetable... But again - you are doing another try to revalue data which isn't yours with your "value system". >> Thanks for pointing that but in considered situations this is slight >> difference. > > Halving the strength of a 128-bit cipher leaves you with 127 effective > bits of security. Rooting the strength of a 128-bit cipher leaves you > with 64 effective bits of security. The former is still well beyond our > ability to brute-force: the latter is well within our ability to brute > force. I don't consider this to be a slight difference. "(...) Thus in the presence of large quantum computers an n-bit key can provide at least n/2 bits of security." Slight difference. I don't have more comments. >> You can't tell consumer or end-user that he can't use 256-bit, >> symmetric cipher for his (even!) porn stash because this is some kind >> of faux pas and he is iconoclast because of this. > > I cannot force someone to not use a 256-bit cipher, true. I can > certainly point and laugh at people who believe using one makes them > more secure, though. > > Nobody has the right to be taken seriously. That's a privilege that > must be earned. In context of this discussion your statement is ridiculous. At one point you even agreed on using 256-bit symmetric cipher for 50+ years confidentiality (not guaranteed but at least assumed or expected) and now you are turning all things around. You are not able to understand that people can get better security margin dirt-cheap and some stuff can be worth for them of securing for long, long years. Calling them "not serious" because of picking 256-bit symmetric cipher is... Well I don't have more comments here. >> Really? Then what's the reason behind 256-bit hw-supproted crypto >> (e.g. AES instructions for amd64 and x86), widely accessible on >> consumer market which has nothing to do with nuclear weapons? > > Marketing. No. Healthy security margin. > The dirty little secret of crypto is that we've had a *great* symmetric > cipher ever since the mid-1970s: 3DES. It's big. It's ungainly. It's > slow. It has all the aesthetics of the Soviet Realism school of art. > It's very hard to code up because there are so many fiddly bits. And > yet, 3DES has been turning the best minds in crypto into burned-out > alcoholic wrecks for the last 35 years. > > It has been undergoing constant attack for 35 *years*. Entire new > branches of cryptanalysis have been invented just to try and dent it. > These approaches have all failed miserably. > > There are a few niches where 3DES doesn't work very well. If you need a > cipher that can encrypt a 1000baseT connection, you're better off using > something faster. If you need it on a smartcard, you're better off > using something more space-efficient. But for the rest of the problem > space, 3DES has been rocking the house for almost as long as I've been > alive. > > So here's the question: why isn't 3DES used in more places? > > > Marketing. Because people -- both in the private sector and in the Free > Software world -- want to be able to say they support the latest and > greatest and best thing. 3des is old and it's providing something like 80-112 bits of security. It has ugly history of keying hacks and some aren't back compatible - which is ugly. Your "porn stash" (in metaphorical sense. possibly) can be safe today, but not tomorrow. It's not marketing. -- Regards, Milo From peter at digitalbrains.com Sat May 5 12:08:58 2012 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Sat, 05 May 2012 12:08:58 +0200 Subject: SSH Agent keys >4096 bit? In-Reply-To: <4FA43D75.8030200@oneiroi.net> References: <1434887.kcK6zIOEg5@bursa01> <87havw9wam.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <3327457.JrFl41MfE4@bursa01> <4FA3CE3F.3000804@sixdemonbag.org> <4FA3E517.7070408@oneiroi.net> <4FA3F229.9000501@sixdemonbag.org> <4FA43D75.8030200@oneiroi.net> Message-ID: <4FA4FC3A.1030909@digitalbrains.com> On 04/05/12 22:35, Milo wrote: > You can't tell consumer or end-user that he can't use 256-bit, symmetric > cipher for his (even!) porn stash because this is some kind of faux pas > and he is iconoclast because of this. It's up to him. Why should the GnuPG authors include a feature they don't believe in? If it's in GnuPG official, it will need to be supported. What if there is some bug that only rears its ugly head with 8k keys? They'll need to spend more time on it, time better spent elsewhere. And especially, why should they add something they simply don't believe in. The use of 8k keys is bothersome to others. In the GnuPG case for certifications and signatures, and in the SSH case for the owner of the server you're logging in to and burning unnecesary CPU cycles. > One more time - this is not up to you or software authors to decide > what's the value behind encrypted data. Even if reason of encrypting it > is silly. I don't think it's up to you to decide that the GnuPG authors need to officially support something they find silly. And you seem to forget that when you use GnuPG with (for example) 4k keys, the 4k key is simply not the weakest link! This has been said already. It's an interesting take on things, that the GnuPG authors somehow think your data must be invaluable, because they don't offer 8k RSA. If your data is that valuable, keep it to yourself. Don't give even the encrypted variant to your enemy. Because your formidable enemy will know of a way to decrypt it without breaking your 8k key. Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at http://wwwhome.cs.utwente.nl/~lebbing/pubkey.txt From gnupg at oneiroi.net Sat May 5 12:19:03 2012 From: gnupg at oneiroi.net (Milo) Date: Sat, 05 May 2012 12:19:03 +0200 Subject: SSH Agent keys >4096 bit? In-Reply-To: <4FA4E126.6000409@gmail.com> References: <1434887.kcK6zIOEg5@bursa01> <87havw9wam.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <3327457.JrFl41MfE4@bursa01> <4FA3CE3F.3000804@sixdemonbag.org> <4FA3E517.7070408@oneiroi.net> <4FA4E126.6000409@gmail.com> Message-ID: <4FA4FE97.3060400@oneiroi.net> On 05/05/2012 10:13 AM, Faramir wrote: > El 04-05-2012 10:17, Milo escribi?: >> Hello Robert, Hello all. > ... >>> How many petabytes are sent across the wire each day? Do you >>> really think people will be storing all of today's traffic for >>> twenty years, just so some analyst not even born yet will someday >>> be able to say, "wow, I really want to see what's in this random >>> guy's porn stash!"? > >> Yeah, then leave your home open because "Wow, who want to check >> every door in the world. So many of them". > > The difference is you don't need to store doors before checking them. Do you see any technical problem with this? http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/01/feds-must-exami/ http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2006/04/70619 http://defensetech.org/2005/12/24/nsa-tapping-into-telecoms-main-arteries/ https://www.eff.org/issues/nsa-spying Even if it requires some effort is becoming more possible then ever (especially with such amount of resources...). > Best Regards -- Regards, Milo From gnupg at oneiroi.net Sat May 5 12:49:16 2012 From: gnupg at oneiroi.net (Milo) Date: Sat, 05 May 2012 12:49:16 +0200 Subject: SSH Agent keys >4096 bit? In-Reply-To: <4FA4FC3A.1030909@digitalbrains.com> References: <1434887.kcK6zIOEg5@bursa01> <87havw9wam.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <3327457.JrFl41MfE4@bursa01> <4FA3CE3F.3000804@sixdemonbag.org> <4FA3E517.7070408@oneiroi.net> <4FA3F229.9000501@sixdemonbag.org> <4FA43D75.8030200@oneiroi.net> <4FA4FC3A.1030909@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <4FA505AC.7040504@oneiroi.net> On 05/05/2012 12:08 PM, Peter Lebbing wrote: > On 04/05/12 22:35, Milo wrote: >> You can't tell consumer or end-user that he can't use 256-bit, symmetric >> cipher for his (even!) porn stash because this is some kind of faux pas >> and he is iconoclast because of this. It's up to him. > > Why should the GnuPG authors include a feature they don't believe in? If > it's in GnuPG official, it will need to be supported. What if there is > some bug that only rears its ugly head with 8k keys? They'll need to > spend more time on it, time better spent elsewhere. 1) You are responding to citation regarding symmetric crypto with widely used key length. 2) Proponents of approach you are commenting on gave some arguments here already. If not sure check thread and other sources. > And especially, why should they add something they simply don't believe in. > > The use of 8k keys is bothersome to others. In the GnuPG case for > certifications and signatures, and in the SSH case for the owner of the > server you're logging in to and burning unnecesary CPU cycles. > >> One more time - this is not up to you or software authors to decide >> what's the value behind encrypted data. Even if reason of encrypting it >> is silly. > > I don't think it's up to you to decide that the GnuPG authors need to > officially support something they find silly. This is open discussion about free software's value and (expected by some) functionality. Discussion and judging on value of private data is something totally different you know. No offence but I don't think that GnuPG is only to address 100% authors' needs. > And you seem to forget that when you use GnuPG with (for example) 4k > keys, the 4k key is simply not the weakest link! This has been said already. I'm not forgetting about this. But you are forgetting you are using symmetric crypto with 256-bit key length (e.g. HTTPS) and you don't have any problem with this "security overkill" (but yes - symmetric ciphers are computationally to use cheaper). For RSA you'll get similar security with ~15k key! Simply for some 4k isn't enough here. Can you imagine your own, private data which should be encrypted for more years then 4k asymmetric key is able to secure? If not you are including into discussion your own needs (or lack of them) as universal and only truth. > It's an interesting take on things, that the GnuPG authors somehow think > your data must be invaluable, because they don't offer 8k RSA. This is your flawed conclusion. > If your > data is that valuable, keep it to yourself. Don't give even the > encrypted variant to your enemy. Because your formidable enemy will know > of a way to decrypt it without breaking your 8k key. Give people in need reasonable way of providing comparable level of security in physical means (with at least same costs as with cryptography). You'll become rich, rich man. > Peter. > -- Regards, Milo From peter at digitalbrains.com Sat May 5 13:09:48 2012 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Sat, 05 May 2012 13:09:48 +0200 Subject: SSH Agent keys >4096 bit? In-Reply-To: <4FA505AC.7040504@oneiroi.net> References: <1434887.kcK6zIOEg5@bursa01> <87havw9wam.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <3327457.JrFl41MfE4@bursa01> <4FA3CE3F.3000804@sixdemonbag.org> <4FA3E517.7070408@oneiroi.net> <4FA3F229.9000501@sixdemonbag.org> <4FA43D75.8030200@oneiroi.net> <4FA4FC3A.1030909@digitalbrains.com> <4FA505AC.7040504@oneiroi.net> Message-ID: <4FA50A7C.2020304@digitalbrains.com> On 05/05/12 12:49, Milo wrote: > 1) You are responding to citation regarding symmetric crypto with > widely used key length. Well it's not my fault someone else went off-topic is it? If you are here to persuade the GnuPG authors to include AES256 you're too late. I think you can perfectly discern what message I was intending to get across. > 2) Proponents of approach you are commenting on gave some arguments > here already. If not sure check thread and other sources. I am very well aware of that. They don't convince, because they don't tackle the problem of the weakest link. >>> One more time - this is not up to you or software authors to >>> decide what's the value behind encrypted data. Even if reason of >>> encrypting it is silly. >> >> I don't think it's up to you to decide that the GnuPG authors need >> to officially support something they find silly. > > This is open discussion about free software's value and (expected by > some) functionality. Discussion and judging on value of private data > is something totally different you know. Please read these three quotes again carefully. You are saying you yourself are off-topic; discussing something totally different. I agree. > I'm not forgetting about this. But you are forgetting you are using > symmetric crypto with 256-bit key length (e.g. HTTPS) and you don't > have any problem with this "security overkill" (but yes - symmetric > ciphers are computationally to use cheaper). GnuPG should include 8k RSA because I didn't go through the trouble of disabling AES256 in my browser, risking breakage when an oddball webserver administrator disables all algorithms but AES256? You also indicate yourself where this goes askew: RSA 8k is immensely more CPU intensive than AES256 v AES128. >> It's an interesting take on things, that the GnuPG authors somehow >> think your data must be invaluable, because they don't offer 8k >> RSA. > > This is your flawed conclusion. I was replying to: >> One more time - this is not up to you or software authors to decide >> what's the value behind encrypted data. I read that as: GnuPG authors decide your data is not valuable enough for RSA 8k. I'm unsure how else to read it, but it certainly isn't /my/ conclusion, it's what I read as /your/ conclusion. Please don't make it my conclusion, I would have to severely disagree with myself, and I hate it when that happens. A large error I made: I wrote invaluable when I meant not valuable at all. Is this the source of the confusion? Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at http://wwwhome.cs.utwente.nl/~lebbing/pubkey.txt From gnupg at oneiroi.net Sat May 5 13:46:54 2012 From: gnupg at oneiroi.net (Milo) Date: Sat, 05 May 2012 13:46:54 +0200 Subject: SSH Agent keys >4096 bit? In-Reply-To: <4FA50A7C.2020304@digitalbrains.com> References: <1434887.kcK6zIOEg5@bursa01> <87havw9wam.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <3327457.JrFl41MfE4@bursa01> <4FA3CE3F.3000804@sixdemonbag.org> <4FA3E517.7070408@oneiroi.net> <4FA3F229.9000501@sixdemonbag.org> <4FA43D75.8030200@oneiroi.net> <4FA4FC3A.1030909@digitalbrains.com> <4FA505AC.7040504@oneiroi.net> <4FA50A7C.2020304@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <4FA5132E.4020400@oneiroi.net> On 05/05/2012 01:09 PM, Peter Lebbing wrote: > On 05/05/12 12:49, Milo wrote: >> 1) You are responding to citation regarding symmetric crypto with >> widely used key length. > > (...) > > >>>> One more time - this is not up to you or software authors to >>>> decide what's the value behind encrypted data. Even if reason of >>>> encrypting it is silly. >>> >>> I don't think it's up to you to decide that the GnuPG authors need >>> to officially support something they find silly. >> >> This is open discussion about free software's value and (expected by >> some) functionality. Discussion and judging on value of private data >> is something totally different you know. > > Please read these three quotes again carefully. You are saying you > yourself are off-topic; discussing something totally different. I agree. No. Discussion was at some point about reasons of using strong crypto. And at some point idea that it's not worth to use it against data which has no value appeared. My point is you are not in the position to say what's the value of the data someone is encrypting. You weren't reading carefully enough to see this and you are suggesting me that I'm trying to force GnuPG authors to do something which is - almost offensive - rubbish. This is discussion Peter, nothing else. >> I'm not forgetting about this. But you are forgetting you are using >> symmetric crypto with 256-bit key length (e.g. HTTPS) and you don't >> have any problem with this "security overkill" (but yes - symmetric >> ciphers are computationally to use cheaper). > > GnuPG should include 8k RSA because I didn't go through the trouble of > disabling AES256 in my browser, risking breakage when an oddball > webserver administrator disables all algorithms but AES256? In overall I agree with this but "disabling all stuff but AES256" is silly and overdrawn try to devaluate my statement. > You also indicate yourself where this goes askew: RSA 8k is immensely > more CPU intensive than AES256 v AES128. If you can't afford this "immense" expense - don't use 8k RSA. >>> It's an interesting take on things, that the GnuPG authors somehow >>> think your data must be invaluable, because they don't offer 8k >>> RSA. >> >> This is your flawed conclusion. > > I was replying to: >>> One more time - this is not up to you or software authors to decide >>> what's the value behind encrypted data. > > I read that as: GnuPG authors decide your data is not valuable enough > for RSA 8k. I'm unsure how else to read it, but it certainly isn't /my/ > conclusion, it's what I read as /your/ conclusion. Please don't make it > my conclusion, I would have to severely disagree with myself, and I hate > it when that happens. You are following idea that people who are using strong crypto to things which are in your opinion worthless aren't serious. Looks like at best you replied to piece of thread without knowing its context. There is a difference between your overdrawn (again) interpretation that all this data is without value in eyes of GnuPG authors. I'm just saying that it's not for them do evaluate value of this data. Simple as this. And yes - by using extremely cheap rhetoric tricks you made this opinion yours. I'm really sorry because of you but this is not my problem. > A large error I made: I wrote invaluable when I meant not valuable at > all. Is this the source of the confusion? As above. > Peter. > At some point discussion was quite constructive but it's not anymore. -- Regards, Milo From peter at digitalbrains.com Sat May 5 14:05:13 2012 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Sat, 05 May 2012 14:05:13 +0200 Subject: SSH Agent keys >4096 bit? In-Reply-To: <4FA5132E.4020400@oneiroi.net> References: <1434887.kcK6zIOEg5@bursa01> <87havw9wam.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <3327457.JrFl41MfE4@bursa01> <4FA3CE3F.3000804@sixdemonbag.org> <4FA3E517.7070408@oneiroi.net> <4FA3F229.9000501@sixdemonbag.org> <4FA43D75.8030200@oneiroi.net> <4FA4FC3A.1030909@digitalbrains.com> <4FA505AC.7040504@oneiroi.net> <4FA50A7C.2020304@digitalbrains.com> <4FA5132E.4020400@oneiroi.net> Message-ID: <4FA51779.10104@digitalbrains.com> Milo, I am sorry if I somehow offended you. That's the feeling I get from your latest mail. It was not the intention. I do want to note that no matter how careful you read, English is multi-interpretable and ambiguous. So when someone interprets a statement differently than you do, it does not necessarily mean they must not have read carefully enough. Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at http://wwwhome.cs.utwente.nl/~lebbing/pubkey.txt From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Sat May 5 14:20:19 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Sat, 05 May 2012 08:20:19 -0400 Subject: SSH Agent keys >4096 bit? In-Reply-To: <4FA4E6CF.1030701@oneiroi.net> References: <1434887.kcK6zIOEg5@bursa01> <87havw9wam.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <3327457.JrFl41MfE4@bursa01> <4FA3CE3F.3000804@sixdemonbag.org> <4FA3E517.7070408@oneiroi.net> <4FA3F229.9000501@sixdemonbag.org> <4FA43D75.8030200@oneiroi.net> <4FA46CE0.2050609@sixdemonbag.org> <4FA4E6CF.1030701@oneiroi.net> Message-ID: <4FA51B03.2010608@sixdemonbag.org> On 5/5/12 4:37 AM, Milo wrote: > This is futile. I'm reminding you that you are giving one example of > rarely used algo (so _niche_ and _out_of_mainsteam_) to back your > statement "that there is good amount of them". "Rarely used" is not the same as "proof of concept." Your statement did not mention "out of the mainstream." No moving the goalposts, please. You were also arguing that QC would shred all or most asymmetric systems. It turns out that no, QC doesn't, can't, won't: it will only shred the discrete logarithm problem or problems isomorphic to it, such as integer factorization. Other systems, whether multivariate, lattice or Goppa code-based systems, won't be. (Well -- lattice systems might: right now they're only conjectured to be outside of BQP. But Goppa codes are well-known for being NP-hard.) If you're now claiming that I've only presented one system, well, that's because I wasn't aware you were looking for the kitchen sink. Do some reading on post-quantum cryptography. As I read the tea leaves the new hotness is in the lattice-based systems, but I think systems based on Goppa codes will continue to surprise us. > In context of this discussion your statement is ridiculous. At one point > you even agreed on using 256-bit symmetric cipher for 50+ years > confidentiality (not guaranteed but at least assumed or expected) and > now you are turning all things around. Not at all. If you're securing nuclear weapon release codes and you ask me, "is it okay if I use 256-bit crypto?", I will blink a few times and back away slowly from the thermonuclear weapon while nodding vigorously and making noises about how they must be secure for fifty years or more, oh and is that thing releasing radiation right now and where do you plan on storing this so I can live far away from it. If you're securing your recipe book and you ask me, "is it okay if I use 256-bit crypto?", I will smile and pleasantly explain that, really, past about 112 bits it's just an exercise in paranoia. Use whatever you like, but managing your keys will be a much more important task than deciding between 3DES and AES256. And if you're telling everyone that AES256 will give them a larger security margin than 3DES, well... at that point I'm going to start pointing and laughing. There is enough misinformation and half-truths floating around the crypto-hobbyist's world: I consider it to be a polite act towards the community to challenge this when I encounter it. > 3des is old Old software engineering joke: "legacy code (n): code that hasn't crashed in the last 40 years." You call 3DES old. I call it quite well tested in demanding production environments. More often than not when you swipe a credit card, 3DES is being used to secure the transaction at various critical points. > and it's providing something like 80-112 bits of security. The best attack against three-key 3DES requires almost 10^27 bytes of RAM. This is completely impractical, as even the inventor of the attack has said. To the best of our knowledge there is no effective way to reduce three-key 3DES, which is the only NIST-approved version, below 168 bits of key space. > It has ugly history of keying hacks and some aren't back compatible - ... I have absolutely no idea what you're talking about here. None. From gnupg at oneiroi.net Sat May 5 14:57:45 2012 From: gnupg at oneiroi.net (Milo) Date: Sat, 05 May 2012 14:57:45 +0200 Subject: SSH Agent keys >4096 bit? In-Reply-To: <4FA51B03.2010608@sixdemonbag.org> References: <1434887.kcK6zIOEg5@bursa01> <87havw9wam.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <3327457.JrFl41MfE4@bursa01> <4FA3CE3F.3000804@sixdemonbag.org> <4FA3E517.7070408@oneiroi.net> <4FA3F229.9000501@sixdemonbag.org> <4FA43D75.8030200@oneiroi.net> <4FA46CE0.2050609@sixdemonbag.org> <4FA4E6CF.1030701@oneiroi.net> <4FA51B03.2010608@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <4FA523C9.5080504@oneiroi.net> On 05/05/2012 02:20 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > On 5/5/12 4:37 AM, Milo wrote: >> This is futile. I'm reminding you that you are giving one example of >> rarely used algo (so _niche_ and _out_of_mainsteam_) to back your >> statement "that there is good amount of them". > > "Rarely used" is not the same as "proof of concept." Your statement did > not mention "out of the mainstream." No moving the goalposts, please. I mentioned some attributes of ciphers which are generally out of concern because - e.g. - they aren't widely used. I understand term "niche cipher" as somehow overlapping and with similar meaning as "out of mainstream". And I used `,' logical disjunction. Hope my intention is clear now ;) > You were also arguing that QC would shred all or most asymmetric > systems. It turns out that no, QC doesn't, can't, won't: it will only > shred the discrete logarithm problem or problems isomorphic to it, such > as integer factorization. Other systems, whether multivariate, lattice > or Goppa code-based systems, won't be. (Well -- lattice systems might: > right now they're only conjectured to be outside of BQP. But Goppa > codes are well-known for being NP-hard.) after Wikipedia: "Derivatives of Shor's algorithm are widely conjectured to be effective against all mainstream public-key algorithms including RSA, Diffie-Hellman and elliptic curve cryptography". I'm not considering all of them. I used more general expression. > If you're now claiming that I've only presented one system, well, that's > because I wasn't aware you were looking for the kitchen sink. Do some > reading on post-quantum cryptography. As I read the tea leaves the new > hotness is in the lattice-based systems, but I think systems based on > Goppa codes will continue to surprise us. Thanks for this tip. >> In context of this discussion your statement is ridiculous. At one point >> you even agreed on using 256-bit symmetric cipher for 50+ years >> confidentiality (not guaranteed but at least assumed or expected) and >> now you are turning all things around. > > Not at all. > > If you're securing nuclear weapon release codes and you ask me, "is it > okay if I use 256-bit crypto?", I will blink a few times and back away > slowly from the thermonuclear weapon while nodding vigorously and making > noises about how they must be secure for fifty years or more, oh and is > that thing releasing radiation right now and where do you plan on > storing this so I can live far away from it. > > If you're securing your recipe book and you ask me, "is it okay if I use > 256-bit crypto?", I will smile and pleasantly explain that, really, past > about 112 bits it's just an exercise in paranoia. Use whatever you > like, but managing your keys will be a much more important task than > deciding between 3DES and AES256. > > And if you're telling everyone that AES256 will give them a larger > security margin than 3DES, well... at that point I'm going to start > pointing and laughing. There is enough misinformation and half-truths > floating around the crypto-hobbyist's world: I consider it to be a > polite act towards the community to challenge this when I encounter it. And again we are going through field of evaluating data's value. I don't think I have something more to add here. I understand your point and possibly person who will ask you such question(s) can follow your advice without harm. But I don't think that biggest proponents of longer asymmetric keys are such kind of guys. Your approach advised to this hypothetical person is more like tao of using encryption then set of objective rules. >> 3des is old > > Old software engineering joke: "legacy code (n): code that hasn't > crashed in the last 40 years." > > You call 3DES old. I call it quite well tested in demanding production > environments. More often than not when you swipe a credit card, 3DES is > being used to secure the transaction at various critical points. But lacking bigger margin of security because of limited key space. See NIST advisories for 3des keying methods (see: 50 years+ security problem; yeah, some people are quite suspicious about them). >> and it's providing something like 80-112 bits of security. > > The best attack against three-key 3DES requires almost 10^27 bytes of > RAM. This is completely impractical, as even the inventor of the attack > has said. To the best of our knowledge there is no effective way to > reduce three-key 3DES, which is the only NIST-approved version, below > 168 bits of key space. > >> It has ugly history of keying hacks and some aren't back compatible - > > ... I have absolutely no idea what you're talking about here. None. Check 3des history for details ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/3des#Keying_options ). -- Regards, Milo From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Sat May 5 15:13:59 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Sat, 05 May 2012 09:13:59 -0400 Subject: SSH Agent keys >4096 bit? In-Reply-To: <4FA523C9.5080504@oneiroi.net> References: <1434887.kcK6zIOEg5@bursa01> <87havw9wam.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <3327457.JrFl41MfE4@bursa01> <4FA3CE3F.3000804@sixdemonbag.org> <4FA3E517.7070408@oneiroi.net> <4FA3F229.9000501@sixdemonbag.org> <4FA43D75.8030200@oneiroi.net> <4FA46CE0.2050609@sixdemonbag.org> <4FA4E6CF.1030701@oneiroi.net> <4FA51B03.2010608@sixdemonbag.org> <4FA523C9.5080504@oneiroi.net> Message-ID: <4FA52797.7020305@sixdemonbag.org> On 5/5/12 8:57 AM, Milo wrote: > "Derivatives of Shor's algorithm are widely conjectured to be effective > against all mainstream public-key algorithms including RSA, > Diffie-Hellman and elliptic curve cryptography". I'm not considering all > of them. I used more general expression. In that case, everything you're advocating is confusing me. Yes, if and when QC comes along many existing systems will need to be considered suspect. However, if you're concerned about QC you will get far more mileage from switching to a QC-resistant asymmetric algorithm than from adding a few bits to your RSA key. Why all this focus on longer RSA keys as a response to QC? It makes no sense at all. > But I don't think that biggest proponents of longer asymmetric keys are > such kind of guys. Your approach advised to this hypothetical person is > more like tao of using encryption then set of objective rules. That's because there are very few objective rules. Computer security is dominated by the human element, and human beings do not tend to strictly follow objective rules. When it comes to crypto, yes, we can say certain things with great mathematical certainty. The instant that crypto gets fielded, though, the math becomes the least important part of the equation. The human element becomes overwhelmingly dominant. > But lacking bigger margin of security because of limited key space. NIST has certified 3DES until 2030: it is quite likely that in 2030 3DES will be certified for another couple of decades. > Check 3des history for details ( > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/3des#Keying_options ). I did, and I don't see anything in there that are ugly hacks or backwards-incompatible. Choose your keying option (three-key being preferred), stick with it and you're done. From hka at qbs.com.pl Sat May 5 15:49:56 2012 From: hka at qbs.com.pl (Hubert Kario) Date: Sat, 05 May 2012 15:49:56 +0200 Subject: SSH Agent keys >4096 bit? In-Reply-To: <4FA430E5.8030104@digitalbrains.com> References: <4FA430E5.8030104@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <9367773.adnsgCOs15@bursa01> On Friday 04 of May 2012 21:41:25 Peter Lebbing wrote: > On 04/05/12 20:54, Ali Lown wrote: > > Might I point out that discussion is with respect to an 8k RSA SSH key > > for SSH authentication, not for email. A 2 second delay during the > > initialization of an SSH connection is not a problem. > > And here is precisely something interesting: 8k RSA is discussed as a method > to keep messages confidential for decades. I haven't looked into it, but > I'm under the impression RSA is used purely for authentication in SSH, not > for key exchange[1]. What are you protecting decades against here? A server > reusing a random challenge? That seems quite far fetched. > > Oh, by the way, only the computational load for the client was discussed. > There's also the server (although the public side of the computation is > quicker than the private side). The server gets logins from potentially a > lot of clients. > > Peter. > > [1] I get this impression because there is a configuration option for > OpenSSH sshd that selects which key exchange methods to use, and they all > have DH (Diffie-Helmann) in their name. As far as I know, OpenSSH uses DH parameters of the same size as the RSA keys: for 8k DH you need 8k RSA or (which is unmaintainable) manually force use of 8k DH. Regards, -- Hubert Kario QBS - Quality Business Software 02-656 Warszawa, ul. Ksawer?w 30/85 tel. +48 (22) 646-61-51, 646-74-24 www.qbs.com.pl From hka at qbs.com.pl Sat May 5 16:13:08 2012 From: hka at qbs.com.pl (Hubert Kario) Date: Sat, 05 May 2012 16:13:08 +0200 Subject: SSH Agent keys >4096 bit? In-Reply-To: <4FA3CE3F.3000804@sixdemonbag.org> References: <3327457.JrFl41MfE4@bursa01> <4FA3CE3F.3000804@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <2076113.YqL5sHRapL@bursa01> On Friday 04 of May 2012 08:40:31 Robert J. Hansen wrote: > On 05/04/2012 06:07 AM, Hubert Kario wrote: > > It still doesn't change the overall picture: > > 1. migrating to ECC is hard and complicated > > 2. using 8k RSA is easy > > Nor does it change > > 3. using 8K RSA gives a modest increase to an already formidable > margin of security > > Breaking a 128-bit keyspace is hard. Like, really, really hard. The > power analysis on that one is eye-popping: to break a 128-bit keyspace > in anything approaching a reasonable length of time requires an energy > output on the level of a hypernova. If you want to break a 128-bit > keyspace, please do it in a galaxy far, far away. So why do we need to > increase a 128-bit keyspace (RSA-3K) to a 192-bit-plus-a-small-amount > keyspace (RSA-8K)? > > The obvious response is "to defend against enhanced attacks against RSA, > such as quantum computing and Shor's Algorithm." But that's just crazy. > Shor's Algorithm requires 2N qubits to break an N-bit key. Right now > we've got quantum computers that have, what, eight qubits? Any RSA > modulus smaller than sixteen is in trouble now, let me tell you. Reading about cryptography history I noticed one thing, when NSA said "don't do something" it meant that this thing did break the crypto entirely or allowed for far easier attacks. Considering that they tell us "don't use RSA" (in Crypto suite B), would suggest that they have an attack on RSA that considerably limits its security. So whatever 4k RSA really does have a large margin of security is questionable. We've already established that telling everybody to use 8k or greater keys is infeasible because of computational problems (in phones and web servers, let alone smartchips). The only solution for that problem is to tell everybody to use ECC (which has lower computational requirements). This does not mean that long RSA keys are useless for all use cases. SSH certainly isn't one of them. Regards, -- Hubert Kario QBS - Quality Business Software 02-656 Warszawa, ul. Ksawer?w 30/85 tel. +48 (22) 646-61-51, 646-74-24 www.qbs.com.pl From gnupg at oneiroi.net Sat May 5 16:17:58 2012 From: gnupg at oneiroi.net (Milo) Date: Sat, 05 May 2012 16:17:58 +0200 Subject: SSH Agent keys >4096 bit? In-Reply-To: <4FA52797.7020305@sixdemonbag.org> References: <1434887.kcK6zIOEg5@bursa01> <87havw9wam.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <3327457.JrFl41MfE4@bursa01> <4FA3CE3F.3000804@sixdemonbag.org> <4FA3E517.7070408@oneiroi.net> <4FA3F229.9000501@sixdemonbag.org> <4FA43D75.8030200@oneiroi.net> <4FA46CE0.2050609@sixdemonbag.org> <4FA4E6CF.1030701@oneiroi.net> <4FA51B03.2010608@sixdemonbag.org> <4FA523C9.5080504@oneiroi.net> <4FA52797.7020305@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <4FA53696.70400@oneiroi.net> On 05/05/2012 03:13 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > On 5/5/12 8:57 AM, Milo wrote: >> "Derivatives of Shor's algorithm are widely conjectured to be effective >> against all mainstream public-key algorithms including RSA, >> Diffie-Hellman and elliptic curve cryptography". I'm not considering all >> of them. I used more general expression. > > In that case, everything you're advocating is confusing me. Yes, if and > when QC comes along many existing systems will need to be considered > suspect. However, if you're concerned about QC you will get far more > mileage from switching to a QC-resistant asymmetric algorithm than from > adding a few bits to your RSA key. Why all this focus on longer RSA > keys as a response to QC? It makes no sense at all. You are mixing two topics: Need of security margin better then provided by one of common, widely used asymmetric algorithms using 4k key and/with possible impact of QC on asymmetric ciphers in general. Second topic was started indirectly by you with "tap on nova's energy output" and my reply to this part has not much too do with first part. >> But I don't think that biggest proponents of longer asymmetric keys are >> such kind of guys. Your approach advised to this hypothetical person is >> more like tao of using encryption then set of objective rules. > > That's because there are very few objective rules. Computer security is > dominated by the human element, and human beings do not tend to strictly > follow objective rules. Hmm. Not sure if I can agree with you here. This is something I must think about. > When it comes to crypto, yes, we can say certain things with great > mathematical certainty. The instant that crypto gets fielded, though, > the math becomes the least important part of the equation. The human > element becomes overwhelmingly dominant. > >> But lacking bigger margin of security because of limited key space. > > NIST has certified 3DES until 2030: it is quite likely that in 2030 3DES > will be certified for another couple of decades. Guesswork. >> Check 3des history for details ( >> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/3des#Keying_options ). > > I did, and I don't see anything in there that are ugly hacks or > backwards-incompatible. Choose your keying option (three-key being > preferred), stick with it and you're done. "(...) This improves the strength of the algorithm when using keying option 2, and _provides_ _backward_compatibility_ with DES with keying option 3." If you aren't OK with this view - fine. Can't help it. The fact is the simpler and more transparent cipher is, the easier its security evaluation is. Simplicity in cryptography is often practical. -- Regards, Milo From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Sat May 5 16:26:09 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Sat, 05 May 2012 10:26:09 -0400 Subject: SSH Agent keys >4096 bit? In-Reply-To: <4FA53696.70400@oneiroi.net> References: <1434887.kcK6zIOEg5@bursa01> <87havw9wam.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <3327457.JrFl41MfE4@bursa01> <4FA3CE3F.3000804@sixdemonbag.org> <4FA3E517.7070408@oneiroi.net> <4FA3F229.9000501@sixdemonbag.org> <4FA43D75.8030200@oneiroi.net> <4FA46CE0.2050609@sixdemonbag.org> <4FA4E6CF.1030701@oneiroi.net> <4FA51B03.2010608@sixdemonbag.org> <4FA523C9.5080504@oneiroi.net> <4FA52797.7020305@sixdemonbag.org> <4FA53696.70400@oneiroi.net> Message-ID: <4FA53881.7090205@sixdemonbag.org> On 5/5/12 10:17 AM, Milo wrote: > "(...) This improves the strength of the algorithm when using keying > option 2, and _provides_ _backward_compatibility_ with DES with keying > option 3." One-key 3DES *is* DES. It's a DES encryption, decryption with that same key, then re-encryption with that same key. One-key 3DES existed to allow institutions to bootstrap their infrastructure out of DES. First they instituted one-key 3DES, which let them transparently upgrade their infrastructure without impacting business operations. Once they were convinced their new 3DES infrastructure was working correctly, they switched to using two-key or three-key 3DES. One-key 3DES was never meant to be used as anything more than an upgrade path. The backwards compatibility of one-key 3DES was necessary for upgrade purposes, but once fully deployed 3DES has never had a problem with backwards compatibility. What you said earlier was that 3DES had a bunch of keying hacks and backwards incompatibilities. Neither is true. All the various forms have been scrutinized quite closely and found to be solid. One-key 3DES has the benefit of backwards compatibility with DES, which is useful for upgrade purposes, but it's a gross misstatement of fact to claim that 3DES has a problem with backwards incompatibility. From gnupg at oneiroi.net Sat May 5 16:42:04 2012 From: gnupg at oneiroi.net (Milo) Date: Sat, 05 May 2012 16:42:04 +0200 Subject: SSH Agent keys >4096 bit? In-Reply-To: <4FA53881.7090205@sixdemonbag.org> References: <1434887.kcK6zIOEg5@bursa01> <87havw9wam.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <3327457.JrFl41MfE4@bursa01> <4FA3CE3F.3000804@sixdemonbag.org> <4FA3E517.7070408@oneiroi.net> <4FA3F229.9000501@sixdemonbag.org> <4FA43D75.8030200@oneiroi.net> <4FA46CE0.2050609@sixdemonbag.org> <4FA4E6CF.1030701@oneiroi.net> <4FA51B03.2010608@sixdemonbag.org> <4FA523C9.5080504@oneiroi.net> <4FA52797.7020305@sixdemonbag.org> <4FA53696.70400@oneiroi.net> <4FA53881.7090205@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <4FA53C3C.5030008@oneiroi.net> On 05/05/2012 04:26 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > On 5/5/12 10:17 AM, Milo wrote: >> "(...) This improves the strength of the algorithm when using keying >> option 2, and _provides_ _backward_compatibility_ with DES with keying >> option 3." > > One-key 3DES *is* DES. Obviously it's not. It's for example inappropriate to call single run of DES 3DES... > It's a DES encryption, decryption with that same > key, then re-encryption with that same key. One-key 3DES existed to > allow institutions to bootstrap their infrastructure out of DES. First > they instituted one-key 3DES, which let them transparently upgrade their > infrastructure without impacting business operations. Once they were > convinced their new 3DES infrastructure was working correctly, they > switched to using two-key or three-key 3DES. One-key 3DES was never > meant to be used as anything more than an upgrade path. The backwards > compatibility of one-key 3DES was necessary for upgrade purposes, but > once fully deployed 3DES has never had a problem with backwards > compatibility. And simply, you've just described ugly hack. > What you said earlier was that 3DES had a bunch of keying hacks and > backwards incompatibilities. Neither is true. All the various forms > have been scrutinized quite closely and found to be solid. And nothing changed in my stance. What's more 3DES is one big hack to prolong life of outdated cipher. If you are making such statements as above, try to not do this while commenting heavily edited, original message. > One-key 3DES has the benefit of backwards compatibility with DES, which > is useful for upgrade purposes, but it's a gross misstatement of fact to > claim that 3DES has a problem with backwards incompatibility. I'm not interested (in context of this discussion) in benefits of this mode. -- Regards, Milo From gnupg at oneiroi.net Sat May 5 16:52:34 2012 From: gnupg at oneiroi.net (Milo) Date: Sat, 05 May 2012 16:52:34 +0200 Subject: SSH Agent keys >4096 bit? In-Reply-To: <4FA53696.70400@oneiroi.net> References: <1434887.kcK6zIOEg5@bursa01> <87havw9wam.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <3327457.JrFl41MfE4@bursa01> <4FA3CE3F.3000804@sixdemonbag.org> <4FA3E517.7070408@oneiroi.net> <4FA3F229.9000501@sixdemonbag.org> <4FA43D75.8030200@oneiroi.net> <4FA46CE0.2050609@sixdemonbag.org> <4FA4E6CF.1030701@oneiroi.net> <4FA51B03.2010608@sixdemonbag.org> <4FA523C9.5080504@oneiroi.net> <4FA52797.7020305@sixdemonbag.org> <4FA53696.70400@oneiroi.net> Message-ID: <4FA53EB2.10302@oneiroi.net> On 05/05/2012 04:17 PM, Milo wrote: > (...) > > You are mixing two topics: > > Need of security margin better then provided by one of common, widely > used asymmetric algorithms using 4k key I was rather thinking about 4k RSA key or "security equivalent provided by one of common, widely used asymmetric algorithms" here, sorry. > and/with > > possible impact of QC on asymmetric ciphers in general. > > Second topic was started indirectly by you with "tap on nova's energy > output" and my reply to this part has not much too do with first part. > > (...) -- Regards, Milo From peter at digitalbrains.com Sat May 5 20:03:04 2012 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Sat, 05 May 2012 20:03:04 +0200 Subject: SSH Agent keys >4096 bit? In-Reply-To: <9367773.adnsgCOs15@bursa01> References: <4FA430E5.8030104@digitalbrains.com> <9367773.adnsgCOs15@bursa01> Message-ID: <4FA56B58.6060101@digitalbrains.com> On 05/05/12 15:49, Hubert Kario wrote: > As far as I know, OpenSSH uses DH parameters of the same size as the RSA keys: > for 8k DH you need 8k RSA or (which is unmaintainable) manually force use of > 8k DH. Okay, going out on a limb here, since all what I say is conjecture. Actually consulting the SSH RFC's seems like too much work, or seems too much like work :). I think it's rather the case that the size of the DH parameters is proportional to the keysize of the symmetric algorithm used to secure the SSH session, because the DH params are used to compute the session key. So you are right that the DH params are proportional in size to a key used, but you've confused the keys, asymmetric vs symmetric. That way it makes sense to me. If I look at the debug messages emitted by the OpenSSH client, I'm under the impression that key exchange is already completed before authentication with RSA starts. Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at http://wwwhome.cs.utwente.nl/~lebbing/pubkey.txt From gnupg at oneiroi.net Sat May 5 20:27:10 2012 From: gnupg at oneiroi.net (Milo) Date: Sat, 05 May 2012 20:27:10 +0200 Subject: SSH Agent keys >4096 bit? In-Reply-To: <4FA56B58.6060101@digitalbrains.com> References: <4FA430E5.8030104@digitalbrains.com> <9367773.adnsgCOs15@bursa01> <4FA56B58.6060101@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <4FA570FE.3010606@oneiroi.net> On 05/05/2012 08:03 PM, Peter Lebbing wrote: > On 05/05/12 15:49, Hubert Kario wrote: >> As far as I know, OpenSSH uses DH parameters of the same size as >> the RSA keys: for 8k DH you need 8k RSA or (which is >> unmaintainable) manually force use of 8k DH. > > Okay, going out on a limb here, since all what I say is > conjecture. Actually consulting the SSH RFC's seems like too much > work, or seems too much like work :). > > I think it's rather the case that the size of the DH parameters is > proportional to the keysize of the symmetric algorithm used to > secure the SSH session, because the DH params are used to compute > the session key. So you are right that the DH params are > proportional in size to a key used, but you've confused the keys, > asymmetric vs symmetric. That way it makes sense to me. > > If I look at the debug messages emitted by the OpenSSH client, I'm > under the impression that key exchange is already completed before > authentication with RSA starts. Hm, shouldn't authentication happen before exchanging key for symmetric part of encryption during the SSH session? > Peter. > -- Regards, Milo From hka at qbs.com.pl Sun May 6 01:42:13 2012 From: hka at qbs.com.pl (Hubert Kario) Date: Sun, 06 May 2012 01:42:13 +0200 Subject: SSH Agent keys >4096 bit? In-Reply-To: <4FA56B58.6060101@digitalbrains.com> References: <9367773.adnsgCOs15@bursa01> <4FA56B58.6060101@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <1859060.19pmkayjZS@bursa01> On Saturday 05 of May 2012 20:03:04 Peter Lebbing wrote: > On 05/05/12 15:49, Hubert Kario wrote: > > As far as I know, OpenSSH uses DH parameters of the same size as the RSA > > keys: for 8k DH you need 8k RSA or (which is unmaintainable) manually > > force use of 8k DH. > > Okay, going out on a limb here, since all what I say is conjecture. > Actually consulting the SSH RFC's seems like too much work, or seems too > much like work :). > > I think it's rather the case that the size of the DH parameters is > proportional to the keysize of the symmetric algorithm used to secure > the SSH session, because the DH params are used to compute the session > key. So you are right that the DH params are proportional in size to a > key used, but you've confused the keys, asymmetric vs symmetric. That > way it makes sense to me. The secret being exchanged is, of course, the random session key. Its size is related to size of subgroup in DH. But it's the size of prime used that sets the security level, which just happens to share security evaluation with RSA as far as number of bits is concerned (IOW: n-bit DH is considered to be as hard to attack as n-bit RSA). > If I look at the debug messages emitted by the OpenSSH client, I'm under > the impression that key exchange is already completed before > authentication with RSA starts. DH without authentication is useless (trivial to MITM). You need to authenticate the DH params you recieve from the other party before you do anything with them. Regards, -- Hubert Kario QBS - Quality Business Software 02-656 Warszawa, ul. Ksawer?w 30/85 tel. +48 (22) 646-61-51, 646-74-24 www.qbs.com.pl From faramir.cl at gmail.com Sun May 6 05:51:59 2012 From: faramir.cl at gmail.com (Faramir) Date: Sat, 05 May 2012 23:51:59 -0400 Subject: SSH Agent keys >4096 bit? In-Reply-To: <4FA5132E.4020400@oneiroi.net> References: <1434887.kcK6zIOEg5@bursa01> <87havw9wam.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <3327457.JrFl41MfE4@bursa01> <4FA3CE3F.3000804@sixdemonbag.org> <4FA3E517.7070408@oneiroi.net> <4FA3F229.9000501@sixdemonbag.org> <4FA43D75.8030200@oneiroi.net> <4FA4FC3A.1030909@digitalbrains.com> <4FA505AC.7040504@oneiroi.net> <4FA50A7C.2020304@digitalbrains.com> <4FA5132E.4020400@oneiroi.net> Message-ID: <4FA5F55F.3080307@gmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 El 05-05-2012 7:46, Milo escribi?: ... >> You also indicate yourself where this goes askew: RSA 8k is >> immensely more CPU intensive than AES256 v AES128. > > If you can't afford this "immense" expense - don't use 8k RSA. But if you send a signed message, using RSA 8k, then you force your recipient to use it. GPG choses the symmetric algo and hash algo based on the recipient's preferences, but it can't chose they asymmetric algo. Best Regards -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJPpfVfAAoJEMV4f6PvczxA8PwIAKD1jSUMQhx+nWrOmTMAfwTp 6XKso4YKlr0eQofnYDywBu8sUW2N1HZvl2u2f/1pp8n63Xifua45a6glZPl5nsGF wouA2OFcQPupDIOZVq6skkp+Dxxr2nvjvvG2HYxSJqtAjWsEezFcUrmFP15/TC4W G7RNAz8bC39O9VNcPCBA5qBLUX/DF2tBKZ22tm9IEE1OTiYREOJNnq0AQcnkro/T xIbZwcVQTz7wuG8TTzy5tQZNJnk0tTVSNbEpPJGEP2D7gVXteaprV+nVhcfwOGkr 1w1VlQiQTRFJBIWJyKES6LTLqtqSkIlTEogAsWLX53k7RyhVCie0iI7qg/8SDNg= =LOro -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From peter at digitalbrains.com Sun May 6 10:09:38 2012 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Sun, 06 May 2012 10:09:38 +0200 Subject: SSH Agent keys >4096 bit? In-Reply-To: <1859060.19pmkayjZS@bursa01> References: <9367773.adnsgCOs15@bursa01> <4FA56B58.6060101@digitalbrains.com> <1859060.19pmkayjZS@bursa01> Message-ID: <4FA631C2.4010101@digitalbrains.com> On 06/05/12 01:42, Hubert Kario wrote: > But it's the size of prime used that sets the security level, which > just happens to share security evaluation with RSA as far as number > of bits is concerned (IOW: n-bit DH is considered to be as hard to > attack as n-bit RSA). Ah, yes, I misunderstood your point. But the DH protects the session. Cracking DH will get you the session contents. RSA is only used to authenticate. If it weren't for the symmetric encryption of the session, you can probably even get a (plaintext,ciphertext) pair. I've quickly snooped through the RFC's. RSA is used by the client to sign the "session identifier", which is determined by DH. Determining the (plaintext, ciphertext) pair from RSA gets you nothing in this case. Which is fortunate, because the server you log into also has the (plaintext, ciphertext) pair after you authenticate. Actually factoring the semiprime is obviously something completely different. But we were talking about keeping confidential messages confidential for decades. There is nothing confidential about an authentication challenge. Confidentiality is encryption. Authentication is a form of signing[1]. With signatures, the plaintext is not confidential. > DH without authentication is useless (trivial to MITM). You need to > authenticate the DH params you recieve from the other party before > you do anything with them. The /server/ is authenticated during key exchange. The /client/ can also be authenticated with a plaintext password sent over the encrypted connection to the server. I don't think the client is authenticated until after key exchange, whether you use RSA or a password (or another form of authentication). Peter. [1] Signing a challenge, which is still quite different in nature from signing data. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at http://wwwhome.cs.utwente.nl/~lebbing/pubkey.txt From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Sun May 6 10:50:49 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Sun, 06 May 2012 04:50:49 -0400 Subject: SSH Agent keys >4096 bit? In-Reply-To: <4FA53C3C.5030008@oneiroi.net> References: <1434887.kcK6zIOEg5@bursa01> <87havw9wam.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <3327457.JrFl41MfE4@bursa01> <4FA3CE3F.3000804@sixdemonbag.org> <4FA3E517.7070408@oneiroi.net> <4FA3F229.9000501@sixdemonbag.org> <4FA43D75.8030200@oneiroi.net> <4FA46CE0.2050609@sixdemonbag.org> <4FA4E6CF.1030701@oneiroi.net> <4FA51B03.2010608@sixdemonbag.org> <4FA523C9.5080504@oneiroi.net> <4FA52797.7020305@sixdemonbag.org> <4FA53696.70400@oneiroi.net> <4FA53881.7090205@sixdemonbag.org> <4FA53C3C.5030008@oneiroi.net> Message-ID: <4FA63B69.5080700@sixdemonbag.org> On 05/05/2012 10:42 AM, Milo wrote: > Obviously it's not. It's for example inappropriate to call single run > of DES 3DES... At this point I genuinely can't tell if I'm being trolled. I'm going to assume that I am not, and this will be my last statement on this entire thread. Two functions may operate quite differently, and yet be considered completely identical from a computational perspective. If I ask you to add the numbers from 1 to 100, you might solve it the long way by doing one hundred additions or you might do it the quick way by computing (101*100)/2 or you might do it the fastest possible way by making a lucky guess of 5,050. Doesn't matter. They're all equivalent. If Function A and Function B accept the same domain, output the same range, and have identical surjections from domain onto range, then they can be said to be identical. DES is an example of this. Nowhere in the DES validation tests does it specify, "your code must look like this." The DES validation tests only say, "given this input and this key, you must generate this output." If your implementation passes the DES validation tests, then congratulations, you can be certified as a FIPS-compliant DES implementation. One-key 3DES is quite capable of passing the DES validation tests. This means that for all intents and purposes it is a DES implementation. As I said, I don't know if I'm being trolled or if you're just thoroughly misinformed. If the former, please stop. If the latter, it can be corrected. From moses.mason at gmail.com Sun May 6 14:39:07 2012 From: moses.mason at gmail.com (Moses) Date: Sun, 6 May 2012 12:39:07 +0000 Subject: Why the "--export-secret-key" switch is not listed in help screen? Message-ID: Hi, I've notice the switch "--export-secret-key" is not listed in the help screen (i.e. gpg --help) and I spend a lot of time to find it. It seems to be one of the most used switch for backup private keys and sync keys between machines. Could the developer add this switch to the help screen? It would save users a lot of time. Thanks. From mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com Sun May 6 16:11:10 2012 From: mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com (Mika Suomalainen) Date: Sun, 06 May 2012 17:11:10 +0300 Subject: Why the "--export-secret-key" switch is not listed in help screen? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <4FA6867E.70702@hotmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 06.05.2012 15:39, Moses kirjoitti: > Hi, > > I've notice the switch "--export-secret-key" is not listed in the > help screen (i.e. gpg --help) and I spend a lot of time to find it. > It seems to be one of the most used switch for backup private keys > and sync keys between machines. Could the developer add this switch > to the help screen? It would save users a lot of time. > > Thanks. It seems that you are right. It's not mentioned in --help, but it's mentioned in the manual page. > --export-secret-keys > > --export-secret-subkeys > Same as --export, but exports the secret keys instead. This is > normally not very useful and a security risk. The second form > of the command has the special property to render the secret > part of the primary key useless; this is a GNU extension to > OpenPGP and other implementations can not be expected to suc? > cessfully import such a key. See the option - --simple-sk-check? > sum if you want to import such an exported key with an older > OpenPGP implementation. > I found that option by Googling for "gpg cheat sheet". Hopefully someone else can answer this question. PS. Sorry for weird looking paste. It's directly copy-pasted from most and copy-pasting from pager looks weird always. - -- Mika Suomalainen gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net --recv-keys 4DB53CFE82A46728 Key fingerprint = 24BC 1573 B8EE D666 D10A AA65 4DB5 3CFE 82A4 6728 http://mkaysi.github.com/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.19 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJPpoZ7AAoJEE21PP6CpGcoyhEP+gJ/hWf2EnwCr6fdajXpN1cr AXUsD4pxYMDT0dLcILlxYjCkCcUjebuimHguR6qEk/ErZB5b0eKBB0G9GrPmFhri F5ABvwuJ5W/3chqw4rBtND3HKcMwUndwWS8+OcDcxw9FS7IIYm4uAfI40TObjvKv 7cRKKHnpT5xW/e+d6A93RDQzCGEt8FotzHBSsteNfnvEekWX+b9uMF9MqJwgS3yw xmHs/iDuVBKONOc1Vm4pMElajhwTDwOmBJvX3IZYIZVpAOxUyD48VJCaB1r6HUwo H21dAku3g/pPguNp/2kBRilrNFNfOXZySvN9y+r5fK5vsbSjiDeF472UiRJ5WX4z 0S0S7GspmUQJsnKgkAS0oUDKus+cVBuojrAFIIYE6wz7IVUjoravnhfVC/lm2iAm LZA+gdU4b8rPe7GA+ANej8ySX/wEc6wMX3Lf3ZUWeLXTdrttZ4AqSFua0GHgzm8j vJFJl2sRfj3Nvj+foS1DpW6g5mk6M9zYTQB8LN14dnjOgEFyunkQIjVwAY1mZ0bd nRCHWAwILGA0Lp7xGBkCZgO271B9ZrVst/cyGbIUP13uOP8YW0jP3ps48DZZwZLt 9w9500xi3F4DJxtcaqVZuNPNifbDNqE8Qk1r3vqJcbNaMRYakZLAmPMxoA4Oyp/l phPB7ggRJ9GohPrTwls0 =qtDu -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From peter at digitalbrains.com Sun May 6 20:15:19 2012 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Sun, 06 May 2012 20:15:19 +0200 Subject: Why the "--export-secret-key" switch is not listed in help screen? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <4FA6BFB7.2070708@digitalbrains.com> It does say in the "gpg --help" output: > (See the man page for a complete listing of all commands and options) There are many more options and also commands in the full man(ual) page. I suppose it was thought that exporting a private key was such a relatively "rarely used" command it did not need to be among the most used commands listed by "--help". Or it was simply an oversight :). Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at http://wwwhome.cs.utwente.nl/~lebbing/pubkey.txt From mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com Sun May 6 20:28:41 2012 From: mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com (Mika Suomalainen) Date: Sun, 06 May 2012 21:28:41 +0300 Subject: Why the "--export-secret-key" switch is not listed in help screen? In-Reply-To: <4FA6BFB7.2070708@digitalbrains.com> References: <4FA6BFB7.2070708@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <4FA6C2D9.3080705@hotmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 06.05.2012 21:15, Peter Lebbing kirjoitti: > It does say in the "gpg --help" output: > >> (See the man page for a complete listing of all commands and >> options) > > There are many more options and also commands in the full man(ual) > page. I suppose it was thought that exporting a private key was > such a relatively "rarely used" command it did not need to be among > the most used commands listed by "--help". Or it was simply an > oversight :). > > Peter. > It shouldn't be rarely used. The first thing to do after creating a key should be backing it up somewhere just in case something happens someday in my opinion. - -- Mika Suomalainen gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net --recv-keys 4DB53CFE82A46728 Key fingerprint = 24BC 1573 B8EE D666 D10A AA65 4DB5 3CFE 82A4 6728 http://mkaysi.github.com/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.19 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJPpsLXAAoJEE21PP6CpGcozOkQALBCYyfX9rSX+boJm4kh9be3 q/ICyI8gneav+kYciYtTYTBPDx+V8mUlxc7DuMm/e0XsUBwI9wfvXHq0Hz9hDMm/ AzNA3X8Kt+LhbdNDRYlgeUk0HE/OPkmVkTcRz/9ETKReUmw0I3bRkskCM9wawWiY Etbb6py36eB57md1/BSiqdABM3gm2Snaaow0DEmNjPE/WXGdp1R+Vn0LYzvFuBOU 31CI29tRi9XdiVqi+GxEUDkNWFW5hu1s5mmYULdamBpztHisK78xFvviFu7Akr/j Tz5AmKQY6iL7Kj2xDMnrHKK3Fzin9FTUV99FrCUnY4LuZaHKx6iSNCV0F3rJvnQv Zs6QTZTombFsujz3XfnAKE7BWKLwS7qmcb9n50kRVnizepS16pIaeReq5UrKJFrY KeOn6qmfk9iEl4XLjLo+xkIXM/yYsbmMVtum1sK/7HjHu6NtIgSkl/kxBLxPMse/ 63ct5yhsBm6OuocKesrO9W4FGoJ3O5+GU2JQkyD+zPRNCMRgXn8Z8Mur+Xnwr2tz CJ3PczZ4G44Fs7SGq1gyTkg0fgAd9zpxkVBSijnXzJMsIbfieo+IJdIRsnsz2N7D 8xduLnDFkbHDqOYnyTWaGljSxl+yLJ4tRAIm64fPomaDJyO3e1QTylfKqesID6Qd t/vrCBAsMBRwhwY+XqMf =ZPTC -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From dgbaley27 at 0x01b.net Sun May 6 22:29:20 2012 From: dgbaley27 at 0x01b.net (Matthew Monaco) Date: Sun, 06 May 2012 14:29:20 -0600 Subject: importing new uid (offline master key setup) Message-ID: <4FA6DF20.2010400@0x01b.net> On my running system, I keep the public portions of the master key (certify only) and subkey (combined encrypt and sign). I only keep the private portion of the sub key. Recently, I added a UID to the offline copy of my .gnupg directory. Importing the UID into the pubring was simple enough, but I'm having trouble importing the new UID into my secring. Is this supported? Am I going to have the same problems if I change the expiration date on either the master key or a subkey? Thanks, Matt From John at enigmail.net Mon May 7 01:44:34 2012 From: John at enigmail.net (John Clizbe) Date: Sun, 06 May 2012 18:44:34 -0500 Subject: Why the "--export-secret-key" switch is not listed in help screen? In-Reply-To: <4FA6C2D9.3080705@hotmail.com> References: <4FA6BFB7.2070708@digitalbrains.com> <4FA6C2D9.3080705@hotmail.com> Message-ID: <4FA70CE2.2040907@enigmail.net> Mika Suomalainen wrote: > 06.05.2012 21:15, Peter Lebbing kirjoitti: >> It does say in the "gpg --help" output: > >>> (See the man page for a complete listing of all commands and >>> options) > >> There are many more options and also commands in the full man(ual) >> page. I suppose it was thought that exporting a private key was >> such a relatively "rarely used" command it did not need to be among >> the most used commands listed by "--help". Or it was simply an >> oversight :). > >> Peter. > > > It shouldn't be rarely used. The first thing to do after creating a > key should be backing it up somewhere just in case something happens > someday in my opinion. I've heard rumor that Werner and Co. gratefully welcome patch submissions, especially so, for documentation issues, IMNSHO I've even had some code patches accepted. :-) Did you mean to attach a patch correcting this, or did it get stripped off by some poorly behaved MTA? -John -- John P. Clizbe Inet: John (a) Gingerbear DAWT net SKS/Enigmail/PGP-EKP or: John ( @ ) Enigmail DAWT net FSF Assoc #995 / FSFE Fellow #1797 hkp://keyserver.gingerbear.net or mailto:pgp-public-keys at gingerbear.net?subject=HELP Q:"Just how do the residents of Haiku, Hawai'i hold conversations?" A:"An odd melody / island voices on the winds / surplus of vowels" -- John P. Clizbe Inet:John (a) Mozilla-Enigmail.org FSF Assoc #995 / FSFE Fellow #1797 hkp://keyserver.gingerbear.net or mailto:pgp-public-keys at gingerbear.net?subject=HELP Q:"Just how do the residents of Haiku, Hawai'i hold conversations?" A:"An odd melody / island voices on the winds / surplus of vowels" -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 501 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From wk at gnupg.org Mon May 7 09:47:58 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Mon, 07 May 2012 09:47:58 +0200 Subject: SSH Agent keys >4096 bit? In-Reply-To: <4FA43245.1030209@dougbarton.us> (Doug Barton's message of "Fri, 04 May 2012 12:47:17 -0700") References: <4FA32ADC.8080607@enigmail.net> <87d36k9vx1.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FA3EEEC.9070702@dougbarton.us> <87ipgb98mn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FA43245.1030209@dougbarton.us> Message-ID: <878vh477pt.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Fri, 4 May 2012 21:47, dougb at dougbarton.us said: > only use 1.4 as a result already. The thing that will kill 2.1 for me is > the removal of the multiple public keyring functionality. Frankly I doubt that we will be able to remove the latter for 2.1 ;-). Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From wk at gnupg.org Mon May 7 10:13:40 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Mon, 07 May 2012 10:13:40 +0200 Subject: SSH Agent keys >4096 bit? In-Reply-To: <4FA4FC3A.1030909@digitalbrains.com> (Peter Lebbing's message of "Sat, 05 May 2012 12:08:58 +0200") References: <1434887.kcK6zIOEg5@bursa01> <87havw9wam.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <3327457.JrFl41MfE4@bursa01> <4FA3CE3F.3000804@sixdemonbag.org> <4FA3E517.7070408@oneiroi.net> <4FA3F229.9000501@sixdemonbag.org> <4FA43D75.8030200@oneiroi.net> <4FA4FC3A.1030909@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <874nrs76iz.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Sat, 5 May 2012 12:08, peter at digitalbrains.com said: > Why should the GnuPG authors include a feature they don't believe in? If > it's in GnuPG official, it will need to be supported. What if there is It is marketing again. PGP started to use AES-256 for marketing reasons and thus we more or less forced to do include support for AES-256. We initially even did not put AES-256 on top of the cipher preferences, but we even had to change even this: /* The rationale why we use the order AES256,192,128 is for compatibility reasons with PGP. If gpg would define AES128 first, we would get the somewhat confusing situation: gpg -r pgpkey -r gpgkey ---gives--> AES256 gpg -r gpgkey -r pgpkey ---gives--> AES Note that by using --personal-cipher-preferences it is possible to prefer AES128. */ > And you seem to forget that when you use GnuPG with (for example) 4k > keys, the 4k key is simply not the weakest link! This has been said already. Exactly. > data is that valuable, keep it to yourself. Don't give even the > encrypted variant to your enemy. Because your formidable enemy will know > of a way to decrypt it without breaking your 8k key. Well, even the former option is subject to a pretty cheap rubber hose cryptanalysis. It all depends on your threat model. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From wk at gnupg.org Mon May 7 10:21:56 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Mon, 07 May 2012 10:21:56 +0200 Subject: SSH Agent keys >4096 bit? In-Reply-To: <4FA570FE.3010606@oneiroi.net> (Milo's message of "Sat, 05 May 2012 20:27:10 +0200") References: <4FA430E5.8030104@digitalbrains.com> <9367773.adnsgCOs15@bursa01> <4FA56B58.6060101@digitalbrains.com> <4FA570FE.3010606@oneiroi.net> Message-ID: <87zk9k5rkr.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Sat, 5 May 2012 20:27, gnupg at oneiroi.net said: > Hm, shouldn't authentication happen before exchanging key for > symmetric part of encryption during the SSH session? No, DH is commonly (and by SSH) used as a key agreement protocol. This means that N and only N communication peers agree on a shared session key. It can't avoid a MitM attack and thus an additional authentication step is required. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From wk at gnupg.org Mon May 7 10:26:56 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Mon, 07 May 2012 10:26:56 +0200 Subject: non-interactive expiration of a key using --batch? In-Reply-To: <87lil7d11d.fsf@pip.fifthhorseman.net> (Daniel Kahn Gillmor's message of "Fri, 04 May 2012 18:38:54 -0400") References: <87lil7d11d.fsf@pip.fifthhorseman.net> Message-ID: <87vck85rcf.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Sat, 5 May 2012 00:38, dkg at fifthhorseman.net said: > Any ideas what's going on here? Am i wrong to try to use --batch in > this instance? It would be useful to add --status-fd 2, so that you can see what gpg actually expects as user/batch input. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From wk at gnupg.org Mon May 7 10:32:30 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Mon, 07 May 2012 10:32:30 +0200 Subject: importing new uid (offline master key setup) In-Reply-To: <4FA6DF20.2010400@0x01b.net> (Matthew Monaco's message of "Sun, 06 May 2012 14:29:20 -0600") References: <4FA6DF20.2010400@0x01b.net> Message-ID: <87mx5k5r35.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Sun, 6 May 2012 22:29, dgbaley27 at 0x01b.net said: > Is this supported? Am I going to have the same problems if I change the No. You don't need it. However, GnuPG 2.1 kind of supports this because it drops the secring entirely and thus there is no more need trying to keep pubring and secring in sync. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From wk at gnupg.org Mon May 7 10:30:30 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Mon, 07 May 2012 10:30:30 +0200 Subject: Why the "--export-secret-key" switch is not listed in help screen? In-Reply-To: <4FA6BFB7.2070708@digitalbrains.com> (Peter Lebbing's message of "Sun, 06 May 2012 20:15:19 +0200") References: <4FA6BFB7.2070708@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <87r4uw5r6h.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Sun, 6 May 2012 20:15, peter at digitalbrains.com said: > I suppose it was thought that exporting a private key was such a > relatively "rarely used" command it did not need to be among the most It is also possible that I did not list it with --help so that the user is required to read the full blurb: --export-secret-keys --export-secret-subkeys Same as --export, but exports the secret keys instead. This is normally not very useful and a security risk. The second form of the command has the special property to render the secret part of the primary key useless; this is a GNU extension to OpenPGP and other implementations can not be expected to successfully import such a key. See the option --simple-sk-checksum if you want to import such an exported key with an older OpenPGP implementation. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From peter at digitalbrains.com Mon May 7 11:12:55 2012 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Mon, 07 May 2012 11:12:55 +0200 Subject: Why the "--export-secret-key" switch is not listed in help screen? In-Reply-To: <87r4uw5r6h.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <4FA6BFB7.2070708@digitalbrains.com> <87r4uw5r6h.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <4FA79217.6090706@digitalbrains.com> On 07/05/12 10:30, Werner Koch wrote: > On Sun, 6 May 2012 20:15, peter at digitalbrains.com said: >> I suppose it was thought > > It is also possible that I Haha! Nice one :) Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at http://wwwhome.cs.utwente.nl/~lebbing/pubkey.txt From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Mon May 7 15:16:46 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Mon, 07 May 2012 09:16:46 -0400 Subject: SSH Agent keys >4096 bit? In-Reply-To: <874nrs76iz.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <1434887.kcK6zIOEg5@bursa01> <87havw9wam.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <3327457.JrFl41MfE4@bursa01> <4FA3CE3F.3000804@sixdemonbag.org> <4FA3E517.7070408@oneiroi.net> <4FA3F229.9000501@sixdemonbag.org> <4FA43D75.8030200@oneiroi.net> <4FA4FC3A.1030909@digitalbrains.com> <874nrs76iz.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <4FA7CB3E.1020605@sixdemonbag.org> On 05/07/2012 04:13 AM, Werner Koch wrote: > It is marketing again. PGP started to use AES-256 for marketing reasons > and thus we more or less forced to do include support for AES-256. Minor correction: PGP first started using Twofish-256 for marketing reasons. The AES competition was in full swing and PGP Security believed Twofish was going to be the winner, so Twofish-256 was introduced for marketing reasons. This was in PGP 7.0, if memory serves. Once Rijndael was selected, it was introduced in PGP 7.1. From dkg at fifthhorseman.net Mon May 7 16:31:24 2012 From: dkg at fifthhorseman.net (Daniel Kahn Gillmor) Date: Mon, 07 May 2012 10:31:24 -0400 Subject: non-interactive expiration of a key using --batch? In-Reply-To: <87vck85rcf.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <87lil7d11d.fsf@pip.fifthhorseman.net> <87vck85rcf.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <4FA7DCBC.9090204@fifthhorseman.net> On 05/07/2012 04:26 AM, Werner Koch wrote: > On Sat, 5 May 2012 00:38, dkg at fifthhorseman.net said: > >> Any ideas what's going on here? Am i wrong to try to use --batch in >> this instance? > > It would be useful to add --status-fd 2, so that you can see what gpg > actually expects as user/batch input. here you go, with --status-fd 2 (wrapped in --list-keys so you can see that the expiration date doesn't change): ----------------------- 0 wt215 at pip:~$ gpg --list-keys test at example.org pub 1024R/20819466 2012-05-03 [expires: 2012-07-09] uid blab blab (DO NOT USE!) 0 wt215 at pip:~$ printf "10w\nsave\n" | gpg --batch --passphrase-fd 3 --command-fd 0 --status-fd=2 --edit-key test at example.org expire 3 Changing expiration time for the primary key. Please specify how long the key should be valid. 0 = key does not expire = key expires in n days w = key expires in n weeks m = key expires in n months y = key expires in n years [GNUPG:] GET_LINE keygen.valid [GNUPG:] GOT_IT Key expires at Mon 16 Jul 2012 10:29:02 AM EDT [GNUPG:] USERID_HINT 34759F1120819466 blab blab (DO NOT USE!) [GNUPG:] NEED_PASSPHRASE 34759F1120819466 34759F1120819466 1 0 [GNUPG:] GOOD_PASSPHRASE pub 1024R/20819466 created: 2012-05-03 expires: 2012-07-16 usage: SC trust: ultimate validity: ultimate [ultimate] (1). blab blab (DO NOT USE!) 0 wt215 at pip:~$ gpg --list-keys test at example.org pub 1024R/20819466 2012-05-03 [expires: 2012-07-09] uid blab blab (DO NOT USE!) 0 wt215 at pip:~$ ------------------------- I don't see anything in the --status-fd output that gives me more of a clue, unfortunately. Any pointers? --dkg -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 1030 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From wk at gnupg.org Mon May 7 17:18:05 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Mon, 07 May 2012 17:18:05 +0200 Subject: non-interactive expiration of a key using --batch? In-Reply-To: <4FA7DCBC.9090204@fifthhorseman.net> (Daniel Kahn Gillmor's message of "Mon, 07 May 2012 10:31:24 -0400") References: <87lil7d11d.fsf@pip.fifthhorseman.net> <87vck85rcf.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FA7DCBC.9090204@fifthhorseman.net> Message-ID: <87wr4o3tqq.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Mon, 7 May 2012 16:31, dkg at fifthhorseman.net said: > I don't see anything in the --status-fd output that gives me more of a > clue, unfortunately. I need to debug it later this evening. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From rychitre at yahoo.com Mon May 7 18:54:53 2012 From: rychitre at yahoo.com (Rupali Chitre) Date: Mon, 7 May 2012 09:54:53 -0700 (PDT) Subject: secret key not found In-Reply-To: <1336271288.77579.YahooMailClassic@web160902.mail.bf1.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <1336409693.41075.YahooMailClassic@web160901.mail.bf1.yahoo.com> It gives below error. Why it is looking in 'C:/Documents and Settings/Default User/Application'?? Can someone help on this? ? gpg: keyblock resource `C:/Documents and Settings/Default User/Application Data/gnupg/temporary': No such file or directory gpg: encrypted with RSA key, ID XXXXX gpg: encrypted with RSA key, ID YYYYY gpg: decryption failed: No secret key --- On Sat, 5/5/12, Rupali Chitre wrote: From: Rupali Chitre Subject: Re: secret key not found To: "Hauke Laging" Date: Saturday, May 5, 2012, 10:28 PM Application runs under different user id. What is chroot? It is windows environment. --- On Fri, 5/4/12, Hauke Laging wrote: From: Hauke Laging Subject: Re: secret key not found To: gnupg-users at gnupg.org Date: Friday, May 4, 2012, 6:48 PM Am Fr 04.05.2012, 12:18:40 schrieb Rupali Chitre: > But the same command when I call from application (Informatica), it gives > below error. > >>gpg: encrypted with RSA key, ID AAAAAA > >? ???gpg: decryption failed: No secret key Does the application run under the same user ID or in a chroot environment? Hauke -- PGP: D44C 6A5B 71B0 427C CED3 025C BD7D 6D27 ECCB 5814 -----Inline Attachment Follows----- _______________________________________________ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users at gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users It runs with -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From wk at gnupg.org Mon May 7 20:47:06 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Mon, 07 May 2012 20:47:06 +0200 Subject: non-interactive expiration of a key using --batch? In-Reply-To: <4FA7DCBC.9090204@fifthhorseman.net> (Daniel Kahn Gillmor's message of "Mon, 07 May 2012 10:31:24 -0400") References: <87lil7d11d.fsf@pip.fifthhorseman.net> <87vck85rcf.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FA7DCBC.9090204@fifthhorseman.net> Message-ID: <87ipg74ymt.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Hi, the problem you have is that you mix commands on the command line and those from stdin. If you replace $ printf "10w\nsave\n" | gpg --batch --passphrase-fd 3 \ --command-fd 0 --status-fd=2 --edit-key test at example.org expire 3 (Rupali Chitre's message of "Mon, 7 May 2012 09:54:53 -0700 (PDT)") References: <1336409693.41075.YahooMailClassic@web160901.mail.bf1.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <87ehqv4ybv.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Mon, 7 May 2012 18:54, rychitre at yahoo.com said: > It gives below error. Why it is looking in 'C:/Documents and > Settings/Default User/Application'?? Can someone help on this? Because that is the correct directory as told by your Windows version (by means of CSIDL_APPDATA) or configured by you: --homedir DIR Set the name of the home directory to DIR. If this option is not used, the home directory defaults to '~/.gnupg'. It is only recognized when given on the command line. It also overrides any home directory stated through the environment variable 'GNUPGHOME' or (on W32 systems) by means of the Registry entry 'HKCU\Software\GNU\GnuPG:HomeDir'. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From rychitre at yahoo.com Tue May 8 00:08:44 2012 From: rychitre at yahoo.com (Rupali Chitre) Date: Mon, 7 May 2012 15:08:44 -0700 (PDT) Subject: secret key not found In-Reply-To: <87ehqv4ybv.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <1336428524.66945.YahooMailClassic@web160906.mail.bf1.yahoo.com> It still gives same error. I added '--homedir DIR ' in command. ? echo paraphrase|gpg.exe --homedir DIR --batch? --secret-keyring temporary? --passphrase-fd 0 --decrypt-files E:\a.txt.gpg gpg: keyblock resource `DIR/secring.gpg': No such file or directory gpg: keyblock resource `DIR/temporary': No such file or directory gpg: keyblock resource `DIR/pubring.gpg': No such file or directory gpg: encrypted with RSA key, ID XXXXX gpg: encrypted with RSA key, ID YYYY gpg: decryption failed: No secret key --- On Mon, 5/7/12, Werner Koch wrote: From: Werner Koch Subject: Re: secret key not found To: "Rupali Chitre" Cc: "Hauke Laging" , Gnupg-users at gnupg.org Date: Monday, May 7, 2012, 2:53 PM On Mon,? 7 May 2012 18:54, rychitre at yahoo.com said: > It gives below error. Why it is looking in 'C:/Documents and > Settings/Default User/Application'?? Can someone help on this? Because that is the correct directory as told by your Windows version (by means of CSIDL_APPDATA) or configured by you: ? --homedir DIR ? Set the name of the home directory to DIR. If this option is not used, ? the home directory defaults to '~/.gnupg'.? It is only recognized when ? given on the command line.? It also overrides any home directory ? stated through the environment variable 'GNUPGHOME' or (on W32 ? systems) by means of the Registry entry ? 'HKCU\Software\GNU\GnuPG:HomeDir'. Salam-Shalom, ???Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei.? Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From dougb at dougbarton.us Tue May 8 01:09:21 2012 From: dougb at dougbarton.us (Doug Barton) Date: Mon, 07 May 2012 16:09:21 -0700 Subject: SSH Agent keys >4096 bit? In-Reply-To: <878vh477pt.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <4FA32ADC.8080607@enigmail.net> <87d36k9vx1.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FA3EEEC.9070702@dougbarton.us> <87ipgb98mn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FA43245.1030209@dougbarton.us> <878vh477pt.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <4FA85621.7080101@dougbarton.us> On 05/07/2012 00:47, Werner Koch wrote: > On Fri, 4 May 2012 21:47, dougb at dougbarton.us said: > >> only use 1.4 as a result already. The thing that will kill 2.1 for me is >> the removal of the multiple public keyring functionality. > > Frankly I doubt that we will be able to remove the latter for 2.1 ;-). Awesome. :) Doug -- If you're never wrong, you're not trying hard enough From wk at gnupg.org Tue May 8 11:31:52 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Tue, 08 May 2012 11:31:52 +0200 Subject: secret key not found In-Reply-To: <1336428524.66945.YahooMailClassic@web160906.mail.bf1.yahoo.com> (Rupali Chitre's message of "Mon, 7 May 2012 15:08:44 -0700 (PDT)") References: <1336428524.66945.YahooMailClassic@web160906.mail.bf1.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <874nrr3to7.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Tue, 8 May 2012 00:08, rychitre at yahoo.com said: > gpg: keyblock resource `DIR/secring.gpg': No such file or directory > gpg: keyblock resource `DIR/temporary': No such file or directory > gpg: keyblock resource `DIR/pubring.gpg': No such file or directory I suggest that you import the keys first. Why do you define a second secret keyring (temporary) which does not exists? You may also want to read one of the HOWTO documents at http://gnupg.org/documentation/howtos.en.html first. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From peter at digitalbrains.com Tue May 8 12:12:58 2012 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Tue, 08 May 2012 12:12:58 +0200 Subject: secret key not found In-Reply-To: <1336428524.66945.YahooMailClassic@web160906.mail.bf1.yahoo.com> References: <1336428524.66945.YahooMailClassic@web160906.mail.bf1.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <4FA8F1AA.8000607@digitalbrains.com> On 08/05/12 00:08, Rupali Chitre wrote: > It still gives same error. I added '--homedir DIR ' in command. > > > echo paraphrase|gpg.exe --homedir DIR --batch --secret-keyring temporary > --passphrase-fd 0 --decrypt-files E:\a.txt.gpg > gpg: keyblock resource `DIR/secring.gpg': No such file or directory > gpg: keyblock resource `DIR/temporary': No such file or directory > gpg: keyblock resource `DIR/pubring.gpg': No such file or directory Are you literally entering DIR? Because it was intended to be an indicator that that is the place you should place the wanted directory name, as in for example[1]: --homedir "C:\Documents and Settings\Rupali\Application Data" or something similar. Peter. [1] I don't use Windows, so I might make a mistake in syntax or actual directory names or something like that -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at http://wwwhome.cs.utwente.nl/~lebbing/pubkey.txt From wk at gnupg.org Tue May 8 12:39:49 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Tue, 08 May 2012 12:39:49 +0200 Subject: [Announce] nPth - The New GNU Portable Threads Library Message-ID: <87zk9j2byi.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Hi! We are pleased to announce the first tarball release of the New GNU Portable Threads Library: nPth version 0.90. nPth is a non-preemptive threads implementation using an API very similar to the one known from GNU Pth. It has been designed as a replacement of GNU Pth for non-ancient operating systems. In contrast to GNU Pth is is based on the system's standard threads implementation. Thus nPth allows the use of libraries which are not compatible to GNU Pth. GNU Pth is often used to provide a co-routine based framework. GnuPG-2 makes heavy use of this concept for good audibility, general security concerns, and ease of implementation. However, GNU Pth has the drawback that ugly hacks are required to work with libraries which are not GNU Pth aware. The nPth tarball and its signature are available as ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/npth/npth-0.90.tar.bz2 ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/npth/npth-0.90.tar.bz2.sig and at all GnuPG mirrors. See the included README file and the npth.h header for documentation. Bug reports and requests for help should be send to the gnupg-devel mailing list at gnupg.org. nPth is available under the terms of the LGPLv3+ or the GPLv2+. The GIT repository is at git://git.gnupg.org/npth.git . The current development version of GnuPG (2.1) has already been migrated to nPth and thus the next beta release will require it. Obviously we expect to fix some portability problems before we can release 1.0. On common Linux and kFreeBSD systems and even on Android, nPth should build and work fine. Background: When porting GnuPG-2 to Windows in 2004, we had the need for a replacement of GNU Pth, which is not available for native Windows. We came up with an emulation based on the native Windows thread system. Experience since then showed that such an emulation is a solid way to provide a co-routine based framework. Given that thread implementations (in particular pthreads) are now in common use on all platforms, there is not must justification left for not using them: Without considering the GnuPG packages, Debian has only two packages requiring GNU Pth (zhcon and jabberd14 - the latter even seems not in wide use anymore). Many thanks to Ralf S. Engelschall for his excellent GNU PTH library, which served GnuPG very well for many years. Happy hacking, Marcus and Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 207 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- _______________________________________________ Gnupg-announce mailing list Gnupg-announce at gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-announce From johnmurphy at secure-mail.biz Mon May 7 22:52:35 2012 From: johnmurphy at secure-mail.biz (Secure-Mail User) Date: Mon, 07 May 2012 22:52:35 +0200 Subject: Symmetric encryption using multiple keys Message-ID: <40ad29a6c8cb0619215cfbc816257bbb@mail.secure-mail.biz> An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Tue May 8 16:41:59 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Tue, 08 May 2012 10:41:59 -0400 Subject: Symmetric encryption using multiple keys In-Reply-To: <40ad29a6c8cb0619215cfbc816257bbb@mail.secure-mail.biz> References: <40ad29a6c8cb0619215cfbc816257bbb@mail.secure-mail.biz> Message-ID: <4FA930B7.5020009@sixdemonbag.org> On 05/07/2012 04:52 PM, Secure-Mail User wrote: > How can I encrypt data with multiple symmetric keys?(If gpg2 does not > work, I would be happy to hear alternatives) This is not possible. Symmetric encryption uses one key and only one key. From rychitre at yahoo.com Tue May 8 15:48:45 2012 From: rychitre at yahoo.com (Rupali Chitre) Date: Tue, 8 May 2012 06:48:45 -0700 (PDT) Subject: secret key not found In-Reply-To: <4FA8F1AA.8000607@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <1336484925.1635.YahooMailClassic@web160903.mail.bf1.yahoo.com> I am running simple command 'gpg --decrypt E:\a.txt.gpg'. It runs successfully from command prompt, but when I run from application it gives below error. Why it is saying 'No secret key'. How to fix this? It is the same environment. gpg: encrypted with RSA key, ID BA041825 gpg: decryption failed: No secret key --- On Tue, 5/8/12, Peter Lebbing wrote: From: Peter Lebbing Subject: Re: secret key not found To: "Rupali Chitre" Cc: Gnupg-users at gnupg.org Date: Tuesday, May 8, 2012, 6:12 AM On 08/05/12 00:08, Rupali Chitre wrote: > It still gives same error. I added '--homedir DIR ' in command. >? > > echo paraphrase|gpg.exe --homedir DIR --batch? --secret-keyring temporary > --passphrase-fd 0 --decrypt-files E:\a.txt.gpg > gpg: keyblock resource `DIR/secring.gpg': No such file or directory > gpg: keyblock resource `DIR/temporary': No such file or directory > gpg: keyblock resource `DIR/pubring.gpg': No such file or directory Are you literally entering DIR? Because it was intended to be an indicator that that is the place you should place the wanted directory name, as in for example[1]: --homedir "C:\Documents and Settings\Rupali\Application Data" or something similar. Peter. [1] I don't use Windows, so I might make a mistake in syntax or actual directory names or something like that -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at http://wwwhome.cs.utwente.nl/~lebbing/pubkey.txt -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rychitre at yahoo.com Tue May 8 18:08:17 2012 From: rychitre at yahoo.com (Rupali Chitre) Date: Tue, 8 May 2012 09:08:17 -0700 (PDT) Subject: secret key not found In-Reply-To: <874nrr3to7.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <1336493297.24189.YahooMailClassic@web160906.mail.bf1.yahoo.com> After importing keys, I am able to decrypt files. Thanks a lot. --- On Tue, 5/8/12, Werner Koch wrote: From: Werner Koch Subject: Re: secret key not found To: "Rupali Chitre" Cc: Gnupg-users at gnupg.org Date: Tuesday, May 8, 2012, 5:31 AM On Tue,? 8 May 2012 00:08, rychitre at yahoo.com said: > gpg: keyblock resource `DIR/secring.gpg': No such file or directory > gpg: keyblock resource `DIR/temporary': No such file or directory > gpg: keyblock resource `DIR/pubring.gpg': No such file or directory I suggest that you import the keys first.? Why do you define a second secret keyring (temporary) which does not exists? You may also want to read one of the HOWTO documents at http://gnupg.org/documentation/howtos.en.html first. Shalom-Salam, ???Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei.? Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From wk at gnupg.org Tue May 8 19:12:05 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Tue, 08 May 2012 19:12:05 +0200 Subject: Symmetric encryption using multiple keys In-Reply-To: <4FA930B7.5020009@sixdemonbag.org> (Robert J. Hansen's message of "Tue, 08 May 2012 10:41:59 -0400") References: <40ad29a6c8cb0619215cfbc816257bbb@mail.secure-mail.biz> <4FA930B7.5020009@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <87r4uu38d6.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Tue, 8 May 2012 16:41, rjh at sixdemonbag.org said: > Symmetric encryption uses one key and only one key. In theory this is correct. However, OpenPGP uses a random session key and that key is in turn encrypted symmetrically. The protocol allows to mix arbitrary numbers of public and symmetric keys. GnuPG should be able to decrypt such messages but encryption is only possible with one symmetric key (and optionally several public keys). The problem is to find a good way to pass several symmetric keys. Given that public keys are much simpler to use, I never considered to implement multiple symmetric keys. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From lopaki at gmail.com Wed May 9 18:40:30 2012 From: lopaki at gmail.com (Scott Lambdin) Date: Wed, 9 May 2012 12:40:30 -0400 Subject: Key in keyring signed but not valid? Message-ID: Good day: --list-sig shows that a certain key is signed by the private key that signed all the other keys, but still --edit-key shows "Validity: unknown" Does anyone know how that can be? While investigating, the key in one keyring later turned to "Validity: Full", seemingly without our issuing any commands that would have caused it to change. In another keyring, that key remains "Validty: Unknown." --Scott -- Eat like you give a damn. Go vegan. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From guyome at lechiennoir.net Wed May 9 22:15:05 2012 From: guyome at lechiennoir.net (Guillaume Lanquepin-Chesnais) Date: Wed, 09 May 2012 22:15:05 +0200 Subject: x509 and openGPG smartcard Message-ID: <1336594505.2594.7.camel@guyome-laptop> Hello, I've just bought a Gemalto USB Shell Token V2 and openGPG smartcard. I successfully get it work on Ubuntu 12.04 (gnupgp 2.0.17) without any problem. However, I can't store a x509 certificate on the smartcard. I get a certificate from Cacert that I converted with gpgsm gpgsm --import guyome.p12 gpgsm -o guyome.pem --export -a XXXXXX Then I edit the smartcard gpg2 --card-edit and I import the certificate on the smartcard gpg/card> admin Les commandes d'administration sont permises gpg/card> writecert 3 < guyome.pem Up to now, I did not get any error message. But If do gpg/card> readcert 3 > test.pem gpg: error reading certificate from card: Not Found gpg/card> writecert 3 < guyome.pem gpg: error writing certificate to card: General Erreur It seems that I can't write the certificate to the smartcard. Is it a bug or did I made a mistake? BTW, I get the same error on Fedora 16.. Regards, Guillaume From wk at gnupg.org Thu May 10 13:09:48 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Thu, 10 May 2012 13:09:48 +0200 Subject: x509 and openGPG smartcard In-Reply-To: <1336594505.2594.7.camel@guyome-laptop> (Guillaume Lanquepin-Chesnais's message of "Wed, 09 May 2012 22:15:05 +0200") References: <1336594505.2594.7.camel@guyome-laptop> Message-ID: <87mx5g1edf.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Wed, 9 May 2012 22:15, guyome at lechiennoir.net said: > It seems that I can't write the certificate to the smartcard. > Is it a bug or did I made a mistake? BTW, I get the same error on Fedora 16.. I don't know. I only implemented it once and never used. There is no need for it in GnuPG. To debug it you should put debug 2048 debug 1024 log-file /foor/bar/scd.log into scdaemon.log and run gpgconf --reload scdaemon to restart scdaemon. Take care: debug 2048 may also log your PIN. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From simon at josefsson.org Thu May 10 13:29:41 2012 From: simon at josefsson.org (Simon Josefsson) Date: Thu, 10 May 2012 13:29:41 +0200 Subject: x509 and openGPG smartcard In-Reply-To: <1336594505.2594.7.camel__5758.79436587474$1336597917$gmane$org@guyome-laptop> (Guillaume Lanquepin-Chesnais's message of "Wed, 09 May 2012 22:15:05 +0200") References: <1336594505.2594.7.camel__5758.79436587474$1336597917$gmane$org@guyome-laptop> Message-ID: <87y5p0clzu.fsf@latte.josefsson.org> Guillaume Lanquepin-Chesnais writes: > Hello, > > I've just bought a Gemalto USB Shell Token V2 and openGPG smartcard. I > successfully get it work on Ubuntu 12.04 (gnupgp 2.0.17) without any > problem. However, I > can't store a x509 certificate on the smartcard. I thought OpenPGP cards didn't support storing X.509 certs? /Simon From wk at gnupg.org Thu May 10 13:44:10 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Thu, 10 May 2012 13:44:10 +0200 Subject: x509 and openGPG smartcard In-Reply-To: <87y5p0clzu.fsf@latte.josefsson.org> (Simon Josefsson's message of "Thu, 10 May 2012 13:29:41 +0200") References: <1336594505.2594.7.camel__5758.79436587474$1336597917$gmane$org@guyome-laptop> <87y5p0clzu.fsf@latte.josefsson.org> Message-ID: <87ehqs1cs5.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Thu, 10 May 2012 13:29, simon at josefsson.org said: > I thought OpenPGP cards didn't support storing X.509 certs? There was some spare space on the new chips and thus the specs allow for an optional field to store a certificate (or any other data) . GnuPG 1.4 does not support it. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From avi.wiki at gmail.com Mon May 14 18:05:08 2012 From: avi.wiki at gmail.com (Avi) Date: Mon, 14 May 2012 12:05:08 -0400 Subject: GPG 1.4.x, 2.x, ECC, and portability Message-ID: -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 In one of the recent, longer, threads, it was my understanding that Werner said that the 1.4.x branch of GnuPG will not be updated to have ECC capabilities, and may eventually be "put into runoff" as it were. Werner, may I request that you confirm or refute that? Assuming that is the case, it means those of us using 1.4.x need to move to 2.x to use ECC. In and of itself that shouldn't be an issue. What concerns me is that, and perhaps this is due solely to ignorance, it appears to me that GnuPG 2.0 for Windows cannot be installed in a solely portable fashion the way that 1.4.12 can. I do not wish to get into the debate about the benefits of having ones GnuPG installation on a USB stick, keyloggers, rootkits, and the overall safety of all of the above. If for whatever reason there are people who wish to have a completely self-contained Windows installation of GnuPG on a flashdrive (and not one built-in like crypto drive, which cannot use ECC now anyway) is there 1) any way that can be done, and if not, 2) any possibility that someone other than Werner would consider folding the code into 1.4.x? I am not a programmer by a long shot, and this would so far out of my league as to be functionally impossible, so I cannot volunteer to do anything, unfortunately; merely piggyback off of the expertise of others, I am afraid. Thank you, Avi -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (MingW32) - GPGshell v3.78 Comment: Most recent key: Click show in box @ http://is.gd/4xJrs iL4EAREKAGYFAk+v/81fGGh0dHA6Ly9rZXlzZXJ2ZXIudWJ1bnR1LmNvbS9wa3Mv bG9va3VwP29wPWdldCZoYXNoPW9uJmZpbmdlcnByaW50PW9uJnNlYXJjaD0weDBE NjJCMDE5RjgwRTI5RjkACgkQDWKwGfgOKfmx0QD9FCKt7218fnanMfVRUCpvATFN SpuUiCcfjpZ8gm9O7+EA/j5jXY6jKbR4YgVNeQNDeEuN4yYV5ls+71PNk1MrF05v =GM+F -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ---- User:Avraham pub 3072D/F80E29F9 1/30/2009 Avi (Wikimedia-related key) ?? Primary key fingerprint: 167C 063F 7981 A1F6 71EC ABAA 0D62 B019 F80E 29F9 From bernhard.reiter at intevation.de Fri May 11 23:17:57 2012 From: bernhard.reiter at intevation.de (Bernhard Reiter) Date: Fri, 11 May 2012 23:17:57 +0200 Subject: Python bindings for GnuPG Message-ID: <2927518.c3SSz3RRGp@kymo.gruen> For those of you seeking to use GnuPG from Python, there is an overview at http://wiki.python.org/moin/GnuPrivacyGuard I've just overhauled it. My recommendation currently is to use James Henstridge's PyGPGME. As it is actively maintained and even supports Python 3 and 2 since March. An interesting approach is W. Trevor King's pgp-mime which uses pyassuan to speak to gpgme-tool. Haven't tried it. Happy Hacking, Bernhard From wk at gnupg.org Mon May 14 23:19:03 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Mon, 14 May 2012 23:19:03 +0200 Subject: GPG 1.4.x, 2.x, ECC, and portability In-Reply-To: (Avi's message of "Mon, 14 May 2012 12:05:08 -0400") References: Message-ID: <873972xxyw.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Mon, 14 May 2012 18:05, avi.wiki at gmail.com said: > In one of the recent, longer, threads, it was my understanding > that Werner said that the 1.4.x branch of GnuPG will not be > updated to have ECC capabilities, and may eventually be "put > into runoff" as it were. Werner, may I request that you confirm > or refute that? Right, that is the current plan. Maintaining two stable branches is extremely time and thus cost intensive. Given that it is hard to find any financial funding for our work, we need to spend our time more effective. Consider that GnuPG-2 is more than 10 years old and 1.4 only 4 years older. I consider 2.0 more matured than 1.4. > Assuming that is the case, it means those of us using 1.4.x need > to move to 2.x to use ECC. In and of itself that shouldn't be an We try to make it as easy as possible. In 2.1 there is even a way to provide a passphrase to gpg-agent - without a need for Pinentry. > issue. What concerns me is that, and perhaps this is due solely > to ignorance, it appears to me that GnuPG 2.0 for Windows cannot > be installed in a solely portable fashion the way that 1.4.12 > can. I do not wish to get into the debate about the benefits of With gpgconf it is even easier to do this with 2.x. There is no need for a registry key for example. Obviously you need to set GNUPGHOME if you don't want to use the default home directory. > any possibility that someone other than Werner would consider > folding the code into 1.4.x? I am not a programmer by a long The major problem is not about writing the code in the first place, but to maintain it for the next couple of years if not decades. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From avi.wiki at gmail.com Mon May 14 23:53:21 2012 From: avi.wiki at gmail.com (Avi) Date: Mon, 14 May 2012 17:53:21 -0400 Subject: GPG 1.4.x, 2.x, ECC, and portability In-Reply-To: <873972xxyw.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <873972xxyw.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: On Mon, May 14, 2012 at 5:19 PM, Werner Koch wrote: > With gpgconf it is even easier to do this with 2.x. There is no need > for a registry key for example. Obviously you need to set GNUPGHOME if > you don't want to use the default home directory. Thank you, Werner. I've tried installing GPG4Win to my USB stick, and I cannot get anything to work, as I am not able to figure out how to us gpgconf to switch sysconfdir to my stick's drive, and everything else is failing due to not finding the corresponding drive on C: (which I do not want to exist). Am I just missing something simple? Thank you, Avi ---- User:Avraham pub 3072D/F80E29F9 1/30/2009 Avi (Wikimedia-related key) ?? Primary key fingerprint: 167C 063F 7981 A1F6 71EC ABAA 0D62 B019 F80E 29F9 From wk at gnupg.org Tue May 15 11:33:54 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Tue, 15 May 2012 11:33:54 +0200 Subject: GPG 1.4.x, 2.x, ECC, and portability In-Reply-To: (Avi's message of "Mon, 14 May 2012 17:53:21 -0400") References: <873972xxyw.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <87y5otwzy5.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Mon, 14 May 2012 23:53, avi.wiki at gmail.com said: > anything to work, as I am not able to figure out how to us gpgconf to > switch sysconfdir to my stick's drive, and everything else is failing The directory is determined by looking at CSIDL_COMMON_APPDATA. It seems you can change the value by changing the environment variable APPDATA. However, I am not sure whether this is a documented feature. A quick test shows that a wrong value for APPDATA returns an error and thus gnupg will use a value based on the actual modules directory. What do you think of an environment variable to explicitly force the use of the installation directory (i.e the USB stick). Instead of an envvar we could also check the presence of a marker file in the installation directory, to disable all use of default locations. Both things are easy to implement. I don't know how the USB stick approach works with the Outlook and Explorer plugins - they need to have registry entries. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From avi.wiki at gmail.com Tue May 15 16:50:46 2012 From: avi.wiki at gmail.com (Avi) Date: Tue, 15 May 2012 10:50:46 -0400 Subject: GPG 1.4.x, 2.x, ECC, and portability In-Reply-To: <87y5otwzy5.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <873972xxyw.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <87y5otwzy5.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: On Tue, May 15, 2012 at 5:33 AM, Werner Koch wrote: > On Mon, 14 May 2012 23:53, avi.wiki at gmail.com said: > >> anything to work, as I am not able to figure out how to us gpgconf to >> switch sysconfdir to my stick's drive, and everything else is failing > > The directory is determined by looking at CSIDL_COMMON_APPDATA. It > seems you can change the value by changing the environment variable > APPDATA. However, I am not sure whether this is a documented feature. Thank you; I didn't see this in the manual. I'm loathe to change it though as that probably affects many programs on the hosting computer, and may cause many other programs to go a bit haywire. > A quick test shows that a wrong value for APPDATA returns an error and > thus gnupg will use a value based on the actual modules directory. > > What do you think of an environment variable to explicitly force the use > of the installation directory (i.e the USB stick). Instead of an envvar > we could also check the presence of a marker file in the installation > directory, to disable all use of default locations. Both things are > easy to implement. Speaking for myself, I think I would prefer the latter to the former, as I would prefer to have a Windows installation that is (as much as possible) completely divorced from the hosting computer and results in a GnuPG installation that is as "portable" as possible between trusted computers. This would mean minimizing or eliminating any reference to environment variable OR having the launch of the program/GUI setting them temporarily each time if necessary. Allowing an option to have the home and other helper directories configured as a subfolder of the install directory on the install should be helpful as well. What I have now with 1.4.x is the ability to plug my stick into any trusted computer, fire up Truecrypt, mount the encrypted drive, and use a GUI to sign, encrypt, and decrypt the clipboard or files, manage keys (including signing, generating revoke certs, etc.) and pretty much using a GUI to handle most command-line actions of gpg. > I don't know how the USB stick approach works with the Outlook and > Explorer plugins - they need to have registry entries. Agreed. Having a portable installation would preclude integration with other programs, so the Outlook and Explorer extensions would not be installed in such a situation. In my current 1.4.12 install, for example, I do not have shell integration or plugins to other programs, which is fine, as who is to say that a program on trusted computer A is installed on trusted computer B. Once again, thank you. --Avi ---- User:Avraham pub 3072D/F80E29F9 1/30/2009 Avi (Wikimedia-related key) ?? Primary key fingerprint: 167C 063F 7981 A1F6 71EC ABAA 0D62 B019 F80E 29F9 From prakash at visataxes.com Tue May 15 17:51:02 2012 From: prakash at visataxes.com (Prakash Sankar) Date: Tue, 15 May 2012 11:51:02 -0400 Subject: Website link broken Message-ID: http://www.gnupg.org/related_software/frontends.html#mua *XFmail * http://xfmail.slappy.org/ The link above is broken it points to godaddy page now. Please fix or remove. Thanks Prakash -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From david at gbenet.com Tue May 15 22:21:13 2012 From: david at gbenet.com (david at gbenet.com) Date: Tue, 15 May 2012 21:21:13 +0100 Subject: Website link broken In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <4FB2BAB9.4020102@gbenet.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On 15/05/12 16:51, Prakash Sankar wrote: > http://www.gnupg.org/related_software/frontends.html#mua > > *XFmail * > > http://xfmail.slappy.org/ > > The link above is broken it points to godaddy page now. > > Please fix or remove. > > Thanks > > Prakash > > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users It works now :) David - -- ?See the sanity of the man! No gods, no angels, no demons, no body. Nothing of the kind.Stern, sane,every brain-cell perfect and complete even at the moment of death. No delusion.? https://linuxcounter.net/user/512854.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.16 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQEVAwUBT7K6ueJpqm7flRExAQEejAgAkt+1ncg7VhFIwkadm6jrQIuHDuFyE+52 k7kZ3KEdOYFDdbcCk6uXFf8IWjI1PTm/0b11ofcmm9s2WeGW6qqhOSCkNliBZNWx EyrNSxYoMQc6evWP+mHUcvwnd3v5QehB1JUJ9s1qCVFQMHpOcbvb+I8fBrO/RNZ3 MwP5KGmlNF9BneJksU4+iwutt/8S0bVZbAjD2S4N7NFvE/mpHtBOkkCiMR+jcCFk w2kr0Lz+lBdEbjguldrwPFlONTV4JXjFJ8bM8g8sqj/VO0VteKE13KP5OdVGWZoJ CxeY+KfbbpwTQEAwJASub35ujkgftKSgF+FaDg5dYufQsE1rxxmT5w== =GN7q -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From expires2012 at rocketmail.com Tue May 15 23:43:18 2012 From: expires2012 at rocketmail.com (MFPA) Date: Tue, 15 May 2012 22:43:18 +0100 Subject: Website link broken In-Reply-To: <4FB2BAB9.4020102@gbenet.com> References: <4FB2BAB9.4020102@gbenet.com> Message-ID: <455784756.20120515224318@my_localhost> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Hi On Tuesday 15 May 2012 at 9:21:13 PM, in , david at gbenet.com wrote: > It works now :) Not from here - I just visited http://xfmail.slappy.org/ and was served a "domain parked" holding page. - -- Best regards MFPA mailto:expires2012 at rocketmail.com Wait. You think I'm right? -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQCVAwUBT7LOA6ipC46tDG5pAQqvMQQAyHfV3G5xQ94b5nfUS+3eThbxAAbot3Ks ct7imvys177iPVrSNaBD3J0qivjX95G0W6xAxHXt+Uz1sGZX24qUr9zBj/kEDE// 5JIgl3bxg96pER2Au8/BF9Jsjv0RdifHfWpuj/pfI0ft0KKn7FKkBl/JzIbAfoKF rsiXrpazpPk= =mD5v -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From david at gbenet.com Wed May 16 08:33:12 2012 From: david at gbenet.com (david at gbenet.com) Date: Wed, 16 May 2012 07:33:12 +0100 Subject: Website link broken In-Reply-To: <455784756.20120515224318@my_localhost> References: <4FB2BAB9.4020102@gbenet.com> <455784756.20120515224318@my_localhost> Message-ID: <4FB34A28.7010602@gbenet.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On 15/05/12 22:43, MFPA wrote: > Hi > > > On Tuesday 15 May 2012 at 9:21:13 PM, in > , david at gbenet.com wrote: > > >> It works now :) > > Not from here - I just visited http://xfmail.slappy.org/ and was > served a "domain parked" holding page. > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users > How odd is that? I rechecked the link and it still works David - -- ?See the sanity of the man! No gods, no angels, no demons, no body. Nothing of the kind.Stern, sane,every brain-cell perfect and complete even at the moment of death. No delusion.? https://linuxcounter.net/user/512854.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.16 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQEVAwUBT7NKKOJpqm7flRExAQHFTwgAodLomaeNIG2W51ZGnlgi3yScqNcAkqzn 5X1+BmAZicTNEkAFYnzdL5i7G0YTAmh8VreNWdZPp8niXVU2YaoDVPeb3RKdeamZ tbBZaGrac17OCkWooh2Udpjf9KG7Fzj0nb9X6yV4ORiurZG3a6OY7uTx9yyfgkHH avtbH2ji4IjiKCFRc7LLXqCFFzlKI+ZRHdhBx9zwrLKSaoV7SIGfQPD5wzFj0kYo 1lYcjyipthxJEpQGNNo7uCGNRKRC2XD2ffNMtUK3CD5HEPCEFAG3fH4cgoMaupwU x1tGcbVhI6mRgEQ8k0bZF0qp1Cqy0LGW8a6FPV8Sil2Ht+FQiG2tog== =ZQ7R -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From hjyanghj at gmail.com Wed May 16 04:13:51 2012 From: hjyanghj at gmail.com (Yang Hon-Jang) Date: Wed, 16 May 2012 10:13:51 +0800 Subject: how to use samrtcard with PC/SC cardreader Message-ID: I am interested in NOT put private keys in disk. I like the idea, put private keys in smartcard. How to use the Fellowship Smartcarddescribe how to use OpenPGP card with gpg. But in section 2.3.2, PC/SC(Personal computer/Smart card), there are only two lines: >TODO >To use PC/SC make sure you disable CCID by passing the --disable-ccid option to GnuPG. My questions are: 1. If I use command gpg --disable-ccid I got message gpg: invalid option "--disable-ccid" (PS, I use GnuPG 2.0.17 in Windows 7) What is wrong? 2. Are GnuPG 2.0.17, Windows(Operation System), OpenPGP SmartCard V2,EZ 100 PU USB PC/SC IC card reader compatible ? Thanks. http://shop.kernelconcepts.de/product_info.php?products_id=42 -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From branko at majic.rs Wed May 16 09:47:53 2012 From: branko at majic.rs (=?UTF-8?B?0JHRgNCw0L3QutC+INCc0LDRmNC40Zs=?=) Date: Wed, 16 May 2012 09:47:53 +0200 Subject: Website link broken In-Reply-To: <4FB34A28.7010602@gbenet.com> References: <4FB2BAB9.4020102@gbenet.com> <455784756.20120515224318@my_localhost> <4FB34A28.7010602@gbenet.com> Message-ID: <20120516094753.23f79a7b@majic.rs> Well, checking from Serbia - the domain is parked. The link works, but points, well, to parked domain :) ???? Wed, 16 May 2012 07:33:12 +0100 "david at gbenet.com" ??????: > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > > On 15/05/12 22:43, MFPA wrote: > > Hi > > > > > > On Tuesday 15 May 2012 at 9:21:13 PM, in > > , david at gbenet.com wrote: > > > > > >> It works now :) > > > > Not from here - I just visited http://xfmail.slappy.org/ and was > > served a "domain parked" holding page. > > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Gnupg-users mailing list > > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users > > > > How odd is that? I rechecked the link and it still works > > David > > - -- > ?See the sanity of the man! No gods, no angels, no demons, no body. > Nothing of the kind.Stern, sane,every brain-cell perfect and complete > even at the moment of death. No delusion.? > https://linuxcounter.net/user/512854.html -----BEGIN PGP > SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.16 (GNU/Linux) > Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ > > iQEVAwUBT7NKKOJpqm7flRExAQHFTwgAodLomaeNIG2W51ZGnlgi3yScqNcAkqzn > 5X1+BmAZicTNEkAFYnzdL5i7G0YTAmh8VreNWdZPp8niXVU2YaoDVPeb3RKdeamZ > tbBZaGrac17OCkWooh2Udpjf9KG7Fzj0nb9X6yV4ORiurZG3a6OY7uTx9yyfgkHH > avtbH2ji4IjiKCFRc7LLXqCFFzlKI+ZRHdhBx9zwrLKSaoV7SIGfQPD5wzFj0kYo > 1lYcjyipthxJEpQGNNo7uCGNRKRC2XD2ffNMtUK3CD5HEPCEFAG3fH4cgoMaupwU > x1tGcbVhI6mRgEQ8k0bZF0qp1Cqy0LGW8a6FPV8Sil2Ht+FQiG2tog== > =ZQ7R > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users -- Branko Majic Jabber: branko at majic.rs Please use only Free formats when sending attachments to me. ?????? ????? ?????: branko at majic.rs ????? ??? ?? ??????? ?????? ????????? ? ????????? ?????????. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 836 bytes Desc: not available URL: From brad at fineby.me.uk Wed May 16 09:01:42 2012 From: brad at fineby.me.uk (Brad Rogers) Date: Wed, 16 May 2012 08:01:42 +0100 Subject: Website link broken In-Reply-To: <4FB34A28.7010602@gbenet.com> References: <4FB2BAB9.4020102@gbenet.com> <455784756.20120515224318@my_localhost> <4FB34A28.7010602@gbenet.com> Message-ID: <20120516080142.66084d46@abydos.stargate.org.uk> On Wed, 16 May 2012 07:33:12 +0100 "david at gbenet.com" wrote: Hello david at gbenet.com, > How odd is that? I rechecked the link and it still works I can confirm MFPA's (and the OP's) findings that the link goers to a place holder. Are you, possibly, seeing a locally cached version of that page? -- Regards _ / ) "The blindingly obvious is / _)rad never immediately apparent" It couldn't adapt so it couldn't survive The Great British Mistake - The Adverts -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 490 bytes Desc: not available URL: From bernhard.kleine at gmx.net Wed May 16 09:08:47 2012 From: bernhard.kleine at gmx.net (Bernhard Kleine) Date: Wed, 16 May 2012 09:08:47 +0200 Subject: Website link broken In-Reply-To: <4FB34A28.7010602@gbenet.com> References: <4FB2BAB9.4020102@gbenet.com> <455784756.20120515224318@my_localhost> <4FB34A28.7010602@gbenet.com> Message-ID: <1337152127.2960.1.camel@amd2000bk> Am Mittwoch, den 16.05.2012, 07:33 +0100 schrieb david at gbenet.com: > On 15/05/12 22:43, MFPA wrote: > > Hi > > > > > > On Tuesday 15 May 2012 at 9:21:13 PM, in > > , david at gbenet.com wrote: > > > > > >> It works now :) > > > > Not from here - I just visited http://xfmail.slappy.org/ and was > > served a "domain parked" holding page. > > Well, I have never been to that link before and it is godaddy. What about cleaning cache? Bernhard -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 198 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part URL: From yyy at yyy.id.lv Wed May 16 08:47:17 2012 From: yyy at yyy.id.lv (yyy) Date: Wed, 16 May 2012 09:47:17 +0300 Subject: Website link broken References: <4FB2BAB9.4020102@gbenet.com> <455784756.20120515224318@my_localhost> Message-ID: <8F8B5F268CE34CABA118750C8A38A114@ktf.rtu.lv> ----- Original Message ----- From: "MFPA" To: "david at gbenet.com on GnuPG-Users" Sent: Wednesday, May 16, 2012 12:43 AM Subject: Re: Website link broken > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA512 > > Hi > > > On Tuesday 15 May 2012 at 9:21:13 PM, in > , david at gbenet.com wrote: > > >> It works now :) does not works from here, either From psalters at gmail.com Wed May 16 10:13:18 2012 From: psalters at gmail.com (Paul Salters) Date: Wed, 16 May 2012 10:13:18 +0200 Subject: Problem with libgcrypt Message-ID: Hi, I am using libcurl to develop an appilication to do xml requests. These requests are using HTTPS so the libgnutls and libgcrypt is used. It uses multiple threads to do requests. Most of the time it runes fine but sometimes I get the following error: "ath.c:193: _gcry_ath_mutex_lock: Assertion '*lock == ((ath_mutex_t)" What causes this? I have read the documentation about thread safety and I have the following lines in my code. GCRY_THREAD_OPTION_PTHREAD_IMPL; gcry_control (GCRYCTL_SET_THREAD_CBS, &gcry_threads_pthread); gnutls_global_init(); Appreciate your help! Paul Salters The Netherlands From david at gbenet.com Wed May 16 15:06:56 2012 From: david at gbenet.com (david at gbenet.com) Date: Wed, 16 May 2012 14:06:56 +0100 Subject: Website link broken In-Reply-To: <20120516080142.66084d46@abydos.stargate.org.uk> References: <4FB2BAB9.4020102@gbenet.com> <455784756.20120515224318@my_localhost> <4FB34A28.7010602@gbenet.com> <20120516080142.66084d46@abydos.stargate.org.uk> Message-ID: <4FB3A670.7010804@gbenet.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On 16/05/12 08:01, Brad Rogers wrote: > On Wed, 16 May 2012 07:33:12 +0100 "david at gbenet.com" wrote: > > Hello david at gbenet.com, > >> How odd is that? I rechecked the link and it still works > > I can confirm MFPA's (and the OP's) findings that the link goers to a place holder. > > Are you, possibly, seeing a locally cached version of that page? > > > > > _______________________________________________ Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users I just deleted my cache - it still works - very odd David - -- ?See the sanity of the man! No gods, no angels, no demons, no body. Nothing of the kind.Stern, sane,every brain-cell perfect and complete even at the moment of death. No delusion.? https://linuxcounter.net/user/512854.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.16 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQEVAwUBT7OmcOJpqm7flRExAQGagQgAkoQ7UV7ciwwkmijBE7QH8eaJEDSoP1vL VLRMOI0irtfMNCtvrR3VR3Ft8ZnZ4lONrGrVvQRw2NQJNxbM9XTDr5FOddb0gYXM rEnJxGDvdgl2h8xKarTWKm9Cv2V4xlU8T85ISc9mML1z0QDnTKeksMlu2AhOxHAp nqCCJilvsupxsfXyYUou5WXtG1abXIP1LKVNVECVk6VyVKZy4ZN4LeP+nThQHyN1 jZYbNMkbyc64U2mvdOs8Ev4fjbEJE3vsUsWDLxcM/w8swyltDb6iKy0AE3eGegJe +OXpex6zYZrvAvoIFxdXQqJdT25it8DGsn01fYEXwQPAJMAeX2VDWQ== =V1B3 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From kschmid1.uw.edu at gmail.com Thu May 17 00:29:56 2012 From: kschmid1.uw.edu at gmail.com (Kurt Schmidt) Date: Wed, 16 May 2012 15:29:56 -0700 Subject: Website link broken Message-ID: > Date: Wed, 16 May 2012 09:47:53 +0200 > From: ?????? ????? > Well, checking from Serbia - the domain is parked. > The link works, but points, well, to parked domain :) Same here - parked at GoDaddy. From Lists.gnupg at mephisto.fastmail.net Sun May 20 04:45:16 2012 From: Lists.gnupg at mephisto.fastmail.net (Kevin Kammer) Date: Sat, 19 May 2012 22:45:16 -0400 Subject: Card fails to decrypt using 4096-bit key Message-ID: <20120520024516.GA573@clarus.smellysneakers.net> I have seen a few other threads started on this problem I have just encountered, or similar subjects, most notably one some months ago by Edmond [at] systemli. However, I never saw a resolution posted, and I believe I have more data to work with. I have been using the ZeitControl OpenPGP cards for a few years now. I have my primary keys on a v2.0 card, and they have been working fine (for the most part). These are 3072 bit keys. I recently learned of the support for 4096 bit keys on cards, added with GnuPG 2.0.18, and since I had an extra, blank card laying around, I decided to experiment with it. I started by updating to the latest version of GnuPG (2.0.19 as of this writing) which I downloaded in source form from ftp.gnupg.org. The source compiled without any problems, and I verified that the installed binaries worked with my existing keys and cards. This is on Mac OS 10.7.4. On my spare OpenPGP card, I generated a 4096 bit cert/signing key, a 4096 bit encryption key, and a 2048 bit authorization key. All of the keys were generated on the card itself. No errors were reported during the key generation process. The 4096 bit signing key works perfectly. I have signed with it many times, and the signatures verify properly. Likewise, the auth key works for SSH logon, though it is a 2048 bit key. However, whenever I try to decrypt a document encrypted to the 4096 bit encryption key on the card, the decryption process fails to even begin, with an error like the following: Version: GnuPG v2.0.19 (Darwin) gpg: armor header: gpg: public key is 0xA9D4A64F1FADF7D2 gpg: using subkey 0xA9D4A64F1FADF7D2 instead of primary key 0x24620B795999A6DB gpg: using subkey 0xA9D4A64F1FADF7D2 instead of primary key 0x24620B795999A6DB gpg: encrypted with 4096 bit RSA key, ID 0xA9D4A64F1FADF7D2, created 2012-05-16 "Kevin Kammer " gpg: public key decryption failed: General error gpg: decryption failed: No secret key This is essentially the same error that Edmond described. I realize it looks as though the private key (or rather, its stub, as it was generated on the card and never left) is not on my keychain, but I can assure you that is not the case. gpg -K shows the private key, and examining it in reasonable detail with gpg --edit-key shows no discrepancies either. Since the 4096 bit size of the key is a new variable, I decided to destroy the keys, and try to generate and test new keys of varying strength on the card. To summarize, here are my findings: SC E A Result ------------------------------------------------------------- 2048 2048 2048 All of them work 3072 3072 2048 All of them work 4096 3072 2048 All of them work 4096 4096 2048 SC works to sign, E fails to decrypt. It is also worth noting that my results are the same using two different card readers: SCM and Gemalto. I have not had the opportunity to test with an entirely different computer/OS. It's not really important to me to use 4096 bit keys vs. 3072; but if I understood the release notes for v2.0.18+ this should work, correct? From Lists.gnupg at mephisto.fastmail.net Mon May 21 03:07:11 2012 From: Lists.gnupg at mephisto.fastmail.net (Kevin Kammer) Date: Sun, 20 May 2012 21:07:11 -0400 Subject: how to use samrtcard with PC/SC cardreader In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20120521010711.GA2424@clarus.smellysneakers.net> On Wed, May 16, 2012 at 10:13:51AM +0800 Also sprach Yang Hon-Jang: > I am interested in NOT put private keys in disk. I like the idea, put > private keys in smartcard. > > How to use the Fellowship > Smartcarddescribe > how to use OpenPGP card with gpg. But in section 2.3.2, > PC/SC(Personal computer/Smart card), there are only two lines: > > >TODO > > >To use PC/SC make sure you disable CCID by passing the --disable-ccid > option to GnuPG. > > My questions are: > > 1. If I use command > > gpg --disable-ccid > > I got message > > gpg: invalid option "--disable-ccid" > > (PS, I use GnuPG 2.0.17 in Windows 7) > > What is wrong? I don't personally have much experience with using GnuPG on the Windows platform, but I can say with reasonable confidence that --disable-ccid is not a gpg option. On Unix/Linux, that option is for scdaemon, a component which is installed with GnuPG 2.0.x and which manages the smart card interface. Typically to use that option you would put "disable-ccid" into your scdaemon.conf file, as scdaemon is rarely launched by the user directly. I'm sure someone with gpg4win xperience will be along shortly to be of more help. From wk at gnupg.org Tue May 22 11:15:20 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Tue, 22 May 2012 11:15:20 +0200 Subject: GPG 1.4.x, 2.x, ECC, and portability In-Reply-To: (Avi's message of "Tue, 15 May 2012 10:50:46 -0400") References: <873972xxyw.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <87y5otwzy5.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <87ipfoshjr.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Tue, 15 May 2012 16:50, avi.wiki at gmail.com said: > them temporarily each time if necessary. Allowing an option to have > the home and other helper directories configured as a subfolder of the > install directory on the install should be helpful as well. What I I agree. We could do this. If a file "gnupg-enable-standalone" exists in the same directory as the gpg binary, we set the GNUPGHOME directory to a subdirectory (e.g. "home") and all other directories also to a subdirectory (iirc, we only need an "etc"). On a USB stick this might look like this / # Binaries etc. | + home/ # pubring, trustdb etc. (This is NEW). | | | + private-keys-v1.d/ # Secret X.509 keys | # and (for v2.1) secret OpenPGP keys | + pub/ # Stuff you may put into your PATH | + etc/ # Dirmngr configuration | + lib/ # Stuff required by GnuPG etc. | ... If the file "gnupg-enable-standalone" is not in the root directory, everything behaves as before. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From Tony.Benson at gmail.com Mon May 21 23:47:55 2012 From: Tony.Benson at gmail.com (Tony Benson) Date: Mon, 21 May 2012 22:47:55 +0100 Subject: Gnupg extension/wrapper on ubuntu 12.04 server Message-ID: Hello, First of all, bit of a newbie alert, so please forgive the pseudo code. I have a linux mint lisa desktop with an apache2 server installed, php 5.3.6 and the Gnupg wrapper installed (GPGME version 1.2.0, Extension Version 1.3.2-dev) I have an php script which will decrypt a passed file name automatically. With the script these are the pertinent lines of code. $GnuPG = new gnupg(); $GnuPG -> adddecryptkey("fingerprint","passphrase"); $text = file_get_contents($path1.$file); $plain = $GnuPG -> decrypt($text); This works without an issue, the encrypted file is grabbed and its contents decrypted, the rest of the script doing what it needs to do. Now I have since created an ubuntu 12.04 server version of the above, with apache2, php 5.3.*10* and the same versions of GNUGP wrapper installed. The same process was used for installing the wrapper on both machines, the pertinent code is the same but I get nothing. In an attempt to debug, I have written about the $path1.$file and $text variables to a log file and they are as I would expect. I have tried to write out the $plain information as well but nothing is returned. My issue is that I do not know where to go with this for debugging purposes; nothing is written to the apache error logs, literally nothing fails, so no error to write out. the access log just shows the initial request. Does anyone have any ideas either about the problem itself or where I may find more information to debug it? Many thanks Tony -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From tim.kachao at gmail.com Tue May 22 10:58:48 2012 From: tim.kachao at gmail.com (tim.kachao at gmail.com) Date: Tue, 22 May 2012 04:58:48 -0400 Subject: Some people say longer keys are silly. I think they should be supported by gpg. Message-ID: <20120522.085848.109.2@GGHJK5> I think it should be okay to dredge up this topic ever couple years. From what I am reading, links below, I do not feel comfortable with the key length and algorithmic security offered by GPG's defaults. I have not been able to figure out how to get keylengths greater than 3072 for DSA/elgmal or >4094 rsa, so I conclude that generating them is unsupported by GPG although GPG can use them. I have seen many people saying that these types of key lengths are way more than anyone could reasonably need, but I am skeptical. I am involved in a local Occupy (bet you thought occupy was kaput eh? well as it were known it is but that's another story) and frankly we aren't just up against one intelligence agency, but all intel agencies put together. An entire global class of people. You can argue that they may be uninterested in me, however I don't buy that argument at all because they have spent (possibly a lot) more than a thousand dollars at least on me personally at this point I am sure in policing costs to try to survielle and intimidate me, after you divide down. The eviction alone at my occupy cost (probably greatly) in excess of $16,000 to arrest 8 people, and involved almost 200 cops for 4 hours. There are also estimates made that in the US 1 in 6 "protestors" is actually a government agent of one sort or another, dept of defense, homeland security, fbi what have you. And that exludes any thugs the bankers put in the crowd as privately hired types. Secondly I want my communications to remain unread into the relatively distant future. Given the sort of crap the 1% do wrt murdering and maiming vast quantites of people for a couple extra bucks I would not be the least bit surprised if 20 years from now they "dissapeared" me because I passed our some pamphlets that said "end class war now". An enemy is an enemy, and enemies must be smooshed, right? Why take risks like letting an innocent person live if they might concievable scratch your gravy train at some point in the future? Abductions and bullets aren't that expensive once you got everything all set up, it's a good investement. I'm 23 now and I take various modest precautions to ensure that I have the best chance I can to remain in good health when I am 43. Or 63. A couple hundred extra milliseconds of decryption/encryption time per message for a key longer than 3072 or 4092 sounds like a good choice frankly. Is that not what we are looking at? And yes I recognize that it would be a lot easier for them to plant spyware on my computers than break the keys, however they can't plant spyware on everone's computer. without people noticing They do slurp up and probably store indefinitely all text -and many other- communications on the internet (carnivore etc.). In the future, data they don't have they can't use. There is always a substantial probability that they will not get my keys with spyware, and I would like capitalize (If you'll pardon me) on that. Fourthly a little safety margin never hurt. I think it should be easier to pick longer keys. Also info should be included in the compendium regarding practical aspects of key choice, like a table that shows how long it takes to encrypt a symmetric key with 2048, 4092 etc. Or event just a table in which you select your adversary, then your time horizon, and it tells you what key lengths are suitable, with due warnings and notes regarding the possibility of quantum computers, mathematical advances etc. I understand that no matter how long the keys are it's still only a relatively small part of the equation. However I thought it was the norm to pick something that basically eliminated concern about the encryption being broken, so one could forget about that part and focus on the rest.of your security worries. My trust in GPG has been disturbed by this state of affairs. I thought I could just trust the defaults but I am finding that they may not really include the safety margin that people desire. I shudder to think of people who are doing more serious stuff in the class war than little ol' me (which isn't hard). Links: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSA_%28algorithm%29 -http://www.schneier.com/essay-368.html < note that this was written in 1998 http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2004 this one in particular makes it clear that it is not unreasonable for someone in my position to choose a 4096 bit key. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Key_length wikipedia says the U.S. Government requires 192 or 256-bit AES keys for highly sensitive data. A 3072 bit RSA or elGamal key is about equivalent to 128 bit symmetric key, right? And a 256 bit key length equivalent public key is abut 15,387 bits.. I think if people want to use the same level of encryption for their data that the government uses shouldn't that be supported at least in command line mode? http://www.win.tue.nl/~klenstra/aes_match.pdf good paper on equivalencies in computation and cost of public key vs. symmetric. From jerry at seibercom.net Tue May 22 14:12:53 2012 From: jerry at seibercom.net (Jerry) Date: Tue, 22 May 2012 08:12:53 -0400 Subject: Some people say longer keys are silly. I think they should be supported by gpg. In-Reply-To: <20120522.085848.109.2@GGHJK5> References: <20120522.085848.109.2@GGHJK5> Message-ID: <20120522081253.67fde581@scorpio> On Tue, 22 May 2012 04:58:48 -0400 tim.kachao at gmail.com articulated: {snip} Interesting! I once worked for a secret government agency. We had a working theory that anyone using encryption for other than normal business operations was an obvious enemy of the state. I guess we must have missed you. We will be coming soon. Seriously, have you forgotten to take your meds today? -- Jerry ? Disclaimer: off-list followups get on-list replies or get ignored. Please do not ignore the Reply-To header. __________________________________________________________________ "if all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail" From david at gbenet.com Tue May 22 14:34:20 2012 From: david at gbenet.com (david at gbenet.com) Date: Tue, 22 May 2012 13:34:20 +0100 Subject: Some people say longer keys are silly. I think they should be supported by gpg. In-Reply-To: <20120522.085848.109.2@GGHJK5> References: <20120522.085848.109.2@GGHJK5> Message-ID: <4FBB87CC.7010706@gbenet.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 22/05/12 09:58, tim.kachao at gmail.com wrote: > I think it should be okay to dredge up this topic ever couple years. From > what I am reading, links below, I do not feel comfortable with the key > length and algorithmic security offered by GPG's defaults. > > I have not been able to figure out how to get keylengths greater than 3072 > for DSA/elgmal or >4094 rsa, so I conclude that generating them is > unsupported by GPG although GPG can use them. I have seen many people > saying that these types of key lengths are way more than anyone could > reasonably need, but I am skeptical. > > I am involved in a local Occupy (bet you thought occupy was kaput eh? well > as it were known it is but that's another story) and frankly we aren't > just up against one intelligence agency, but all intel agencies put > together. An entire global class of people. You can argue that they may > be uninterested in me, however I don't buy that argument at all because > they have spent (possibly a lot) more than a thousand dollars at least on > me personally at this point I am sure in policing costs to try to > survielle and intimidate me, after you divide down. > > The eviction alone at my occupy cost (probably greatly) in excess of > $16,000 to arrest 8 people, and involved almost 200 cops for 4 hours. > There are also estimates made that in the US 1 in 6 "protestors" is > actually a government agent of one sort or another, dept of defense, > homeland security, fbi what have you. And that exludes any thugs the > bankers put in the crowd as privately hired types. > > Secondly I want my communications to remain unread into the relatively > distant future. Given the sort of crap the 1% do wrt murdering and > maiming vast quantites of people for a couple extra bucks I would not be > the least bit surprised if 20 years from now they "dissapeared" me > because I passed our some pamphlets that said "end class war now". > > An enemy is an enemy, and enemies must be smooshed, right? Why take risks > like letting an innocent person live if they might concievable scratch > your gravy train at some point in the future? Abductions and bullets > aren't that expensive once you got everything all set up, it's a good > investement. > > > I'm 23 now and I take various modest precautions to ensure that I have the > best chance I can to remain in good health when I am 43. Or 63. A couple > hundred extra milliseconds of decryption/encryption time per message for > a key longer than 3072 or 4092 sounds like a good choice frankly. Is > that not what we are looking at? > > And yes I recognize that it would be a lot easier for them to plant spyware > on my computers than break the keys, however they can't plant spyware on > everone's computer. without people noticing They do slurp up and > probably store indefinitely all text -and many other- communications on > the internet (carnivore etc.). In the future, data they don't have they > can't use. There is always a substantial probability that they will not > get my keys with spyware, and I would like capitalize (If you'll pardon > me) on that. > > Fourthly a little safety margin never hurt. > > I think it should be easier to pick longer keys. Also info should be > included in the compendium regarding practical aspects of key choice, > like a table that shows how long it takes to encrypt a symmetric key with > 2048, 4092 etc. Or event just a table in which you select your > adversary, then your time horizon, and it tells you what key lengths are > suitable, with due warnings and notes regarding the possibility of > quantum computers, mathematical advances etc. > > I understand that no matter how long the keys are it's still only a > relatively small part of the equation. However I thought it was the norm > to pick something that basically eliminated concern about the encryption > being broken, so one could forget about that part and focus on the > rest.of your security worries. > > My trust in GPG has been disturbed by this state of affairs. I thought I > could just trust the defaults but I am finding that they may not really > include the safety margin that people desire. I shudder to think of > people who are doing more serious stuff in the class war than little ol' > me (which isn't hard). > > Links: > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSA_%28algorithm%29 > -http://www.schneier.com/essay-368.html < note that this was written in 1998 > http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2004 this one in particular makes > it clear that it is not unreasonable for someone in my position to choose > a 4096 bit key. > > > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Key_length wikipedia says the U.S. Government > requires 192 or 256-bit AES keys for highly sensitive data. A 3072 bit > RSA or elGamal key is about equivalent to 128 bit symmetric key, right? > And a 256 bit key length equivalent public key is abut 15,387 bits.. I > think if people want to use the same level of encryption for their data > that the government uses shouldn't that be supported at least in command > line mode? > http://www.win.tue.nl/~klenstra/aes_match.pdf good paper on equivalencies > in computation and cost of public key vs. symmetric. > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users > Some say that all the power of the universe - and all the time its been in existence will not crack a 2048 bit key with a secure passphrase. So by the time the universe is well and truly over and some poor sod of a government agent is alive and well he will not have cracked yer e-mails or indeed any encrypted data. Can you imagine that power from a computer? No. The mind boggles at the energy it would consume - a million million million ad infinitum suns. But they "key" to all this is them holding your private key - it would be quicker and a lot simpler to crush your balls with a pair of pliers - you will give up your most treasured possession - your passphrase. This is the meaning of brute force attacks on your key. The strength of your passphrase is critical alpha numerics take the whole universe to crack where as a phrase like: "marymary&%/*had*)/+a:+=little$?"KL$Donkey#*hadxxxabad%$*JHGbadIUNG6**leg^)andalways@#][a\|little-0UHKTwalkedUKL:@?^wonkey is a good key it will last you forever - if you can stand having your balls crushed. So the best form of security would be to invest in a sturdy steel codpiece and a long passphrase. David - -- ?See the sanity of the man! No gods, no angels, no demons, no body. Nothing of the kind.Stern, sane,every brain-cell perfect and complete even at the moment of death. No delusion.? https://linuxcounter.net/user/512854.html - http://gbenet.com -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJPu4e+AAoJEOJpqm7flRExvbwH/jQ63xJMsbTFKpwSugXEVf7E u4EhPUpBUrMGW51XYubEsEa/lJFRm9OTysG7/f33gQP27z3pKqqH0ZX9Te38e781 +CqBMdvpB18f+LBROk/21AcpErlFIqYAoDhvgmOVdNvWGKfW61GKvdcHpoitPMt3 fEOAw3qZRZZqd+fOQUt42uFWx2YCtOMdWDt3slih6TI3gq5E3/+CtXkWO41czy3g BHY61NEriOplQ+0HfrKulDsXArPRpfddN7N4kfuiAwm7kzjfitgcUdWdU/ZJE2Zp oNvQ83zjzisHFHDg1c6n4hpJzGPLQ96ox6GMj+igEIW73A/N45nWSUoMzGdsPao= =YnnX -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Tue May 22 15:23:36 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Tue, 22 May 2012 09:23:36 -0400 Subject: Some people say longer keys are silly. I think they should be supported by gpg. In-Reply-To: <20120522081253.67fde581@scorpio> References: <20120522.085848.109.2@GGHJK5> <20120522081253.67fde581@scorpio> Message-ID: <4FBB9358.2000101@sixdemonbag.org> On 5/22/12 8:12 AM, Jerry wrote: > Seriously, have you forgotten to take your meds today? Let's not be mean. I will be the absolute first person demanding the right to criticize ideas as harshly as I want. I'll happily call an idea stupid, ill-informed, wrong, or anything else. I do this with a clear conscience because I know that I'm not my ideas, just like nobody else is theirs. But I don't ever want to the the first person to be calling *people* those things. People are special, precious, and often fragile. Our community is made up of these rare commodities, and it behooves us to treat other people with dignity and respect and consideration. Let's not be mean. From david at gbenet.com Tue May 22 15:36:25 2012 From: david at gbenet.com (david at gbenet.com) Date: Tue, 22 May 2012 14:36:25 +0100 Subject: Some people say longer keys are silly. I think they should be supported by gpg. In-Reply-To: <20120522081253.67fde581@scorpio> References: <20120522.085848.109.2@GGHJK5> <20120522081253.67fde581@scorpio> Message-ID: <4FBB9659.8000508@gbenet.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 22/05/12 13:12, Jerry wrote: > On Tue, 22 May 2012 04:58:48 -0400 tim.kachao at gmail.com articulated: > > {snip} > > > > Interesting! I once worked for a secret government agency. We had a working theory that > anyone using encryption for other than normal business operations was an obvious enemy > of the state. I guess we must have missed you. We will be coming soon. > > > > Seriously, have you forgotten to take your meds today? > Knock! Knock! I think that here in the UK the intelligence services have always considered that the real enemy of the state was the people! I take a dispersible Aspirin every day - keeps the "spooks" away! Ha! David - -- ?See the sanity of the man! No gods, no angels, no demons, no body. Nothing of the kind.Stern, sane,every brain-cell perfect and complete even at the moment of death. No delusion.? https://linuxcounter.net/user/512854.html - http://gbenet.com -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJPu5ZMAAoJEOJpqm7flRExQbQH/RpzFyB5fZ4wWvds+L09MHfS 0mnw+8PNfIXEOczswWGRkzMmbHcqTfhH2k669VppcQx1UXCYcJseTquRArlcxVl/ Et/I8cBIJu0TnkDvJmbzEacJAJpM6LRSqfZtjzIS4BTFnaJCsrNg1Z+mXAH0qaNT 6oL1VTOUTVsQuLytNeZSUCTppIlt6UtSB38c3HqxOZufJmH2GQK7bzYUnbPbvODo mLJ/psupfAEBmk81wAinIe0JxX2d+enVGYsZyOk0cvCLe2JY+4JBpMJx2Iydhv+N Zc4ee4kkbTvMHjEBxHQ6UcK+A2c515F/xmmaBgo8/fUw1VOTYuG3Wd8BbLp9JjY= =xXwi -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Tue May 22 15:51:07 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Tue, 22 May 2012 09:51:07 -0400 Subject: Some people say longer keys are silly. I think they should be supported by gpg. In-Reply-To: <20120522.085848.109.2@GGHJK5> References: <20120522.085848.109.2@GGHJK5> Message-ID: <4FBB99CB.1040606@sixdemonbag.org> On 5/22/12 4:58 AM, tim.kachao at gmail.com wrote: > I am involved in a local Occupy (bet you thought occupy was kaput eh? > well as it were known it is but that's another story) and frankly we > aren't just up against one intelligence agency, but all intel > agencies put together. You might want to re-think talking about this in a public forum. This mailing list is open to everyone, including the very people you're talking about. The first rule of good operational security is, "don't draw attention to yourself or your organization." > Secondly I want my communications to remain unread into the > relatively distant future. A 3072-bit key will do that today. Breaking a 3K key would require such technological advances that it would be indistinguishable from science fiction. There's no point in going past a 3K key because if a 3K key were to ever fall we'd have to reconsider the mathematical foundations of cryptography. > I'm 23 now and I take various modest precautions to ensure that I > have the best chance I can to remain in good health when I am 43. Or > 63. A couple hundred extra milliseconds of decryption/encryption > time per message for a key longer than 3072 or 4092 sounds like a > good choice frankly. Is that not what we are looking at? No, it's not. Imagine an automobile. You might say, "well, I'd like an additional hundred horsepower so I want to put a V-8 engine in my automobile: why doesn't my automobile support this?" But if your car is a Fiat 500, well, there's simply not the room for such a large engine, nor is the transmission or powertrain ready for that. For that matter, even the wheels would have to be redesigned: sustained high-speed driving on your average Goodyears will cause them to delaminate and come apart, so you'd need H-rated sport wheels or Pirelli PZero Neros. Changing one component requires changes to a lot of other components. That's what we're facing with changing the maximum key length. The mobile experience would be impacted, the embedded market would be impacted, and even interoperability with other OpenPGP applications would be impacted (since as far as I know none of them save for PGP 6.5.8ckt support such large keys). It's all right to ask for larger keys to be supported, but there are tradeoffs to be made here. > Fourthly a little safety margin never hurt. That safety margin is already present. > I understand that no matter how long the keys are it's still only a > relatively small part of the equation. However I thought it was the > norm to pick something that basically eliminated concern about the > encryption being broken, so one could forget about that part and > focus on the rest.of your security worries. Yes, and 128-bit crypto is plenty sufficient for that. > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Key_length wikipedia says the U.S. > Government requires 192 or 256-bit AES keys for highly sensitive > data. Quoting from that page, "128 bits is currently thought, by many observers, to be sufficient for the foreseeable future." The Wikipedia page is also in error. Per the publicly-available NSA Suite B documents, AES128 is considered sufficient for SECRET data. There is no AES192 requirement in Suite B. From avi.wiki at gmail.com Tue May 22 17:29:28 2012 From: avi.wiki at gmail.com (Avi) Date: Tue, 22 May 2012 11:29:28 -0400 Subject: GPG 1.4.x, 2.x, ECC, and portability In-Reply-To: <87ipfoshjr.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <873972xxyw.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <87y5otwzy5.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <87ipfoshjr.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: >On Tue, May 22, 2012 at 5:15 AM, Werner Koch wrote: On Tue, 15 May 2012 16:50, avi.wiki at gmail.com said: > them temporarily each time if necessary. Allowing an option to have > the home and other helper directories configured as a subfolder of the > install directory on the install should be helpful as well. ?What I >I agree. ?We could do this. ?If a file "gnupg-enable-standalone" exists >in the same directory as the gpg binary, we set the GNUPGHOME directory to >a subdirectory (e.g. "home") and all other directories also to a >subdirectory (iirc, we only need an "etc"). That would be great! To close the loop, could the installer be modified to ask if the current install is portable and then create that file before the rest of the install to make it seamless? --Avi ---- User:Avraham pub 3072D/F80E29F9 1/30/2009 Avi (Wikimedia-related key) ?? Primary key fingerprint: 167C 063F 7981 A1F6 71EC ABAA 0D62 B019 F80E 29F9 From christoph.anton.mitterer at physik.uni-muenchen.de Tue May 22 15:39:04 2012 From: christoph.anton.mitterer at physik.uni-muenchen.de (Christoph Anton Mitterer) Date: Tue, 22 May 2012 15:39:04 +0200 Subject: Some people say longer keys are silly. I think they should be supported by gpg. In-Reply-To: <20120522.085848.109.2@GGHJK5> References: <20120522.085848.109.2@GGHJK5> Message-ID: <1337693944.9147.33.camel@gar-ws-etp71.garching.physik.uni-muenchen.de> Hi. This pops up over and over again... >From a technical point of view that seems to be not only a intended limitation,... at least it's not enough to change the max size in the code,... there seem to be several buffers one would need to enlarge in order to make bigger keys. Personally I'd prefer if gpg wouldn't have that limitation. I know all the arguments against larger keys.... which is why I'd suggest to enable larger sizes only when --expert is given and even then warn. Most people will get quickly distracted from large key sizes anyway when they see how long their generation takes ;) Nevertheless I guess it could even help to find awkward bugs or other issues that may not appear with the "moderate" key sizes. Cheers, Chris. From wk at gnupg.org Tue May 22 17:50:00 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Tue, 22 May 2012 17:50:00 +0200 Subject: Some people say longer keys are silly. I think they should be supported by gpg. In-Reply-To: <20120522.085848.109.2@GGHJK5> (tim kachao's message of "Tue, 22 May 2012 04:58:48 -0400") References: <20120522.085848.109.2@GGHJK5> Message-ID: <87ehqcrz9z.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Tue, 22 May 2012 10:58, tim.kachao at gmail.com said: > on my computers than break the keys, however they can't plant spyware on > everone's computer. without people noticing They do slurp up and Are you sure? Did you looked at the GnuPG code so closely to come up with such a strong statement? I should feel honored that you put that much trust into us GnuPG authors and the few white hats who closely reviewed the code. However there is more to it than GnuPG. Do you put the same trust into the gcc and glibc maintainers, Linux kernel hackers, the Windows hackers at Microsoft and elsewhere, the hardware guys at Intel or AMD, the support chip vendors? There are a lot of ways to compromise a system, hidden backdoors in other systems have already been revealed in the past. > 2048, 4092 etc. Or event just a table in which you select your > adversary, then your time horizon, and it tells you what key lengths are > suitable, with due warnings and notes regarding the possibility of Any such table would to some extend be the result of applying black magic. GnuPG is just a tool and not a cover all security solution. For such a solution you need to come up with a threat analysis, evaluate countermeasures, policies, training, more software, and likely additional hardware (walls, locks, barbed wire). > to pick something that basically eliminated concern about the encryption > being broken, so one could forget about that part and focus on the > rest.of your security worries. Right, we are doing just that. As of now 2048 bit RSA is a pretty good default. Before you use a longer key, my suggestion would be to first install a random generator which holds up with such a key. > http://www.win.tue.nl/~klenstra/aes_match.pdf good paper on equivalencies > in computation and cost of public key vs. symmetric. That is pure cryptography and as such good hint on how to select defaults for a general purposes system - but not a absolute truth. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From peter at digitalbrains.com Tue May 22 17:50:47 2012 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Tue, 22 May 2012 17:50:47 +0200 Subject: Some people say longer keys are silly. I think they should be supported by gpg. In-Reply-To: <1337693944.9147.33.camel@gar-ws-etp71.garching.physik.uni-muenchen.de> References: <20120522.085848.109.2@GGHJK5> <1337693944.9147.33.camel@gar-ws-etp71.garching.physik.uni-muenchen.de> Message-ID: <4FBBB5D7.7010307@digitalbrains.com> On 22/05/12 15:39, Christoph Anton Mitterer wrote: > Nevertheless I guess it could even help to find awkward bugs or other > issues that may not appear with the "moderate" key sizes. Or bugs only affecting large keys are not found because so few people use it, and it becomes an attack vector affecting only those using large keys. Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at http://wwwhome.cs.utwente.nl/~lebbing/pubkey.txt From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Tue May 22 18:28:49 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Tue, 22 May 2012 12:28:49 -0400 Subject: Some people say longer keys are silly. I think they should be supported by gpg. In-Reply-To: <87ehqcrz9z.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <20120522.085848.109.2@GGHJK5> <87ehqcrz9z.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <4FBBBEC1.2080907@sixdemonbag.org> On 5/22/12 11:50 AM, Werner Koch wrote: > There are a lot of ways to compromise a system, hidden backdoors in > other systems have already been revealed in the past. It's worth bringing out Vint Cerf's estimate that between a sixth and a quarter of all desktop PCs have been completely compromised and are under the control of botnet operators [1]. That was from five years ago: the numbers are probably worse today. And that only covers people targeted randomly! For those people unfortunate enough to be targeted for surveillance by an even semi-competent crew, it's far worse. Your front door is no obstacle to someone who's learned how to pick a lock -- or someone smart enough to look around for a fake plastic rock nearby in which you've placed your backup key. I have no doubt whatsoever that a good crew could gain access, enter, compromise the target's PC and be out of there in under five minutes without the target ever knowing about it. So, yes. If anyone is the target of a serious surveillance campaign (legal or extralegal, state actors or non-state actors, whatever), well... you have your work cut out for you defending against that. GnuPG will not save you, not even with a 16K keypair. From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Tue May 22 18:30:15 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Tue, 22 May 2012 12:30:15 -0400 Subject: Some people say longer keys are silly. I think they should be supported by gpg. In-Reply-To: <4FBBBEC1.2080907@sixdemonbag.org> References: <20120522.085848.109.2@GGHJK5> <87ehqcrz9z.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FBBBEC1.2080907@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <4FBBBF17.7030003@sixdemonbag.org> On 5/22/12 12:28 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > under the control of botnet operators [1]. Whoops. [1] http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6298641.stm From jerry at seibercom.net Tue May 22 18:33:03 2012 From: jerry at seibercom.net (Jerry) Date: Tue, 22 May 2012 12:33:03 -0400 Subject: Some people say longer keys are silly. I think they should be supported by gpg. In-Reply-To: <4FBB9358.2000101@sixdemonbag.org> References: <20120522.085848.109.2@GGHJK5> <20120522081253.67fde581@scorpio> <4FBB9358.2000101@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <20120522123303.44ccffeb@scorpio> On Tue, 22 May 2012 09:23:36 -0400 Robert J. Hansen articulated: >On 5/22/12 8:12 AM, Jerry wrote: >> Seriously, have you forgotten to take your meds today? > >Let's not be mean. > >I will be the absolute first person demanding the right to criticize >ideas as harshly as I want. I'll happily call an idea stupid, >ill-informed, wrong, or anything else. I do this with a clear >conscience because I know that I'm not my ideas, just like nobody else >is theirs. > >But I don't ever want to the the first person to be calling *people* >those things. People are special, precious, and often fragile. Our >community is made up of these rare commodities, and it behooves us to >treat other people with dignity and respect and consideration. > >Let's not be mean. Sorry, I did not mean it to sound that way. I have worked with people that when they forget to take their medication are absolutely paranoid beyond belief. You have no doubt heard the phase, "Only sick people take drugs; therefore, if I don't take drugs I am not sick." Many paranoid, schizophrenics rationalize skipping their medication on just that sort of logic. What really amazed me though was that the OP wants security and yet he uses GMail. "GMail" and "security" are diametrically opposed concepts. Now if you will excuse me, I have to put new aluminum foil up on my windows. -- Jerry ? Disclaimer: off-list followups get on-list replies or get ignored. Please do not ignore the Reply-To header. __________________________________________________________________ From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Tue May 22 19:10:05 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Tue, 22 May 2012 13:10:05 -0400 Subject: Some people say longer keys are silly. I think they should be supported by gpg. In-Reply-To: <20120522.085848.109.2@GGHJK5> References: <20120522.085848.109.2@GGHJK5> Message-ID: <4FBBC86D.30405@sixdemonbag.org> I apologize in advance if any of this sounds snarky. It's not intended as such. Everything I've written here is sincere. > I am involved in a local Occupy (bet you thought occupy was kaput eh? well > as it were known it is but that's another story) and frankly we aren't > just up against one intelligence agency, but all intel agencies put > together. Did you know that in the United States, the Fish and Wildlife Service is an intelligence agency? Check their jobs postings and you'll see a good number of them say a security clearance is required. Your claim may lead people to writing off your movement on the grounds that one of two things are true. Either: - "They're a bunch of crazies who think that even the park rangers are after them," - Or, "holy Toledo, even the park rangers are after them!" It seems unlikely to me that either one will engender much support. If people think the former, then the movement is crazy and can be written off. If people think the latter, then it's incredibly dangerous to stand too close to you and no one will show up to your protests. > There are also estimates made that in the US 1 in 6 "protestors" is > actually a government agent of one sort or another, dept of defense, > homeland security, fbi what have you. Not even Nicolai Ceaucescu's Romania or Erich Honecker's German Democratic Republic were able to get one in six people to serve as informers. > I'm 23 now and I take various modest precautions to ensure that I have the > best chance I can to remain in good health when I am 43. Or 63. A couple > hundred extra milliseconds of decryption/encryption time per message for > a key longer than 3072 or 4092 sounds like a good choice frankly. Is > that not what we are looking at? No, it's not what we're looking at. If we take you seriously, if we really believe what you say, then what we're looking at is: - If we help you, we're likely going to get "disappeared", either now or in twenty years - Your group is completely penetrated/compromised - Your group has no effective methods of policing itself to detect and expel infiltrators - There's an excellent chance *you yourself* are a mole. After all, there's no better way to deflect suspicion than to be looking for moles -- ask Aldrich Ames or Robert Hanssen - And yet, you believe that if GnuPG supports larger key sizes that your security will be substantially improved. > Fourthly a little safety margin never hurt. If what you say is true, then just by coming onto this list and asking for help you have put everyone on this list in jeopardy. Your obsession with a "little safety margin" seems rather hypocritical. There are really only two possibilities here. Either your claims are substantially true, or they are substantially false. I believe they are substantially false, and I encourage you to re-think them. A correct estimation of your situation and what sorts of security threats you're facing will do you infinitely more good than a larger GnuPG key. And with that, I'm done with this thread. I wish you luck. From hka at qbs.com.pl Tue May 22 19:18:12 2012 From: hka at qbs.com.pl (Hubert Kario) Date: Tue, 22 May 2012 19:18:12 +0200 Subject: Some people say longer keys are silly. I think they should be supported by gpg. In-Reply-To: <20120522123303.44ccffeb@scorpio> References: <20120522.085848.109.2@GGHJK5> <4FBB9358.2000101@sixdemonbag.org> <20120522123303.44ccffeb@scorpio> Message-ID: <1404177.8LgxOSEToE@bursa22> On Tuesday 22 of May 2012 12:33:03 Jerry wrote: > What really amazed me though was that the OP wants > security and yet he uses GMail. "GMail" and "security" are > diametrically opposed concepts. Since when the security of encryption is dependant on the carrier/communication channel? Did I miss some memo? Regards, -- Hubert Kario QBS - Quality Business Software 02-656 Warszawa, ul. Ksawer?w 30/85 tel. +48 (22) 646-61-51, 646-74-24 www.qbs.com.pl From hka at qbs.com.pl Tue May 22 19:23:28 2012 From: hka at qbs.com.pl (Hubert Kario) Date: Tue, 22 May 2012 19:23:28 +0200 Subject: Some people say longer keys are silly. I think they should be supported by gpg. In-Reply-To: <4FBB87CC.7010706@gbenet.com> References: <20120522.085848.109.2@GGHJK5> <4FBB87CC.7010706@gbenet.com> Message-ID: <3298082.8Tiu87piaL@bursa22> On Tuesday 22 of May 2012 13:34:20 david at gbenet.com wrote: > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA1 > > On 22/05/12 09:58, tim.kachao at gmail.com wrote: > > I think it should be okay to dredge up this topic ever couple years. > > From what I am reading, links below, I do not feel comfortable with > > the key length and algorithmic security offered by GPG's defaults. > > > > I have not been able to figure out how to get keylengths greater than > > 3072 for DSA/elgmal or >4094 rsa, so I conclude that generating them is > > unsupported by GPG although GPG can use them. I have seen many people > > saying that these types of key lengths are way more than anyone could > > reasonably need, but I am skeptical. > > > > I am involved in a local Occupy (bet you thought occupy was kaput eh? > > well as it were known it is but that's another story) and frankly we > > aren't just up against one intelligence agency, but all intel agencies > > put together. An entire global class of people. You can argue that > > they may be uninterested in me, however I don't buy that argument at > > all because they have spent (possibly a lot) more than a thousand > > dollars at least on me personally at this point I am sure in policing > > costs to try to survielle and intimidate me, after you divide down. > > > > The eviction alone at my occupy cost (probably greatly) in excess of > > > > $16,000 to arrest 8 people, and involved almost 200 cops for 4 hours. > > There are also estimates made that in the US 1 in 6 "protestors" is > > actually a government agent of one sort or another, dept of defense, > > homeland security, fbi what have you. And that exludes any thugs the > > bankers put in the crowd as privately hired types. > > > > Secondly I want my communications to remain unread into the relatively > > distant future. Given the sort of crap the 1% do wrt murdering and > > maiming vast quantites of people for a couple extra bucks I would not be > > the least bit surprised if 20 years from now they "dissapeared" me > > because I passed our some pamphlets that said "end class war now". > > > > An enemy is an enemy, and enemies must be smooshed, right? Why take > > risks> > > like letting an innocent person live if they might concievable scratch > > your gravy train at some point in the future? Abductions and bullets > > aren't that expensive once you got everything all set up, it's a good > > investement. > > > > > > I'm 23 now and I take various modest precautions to ensure that I have > > the best chance I can to remain in good health when I am 43. Or 63. A > > couple hundred extra milliseconds of decryption/encryption time per > > message for a key longer than 3072 or 4092 sounds like a good choice > > frankly. Is that not what we are looking at? > > > > And yes I recognize that it would be a lot easier for them to plant > > spyware on my computers than break the keys, however they can't plant > > spyware on everone's computer. without people noticing They do slurp > > up and probably store indefinitely all text -and many other- > > communications on the internet (carnivore etc.). In the future, data > > they don't have they can't use. There is always a substantial > > probability that they will not get my keys with spyware, and I would > > like capitalize (If you'll pardon me) on that. > > > > Fourthly a little safety margin never hurt. > > > > I think it should be easier to pick longer keys. Also info should be > > included in the compendium regarding practical aspects of key choice, > > like a table that shows how long it takes to encrypt a symmetric key > > with > > 2048, 4092 etc. Or event just a table in which you select your > > adversary, then your time horizon, and it tells you what key lengths are > > suitable, with due warnings and notes regarding the possibility of > > quantum computers, mathematical advances etc. > > > > I understand that no matter how long the keys are it's still only a > > relatively small part of the equation. However I thought it was the > > norm > > to pick something that basically eliminated concern about the encryption > > being broken, so one could forget about that part and focus on the > > rest.of your security worries. > > > > My trust in GPG has been disturbed by this state of affairs. I thought > > I > > could just trust the defaults but I am finding that they may not really > > include the safety margin that people desire. I shudder to think of > > people who are doing more serious stuff in the class war than little ol' > > me (which isn't hard). > > > > Links: > > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSA_%28algorithm%29 > > -http://www.schneier.com/essay-368.html < note that this was written in > > 1998 http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2004 this one in > > particular makes it clear that it is not unreasonable for someone in my > > position to choose a 4096 bit key. > > > > > > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Key_length wikipedia says the U.S. > > Government requires 192 or 256-bit AES keys for highly sensitive data. > > A 3072 bit RSA or elGamal key is about equivalent to 128 bit symmetric > > key, right? And a 256 bit key length equivalent public key is abut > > 15,387 bits.. I think if people want to use the same level of > > encryption for their data that the government uses shouldn't that be > > supported at least in command line mode? > > http://www.win.tue.nl/~klenstra/aes_match.pdf good paper on > > equivalencies > > in computation and cost of public key vs. symmetric. > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Gnupg-users mailing list > > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users > > Some say that all the power of the universe - and all the time its been in > existence will not crack a 2048 bit key with a secure passphrase. So by > the time the universe is well and truly over and some poor sod of a > government agent is alive and well he will not have cracked yer e-mails > or indeed any encrypted data. Can you imagine that power from a computer? > No. The mind boggles at the energy it would consume - a million million > million ad infinitum suns. > > But they "key" to all this is them holding your private key - it would be > quicker and a lot simpler to crush your balls with a pair of pliers - you > will give up your most treasured possession - your passphrase. This is > the meaning of brute force attacks on your key. > > The strength of your passphrase is critical alpha numerics take the whole > universe to crack where as a phrase like: > > "marymary&%/*had*)/+a:+=little$?"KL$Donkey#*hadxxxabad%$*JHGbadIUNG6**leg^ > )andalways@#][a\|little-0UHKTwalkedUKL:@?^wonkey > > > is a good key it will last you forever - if you can stand having your > balls crushed. So the best form of security would be to invest in a > sturdy steel codpiece and a long passphrase. > > David "everything that could be invented has been invented" "640k ought to be enough for anybody" Do we really have to repeat the history? Regards, -- Hubert Kario QBS - Quality Business Software 02-656 Warszawa, ul. Ksawer?w 30/85 tel. +48 (22) 646-61-51, 646-74-24 www.qbs.com.pl From christoph.anton.mitterer at physik.uni-muenchen.de Tue May 22 19:34:42 2012 From: christoph.anton.mitterer at physik.uni-muenchen.de (Christoph Anton Mitterer) Date: Tue, 22 May 2012 19:34:42 +0200 Subject: Some people say longer keys are silly. I think they should be supported by gpg. In-Reply-To: <4FBBB5D7.7010307@digitalbrains.com> References: <20120522.085848.109.2@GGHJK5> <1337693944.9147.33.camel@gar-ws-etp71.garching.physik.uni-muenchen.de> <4FBBB5D7.7010307@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <1337708082.3376.11.camel@fermat.scientia.net> On Tue, 2012-05-22 at 17:50 +0200, Peter Lebbing wrote: > Or bugs only affecting large keys are not found because so few people use it, > and it becomes an attack vector affecting only those using large keys. While this could happen, I'd guess it would be rather vice versa.... And eventually larger key sizes may become common (as it always happened so far) and then we'd stumble across such problems anyway... better now, where larger key sizes are not yet needed.... Chris. From John at enigmail.net Tue May 22 19:54:31 2012 From: John at enigmail.net (John Clizbe) Date: Tue, 22 May 2012 12:54:31 -0500 Subject: Some people say longer keys are silly. I think they should be supported by gpg. In-Reply-To: <20120522.085848.109.2@GGHJK5> References: <20120522.085848.109.2@GGHJK5> Message-ID: <4FBBD2D7.1040805@enigmail.net> tim.kachao at gmail.com wrote: > I think it should be okay to dredge up this topic ever couple years. From > what I am reading, links below, I do not feel comfortable with the key > length and algorithmic security offered by GPG's defaults. [I think I write this same email on one list or another at least once per year] That is your right. Come back with the math if you wish to convince many of us of your position. > I have not been able to figure out how to get keylengths greater than 3072 > for DSA/elgmal or >4094 rsa, so I conclude that generating them is > unsupported by GPG although GPG can use them. I have seen many people > saying that these types of key lengths are way more than anyone could > reasonably need, but I am skeptical. You do what has been done in the past, you hack the source. BTW, the NSA whose second primary mission is securing the communication of the US Gov't says 2048-3072 is as far as that technology goes. At that length the switch should be made to ECC. NIST who sets the standards for the rest of the Gov't and much of business agree. > > > I'm 23 now and I take various modest precautions to ensure that I have the > best chance I can to remain in good health when I am 43. Or 63. A couple > hundred extra milliseconds of decryption/encryption time per message for > a key longer than 3072 or 4092 sounds like a good choice frankly. Is > that not what we are looking at? Pssst, they're not going to try to break your encryption, they have easier methods of stalking and watching you. > And yes I recognize that it would be a lot easier for them to plant spyware > on my computers than break the keys, however they can't plant spyware on > everone's computer. without people noticing They do slurp up and > probably store indefinitely all text -and many other- communications on > the internet (carnivore etc.). In the future, data they don't have they > can't use. There is always a substantial probability that they will not > get my keys with spyware, and I would like capitalize (If you'll pardon > me) on that. > > Fourthly a little safety margin never hurt. Except when they're are easier ways to achieve equal or better security > > I think it should be easier to pick longer keys. Also info should be > included in the compendium regarding practical aspects of key choice, > like a table that shows how long it takes to encrypt a symmetric key with > 2048, 4092 etc. Or event just a table in which you select your > adversary, then your time horizon, and it tells you what key lengths are > suitable, with due warnings and notes regarding the possibility of > quantum computers, mathematical advances etc. 4092 bit keys will never come into vogue except among a small group of people who think they are "better". > I understand that no matter how long the keys are it's still only a > relatively small part of the equation. However I thought it was the norm > to pick something that basically eliminated concern about the encryption > being broken, so one could forget about that part and focus on the > rest.of your security worries. > > My trust in GPG has been disturbed by this state of affairs. I thought I > could just trust the defaults but I am finding that they may not really > include the safety margin that people desire. I shudder to think of > people who are doing more serious stuff in the class war than little ol' > me (which isn't hard). The defaults in GnuPG are quite safe. You're understanding of them needs a bit of work. > Links: > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSA_%28algorithm%29 > -http://www.schneier.com/essay-368.html < note that this was written in 1998 > http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2004 this one in particular makes > it clear that it is not unreasonable for someone in my position to choose > a 4096 bit key. Specific predictions about Cryptography far in the future should be taken with a LARGE grain of salt. Most of the RSA 8192 ideas come from Schneier's Applied Crypotograthy. Bruce Schneier has done a lot of great work, but relying on 14-year-old advice for RSA key sizes ignores current work and best practice thought in cryptography Over the summer (2010), readers of the [Cryptography] mailing list were reminded that in 1993 folks thought that 1024-bit RSA 'should be ok (safe from key-factoring attacks) for "a few decades".' 1.75 decades later it's essentially history. > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Key_length wikipedia says the U.S. Government > requires 192 or 256-bit AES keys for highly sensitive data. A 3072 bit > RSA or elGamal key is about equivalent to 128 bit symmetric key, right? > And a 256 bit key length equivalent public key is abut 15,387 bits.. I > think if people want to use the same level of encryption for their data > that the government uses shouldn't that be supported at least in command > line mode? > http://www.win.tue.nl/~klenstra/aes_match.pdf good paper on equivalencies > in computation and cost of public key vs. symmetric. past RSA key sizes of 2048-3072, the migration is to Elliptic Curve Crypto (ECC). Huge RSA keys do not scale for most Internet usages (PKI/TLS/SSL). NO ONE is recommending 4096 RSA or DSA, not because it's unsafe but it's computationally unwieldy, especially on small devices. At asymmetric key sizes of 3072 bits, the smart money is moving to Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). How does ECC compare to RSA _today_? >From the National Institutes of Science and Technology (one of the gold standards for engineering know-how): RSA ECC Sym 1024 160 80 2048 224 112 3072 256 128 7680 384 192 15360 512 256 (One may add a 'Hash' column by doubling the values in the Symmetric Encryption column.) These recommendations can be found on page 63 of NIST Special Publication 800-57, Recommendations for Key Management, Part I. 2nd Revision, 8 Mar, 2007. [http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-57/sp800-57-Part1-revised2_Mar08-2007.pdf] All three parts of SP800-57 are available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsSPs.html The NSA's 2010 Suite-B [http://www.nsa.gov/ia/programs/suiteb_cryptography/index.shtml] recommendations are: Type Symmetric Elliptic Curve Hash Secret 128 256 256 Top Secret 256 384 384 A key aspect of Suite B is its use of elliptic curve technology instead of classical public key technology. During the transition to the use of elliptic curve cryptography in ECDH and ECDSA, DH, DSA and RSA can be used with a 2048-bit modulus to protect classified information up to the _secret_ level [http://www.keylength.com/en/6/]. So, depending on the source, a consensus seems to be forming that beyond a 2048 or 3072 bit modulus for DSA2 or RSA, folks need to switch to ECC. 2048-RSA is the current default in GnuPG. OpenPGP cards will support up to 3072-bit RSA; GnuPG up to 4096-bit RSA and 3072-bit DSA2. ECC in OpenPGP is on its way toward becoming a RFC and being included in OpenPGP. Larger and larger RSA keys aren't the solution, ECC is. The balance of power has tipped away from RSA and toward ECC. The Internet Draft for ECC in OpenPGP [https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jivsov-openpgp-ecc-11] is in the Final Comment period with comments due by 2012-04-09. I imagine it will be voted on soon, and approved. ECC is already mostly in place in GnuPG 2.0. Feel free to ignore everything I've told you. There's no reason you should trust me. But by all means, keep asking questions and read the /authoritative/ articles and documents. -- John P. Clizbe Inet: John (a) Gingerbear DAWT net SKS/Enigmail/PGP-EKP or: John ( @ ) Enigmail DAWT net FSF Assoc #995 / FSFE Fellow #1797 hkp://keyserver.gingerbear.net or mailto:pgp-public-keys at gingerbear.net?subject=HELP Q:"Just how do the residents of Haiku, Hawai'i hold conversations?" A:"An odd melody / island voices on the winds / surplus of vowels" From david at gbenet.com Tue May 22 20:00:18 2012 From: david at gbenet.com (david at gbenet.com) Date: Tue, 22 May 2012 19:00:18 +0100 Subject: Some people say longer keys are silly. I think they should be supported by gpg. In-Reply-To: <3298082.8Tiu87piaL@bursa22> References: <20120522.085848.109.2@GGHJK5> <4FBB87CC.7010706@gbenet.com> <3298082.8Tiu87piaL@bursa22> Message-ID: <4FBBD432.80007@gbenet.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 22/05/12 18:23, Hubert Kario wrote: > On Tuesday 22 of May 2012 13:34:20 david at gbenet.com wrote: >> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 >> >> On 22/05/12 09:58, tim.kachao at gmail.com wrote: >>> I think it should be okay to dredge up this topic ever couple years. From what I am >>> reading, links below, I do not feel comfortable with the key length and >>> algorithmic security offered by GPG's defaults. >>> >>> I have not been able to figure out how to get keylengths greater than 3072 for >>> DSA/elgmal or >4094 rsa, so I conclude that generating them is unsupported by GPG >>> although GPG can use them. I have seen many people saying that these types of key >>> lengths are way more than anyone could reasonably need, but I am skeptical. >>> >>> I am involved in a local Occupy (bet you thought occupy was kaput eh? well as it >>> were known it is but that's another story) and frankly we aren't just up against >>> one intelligence agency, but all intel agencies put together. An entire global >>> class of people. You can argue that they may be uninterested in me, however I >>> don't buy that argument at all because they have spent (possibly a lot) more than a >>> thousand dollars at least on me personally at this point I am sure in policing >>> costs to try to survielle and intimidate me, after you divide down. >>> >>> The eviction alone at my occupy cost (probably greatly) in excess of >>> >>> $16,000 to arrest 8 people, and involved almost 200 cops for 4 hours. There are >>> also estimates made that in the US 1 in 6 "protestors" is actually a government >>> agent of one sort or another, dept of defense, homeland security, fbi what have >>> you. And that exludes any thugs the bankers put in the crowd as privately hired >>> types. >>> >>> Secondly I want my communications to remain unread into the relatively distant >>> future. Given the sort of crap the 1% do wrt murdering and maiming vast quantites >>> of people for a couple extra bucks I would not be the least bit surprised if 20 >>> years from now they "dissapeared" me because I passed our some pamphlets that said >>> "end class war now". >>> >>> An enemy is an enemy, and enemies must be smooshed, right? Why take risks> like >>> letting an innocent person live if they might concievable scratch your gravy train >>> at some point in the future? Abductions and bullets aren't that expensive once you >>> got everything all set up, it's a good investement. >>> >>> >>> I'm 23 now and I take various modest precautions to ensure that I have the best >>> chance I can to remain in good health when I am 43. Or 63. A couple hundred extra >>> milliseconds of decryption/encryption time per message for a key longer than 3072 >>> or 4092 sounds like a good choice frankly. Is that not what we are looking at? >>> >>> And yes I recognize that it would be a lot easier for them to plant spyware on my >>> computers than break the keys, however they can't plant spyware on everone's >>> computer. without people noticing They do slurp up and probably store indefinitely >>> all text -and many other- communications on the internet (carnivore etc.). In the >>> future, data they don't have they can't use. There is always a substantial >>> probability that they will not get my keys with spyware, and I would like >>> capitalize (If you'll pardon me) on that. >>> >>> Fourthly a little safety margin never hurt. >>> >>> I think it should be easier to pick longer keys. Also info should be included in >>> the compendium regarding practical aspects of key choice, like a table that shows >>> how long it takes to encrypt a symmetric key with 2048, 4092 etc. Or event just a >>> table in which you select your adversary, then your time horizon, and it tells you >>> what key lengths are suitable, with due warnings and notes regarding the >>> possibility of quantum computers, mathematical advances etc. >>> >>> I understand that no matter how long the keys are it's still only a relatively >>> small part of the equation. However I thought it was the norm to pick something >>> that basically eliminated concern about the encryption being broken, so one could >>> forget about that part and focus on the rest.of your security worries. >>> >>> My trust in GPG has been disturbed by this state of affairs. I thought I could >>> just trust the defaults but I am finding that they may not really include the >>> safety margin that people desire. I shudder to think of people who are doing more >>> serious stuff in the class war than little ol' me (which isn't hard). >>> >>> Links: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSA_%28algorithm%29 >>> -http://www.schneier.com/essay-368.html < note that this was written in 1998 >>> http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2004 this one in particular makes it clear >>> that it is not unreasonable for someone in my position to choose a 4096 bit key. >>> >>> >>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Key_length wikipedia says the U.S. Government requires >>> 192 or 256-bit AES keys for highly sensitive data. A 3072 bit RSA or elGamal key is >>> about equivalent to 128 bit symmetric key, right? And a 256 bit key length >>> equivalent public key is abut 15,387 bits.. I think if people want to use the same >>> level of encryption for their data that the government uses shouldn't that be >>> supported at least in command line mode? >>> http://www.win.tue.nl/~klenstra/aes_match.pdf good paper on equivalencies in >>> computation and cost of public key vs. symmetric. >>> >>> _______________________________________________ Gnupg-users mailing list >>> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users >> >> Some say that all the power of the universe - and all the time its been in existence >> will not crack a 2048 bit key with a secure passphrase. So by the time the universe >> is well and truly over and some poor sod of a government agent is alive and well he >> will not have cracked yer e-mails or indeed any encrypted data. Can you imagine that >> power from a computer? No. The mind boggles at the energy it would consume - a >> million million million ad infinitum suns. >> >> But they "key" to all this is them holding your private key - it would be quicker and >> a lot simpler to crush your balls with a pair of pliers - you will give up your most >> treasured possession - your passphrase. This is the meaning of brute force attacks on >> your key. >> >> The strength of your passphrase is critical alpha numerics take the whole universe to >> crack where as a phrase like: >> >> "marymary&%/*had*)/+a:+=little$?"KL$Donkey#*hadxxxabad%$*JHGbadIUNG6**leg^ >> )andalways@#][a\|little-0UHKTwalkedUKL:@?^wonkey >> >> >> is a good key it will last you forever - if you can stand having your balls crushed. >> So the best form of security would be to invest in a sturdy steel codpiece and a long >> passphrase. >> >> David > > "everything that could be invented has been invented" > > "640k ought to be enough for anybody" > > Do we really have to repeat the history? > > Regards, Ah I missed out the foil hat - the invisibility cloak and the light absorbing paint - oh well - I noticed that no one was in any kind of paranoid rush to send encrypted e-mails :) David - -- ?See the sanity of the man! No gods, no angels, no demons, no body. Nothing of the kind.Stern, sane,every brain-cell perfect and complete even at the moment of death. No delusion.? https://linuxcounter.net/user/512854.html - http://gbenet.com -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJPu9QeAAoJEOJpqm7flREx9dAH/3/glUi2F0wYFA/jkhlDKswT lIhcTtnSBQOscjMCVnmEOThHRdOMdpui8hsWnxuYjEAI94Adzs+0piFyuio86+P2 zJR2cVz3B1/GTS1jErKjByQiYhk8RbxYDLGCxY69gMMp0usEpWyBDCiFAFONab0H ERUfhiue4hXaeS1Yi71CkelXGgHw689BLSTGQXUeQFCuZW4JuJ8VNeOWA6hMtX5c N7p3q+oAE3epxQU10Dg5doCcGJE2KGP44S8PbS+rlOHEwkm8nYHNuxZJXUjaLcMk TRAI+fGp8bzjFXfXGBnmrMS4dIZ8Eu9UEVsz3cW9mjpQgb1UrvmbSW+gVguDgps= =aYwi -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From peter at digitalbrains.com Tue May 22 20:03:24 2012 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Tue, 22 May 2012 20:03:24 +0200 Subject: Some people say longer keys are silly. I think they should be supported by gpg. In-Reply-To: <4FBBC86D.30405@sixdemonbag.org> References: <20120522.085848.109.2@GGHJK5> <4FBBC86D.30405@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <4FBBD4EC.3040505@digitalbrains.com> On 22/05/12 19:10, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > Your claim may lead people to writing off your movement on the grounds > that one of two things are true. Either: > > - "They're a bunch of crazies who think that even the park > rangers are after them," > - Or, "holy Toledo, even the park rangers are after them!" > > It seems unlikely to me that either one will engender much support. If > people think the former, then the movement is crazy and can be written > off. If people think the latter, then it's incredibly dangerous to > stand too close to you and no one will show up to your protests. This presupposes that "people" will equate the whole movement with this single individual. This is definitely not unlikely, though :-) [1] Peter. [1] After all, *all* people generalise! ;) -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at http://wwwhome.cs.utwente.nl/~lebbing/pubkey.txt From peter at digitalbrains.com Tue May 22 20:09:41 2012 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Tue, 22 May 2012 20:09:41 +0200 Subject: Some people say longer keys are silly. I think they should be supported by gpg. In-Reply-To: <4FBBD432.80007@gbenet.com> References: <20120522.085848.109.2@GGHJK5> <4FBB87CC.7010706@gbenet.com> <3298082.8Tiu87piaL@bursa22> <4FBBD432.80007@gbenet.com> Message-ID: <4FBBD665.9020300@digitalbrains.com> On 22/05/12 20:00, david at gbenet.com wrote: > On 22/05/12 18:23, Hubert Kario wrote: [...snip...] David and Hubert, could you please trim the quotes in your replies? I'm typing this with one hand because my scroll finger is cramping... ;) j/k Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at http://wwwhome.cs.utwente.nl/~lebbing/pubkey.txt From david at gbenet.com Tue May 22 20:14:09 2012 From: david at gbenet.com (david at gbenet.com) Date: Tue, 22 May 2012 19:14:09 +0100 Subject: Some people say longer keys are silly. I think they should be supported by gpg. In-Reply-To: <4FBBD665.9020300@digitalbrains.com> References: <20120522.085848.109.2@GGHJK5> <4FBB87CC.7010706@gbenet.com> <3298082.8Tiu87piaL@bursa22> <4FBBD432.80007@gbenet.com> <4FBBD665.9020300@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <4FBBD771.7080106@gbenet.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 22/05/12 19:09, Peter Lebbing wrote: Oh all right :) Ha! Ha! David - no offence meant btw :) just so funny :) - -- ?See the sanity of the man! No gods, no angels, no demons, no body. Nothing of the kind.Stern, sane,every brain-cell perfect and complete even at the moment of death. No delusion.? https://linuxcounter.net/user/512854.html - http://gbenet.com -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJPu9dwAAoJEOJpqm7flRExb0oH/Alv+svuTQ2P+b1XfT05ke1u c62vV/LXL4n8XM9WmSd0DRm9qjpmJ77KdRR4cn5RCsz9CdiaFTQGVuB44EGWkudt RYTxiSnirn+hpZ31PWnvT6SNNN06xJFevTLpNt33oF1POC7Jfuz618LAi6VIWK3U 6IBY7QLqx+BxcJmRWpayXYcvCBCP0NBN2wi1ay5mwnHcXiaxHs7pg2M+sXaWXeun Iiiiz7MmnJGIzeBhvp8jO4gqoJ68LpnBRAH43D0DQ33EA/T2AkVxGVUQwTxLtIdp ful2lQbA3q3oOnWD61pMz+nlCDQeMHo8lc+YU468DD0vT7Ds2cd03gc7fbewBds= =A1dH -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de Tue May 22 20:26:14 2012 From: mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de (Hauke Laging) Date: Tue, 22 May 2012 20:26:14 +0200 Subject: Some people say longer keys are silly. I think they should be supported by gpg. In-Reply-To: <87ehqcrz9z.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <20120522.085848.109.2@GGHJK5> <87ehqcrz9z.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <2229151.TVjeFaZsDS@inno> Given the frequency of this discussion and the amount of effort takes by the participants: Wouldn't it make sense to make this a FAQ entry? Hauke -- PGP: D44C 6A5B 71B0 427C CED3 025C BD7D 6D27 ECCB 5814 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 555 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Tue May 22 20:40:07 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Tue, 22 May 2012 14:40:07 -0400 Subject: Some people say longer keys are silly. I think they should be supported by gpg. In-Reply-To: <2229151.TVjeFaZsDS@inno> References: <20120522.085848.109.2@GGHJK5> <87ehqcrz9z.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <2229151.TVjeFaZsDS@inno> Message-ID: <4FBBDD87.30704@sixdemonbag.org> On 5/22/12 2:26 PM, Hauke Laging wrote: > Given the frequency of this discussion and the amount of effort takes by the > participants: Wouldn't it make sense to make this a FAQ entry? I think so, yes. The question is who's going to write it? I suspect Werner doesn't have the time. If he wants, I would be happy to take a stab at writing it. From Lists.gnupg at mephisto.fastmail.net Tue May 22 20:46:03 2012 From: Lists.gnupg at mephisto.fastmail.net (Kevin Kammer) Date: Tue, 22 May 2012 14:46:03 -0400 Subject: Some people say longer keys are silly. I think they should be supported by gpg. In-Reply-To: <2229151.TVjeFaZsDS@inno> References: <20120522.085848.109.2@GGHJK5> <87ehqcrz9z.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <2229151.TVjeFaZsDS@inno> Message-ID: <20120522184603.GC756@Clarus.mgh.harvard.edu> On Tue, May 22, 2012 at 08:26:14PM +0200 Also sprach Hauke Laging: > Given the frequency of this discussion and the amount of effort takes by the > participants: Wouldn't it make sense to make this a FAQ entry? Honestly now, do you think having a FAQ entry stops this topic resurrecting every few months? Either someone will take issue with what is said in the FAQ, or they (most likely) do not read it at all. From John at enigmail.net Tue May 22 20:48:26 2012 From: John at enigmail.net (John Clizbe) Date: Tue, 22 May 2012 13:48:26 -0500 Subject: Some people say longer keys are silly. I think they should be supported by gpg. In-Reply-To: <20120522.085848.109.2@GGHJK5> References: <20120522.085848.109.2@GGHJK5> Message-ID: <4FBBDF7A.5090208@enigmail.net> tim.kachao at gmail.com wrote: > I think it should be okay to dredge up this topic ever couple years. From > what I am reading, links below, I do not feel comfortable with the key > length and algorithmic security offered by GPG's defaults. > > I have not been able to figure out how to get keylengths greater than 3072 > for DSA/elgmal or >4094 rsa, so I conclude that generating them is > unsupported by GPG although GPG can use them. I have seen many people > saying that these types of key lengths are way more than anyone could > reasonably need, but I am skeptical. > > I am involved in a local Occupy (bet you thought occupy was kaput eh? well > as it were known it is but that's another story) and frankly we aren't > just up against one intelligence agency, but all intel agencies put > together. An entire global class of people. You can argue that they may > be uninterested in me, however I don't buy that argument at all because > they have spent (possibly a lot) more than a thousand dollars at least on > me personally at this point I am sure in policing costs to try to > survielle and intimidate me, after you divide down. > I was wondering... Does your group communicate with one another using cell phones? I ask not because of the irony of protesting globalization on cell phones, but because of the cell phone industry's woefully poor record on ecryption technology. What about WiFi? Do the public Access Points you all use use encryption? Is it stronger than WEP? what about someone plugging in a Snooper in the wiring closet of that StarBucks or McDonald's? _IF_ THEY are /really/ watching you, they've used cameras to watch you type in your passphrase, and windows and Gmail passwords. They may have used a weakness in CIFS to copy your keyrings. All this and you're worried about overkill on the one place they WON'T attack? No one attacks the crypto. They're are too many easier routes. If you're /really/ worried about privacy and security, get your priorities straightened out. bin Laden didn't use cell phones, not because he was a techno-Luddite, but because he understood the risks of using them. You need to get a handle on all the risks of all the technology you use. -John PS: Leave the tinfoil hat at home, it draws undue attention to you. -- John P. Clizbe Inet: John (a) Gingerbear DAWT net SKS/Enigmail/PGP-EKP or: John ( @ ) Enigmail DAWT net FSF Assoc #995 / FSFE Fellow #1797 hkp://keyserver.gingerbear.net or mailto:pgp-public-keys at gingerbear.net?subject=HELP Q:"Just how do the residents of Haiku, Hawai'i hold conversations?" A:"An odd melody / island voices on the winds / surplus of vowels" From avi.wiki at gmail.com Tue May 22 21:10:31 2012 From: avi.wiki at gmail.com (Avi) Date: Tue, 22 May 2012 15:10:31 -0400 Subject: Some people say longer keys are silly. I think they should be supported by gpg. Message-ID: On Tue, May 22, 2012 at 1:50 PM, wrote: > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > From: "Robert J. Hansen" > To: gnupg-users at gnupg.org > Cc: > Date: Tue, 22 May 2012 14:40:07 -0400 > Subject: Re: Some people say longer keys are silly. I think they should be supported by gpg. > On 5/22/12 2:26 PM, Hauke Laging wrote: >> Given the frequency of this discussion and the amount of effort takes by the >> participants: Wouldn't it make sense to make this a FAQ entry? > > I think so, yes. The question is who's going to write it? I suspect > Werner doesn't have the time. If he wants, I would be happy to take a > stab at writing it. Didn't you already write a pretty good one one, Robert? --Avi ---- User:Avraham pub 3072D/F80E29F9 1/30/2009 Avi (Wikimedia-related key) ?? Primary key fingerprint: 167C 063F 7981 A1F6 71EC ABAA 0D62 B019 F80E 29F9 From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Tue May 22 21:14:33 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Tue, 22 May 2012 15:14:33 -0400 Subject: Some people say longer keys are silly. I think they should be supported by gpg. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <4FBBE599.9080409@sixdemonbag.org> On 5/22/12 3:10 PM, Avi wrote: > Didn't you already write a pretty good one one, Robert? > It's hubris for an author to refer to his own work. :) Also, that FAQ is in desperate need of a rewrite. Nothing in it is wrong, per se, but it needs a rewrite. From mlists at robin-kipp.net Tue May 22 20:06:40 2012 From: mlists at robin-kipp.net (Robin Kipp) Date: Tue, 22 May 2012 20:06:40 +0200 Subject: Testing GPG EMail encryption Message-ID: <8A981623-00E9-4DCB-8470-17EF24F778E2@robin-kipp.net> Hello all, well, as of today, I finally decided to start signing my EMail messages using GPG to prove the integrety of my messages. As I am primarily using Mac OS, I downloaded MacGPG (http://gpgtools.org), installed it and set it all up. As I'm completely blind, I first had some issues with MacGPG, as it uses a special window (called, I think, the PINEntry window) to ask for the passphrase. Unfortunately, this window isn't accessible using VoiceOver, the screenreader built into Mac OS. However, I was now able to come up with a workaround and now it seems as if I can sign and encrypt messages without much trouble. I've informed the MacGPG developers about the accessibility issues in their software, and they seem very committed to solving it in an upcoming version. If anyone is interested, the related ticket can be found at http://gpgtools.lighthouseapp.com/projects/66001-macgpg2/tickets/94-pinentry-window-not-recognized-by-voiceover Now, I'd really like to test out EMail encryption so that I can verify this works properly, but for that, of course, I need one other party also using GPG. So, I was wondering, would it be possible for any of the GPG users on here to contact me offlist so that we could try this out once? If anyone on here would be willing to do that, I'd greatly appreciate that! Thanks for any help :-) Best regards, Robin. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 495 bytes Desc: Message signed with OpenPGP using GPGMail URL: From jerry at seibercom.net Tue May 22 21:27:41 2012 From: jerry at seibercom.net (Jerry) Date: Tue, 22 May 2012 15:27:41 -0400 Subject: Some people say longer keys are silly. I think they should be supported by gpg. In-Reply-To: <4FBBDF7A.5090208@enigmail.net> References: <20120522.085848.109.2@GGHJK5> <4FBBDF7A.5090208@enigmail.net> Message-ID: <20120522152741.42858fb5@scorpio> On Tue, 22 May 2012 13:48:26 -0500 John Clizbe articulated: >All this and you're worried about overkill on the one place they WON'T >attack? No one attacks the crypto. They're are too many easier routes. >If you're /really/ worried about privacy and security, get your >priorities straightened out. bin Laden didn't use cell phones, not >because he was a techno-Luddite, but because he understood the risks >of using them. You need to get a handle on all the risks of all the >technology you use. Interestingly enough, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed turned on his cell phone for the first time in nearly a year and the NSA was able to pinpoint his location and arrest him in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, in March 2003. -- Jerry ? Disclaimer: off-list followups get on-list replies or get ignored. Please do not ignore the Reply-To header. __________________________________________________________________ From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Tue May 22 21:39:44 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Tue, 22 May 2012 15:39:44 -0400 Subject: Testing GPG EMail encryption In-Reply-To: <8A981623-00E9-4DCB-8470-17EF24F778E2@robin-kipp.net> References: <8A981623-00E9-4DCB-8470-17EF24F778E2@robin-kipp.net> Message-ID: <4FBBEB80.8010105@sixdemonbag.org> On 5/22/12 2:06 PM, Robin Kipp wrote: > Now, I'd really like to test out EMail encryption so that I can verify > this works properly, but for that, of course, I need one other party > also using GPG. (Responded to on-list so that people can know your request has been answered, otherwise you'll get drowned in dozens of responses) Feel free to send an encrypted/signed email my way. The certificate is available from the keyservers: gpg --keyserver keyservers.org --recv-key 0xD6B98E10 I look forward to helping get you set up and straightened out! :) From mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de Tue May 22 21:50:40 2012 From: mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de (Hauke Laging) Date: Tue, 22 May 2012 21:50:40 +0200 Subject: Some people say longer keys are silly. I think they should be supported by gpg. In-Reply-To: <20120522184603.GC756@Clarus.mgh.harvard.edu> References: <20120522.085848.109.2@GGHJK5> <2229151.TVjeFaZsDS@inno> <20120522184603.GC756@Clarus.mgh.harvard.edu> Message-ID: <2404380.Per2I9mYWi@inno> Am Di 22.05.2012, 14:46:03 schrieb Kevin Kammer: > On Tue, May 22, 2012 at 08:26:14PM +0200 Also sprach Hauke Laging: > > Given the frequency of this discussion and the amount of effort takes by > > the participants: Wouldn't it make sense to make this a FAQ entry? > > Honestly now, do you think having a FAQ entry stops this topic > resurrecting every few months? No, but I don't see that as a problem. I think the question / proposal would come up at about the same frequency but would end in one reply pointing at the FAQ entry instead of now (do you want to count...?) emails. Hauke -- PGP: D44C 6A5B 71B0 427C CED3 025C BD7D 6D27 ECCB 5814 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 555 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From wk at gnupg.org Tue May 22 22:38:23 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Tue, 22 May 2012 22:38:23 +0200 Subject: Some people say longer keys are silly. I think they should be supported by gpg. In-Reply-To: <4FBBDD87.30704@sixdemonbag.org> (Robert J. Hansen's message of "Tue, 22 May 2012 14:40:07 -0400") References: <20120522.085848.109.2@GGHJK5> <87ehqcrz9z.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <2229151.TVjeFaZsDS@inno> <4FBBDD87.30704@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <877gw4rlxc.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Tue, 22 May 2012 20:40, rjh at sixdemonbag.org said: > I think so, yes. The question is who's going to write it? I suspect > Werner doesn't have the time. If he wants, I would be happy to take a > stab at writing it. Please go ahead. Plain text optionally with org-mode formatting. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From wk at gnupg.org Tue May 22 22:52:09 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Tue, 22 May 2012 22:52:09 +0200 Subject: GPG 1.4.x, 2.x, ECC, and portability In-Reply-To: (Avi's message of "Tue, 22 May 2012 11:29:28 -0400") References: <873972xxyw.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <87y5otwzy5.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <87ipfoshjr.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <87396srlae.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Tue, 22 May 2012 17:29, avi.wiki at gmail.com said: > That would be great! To close the loop, could the installer be > modified to ask if the current install is portable and then create > that file before the rest of the install to make it seamless? I am not keen to add yet another visible option. However, there are command line parameters which can be employed to do this. But then you need a script anyway and that script could also create that file. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From mlists at robin-kipp.net Tue May 22 23:37:46 2012 From: mlists at robin-kipp.net (Robin Kipp) Date: Tue, 22 May 2012 23:37:46 +0200 Subject: Testing GPG EMail encryption In-Reply-To: <8A981623-00E9-4DCB-8470-17EF24F778E2@robin-kipp.net> References: <8A981623-00E9-4DCB-8470-17EF24F778E2@robin-kipp.net> Message-ID: <451490E5-57F6-48D6-9C17-12B6B3098AB3@robin-kipp.net> Hello all, thanks a lot for that! Actually, I'm quite flattered by the amount of encrypted messages that came in over the last few minutes from all of you who wanted to help, I honestly wouldn't have expected so much feedback! I'll definitely reply to all of you who took the time and effort to reply to me with an encrypted message so that I could try and decrypt it in order to make it readable. Actually, I succeeded in decrypting all of them, but the exercise also showed that my workaround is far from being flawless. Nevertheless, it's been a lot of fun reading all the messages that ended up in my inbox, and I'll definitely reply during the next few hours!!! This is a great community, and I'm really glad that I'm now part of it - keep up the great work everyone!!! :-) Best wishes, Robin. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 495 bytes Desc: Message signed with OpenPGP using GPGMail URL: From mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de Tue May 22 23:52:51 2012 From: mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de (Hauke Laging) Date: Tue, 22 May 2012 23:52:51 +0200 Subject: Testing GPG EMail encryption In-Reply-To: <451490E5-57F6-48D6-9C17-12B6B3098AB3@robin-kipp.net> References: <8A981623-00E9-4DCB-8470-17EF24F778E2@robin-kipp.net> <451490E5-57F6-48D6-9C17-12B6B3098AB3@robin-kipp.net> Message-ID: <33450129.XK7aaBQoRl@inno> Am Di 22.05.2012, 23:37:46 schrieb Robin Kipp: > Hello all, > thanks a lot for that! Actually, I'm quite flattered by the amount of > encrypted messages that came in over the last few minutes from all of you > who wanted to help I am happy for him but obviously this approach doesn't scale well. :-) I don't know how much the demand is (or could be) but perhaps it would help make more people use OpenPGP to have a round-robin email contact system. Whoever is willing to help new users (like in this case) registers his email address with the languages he's capable of communicating in. A new user could send a mail to de at newusers.gnupg.org en at newusers.gnupg.org ... and the mail would be forwarded to one or two people. OpenPGP-Addons for email software (like Enigmail) could hint the user at this service. Hauke -- PGP: D44C 6A5B 71B0 427C CED3 025C BD7D 6D27 ECCB 5814 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 555 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From faramir.cl at gmail.com Wed May 23 03:28:18 2012 From: faramir.cl at gmail.com (Faramir) Date: Tue, 22 May 2012 21:28:18 -0400 Subject: Some people say longer keys are silly. I think they should be supported by gpg. In-Reply-To: <20120522123303.44ccffeb@scorpio> References: <20120522.085848.109.2@GGHJK5> <20120522081253.67fde581@scorpio> <4FBB9358.2000101@sixdemonbag.org> <20120522123303.44ccffeb@scorpio> Message-ID: <4FBC3D32.7080604@gmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 El 22-05-2012 12:33, Jerry escribi?: ... > that sort of logic. What really amazed me though was that the OP > wants security and yet he uses GMail. "GMail" and "security" are > diametrically opposed concepts. Why? If I send an encrypted message, it doesn't matter if I use gmail, ISP-expensive-crap-mail or any other provider, the message would still be encrypted end-to-end. Of course I'm not talking about composing a message in the webmail editor and then encrypting it, but about using a MUA, like Thunderbird, or maybe composing the message on a text editor, encrypting it and pasting it on the message body (or attaching the encrypted text file). Best Regards -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJPvD0yAAoJEMV4f6PvczxA0BAH/A2prkdtv6LcIC6U1PQcId3v BBbeLL8VeqBZq+XDYqBM1GP56BLH1CFWOXaSrEiIhPsLtaF6TkJLHfA5GEbSwQ+j RkyI5MN1M88ZyTlvbdvm0uSiLzFXEmp9Jtqlwr58C29oTvI1JFwD9SxVKXmOwnSP GHRgG7HBwSiBDFbSnjALE9nW6cDD1J6LwJaGvkD4tmKkJLqPzimoBnJ+o8P3TbdB /AnhGlwaxlQQd0+5cxCiGBZ1NfZAZGmMWqD/1IE3bZMIs3hp/JkA4MDUwP5E8z25 N/nQPgoNb9iaFy0yozycZLEq4qDBHQxvLQNK79tSBe5+B2QJmPEYglxzserNfXA= =o2WG -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From faramir.cl at gmail.com Wed May 23 03:41:13 2012 From: faramir.cl at gmail.com (Faramir) Date: Tue, 22 May 2012 21:41:13 -0400 Subject: Some people say longer keys are silly. I think they should be supported by gpg. In-Reply-To: <4FBB87CC.7010706@gbenet.com> References: <20120522.085848.109.2@GGHJK5> <4FBB87CC.7010706@gbenet.com> Message-ID: <4FBC4039.1040201@gmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 El 22-05-2012 8:34, david at gbenet.com escribi?: ... > Some say that all the power of the universe - and all the time its > been in existence will not crack a 2048 bit key with a secure > passphrase. So by the time the universe is well and That is about if you secret key falls in the hands of somebody wanting to use it. But factoring your public key to obtain a working copy of your secret key is certainly something that may be done before the end of time, and won't require dyson spheres to power the machine. We know one day RSA 2048 will be broken... BUT, the question is: "will it matter to us when it happens?". Maybe I will say "Finally! I will be able to revoke that orphan key I uploaded to keyservers when I was learning how to use GPG... if I could remember the UID it had". We can use RSA 2048 and wait until something stronger is available, or we can go RSA 3072 and be even safer. Or we can even go RSA 4096, and people will say "that's an overkill!!!", all that without modifying GnuPG. Best Regards -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJPvEA5AAoJEMV4f6PvczxAMwoH+wWn0YnqWTjBYe3NIvYaGQyW oIvUsAQu5B9xVRP1wN7f0OJFKoPevcaI0pU5erAs6RGpiHmd35oLYzxGEpsCWE26 YJ37m3mBJCGRk0aOkthT6ugDJ4fEHsm5toj2si9ItJNLq2374+8GMoz++c6Vpbf/ b/y/LaWO3eeZXhtdBCC8OSYKdZiUQ1DYBBFT6WAickgYQJ+hYtRhiq2JQq9SicCA KkWEj/NVB7esOMVoVcrQzAxbivgqKwUyGjpOVTmPlnz2lx19t3j5TAucM9Vhrsab wfY3u4dW6T6X24Pv6WEZmyb14JgEAsK8elehU4dyRTKA+OzOAZr1ihcNOODC/Yg= =I24B -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Wed May 23 04:03:36 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Tue, 22 May 2012 22:03:36 -0400 Subject: Some people say longer keys are silly. I think they should be supported by gpg. In-Reply-To: <4FBC4039.1040201@gmail.com> References: <20120522.085848.109.2@GGHJK5> <4FBB87CC.7010706@gbenet.com> <4FBC4039.1040201@gmail.com> Message-ID: <4FBC4578.2060404@sixdemonbag.org> On 5/22/12 9:41 PM, Faramir wrote: > [F]actoring your public key to obtain a working copy of your secret > key is certainly something that may be done before the end of time, > and won't require dyson spheres to power the machine. I'm not so optimistic. Factoring is a hard problem. We may never develop the technology to factor extremely large composites. Doing so would require either (a) the development of extremely large-scale quantum computing, (b) a mathematical proof of P=NP, or (c) classical computers that run close to the thermodynamic limits of the universe. There are no guarantees we will ever develop any of those three technologies. That said, no one has ever proven that the only way to break RSA is to factor large composites. That's wholly conjecture, and there's some evidence that it's not true. From faramir.cl at gmail.com Wed May 23 04:04:58 2012 From: faramir.cl at gmail.com (Faramir) Date: Tue, 22 May 2012 22:04:58 -0400 Subject: Some people say longer keys are silly. I think they should be supported by gpg. In-Reply-To: <20120522.085848.109.2@GGHJK5> References: <20120522.085848.109.2@GGHJK5> Message-ID: <4FBC45CA.8000405@gmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 El 22-05-2012 4:58, tim.kachao at gmail.com escribi?: ... > There are also estimates made that in the US 1 in 6 "protestors" is > actually a government agent of one sort or another, dept of > defense, homeland security, fbi what have you. And that exludes > any thugs the bankers put in the crowd as privately hired types. If that's the case, it is very likely you will send your messages encrypted to the Super-Secure 32.768 bits RSA key belonging to infiltrated agent... which of course won't have to break the key to read it, because he already has the key. Best Regards -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJPvEXKAAoJEMV4f6PvczxAcLkH/3dOjOpou//Auk4bIwizLodI u6PvxBYW8P0rrdg3/1QUDWoj2mXA6AoaihbPe5LcmXH3fTgA06Y3i1zndzAfAPrD 7IGve7Km08ew6muutPmKnq0jk8nHhLJ6b1P1llD8ePky5nsppBVH0kT9gNFDQzbv oRXLs4hcKS3DIs49BQnQswE8upgl72HcR9ozU95ptTsayewv1n57PZg+cj8o0dNT N56kZ1YfJqZqx8uImV1fT8Oh658V5HDn3Fvx58s6M5r6WVbGynN9ZyPeL3uFNYpQ wtZNHKK4Zc7XE/7n87IUy6/D8bH+rQTvbHWBiYa0rhs7H5JJqejEnkZMRSCPUsg= =yKPa -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From dkg at fifthhorseman.net Wed May 23 07:03:47 2012 From: dkg at fifthhorseman.net (Daniel Kahn Gillmor) Date: Wed, 23 May 2012 01:03:47 -0400 Subject: gpgsm: (pinentry:24664): GLib-GObject-CRITICAL **: Object class GtkSecureEntry doesn't implement property 'editing-canceled' from interface 'GtkCellEditable' Message-ID: <8762bnlc98.fsf@pip.fifthhorseman.net> Hi GnuPG folks-- I'm experimenting with gpgsm. I'm using pinentry-gtk, and all packages are from debian testing or unstable. I'm running "gpgsm --armor --export-secret-key $KEYID > key.pkcs12". I find that after each passphrase entry, i get the following warning on stderr: gpgsm: (pinentry:24664): GLib-GObject-CRITICAL **: Object class GtkSecureEntry doesn't implement property 'editing-canceled' from interface 'GtkCellEditable' This seems like noise to me -- is there a way to avoid it? Can i provide any other debugging diagnostics that would help? --dkg -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 965 bytes Desc: not available URL: From stevebell at gulli.com Tue May 22 21:28:39 2012 From: stevebell at gulli.com (Steve) Date: Tue, 22 May 2012 21:28:39 +0200 Subject: Testing GPG EMail encryption In-Reply-To: <8A981623-00E9-4DCB-8470-17EF24F778E2@robin-kipp.net> References: <8A981623-00E9-4DCB-8470-17EF24F778E2@robin-kipp.net> Message-ID: <69A03883-D514-4FD1-896F-FCC5CCF47E66@gulli.com> Hey Robin, I'll send you a testmail in a minute. I'm the guy from the GPGTools support discussion we had today. Talk to you off-list. If any of the GnuPG wizards like to chime in on the technical side on the bug tracker we're happy about any input. Cheers, steve Am 22.05.2012 um 20:06 schrieb Robin Kipp: > Hello all, > well, as of today, I finally decided to start signing my EMail messages using GPG to prove the integrety of my messages. As I am primarily using Mac OS, I downloaded MacGPG (http://gpgtools.org), installed it and set it all up. As I'm completely blind, I first had some issues with MacGPG, as it uses a special window (called, I think, the PINEntry window) to ask for the passphrase. Unfortunately, this window isn't accessible using VoiceOver, the screenreader built into Mac OS. However, I was now able to come up with a workaround and now it seems as if I can sign and encrypt messages without much trouble. I've informed the MacGPG developers about the accessibility issues in their software, and they seem very committed to solving it in an upcoming version. If anyone is interested, the related ticket can be found at http://gpgtools.lighthouseapp.com/projects/66001-macgpg2/tickets/94-pinentry-window-not-recognized-by-voiceover > > Now, I'd really like to test out EMail encryption so that I can verify this works properly, but for that, of course, I need one other party also using GPG. So, I was wondering, would it be possible for any of the GPG users on here to contact me offlist so that we could try this out once? If anyone on here would be willing to do that, I'd greatly appreciate that! > Thanks for any help :-) > Best regards, > Robin. > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 841 bytes Desc: Message signed with OpenPGP using GPGMail URL: From wk at gnupg.org Wed May 23 09:02:51 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Wed, 23 May 2012 09:02:51 +0200 Subject: gpgsm: (pinentry:24664): GLib-GObject-CRITICAL **: Object class GtkSecureEntry doesn't implement property 'editing-canceled' from interface 'GtkCellEditable' In-Reply-To: <8762bnlc98.fsf@pip.fifthhorseman.net> (Daniel Kahn Gillmor's message of "Wed, 23 May 2012 01:03:47 -0400") References: <8762bnlc98.fsf@pip.fifthhorseman.net> Message-ID: <87r4ubqt0k.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Wed, 23 May 2012 07:03, dkg at fifthhorseman.net said: > gpgsm: (pinentry:24664): GLib-GObject-CRITICAL **: Object class GtkSecureEntry doesn't implement property 'editing-canceled' from interface 'GtkCellEditable' This warning is due to a newer version of Gtk+ (2.20). Pinentry uses a replacement of GTK+'s standard text entry widget which was written many years ago. It should will be simple to add this property and explicitly return FALSE - this should silence the warning. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From steve at gpgtools.org Wed May 23 08:50:07 2012 From: steve at gpgtools.org (Steve) Date: Wed, 23 May 2012 08:50:07 +0200 Subject: Testing GPG EMail encryption In-Reply-To: <33450129.XK7aaBQoRl@inno> References: <8A981623-00E9-4DCB-8470-17EF24F778E2@robin-kipp.net> <451490E5-57F6-48D6-9C17-12B6B3098AB3@robin-kipp.net> <33450129.XK7aaBQoRl@inno> Message-ID: <7C84919C-1948-4D44-97F9-17A9CF977AED@gpgtools.org> > I don't know how much the demand is (or could be) but perhaps it would help > make more people use OpenPGP to have a round-robin email contact system. > Whoever is willing to help new users (like in this case) registers his email > address with the languages he's capable of communicating in. A new user could > send a mail to > > de at newusers.gnupg.org > en at newusers.gnupg.org > ... > > and the mail would be forwarded to one or two people. OpenPGP-Addons for email > software (like Enigmail) could hint the user at this service. Hi all, I absolutely agree. At GPGTools we thought about an automatic testing system. Checking if the mail was encrypted and / or signed and then sending out the according reply. As with so many things and I assume Werner and the Enigmail people know the problem, we never managed to get it done. I'm not sure if one system to rule them all is ideal. Since if a user of GPGTools sendss an unencrypted but signed mail we'd direct him at the according knowledge base article. If we'd use one mail address for GPTools / Enigmail / terminal users, it might be hard to provide the correct information to help users. So it might not be automatable thus create more work. Currently we encourage the user to send a test mail and do all this manually. All the best, steve -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 841 bytes Desc: Message signed with OpenPGP using GPGMail URL: From wk at gnupg.org Wed May 23 10:13:17 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Wed, 23 May 2012 10:13:17 +0200 Subject: Testing GPG EMail encryption In-Reply-To: <69A03883-D514-4FD1-896F-FCC5CCF47E66@gulli.com> (Steve's message of "Tue, 22 May 2012 21:28:39 +0200") References: <8A981623-00E9-4DCB-8470-17EF24F778E2@robin-kipp.net> <69A03883-D514-4FD1-896F-FCC5CCF47E66@gulli.com> Message-ID: <87mx4zqpr6.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Tue, 22 May 2012 21:28, stevebell at gulli.com said: > If any of the GnuPG wizards like to chime in on the technical side on the bug tracker we're happy about any input. AFAIK a Mac specific PINentry is used and not the GTK+ or QT version. Thus I can't help. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From david at gbenet.com Wed May 23 10:44:19 2012 From: david at gbenet.com (david at gbenet.com) Date: Wed, 23 May 2012 09:44:19 +0100 Subject: Some people say longer keys are silly. I think they should be supported by gpg. In-Reply-To: <4FBBDD87.30704@sixdemonbag.org> References: <20120522.085848.109.2@GGHJK5> <87ehqcrz9z.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <2229151.TVjeFaZsDS@inno> <4FBBDD87.30704@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <4FBCA363.9000303@gbenet.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 22/05/12 19:40, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > On 5/22/12 2:26 PM, Hauke Laging wrote: >> Given the frequency of this discussion and the amount of effort takes by the >> participants: Wouldn't it make sense to make this a FAQ entry? > > I think so, yes. The question is who's going to write it? I suspect Werner doesn't > have the time. If he wants, I would be happy to take a stab at writing it. > > > _______________________________________________ Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users > A good idea Robert! David - -- ?See the sanity of the man! No gods, no angels, no demons, no body. Nothing of the kind.Stern, sane,every brain-cell perfect and complete even at the moment of death. No delusion.? https://linuxcounter.net/user/512854.html - http://gbenet.com -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJPvKNjAAoJEOJpqm7flRExCLwH/RkpUwsTVZhXog8abFgosJqe th4H1d3yejkbO1fxytyxwufQEZmzruz4SPpoWT2TcZ71SmznoSWXqWm5rQ53K1sD WoRvGdutOiVRTghR1wS3bvsR+BcH2lUXQqvWqqiu0WYkEvKierEpR+rw+p5vrEsS P2CQ8GqKDwNeipZn+7zcx5ZE2jykSk/Yzc47ptEv9PrKuIA4R7Gs8FqZ3Hbr4gCM wWPz+YmjIlvl3YSncMOOWnMbFD2HqJhVB6kQN/9rGVUy3H09aqhbQSYFUwwns/tE 1AnrZ8VytiMJGUGt8il0KWZtTtHkqs1Rzn6nOrtHo2agxb0ELpECXDqFTnI1fLs= =yP71 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From david at gbenet.com Wed May 23 10:55:25 2012 From: david at gbenet.com (david at gbenet.com) Date: Wed, 23 May 2012 09:55:25 +0100 Subject: Some people say longer keys are silly. I think they should be supported by gpg. In-Reply-To: <20120522184603.GC756@Clarus.mgh.harvard.edu> References: <20120522.085848.109.2@GGHJK5> <87ehqcrz9z.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <2229151.TVjeFaZsDS@inno> <20120522184603.GC756@Clarus.mgh.harvard.edu> Message-ID: <4FBCA5FD.5030102@gbenet.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 22/05/12 19:46, Kevin Kammer wrote: > On Tue, May 22, 2012 at 08:26:14PM +0200 Also sprach Hauke Laging: >> Given the frequency of this discussion and the amount of effort takes by the >> participants: Wouldn't it make sense to make this a FAQ entry? > > Honestly now, do you think having a FAQ entry stops this topic > resurrecting every few months? Either someone will take issue with > what is said in the FAQ, or they (most likely) do not read it at all. > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users > I think that there's so much stuff written out there - so many books and papers - so I've decided to bring one more web site into show. I've got all the books - I want the site for beginners and pro's - to bring papers books anything they wish - also have a mailing list so people can practice their skills - and most important have no deadd links on thesite which so many other sites have! I'm still playing with wiki's at the moment - I want something that shares the enthusiasm the commitment - and the fun of cryptology - where any one can add their two pennies worth. I have been thinking about it for years and now I've decided to do something positive! What is required is a focus point - trusted. Updated and contributed too. It's finding the right wiki don't say mediawiki I installed it - and found I could not edit anything - and it failed to recognise me! Oh well - back to the testing.......... David - -- ?See the sanity of the man! No gods, no angels, no demons, no body. Nothing of the kind.Stern, sane,every brain-cell perfect and complete even at the moment of death. No delusion.? https://linuxcounter.net/user/512854.html - http://gbenet.com -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJPvKX8AAoJEOJpqm7flRExPxEH/AkUShX89LcveU9/IHhAMoqp qCXCM2Ka28pt5ZPpw1D/hAaFHzqq115OtyZh7+5qUbDFO/yz7dEKfL3B6YKShIE/ hPHpCFTcxrzr11zFjvEekCNF6K2m6JuBCSv0jKL1s8sH0Ifj9ZJh8/dQx0NIjIyn xJXfI88yKLSirRoYnzqe2oM1xtpTFZm29Wd/8p6BKevdv2zDTeCoYaI1rk/vRIF0 5R0GpiKMW57EzK2jSERH4WJtZFM4hYrodL3SkyqG7LXU4Ss21B/j+ODK5Bo64e+0 gtGfD//bFb6ZSx4OlTrslKbJia0kfsvVdhVg6/QCnNdBlYTaJ/6IiyOeA/oo/vQ= =frJl -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From branko at majic.rs Wed May 23 11:19:07 2012 From: branko at majic.rs (Branko Majic) Date: Wed, 23 May 2012 11:19:07 +0200 Subject: Testing GPG EMail encryption In-Reply-To: <7C84919C-1948-4D44-97F9-17A9CF977AED@gpgtools.org> References: <8A981623-00E9-4DCB-8470-17EF24F778E2@robin-kipp.net> <451490E5-57F6-48D6-9C17-12B6B3098AB3@robin-kipp.net> <33450129.XK7aaBQoRl@inno> <7C84919C-1948-4D44-97F9-17A9CF977AED@gpgtools.org> Message-ID: <5a3ee2ce-ecdd-46bd-9c88-f272514ed1ca@email.android.com> As a curiosity, any ideas on what you would do to avoid use of this system for spam purposes? (although encrypted spam won't be of much use :) Steve wrote: >> I don't know how much the demand is (or could be) but perhaps it >would help >> make more people use OpenPGP to have a round-robin email contact >system. >> Whoever is willing to help new users (like in this case) registers >his email >> address with the languages he's capable of communicating in. A new >user could >> send a mail to >> >> de at newusers.gnupg.org >> en at newusers.gnupg.org >> ... >> >> and the mail would be forwarded to one or two people. OpenPGP-Addons >for email >> software (like Enigmail) could hint the user at this service. > >Hi all, > >I absolutely agree. At GPGTools we thought about an automatic testing >system. Checking if the mail was encrypted and / or signed and then >sending out the according reply. > >As with so many things and I assume Werner and the Enigmail people know >the problem, we never managed to get it done. I'm not sure if one >system to rule them all is ideal. Since if a user of GPGTools sendss an >unencrypted but signed mail we'd direct him at the according knowledge >base article. If we'd use one mail address for GPTools / Enigmail / >terminal users, it might be hard to provide the correct information to >help users. So it might not be automatable thus create more work. > >Currently we encourage the user to send a test mail and do all this >manually. > >All the best, >steve_______________________________________________ >Gnupg-users mailing list >Gnupg-users at gnupg.org >http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users -- Branko Majic Jabber: branko at majic.rs Please use only Free formats when sending attachments to me. ?????? ????? ?????: branko at majic.rs ????? ??? ?? ??????? ?????? ????????? ? ????????? ?????????. From mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com Wed May 23 11:30:54 2012 From: mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com (Mika Suomalainen) Date: Wed, 23 May 2012 12:30:54 +0300 Subject: Testing GPG EMail encryption In-Reply-To: <8A981623-00E9-4DCB-8470-17EF24F778E2@robin-kipp.net> References: <8A981623-00E9-4DCB-8470-17EF24F778E2@robin-kipp.net> Message-ID: <4FBCAE4E.1020704@hotmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Hi, On 22.05.2012 21:06, Robin Kipp wrote: > Hello all, well, as of today, I finally decided to start signing my > EMail messages using GPG to prove the integrety of my messages. As > I am primarily using Mac OS, I downloaded MacGPG > (http://gpgtools.org), installed it and set it all up. As I'm > completely blind, I first had some issues with MacGPG, as it uses a > special window (called, I think, the PINEntry window) to ask for > the passphrase. Unfortunately, this window isn't accessible using > VoiceOver, the screenreader built into Mac OS. However, I was now > able to come up with a workaround and now it seems as if I can sign > and encrypt messages without much trouble. I've informed the > MacGPG developers about the accessibility issues in their software, > and they seem very committed to solving it in an upcoming version. > If anyone is interested, the related ticket can be found at > http://gpgtools.lighthouseapp.com/projects/66001-macgpg2/tickets/94-pinentry-window-not-recognized-by-voiceover > > Now, I'd really like to test out EMail encryption so that I can > verify this works properly, but for that, of course, I need one > other party also using GPG. So, I was wondering, would it be > possible for any of the GPG users on here to contact me offlist so > that we could try this out once? If anyone on here would be willing > to do that, I'd greatly appreciate that! Thanks for any help :-) > Best regards, Robin. I cannot verify your signature, because you use PGP/MIME and this mailing list uses mailing list software which somehow messes up with headers and makes PGP/MIME signatures unverifiable. You can test email encryption by emailing Adele. pub 1024D/92AB3FF7 2002-03-06 uid Adele (The friendly OpenPGP email robot) uid Adele (Der freundliche E-Mail-Roboter) sub 1024g/62BDBFD4 2002-03-06 - -- [Mika Suomalainen](https://mkaysi.github.com/) || [gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net --recv-keys 4DB53CFE82A46728](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/key.txt) || [Why do I sign my emails?](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/WhyDoISignEmails.html) || [Please don't send HTML.](http://mkaysi.github.com/articles/complaining/HTML.html) || [Please don't toppost](http://mkaysi.github.com/articles/complaining/topposting.html) || [This signature](https://gist.github.com/2643070) || -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.19 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJPvK5LAAoJEE21PP6CpGconqIQAKwRD5G/NPh9Yqr9atTjVXEH 7X11ttimt2cmON8MExymAu+fPpEqejriSKqppazwaBTvtxhonBoJ528/3VkZzn98 ZYz7dujDBKp6ws203DD21sbO/3XMWOJqghqXvdiQSML8h5k6RLCOgfE7G1NIhra3 NhtJouaJ9zTyEObFseF3H/vpQPFFtm+drSbRMXSbD9OPeK+OLvWRvcTTWxmTc4tJ adGhcvuj7C0tAXQ6yf6BquWv1S8AnepZnpQ4+hHmxalip2wLBKcBgM/vJFwEzR2Z 9nUO7d4XLpFCkIsalOFmylBPqunndF6amqHqkWOFj8meZ3j8xqFMbaLXsA2N7hrv 0apdHvt3UKoyEamHQb9QxOUe3qZ6Q2sAFcY3lLG15zXBuXcyfhW+/VtIKvAH7eAX 3fKycZXEQT7/MFH9xWgDxpa6tymdYtZqMcQBbtsokiSXtuK0rVb0XLJdhQYtBDsi btPeI6CCLUTArYFDXUDnCEQlljIOwJq8/QKsIyGlim4N9tL/axJLzu04+GQbqRY5 YDZbg6T9zgGLfPN2T5A21NnqWufzdDYtwFg4iwyFLgyCiA/9sUt80ysUqUS5UCax cx2JhMCC0X2lef/nyd4tDKrj2dCim2bdm5LLPaznEdyK39L0mq+GMbqgzOn6COVv 0jsRZ2b2c7Uuf2fD8xab =5ilr -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From peter at digitalbrains.com Wed May 23 11:37:33 2012 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Wed, 23 May 2012 11:37:33 +0200 Subject: Testing GPG EMail encryption In-Reply-To: <5a3ee2ce-ecdd-46bd-9c88-f272514ed1ca@email.android.com> References: <8A981623-00E9-4DCB-8470-17EF24F778E2@robin-kipp.net> <451490E5-57F6-48D6-9C17-12B6B3098AB3@robin-kipp.net> <33450129.XK7aaBQoRl@inno> <7C84919C-1948-4D44-97F9-17A9CF977AED@gpgtools.org> <5a3ee2ce-ecdd-46bd-9c88-f272514ed1ca@email.android.com> Message-ID: <4FBCAFDD.3020204@digitalbrains.com> On 23/05/12 11:19, Branko Majic wrote: > As a curiosity, any ideas on what you would do to avoid use of this system > for spam purposes? (although encrypted spam won't be of much use :) A simple challenge-response system should suffice, I'd say. When a new user mails to such an address, he receives a reply with a code that should again be mailed back to indicate the user is a human and can respond to the challenge. Bots could be adapted to defeat a lot of variations of this, but when it's a special-purpose design, I don't think it would be worth their time. Otherwise, use a captcha. I've never seen captcha's used in e-mail traffic, but it's easily done. Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at http://wwwhome.cs.utwente.nl/~lebbing/pubkey.txt From steve at gpgtools.org Wed May 23 11:56:40 2012 From: steve at gpgtools.org (Steve) Date: Wed, 23 May 2012 11:56:40 +0200 Subject: Testing GPG EMail encryption AKA PGP/MIME In-Reply-To: <4FBCAE4E.1020704@hotmail.com> References: <8A981623-00E9-4DCB-8470-17EF24F778E2@robin-kipp.net> <4FBCAE4E.1020704@hotmail.com> Message-ID: <1AD948C7-3D4D-4920-9EB8-2765F7FC01BB@gpgtools.org> I think we had the PGP/MIME vs inline discussion already. @Robert: Would that qualify for a second entry in your FAQ with the pro/cons listed? I really would love to see some distilled output. The discussions on this list are very valuable and having the pro / con arguments in some sort of wiki / faq (maybe editable by the users) would imo bring benefit to users, trying to understand backgrounds. @David let us know once you get the basic setup done. Would GitHub maybe be sufficient as a wiki? I am sure there are other nice solutions around, too. Cheers, steve > > I cannot verify your signature, because you use PGP/MIME and this > mailing list uses mailing list software which somehow messes up with > headers and makes PGP/MIME signatures unverifiable. > > You can test email encryption by emailing Adele. > pub 1024D/92AB3FF7 2002-03-06 > uid Adele (The friendly OpenPGP email robot) > > uid Adele (Der freundliche E-Mail-Roboter) > > sub 1024g/62BDBFD4 2002-03-06 -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 841 bytes Desc: Message signed with OpenPGP using GPGMail URL: From ueno at unixuser.org Wed May 23 11:27:13 2012 From: ueno at unixuser.org (Daiki Ueno) Date: Wed, 23 May 2012 18:27:13 +0900 Subject: gpgsm: (pinentry:24664): GLib-GObject-CRITICAL **: Object class GtkSecureEntry doesn't implement property 'editing-canceled' from interface 'GtkCellEditable' In-Reply-To: <87r4ubqt0k.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> (Werner Koch's message of "Wed, 23 May 2012 09:02:51 +0200") References: <8762bnlc98.fsf@pip.fifthhorseman.net> <87r4ubqt0k.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: Werner Koch writes: >> gpgsm: (pinentry:24664): GLib-GObject-CRITICAL **: Object class >> GtkSecureEntry doesn't implement property 'editing-canceled' from >> interface 'GtkCellEditable' > > This warning is due to a newer version of Gtk+ (2.20). Pinentry uses a > replacement of GTK+'s standard text entry widget which was written many > years ago. It should will be simple to add this property and explicitly > return FALSE - this should silence the warning. And it seems you already fixed it in the git repo some time ago: http://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=pinentry.git;a=commit;h=671a1a70 Is there any chance of new release? :-) Regards, -- Daiki Ueno From jeandavid8 at verizon.net Wed May 23 13:41:56 2012 From: jeandavid8 at verizon.net (Jean-David Beyer) Date: Wed, 23 May 2012 07:41:56 -0400 Subject: There may be more to security than password length, or even its complexity. Message-ID: <4FBCCD04.8090802@verizon.net> http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-v15Nbl_zG7s/T6BFiQoGDEI/AAAAAAAAAHs/U5eU7O6MG3o/s1600/security-fail.jpg -- .~. Jean-David Beyer Registered Linux User 85642. /V\ PGP-Key: 9A2FC99A Registered Machine 241939. /( )\ Shrewsbury, New Jersey http://counter.li.org ^^-^^ 07:40:01 up 33 days, 1:17, 3 users, load average: 4.45, 4.52, 4.64 From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Wed May 23 15:24:17 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Wed, 23 May 2012 09:24:17 -0400 Subject: Testing GPG EMail encryption In-Reply-To: <7C84919C-1948-4D44-97F9-17A9CF977AED@gpgtools.org> References: <8A981623-00E9-4DCB-8470-17EF24F778E2@robin-kipp.net> <451490E5-57F6-48D6-9C17-12B6B3098AB3@robin-kipp.net> <33450129.XK7aaBQoRl@inno> <7C84919C-1948-4D44-97F9-17A9CF977AED@gpgtools.org> Message-ID: <4FBCE501.7020205@sixdemonbag.org> On 5/23/12 2:50 AM, Steve wrote: > I absolutely agree. At GPGTools we thought about an automatic testing > system. Checking if the mail was encrypted and / or signed and then > sending out the according reply. You may want to move this discussion over to the Enigmail list. We have a system set up that does much of this already, called Adele. We'd be happy to share. From hka at qbs.com.pl Wed May 23 15:51:47 2012 From: hka at qbs.com.pl (Hubert Kario) Date: Wed, 23 May 2012 15:51:47 +0200 Subject: There may be more to security than password length, or even its complexity. In-Reply-To: <4FBCCD04.8090802@verizon.net> References: <4FBCCD04.8090802@verizon.net> Message-ID: <1759407.1FSTjv16TN@k85hala03> On Wednesday 23 of May 2012 07:41:56 Jean-David Beyer wrote: > http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-v15Nbl_zG7s/T6BFiQoGDEI/AAAAAAAAAHs/U5eU7O6MG3o/s1 > 600/security-fail.jpg How putting passwords to public WiFi on a wall undermines security? If you depend on PSK WiFi for security then you've already failed... Regards, -- Hubert Kario QBS - Quality Business Software 02-656 Warszawa, ul. Ksawer?w 30/85 tel. +48 (22) 646-61-51, 646-74-24 www.qbs.com.pl From wk at gnupg.org Wed May 23 17:21:20 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Wed, 23 May 2012 17:21:20 +0200 Subject: gpgsm: (pinentry:24664): GLib-GObject-CRITICAL **: Object class GtkSecureEntry doesn't implement property 'editing-canceled' from interface 'GtkCellEditable' In-Reply-To: (Daiki Ueno's message of "Wed, 23 May 2012 18:27:13 +0900") References: <8762bnlc98.fsf@pip.fifthhorseman.net> <87r4ubqt0k.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <87wr42q5xr.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Wed, 23 May 2012 11:27, ueno at unixuser.org said: > And it seems you already fixed it in the git repo some time ago: Well, close to a year ;-). > Is there any chance of new release? :-) I will do one tomorrow. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From wk at gnupg.org Wed May 23 17:29:50 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Wed, 23 May 2012 17:29:50 +0200 Subject: Testing GPG EMail encryption In-Reply-To: <4FBCE501.7020205@sixdemonbag.org> (Robert J. Hansen's message of "Wed, 23 May 2012 09:24:17 -0400") References: <8A981623-00E9-4DCB-8470-17EF24F778E2@robin-kipp.net> <451490E5-57F6-48D6-9C17-12B6B3098AB3@robin-kipp.net> <33450129.XK7aaBQoRl@inno> <7C84919C-1948-4D44-97F9-17A9CF977AED@gpgtools.org> <4FBCE501.7020205@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <87obpeq5jl.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Wed, 23 May 2012 15:24, rjh at sixdemonbag.org said: > You may want to move this discussion over to the Enigmail list. We have > a system set up that does much of this already, called Adele. We'd be Is that a different one than the Adele from Gnu_PP_, which is a closed source web service? Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From wk at gnupg.org Wed May 23 17:27:39 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Wed, 23 May 2012 17:27:39 +0200 Subject: Testing GPG EMail encryption In-Reply-To: <4FBCAE4E.1020704@hotmail.com> (Mika Suomalainen's message of "Wed, 23 May 2012 12:30:54 +0300") References: <8A981623-00E9-4DCB-8470-17EF24F778E2@robin-kipp.net> <4FBCAE4E.1020704@hotmail.com> Message-ID: <87sjeqq5n8.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Wed, 23 May 2012 11:30, mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com said: > I cannot verify your signature, because you use PGP/MIME and this > mailing list uses mailing list software which somehow messes up with > headers and makes PGP/MIME signatures unverifiable. It is this old Mailman/Python illness. I really wonder what the state of the fixes is. For years I ran a patched Mailman version but this patch never made it into Mailman proper. Along with the hard to use standard archiver (pipermail), this is a major drawback of Mailman. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com Wed May 23 17:35:39 2012 From: mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com (Mika Suomalainen) Date: Wed, 23 May 2012 18:35:39 +0300 Subject: Testing GPG EMail encryption AKA PGP/MIME In-Reply-To: <1AD948C7-3D4D-4920-9EB8-2765F7FC01BB@gpgtools.org> References: <8A981623-00E9-4DCB-8470-17EF24F778E2@robin-kipp.net> <4FBCAE4E.1020704@hotmail.com> <1AD948C7-3D4D-4920-9EB8-2765F7FC01BB@gpgtools.org> Message-ID: <4FBD03CB.1070503@hotmail.com> On 23.05.2012 12:56, Steve wrote: > I think we had the PGP/MIME vs inline discussion already. I am using PGP/MIME in this email. Can you verify my signature on this email? You can find link to my public key in my signature. Now I stop answering to these PGP/MIME vs INLINE. I think that I have said enough in http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/WhyDoISignEmails.html . -- [Mika Suomalainen](https://mkaysi.github.com/) || [gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net --recv-keys 4DB53CFE82A46728](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/key.txt) || [Why do I sign my emails?](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/WhyDoISignEmails.html) || [Please don't send HTML.](http://mkaysi.github.com/articles/complaining/HTML.html) || [Please don't toppost](http://mkaysi.github.com/articles/complaining/topposting.html) || [This signature](https://gist.github.com/2643070) || -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 900 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com Wed May 23 17:38:11 2012 From: mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com (Mika Suomalainen) Date: Wed, 23 May 2012 18:38:11 +0300 Subject: Testing GPG EMail encryption In-Reply-To: <4FBCE501.7020205@sixdemonbag.org> References: <8A981623-00E9-4DCB-8470-17EF24F778E2@robin-kipp.net> <451490E5-57F6-48D6-9C17-12B6B3098AB3@robin-kipp.net> <33450129.XK7aaBQoRl@inno> <7C84919C-1948-4D44-97F9-17A9CF977AED@gpgtools.org> <4FBCE501.7020205@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <4FBD0463.1010103@hotmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 23.05.2012 16:24, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > On 5/23/12 2:50 AM, Steve wrote: >> I absolutely agree. At GPGTools we thought about an automatic >> testing system. Checking if the mail was encrypted and / or >> signed and then sending out the according reply. > > You may want to move this discussion over to the Enigmail list. We > have a system set up that does much of this already, called Adele. > We'd be happy to share. Why to move it to Enigmail list? That email which you quoted doesn't have mention Enigmail. As far as I know, GPGTools doesn't even include Enigmail. - -- [Mika Suomalainen](https://mkaysi.github.com/) || [gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net --recv-keys 4DB53CFE82A46728](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/key.txt) || [Why do I sign my emails?](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/WhyDoISignEmails.html) || [Please don't send HTML.](http://mkaysi.github.com/articles/complaining/HTML.html) || [Please don't toppost](http://mkaysi.github.com/articles/complaining/topposting.html) || [This signature](https://gist.github.com/2643070) || -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.19 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJPvQRgAAoJEE21PP6CpGcoabAQAMeDSGQLo3UbTOEwpi+efOHN zIVq7iMofD/VdY/tFpAvHDOc/BvYk2+f8WLXIlapc7U9Xto17BcBFsohpN65TKe2 z1yd8yh8HNtS2QQT2SWhkuGrrfP9QjlH46VquOX3z03rovsqLp5rqmOyuH08RRxx Gn29L9hYSAbDKdKKlO/k6HjRiJIg5xcH7jkkcqKvi7MNDocjfxzrbVVG2gA0vguG AoRALiVyXtoc/wFuAFBE47PUhtUU1H3eH0pZx4T5J6x6Ec7bGiqz99NYgbiIzLjM 6kdeH4FDegHuRyRkSeupyJJJFVafKZSsJyHg/zX9BJ00dOVtYrez2gutp49Gl8Lg MXf80BgfnC6bhp5zxfJUQt1sde9+2it2ed0+rSUqkOggsR3eY4xEPAZIgsHQ+99Y 3o/kMkeJXQDuCu8uyPDIH2jDziGFzAXWgEx9kkf4QlHwmMJeuJd87Y9IrFtR83VP cusXrt2bEVK4VRQzIqb38Xk2NiUdsg6hJZOToXiuOTdZ9M0TXpstnxI9diiR8dyq wQBWZTR4gaPa37jJiOHS6sg/MemxyLKhkhQaxbPkk6m5hmY1ki0YEbKN7Xj4fjhT z4lRq5T3lZQStFEaebi+pCjojryCxFtmZF/wzIVYo4Ea1/xps6gZwCPxFihv42+m 8pAForfS47nU7asHT74/ =qf7k -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From david at gbenet.com Wed May 23 17:38:32 2012 From: david at gbenet.com (david at gbenet.com) Date: Wed, 23 May 2012 16:38:32 +0100 Subject: Fwd: The UK's cruelest cut In-Reply-To: <4B.CC.27051.55FCCBF4@avaaz-mta> References: <4B.CC.27051.55FCCBF4@avaaz-mta> Message-ID: <4FBD0478.8030204@gbenet.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 - -------- Original Message -------- Subject: The UK's cruelest cut Date: Wed, 23 May 2012 07:51:49 -0400 From: Emma Ruby-Sachs - Avaaz.org To: david at gbenet.com Dear friends across the UK, Each year, tens of thousands of girls in the UK are forced to have their genitals cut, often with no anesthesia. But there has been never been a conviction for female genital mutilation here -- even though in London alone, police have received 166 complaints in the last four years! Now we have a chance to help. Undercover reporters for the Sunday Times recently caught three medics on film offering to mutilate young girls, massively scaling up the pressure on law enforcement to act. We can use this moment to call on Home Secretary Theresa May for real accountability. She is in charge of every police chief in England and Wales -- if she takes the issue up personally, the entire police system could be shaken into action. Avaaz member Ruth Burnett has created a petition calling on the Home Secretary to start prosecuting people involved with these assaults and already more than 2000 people have signed! If we reach 20,000 signatures, Avaaz will deliver it directly to Home Secretary May and the head of Metropolitan Police Force -- click below to sign and forward to everyone: http://www.avaaz.org/en/petition/Stop_female_genital_mutilation_in_the_UK/?cl=1821616703&v=14523 Female Genital Mutilation is a custom widespread in nearly 30 Middle Eastern and African countries. But FGM has been illegal in the UK since 1985 and in 2003 the law was tightened to stop girls being taken abroad for the operation -- on so-called ?FGM holidays?. Still, the practice is widespread here in the UK! When the undercover Sunday Times reporter explained to Mohammed Sahib, an alternative medicine practitioner in East London that he represented a Ghanaian couple who wanted to have their two daughters -- aged 10 and 13 -- circumcised, he said ?I can do it here,? confirming that he would both remove the clitoris and sew up the vagina. ?This is my work. I know what I?m doing. I?m going to do it. I will tell you how [much] to pay [for one]: ?750.? Home Secretary Theresa May -- who oversees women?s issues for David Cameron, and who has the power to hold police chiefs all across England and Wales accountable -- recently admitted people would be ?shocked? by the number of young girls in Britain subjected to FGM. Now we can push her to take concrete action to end FGM in the UK -- click below to sign the petition now and share with everyone: http://www.avaaz.org/en/petition/Stop_female_genital_mutilation_in_the_UK/?cl=1821616703&v=14523 >From Iran to Morocco to South Africa, our community has fought back attacks on women?s fundamental rights. In the world we all want, a woman would never be forced to suffer the horror, pain and trauma involved with FGM. Today, here in Britain, we have a chance to take a giant step closer to making that world a reality. Let?s stand with these women and eliminate this practice from our country. With hope and determination, Emma, Maria Paz, Ricken, Alex, Rewan, Emily and the whole Avaaz team MORE INFORMATION: Female genital mutilation 'offered by UK medics' (The Guardian) http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2012/apr/22/female-genital-mutilation-uk-medics Birmingham arrests over female genital mutilation (BBC) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-birmingham-17955330 Cruel Cuts (Avaaz.org Daily Briefing) https://en.avaaz.org/418/female-circumcision-scandal-uk Genital mutilation in the UK, an investigation (Sunday Times, paywall): http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/comment/leaders/article1021882.ece The Prevalence of Female Genital Mutilation in England and Wales (DoH study, 2007): http://www.forwarduk.org.uk/key-issues/fgm/research This message was sent to david at gbenet.com. To change your email address, language, or other information, contact us here: http://www.avaaz.org/en/contact/?footer Want to leave this list? Send a message to unsubscribe at avaaz.org, or click here: https://secure.avaaz.org/act/?r=unsub&cl=1821616703&email=david at gbenet.com&b=1831&v=14523&lang=enTo contact Avaaz, please do not reply to this email. Instead, write to us via the form at http://www.avaaz.org/en/contact. You can also call us at +1-888-922-8229 (US). __________________________ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJPvQRkAAoJEOJpqm7flRExb6gH/1XHIpojd63SuPpQ9lKQFniZ XdOwhVpfZhN93jr1rGrAoWWfKaUEEmqOLUD9NC0+msXQyJ6SAud56/rtZy9f1zd5 nv8TtS7wsuCii+XQJ3wtO5e6p9nC4QSmWStlbXbsqL9+3PM75ZfIGl0sftqeGa7q dv2/ZzMCaxiWL63dcN+m7OfddhL2qtvcNJ3pQ0K4rZ9JRqN8SYg1jMfNLJcsQ457 labiBK1GU6u6DcnVQCoJ+1LM0VPeRBbUtEbOcaB8rvODKRgQ5rTNpBh5YwJReh/N ZhzjCqF/Xn5zKbYWQK/cwIBcmxb/C0Q5LM5Gcb+jxtXaL+8j8WpFWPan//7Acqg= =31C1 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Wed May 23 17:48:23 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Wed, 23 May 2012 11:48:23 -0400 Subject: Testing GPG EMail encryption In-Reply-To: <4FBD0463.1010103@hotmail.com> References: <8A981623-00E9-4DCB-8470-17EF24F778E2@robin-kipp.net> <451490E5-57F6-48D6-9C17-12B6B3098AB3@robin-kipp.net> <33450129.XK7aaBQoRl@inno> <7C84919C-1948-4D44-97F9-17A9CF977AED@gpgtools.org> <4FBCE501.7020205@sixdemonbag.org> <4FBD0463.1010103@hotmail.com> Message-ID: <4FBD06C7.3030502@sixdemonbag.org> On 5/23/12 11:38 AM, Mika Suomalainen wrote: > Why to move it to Enigmail list? According to American legend, a journalist once asked the infamous bank robber John Dillinger why he robbed banks for a living. "Because that's where the money is," he said. Why should a discussion about Adele move over to the Enigmail list? Because Enigmail runs Adele, has the source code for it, and the people who are responsible for it are all over there. I'm not sure that all the involved people are on this list. A discussion about Adele that involves all the Adele people should probably go over to Enigmail, because that's where Adele and the Adele maintainers are. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 187 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Wed May 23 17:51:07 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Wed, 23 May 2012 11:51:07 -0400 Subject: Testing GPG EMail encryption In-Reply-To: <87obpeq5jl.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <8A981623-00E9-4DCB-8470-17EF24F778E2@robin-kipp.net> <451490E5-57F6-48D6-9C17-12B6B3098AB3@robin-kipp.net> <33450129.XK7aaBQoRl@inno> <7C84919C-1948-4D44-97F9-17A9CF977AED@gpgtools.org> <4FBCE501.7020205@sixdemonbag.org> <87obpeq5jl.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <4FBD076B.4060202@sixdemonbag.org> On 5/23/12 11:29 AM, Werner Koch wrote: > Is that a different one than the Adele from Gnu_PP_, which is a closed > source web service? I don't know. We have the source and permission to use it -- my impression is that it's Free Software, but it's been years since I've taken a look at our Adele code and read the copyright notice. John Clizbe would probably have a better handle on its licensing situation than I do. From wk at gnupg.org Wed May 23 17:54:32 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Wed, 23 May 2012 17:54:32 +0200 Subject: Testing GPG EMail encryption AKA PGP/MIME In-Reply-To: <4FBD03CB.1070503@hotmail.com> (Mika Suomalainen's message of "Wed, 23 May 2012 18:35:39 +0300") References: <8A981623-00E9-4DCB-8470-17EF24F778E2@robin-kipp.net> <4FBCAE4E.1020704@hotmail.com> <1AD948C7-3D4D-4920-9EB8-2765F7FC01BB@gpgtools.org> <4FBD03CB.1070503@hotmail.com> Message-ID: <87fwaqq4ef.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Wed, 23 May 2012 17:35, mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com said: > On 23.05.2012 12:56, Steve wrote: >> I think we had the PGP/MIME vs inline discussion already. > > I am using PGP/MIME in this email. Can you verify my signature on this > email? You can find link to my public key in my signature. Sure: [[PGP Signed Part:Good signature from 4DB53CFE82A46728 Mika Suomalainen (trust undefined) created at 2012-05-23T17:35:40+0200 using RSA]] Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From david at gbenet.com Wed May 23 17:59:11 2012 From: david at gbenet.com (david at gbenet.com) Date: Wed, 23 May 2012 16:59:11 +0100 Subject: Testing GPG EMail encryption In-Reply-To: <4FBD0463.1010103@hotmail.com> References: <8A981623-00E9-4DCB-8470-17EF24F778E2@robin-kipp.net> <451490E5-57F6-48D6-9C17-12B6B3098AB3@robin-kipp.net> <33450129.XK7aaBQoRl@inno> <7C84919C-1948-4D44-97F9-17A9CF977AED@gpgtools.org> <4FBCE501.7020205@sixdemonbag.org> <4FBD0463.1010103@hotmail.com> Message-ID: <4FBD094F.2060909@gbenet.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 23/05/12 16:38, Mika Suomalainen wrote: > On 23.05.2012 16:24, Robert J. Hansen wrote: >> On 5/23/12 2:50 AM, Steve wrote: >>> I absolutely agree. At GPGTools we thought about an automatic >>> testing system. Checking if the mail was encrypted and / or >>> signed and then sending out the according reply. > >> You may want to move this discussion over to the Enigmail list. We >> have a system set up that does much of this already, called Adele. >> We'd be happy to share. > > Why to move it to Enigmail list? That email which you quoted doesn't > have mention Enigmail. As far as I know, GPGTools doesn't even include > Enigmail. > > > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users > Yup and I was on there list too - and effectively told to shove off when I pointed out errors in enigmail - they don't like testing and error reporting - so kfuc em David - -- ?See the sanity of the man! No gods, no angels, no demons, no body. Nothing of the kind.Stern, sane,every brain-cell perfect and complete even at the moment of death. No delusion.? https://linuxcounter.net/user/512854.html - http://gbenet.com -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJPvQlPAAoJEOJpqm7flREx71MH/AhKdugWlY764s7OaHv8EDbq 1NFHolY8ToJVBt7jTqaJCGykvmloaRwEgKjRLG4hZTvbLGQkaL3Jh7usCL9GG4FA wNEVwF69YxPjWYPjChu59nPMEFISMa0zfhiktK74tOatQQCwVHKBh6VqWoKxvvtO Dxd17EYf4LylqC8A1WLURShehh9JxC7axkMrwBlTK0h8QktFu4WnttLo43/O1A39 DMqmyaIcFnLorKVT7roEAcUIMfy1ie3Tir5L2Ct4fu/yFZ39yNXgxRh12IUCZky0 1AVlTqYw2DV3zKlMCcZ4lDXGnXMAaso8elwatv/z4zgLm0NkHyyf7q85hVx+sKg= =bglt -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com Wed May 23 17:59:24 2012 From: mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com (Mika Suomalainen) Date: Wed, 23 May 2012 18:59:24 +0300 Subject: Testing GPG EMail encryption AKA PGP/MIME In-Reply-To: <87fwaqq4ef.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <8A981623-00E9-4DCB-8470-17EF24F778E2@robin-kipp.net> <4FBCAE4E.1020704@hotmail.com> <1AD948C7-3D4D-4920-9EB8-2765F7FC01BB@gpgtools.org> <4FBD03CB.1070503@hotmail.com> <87fwaqq4ef.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <4FBD095C.2030200@hotmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 23.05.2012 18:54, Werner Koch wrote: > On Wed, 23 May 2012 17:35, mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com said: >> On 23.05.2012 12:56, Steve wrote: >>> I think we had the PGP/MIME vs inline discussion already. >> >> I am using PGP/MIME in this email. Can you verify my signature >> on this email? You can find link to my public key in my >> signature. > > Sure: > > [[PGP Signed Part:Good signature from 4DB53CFE82A46728 Mika > Suomalainen (trust undefined) created at 2012-05-23T17:35:40+0200 > using RSA]] > > > Salam-Shalom, > > Werner > Weird. All PGP/MIME signed emails here cannot be verified if they are from mailing lists. PS. I am on this list so you don't need to CC me unless your email client forces it. - -- [Mika Suomalainen](https://mkaysi.github.com/) || [gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net --recv-keys 4DB53CFE82A46728](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/key.txt) || [Why do I sign my emails?](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/WhyDoISignEmails.html) || [Please don't send HTML.](http://mkaysi.github.com/articles/complaining/HTML.html) || [Please don't toppost](http://mkaysi.github.com/articles/complaining/topposting.html) || [This signature](https://gist.github.com/2643070) || -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.19 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJPvQlZAAoJEE21PP6CpGcoNvwP/jA1dwWm1pv2gghrl6t+IiGz 1t+WXjHzr732/cnvXsWIKeyHzAYQ1NrcArrET4LMzJXDeaaqDQLRVIezTm0hgo0Y kE1En7Cti+Q1AVxM6Zj606q1ATKMvzPPTOnHk3ZF3b9e4Ipt2h4FKgkIt6jW4yeg 0hl0yDR2CudpPR81JjjzMvSaGqRQnoJKFRmrEdxH2wWXY/GP1HsPFPuSnFwb0mY4 VDAHqWLY+a7LrKJDI53hQTsQAGZtbRIslPKNBvnAICX3Zsao3V9SnRReqngIiSu5 YX3HJhKWTEzU2roZ4PPqeyPJW9j4a350HsFz7m8FT76S7L77e3Rd4nWcnP/qIYgQ kEQTH/LZjkaVYPkbh2Sa94NXuDDUH/GryDFJLy3x4Gas5p7K9ZB1TJARm9plveeV qJeHYRNsUexoktPY6idVyAV0mltoCgkwTYRwToz6HIxCMFSfhSSPFcbcVd0ovWDG RtS7BVrRgDQrNb/yvTz4/7KFjeSD1KdCXSpe6qQqh7umtoxy+U/lUEEQzEFa6Jru +b5tvL7syxlTOy/+Qk9y/0NXBCo3CiYQe5KJqkmtZn0CmOzcv6BeJeqW5E1ax7ju 8LOso5mQycghBwaQ1WcnGcioPJLuygiHWgCE93bHbPPj55NBAkudnLWSrx3gveJL s+ZgGCp8YfZvQvtwdXEc =eBwo -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com Wed May 23 17:59:28 2012 From: mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com (Mika Suomalainen) Date: Wed, 23 May 2012 18:59:28 +0300 Subject: Testing GPG EMail encryption AKA PGP/MIME In-Reply-To: <87fwaqq4ef.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <8A981623-00E9-4DCB-8470-17EF24F778E2@robin-kipp.net> <4FBCAE4E.1020704@hotmail.com> <1AD948C7-3D4D-4920-9EB8-2765F7FC01BB@gpgtools.org> <4FBD03CB.1070503@hotmail.com> <87fwaqq4ef.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <4FBD0960.1020306@hotmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 23.05.2012 18:54, Werner Koch wrote: Weird. All PGP/MIME signed emails here cannot be verified if they are from mailing lists. PS. I am on this list so you don't need to CC me unless your email client forces it. - -- [Mika Suomalainen](https://mkaysi.github.com/) || [gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net --recv-keys 4DB53CFE82A46728](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/key.txt) || [Why do I sign my emails?](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/WhyDoISignEmails.html) || [Please don't send HTML.](http://mkaysi.github.com/articles/complaining/HTML.html) || [Please don't toppost](http://mkaysi.github.com/articles/complaining/topposting.html) || [This signature](https://gist.github.com/2643070) || -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.19 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJPvQlZAAoJEE21PP6CpGcoz3sQALS5P9i3pRNmeWFzCebl7s19 RpXIjyk3/OFTkmn6I+O07T9zFx102ENxJZSt/A6JLRXYyuSKp/b02KPUA/Ce3mxC wt/kVO8SwtTq1YjWBG0uDV5+zJ6ewzY7BEf8qMz7wwqg0QhI+Yfn8aq1U2twKyJ7 xIl0p+jA41ebGkMeF27dnKRsPhOqco1kgxD4/7j8uzdvAr9fhxCfARwzMyg6DW6r smPAmheRPjBLa9kcWN4m4sydXLuMUBZBsSETUWh5o84pOZ9viDJE9apvEm8R7TnX kR52UKWGOj2mbLzTjNx4G5m2K80cRh36UJovCvTY3EHzEeBWDYOqSVGXXcOiQngN Lu9wZ6VjytuTVvjEWa9uh7E+9CVhSA5Vu48upGhLrm1rwrcBUF7wrWeYPWEwqH+9 Dya3d0uxZv0Vzuwxi0xWEIDo904r9sHOuv2/HcOPo1qZP4b9gSqJb18PCyHHJyEk +/ina+4mIBD+JBiBU8pzhmgG+ViGBQqdbbtzjC1xp6L5RGSRzrIYAjdOrGwWso0J 56yRBQa0/LhcYRZ9mba+Ir+BJdl5dxx3ZMwMTgD8SrAmpNAiL6jnDvMcZ3TMcgY/ TbRbEXnS2FPXAXLLz2wdLAty6Sw3Ge2bU98IpdpWXsoeTb+hElmgycvXD/4BYviS Hp4+9HHhKdoWJHyPcCV+ =hD3Y -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From david at gbenet.com Wed May 23 18:17:56 2012 From: david at gbenet.com (david at gbenet.com) Date: Wed, 23 May 2012 17:17:56 +0100 Subject: Testing GPG EMail encryption AKA PGP/MIME In-Reply-To: <87fwaqq4ef.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <8A981623-00E9-4DCB-8470-17EF24F778E2@robin-kipp.net> <4FBCAE4E.1020704@hotmail.com> <1AD948C7-3D4D-4920-9EB8-2765F7FC01BB@gpgtools.org> <4FBD03CB.1070503@hotmail.com> <87fwaqq4ef.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <4FBD0DB4.90208@gbenet.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 23/05/12 16:54, Werner Koch wrote: > On Wed, 23 May 2012 17:35, mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com said: >> On 23.05.2012 12:56, Steve wrote: >>> I think we had the PGP/MIME vs inline discussion already. >> >> I am using PGP/MIME in this email. Can you verify my signature on this >> email? You can find link to my public key in my signature. > > Sure: > > [[PGP Signed Part:Good signature from 4DB53CFE82A46728 Mika > Suomalainen (trust undefined) created at 2012-05-23T17:35:40+0200 > using RSA]] > > > Salam-Shalom, > > Werner > Hi Verner, I've had your key for ages - so why not attach it? David - -- ?See the sanity of the man! No gods, no angels, no demons, no body. Nothing of the kind.Stern, sane,every brain-cell perfect and complete even at the moment of death. No delusion.? https://linuxcounter.net/user/512854.html - http://gbenet.com -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJPvQ20AAoJEOJpqm7flRExbMkH/jOiHf9n76WrKXBmyWmp6cx4 ICXNF2ijkNrFmKE08v7E9zW9DpropD94mtIrtnuiLRMKKnwcMBxz7YnJNYNllOwr Ef278lwE6cfWJ/KXSRvFrrigZbkywyw2pfXDME7mElFqIJg8uvvT5Akl581Y7TXj 4vzbcQ2B8EELQUsK9QyBiaVmL4+VLPSEvp4Pq9N0D9I+C0BDjlMX8k+4//TdBj+j p8qfSBM1oIGTwXLOhCz9p/E0q8C6SH3//e6LYqu/mY0MxNNzxgKo7v8X3ECDnL0d f40WO36cP1XSzZInkhnmjHS1sWkXv1iq4zXVxrini7jtwX1DuOWcVYLod4BDK/4= =JXUz -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Wed May 23 18:18:49 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Wed, 23 May 2012 12:18:49 -0400 Subject: Draft of nine new FAQ questions Message-ID: <4FBD0DE9.6060205@sixdemonbag.org> I have a draft version of nine frequently asked questions ready for community review: http://keyservers.org/gnupgfaq.xhtml Note that this draft is in nicely-typeset XHTML5. This is to make it easier to proofread. The final version that I'm going to submit to Werner will be in plain text, so please, no suggestions about fonts, visual design, layout, or anything else like that. Any and all feedback (save for visual design, layout, etc.) will be gratefully accepted. Thank you! From wk at gnupg.org Wed May 23 18:32:38 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Wed, 23 May 2012 18:32:38 +0200 Subject: Testing GPG EMail encryption AKA PGP/MIME In-Reply-To: <4FBD095C.2030200@hotmail.com> (Mika Suomalainen's message of "Wed, 23 May 2012 18:59:24 +0300") References: <8A981623-00E9-4DCB-8470-17EF24F778E2@robin-kipp.net> <4FBCAE4E.1020704@hotmail.com> <1AD948C7-3D4D-4920-9EB8-2765F7FC01BB@gpgtools.org> <4FBD03CB.1070503@hotmail.com> <87fwaqq4ef.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FBD095C.2030200@hotmail.com> Message-ID: <87396qq2mx.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Wed, 23 May 2012 17:59, mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com said: > PS. I am on this list so you don't need to CC me unless your email > client forces it. Set your MFT header correctly, if you want to avoid a CC. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From mick.crane at gmail.com Wed May 23 18:34:16 2012 From: mick.crane at gmail.com (michael crane) Date: Wed, 23 May 2012 17:34:16 +0100 Subject: Draft of nine new FAQ questions In-Reply-To: <4FBD0DE9.6060205@sixdemonbag.org> References: <4FBD0DE9.6060205@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <624441332922bf4b9245d1ab8e77986c.squirrel@192.168.1.50> On Wed, May 23, 2012 5:18 pm, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > I have a draft version of nine frequently asked questions ready for > community review: > > http://keyservers.org/gnupgfaq.xhtml for me the first should always be "what is gnupg ?" regards mick -- keyID: 0x4BFEBB31 From shavital at gmail.com Wed May 23 18:40:28 2012 From: shavital at gmail.com (Charly Avital) Date: Wed, 23 May 2012 12:40:28 -0400 Subject: Testing GPG EMail encryption AKA PGP/MIME In-Reply-To: <4FBD03CB.1070503@hotmail.com> References: <8A981623-00E9-4DCB-8470-17EF24F778E2@robin-kipp.net> <4FBCAE4E.1020704@hotmail.com> <1AD948C7-3D4D-4920-9EB8-2765F7FC01BB@gpgtools.org> <4FBD03CB.1070503@hotmail.com> Message-ID: <4FBD12FC.3060600@gmail.com> Mika Suomalainen <4FBD03CB.1070503 at hotmail.com> May 23, 2012 12:38:40 PM wrote: > I am using PGP/MIME in this email. Can you verify my signature on this > email? You can find link to my public key in my signature. Good signature from Mika Suomalainen Key ID: 0x82A46728 / Signed on: 5/23/12 11:35 AM Key fingerprint: 24BC 1573 B8EE D666 D10A AA65 4DB5 3CFE 82A4 6728 Charly Mac OS X 10.7.4 (11E52) MacBook Intel C2Duo 2GHz MacGPG2-2.0.17-9 - Thunderbird 12.0.1 Enigmail 1.5a1pre (20120521-2224) From steve at gpgtools.org Wed May 23 19:39:46 2012 From: steve at gpgtools.org (Steve) Date: Wed, 23 May 2012 19:39:46 +0200 Subject: Testing GPG EMail encryption In-Reply-To: <4FBD094F.2060909@gbenet.com> References: <8A981623-00E9-4DCB-8470-17EF24F778E2@robin-kipp.net> <451490E5-57F6-48D6-9C17-12B6B3098AB3@robin-kipp.net> <33450129.XK7aaBQoRl@inno> <7C84919C-1948-4D44-97F9-17A9CF977AED@gpgtools.org> <4FBCE501.7020205@sixdemonbag.org> <4FBD0463.1010103@hotmail.com> <4FBD094F.2060909@gbenet.com> Message-ID: <2D1A1214-D036-4DFC-8392-533390654EEE@gpgtools.org> Hey David et all, first: GPGTools Installer does indeed contain Enigmail and allows installation. Not sure if it has the latest version since Mozilla's crazy versioning means lots of maintenance and we couldn't find a way to automate including new Enigmail versions. Also not sure if it is smart to include it in the future. We'd have to find some smart mechanism to deal with updates. David, which list are you referring to? GPGTools mailing list? If so, I'm not so sure what you write is correct. Can't recall anybody ever was told to shove off. We had the Inline vs. GPG/MIME discussion in the GPGTools Project and have made a decision for PGP/MIME since we believe that it is the future and is a documented standard. If mailing-list software has issues it is at the devs of that software to step up and continue development of their software. The fact that Werner even wrote a patch which seems to have been ignored is even more frustrating. If Enigmail encounters problems with mails encrypted with GPGTools, we'll be happy to work things out with Patrick from the Enigmail team. And I know that the GPGTools project was in direct contact with him. So I don't really see the drama. Let's try to be constructive and solve problems. Not cause some where there aren't any. And as always: feel free to write a patch. :) <3 steve > Signierter PGP Teil > > Why to move it to Enigmail list? That email which you quoted doesn't > > have mention Enigmail. As far as I know, GPGTools doesn't even include > > Enigmail. > > Yup and I was on there list too - and effectively told to shove off when I pointed out > errors in enigmail - they don't like testing and error reporting - so kfuc em -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 841 bytes Desc: Message signed with OpenPGP using GPGMail URL: From brad at fineby.me.uk Wed May 23 17:57:26 2012 From: brad at fineby.me.uk (Brad Rogers) Date: Wed, 23 May 2012 16:57:26 +0100 Subject: Testing GPG EMail encryption In-Reply-To: <4FBCAE4E.1020704@hotmail.com> References: <8A981623-00E9-4DCB-8470-17EF24F778E2@robin-kipp.net> <4FBCAE4E.1020704@hotmail.com> Message-ID: <20120523165726.3c563404@abydos.stargate.org.uk> On Wed, 23 May 2012 12:30:54 +0300 Mika Suomalainen wrote: Hello Mika, > I cannot verify your signature, because you use PGP/MIME and this > mailing list uses mailing list software which somehow messes up with > headers and makes PGP/MIME signatures unverifiable. Robin's sig verifies okay here. As do most(1) of the sigs I come across in any mailing list. Most of the lists I subscribe to are run on mailman. BTW. Or have I missed your meaning? (1) Occasionally one doesn't verify, but that's always been because of an error introduced elsewhere, not by mailman. -- Regards _ / ) "The blindingly obvious is / _)rad never immediately apparent" Life's short, don't make a mess of it No Time To Be 21 - The Adverts -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 490 bytes Desc: not available URL: From Lists.gnupg at mephisto.fastmail.net Wed May 23 20:28:18 2012 From: Lists.gnupg at mephisto.fastmail.net (Kevin Kammer) Date: Wed, 23 May 2012 14:28:18 -0400 Subject: Draft of nine new FAQ questions In-Reply-To: <624441332922bf4b9245d1ab8e77986c.squirrel@192.168.1.50> References: <4FBD0DE9.6060205@sixdemonbag.org> <624441332922bf4b9245d1ab8e77986c.squirrel@192.168.1.50> Message-ID: <20120523182818.GA408@Clarus.partners.org> On Wed, May 23, 2012 at 05:34:16PM +0100 Also sprach michael crane: > > for me the first should always be "what is gnupg ?" > I believe these nine "new" FAQ entries are to be added to the existing entries to provide additional information regarding keysizes specifically. They are not comprehensive, and general discussion of GnuPG and its purpose is covered in the existing FAQ. From david at gbenet.com Wed May 23 20:44:25 2012 From: david at gbenet.com (david at gbenet.com) Date: Wed, 23 May 2012 19:44:25 +0100 Subject: Draft of nine new FAQ questions In-Reply-To: <624441332922bf4b9245d1ab8e77986c.squirrel@192.168.1.50> References: <4FBD0DE9.6060205@sixdemonbag.org> <624441332922bf4b9245d1ab8e77986c.squirrel@192.168.1.50> Message-ID: <4FBD3009.7000209@gbenet.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 23/05/12 17:34, michael crane wrote: > > On Wed, May 23, 2012 5:18 pm, Robert J. Hansen wrote: >> I have a draft version of nine frequently asked questions ready for >> community review: >> >> http://keyservers.org/gnupgfaq.xhtml > > for me the first should always be "what is gnupg ?" > > regards > > mick > I too felt that there was something missing. This whole topic got kicked off by some one questioning the strength - the security of keys. No other contribution from the original poster has been made - may be he "disappeared." Anyway I felt that there was something missing - and that's a write of gpg 1.4.11 version 2's an add-on and only needs a few words. Needs to be more informative - authoritative and a bit more on the maths :) David - -- ?See the sanity of the man! No gods, no angels, no demons, no body. Nothing of the kind.Stern, sane,every brain-cell perfect and complete even at the moment of death. No delusion.? https://linuxcounter.net/user/512854.html - http://gbenet.com -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJPvS+4AAoJEOJpqm7flRExmeEH/jndZrwunmnYQqvfxkdS16YH GNJvRh7MmcAMSjBuB543aveRFjf+yl1tOcLrXVA3uO1/ktW6grHWrLJZ06W+U9Sv h9CEHie+wGmNqs0qgBRYMp8cJvoPpJSO6P2EV4ZdmTORRs4ETI5B7CVKq7bnK3qL MR4+QvlsomwokWJjSSFmPOcWA2+TxsyCj/I41Hz0bI8iNnmyDqkHFmPleiIiRUef uKgJtezNg/SHHIYEUuu0QeBMlNwtFv1J4kuWteVxbCO70EN3lnSyWNIIQxuUQAJS SsEzCaDo/M6dsHs44MdZiXWv4Wa8oIPUwD01zyO8o6IvQXI1X/IoQC1ySdzvVOc= =GAGl -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From david at gbenet.com Wed May 23 21:07:54 2012 From: david at gbenet.com (david at gbenet.com) Date: Wed, 23 May 2012 20:07:54 +0100 Subject: Testing GPG EMail encryption In-Reply-To: <2D1A1214-D036-4DFC-8392-533390654EEE@gpgtools.org> References: <8A981623-00E9-4DCB-8470-17EF24F778E2@robin-kipp.net> <451490E5-57F6-48D6-9C17-12B6B3098AB3@robin-kipp.net> <33450129.XK7aaBQoRl@inno> <7C84919C-1948-4D44-97F9-17A9CF977AED@gpgtools.org> <4FBCE501.7020205@sixdemonbag.org> <4FBD0463.1010103@hotmail.com> <4FBD094F.2060909@gbenet.com> <2D1A1214-D036-4DFC-8392-533390654EEE@gpgtools.org> Message-ID: <4FBD358A.8010409@gbenet.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 23/05/12 18:39, Steve wrote: > Hey David et all, > > first: GPGTools Installer does indeed contain Enigmail and allows installation. Not sure if it has the latest version since Mozilla's crazy versioning means lots of maintenance and we couldn't find a way to automate including new Enigmail versions. Also not sure if it is smart to include it in the future. We'd have to find some smart mechanism to deal with updates. > > David, which list are you referring to? GPGTools mailing list? If so, I'm not so sure what you write is correct. Can't recall anybody ever was told to shove off. We had the Inline vs. GPG/MIME discussion in the GPGTools Project and have made a decision for PGP/MIME since we believe that it is the future and is a documented standard. If mailing-list software has issues it is at the devs of that software to step up and continue development of their software. The fact that Werner even wrote a patch which seems to have been ignored is even more frustrating. > > If Enigmail encounters problems with mails encrypted with GPGTools, we'll be happy to work things out with Patrick from the Enigmail team. And I know that the GPGTools project was in direct contact with him. So I don't really see the drama. Let's try to be constructive and solve problems. Not cause some where there aren't any. > > And as always: feel free to write a patch. :) > > <3 > > steve > > >> Signierter PGP Teil >>> Why to move it to Enigmail list? That email which you quoted doesn't >>> have mention Enigmail. As far as I know, GPGTools doesn't even include >>> Enigmail. >> >> Yup and I was on there list too - and effectively told to shove off when I pointed out >> errors in enigmail - they don't like testing and error reporting - so kfuc em > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users First off, It was the enigmail mail list which I un-subscribed too. I am currently using Mint Linux 32 bit LXDE. I don't trust and have no faith in Openpgp's ability to encrypt to predefined per-recipient rules. I have set my system to do it manually. Now I have 3 Linux Laptops. I started testing Linux distros with gpg2 - enigmail with Thunderbird - all 100 per cent Openpgp failed to initialise with pgp2 and in fact Openpgp always signed to my private key not my public key when using percipient rules. Here is a list of main Linux distros which all fail to initialise pgp2: Opensuse 12.1 12..2 11.1/4 either 32/64 bit with KDE/Gnome/LXDE Ubuntu (any flavour) KDE/Gnome/LXDE 32/64 bit Linux Mint KDE/Gnome?LXDE 32/64 bit Fedora-16 KDE/Gnome/LXDE 32/64 bit (With all official updates). With Thunderbird Enigmail/Openpgp with gpg2 your system may freeze you may not digitally sign or encrypt to someone's public key via e-mail. You may not digitally sign an e-mail whilst at the same time encrypting. Be warned - any encryption done will be to your private key and not to your public key. Enigmail may fail to initialise (gpg2). There is no compatibility in above Linux distros with Enimail/Openpgp and gpg2 - you are best advised to stick with gpg (GnuPG) 1..4.11. I have posted this info on my main page to my web site - I have tested. And tested sending people e-mails - No one to my comments seriously - even when I told Verner - he said let kgpg handle commands - why? gpg2 specific commands do not work with gpg2. Now testing with a fellow Linux user revealed that if you have both gpg 1.4.11 and gpg2 installed you don't get any problems. So I can only conclude that gpg2 is an add-on widget to gpg 1.4.11 - gpg2 only recognises gpg 1.4.11 commands. Openpgp/enigmail does not support gpg2 unless one has installed gpg 1.4.11 - but I no longer trust Openpgp/enigmail to do anything. David - -- ?See the sanity of the man! No gods, no angels, no demons, no body. Nothing of the kind.Stern, sane,every brain-cell perfect and complete even at the moment of death. No delusion.? https://linuxcounter.net/user/512854.html - http://gbenet.com -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJPvTWJAAoJEOJpqm7flRExDTsH/ic3He3Xe9eSF/rZ+eP1fofX +5imrR22qsDvxLUmy4MDJQ4C5H8CKkX9Yp2Trt1D4Srt+oWFO3D4mbIu6arfaJYX SGR7KfrAmV2iuYjJ51eHcAXilIGLqjkFnhXlnM+FwbN0rlLkLYY/Iht3IzeRqCvX w95exHeLalgNoKP1BVLyXKLZYJA03IOC14RzFaptuOY2yGz+DvEpaFj/pmGRUeVu 7xQ3Bi85VjOTXGx/uCFDxzNcSBWSpiy4ikbpwPaxbH3pSVAH26T6y2qq30ifYhkz 7hS3Y5iXqW2dIjqBygkhHsT1ozuJTSo4vZaFJ7OSesgSkkUc2aasKeKIkxgm6D0= =pLIB -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Wed May 23 21:28:55 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Wed, 23 May 2012 15:28:55 -0400 Subject: Testing GPG EMail encryption In-Reply-To: <4FBD358A.8010409@gbenet.com> References: <8A981623-00E9-4DCB-8470-17EF24F778E2@robin-kipp.net> <451490E5-57F6-48D6-9C17-12B6B3098AB3@robin-kipp.net> <33450129.XK7aaBQoRl@inno> <7C84919C-1948-4D44-97F9-17A9CF977AED@gpgtools.org> <4FBCE501.7020205@sixdemonbag.org> <4FBD0463.1010103@hotmail.com> <4FBD094F.2060909@gbenet.com> <2D1A1214-D036-4DFC-8392-533390654EEE@gpgtools.org> <4FBD358A.8010409@gbenet.com> Message-ID: <4FBD3A77.8030302@sixdemonbag.org> On 5/23/12 3:07 PM, david at gbenet.com wrote: > Now I have 3 Linux Laptops. I started testing Linux distros with gpg2 > - enigmail with Thunderbird - all 100 per cent Openpgp failed to > initialise with pgp2 and in fact Openpgp always signed to my private > key not my public key when using percipient rules. Here is a list of > main Linux distros which all fail to initialise pgp2: As you were told on the Enigmail list, thousands of people have found that GnuPG 2 works well with Enigmail on Linux. I demonstrated this to you by sending to the list a correctly-signed email written on an Ubuntu 12.04LTS system using GnuPG 2. If you're having troubles getting Enigmail to work there are many people who are willing to help you. However, talking about how GnuPG 2 is completely broken on Linux, and how Enigmail is clearly too buggy to use, and everything else, is not exactly constructive. GnuPG 2 works just fine for the overwhelming majority of Linux users. I don't know what your particular problem is, but it can likely be resolved. > Be warned - any encryption done will be to your private key and not > to your public key. Enigmail may fail to initialise (gpg2). If it were encrypting to the private key, this would be a digital signature. That's what a digital signature is -- an encryption operation using the private key. I don't understand your complaint. If you're saying "Enigmail will sign emails," well, yes, it's designed to do that -- but I don't think that's what you're trying to say here. > There is no compatibility in above Linux distros with > Enimail/Openpgp and gpg2 - you are best advised to stick with gpg > (GnuPG) 1..4.11. I have been using Enigmail with GnuPG 2.x for literally years, and over that time I have had no trouble interoperating with people using other Linux distros or even entirely different operating systems. This is the first time in all my years of using Enigmail that I have heard anyone tell me that Enigmail's output is not interoperable with other systems. This is not to say that you're not having trouble with Enigmail -- far from it! -- but claiming there is "no compatibility" is a fairly extreme claim, and I'm going to need to see some supporting evidence. > Now testing with a fellow Linux user revealed that if you have both > gpg 1.4.11 and gpg2 installed you don't get any problems. So I can > only conclude that gpg2 is an add-on widget to gpg 1.4.11 - gpg2 only > recognises gpg 1.4.11 commands. GnuPG 2 is not an add-on widget to GnuPG 1.4. From mustrum at mustrum.net Wed May 23 16:15:10 2012 From: mustrum at mustrum.net (Mustrum) Date: Wed, 23 May 2012 16:15:10 +0200 Subject: =?UTF-8?Q?Re=3A_There_may_be_more_to_security_than_?= =?UTF-8?Q?password_length=2C=09or_even_its_complexity=2E?= In-Reply-To: <4FBCCD04.8090802@verizon.net> References: <4FBCCD04.8090802@verizon.net> Message-ID: <852db1a3-b26c-434f-9dec-dc55d2b41acd@email.android.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Http://xkcd.com/538 :-) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: APG v1.0.8 iQI7BAEBCgAlBQJPvPDuHhxNdXN0cnVtIDxNdXN0cnVtQE11c3RydW0ubmV0PgAK CRBMuv2GX9WDnv71EADJYr8hgWu/5yGnKgrYHhE/w+uxieCAAtIlZDvXxHKKVFGC MC1xVgeYeksvM8fNL4RPMCs5ttsi1uA0OUax6jGxUg7WrGYBjcPhie5tiMfcIUjS nixGxsLu05PWlC/kH4vYF1dlRM2hVucokLck4MoCP/JqXsCMMmV0saw55sXl6bqq X2prtZegMXNGZ3ZlsOalvV2kPhKorbtvMqKW4p/M+de59eQC7bvV/boyL8HxzHR0 rCYf6e1vDqtoVaE0l0nDipbi7erKHNbcc62/g+WsvXleY0OEY4Uf9QBMgdyt+h/y d8LuYO7Hai4z5TA+FRrouP+ENiFyw2u8ddUl1IfiF3+OIh/z41tEQoWTM9fU0LC6 tjYIbodcLS/Vj4dTCKk8ppsj41EIW1AFEqnKXTpJppBroUeqs12WTCUQEv3V5PRu Js4xUyL4T2Qt5m/F06cgPLu2zcOSZ/60D0UvdqF5/dhZHxkK9/c9XnE5m7Xu/X3r 9JXmrrIMBP4p+dfRbrwrpiqLmdtDjPKzzO86Bta8UIBjxFD47nWEjstKwELk0R1w hnVSCUYQwdjTSdtL4eSXW+m+LlAOTVzsTevICODpomXuthLJ2/fQVwbbQCrEMSbb LaGFc67sNDk7CgIav8AZksBSJm8RToxchbF9MF8SBq19iBTft5ehPuiYJMkWkg== =fvwJ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Wed May 23 22:12:25 2012 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Wed, 23 May 2012 16:12:25 -0400 Subject: Draft of nine new FAQ questions In-Reply-To: <4FBD0DE9.6060205@sixdemonbag.org> References: <4FBD0DE9.6060205@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: On May 23, 2012, at 12:18 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > I have a draft version of nine frequently asked questions ready for > community review: > > http://keyservers.org/gnupgfaq.xhtml > > Note that this draft is in nicely-typeset XHTML5. This is to make it > easier to proofread. The final version that I'm going to submit to > Werner will be in plain text, so please, no suggestions about fonts, > visual design, layout, or anything else like that. > > Any and all feedback (save for visual design, layout, etc.) will be > gratefully accepted. Thank you! Very nice work. I have just three minor notes: #1 explains why we default to 2048-bit keys, but not why RSA. What NIST stated about key strength is true for any 2048-bit OpenPGP key (DSA or RSA). The reason why we switched to RSA in 2009 was mainly for reasons of being able to use a larger primary key. DSA was inherently capped at 1024 bits (and a 160-bit hash), and while DSA2 existed (so we could theoretically have used a 2048-bit DSA key instead of RSA), it was not nearly as widely implemented across the OpenPGP user base as RSA was. The answer you have for #4 is not exactly wrong, but it is not complete. GnuPG doesn't support 4096-bit keys just because PGP (the product) does. It also supports a range of key sizes because OpenPGP (the standard) does. And it also supports a range of key sizes because people want/need them (local policy for key length, for example, as you note in the answer to #3). GnuPG is a powerful and flexible tool, and that includes the power and flexibility to do things that are not necessarily recommended by the GnuPG developers. For #10, it might be worth mentioning something about the use of different hash lengths (q) for the different DSA sizes. The two sort of go hand in hand. Or for that matter, perhaps a question #11 "How come my signatures from my 2048-bit DSA key use a different hash than those from my 1024-bit DSA key?" would be interesting. David From david at gbenet.com Wed May 23 22:39:04 2012 From: david at gbenet.com (david at gbenet.com) Date: Wed, 23 May 2012 21:39:04 +0100 Subject: Testing GPG EMail encryption In-Reply-To: <4FBD3A77.8030302@sixdemonbag.org> References: <8A981623-00E9-4DCB-8470-17EF24F778E2@robin-kipp.net> <451490E5-57F6-48D6-9C17-12B6B3098AB3@robin-kipp.net> <33450129.XK7aaBQoRl@inno> <7C84919C-1948-4D44-97F9-17A9CF977AED@gpgtools.org> <4FBCE501.7020205@sixdemonbag.org> <4FBD0463.1010103@hotmail.com> <4FBD094F.2060909@gbenet.com> <2D1A1214-D036-4DFC-8392-533390654EEE@gpgtools.org> <4FBD358A.8010409@gbenet.com> <4FBD3A77.8030302@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <4FBD4AE8.3040609@gbenet.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 23/05/12 20:28, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > On 5/23/12 3:07 PM, david at gbenet.com wrote: >> Now I have 3 Linux Laptops. I started testing Linux distros with gpg2 >> - enigmail with Thunderbird - all 100 per cent Openpgp failed to >> initialise with pgp2 and in fact Openpgp always signed to my private >> key not my public key when using percipient rules. Here is a list of >> main Linux distros which all fail to initialise pgp2: > > As you were told on the Enigmail list, thousands of people have found > that GnuPG 2 works well with Enigmail on Linux. I demonstrated this to > you by sending to the list a correctly-signed email written on an Ubuntu > 12.04LTS system using GnuPG 2. > > If you're having troubles getting Enigmail to work there are many people > who are willing to help you. However, talking about how GnuPG 2 is > completely broken on Linux, and how Enigmail is clearly too buggy to > use, and everything else, is not exactly constructive. > > GnuPG 2 works just fine for the overwhelming majority of Linux users. I > don't know what your particular problem is, but it can likely be resolved. > >> Be warned - any encryption done will be to your private key and not >> to your public key. Enigmail may fail to initialise (gpg2). > > If it were encrypting to the private key, this would be a digital > signature. That's what a digital signature is -- an encryption > operation using the private key. I don't understand your complaint. If > you're saying "Enigmail will sign emails," well, yes, it's designed to > do that -- but I don't think that's what you're trying to say here. > >> There is no compatibility in above Linux distros with >> Enimail/Openpgp and gpg2 - you are best advised to stick with gpg >> (GnuPG) 1..4.11. > > I have been using Enigmail with GnuPG 2.x for literally years, and over > that time I have had no trouble interoperating with people using other > Linux distros or even entirely different operating systems. This is the > first time in all my years of using Enigmail that I have heard anyone > tell me that Enigmail's output is not interoperable with other systems. > This is not to say that you're not having trouble with Enigmail -- far > from it! -- but claiming there is "no compatibility" is a fairly extreme > claim, and I'm going to need to see some supporting evidence. > >> Now testing with a fellow Linux user revealed that if you have both >> gpg 1.4.11 and gpg2 installed you don't get any problems. So I can >> only conclude that gpg2 is an add-on widget to gpg 1.4.11 - gpg2 only >> recognises gpg 1.4.11 commands. > > GnuPG 2 is not an add-on widget to GnuPG 1.4. > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users > I ran the debugging programme with Openpgp debugging options to console and I got the message that with gpg2 installed one was not able to digitally sign an e-mail whilst encrypting to their public key which in all the named distros it encrypted to my private key - fact. Another user who was using Fedora-16 64 bit with gnome stated that Openpgp would not initialise pgp2 - and me? I ran Fedora-16 32 bit - I had to reboot before openpgp would work (so badly as was useless) with gpg2. Fact I even when and installed Fedora-16 64 bit fact and encountered the same issues, Fact. It is a fact that Openpgp will only work if BOTH gpg 1.4.11 and the widget gpg2 is then added. Fact. Most Linux users have BOTH by default. Fact. That's why no one's reporting aany problems. Fact. If you remove from your system gpg 1.4.11 then you have real problems with open Openpgp - even Kleopatra. Fact Now if you don't like these facts then that's not a problem. I have decided to tell every one not to use gpg2 without having installed gpg 1.4.11. Now as I haave spent the last 10 days playing with all these Linux distros and sending all these test e-mails which have provided factual evidence as stated I can only conclude that Openpgp will only work with 1.4.11 installed. Now I have not mentioned anything about Windows XP and the latest version of PGP4Win which some times encrypts to my girlfriends private and not to my public key I've not figured out that one yet - unless I install gpg 1.4.11!! I will say this I am running Linux Mint LXDE 32 bit - on a 64 bit Acer Laptop with all updates. My gpg-agent's running because I added it to my .xsession file. Now I have un-ticked the box - use agent. Now Openpgp is pretty variable in how long my passphrase lasts - it could last all day yet it could last to the next e-mail. But I don't trust Openpgp to honour per-recipient rules. It does not work ie it will not encrypt to the e-mail address as set out in its own rule. Fact. Now if you can't even trust the software to do what it says on the tin - then you have to go back to basics as I have done. Fact. Now I have pointed out some serious short comings that are spread over Linux Distros and Windows XP with Thunderbird and enigmail/Openpgp installed. Fact. I am not angry - far from it - I got a lot of brain ache burning DVDs installing various Linux Distros and playing with them. I would have tested more - but hey - I pointed out the facts of my discovery. Now all my 3 Linux laptops are Mint Linux LXDE 32 bit installed with TB gpg 1.4.11 enigmail/Openpgp - No probs. Fact. But I still do not trust enigmail/openpgp to do anything on the tin. Fact. Now on the whole as no one's interested in these facts - I don't much care. I worry about sending an encrypted mail to some one's public key in case it does not work. It digitally signs e-mails - but I have no confidence no assurance of encrypting to a public key. My girlfriend who only sends me encrypted mail sometimes sends me encrypted mail that I cannot read. Why? The answer is very very simple - sometimes Openpgp/enigmail signs to your private key and not the person your e-mailing's public key. Fact. I'm not angry about that - why? Because the error does not happen all the time. Fact. All I do is repeat the facts. Get 50 variants of popular Linux distros KDE/Gnome?LXDE do not install gpg 1.4.11 just gpg2 TB Enigmail/Openpgp and have fun. David - -- ?See the sanity of the man! No gods, no angels, no demons, no body. Nothing of the kind.Stern, sane,every brain-cell perfect and complete even at the moment of death. No delusion.? https://linuxcounter.net/user/512854.html - http://gbenet.com -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJPvUroAAoJEOJpqm7flREx6c8H/21/QifwXOuHbj03rYFtJvkG cBHVSBvt+z3z8NBSPWPkzZDQY2tKqESTU3BbPtVv8qw5/GJkv3FUNQUVeoiXZSwp lbVeC+V36+nB9NWpLB8FuAxvggFfbrq4/+pnP+slHk9WSFtgX6Ow7D/GcPnOzC26 EQAYBb0+gimmPrrjbVjaS3sB6Qz0Y75a+ZEp+2lntr8Igna5V01R2sOfMzQFrvQF hiIgB5OcmfD0UbPyeWgshlYHtEOO8TR53sVaOBxnMqXMT4AEYCisMyAaSkJsGPU5 5o3rEEbKcDAMd7NHs8kkilw2qKhgYYTh3RKOKiHdkumD5MgwCl2n2hviXswiJIs= =2dcQ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From david at gbenet.com Wed May 23 22:43:58 2012 From: david at gbenet.com (david at gbenet.com) Date: Wed, 23 May 2012 21:43:58 +0100 Subject: There may be more to security than password length, or even its complexity. In-Reply-To: <852db1a3-b26c-434f-9dec-dc55d2b41acd@email.android.com> References: <4FBCCD04.8090802@verizon.net> <852db1a3-b26c-434f-9dec-dc55d2b41acd@email.android.com> Message-ID: <4FBD4C0E.7070806@gbenet.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 23/05/12 15:15, Mustrum wrote: > Http://xkcd.com/538 > > :-) > > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users > Well is a wrench better that a pair of pliers? Interesting question - but the maths are the same - it hurts!!!! David - -- ?See the sanity of the man! No gods, no angels, no demons, no body. Nothing of the kind.Stern, sane,every brain-cell perfect and complete even at the moment of death. No delusion.? https://linuxcounter.net/user/512854.html - http://gbenet.com -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJPvUwOAAoJEOJpqm7flRExGx4H/3oqLHaesQikMeRLeoyVtiBb reHnga1mY3RNiVwAIndfRHX2HSPSAksScScvaejPLYQ6Dfi+lRbkqt8UtFv8bDBX dHmIGQZ4cTeJliH875AqTCW8wxidphskV9baLCq3q7Wnr7+xDkqVnUMoLxtdizPu 4BvZZPjOMOkWyo763CYAZCjKOAR6BwbMvTbeli1mcUuNaKH/mXdd4ta+GxN488r5 1Ixm7wQHnLUwIJN0VnN6e4Zu0z1MoN1vE84UMZwhP3fHj0wSaVQ/mPQvKe8hNIKW BwFqxXggw3bn2MG0L2EvZ8lSBVAIx9GSp0E/L+wI40FSBXVe6OcRKsCbeTuUIvg= =jUEa -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Wed May 23 22:45:30 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Wed, 23 May 2012 16:45:30 -0400 Subject: Draft of nine new FAQ questions In-Reply-To: References: <4FBD0DE9.6060205@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <4FBD4C6A.4020304@sixdemonbag.org> On 5/23/12 4:12 PM, David Shaw wrote: > #1 explains why we default to 2048-bit keys, but not why RSA. Fixed, thank you. > The answer you have for #4 is not exactly wrong, but it is not > complete. GnuPG doesn't support 4096-bit keys just because PGP (the > product) does. It also supports a range of key sizes because OpenPGP > (the standard) does. I don't want to seem argumentative (especially because I haven't looked at the RFC lately), but I was under the impression the RFC was mostly silent on the subject of algorithms and key sizes -- DSA being a MUST algorithm, but little guidance beyond that. Am I in error? (That said, the text has been fixed: thank you.) > For #10, it might be worth mentioning something about the use of > different hash lengths (q) for the different DSA sizes. The two sort > of go hand in hand. Or for that matter, perhaps a question #11 "How > come my signatures from my 2048-bit DSA key use a different hash than > those from my 1024-bit DSA key?" would be interesting. Added. From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Wed May 23 23:40:03 2012 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Wed, 23 May 2012 17:40:03 -0400 Subject: Draft of nine new FAQ questions In-Reply-To: <4FBD4C6A.4020304@sixdemonbag.org> References: <4FBD0DE9.6060205@sixdemonbag.org> <4FBD4C6A.4020304@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: On May 23, 2012, at 4:45 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > I don't want to seem argumentative (especially because I haven't looked > at the RFC lately), but I was under the impression the RFC was mostly > silent on the subject of algorithms and key sizes -- DSA being a MUST > algorithm, but little guidance beyond that. Am I in error? The fact that RSA can have different key sizes is clearly stated, since you need that information to interoperate, and that's what I was referring to. I don't mean to say that one of the several reasons GnuPG supports 4096-bit keys is because the OpenPGP spec says they are better. I mean to say that one of the several reasons GnuPG supports 4096-bit keys is because the OpenPGP spec says they *exist* (there is some implementation art here - we don't support 8192-bit keys even though they obviously exist as well). The way you stated it in the revised FAQ covers this very well. The standard is indeed mostly silent on the topic on why you would *want* to pick a particular key size over a different key size. That is appropriate for a message format document - it's not really taking sides. Pretty much all it says is to be careful and notes that 4096 was the common limit at publication time: * OpenPGP does not put limits on the size of public keys. However, larger keys are not necessarily better keys. Larger keys take more computation time to use, and this can quickly become impractical. Different OpenPGP implementations may also use different upper bounds for public key sizes, and so care should be taken when choosing sizes to maintain interoperability. As of 2007 most implementations have an upper bound of 4096 bits. >> For #10, it might be worth mentioning something about the use of >> different hash lengths (q) for the different DSA sizes. The two sort >> of go hand in hand. Or for that matter, perhaps a question #11 "How >> come my signatures from my 2048-bit DSA key use a different hash than >> those from my 1024-bit DSA key?" would be interesting. > > Added. Excellent. One note on the new text - it states that 2048-bit DSA keys use a 224-bit hash. In fact, a 2048-bit DSA key can use either 224 or 256-bit hashes. GnuPG uses 256 here (but will of course accept a 224 generated elsewhere), so we're either using 160 or 256 unless someone forces 224 by picking an odd DSA key size like 1536. David From mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de Thu May 24 01:03:13 2012 From: mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de (Hauke Laging) Date: Thu, 24 May 2012 01:03:13 +0200 Subject: Draft of nine new FAQ questions In-Reply-To: <4FBD0DE9.6060205@sixdemonbag.org> References: <4FBD0DE9.6060205@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <4668413.lr5FprjAyU@inno> Am Mi 23.05.2012, 12:18:49 schrieb Robert J. Hansen: > I have a draft version of nine frequently asked questions ready for > community review: > > http://keyservers.org/gnupgfaq.xhtml The reason I suggested a FAQ addition is not covered :-) At least not by the headlines. There should be a paragraph "Why does GnuPG not support more than 4096 bits?". @ "Why does GnuPG use 2048-bit RSA by default?": Does the g10 smartcard not count as a reason for RSA default? @ "Has GnuPG ever been successfully attacked?" That sounds like there has never been a security problem. El-Gamal signatures, anyone? Furthermore: http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-announce/2006q1/000211.html Hauke -- PGP: D44C 6A5B 71B0 427C CED3 025C BD7D 6D27 ECCB 5814 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 555 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From reynt0 at cs.albany.edu Thu May 24 00:50:41 2012 From: reynt0 at cs.albany.edu (reynt0) Date: Wed, 23 May 2012 18:50:41 -0400 (EDT) Subject: Draft of nine new FAQ questions In-Reply-To: <4FBD0DE9.6060205@sixdemonbag.org> References: <4FBD0DE9.6060205@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: On Wed, 23 May 2012, Robert J. Hansen wrote: . . . > I have a draft version of nine frequently asked questions ready for > community review: > http://keyservers.org/gnupgfaq.xhtml > > Any and all feedback (save for visual design, layout, etc.) will be > gratefully accepted. Thank you! Here FWIW are some kindof stylistic suggestions, following some standard types of phrasings I have found useful to minimize confusion when communicating with people from varied or unknown linguistic backgrounds. Changes are identified by "*** ***". Interestingly, good rather than loose grammar often seems to be more understandable by people who learned English in non-USA schools, since they often learned by a book which taught by grammar. (Cf eg my "***ever to be***" below.) Also, just to mention, best to avoid smart apostrophes/quotes in the final version, naturally, right? And maybe most contractions. ---re #1: Why does GnuPG use 2048-bit RSA by default? ***This question can be separated into two questions: Why ... by default?; and Why ... by default?"*** This is actually two separate questions in one: why does GnuPG use 2048-bit keys by default, and why does GnuPG use the RSA algorithm by default? ***The answer to the first question is that GnuPG .... NIST's current position (as of May 2012) is that software providing 112*** With respect to the first question, GnuPG uses 2048-bit keys in order to comply with the current (as of Spring 2012) recommendations of the United . . . ***The answer to the second question is that GPS uses RSA rather than DSA mostly*** With respect to the second question, GnuPG uses RSA over DSA mostly . . . ---re #3: Why doesn't GnuPG default to 4096-bit RSA? . . . ***If a 2048-bit key were ever to be ... to advocate that RSA be .... Against what we assume would take a breakthrough of great significance, ["magnitude" is a size word, might confuse someone roughing out a translation about key size]*** If a 2048-bit key were to ever be successfully attacked, that would be enough to advocate RSA be abandoned completely. Against a breakthrough of that magnitude another few thousand bits of key would likely make no difference. . . . the shift to 3072-bit keys gives little additional resistance, and 4096-bit keys ***give*** an even smaller addition ***GnuPG is not for only desktop or laptop computers.*** GnuPG is not just for desktops. It has been successfully ported . . . 2048-bit RSA is believed safe until 2030, which exceeds the needs of most GnuPG users. If for some reason a longer duration is needed***,*** a 4096-bit key may certainly be generated and used, ***. But***but the defaults are meant to be appropriate for the majority of users ***and*** not for specialized or niche security needs. ---re #5: Is RSA-2048 really enough? ***start 2nd sentence : And other organizations to whom encryption is important (such as RSA...*** [The world changes, and maybe an explicit endorsement might not be so appropriate tomorrow, but embarassing or similar to change then. Just mentioning them is an implicit endorsement, IMHO of course] According to NIST, yes. Further, other well-respected organizations (such as RSA Security) have publicly supported NIST's recommendations. . . . key recommendations have been superseded by those in Practical Cryptography, which, to repeat, says ***replace "says" with "estimates"*** RSA-2048 will be sufficient until the mid-2020s. ---re #6: Can any of the ciphers in GnuPG be brute-forced? . . . ***In terms of current scientific understandings, the symmetric ciphers used in GnuPG are utterly*** The symmetric ciphers used in GnuPG are utterly immune to brute forcing. The Second Law of Thermodynamics places strict . . . --re #7: Has GnuPG ever been successfully attacked? We are unaware of any successful cryptanalytic attacks against GnuPG. However, it is still susceptible to non-cryptanalytic attacks such as malware, unauthorized physical access, ***social engineering attacks,*** and other such things. ---re #8: Should I use PGP/MIME or inline OpenPGP for my emails? Unfortunately, there is no clear answer. ***move "for instance" from the end to the start of the 2nd sentence*** PGP/MIME has some distinct advantages over inline email. It handles attachments automatically, for instance. It also separates the signature from the document, which many people prefer over . . . ***Mail servers further confound things. As a general tactic against malware, any mail servers will strip off, alter, ..." {and delete "as an anti-malware measure" from end of sentence]*** Mail servers further confound things. Many mail servers will strip off, alter, or quarantine attachments as an anti-malware measure. This has the effect of breaking PGP/MIME. For many years GNU Mailman mailing-list software mangled PGP/MIME attachments in ways that broke signatures. These ***replace "these" with "Some"*** old Mailman installations ***like that*** still exist today. ============= Cheers. HTH FWIW From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Thu May 24 02:22:56 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Wed, 23 May 2012 20:22:56 -0400 Subject: Draft of nine new FAQ questions In-Reply-To: References: <4FBD0DE9.6060205@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <4FBD7F60.3060406@sixdemonbag.org> On 5/23/12 6:50 PM, reynt0 wrote: > Also, just to mention, best to avoid smart apostrophes/quotes > in the final version, naturally, right? Not a whelk?s chance in a supernova. Those aren?t smart quotes, they?re perfectly valid UTF-8 typographic marks. "Straight quotes" and 'straight apostrophes' are artifacts of the typewriter era, where there was simply not enough space on the keyboard to provide proper typographic marks. If you read a book, you?ll discover they pay attention to things like ligatures, kerning, proper typographic marks, and all manner of other things. Centuries of use have shown that these marks make text easier to read. The final version that gets submitted to Werner will by necessity be plain text, and that will probably get downshifted into dumb typewriter markings. But so long as I?m going blind on it, reading those rows of text again and again and again, I?m going to pay attention to the typography. I encourage anyone who?s writing web pages to abjure dumb typewriter markings. In the UTF-8 era, there?s absolutely no reason why any of us should have to put up with them. From jeandavid8 at verizon.net Thu May 24 02:48:10 2012 From: jeandavid8 at verizon.net (Jean-David Beyer) Date: Wed, 23 May 2012 20:48:10 -0400 Subject: There may be more to security than password length, or even its complexity. In-Reply-To: <852db1a3-b26c-434f-9dec-dc55d2b41acd@email.android.com> References: <4FBCCD04.8090802@verizon.net> <852db1a3-b26c-434f-9dec-dc55d2b41acd@email.android.com> Message-ID: <4FBD854A.3090504@verizon.net> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Mustrum wrote: > Http://xkcd.com/538 > > :-) I like that. It may be my passphrase is too long. I want it easier for the black hats to crack my stuff than for them to torture my passphrase out of me. I recently tested a (retired) password to my computer out on a couple of web sites that told my how hard it would be to crack it. One of them said more than 10 million years. I guess that one is good enough, though my current ones have two more characters. Maybe I should shorten them. - -- .~. Jean-David Beyer Registered Linux User 85642. /V\ PGP-Key: 9A2FC99A Registered Machine 241939. /( )\ Shrewsbury, New Jersey http://counter.li.org ^^-^^ 20:45:01 up 33 days, 14:22, 3 users, load average: 4.61, 4.57, 4.54 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.5 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with CentOS - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iD8DBQFPvYVKPtu2XpovyZoRAhhLAKDBF0JRi2IErOHUIeIWiRh/f1e6/wCfSehd 4VK5VllC9uXNHKz33TSlowc= =82DQ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com Thu May 24 09:09:05 2012 From: mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com (Mika Suomalainen) Date: Thu, 24 May 2012 10:09:05 +0300 Subject: Testing GPG EMail encryption In-Reply-To: <20120523165726.3c563404@abydos.stargate.org.uk> References: <8A981623-00E9-4DCB-8470-17EF24F778E2@robin-kipp.net> <4FBCAE4E.1020704@hotmail.com> <20120523165726.3c563404@abydos.stargate.org.uk> Message-ID: <4FBDDE91.20204@hotmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 23.05.2012 18:57, Brad Rogers wrote: > On Wed, 23 May 2012 12:30:54 +0300 Mika Suomalainen > wrote: > > Hello Mika, > >> I cannot verify your signature, because you use PGP/MIME and >> this mailing list uses mailing list software which somehow messes >> up with headers and makes PGP/MIME signatures unverifiable. > > Robin's sig verifies okay here. As do most(1) of the sigs I come > across in any mailing list. Most of the lists I subscribe to are > run on mailman. BTW. > > Or have I missed your meaning? > > (1) Occasionally one doesn't verify, but that's always been because > of an error introduced elsewhere, not by mailman. At least Enigmail fails to recognize PGP/MIME signatures on some mailman mailing lists. - -- [Mika Suomalainen](https://mkaysi.github.com/) || [gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net --recv-keys 4DB53CFE82A46728](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/key.txt) || [Why do I sign my emails?](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/WhyDoISignEmails.html) || [Please don't send HTML.](http://mkaysi.github.com/articles/complaining/HTML.html) || [Please don't toppost](http://mkaysi.github.com/articles/complaining/topposting.html) || [This signature](https://gist.github.com/2643070) || -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.19 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJPvd6MAAoJEE21PP6CpGcoKcAP/0OHfeyNL1h18+IuWd3F/d30 fxUOf8fZpCK8i/nsAs3T8LML8yeJyDVX7ras7PL8S+STwUh+fMIM26uItoLJ6wgP bxHmw0UmR/xwtp0FBMtjAOEYiw6ukjrsVfuDlBVh9WuqB2dWQIdGpzxd7e6HQufM 4j6sn5OdiUxS9PakKIM53P1j8lTpd/L3OoptQi8ymYz+/YABjwu5+z5oJhBmnzXS P9RTWq90eFZbbZKHte7/4wU03x8yrWOKclggJiSdd9wTr+XDwlJBaXb3QUo0F8+c XGXLLz9Px1Dovll4ff8iKKPD20dtmSy+Zs8Ad9BIQPxHw4lC6QAcq5+LBvnKkzW4 0MBPo1/I8Ox0goVuhcEqSnp223Ku7cpzB9Xyvw+JH/igUBtcRGGwwhRe2nKDjjMz q5SzgR2zjsN1vJ/aBUK4lz3mjAwci1MxdbHziy5LIXEoeD+XcuU6BBKDOC3ZqrDJ s1zodbUT07iQDr1AXSVSj1ZBydpy1kJYbbkFcHH46e2r04G5y5vqtcamSJ02d5SO vziZ/fsYAjo9LzzsC4S3TyxbLRssT4QTfGwjzhLzByI2eO+yR1mcbPY2sM6CA6qu DZaZACqmVzK//itEnKnlANeLuDIT4zJTamwm8ZVBkY8SsQ9vG0xVbkV5avWW1RqY 4FnkAgYPrgO/Lxhspp6W =Zqh5 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From wk at gnupg.org Thu May 24 11:59:16 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Thu, 24 May 2012 11:59:16 +0200 Subject: Draft of nine new FAQ questions In-Reply-To: (David Shaw's message of "Wed, 23 May 2012 17:40:03 -0400") References: <4FBD0DE9.6060205@sixdemonbag.org> <4FBD4C6A.4020304@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <87txz5oq6j.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Wed, 23 May 2012 23:40, dshaw at jabberwocky.com said: > Excellent. One note on the new text - it states that 2048-bit DSA > keys use a 224-bit hash. In fact, a 2048-bit DSA key can use either > 224 or 256-bit hashes. GnuPG uses 256 here (but will of course accept For the records: Before 2.0.13, SHA-224 was used for 2048 bit DSA keys. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From rob at robert-earl-hazelett.com Thu May 24 11:08:36 2012 From: rob at robert-earl-hazelett.com (Rob) Date: Thu, 24 May 2012 17:08:36 +0800 Subject: Scripts Message-ID: <7CBA8DC82A8C4CBFB790CD522506CC87@win06v4> Hello, Does anyone here consider himself/herself an expert at writing CMD scripts for use with/by GPG? I ask because I have a problem with such a script and I'm seeking help or advice. Rob From wk at gnupg.org Thu May 24 12:20:42 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Thu, 24 May 2012 12:20:42 +0200 Subject: Draft of nine new FAQ questions In-Reply-To: <4668413.lr5FprjAyU@inno> (Hauke Laging's message of "Thu, 24 May 2012 01:03:13 +0200") References: <4FBD0DE9.6060205@sixdemonbag.org> <4668413.lr5FprjAyU@inno> Message-ID: <87pq9top6t.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Thu, 24 May 2012 01:03, mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de said: > That sounds like there has never been a security problem. El-Gamal signatures, > anyone? Right, there was a bug in the Elgamal signature code. However this was a regression long after we changed the default to DSA with version 0.3.0 in 1998. Only a few keys generated with those versions - and those how created keys without using the defaults - were troubled. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From wk at gnupg.org Thu May 24 12:23:57 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Thu, 24 May 2012 12:23:57 +0200 Subject: Testing GPG EMail encryption AKA PGP/MIME In-Reply-To: <4FBD0DB4.90208@gbenet.com> (david@gbenet.com's message of "Wed, 23 May 2012 17:17:56 +0100") References: <8A981623-00E9-4DCB-8470-17EF24F778E2@robin-kipp.net> <4FBCAE4E.1020704@hotmail.com> <1AD948C7-3D4D-4920-9EB8-2765F7FC01BB@gpgtools.org> <4FBD03CB.1070503@hotmail.com> <87fwaqq4ef.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FBD0DB4.90208@gbenet.com> Message-ID: <87likhop1d.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Wed, 23 May 2012 18:17, david at gbenet.com said: > I've had your key for ages - so why not attach it? Sorry, I don't understand. You want my key? Look into the OpenPGP mail header or simply use a keyserver. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From rychitre at yahoo.com Thu May 24 13:13:44 2012 From: rychitre at yahoo.com (Rupali Chitre) Date: Thu, 24 May 2012 04:13:44 -0700 (PDT) Subject: Draft of nine new FAQ questions In-Reply-To: <87pq9top6t.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <1337858024.6886.YahooMailClassic@web160906.mail.bf1.yahoo.com> Hello, ? I want to opt out from emails. I don't see unsubscribe option. How can I opt out? ? Thanks, Rupali --- On Thu, 5/24/12, Werner Koch wrote: From: Werner Koch Subject: Re: Draft of nine new FAQ questions To: "Hauke Laging" Cc: gnupg-users at gnupg.org Date: Thursday, May 24, 2012, 6:20 AM On Thu, 24 May 2012 01:03, mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de said: > That sounds like there has never been a security problem. El-Gamal signatures, > anyone? Right, there was a bug in the Elgamal signature code.? However this was a regression long after we changed the default to DSA with version 0.3.0 in 1998.? Only a few keys generated with those versions - and those how created keys without using the defaults - were troubled. Salam-Shalom, ???Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei.? Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. _______________________________________________ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users at gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From mwood at IUPUI.Edu Thu May 24 14:55:54 2012 From: mwood at IUPUI.Edu (Mark H. Wood) Date: Thu, 24 May 2012 08:55:54 -0400 Subject: Testing GPG EMail encryption In-Reply-To: <4FBD4AE8.3040609@gbenet.com> References: <451490E5-57F6-48D6-9C17-12B6B3098AB3@robin-kipp.net> <33450129.XK7aaBQoRl@inno> <7C84919C-1948-4D44-97F9-17A9CF977AED@gpgtools.org> <4FBCE501.7020205@sixdemonbag.org> <4FBD0463.1010103@hotmail.com> <4FBD094F.2060909@gbenet.com> <2D1A1214-D036-4DFC-8392-533390654EEE@gpgtools.org> <4FBD358A.8010409@gbenet.com> <4FBD3A77.8030302@sixdemonbag.org> <4FBD4AE8.3040609@gbenet.com> Message-ID: <20120524125554.GC15725@IUPUI.Edu> On Wed, May 23, 2012 at 09:39:04PM +0100, david at gbenet.com wrote: > I ran the debugging programme with Openpgp debugging options to > console and I got the message that with gpg2 installed one was not > able to digitally sign an e-mail whilst encrypting to their public > key which in all the named distros it encrypted to my private key - > fact. I have no idea how a debugger would know that you couldn't sign an email. > It is a fact that Openpgp will only work if BOTH gpg 1.4.11 and the > widget gpg2 is then added. Fact. Most Linux users have BOTH by > default. Fact. That's why no one's reporting aany problems. Fact. If > you remove from your system gpg 1.4.11 then you have real problems > with open Openpgp - even Kleopatra. Fact On my Gentoo system, there is no gpg v1 installed: mwood at mhw ~ $ dir /usr/bin/gpg* lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 4 Sep 15 2011 /usr/bin/gpg -> gpg2 -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 699072 Jun 29 2011 /usr/bin/gpg2 -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 268352 Jun 29 2011 /usr/bin/gpg-agent -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 130720 Jun 29 2011 /usr/bin/gpgconf -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 142736 Jun 29 2011 /usr/bin/gpg-connect-agent -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 50627 Apr 2 15:28 /usr/bin/gpgdir -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 205 Jun 30 2011 /usr/bin/gpgen -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 18448 Sep 21 2011 /usr/bin/gpg-error -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 1804 Sep 21 2011 /usr/bin/gpg-error-config -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 8990 Apr 2 15:28 /usr/bin/gpg-key2ps -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 39320 Jun 29 2011 /usr/bin/gpgkey2ssh -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4005 Apr 2 15:28 /usr/bin/gpglist -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 2750 Apr 2 15:28 /usr/bin/gpg-mailkeys -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 3521 Jan 11 09:14 /usr/bin/gpgme-config -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 26864 Jun 29 2011 /usr/bin/gpgparsemail -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 1708 Apr 2 15:28 /usr/bin/gpgparticipants -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 13830 Apr 2 15:28 /usr/bin/gpgsigs -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 382016 Jun 29 2011 /usr/bin/gpgsm -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4635 Jun 29 2011 /usr/bin/gpgsm-gencert.sh lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 5 Sep 15 2011 /usr/bin/gpgv -> gpgv2 -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 327504 Jun 29 2011 /usr/bin/gpgv2 -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 22760 Apr 2 15:28 /usr/bin/gpgwrap mwood at mhw ~ $ gpg --version gpg (GnuPG) 2.0.17 libgcrypt 1.4.6 Copyright (C) 2011 Free Software Foundation, Inc. License GPLv3+: GNU GPL version 3 or later This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it. There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law. As you can see, 'gpg' and 'gpgv' are symlinks to the v2 programs. Nevertheless, I just sent a signed message to myself at another address, from Thunderbird, using Enigmail. It arrived signed, with a valid signature. Thunderbird + Enigmail + gpg2 works. You should consider the possibility that you have a different problem. -- Mark H. Wood, Lead System Programmer mwood at IUPUI.Edu Asking whether markets are efficient is like asking whether people are smart. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 198 bytes Desc: not available URL: From wk at gnupg.org Thu May 24 15:06:27 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Thu, 24 May 2012 15:06:27 +0200 Subject: Draft of nine new FAQ questions In-Reply-To: <1337858024.6886.YahooMailClassic@web160906.mail.bf1.yahoo.com> (Rupali Chitre's message of "Thu, 24 May 2012 04:13:44 -0700 (PDT)") References: <1337858024.6886.YahooMailClassic@web160906.mail.bf1.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <87fwapohik.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Thu, 24 May 2012 13:13, rychitre at yahoo.com said: > I want to opt out from emails. I don't see unsubscribe option. How can I opt out? Have a look at the last line of each mail: http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users Or look into the mail headers. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From tanguy.herrmann at gmail.com Thu May 24 14:04:59 2012 From: tanguy.herrmann at gmail.com (Tanguy Herrmann) Date: Thu, 24 May 2012 14:04:59 +0200 Subject: Scripts In-Reply-To: <7CBA8DC82A8C4CBFB790CD522506CC87@win06v4> References: <7CBA8DC82A8C4CBFB790CD522506CC87@win06v4> Message-ID: Hello, I'm interested in it too. I know GPG gives a lot of readable output, so I guess I must take only the return value of the gpg executable, right ? But for example, I don't know how to display only the fingerprint of a key without all the display around that I must grep/cut/sed away. But maybe I have the wrong angle of attack ? Tanguy On Thu, May 24, 2012 at 11:08 AM, Rob wrote: > Hello, > > Does anyone here consider himself/herself an expert at writing CMD scripts > for use with/by GPG? I ask because I have a problem with such a script and > I'm seeking help or advice. > > Rob > > ______________________________**_________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/**mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Thu May 24 15:20:07 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Thu, 24 May 2012 09:20:07 -0400 Subject: Testing GPG EMail encryption In-Reply-To: <4FBDDE91.20204@hotmail.com> References: <8A981623-00E9-4DCB-8470-17EF24F778E2@robin-kipp.net> <4FBCAE4E.1020704@hotmail.com> <20120523165726.3c563404@abydos.stargate.org.uk> <4FBDDE91.20204@hotmail.com> Message-ID: <4FBE3587.3020800@sixdemonbag.org> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 On 5/24/12 3:09 AM, Mika Suomalainen wrote: > At least Enigmail fails to recognize PGP/MIME signatures on some > mailman mailing lists. Every time this has been reported to us, it has turned out to be a bug in Mailman and not Enigmail. If you can find a valid PGP/MIME message that Enigmail is not correctly parsing, we'd love to see it! -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Comment: GPGTools - http://gpgtools.org iFYEAREIAAYFAk++NYcACgkQI4Br5da5jhB3wQDgmc9SCy+QAoyt7G3kRFI285UL eRTZDto1FMSuHwDgmtGnm/gGwn+vPDURp4ro+8qIBDQEMOgiPa7u7A== =V/we -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From brad at fineby.me.uk Thu May 24 12:33:12 2012 From: brad at fineby.me.uk (Brad Rogers) Date: Thu, 24 May 2012 11:33:12 +0100 Subject: Testing GPG EMail encryption In-Reply-To: <4FBDDE91.20204@hotmail.com> References: <8A981623-00E9-4DCB-8470-17EF24F778E2@robin-kipp.net> <4FBCAE4E.1020704@hotmail.com> <20120523165726.3c563404@abydos.stargate.org.uk> <4FBDDE91.20204@hotmail.com> Message-ID: <20120524113312.22e2ee7f@abydos.stargate.org.uk> On Thu, 24 May 2012 10:09:05 +0300 Mika Suomalainen wrote: Hello Mika, > At least Enigmail fails to recognize PGP/MIME signatures on some > mailman mailing lists. That would explain the difference in what you and I see; No enigmail here. -- Regards _ / ) "The blindingly obvious is / _)rad never immediately apparent" You're the psychotic daughter of a psychotic mother Pure Mania - The Vibrators -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 490 bytes Desc: not available URL: From wk at gnupg.org Thu May 24 16:06:19 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Thu, 24 May 2012 16:06:19 +0200 Subject: Scripts In-Reply-To: (Tanguy Herrmann's message of "Thu, 24 May 2012 14:04:59 +0200") References: <7CBA8DC82A8C4CBFB790CD522506CC87@win06v4> Message-ID: <87boldoeqs.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Thu, 24 May 2012 14:04, tanguy.herrmann at gmail.com said: > But for example, I don't know how to display only the fingerprint of a key > without all the display around that I must grep/cut/sed away. But maybe I $ gpg --fingerprint --with-colons 1e42b367 | awk -F: '$1=="fpr" {print $10}' 80615870F5BAD690333686D0F2AD85AC1E42B367 If you have more than one key with the given key id it will list all fingerprints. Better scripts also display information from the pub and uid records. doc/DETAILS has the format. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From david at gbenet.com Thu May 24 17:55:59 2012 From: david at gbenet.com (david at gbenet.com) Date: Thu, 24 May 2012 16:55:59 +0100 Subject: Testing GPG EMail encryption In-Reply-To: <20120524125554.GC15725@IUPUI.Edu> References: <451490E5-57F6-48D6-9C17-12B6B3098AB3@robin-kipp.net> <33450129.XK7aaBQoRl@inno> <7C84919C-1948-4D44-97F9-17A9CF977AED@gpgtools.org> <4FBCE501.7020205@sixdemonbag.org> <4FBD0463.1010103@hotmail.com> <4FBD094F.2060909@gbenet.com> <2D1A1214-D036-4DFC-8392-533390654EEE@gpgtools.org> <4FBD358A.8010409@gbenet.com> <4FBD3A77.8030302@sixdemonbag.org> <4FBD4AE8.3040609@gbenet.com> <20120524125554.GC15725@IUPUI.Edu> Message-ID: <4FBE5A0F.9010902@gbenet.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 24/05/12 13:55, Mark H. Wood wrote: > On Wed, May 23, 2012 at 09:39:04PM +0100, david at gbenet.com wrote: > >> I ran the debugging programme with Openpgp debugging options to >> console and I got the message that with gpg2 installed one was not >> able to digitally sign an e-mail whilst encrypting to their public >> key which in all the named distros it encrypted to my private key - >> fact. > > I have no idea how a debugger would know that you couldn't sign an email. > >> It is a fact that Openpgp will only work if BOTH gpg 1.4.11 and the >> widget gpg2 is then added. Fact. Most Linux users have BOTH by >> default. Fact. That's why no one's reporting aany problems. Fact. If >> you remove from your system gpg 1.4.11 then you have real problems >> with open Openpgp - even Kleopatra. Fact > > On my Gentoo system, there is no gpg v1 installed: > > mwood at mhw ~ $ dir /usr/bin/gpg* > lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 4 Sep 15 2011 /usr/bin/gpg -> gpg2 > -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 699072 Jun 29 2011 /usr/bin/gpg2 > -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 268352 Jun 29 2011 /usr/bin/gpg-agent > -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 130720 Jun 29 2011 /usr/bin/gpgconf > -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 142736 Jun 29 2011 /usr/bin/gpg-connect-agent > -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 50627 Apr 2 15:28 /usr/bin/gpgdir > -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 205 Jun 30 2011 /usr/bin/gpgen > -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 18448 Sep 21 2011 /usr/bin/gpg-error > -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 1804 Sep 21 2011 /usr/bin/gpg-error-config > -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 8990 Apr 2 15:28 /usr/bin/gpg-key2ps > -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 39320 Jun 29 2011 /usr/bin/gpgkey2ssh > -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4005 Apr 2 15:28 /usr/bin/gpglist > -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 2750 Apr 2 15:28 /usr/bin/gpg-mailkeys > -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 3521 Jan 11 09:14 /usr/bin/gpgme-config > -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 26864 Jun 29 2011 /usr/bin/gpgparsemail > -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 1708 Apr 2 15:28 /usr/bin/gpgparticipants > -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 13830 Apr 2 15:28 /usr/bin/gpgsigs > -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 382016 Jun 29 2011 /usr/bin/gpgsm > -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4635 Jun 29 2011 /usr/bin/gpgsm-gencert.sh > lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 5 Sep 15 2011 /usr/bin/gpgv -> gpgv2 > -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 327504 Jun 29 2011 /usr/bin/gpgv2 > -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 22760 Apr 2 15:28 /usr/bin/gpgwrap > mwood at mhw ~ $ gpg --version > gpg (GnuPG) 2.0.17 > libgcrypt 1.4.6 > Copyright (C) 2011 Free Software Foundation, Inc. > License GPLv3+: GNU GPL version 3 or later > > This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it. > There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law. > > As you can see, 'gpg' and 'gpgv' are symlinks to the v2 programs. > > Nevertheless, I just sent a signed message to myself at another > address, from Thunderbird, using Enigmail. It arrived signed, with a > valid signature. Thunderbird + Enigmail + gpg2 works. You should > consider the possibility that you have a different problem. > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users - From tests carried out - Mandrava Linux was ok. I suspect that other Linux distros have no real problems - just because your works - does not mean that every other Linux distro works. I stated I only ran tests on a few Linux Distros - I too have 5 e-mail accounts and could do multiple testing - with surprising results. We all think that at the core all Linux distros are the same - they are not. Heavily branded distros where the core of every programme is re-written is bad news for the user. I case in point. Seahorse. You are supposed to set how long a passphrase will exist for. In Ubuntu and opensuse this feature has been removed. Such programmes as "apt" are not installed - and do not appear on opensuse's list of "approved" apps. But it's not all about re-writing all the code for hard-wired branding. A women wrote to the enigmail list and said that her Fedora-16 64 bit had failed to initialise gpg2 - she ven whent as far as going to Mozilla and downloading and installing Thunderbird. She even went to the enigmail's home page and downloaded and installed the correct version of enigmail for Thunderbird. The result? Openpgp caused her system to freeze. I was the only person who answered her - I was the only person to conduct tests on Fedora-16 KDE/Gnome/LXDE 32/64 bit. I stated the results of my tests. Further in opensuse gpg2 is installed by default - a user-agent is installed by default - but in all versions of opensuse tested no user-agent was ever running. As stated the Seahorse was the default daemon - but had the ability to set how long a passphase would last had been programmed out. With branded versions (not all) of popular Linux distros the term "open source" means "closed source." But we are still faced with the problems of GPG4WIN and the problem of directly installing from source. We are still faced with the fact that Openpgp does not support gpg2. Now I'm running Mint Linux LXDE 32 bit - the Seahorse as provided has no way of controlling the length in minutes your passphrase stays around. Linux Mint uses Ubuntu software sources and that function has been written out. I am trying to install Seahorse directly - I have to google for all its dependences - which are not installed - though I've got a "Seahorse!" You either get the original open source software or a pre-packaged look-a-like. I suspect that when you install a branded Linux - you install Thunderbird and Enigmail all these open source packages are re-written to be a closed shop. But it still does not answer why direct installs have the same problem. Or why Windows XP with Thunderbird and Enigmail have problems. David - -- ?See the sanity of the man! No gods, no angels, no demons, no body. Nothing of the kind.Stern, sane,every brain-cell perfect and complete even at the moment of death. No delusion.? https://linuxcounter.net/user/512854.html - http://gbenet.com -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJPvloPAAoJEOJpqm7flRExNxUH/3XtL5klqWGR1QBZ7Gr32DU6 oxvTQgwniU+v/EwYQYP7x1aHdXWEudVj4FBt6F6MK8sbCo/FEmi77CLoTINFY+Q8 ceOEtd7Djle1gI45xCSAP2PYhb7x5nRCXJo3Jwojc7f2s+QFWtrlI2cfSDBFHag1 EtwRh4CHNAeMjUdfdsQt63PLEAexgJZFr2GTQQ9UnfsAbIOoRyiYymAzoSkvVc6K g2JFLarj7YFaoqyEUxFS2NfF0EGqPQ2363nhBH4b7vD/4c8zrCQ6WPBwxKRApGBV 11mmwCTvCycf75OrT37R68iYzhDdrxZFceQ/dcEmBV/hPw7pjfIvJwnmytjngR8= =pU3e -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From wk at gnupg.org Thu May 24 20:48:08 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Thu, 24 May 2012 20:48:08 +0200 Subject: Testing GPG EMail encryption In-Reply-To: <4FBE5A0F.9010902@gbenet.com> (david@gbenet.com's message of "Thu, 24 May 2012 16:55:59 +0100") References: <451490E5-57F6-48D6-9C17-12B6B3098AB3@robin-kipp.net> <33450129.XK7aaBQoRl@inno> <7C84919C-1948-4D44-97F9-17A9CF977AED@gpgtools.org> <4FBCE501.7020205@sixdemonbag.org> <4FBD0463.1010103@hotmail.com> <4FBD094F.2060909@gbenet.com> <2D1A1214-D036-4DFC-8392-533390654EEE@gpgtools.org> <4FBD358A.8010409@gbenet.com> <4FBD3A77.8030302@sixdemonbag.org> <4FBD4AE8.3040609@gbenet.com> <20120524125554.GC15725@IUPUI.Edu> <4FBE5A0F.9010902@gbenet.com> Message-ID: <874nr5o1p3.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Hi David, your mails are hard to read because you do not trim the quotes and use lines of 90 characters or longer. Please don't use more than about 72. One hint anyway: GNOME has a thing called gnome-keyring which hijacks the gpg-agent IPC and thus you run into problems when using GnuPG-2. It is possible to switch this off (look for a components configure options in gnome-keyring). Seahorse does something quite similar but usually does not break GnuPG's internal communication channels. I don't know which distribution versions enable these misfeatures, though. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From mick.crane at gmail.com Thu May 24 21:27:59 2012 From: mick.crane at gmail.com (michael crane) Date: Thu, 24 May 2012 20:27:59 +0100 Subject: Testing GPG EMail encryption In-Reply-To: <4FBE5A0F.9010902@gbenet.com> References: <451490E5-57F6-48D6-9C17-12B6B3098AB3@robin-kipp.net> <33450129.XK7aaBQoRl@inno> <7C84919C-1948-4D44-97F9-17A9CF977AED@gpgtools.org> <4FBCE501.7020205@sixdemonbag.org> <4FBD0463.1010103@hotmail.com> <4FBD094F.2060909@gbenet.com> <2D1A1214-D036-4DFC-8392-533390654EEE@gpgtools.org> <4FBD358A.8010409@gbenet.com> <4FBD3A77.8030302@sixdemonbag.org> <4FBD4AE8.3040609@gbenet.com> <20120524125554.GC15725@IUPUI.Edu> <4FBE5A0F.9010902@gbenet.com> Message-ID: <4a893378f56448b5c58d6959d331a538.squirrel@192.168.1.50> >> mwood at mhw ~ $ dir /usr/bin/gpg* ^^^ -- keyID: 0x4BFEBB31 From gonzalezjj at hildebrando.com Thu May 24 19:09:20 2012 From: gonzalezjj at hildebrando.com (Jose Juan Gonzalez) Date: Thu, 24 May 2012 12:09:20 -0500 Subject: encrypt message for very if use a key Message-ID: <4FBE6B40.1010006@hildebrando.com> Hi, Good morning I try to encrypt a file ,similar to the step 3 on this page: http://developer.gooddata.com/docs/sso with the next instruction: gpg --armor --output enc.txt --encrypt --recipient security at gooddata.com signed.txt but when I use this, the gpg send me a message: but I need to make this automatic and the user not needs to verify , if he wants to use this key. I found we can use these instructions: -yes and -trust-model always, but send me a error orhow is works ? I hope, you can help me, -- *Jose Juan Gonzalez P.* *Ext: 11086* *Skype: jjgonzalez13* *Cell Phone: +52 4491066576 * *Nextel ID: 92*12*46151 * *Mobile Phone: +52 4492425148 * *"There is nothing impossible, just unknown things"* Hildebrando Software Factory| Sierra de las Palomas 101-101. Aguascalientes, Mexico**| tel +52 44-99961500 | tel +52 44-91393220 | http://www.hildebrando.com.mx -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: ejjiheee.png Type: image/png Size: 7810 bytes Desc: not available URL: From david at gbenet.com Thu May 24 22:37:05 2012 From: david at gbenet.com (david at gbenet.com) Date: Thu, 24 May 2012 21:37:05 +0100 Subject: Testing GPG EMail encryption In-Reply-To: <874nr5o1p3.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <451490E5-57F6-48D6-9C17-12B6B3098AB3@robin-kipp.net> <33450129.XK7aaBQoRl@inno> <7C84919C-1948-4D44-97F9-17A9CF977AED@gpgtools.org> <4FBCE501.7020205@sixdemonbag.org> <4FBD0463.1010103@hotmail.com> <4FBD094F.2060909@gbenet.com> <2D1A1214-D036-4DFC-8392-533390654EEE@gpgtools.org> <4FBD358A.8010409@gbenet.com> <4FBD3A77.8030302@sixdemonbag.org> <4FBD4AE8.3040609@gbenet.com> <20120524125554.GC15725@IUPUI.Edu> <4FBE5A0F.9010902@gbenet.com> <874nr5o1p3.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <4FBE9BF1.7010903@gbenet.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 24/05/12 19:48, Werner Koch wrote: > Hi David, > > your mails are hard to read because you do not trim the quotes and use > lines of 90 characters or longer. Please don't use more than about 72. > One hint anyway: > > GNOME has a thing called gnome-keyring which hijacks the gpg-agent IPC > and thus you run into problems when using GnuPG-2. It is possible to > switch this off (look for a components configure options in > gnome-keyring). Seahorse does something quite similar but usually does > not break GnuPG's internal communication channels. I don't know which > distribution versions enable these misfeatures, though. > > > Salam-Shalom, > > Werner > Hello Verner - first off I will try to write much shorter sentences :) I have gnome-keyring installed - but no icon to click on and nothing in my menus to launch the programme. If I open a terminal and type gnome-keyring - all I get is: david at laptop-1 ~ $ gnome-keyring usage: gnome-keyring command [options] commands: certificate-exception import version david at laptop-1 ~ $ The "help" gnome-keyring --help does not give a list of user commands. A quick search shows I've got gnome-keyring files in my /etc - /usr/bin - usr/include - usr/lib -usr/lib/cli - usr/lib/debug/usr/lib - the list goes on :) So how may I edit components in the gnome-keyring? David - -- ?See the sanity of the man! No gods, no angels, no demons, no body. Nothing of the kind.Stern, sane,every brain-cell perfect and complete even at the moment of death. No delusion.? https://linuxcounter.net/user/512854.html - http://gbenet.com -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJPvpvxAAoJEOJpqm7flRExU9UIAJWiTwDZMqdzKKeP/3vnkMos +uXe5iLa82YBgAXOuGFZ+F7I8KmJbZ3WlSR94QmbANOk/RYYkplyz5cyXDdehrTB ElCiVw8RQN+/fantrvdKT9c/Syx0XXY1ps/bBZ3kOrApdjFTPI/+h2KA/OcQwuQL Pc/ya0b3OejrgnrLQP+JZ0+YV/gwp+zXKCJIOLXb7vL3pElbdjG2n88K3+KZqAK2 aHsvfc+IjWxtJbxsJxQv8sS8zakrnf2uUlypgPLO/EAcVY1z2ymj56cUPwFO4xmX KtgoRFRzPQGa7XHuFNDbFq6oSa7/mkTlh/jyzNH0wI5P0OzOVKIenwp566G6TYQ= =aGYL -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From JPClizbe at tx.rr.com Fri May 25 00:33:01 2012 From: JPClizbe at tx.rr.com (John Clizbe) Date: Thu, 24 May 2012 17:33:01 -0500 Subject: Unsubscribing (was Re: Draft of nine new FAQ questions) In-Reply-To: <1337858024.6886.YahooMailClassic@web160906.mail.bf1.yahoo.com> References: <1337858024.6886.YahooMailClassic@web160906.mail.bf1.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <4FBEB71D.5050603@tx.rr.com> Rupali Chitre wrote: > Hello, > > > I want to opt out from emails. I don't see unsubscribe option. How can I > opt out? > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users Visit the link above - included at the end of EVERY list email or look at the mail headers also included in every list email List-Unsubscribe: , From reynt0 at cs.albany.edu Fri May 25 01:56:00 2012 From: reynt0 at cs.albany.edu (reynt0) Date: Thu, 24 May 2012 19:56:00 -0400 (EDT) Subject: Draft of nine new FAQ questions In-Reply-To: <4FBD7F60.3060406@sixdemonbag.org> References: <4FBD0DE9.6060205@sixdemonbag.org> <4FBD7F60.3060406@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: On Wed, 23 May 2012, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > On 5/23/12 6:50 PM, reynt0 wrote: >> Also, just to mention, best to avoid smart apostrophes/quotes >> in the final version, naturally, right? > > Not a whelk?s chance in a supernova. Those aren?t smart quotes, they?re > perfectly valid UTF-8 typographic marks. > > "Straight quotes" and 'straight apostrophes' are artifacts of the > typewriter era, where there was simply not enough space on the keyboard > to provide proper typographic marks. . . . I was just guessing what they might be. They showed as "garbage" character groups in some browser rendering. The idea is just to maximize usability to maximum audience, of course, however that might be obtained. Cheers. From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Fri May 25 02:27:38 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Thu, 24 May 2012 20:27:38 -0400 Subject: Draft of nine new FAQ questions In-Reply-To: References: <4FBD0DE9.6060205@sixdemonbag.org> <4FBD7F60.3060406@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <4FBED1FA.5030105@sixdemonbag.org> On 5/24/12 7:56 PM, reynt0 wrote: > I was just guessing what they might be. They showed as > "garbage" character groups in some browser rendering. They may render as 'no such glyph', depending on which font you use. I'd suggest using a better font. :) Also, if your browser is set to render everything as ASCII regardless of what character set the webpage says it's using, then you'll also run into problems. The solution here is to trust the webpage character set. > The idea is just to maximize usability to maximum audience, If you wish for that, I invite you to write your own. "Maximum audience" is not the same as "maximum usability." The two are different properties. When it comes to the written word, ease of reading, speed of reading, and comprehension is all improved by using reasonable typography. I consider those to be essential usability goals. If I wanted "maximum audience," I'd try to turn the FAQ into _American Idol_. From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Fri May 25 04:20:22 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Thu, 24 May 2012 22:20:22 -0400 Subject: PGP interoperability Message-ID: <4FBEEC66.6090705@sixdemonbag.org> Looking over the PGP product offerings after their acquisition by Symantec, it seems they have dropped support for 2048- and 3072-bit DSA. This decision makes no sense to me, and is sufficiently weird that I wonder if the marketing copy is horribly in error. However, the marketing copy is clear -- across the whole of the PGP product line, DSA2 is no longer supported. Check the following URLs, click on "System Requirements," and take a look at the "Public Key Algorithms." For each product they offer: * Diffie-Hellman * DSA (1024-bit keys only) * RSA (up to 4096-bit keys) http://www.symantec.com/products/sysreq.jsp?pcid=pcat_business_cont&pvid=desktop_email_1 http://www.symantec.com/products/sysreq.jsp?pcid=pcat_info_risk_comp&pvid=desktop_corporate_1 http://www.symantec.com/products/sysreq.jsp?pcid=pcat_info_risk_comp&pvid=desktop_pro_1 From wk at gnupg.org Fri May 25 10:19:45 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Fri, 25 May 2012 10:19:45 +0200 Subject: Testing GPG EMail encryption In-Reply-To: <4a893378f56448b5c58d6959d331a538.squirrel@192.168.1.50> (michael crane's message of "Thu, 24 May 2012 20:27:59 +0100") References: <451490E5-57F6-48D6-9C17-12B6B3098AB3@robin-kipp.net> <33450129.XK7aaBQoRl@inno> <7C84919C-1948-4D44-97F9-17A9CF977AED@gpgtools.org> <4FBCE501.7020205@sixdemonbag.org> <4FBD0463.1010103@hotmail.com> <4FBD094F.2060909@gbenet.com> <2D1A1214-D036-4DFC-8392-533390654EEE@gpgtools.org> <4FBD358A.8010409@gbenet.com> <4FBD3A77.8030302@sixdemonbag.org> <4FBD4AE8.3040609@gbenet.com> <20120524125554.GC15725@IUPUI.Edu> <4FBE5A0F.9010902@gbenet.com> <4a893378f56448b5c58d6959d331a538.squirrel@192.168.1.50> Message-ID: <87likgn04e.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Thu, 24 May 2012 21:27, mick.crane at gmail.com said: >>> mwood at mhw ~ $ dir /usr/bin/gpg* 10.2 `dir': Briefly list directory contents =========================================== `dir' is equivalent to `ls -C -b'; that is, by default files are listed in columns, sorted vertically, and special characters are represented by backslash escape sequences. -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From wk at gnupg.org Fri May 25 10:31:55 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Fri, 25 May 2012 10:31:55 +0200 Subject: encrypt message for very if use a key In-Reply-To: <4FBE6B40.1010006@hildebrando.com> (Jose Juan Gonzalez's message of "Thu, 24 May 2012 12:09:20 -0500") References: <4FBE6B40.1010006@hildebrando.com> Message-ID: <87hav4mzk4.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Thu, 24 May 2012 19:09, gonzalezjj at hildebrando.com said: > but when I use this, the gpg send me a message: I can't see that but I guess that you want to use this command line: gpg --armor --output enc.txt --encrypt --recipient security at gooddata.com --trust-model always --batch --yes signed.txt (all in one line of course). "--trust-model always" assumes the given key is valid and trusted, "--batch" guarantees that the user is never asked, and "--yes" will overwrite any existing "enc.txt". Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From wk at gnupg.org Fri May 25 10:44:40 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Fri, 25 May 2012 10:44:40 +0200 Subject: Draft of nine new FAQ questions In-Reply-To: <4FBD7F60.3060406@sixdemonbag.org> (Robert J. Hansen's message of "Wed, 23 May 2012 20:22:56 -0400") References: <4FBD0DE9.6060205@sixdemonbag.org> <4FBD7F60.3060406@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <87bolcmyyv.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Thu, 24 May 2012 02:22, rjh at sixdemonbag.org said: > The final version that gets submitted to Werner will by necessity be > plain text, and that will probably get downshifted into dumb typewriter Keep those quotes. I like UTF-8 and it is always easier to replace them by ticks and backticks than the other way around. I would use them as well, but I don't yet know which keys to use. MOD3+(,) give me the single quotes, but the commonly used MOD3+' is bound to deaddiaeresis. For German I also need a lower quote. Finding 3 new keys with Emacs is hard ;-). Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl Fri May 25 11:22:45 2012 From: johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl (Johan Wevers) Date: Fri, 25 May 2012 11:22:45 +0200 Subject: PGP interoperability In-Reply-To: <4FBEEC66.6090705@sixdemonbag.org> References: <4FBEEC66.6090705@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <4FBF4F65.3000809@vulcan.xs4all.nl> On 25-05-2012 4:20, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > Looking over the PGP product offerings after their acquisition by > Symantec, it seems they have dropped support for 2048- and 3072-bit DSA. > This decision makes no sense to me, and is sufficiently weird that I > wonder if the marketing copy is horribly in error. Or something else is wrong: > product they offer: > > * Diffie-Hellman > * DSA (1024-bit keys only) > * RSA (up to 4096-bit keys) Seems they want to push everyone to RSA. I wonder why? The patent issue is over so that can't be it. I understood that it is believed that the discrete log problem is possibly harder than factoring, since solving DL solves factoring but not the other way around. Maybe the NSA has found a workable solution for factoring but not for DL? -- ir. J.C.A. Wevers PGP/GPG public keys at http://www.xs4all.nl/~johanw/pgpkeys.html From nicholas.cole at gmail.com Fri May 25 12:41:46 2012 From: nicholas.cole at gmail.com (Nicholas Cole) Date: Fri, 25 May 2012 11:41:46 +0100 Subject: Draft of nine new FAQ questions In-Reply-To: References: <4FBD0DE9.6060205@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: > ---re #5: ?Is RSA-2048 really enough? > > ***start 2nd sentence : And other organizations to whom encryption > is important (such as RSA...*** ?[The world changes, and maybe > an explicit endorsement might not be so appropriate tomorrow, > but embarassing or similar to change then. ?Just mentioning them > is an implicit endorsement, IMHO of course] > According to NIST, yes. Further, other well-respected organizations (such as > RSA Security) have publicly supported NIST's recommendations. > > ?. . . > key recommendations have been superseded by those in Practical Cryptography, > which, to repeat, says ***replace "says" with > "estimates"*** RSA-2048 will be sufficient until the mid-2020s. > > > ---re #6: ?Can any of the ciphers in GnuPG be brute-forced? > ?. . . > ***In terms of current scientific understandings, the symmetric > ciphers used in GnuPG are utterly*** > The symmetric ciphers used in GnuPG are utterly immune to > brute forcing. ?The Second Law of Thermodynamics places strict > ?. . . and > 7.6 .... 2048-bit keys are believed to be immune to brute-forcing until at least 2030. There's a slight confusion in these answers that I think it would be really helpful to address in an FAQ. On the one-hand, this new FAQ suggests that attacking a 2048 key is already so unfeasible that to suggest that a 3072 key would provide additional security is a nonsense. On the other hand, there is a sense that 2048 keys might only provide adequate security until the mid-2020s / 2030. Is that because the break-through that is anticipated by the second statement is some kind of quantum computing success or some similar advance that completely breaks RSA (and all PKI)? In other words, what really is the status of a statement like "2048 RSA is believed safe until 2030"? Back in the 1990s, such predictions were based on a sense of increasing computing power, and it was possible to predict with reasonable accuracy when (for example) 512 bit RSA would look possible to factor at imaginable cost. Is the "safe until 2030" prediction of a similar quality or just a guess at when technologies that are currently science fiction might look possible? I only raise these points because this has become such a recurrent, sometimes even tiresome theme on this mailing list, that I'd really like the FAQ to be as comprehensive as possible. To put the question in the form that sometimes comes up on this list - what if one wants security until 2040? Would a 3072 key make sense in that case or not? Not that I think my own security needs, by the way, need anything more than a 512 RSA key, if that... ;-) Best wishes, Nicholas From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Fri May 25 14:35:52 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Fri, 25 May 2012 08:35:52 -0400 Subject: Draft of nine new FAQ questions In-Reply-To: References: <4FBD0DE9.6060205@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <4FBF7CA8.9000702@sixdemonbag.org> On 5/25/12 6:41 AM, Nicholas Cole wrote: > ***In terms of current scientific understandings, the symmetric > ciphers used in GnuPG are utterly*** > The symmetric ciphers used in GnuPG are utterly immune to > brute forcing. The Second Law of Thermodynamics places strict I'm comfortable with things as they are. If and when Heisenberg and/or the Second Law stop being accurate descriptions of the universe, I'll have much bigger things to worry about than the FAQ. :) > There's a slight confusion in these answers that I think it would be > really helpful to address in an FAQ. Yes, there is. Unfortunately, the answer is kind of messy. NIST believes a 112-bit *keyspace* ("bits of security") will be sufficient until at least 2030, but NIST never gives their reasons why. I suspect that's because the committee wasn't able to reach an agreement on why: one person believed X was the biggest threat and would come to pass no sooner than 2030, another person believed Y and it would come to pass no sooner than 2030, another person believed Z. They all agreed "safe until 2030," so that's what got put down as a recommendation -- but NIST reached no consensus on what particular threat they were worried about. NIST also believes a 2048-bit key provides a 112-bit keyspace. There's a lot of conjecture going on there. Sure, there may be approximately 2**112 primes that would have to be checked in order to do a brute-force factoring, but there's some evidence that RSA can be broken *without needing to factor anything* (!!). We have no idea how to do it and no idea how much easier this would be than brute-force factoring. (In fact, for all we know it might be harder, although that's considered unlikely.) Dan Boneh showed breaking RSA without factoring anything was probably possible, but it was a nonconstructive demonstration -- we have no idea where to begin. So on the one hand, it's possible that brute-force factoring will have some sort of breakthrough by 2030 (Shor's algorithm, maybe?) that will end the useful lifespan of 2048-bit keys. And on the other hand, it's possible that Boneh's work will have some sort of breakthrough by 2030 that will blow RSA out of the water. We don't know. It's kind of frustrating. It's this sort of complexity that causes our crystal balls to be all murky. Remember, too, that we're talking about predictions *18 years out*. That's a long, long ways. I'll be getting senior citizen's discounts at restaurants by then. I imagine a lot of the NISTers just didn't feel comfortable making pronouncements past 2030. > To put the question in the form that sometimes comes up on this list - > what if one wants security until 2040? Would a 3072 key make sense in > that case or not? Then you're probably best-served going hog-wild on a 4096-bit key, with the strong caveat that nobody really has any idea whether even a 4k key will survive until 2040. From mwood at IUPUI.Edu Fri May 25 15:03:15 2012 From: mwood at IUPUI.Edu (Mark H. Wood) Date: Fri, 25 May 2012 09:03:15 -0400 Subject: Testing GPG EMail encryption In-Reply-To: <4FBE5A0F.9010902@gbenet.com> References: <7C84919C-1948-4D44-97F9-17A9CF977AED@gpgtools.org> <4FBCE501.7020205@sixdemonbag.org> <4FBD0463.1010103@hotmail.com> <4FBD094F.2060909@gbenet.com> <2D1A1214-D036-4DFC-8392-533390654EEE@gpgtools.org> <4FBD358A.8010409@gbenet.com> <4FBD3A77.8030302@sixdemonbag.org> <4FBD4AE8.3040609@gbenet.com> <20120524125554.GC15725@IUPUI.Edu> <4FBE5A0F.9010902@gbenet.com> Message-ID: <20120525130315.GA7201@IUPUI.Edu> On Thu, May 24, 2012 at 04:55:59PM +0100, david at gbenet.com wrote: > - From tests carried out - Mandrava Linux was ok. I suspect that other Linux distros have no > real problems - just because your works - does not mean that every other Linux distro works. However: because it works on my system, even though there is no GPG v1 installed on it anywhere, does demonstrate that gpg v1 is not required and gpg v2 is not the problem. -- Mark H. Wood, Lead System Programmer mwood at IUPUI.Edu Asking whether markets are efficient is like asking whether people are smart. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 198 bytes Desc: not available URL: From mwood at IUPUI.Edu Fri May 25 15:06:26 2012 From: mwood at IUPUI.Edu (Mark H. Wood) Date: Fri, 25 May 2012 09:06:26 -0400 Subject: Testing GPG EMail encryption In-Reply-To: <4a893378f56448b5c58d6959d331a538.squirrel@192.168.1.50> References: <4FBCE501.7020205@sixdemonbag.org> <4FBD0463.1010103@hotmail.com> <4FBD094F.2060909@gbenet.com> <2D1A1214-D036-4DFC-8392-533390654EEE@gpgtools.org> <4FBD358A.8010409@gbenet.com> <4FBD3A77.8030302@sixdemonbag.org> <4FBD4AE8.3040609@gbenet.com> <20120524125554.GC15725@IUPUI.Edu> <4FBE5A0F.9010902@gbenet.com> <4a893378f56448b5c58d6959d331a538.squirrel@192.168.1.50> Message-ID: <20120525130626.GB7201@IUPUI.Edu> On Thu, May 24, 2012 at 08:27:59PM +0100, michael crane wrote: > >> mwood at mhw ~ $ dir /usr/bin/gpg* Sorry, that's lingering evidence of my VMS habits: mwood at mhw ~ $ alias dir alias dir='ls -l' -- Mark H. Wood, Lead System Programmer mwood at IUPUI.Edu Asking whether markets are efficient is like asking whether people are smart. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 198 bytes Desc: not available URL: From hka at qbs.com.pl Fri May 25 15:10:37 2012 From: hka at qbs.com.pl (Hubert Kario) Date: Fri, 25 May 2012 15:10:37 +0200 Subject: PGP interoperability In-Reply-To: <4FBF4F65.3000809@vulcan.xs4all.nl> References: <4FBEEC66.6090705@sixdemonbag.org> <4FBF4F65.3000809@vulcan.xs4all.nl> Message-ID: <1844206.Nb8y4vuGCb@k85hala03> On Friday 25 of May 2012 11:22:45 Johan Wevers wrote: > On 25-05-2012 4:20, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > > product they offer: > > * Diffie-Hellman > > * DSA (1024-bit keys only) > > * RSA (up to 4096-bit keys) > > Seems they want to push everyone to RSA. I wonder why? The patent issue > is over so that can't be it. > > I understood that it is believed that the discrete log problem is > possibly harder than factoring, since solving DL solves factoring but > not the other way around. Maybe the NSA has found a workable solution > for factoring but not for DL? Considering that Suite B uses ECC only for asymetric crypto, I'd say you're probably right. But that's just speculation, we will know in 30 - 40 years... :) Regards. -- Hubert Kario QBS - Quality Business Software 02-656 Warszawa, ul. Ksawer?w 30/85 tel. +48 (22) 646-61-51, 646-74-24 www.qbs.com.pl From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Fri May 25 15:24:32 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Fri, 25 May 2012 09:24:32 -0400 Subject: Draft of nine new FAQ questions In-Reply-To: <4FBF7CA8.9000702@sixdemonbag.org> References: <4FBD0DE9.6060205@sixdemonbag.org> <4FBF7CA8.9000702@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <4FBF8810.1020708@sixdemonbag.org> On 5/25/12 8:35 AM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > Dan Boneh showed breaking RSA without factoring anything was > probably possible, but it was a nonconstructive demonstration -- we have > no idea where to begin. Just realized the phrase "nonconstructive" may need to be explained. The best way to do it is with a story. Imagine that you and Dan Boneh [1] are in a dark room. Neither you nor he have any idea what's in here with you, or if in fact there's anything in here at all. You're completely ... in the dark, if you'll forgive the pun. You begin to muse about wouldn't it be nice if there was a way to find out exactly what else was in the room with you. Dan listens politely, then says: "Well, figuring out what's in the room with us is a big question. Maybe we should start smaller: let's find out if there's *anything* in the room with us." You scoff at this. "How are we going to do that? If we find out *what's* in the room with us, that will tell us *if* anything's in the room with us. How do you propose to figure out *if* anything's in the room with us but not *what* that is?" Now, a little-known fact about academics in computer science is that we are all heavily-armed [2]. This is something you probably wished you had thought about before you foolishly volunteered to be in this metaphor, because now Dan Boneh is quick-drawing a Glock 18 with the sort of grace and precision usually reserved for samurai movies. As he fills the room with hot lead at nine hundred rounds per minute, somewhere in the world Quentin Tarantino stops what he's doing and a single tear of pride rolls down his cheek, although he is not quite sure why. Having fallen over in all the excitement, you quickly pull yourself to your feet and scream out, "WHAT WAS THAT?" Somehow, your voice sounds very tinny and far away. Dan casually removes his earplugs and explains: "Judging from the reverberations, we know there are walls. We just don't know where. Judging from the sounds of fragile things breaking, we know there were fragile things -- but we don't know what shape they're in now. And judging from the noise of a sucking chest wound, it's a fair bet there is some other living creature in the room with us." You take all this in for a moment and exclaim, "Are you telling me you just /shot another human being?!/" "No," Dan observes. "It /could/ have been a werewolf. True, werewolves are usually immune to conventional weapons, but I have no way of knowing whether I was using silver bullets just there. I /may/ have shot a human being. But I'm not ruling out the werewolf hypothesis yet, either." At this point you look skywards and scream, "GET ME OUT OF THIS METAPHOR! I get it already! A nonconstructive proof doesn't tell us anything about /what/ or /why/ or /how/, it just says that something /is/! GET ME OUT OF HERE, I don't want to spend the rest of this metaphor in a dark room with a raving psychotic!" Dan helpfully points out as he's reloading that werewolves suffer from lycanthropy, not psychosis. As for you, you flee the metaphor for the safety of a more literal world. [1] In reality, Dan Boneh is a very nice guy, quite reasonable, and nothing at all like I'm portraying him here. [2] http://www.ccs.neu.edu/home/shivers/autoweapons.html From mwood at IUPUI.Edu Fri May 25 15:31:38 2012 From: mwood at IUPUI.Edu (Mark H. Wood) Date: Fri, 25 May 2012 09:31:38 -0400 Subject: Draft of nine new FAQ questions In-Reply-To: <87bolcmyyv.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <4FBD0DE9.6060205@sixdemonbag.org> <4FBD7F60.3060406@sixdemonbag.org> <87bolcmyyv.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <20120525133138.GC7201@IUPUI.Edu> On Fri, May 25, 2012 at 10:44:40AM +0200, Werner Koch wrote: > On Thu, 24 May 2012 02:22, rjh at sixdemonbag.org said: > > > The final version that gets submitted to Werner will by necessity be > > plain text, and that will probably get downshifted into dumb typewriter > > Keep those quotes. I like UTF-8 and it is always easier to replace them > by ticks and backticks than the other way around. > > I would use them as well, but I don't yet know which keys to use. > MOD3+(,) give me the single quotes, but the commonly used MOD3+' is > bound to deaddiaeresis. For German I also need a lower quote. Finding > 3 new keys with Emacs is hard ;-). And life is too short to go trawling the Internet for X Compose sequences. If I could find a comprehensive table I'd probably use them more. -- Mark H. Wood, Lead System Programmer mwood at IUPUI.Edu Asking whether markets are efficient is like asking whether people are smart. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 198 bytes Desc: not available URL: From bd9439 at att.com Fri May 25 15:39:27 2012 From: bd9439 at att.com (DUELL, BOB) Date: Fri, 25 May 2012 13:39:27 +0000 Subject: Secret key not available In-Reply-To: <87hav4mzk4.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <4FBE6B40.1010006@hildebrando.com> <87hav4mzk4.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: Hi, Couple quick questions (and probably a FAQ): 1. Attempting to decrypt a file that was sent to me by someone else, I get this message: gpg: decryption failed: secret key not available Could that mean the file was not encrypted with my public key? 2. Assuming the above it "yes", is there a command I can use to display what key(s) were used to encrypt the file? This file is coming from a vendor who recently transferred some of their operations to an "offshore" location and I'm dealing with quite a communications delay with them. They probably use different keys to deliver files to different groups in my company, but that's just a guess. Thanks! Bob From mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de Fri May 25 15:59:29 2012 From: mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de (Hauke Laging) Date: Fri, 25 May 2012 15:59:29 +0200 Subject: Secret key not available In-Reply-To: References: <4FBE6B40.1010006@hildebrando.com> <87hav4mzk4.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <3162592.DvnkNnatyu@inno> Am Fr 25.05.2012, 13:39:27 schrieb DUELL, BOB: > Hi, > > Couple quick questions (and probably a FAQ): You need the link to the FAQ? http://www.gnupg.org/documentation/faqs.en.html > 1. Attempting to decrypt a file that was sent to me by someone else, > I get this message: > > gpg: decryption failed: secret key not available > > Could that mean the file was not encrypted with my public key? Indeed. > 2. Assuming the above it "yes", is there a command I can use to > display what key(s) were used to encrypt the file? When I try to decrypt such a file then this happens: start cmd:> LC_ALL=C gpg --decrypt --output /dev/null \ test.html.unavailable_key.gpg gpg: encrypted with 2048-bit RSA key, ID 0x12345678, created 2012-05-22 "foo bar " gpg: decryption failed: No secret key So it has obviously been encrypted for key 0x12345678. Hauke -- PGP: D44C 6A5B 71B0 427C CED3 025C BD7D 6D27 ECCB 5814 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 555 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From vedaal at nym.hush.com Fri May 25 16:11:06 2012 From: vedaal at nym.hush.com (vedaal at nym.hush.com) Date: Fri, 25 May 2012 10:11:06 -0400 Subject: Draft of nine new FAQ questions Message-ID: <20120525141106.D85076F443@smtp.hushmail.com> Robert J. Hansen rjh at sixdemonbag.org wrote on Fri May 25 15:24:32 CEST 2012 : > In reality, Dan Boneh is a very nice guy, quite reasonable, and nothing at all like I'm portraying him here. He gives a free online crypto course at Stanford https://www.coursera.org/#course/crypto The course is more abstract, explaining how encryption and hashing are 'acceptably secure, but not as secure as a one-time-pad', and gives the underlying theory for symmetic ciphers, hashes, DH and RSA. He does the video lectures, and can be reached for questions through the course's forum or by e-mail. vedaal From dkg at fifthhorseman.net Fri May 25 16:26:58 2012 From: dkg at fifthhorseman.net (Daniel Kahn Gillmor) Date: Fri, 25 May 2012 10:26:58 -0400 Subject: Secret key not available In-Reply-To: References: <4FBE6B40.1010006@hildebrando.com> <87hav4mzk4.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <4FBF96B2.8000608@fifthhorseman.net> On 05/25/2012 09:39 AM, DUELL, BOB wrote: > 1. Attempting to decrypt a file that was sent to me by someone else, > I get this message: > > gpg: decryption failed: secret key not available > > Could that mean the file was not encrypted with my public key? yes, that is one plausible explanation. Another possibility is that you don't actually have your secret key on the computer you're currently using. > 2. Assuming the above it "yes", is there a command I can use to > display what key(s) were used to encrypt the file? sure, you could use gpg --list-packets, and redirect standard input to pull from the file in question: 0 dkg at pip:~$ gpg --list-packets < test.gpg :pubkey enc packet: version 3, algo 1, keyid DF7B7722C193565B data: [2046 bits] :encrypted data packet: length: 58 mdc_method: 2 gpg: encrypted with 2048-bit RSA key, ID 0xDF7B7722C193565B, created 2011-11-07 "Werner Koch " gpg: decryption failed: secret key not available 2 dkg at pip:~$ hth, --dkg -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 1030 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From nicholas.cole at gmail.com Fri May 25 17:02:23 2012 From: nicholas.cole at gmail.com (Nicholas Cole) Date: Fri, 25 May 2012 16:02:23 +0100 Subject: Draft of nine new FAQ questions In-Reply-To: <4FBF7CA8.9000702@sixdemonbag.org> References: <4FBD0DE9.6060205@sixdemonbag.org> <4FBF7CA8.9000702@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: >> There's a slight confusion in these answers that I think it would be >> really helpful to address in an FAQ. > > Yes, there is. ?Unfortunately, the answer is kind of messy. [ snip ] Thank you for a really good and useful answer. I hope some of that can make it into the FAQ. If I understand you correctly then the situation is this: - if you want longer symmetric cyphers, then you are asking for something that is a mathematical and physical nonsense. - if you use longer RSA keys, you are being unduly paranoid, and asking for something that would make life awkward for mobile devices, etc, but not asking for something that is a complete nonsense -- just unhelpfully paranoid. I think it would be good if the FAQ managed to capture that. Best, Nicholas From bd9439 at att.com Fri May 25 17:25:10 2012 From: bd9439 at att.com (DUELL, BOB) Date: Fri, 25 May 2012 15:25:10 +0000 Subject: Secret key not available In-Reply-To: <4FBF96B2.8000608@fifthhorseman.net> References: <4FBE6B40.1010006@hildebrando.com> <87hav4mzk4.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FBF96B2.8000608@fifthhorseman.net> Message-ID: Thanks (and Hauke as well). This just confirms my suspicion. I don't get as much info returned as you guys but that's probably because I Have an "old" gpg version on my system (1.4.11): bd9439 at dspsas01 $ gpg --list-packets < optout_050912.zip.gpg gpg: WARNING: using insecure memory! gpg: please see http://www.gnupg.org/faq.html for more information :pubkey enc packet: version 3, algo 16, keyid 22A9F17B1B8A6A37 data: [1020 bits] data: [1023 bits] :encrypted data packet: length: unknown mdc_method: 2 gpg: encrypted with ELG-E key, ID 1B8A6A37 gpg: decryption failed: secret key not available But it is enough to confirm that this is not my key; I'll ask them to resend. And BTW, I really enjoy reading all the crypto discussions, although I only understand about one percent. I suppose that makes me a "one percenter". Thanks again for the help! Bob -----Original Message----- From: Daniel Kahn Gillmor [mailto:dkg at fifthhorseman.net] Sent: Friday, May 25, 2012 7:27 AM To: DUELL, BOB Cc: GnuPG Users Subject: Re: Secret key not available On 05/25/2012 09:39 AM, DUELL, BOB wrote: > 1. Attempting to decrypt a file that was sent to me by someone else, > I get this message: > > gpg: decryption failed: secret key not available > > Could that mean the file was not encrypted with my public key? yes, that is one plausible explanation. Another possibility is that you don't actually have your secret key on the computer you're currently using. > 2. Assuming the above it "yes", is there a command I can use to > display what key(s) were used to encrypt the file? sure, you could use gpg --list-packets, and redirect standard input to pull from the file in question: 0 dkg at pip:~$ gpg --list-packets < test.gpg :pubkey enc packet: version 3, algo 1, keyid DF7B7722C193565B data: [2046 bits] :encrypted data packet: length: 58 mdc_method: 2 gpg: encrypted with 2048-bit RSA key, ID 0xDF7B7722C193565B, created 2011-11-07 "Werner Koch " gpg: decryption failed: secret key not available 2 dkg at pip:~$ hth, --dkg From mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com Fri May 25 17:35:32 2012 From: mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com (Mika Suomalainen) Date: Fri, 25 May 2012 18:35:32 +0300 Subject: encrypt message for very if use a key In-Reply-To: <4FBE6B40.1010006@hildebrando.com> References: <4FBE6B40.1010006@hildebrando.com> Message-ID: <4FBFA6C4.2030004@hotmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Hi, On 24.05.2012 20:09, Jose Juan Gonzalez wrote: > Hi, > > Good morning I try to encrypt a file ,similar to the step 3 on this > page: > > http://developer.gooddata.com/docs/sso > > with the next instruction: > > gpg --armor --output enc.txt --encrypt --recipient > security at gooddata.com signed.txt > > > > but when I use this, the gpg send me a message: > > > > > but I need to make this automatic and the user not needs to verify > , if he wants to use this key. I found we can use these > instructions: -yes and -trust-model always, but send me a error or > how is works ? > > I hope, you can help me, > > > > > > > -- > > *Jose Juan Gonzalez P.* *Ext: 11086* *Skype: jjgonzalez13* *Cell > Phone: +52 4491066576 * *Nextel ID: 92*12*46151 * *Mobile Phone: > +52 4492425148 * *"There is nothing impossible, just unknown > things"* Hildebrando Software Factory| Sierra de las Palomas > 101-101. Aguascalientes, Mexico* *| tel +52 44-99961500 | tel +52 > 44-91393220 | http://www.hildebrando.com.mx That message means, that the key is not signed by your key. You can remove it by (l)signing the key. gpg --edit-key security at gooddata.com lsign y save quit and then you shouldn't see that warning. lsign = sign the key locally and prevent signature from being exported. - -- [Mika Suomalainen](https://mkaysi.github.com/) || [gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net --recv-keys 4DB53CFE82A46728](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/key.txt) || [Why do I sign my emails?](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/WhyDoISignEmails.html) || [Please don't send HTML.](http://mkaysi.github.com/articles/complaining/HTML.html) || [Please don't toppost](http://mkaysi.github.com/articles/complaining/topposting.html) || [This signature](https://gist.github.com/2643070) || -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.19 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJPv6bAAAoJEE21PP6CpGcoJW8QAMBZ2qfBK8xEv0t0qFiWeijM 5HBFlTizJ4Krnpx9+ynVyMWQkki8/bgoA+aHbuFyZ3H2ydUnr2Bhi0/+4Y3gcPZk h2GJrOfpH/xVlut5Jq+gMddr6fHdW+EMB5IAHGsJXWD5XnIaKPQGq1UThktM5FO1 RSjxrsFx/34QGTzsnSCXNp4NoNnRPn8ah29JJ+fCltIplAkG71J3Lftp8ljvjFdY YkczolpAG/7rxbQ4UqXEBzu9PyfXexgUpYMtAoGy4oiWruweOIZUJRAB1KHFVPK1 qJIxK2U7HIdH1aU/T7UsFBaZFiGBtOFXP6MxsI/lHIditltKg3c2sOAzErv6DQpk k3IMvDPRdJpEq1s/MoaHx7futA23eCbHL1Kc9O1X1KWynWQRlVSJ4xF+OQ7hv1T9 S8UWX1YJ9o7L5ozsyOiFYT5gLVFJosIhLLNrRhJNJqixeP+onO03BNQF+AW8al/u gxPLq7L55M8zYRNxAjMT4i/vtLaNkflgnP5sWXipiN6eTNlL6AZ1pyxG4H6fq7hC Qe/b/Y7esUDnX26UqUqrtlr7opvG2XgXig/9ui1dnGNfE0Q8vWIXz5ItrwcM4dhp 5KNxxr4MAD1J/gVZxdaigpUAs/REeFQMYRfbqMfY5eHohERfTwjOfRL4fcMH4SHT ZbJSo3DTrMeYUwJbqEij =UF71 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com Fri May 25 17:55:47 2012 From: mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com (Mika Suomalainen) Date: Fri, 25 May 2012 18:55:47 +0300 Subject: Secret key not available In-Reply-To: References: <4FBE6B40.1010006@hildebrando.com> <87hav4mzk4.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <4FBFAB83.9060907@hotmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Hi, On 25.05.2012 16:39, DUELL, BOB wrote: > Hi, > > Couple quick questions (and probably a FAQ): > > 1. Attempting to decrypt a file that was sent to me by someone > else, I get this message: > > gpg: decryption failed: secret key not available > > Could that mean the file was not encrypted with my public key? Yes, that or you don't have any private keys in your keyring. > 2. Assuming the above it "yes", is there a command I can use to > display what key(s) were used to encrypt the file? I think that decrypting command should show it. > This file is coming from a vendor who recently transferred some of > their operations to an "offshore" location and I'm dealing with > quite a communications delay with them. They probably use > different keys to deliver files to different groups in my company, > but that's just a guess. > > Thanks! > > Bob - -- [Mika Suomalainen](https://mkaysi.github.com/) || [gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net --recv-keys 4DB53CFE82A46728](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/key.txt) || [Why do I sign my emails?](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/WhyDoISignEmails.html) || [Please don't send HTML.](http://mkaysi.github.com/articles/complaining/HTML.html) || [Please don't toppost](http://mkaysi.github.com/articles/complaining/topposting.html) || [This signature](https://gist.github.com/2643070) || -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.19 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJPv6t/AAoJEE21PP6CpGco0W0QAKXZB1L8nZkv+paGBFMbLFXe pSlA6x6FFkyHj3idZaagkeDbszevLTdEJN9cLoaOUMQQKZg8SYeN9lqiNJ9q3pYA ac+AwOyW9f9g1qHoe6I3S5gwUjwRiNKbSv8qnCtXPE2OQ+jkZE6YS1AbiDN/n0uN UfGKciJ5NTbzD8wfJW5ojSRE0vTtE0sfAUjaTCded/SNFGmrCyBLFFZn0YgA9SPK q7rHlcNrJ+YFvsZARv/WKjG8IUJKQdGKpSwufriOofv8V8XZPN/kRk4LrRRhjP9t JsTqZ/KyYopv/alcwa3PhZcUGaQP8oLU7G57hgpQ0I3fnOcWPEfMCbu3gKeveH0G W7TlZ9jLiBhl5589ev8IEyzG9vdUylax7y93WuaK4em3/tRzbxKSR27i54i2gwxK nPhdWhjsNAmkvZzL8WkHBonz8XrxoaiZ6BpaLJPVajb8a6FwyMknoMzk3crGpeHA 8czsVxDwaGr5LGUd22FsKBEvIp+ckVeUZ5Y3+cFJB5V16n1SqTSe6iLjQWapRVdT fen6+vejleF0Dh1FQb/dGyobU2+7sD6VVkefwrbXeET4R1oB+eOpR+XcoDLB5TmC 9220g7NpP+OEIBKEHGqoib7HbcWei+8Ok238MKAeMuuwT4NZnfb51u8HvbM9j8n+ RV72G4lQk5oaMRzY5F4m =vaST -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From wk at gnupg.org Fri May 25 18:02:26 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Fri, 25 May 2012 18:02:26 +0200 Subject: Secret key not available In-Reply-To: (BOB DUELL's message of "Fri, 25 May 2012 15:25:10 +0000") References: <4FBE6B40.1010006@hildebrando.com> <87hav4mzk4.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FBF96B2.8000608@fifthhorseman.net> Message-ID: <87y5ogl04t.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Fri, 25 May 2012 17:25, bd9439 at att.com said: > I don't get as much info returned as you guys but that's probably because I > Have an "old" gpg version on my system (1.4.11): That is not very old. 1.4 is fully maintained in addition to 2.x. > gpg: encrypted with ELG-E key, ID 1B8A6A37 > gpg: decryption failed: secret key not available > > But it is enough to confirm that this is not my key; I'll ask them to resend. Note that gpg only shows the ID of the encryption subkey. The primary key is what is what is commonly used to specify a key id. For example: pub 2048D/1E42B367 2007-12-31 [expires: 2018-12-31] uid Werner Koch sub 1024D/77F95F95 2011-11-02 sub 2048R/C193565B 2011-11-07 [expires: 2013-12-31] 1E42B367 is the primary key and thus has the fingerprint which is usually communicated. C193565B is the encryption key you see in encrypted messages. When encrypting, GPG automatically selects the newest encryption subkey. To see the primary key, you may just use it on the command line: gpg -k C193565B yields the same listing as above. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From david at gbenet.com Fri May 25 19:47:24 2012 From: david at gbenet.com (david at gbenet.com) Date: Fri, 25 May 2012 18:47:24 +0100 Subject: Testing GPG EMail encryption In-Reply-To: <20120525130315.GA7201@IUPUI.Edu> References: <7C84919C-1948-4D44-97F9-17A9CF977AED@gpgtools.org> <4FBCE501.7020205@sixdemonbag.org> <4FBD0463.1010103@hotmail.com> <4FBD094F.2060909@gbenet.com> <2D1A1214-D036-4DFC-8392-533390654EEE@gpgtools.org> <4FBD358A.8010409@gbenet.com> <4FBD3A77.8030302@sixdemonbag.org> <4FBD4AE8.3040609@gbenet.com> <20120524125554.GC15725@IUPUI.Edu> <4FBE5A0F.9010902@gbenet.com> <20120525130315.GA7201@IUPUI.Edu> Message-ID: <4FBFC5AC.2090807@gbenet.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 25/05/12 14:03, Mark H. Wood wrote: > On Thu, May 24, 2012 at 04:55:59PM +0100, david at gbenet.com wrote: >> - From tests carried out - Mandrava Linux was ok. I suspect that other Linux distros have no >> real problems - just because your works - does not mean that every other Linux distro works. > > However: because it works on my system, even though there is no GPG v1 > installed on it anywhere, does demonstrate that gpg v1 is not required > and gpg v2 is not the problem. > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users Therefore, are we saying that with some Linux distros that happen to have installed gp2 automatically that those Linux distros have a problem with gpg2? For example opensuse - all versions tested: (1) When you open the address book in TB select an address right mouse click you get an option to create a per-recipient rule for that person. (Openpgp/inigmail is installed for you to do this). With gpg2 installed this option flickers jumps and fades out. (2) With gpg1 - it is clear - no jumping -no fading no fuzziness - you get other options - such a delete - which are not available when just pgp2 is installed. This same flickering and fuzzing occurs with Fedora-16 all GUIs 32/64 bit and you only have one menu option which is to create a rule - though it flickers on and off one does not know one's created a rule till you go an check it within the options of openpgp. (3) Having created such a rule you decide to digitally sign and send an encrypted e-mail to that person using their public key. (4) But - and this is the big big big but - you can not digitally sign whilst encrypting - and worse when the person gets that e-mail they say "Why did you send me an e-mail that I can not open." These are real person to person facts with gpg2 installed on all the Linux distros I tested. (5) Now I say that gpg2 does not work with the Linux distros I tested. Not all Linux distros are the same they convert open source to proprietary branded Linux. (6) And what's worse when end users download Thunderbird from Mozilla when they download enigmail from their respective web sites and correctly install correctly configure they still have the same problems with gpg2. This is why I said and listed those Linux distros that gpg2 does not work with. Now I suggested that perhaps enigmail/openpgp was at fault - and got told to bugger off cos it was a gpg2 problem. Now as a scientist who believes in the scientific method I have tested and have drawn my tests into the public domain. Now some people's reaction was not helpful - reading in that I was angry without reading the contents of my e-mail - these are fuck-wits. Lowlife cyber-hoodies. But I am patient even with fuck-wits. I may add that I do not consider you a fuck wwit or indeed a cyber-hoodie. But we are still faced with the issues raised thy don't go away: (1) Because "Oh it works on my system so it must work on other people's." (2) "Bugger off we are not interested in how many Linux distros you tested it's not got anything to do with us." (3) "Its not gpg2 it's something else." The "something else" is always a mystery. To conclude: (1) Some heavily branded Linux distros do re-write all the open source code to lock users in and deprive them of some functionality - Seahorse is a case in point (2) Even when installing the open source for TB and Enigmail gpg2 does not work on Linux distros (I tested) (3) Some Linux distros (the one's I tested) do not support gpg2 These are the tested facts of the matter - these are real person to person experiences. There is one commonality which stands out and that is gpg2. We may also say: (1) Do not Install any version of opensuse any version of Ubuntu any version of Fedora-16 and any version of Linux Mint. Why? The gpg2 that get's installed does not work. (2) All heavily branded Linux distros are no respecter's of open source. (3) Further more if you decide to download all the open source from their respective web sites they will not work on these Linux distros. (4) It took me 10 days sometimes 18 hours per day to test something like 50 Linux Distros against (a) A person running Windows XP with GPG4Win installed (they had their fair share of problems too) (b) a person running Mandriva with gpg2 install with "no probs." I trust that matters are clear David - -- ?See the sanity of the man! No gods, no angels, no demons, no body. Nothing of the kind.Stern, sane,every brain-cell perfect and complete even at the moment of death. No delusion.? https://linuxcounter.net/user/512854.html - http://gbenet.com -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJPv8WdAAoJEOJpqm7flRExpdAIAJTcXMq9BwdlqVt7mDU+f2Lh bwm2l/s3/44HN0XXP2MFotLuPIVEsKNR8DqkZ5IypbiYfMNw1KfIFPESkIoMDaIb RBhbq0un/QdSM1EV6wR3G+sxzYJTTasp46zmgBqbxyQgbTA0RoVAVMgY1mJ4lKgs YL2FVkvaQnIE9pOAIfzA6aX089Ip6+2HsH7nTB8tWtr1488wabr6Ay61ygc0Gz9J NUOUxwNeCtb65lKGldn6Sr8py3O4iVEES0MSJbUkKa3INJqfXlSajFgK8TVeWGTQ tIZKgX2hAcjHZMR2KEhBuqsIV5GEGP/+iUQ67Q4HyNeAAnFzessDa8fk+ZXlYgA= =+Zou -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From wk at gnupg.org Fri May 25 21:45:26 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Fri, 25 May 2012 21:45:26 +0200 Subject: [OT] keyboard mapping (was: Draft of nine new FAQ questions) In-Reply-To: <20120525133138.GC7201@IUPUI.Edu> (Mark H. Wood's message of "Fri, 25 May 2012 09:31:38 -0400") References: <4FBD0DE9.6060205@sixdemonbag.org> <4FBD7F60.3060406@sixdemonbag.org> <87bolcmyyv.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <20120525133138.GC7201@IUPUI.Edu> Message-ID: <87hav4kpt5.fsf_-_@vigenere.g10code.de> On Fri, 25 May 2012 15:31, mwood at IUPUI.Edu said: > And life is too short to go trawling the Internet for X Compose > sequences. If I could find a comprehensive table I'd probably use Meanwhile I set my keyboard to: | mod3+ | normal | shift | |-------+--------+--------| | P | ? | ? | | [ | ? | ? | | ] | ? | ? | | 8 | ? | | | 9 | ? | | | 0 | ? | | The P and the 8 are nice to use in German because there the English opening quote is the German closing quote. The '?' guillemot is duplicated for consistency (German commonly uses quotes for letters and guillemots for books). I don't have a compose key, because I like to have the right control of my model M to act as an additional control; the right ALT key is used for MOD3, left control for the window manager and caps lock of course for control. Salam-Shalom, Werner p.s. key {[ 8, asterisk, singlelowquotemark, dead_ogonek]}; key {[ 9, parenleft, leftsinglequotemark, dead_breve]}; key {[ 0, parenright, rightsinglequotemark, dead_abovering]}; key {[ bracketleft, braceleft, leftdoublequotemark, guillemotleft]}; key {[bracketright, braceright, rightdoublequotemark, guillemotright]}; -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Fri May 25 22:47:11 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Fri, 25 May 2012 16:47:11 -0400 Subject: Testing GPG EMail encryption In-Reply-To: <4FBFC5AC.2090807@gbenet.com> References: <7C84919C-1948-4D44-97F9-17A9CF977AED@gpgtools.org> <4FBCE501.7020205@sixdemonbag.org> <4FBD0463.1010103@hotmail.com> <4FBD094F.2060909@gbenet.com> <2D1A1214-D036-4DFC-8392-533390654EEE@gpgtools.org> <4FBD358A.8010409@gbenet.com> <4FBD3A77.8030302@sixdemonbag.org> <4FBD4AE8.3040609@gbenet.com> <20120524125554.GC15725@IUPUI.Edu> <4FBE5A0F.9010902@gbenet.com> <20120525130315.GA7201@IUPUI.Edu> <4FBFC5AC.2090807@gbenet.com> Message-ID: <4FBFEFCF.4010108@sixdemonbag.org> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 On 5/25/12 1:47 PM, david at gbenet.com wrote: > For example opensuse - all versions tested: > > (1) When you open the address book in TB select an address right > mouse click you get an option to create a per-recipient rule for > that person. (Openpgp/inigmail is installed for you to do this). > With gpg2 installed this option flickers jumps and fades out. I have an OpenSUSE 12.1 system here on my desktop. I cannot recreate this. > (2) With gpg1 - it is clear - no jumping -no fading no fuzziness - > you get other options - such a delete - which are not available > when just pgp2 is installed. This same flickering and fuzzing > occurs with Fedora-16 all GUIs 32/64 bit and you only have one menu > option which is to create a rule - though it flickers on and off > one does not know one's created a rule till you go an check it > within the options of openpgp. I have a Fedora 16 server in the closet. I cannot recreate this. > (4) But - and this is the big big big but - you can not digitally > sign whilst encrypting - and worse when the person gets that > e-mail they say "Why did you send me an e-mail that I can not > open." These are real person to person facts with gpg2 installed on > all the Linux distros I tested. I cannot recreate this on either my Ubuntu 12.04LTS laptop, my OpenSUSE desktop, or my Fedora 16 server. > (5) Now I say that gpg2 does not work with the Linux distros I > tested. Not all Linux distros are the same they convert open > source to proprietary branded Linux. Them's fightin' words, "convert[ing] open source to proprietary." > This is why I said and listed those Linux distros that gpg2 does > not work with. Now I suggested that perhaps enigmail/openpgp was at > fault - and got told to bugger off cos it was a gpg2 problem. No one told you to do this. Instead, you were told that if you were so certain this was a GnuPG 2 problem that you should take it to GnuPG-Users. People also volunteered to help you discover the root of your problem with GnuPG 2, but you did not take them up on it. > Now some people's reaction was not helpful - reading in that I was > angry without reading the contents of my e-mail - these are ... We try to keep this mailing list free of vulgarity. I understand you're frustrated and find these people (e.g., me) to be vexing, but many of us would appreciate it if you would avoid vulgar language. > (1) Because "Oh it works on my system so it must work on other > people's." As opposed to, "because it doesn't work on my system it must not work, period"? > (2) "Bugger off we are not interested in how many Linux distros > you tested it's not got anything to do with us." Which is, you know, *true*. If you're certain the problem is with GnuPG 2, then complaining about it on the Enigmail list isn't going to be very productive. The GnuPG developers are on this list, not that one. > (1) Some heavily branded Linux distros do re-write all the open > source code to lock users in and deprive them of some functionality > - Seahorse is a case in point This does not seem to be true. Which distros are forbidding you from getting the source code for Seahorse? If they are doing this then they are violating the copyright license of the Seahorse code, and I'm certain the Seahorse developers would take great umbrage at that. > (2) Even when installing the open source for TB and Enigmail gpg2 > does not work on Linux distros (I tested) It does not work *for you*. > (3) Some Linux distros (the one's I tested) do not support gpg2 It does not work *for you*. > There is one commonality which stands out and that is gpg2. The other commonality is you. It's quite possible you're doing something wrong. And to repeat, we would be happy to try and help, but so far your attitude towards help seems to have been one of angry defiance. > (1) Do not Install any version of opensuse any version of Ubuntu > any version of Fedora-16 and any version of Linux Mint. Why? The > gpg2 that get's installed does not work. My experience, and that of tens of thousands of other Fedora 16, Ubuntu and Linux Mint users, is different. > (2) All heavily branded Linux distros are no respecter's of open > source. I need to see specific instances of their violating the copyright license attached to the code, please. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Comment: GPGTools - http://gpgtools.org iFYEAREIAAYFAk+/788ACgkQI4Br5da5jhAZ6gDbB1Xzj3MwD7R+tzAR2HGKJabD Z9WpLN69Ygx/pgDffmvdRBEfShVZcUGFsVhecwoPRqvhMx3G7ey2IQ== =BaRJ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From aaron.toponce at gmail.com Sat May 26 00:01:22 2012 From: aaron.toponce at gmail.com (Aaron Toponce) Date: Fri, 25 May 2012 16:01:22 -0600 Subject: Testing GPG EMail encryption In-Reply-To: <4FBD358A.8010409@gbenet.com> References: <8A981623-00E9-4DCB-8470-17EF24F778E2@robin-kipp.net> <451490E5-57F6-48D6-9C17-12B6B3098AB3@robin-kipp.net> <33450129.XK7aaBQoRl@inno> <7C84919C-1948-4D44-97F9-17A9CF977AED@gpgtools.org> <4FBCE501.7020205@sixdemonbag.org> <4FBD0463.1010103@hotmail.com> <4FBD094F.2060909@gbenet.com> <2D1A1214-D036-4DFC-8392-533390654EEE@gpgtools.org> <4FBD358A.8010409@gbenet.com> Message-ID: <20120525220120.GG25540@kratos.cocyt.us> On Wed, May 23, 2012 at 08:07:54PM +0100, david at gbenet.com wrote: > Openpgp/enigmail does not support gpg2 unless one has installed gpg > 1.4.11 - but I no longer trust Openpgp/enigmail to do anything. That's unfortunate. While I'm mostly a Mutt user these days, I have Debian Icedove installed with Enigmal and GnuPG v2, and I personally haven't had any problems. Then again, I have both v1 and v2 installed. In fact, I highly recommend Enigmail. It's a fine piece of software. -- . o . o . o . . o o . . . o . . . o . o o o . o . o o . . o o o o . o . . o o o o . o o o From david at gbenet.com Sat May 26 00:43:30 2012 From: david at gbenet.com (david at gbenet.com) Date: Fri, 25 May 2012 23:43:30 +0100 Subject: Testing GPG EMail encryption In-Reply-To: <4FBFEFCF.4010108@sixdemonbag.org> References: <7C84919C-1948-4D44-97F9-17A9CF977AED@gpgtools.org> <4FBCE501.7020205@sixdemonbag.org> <4FBD0463.1010103@hotmail.com> <4FBD094F.2060909@gbenet.com> <2D1A1214-D036-4DFC-8392-533390654EEE@gpgtools.org> <4FBD358A.8010409@gbenet.com> <4FBD3A77.8030302@sixdemonbag.org> <4FBD4AE8.3040609@gbenet.com> <20120524125554.GC15725@IUPUI.Edu> <4FBE5A0F.9010902@gbenet.com> <20120525130315.GA7201@IUPUI.Edu> <4FBFC5AC.2090807@gbenet.com> <4FBFEFCF.4010108@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <4FC00B12.90704@gbenet.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 25/05/12 21:47, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > On 5/25/12 1:47 PM, david at gbenet.com wrote: >> For example opensuse - all versions tested: > >> (1) When you open the address book in TB select an address right >> mouse click you get an option to create a per-recipient rule for >> that person. (Openpgp/inigmail is installed for you to do this). >> With gpg2 installed this option flickers jumps and fades out. > > I have an OpenSUSE 12.1 system here on my desktop. I cannot recreate > this. > >> (2) With gpg1 - it is clear - no jumping -no fading no fuzziness - >> you get other options - such a delete - which are not available >> when just pgp2 is installed. This same flickering and fuzzing >> occurs with Fedora-16 all GUIs 32/64 bit and you only have one menu >> option which is to create a rule - though it flickers on and off >> one does not know one's created a rule till you go an check it >> within the options of openpgp. > > I have a Fedora 16 server in the closet. I cannot recreate this. > >> (4) But - and this is the big big big but - you can not digitally >> sign whilst encrypting - and worse when the person gets that >> e-mail they say "Why did you send me an e-mail that I can not >> open." These are real person to person facts with gpg2 installed on >> all the Linux distros I tested. > > I cannot recreate this on either my Ubuntu 12.04LTS laptop, my OpenSUSE > desktop, or my Fedora 16 server. > >> (5) Now I say that gpg2 does not work with the Linux distros I >> tested. Not all Linux distros are the same they convert open >> source to proprietary branded Linux. > > Them's fightin' words, "convert[ing] open source to proprietary." > >> This is why I said and listed those Linux distros that gpg2 does >> not work with. Now I suggested that perhaps enigmail/openpgp was at >> fault - and got told to bugger off cos it was a gpg2 problem. > > No one told you to do this. Instead, you were told that if you were so > certain this was a GnuPG 2 problem that you should take it to > GnuPG-Users. People also volunteered to help you discover the root of > your problem with GnuPG 2, but you did not take them up on it. > >> Now some people's reaction was not helpful - reading in that I was >> angry without reading the contents of my e-mail - these are ... > > We try to keep this mailing list free of vulgarity. I understand you're > frustrated and find these people (e.g., me) to be vexing, but many of us > would appreciate it if you would avoid vulgar language. > >> (1) Because "Oh it works on my system so it must work on other >> people's." > > As opposed to, "because it doesn't work on my system it must not work, > period"? > >> (2) "Bugger off we are not interested in how many Linux distros >> you tested it's not got anything to do with us." > > Which is, you know, *true*. If you're certain the problem is with GnuPG > 2, then complaining about it on the Enigmail list isn't going to be very > productive. The GnuPG developers are on this list, not that one. > >> (1) Some heavily branded Linux distros do re-write all the open >> source code to lock users in and deprive them of some functionality >> - Seahorse is a case in point > > This does not seem to be true. Which distros are forbidding you from > getting the source code for Seahorse? If they are doing this then they > are violating the copyright license of the Seahorse code, and I'm > certain the Seahorse developers would take great umbrage at that. > >> (2) Even when installing the open source for TB and Enigmail gpg2 >> does not work on Linux distros (I tested) > > It does not work *for you*. > >> (3) Some Linux distros (the one's I tested) do not support gpg2 > > It does not work *for you*. > >> There is one commonality which stands out and that is gpg2. > > The other commonality is you. It's quite possible you're doing > something wrong. And to repeat, we would be happy to try and help, but > so far your attitude towards help seems to have been one of angry > defiance. > >> (1) Do not Install any version of opensuse any version of Ubuntu >> any version of Fedora-16 and any version of Linux Mint. Why? The >> gpg2 that get's installed does not work. > > My experience, and that of tens of thousands of other Fedora 16, Ubuntu > and Linux Mint users, is different. > >> (2) All heavily branded Linux distros are no respecter's of open >> source. > > I need to see specific instances of their violating the copyright > license attached to the code, please. > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users > Let me reiterate "I am not angry." Which means in common English let me explain again to you I am not angry. I gave you an example which was Seahorse - clearly you failed to read. I have set out quite clearly the issues found on Linux distros - you are unable to provide a solution to any. I am neither angry or disappointed. I state observations quite clearly - the recorded facts - and you are at a loss. As previously stated I now run Linux Mint/Ubuntu LXDE 32 bit with gnupg 1.4.11 I am quite happy with this set up. It works. I am considering installing Mandriva 64 bit with LXDE which from tests shows it to be stable with gpg2. My tardiness (slowness) in making such a move is I am a little tired of installing Linux distros. David - -- ?See the sanity of the man! No gods, no angels, no demons, no body. Nothing of the kind.Stern, sane,every brain-cell perfect and complete even at the moment of death. No delusion.? https://linuxcounter.net/user/512854.html - http://gbenet.com -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQEbBAEBAgAGBQJPwAsFAAoJEOJpqm7flRExRg4H9368tN3QPWNLfqcbKFfqPXqg /tOFNdcRHo9ZzHTWQhWgaxN2aXNGseqkBM4AngcN3YEcNOBIUdUavHWfed2gW4Db ah/k9VyLPm4eDpOVi1j+XFNJoVXGB+UsrsTslaR3VDsDEaqnyDxd0Z5B0+dffA9L X4aLChP6INWXi+d5wnjTkwUIA7uQEsKWMETlB1Qb7QYXukAKBAimpAdR5FYL0Px/ qZNXmF3JniqqMlh+Uey6Kv0ztM5bjCrFM8Ympw7aeBXLXWnNXET+lkEtuZuIXi3G b8ro9p8dV50Pm++TwJcXGECxmx5KWT9yXs4Pe4/l7+1IAn5V965YWdEdT2sHhQ== =Y8tq -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From david at gbenet.com Sat May 26 00:48:18 2012 From: david at gbenet.com (david at gbenet.com) Date: Fri, 25 May 2012 23:48:18 +0100 Subject: Testing GPG EMail encryption In-Reply-To: <20120525220120.GG25540@kratos.cocyt.us> References: <8A981623-00E9-4DCB-8470-17EF24F778E2@robin-kipp.net> <451490E5-57F6-48D6-9C17-12B6B3098AB3@robin-kipp.net> <33450129.XK7aaBQoRl@inno> <7C84919C-1948-4D44-97F9-17A9CF977AED@gpgtools.org> <4FBCE501.7020205@sixdemonbag.org> <4FBD0463.1010103@hotmail.com> <4FBD094F.2060909@gbenet.com> <2D1A1214-D036-4DFC-8392-533390654EEE@gpgtools.org> <4FBD358A.8010409@gbenet.com> <20120525220120.GG25540@kratos.cocyt.us> Message-ID: <4FC00C32.9070803@gbenet.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 25/05/12 23:01, Aaron Toponce wrote: > On Wed, May 23, 2012 at 08:07:54PM +0100, david at gbenet.com wrote: >> Openpgp/enigmail does not support gpg2 unless one has installed gpg >> 1.4.11 - but I no longer trust Openpgp/enigmail to do anything. > > That's unfortunate. While I'm mostly a Mutt user these days, I have Debian > Icedove installed with Enigmal and GnuPG v2, and I personally haven't had > any problems. Then again, I have both v1 and v2 installed. In fact, I > highly recommend Enigmail. It's a fine piece of software. > Aron, As stated when you have gpg 1.4.11 and gpg2 installed you do not experience any problems on the Linux distros that I tested. It is only when you have gpg2 on the Linux distros that I tested do you have problems. But some Linux distros are ok with gpg2 and nothing else whilst others that I tested have problems. David - -- ?See the sanity of the man! No gods, no angels, no demons, no body. Nothing of the kind.Stern, sane,every brain-cell perfect and complete even at the moment of death. No delusion.? https://linuxcounter.net/user/512854.html - http://gbenet.com -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJPwAwyAAoJEOJpqm7flRExTKMH/0o4qCVQJv+7aW21/GnjYxkt 0mYpR+VNlVAo7ReIIpF8dNt4iE5wgOKIrpjRuibmt5bYxEY1rQrPM3UgWmDoKp3x rpaNVIbcrJ5xitwFXrg0RQWew/VcLCkCMo/ZsVAwSlS/R5Ob3cmMC6WVS7xGxLf+ IidfgnbSiya8i2sY4bdRd5taprBD3shieUJ5CbGOKWG4JRzhAi52UCINrxg+q6ai P1q0/d6+s2bGj2WTz4pwd9aeQ9CtCvysLgIN7q9sYxft5fEZSAguB0S5rrPBzq57 ugsYKxX1IMKci4n2OP3RcSY3PThyxKjRkLpvK5wiiLAXh5rSxya9uAfS9MaUxRk= =abYa -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From reynt0 at cs.albany.edu Sat May 26 01:06:54 2012 From: reynt0 at cs.albany.edu (reynt0) Date: Fri, 25 May 2012 19:06:54 -0400 (EDT) Subject: Draft of nine new FAQ questions In-Reply-To: <4FBED1FA.5030105@sixdemonbag.org> References: <4FBD0DE9.6060205@sixdemonbag.org> <4FBD7F60.3060406@sixdemonbag.org> <4FBED1FA.5030105@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: On Thu, 24 May 2012, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > On 5/24/12 7:56 PM, reynt0 wrote: . . . >> The idea is just to maximize usability to maximum audience, . . . > "Maximum audience" is not the same as "maximum usability." The two are > different properties. When it comes to the written word, ease of > reading, speed of reading, and comprehension is all improved by using > reasonable typography. I consider those to be essential usability goals. > > If I wanted "maximum audience," I'd try to turn the FAQ into _American > Idol_. Hmmm....., I wonder how music and little animated GIF dancers pointing to the most important parts might look. *<:^} Cheers. From holtzm at cox.net Sat May 26 01:30:04 2012 From: holtzm at cox.net (Robert Holtzman) Date: Fri, 25 May 2012 16:30:04 -0700 Subject: Draft of nine new FAQ questions In-Reply-To: <4FBF8810.1020708@sixdemonbag.org> References: <4FBD0DE9.6060205@sixdemonbag.org> <4FBF7CA8.9000702@sixdemonbag.org> <4FBF8810.1020708@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <20120525233004.GB24269@cox.net> On Fri, May 25, 2012 at 09:24:32AM -0400, Robert J. Hansen wrote: .......snip...... > > At this point you look skywards and scream, "GET ME OUT OF THIS > METAPHOR! I get it already! A nonconstructive proof doesn't tell us > anything about /what/ or /why/ or /how/, it just says that something > /is/! GET ME OUT OF HERE, I don't want to spend the rest of this > metaphor in a dark room with a raving psychotic!" > > Dan helpfully points out as he's reloading that werewolves suffer from > lycanthropy, not psychosis. As for you, you flee the metaphor for the > safety of a more literal world. > > > > [1] In reality, Dan Boneh is a very nice guy, quite reasonable, and > nothing at all like I'm portraying him here. > > [2] http://www.ccs.neu.edu/home/shivers/autoweapons.html The link is absolutely great! -- Bob Holtzman If you think you're getting free lunch, check the price of the beer. Key ID: 8D549279 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 198 bytes Desc: Digital signature URL: From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Sat May 26 03:37:50 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Fri, 25 May 2012 21:37:50 -0400 Subject: Testing GPG EMail encryption In-Reply-To: <4FC00B12.90704@gbenet.com> References: <7C84919C-1948-4D44-97F9-17A9CF977AED@gpgtools.org> <4FBCE501.7020205@sixdemonbag.org> <4FBD0463.1010103@hotmail.com> <4FBD094F.2060909@gbenet.com> <2D1A1214-D036-4DFC-8392-533390654EEE@gpgtools.org> <4FBD358A.8010409@gbenet.com> <4FBD3A77.8030302@sixdemonbag.org> <4FBD4AE8.3040609@gbenet.com> <20120524125554.GC15725@IUPUI.Edu> <4FBE5A0F.9010902@gbenet.com> <20120525130315.GA7201@IUPUI.Edu> <4FBFC5AC.2090807@gbenet.com> <4FBFEFCF.4010108@sixdemonbag.org> <4FC00B12.90704@gbenet.com> Message-ID: <4FC033EE.90605@sixdemonbag.org> On 05/25/2012 06:43 PM, david at gbenet.com wrote: > I gave you an example which was Seahorse - clearly you failed to > read. You did not specify which distro was refusing to give the source for Seahorse. I've found it in the repositories for Ubuntu, Debian and Fedora. > I have set out quite clearly the issues found on Linux distros - you > are unable to provide a solution to any. This is because your problem is not reproducible. If you are able to list exactly the steps you took which resulted in this problem, I would be happy to recreate the problem and find a solution. > I state observations quite clearly - the recorded facts - and you are > at a loss. It seems strange that you seem to want to count coup on people who want to help you and are volunteering their time and expertise. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 251 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From cloos at jhcloos.com Sun May 27 22:00:49 2012 From: cloos at jhcloos.com (James Cloos) Date: Sun, 27 May 2012 16:00:49 -0400 Subject: Draft of nine new FAQ questions In-Reply-To: <20120525133138.GC7201@IUPUI.Edu> (Mark H. Wood's message of "Fri, 25 May 2012 09:31:38 -0400") References: <4FBD0DE9.6060205@sixdemonbag.org> <4FBD7F60.3060406@sixdemonbag.org> <87bolcmyyv.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <20120525133138.GC7201@IUPUI.Edu> Message-ID: >>>>> "MHW" == Mark H Wood writes: MHW> And life is too short to go trawling the Internet for X Compose MHW> sequences. If I could find a comprehensive table I'd probably use MHW> them more. Try: :; grep QUOT /usr/share/X11/locale/en_US.UTF-8/Compose to get something like: : "?" U203a # SINGLE RIGHT-POINTING ANGLE QUOTATION MARK : "?" U2039 # SINGLE LEFT-POINTING ANGLE QUOTATION MARK : "?" guillemotleft # LEFT-POINTING DOUBLE ANGLE QUOTATION MARK : "?" guillemotright # RIGHT-POINTING DOUBLE ANGLE QUOTATION MARK : "?" U2018 # LEFT SINGLE QUOTATION MARK : "?" U2018 # LEFT SINGLE QUOTATION MARK : "?" U2019 # RIGHT SINGLE QUOTATION MARK : "?" U2019 # RIGHT SINGLE QUOTATION MARK : "?" U201a # SINGLE LOW-9 QUOTATION MARK : "?" U201a # SINGLE LOW-9 QUOTATION MARK : "?" U201c # LEFT DOUBLE QUOTATION MARK : "?" U201c # LEFT DOUBLE QUOTATION MARK : "?" U201d # RIGHT DOUBLE QUOTATION MARK : "?" U201d # RIGHT DOUBLE QUOTATION MARK : "?" U201e # DOUBLE LOW-9 QUOTATION MARK : "?" U201e # DOUBLE LOW-9 QUOTATION MARK The names (left vs right) corespond to how there are used in English. Auf Deutsch, IIRC, it works like ?this? and ?this?. Ie, closing with the LEFT marks, ja? -JimC -- James Cloos OpenPGP: 1024D/ED7DAEA6 From expires2012 at rocketmail.com Mon May 28 00:21:26 2012 From: expires2012 at rocketmail.com (MFPA) Date: Sun, 27 May 2012 23:21:26 +0100 Subject: Some people say longer keys are silly. I think they should be supported by gpg. In-Reply-To: <4FBBC86D.30405@sixdemonbag.org> References: <20120522.085848.109.2@GGHJK5> <4FBBC86D.30405@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <409096756.20120527232126@my_localhost> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Hi On Tuesday 22 May 2012 at 6:10:05 PM, in , Robert J. Hansen wrote: > Not even Nicolai Ceaucescu's Romania or Erich > Honecker's German Democratic Republic were able to get > one in six people to serve as informers. Planted informers numbering 1 in 6 of the "protesters" would still be a statistically negligible percentage of the population at large. - -- Best regards MFPA mailto:expires2012 at rocketmail.com Never interrupt me when I'm trying to interrupt you. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQCVAwUBT8Ko+qipC46tDG5pAQq4VwQAwKtRlBkhlH50FC3Qx/dp6Qv4mAh3+bjb xepFNDP3enfgt60RDCarrAqoi0HbZgeyk/zayLxbdLdRkE1u+3TPbkKLmX1iIJLF 9RkvTD0gtG8ExPou6HbHGZEKXbMjf7Tm+S0QVjHOMP5KxSFp0bpPcK8GM2hX65I/ ictKd01Eb2w= =uOM8 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Mon May 28 04:12:24 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Sun, 27 May 2012 22:12:24 -0400 Subject: Some people say longer keys are silly. I think they should be supported by gpg. In-Reply-To: <409096756.20120527232126@my_localhost> References: <20120522.085848.109.2@GGHJK5> <4FBBC86D.30405@sixdemonbag.org> <409096756.20120527232126@my_localhost> Message-ID: <4FC2DF08.4020507@sixdemonbag.org> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 On 5/27/12 6:21 PM, MFPA wrote: > Planted informers numbering 1 in 6 of the "protesters" would still > be a statistically negligible percentage of the population at > large. That's actually not the problem. The problem is that if 1 in 6 people is a plant, then you're going to have endless amounts of embarrassing blue-on-blue -- one plant decides to do X to prove to his handlers that he can Get Things Done(tm) and is worth the money he's getting paid, and one plant, upon hearing that "oh my God, this guy is planning on doing X!", does everything possible to block X in order to prove to *his* handlers that he's preventing major incidents and is worth the money he's getting paid. The problem isn't the fraction of the population. The problem is command and control. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iFYEAREIAAYFAk/C3wgACgkQI4Br5da5jhDmeQDgvcd0Sk0jvTFUqpY/o3dRCQWc 5CkyxhKJj30dFwDeJWwhWPxiMSPh2pk/hBJme6duMcRWi6J8QmrVsA== =W90A -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From benjamin at py-soft.co.uk Mon May 28 18:27:33 2012 From: benjamin at py-soft.co.uk (Benjamin Donnachie) Date: Mon, 28 May 2012 17:27:33 +0100 Subject: Some people say longer keys are silly. I think they should be supported by gpg. In-Reply-To: <20120522.085848.109.2@GGHJK5> References: <20120522.085848.109.2@GGHJK5> Message-ID: On 22 May 2012 09:58, wrote: > I think it should be okay to dredge up this topic ever couple years. From > what I am reading, links below, I do not feel comfortable with the key > length and algorithmic security offered by GPG's defaults. > Use this patch to increase the maximum keysize in gpg2 to 8192 when using the --expert option - intended for v2.0.17 but should be good for later versions too. --- g10/keygen.c 2011-01-15 16:32:30.000000000 +0000 +++ g10/keygen.c 2011-01-15 16:32:42.000000000 +0000 @@ -1774,7 +1774,7 @@ static unsigned ask_keysize (int algo, unsigned int primary_keysize) { - unsigned int nbits, min, def = DEFAULT_STD_KEYSIZE, max=4096; + unsigned int nbits, min, def = DEFAULT_STD_KEYSIZE, max=8192; int for_subkey = !!primary_keysize; int autocomp = 0; *--expert* Allow the user to do certain nonsensical or "silly" things like signing an expired or revoked key, or certain potentially incompatible things like generating unusual key types. This also disables certain warning messages about potentially incompatible actions. As the name implies, this option is for experts only. If you don't fully understand the implications of what it allows you to do, leave this off. --no-expert disables this option. It's generally accepted that a big key is a "silly thing" so seems perfect for inclusion in the expert option. Ben -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From sam at samwhited.com Mon May 28 23:53:03 2012 From: sam at samwhited.com (Sam Whited) Date: Mon, 28 May 2012 17:53:03 -0400 Subject: Some people say longer keys are silly. I think they should be supported by gpg. In-Reply-To: References: <20120522.085848.109.2@GGHJK5> Message-ID: On Mon, May 28, 2012 at 12:27 PM, Benjamin Donnachie wrote: > On 22 May 2012 09:58, wrote: >> >> I think it should be okay to dredge up this topic ever couple years. ?From >> what I am reading, links below, ?I do not feel comfortable with the key >> length and algorithmic security offered by GPG's defaults. > > > Use this patch to increase the maximum keysize in gpg2 to 8192 when using > the --expert option - intended for v2.0.17 but should be good for later > versions too. If you're going to add it to the --expert option it almost seems silly to restrict it to 8192. Might as well pick an arbitrarily large number since the point is to account for "silly" and/or experimental use cases anyways. 2^32 should more than cover it (while we're being silly) I read a paper a while back discussing key size in which they generated extremely large keys on large clusters for some reason... I'll have to see if I can dig it out. ?Sam > > --- g10/keygen.c ? ? ? ?2011-01-15 16:32:30.000000000 +0000 > +++ g10/keygen.c ? ? ? ?2011-01-15 16:32:42.000000000 +0000 > @@ -1774,7 +1774,7 @@ > ?static unsigned > ?ask_keysize (int algo, unsigned int primary_keysize) > ?{ > - ?unsigned int nbits, min, def = DEFAULT_STD_KEYSIZE, max=4096; > + ?unsigned int nbits, min, def = DEFAULT_STD_KEYSIZE, max=8192; > ? ?int for_subkey = !!primary_keysize; > ? ?int autocomp = 0; > > > > --expert > > Allow the user to do certain nonsensical or "silly" things like signing an > expired or revoked key, or certain potentially incompatible things like > generating unusual key types. This also disables certain warning messages > about potentially incompatible actions. As the name implies, this option is > for experts only. If you don't fully understand the implications of what it > allows you to do, leave this off. --no-expert disables this option. > > > It's generally accepted that a big key is a "silly thing" so seems perfect > for inclusion in the expert option. > > Ben > -- Sam Whited pub 4096R/EC2C9934 SamWhited.com sam at samwhited.com 404.492.6008 From anotst01 at fastmail.fm Tue May 29 15:15:35 2012 From: anotst01 at fastmail.fm (anotst01 at fastmail.fm) Date: Tue, 29 May 2012 06:15:35 -0700 Subject: problem signing public key, ----- gets converted to - ----- Message-ID: <1338297335.29146.140661082119993.7AAFEBBB@webmail.messagingengine.com> I want to post a public key in a blog and sign the blog entry. The problem is, that ----- gets converted to - -----. The reader can't copy and paste the public key, he has to remove the "- " first. Example... -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Is there any way to fix this? -- http://www.fastmail.fm - Access your email from home and the web From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Tue May 29 16:41:18 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Tue, 29 May 2012 10:41:18 -0400 Subject: problem signing public key, ----- gets converted to - ----- In-Reply-To: <1338297335.29146.140661082119993.7AAFEBBB@webmail.messagingengine.com> References: <1338297335.29146.140661082119993.7AAFEBBB@webmail.messagingengine.com> Message-ID: <4FC4E00E.5040505@sixdemonbag.org> On 5/29/12 9:15 AM, anotst01 at fastmail.fm wrote: > I want to post a public key in a blog and sign the blog entry. The > problem is, that ----- gets converted to - -----. The reader can't copy > and paste the public key, he has to remove the "- " first. The best solution here is to use the keyserver network: it's what it's there for. Upload your certificate to the keyservers like so: gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net --send-key MY_KEY_ID Then tell people they can fetch your certificate by typing: gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net --recv-key MY_KEY_ID From wk at gnupg.org Tue May 29 16:44:54 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Tue, 29 May 2012 16:44:54 +0200 Subject: problem signing public key, ----- gets converted to - ----- In-Reply-To: <1338297335.29146.140661082119993.7AAFEBBB@webmail.messagingengine.com> (anotst's message of "Tue, 29 May 2012 06:15:35 -0700") References: <1338297335.29146.140661082119993.7AAFEBBB@webmail.messagingengine.com> Message-ID: <87fwajhwrd.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Tue, 29 May 2012 15:15, anotst01 at fastmail.fm said: > I want to post a public key in a blog and sign the blog entry. The > problem is, that ----- gets converted to - -----. The reader can't copy > and paste the public key, he has to remove the "- " first. If you process the signature with GPG, it will remove that escape sequence (gpg --output foo.txt --verify foo.sig). Mail readers usually do this for you. Note, that signing a public key blog does not make much sense. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From lefevre.10 at osu.edu Tue May 29 15:45:48 2012 From: lefevre.10 at osu.edu (Steven Lefevre) Date: Tue, 29 May 2012 09:45:48 -0400 Subject: getting an encrypted file to show what public key was used Message-ID: I am using gnupg via PHP's wrapper for it. I am sending an ecrypted files to remote hosts, using two different keys for the respective hosts. One host can decrypt the file properly, but the other host cannot. I am trying to troubleshoot this bug. Of course, I do not have the private keys from the remote hosts, so I cannot troubleshoot the complete circuit on my own. The host that cannot decrypt their file has the decruption running in some kind of Windows batch file. The error message they get seems to indicate the name of the public key that was used to encrypt the file. I am trying to figure out of the name of the public key is actually encoded into the gpg file. This is their error message: Beginning GPG Decryption Using current version of GNUPG gpg: encrypted with 2048-bit ELG-E key, ID F1940956, created 2002-04-25 "Different Public Key " gpg: decryption failed: secret key not available However, when I try to decrypt the file I'm sending them, without the key, I get simply $> gpg --decrypt sensitive_file.gpg gpg: encrypted with ELG-E key, ID F1940956 gpg: decryption failed: secret key not available I want gpg to report the email address of the key used to encrypt the file, like in the error message I'm getting from the remote host. I want to see "Different Public Key ", like in their error message. But my gpg doesn't report that. Is the name of the public key really encoded into the encrypted file? Or is something else mixed up on the remote host (for instance, them having the other hosts' private key)? How can I see the name of the public key that encrypted the file? Am I missing a switch? From mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de Tue May 29 16:55:07 2012 From: mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de (Hauke Laging) Date: Tue, 29 May 2012 16:55:07 +0200 Subject: problem signing public key, ----- gets converted to - ----- In-Reply-To: <1338297335.29146.140661082119993.7AAFEBBB@webmail.messagingengine.com> References: <1338297335.29146.140661082119993.7AAFEBBB@webmail.messagingengine.com> Message-ID: <9300812.bacrGMgO6G@inno> Am Di 29.05.2012, 06:15:35 schrieb anotst01 at fastmail.fm: > - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- > Is there any way to fix this? As Werner already said: Signing your key does not make sense. So the solution is simple: Exclude the key out of the signed text, insert it before or afterwards. Hauke -- PGP: D44C 6A5B 71B0 427C CED3 025C BD7D 6D27 ECCB 5814 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 555 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Tue May 29 17:02:03 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Tue, 29 May 2012 11:02:03 -0400 Subject: getting an encrypted file to show what public key was used In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <4FC4E4EB.2050501@sixdemonbag.org> On 5/29/12 9:45 AM, Steven Lefevre wrote: > gpg: encrypted with 2048-bit ELG-E key, ID F1940956, created 2002-04-25 > "Different Public Key " > gpg: decryption failed: secret key not available Oh, cute. A short ID collision. :) Quaero Corporation's, apparently. Short answer: try using gpg -vvvv sensitive-file.gpg. This will give you a large amount of detailed information that might be useful for your debugging. From mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de Tue May 29 17:17:04 2012 From: mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de (Hauke Laging) Date: Tue, 29 May 2012 17:17:04 +0200 Subject: getting an encrypted file to show what public key was used In-Reply-To: <4FC4E4EB.2050501@sixdemonbag.org> References: <4FC4E4EB.2050501@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <4366338.ofm6LSEQgj@inno> Am Di 29.05.2012, 11:02:03 schrieb Robert J. Hansen: > On 5/29/12 9:45 AM, Steven Lefevre wrote: > > gpg: encrypted with 2048-bit ELG-E key, ID F1940956, created 2002-04-25 > > > > "Different Public Key " > > > > gpg: decryption failed: secret key not available > > Oh, cute. A short ID collision. :) What can you see that from? Hauke -- PGP: D44C 6A5B 71B0 427C CED3 025C BD7D 6D27 ECCB 5814 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 555 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Tue May 29 17:28:36 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Tue, 29 May 2012 11:28:36 -0400 Subject: getting an encrypted file to show what public key was used In-Reply-To: <4366338.ofm6LSEQgj@inno> References: <4FC4E4EB.2050501@sixdemonbag.org> <4366338.ofm6LSEQgj@inno> Message-ID: <4FC4EB24.3030100@sixdemonbag.org> On 5/29/12 11:17 AM, Hauke Laging wrote: > What can you see that from? Can't, but it seems to be the most likely option. The most likely cause of this seems to be -- 1. His correspondent said "use certificate 0xF1940956." 2. He did a gpg --recv-key 0xF1940956. 3. Quaero Corporation already has a certificate with the short ID of 0xF1940956 on the keyservers, created 2002-04-25. 4. He imported Quaero Corporation's certificate 5. He believes he's using the correct certificate for his correspondent, since he's using the short ID they specified 6. He's actually using Quaero Corporation's certificate 7. And his correspondents can't read the traffic, since he's using the wrong certificate. I could be wrong, of course, but that's where I'd place my bets. This goes to underline the importance of proper certificate validation. If I have the sequence of events correct, then it could have been avoided entirely if there had been a Step 4.5, "validate the certificate he just received." From mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de Tue May 29 17:31:40 2012 From: mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de (Hauke Laging) Date: Tue, 29 May 2012 17:31:40 +0200 Subject: getting an encrypted file to show what public key was used In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <3483158.NIzzYGKoAv@inno> Am Di 29.05.2012, 09:45:48 schrieb Steven Lefevre: > Beginning GPG Decryption > Using current version of GNUPG > gpg: encrypted with 2048-bit ELG-E key, ID F1940956, created 2002-04-25 > "Different Public Key " > gpg: decryption failed: secret key not available > > However, when I try to decrypt the file I'm sending them, without the > key, I get simply > > $> gpg --decrypt sensitive_file.gpg > gpg: encrypted with ELG-E key, ID F1940956 > gpg: decryption failed: secret key not available Was this try in the same GnuPG environment like the encoding or was one within PHP and the other one as your regular user account? GnuPG does not report UIDs if the key is not available in the keyring. The error message tells us that the key which you have encoded for (0xF1940956 (or its main key), "Different Public Key ) is part of the decoding system's keyring but only the public key. So you encode for the wrong key. > I want gpg to report the email address of the key used to encrypt the > file, like in the error message I'm getting from the remote host. I > want to see "Different Public Key ", > like in their error message. But my gpg doesn't report that. You have to import the respective key in order to get that information. > Is the name of the public key really encoded into the encrypted file? No, just the (long) ID of the used key (i.e. possibly a subkey). > How can I see the name of the public key that encrypted the file? Am I > missing a switch? You can search the keyservers for subkeys, too. gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net --search-keys 0xF1940956 I am confused by Robert's short ID collision hint but my remarks should be correct anyway. Hauke -- PGP: D44C 6A5B 71B0 427C CED3 025C BD7D 6D27 ECCB 5814 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 555 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From wk at gnupg.org Tue May 29 17:35:08 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Tue, 29 May 2012 17:35:08 +0200 Subject: getting an encrypted file to show what public key was used In-Reply-To: (Steven Lefevre's message of "Tue, 29 May 2012 09:45:48 -0400") References: Message-ID: <87bol7hufn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Tue, 29 May 2012 15:45, lefevre.10 at osu.edu said: > $> gpg --decrypt sensitive_file.gpg > gpg: encrypted with ELG-E key, ID F1940956 > gpg: decryption failed: secret key not available Use gpg --keyid-format long --decrypt sensitive_file.gpg to see the non-abbreviated key ID as stored in the file. Use this to find the key on a server, etc. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de Tue May 29 17:36:25 2012 From: mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de (Hauke Laging) Date: Tue, 29 May 2012 17:36:25 +0200 Subject: getting an encrypted file to show what public key was used In-Reply-To: <4FC4EB24.3030100@sixdemonbag.org> References: <4366338.ofm6LSEQgj@inno> <4FC4EB24.3030100@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <10069489.TM7tX9El0y@inno> Am Di 29.05.2012, 11:28:36 schrieb Robert J. Hansen: > This goes to underline the importance of proper certificate validation. > If I have the sequence of events correct, then it could have been > avoided entirely if there had been a Step 4.5, "validate the certificate > he just received." Looks like a nice possibility for checking how serious the handling of keys by your partners is: Create a key with a short ID collision for a key available on the keyservers and give them the short ID... 8-) Hauke -- PGP: D44C 6A5B 71B0 427C CED3 025C BD7D 6D27 ECCB 5814 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 555 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From wk at gnupg.org Tue May 29 17:39:12 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Tue, 29 May 2012 17:39:12 +0200 Subject: problem signing public key, ----- gets converted to - ----- In-Reply-To: <9300812.bacrGMgO6G@inno> (Hauke Laging's message of "Tue, 29 May 2012 16:55:07 +0200") References: <1338297335.29146.140661082119993.7AAFEBBB@webmail.messagingengine.com> <9300812.bacrGMgO6G@inno> Message-ID: <877gvvhu8v.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Tue, 29 May 2012 16:55, mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de said: > is simple: Exclude the key out of the signed text, insert it before or > afterwards. Or use PGP/MIME. SCNR, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From tanguy.herrmann at gmail.com Tue May 29 17:16:09 2012 From: tanguy.herrmann at gmail.com (Tanguy Herrmann) Date: Tue, 29 May 2012 17:16:09 +0200 Subject: getting an encrypted file to show what public key was used In-Reply-To: <4FC4E4EB.2050501@sixdemonbag.org> References: <4FC4E4EB.2050501@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: Steven, The key who has the Short Key ID of F1940956 has the same short Key ID as : http://keyserver.ubuntu.com:11371/pks/lookup?search=0xF1940956&op=vindex This is a flaw in the OpenPGP protocol (If I remember right). Short Key ID are only the last 8 hexadecimal characters of the full fingerprint. And the flaw make that OpenPGP verify only that short Key ID instead of the full fingerprint, and that leads to collision of Key ID even if the keys are differents ... The easier solution for you would be to create a new key On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 5:02 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > On 5/29/12 9:45 AM, Steven Lefevre wrote: >> gpg: encrypted with 2048-bit ELG-E key, ID F1940956, created 2002-04-25 >> ? ? ? "Different Public Key " >> gpg: decryption failed: secret key not available > > Oh, cute. ?A short ID collision. ?:) ?Quaero Corporation's, apparently. > > Short answer: try using gpg -vvvv sensitive-file.gpg. ?This will give > you a large amount of detailed information that might be useful for your > debugging. > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users From dkg at fifthhorseman.net Tue May 29 17:51:06 2012 From: dkg at fifthhorseman.net (Daniel Kahn Gillmor) Date: Tue, 29 May 2012 11:51:06 -0400 Subject: changing the default for --keyid-format [was: Re: getting an encrypted file to show what public key was used] In-Reply-To: <87bol7hufn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <87bol7hufn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <4FC4F06A.7000501@fifthhorseman.net> On 05/29/2012 11:35 AM, Werner Koch wrote: > Use > > gpg --keyid-format long --decrypt sensitive_file.gpg > > to see the non-abbreviated key ID as stored in the file. Use this to > find the key on a server, etc. i've seen a lot of these mistakes where people seem to think that 32-bit keyids are somehow collision-resistant. For example: https://lists.ubuntu.com/archives/uds-announce/2012-May/000234.html Perhaps GnuPG should change the default of --keyid-format from "short" to "long"? certainly, the 64-bit keyID itself is not as collision-resistant as the full fingerprint, but it does raise the bar for an attacker (and discourages users from just parrotting the 32-bit keyid if they don't understand what they're looking at). I think switching the default to "long" would be on balance a Good Thing. What do other people think? --dkg -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 1030 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de Tue May 29 18:02:59 2012 From: mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de (Hauke Laging) Date: Tue, 29 May 2012 18:02:59 +0200 Subject: changing the default for --keyid-format [was: Re: getting an encrypted file to show what public key was used] In-Reply-To: <4FC4F06A.7000501@fifthhorseman.net> References: <87bol7hufn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FC4F06A.7000501@fifthhorseman.net> Message-ID: <1725021.9TFsiKB0J5@inno> Am Di 29.05.2012, 11:51:06 schrieb Daniel Kahn Gillmor: > I think switching the default to "long" would be on balance a Good Thing. A smaller change which should "solve" most of these problems could be to change the error message. If gpg is operating with the short format then a respective hint could be added: "gpg is currently operation with short ID format. This prevents short ID collisions from being easily detected. You may want to run gpg with the option '--keyid-format long' to check the long IDs." Hauke -- PGP: D44C 6A5B 71B0 427C CED3 025C BD7D 6D27 ECCB 5814 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 555 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From hka at qbs.com.pl Tue May 29 18:06:29 2012 From: hka at qbs.com.pl (Hubert Kario) Date: Tue, 29 May 2012 18:06:29 +0200 Subject: getting an encrypted file to show what public key was used In-Reply-To: <10069489.TM7tX9El0y@inno> References: <4FC4EB24.3030100@sixdemonbag.org> <10069489.TM7tX9El0y@inno> Message-ID: <1539433.Pzg1ts5ytL@bursa22> On Tuesday 29 of May 2012 17:36:25 Hauke Laging wrote: > Am Di 29.05.2012, 11:28:36 schrieb Robert J. Hansen: > > This goes to underline the importance of proper certificate validation. > > If I have the sequence of events correct, then it could have been > > avoided entirely if there had been a Step 4.5, "validate the certificate > > he just received." > > Looks like a nice possibility for checking how serious the handling of > keys by your partners is: Create a key with a short ID collision for a > key available on the keyservers and give them the short ID... 8-) > No, thank you. Getting people to use any form of crypto is hard enough. We don't need to show them that it doesn't fix all problems... Regards, -- Hubert Kario QBS - Quality Business Software 02-656 Warszawa, ul. Ksawer?w 30/85 tel. +48 (22) 646-61-51, 646-74-24 www.qbs.com.pl From kf at sumptuouscapital.com Tue May 29 18:13:17 2012 From: kf at sumptuouscapital.com (Kristian Fiskerstrand) Date: Tue, 29 May 2012 18:13:17 +0200 Subject: changing the default for --keyid-format [was: Re: getting an encrypted file to show what public key was used] In-Reply-To: <4FC4F06A.7000501__46282.726157415$1338306735$gmane$org@fifthhorseman.net> References: <87bol7hufn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FC4F06A.7000501__46282.726157415$1338306735$gmane$org@fifthhorseman.net> Message-ID: -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 On 2012-05-29 17:51, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: > On 05/29/2012 11:35 AM, Werner Koch wrote: ... > I think switching the default to "long" would be on balance a Good > Thing. > I agree, and don't see much of a reason not to use a long KeyID rather than a short one. However, please note that search for subkeys using the long keyID format is only supported in SKS since version 1.1.3 announced 11 April 2012 (lookup for parent/regular public keys is supported before that), so before implementing such a change I'd like to consider setting the minimum requirement for the SKS pool[0] to 1.1.3. Technically that is a rather easy change, however, it'd currently reduce the number of available servers to about 15 from 61 in the pool with min version requrement of 1.1.0 (current). So might have to give the keyserver administrators some time to upgrade before that. (cross posting to sks-devel) [0] http://sks-keyservers.net/status/ - -- - ---------------------------- Kristian Fiskerstrand http://www.sumptuouscapital.com Twitter: @krifisk - ---------------------------- Corruptissima re publica plurim? leges The greater the degeneration of the republic, the more of its laws - ---------------------------- This email was digitally signed using the OpenPGP standard. If you want to read more about this The book: Sending Emails - The Safe Way: An introduction to OpenPGP security is now available in both Amazon Kindle and Paperback format at http://www.amazon.com/dp/B006RSG1S4/ - ---------------------------- Public PGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at http://www.sumptuouscapital.com/pgp/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.19 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQIcBAEBCAAGBQJPxPWcAAoJEBbgz41rC5UIzLIQAIoftDYMBEl4N3MRO2ucrNt2 qG2t3xMTQlRv3hmf5mqqIYmK6zRvmKmjBdw7WPdIo83xY0+WBRiOSQEkSOM86Ed3 WhgYOlaNFNaPHrYB6v1yL6C9PkqXkv1IxFP8x12CjsfgnV5AWpQWDJIXHquD2C1K lbwX0+c/VnsN9LltBRvNqdrO/Le/HhVZyeMd6CoJYkp7aHdPCnmxsXi3DHqr78Bw FFP4ABWllE9RgAJN8ekvM7j8CedktwPXtkjGjoQw7+13p2xP3qd6E5ggTfFaHAQ5 HibxKBFZZmkcO3JSOmO7SF+63IKYPptu2uJ/p28ZFnExO+8HelU8m5iga+OXQqFC bw/qKbiWLcQxGMD2R+5ZyXOOCaJeg0vNwyt3YAGo09WJ7OJWYGne1A2h2vB/lxNS V09xjkNEbLQqQ1Kt1cLLZ5p/vxwrZ/136uyGhgmxX8gFVN9GBG31VymeV7pVqG11 21i0wqCW1KvW70b+D6vgQIxzTxUE1twc5suRi01bjDnAn0Kkl3mtZjPEI9kRRyfB W6+6zGtJgAr9AMPakAxhey39fTu8bS+dsRYS2ztrhhC/XfaxdreOrKpdKKqaUbEF zKddYjo+XarW27vubpCkIS3hnWd8nn/jBRuAwkKUC/qiSwvKKsvV8Y2FJt0FjLqI suwhmsLwpD1I5U0uMH6D =2Hk4 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From Mike_Acker at charter.net Tue May 29 18:12:39 2012 From: Mike_Acker at charter.net (Mike Acker) Date: Tue, 29 May 2012 12:12:39 -0400 Subject: Gnupg-users Digest, Vol 104, Issue 37 In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <4FC4F577.1060405@charter.net> IMHO(FWIW) it is unlikely, at best, that anyone will attack your cipher text. haquers work by getting malware into the endpoint computers hence it is that requiring signatures on software distributions is one of the most critical topics on the table today -- /MIKE -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Tue May 29 18:24:53 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Tue, 29 May 2012 12:24:53 -0400 Subject: getting an encrypted file to show what public key was used In-Reply-To: References: <4FC4E4EB.2050501@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <4FC4F855.9080809@sixdemonbag.org> On 5/29/12 11:16 AM, Tanguy Herrmann wrote: > This is a flaw in the OpenPGP protocol (If I remember right). The protocol is fine, but it seems that the people involved did not properly validate certificates. (Note that I'm not certain about this, hence my "seems". Maybe I should qualify it as "seems likely.") > And the flaw make that OpenPGP verify only that short Key > ID instead of the full fingerprint, and that leads to collision of Key > ID even if the keys are differents ... Certificate validation uses the full fingerprint. > The easier solution for you would be to create a new key I apologize for sounding strident here, but that advice is both malinformed and wrong. It's malinformed because when something fails, we should learn why it failed and develop processes to prevent the failure in the future. Saying "well, just have a do-over" is not consistent with the best practices of software engineering. It's wrong because it's the other person whose certificate has a collision. He can create all the new certificates he wants but it won't change a thing. He may also not be able to persuade the other person to generate a new certificate: they may have already invested a lot in their current certificate, and may not want to switch. From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Tue May 29 18:31:33 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Tue, 29 May 2012 12:31:33 -0400 Subject: changing the default for --keyid-format [was: Re: getting an encrypted file to show what public key was used] In-Reply-To: <4FC4F06A.7000501@fifthhorseman.net> References: <87bol7hufn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FC4F06A.7000501@fifthhorseman.net> Message-ID: <4FC4F9E5.5070007@sixdemonbag.org> On 5/29/12 11:51 AM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: > Perhaps GnuPG should change the default of --keyid-format from "short" > to "long"? Hurts interoperability. Once someone learns the process on PGP or BouncyCastle or [insert OpenPGP implementation here], they're going to want to take those same skills over to GnuPG. Those other implementations overwhelmingly display short key IDs; if they come to GnuPG expecting short key IDs and see long ones, we'll see a sea of questions of "why did my key ID change when I imported it from PGP to GnuPG?" (Hmm. "Interoperability" might be the wrong word, but there's not a good term for "skill portability.") Anyway, it's not that I think this change is _a priori_ bad, but in order to diminish the skill portability issues (both in moving from other implementations to GnuPG and from GnuPG to other implementations) I think this change should not be implemented without some coordination with the other major implementations. Honestly, this seems like something to bring up to the IETF WG. The RFC already has a plethora of implementation recommendations: adding an implementation recommendation of "use long key IDs when possible" seems to be an entirely reasonable addition. From wk at gnupg.org Tue May 29 19:18:00 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Tue, 29 May 2012 19:18:00 +0200 Subject: changing the default for --keyid-format In-Reply-To: <4FC4F9E5.5070007@sixdemonbag.org> (Robert J. Hansen's message of "Tue, 29 May 2012 12:31:33 -0400") References: <87bol7hufn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FC4F06A.7000501@fifthhorseman.net> <4FC4F9E5.5070007@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <87y5oahpo7.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Tue, 29 May 2012 18:31, rjh at sixdemonbag.org said: > Honestly, this seems like something to bring up to the IETF WG. The RFC > already has a plethora of implementation recommendations: adding an > implementation recommendation of "use long key IDs when possible" seems I bet that this will immediately start a discussion on a v5 key format to fix this problem for ?all? time. And obviously the suggestion will then be to show the full, then, SHA-256 fingerprint. Frontends should handle this problem. For example they could show all matching keys after a decryption problem. Hiding the keyID from the user would even be better - the mail address should be sufficient for 99% of all users. For the experts, a ?Details? button can show all the glory details of the key. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From dougb at dougbarton.us Tue May 29 19:28:49 2012 From: dougb at dougbarton.us (Doug Barton) Date: Tue, 29 May 2012 10:28:49 -0700 Subject: changing the default for --keyid-format In-Reply-To: <87y5oahpo7.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <87bol7hufn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FC4F06A.7000501@fifthhorseman.net> <4FC4F9E5.5070007@sixdemonbag.org> <87y5oahpo7.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <4FC50751.1010107@dougbarton.us> On 5/29/2012 10:18 AM, Werner Koch wrote: > Hiding the keyID from the user would even be better - the mail > address should be sufficient for 99% of all users. I use the e-mail address for almost all of my command-line work, FWIW. -- If you're never wrong, you're not trying hard enough From wk at gnupg.org Tue May 29 19:26:33 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Tue, 29 May 2012 19:26:33 +0200 Subject: [FYI] keys.gnupg.net (was: changing the default for --keyid-format) In-Reply-To: (Kristian Fiskerstrand's message of "Tue, 29 May 2012 18:13:17 +0200") References: <87bol7hufn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FC4F06A.7000501__46282.726157415$1338306735$gmane$org@fifthhorseman.net> Message-ID: <87txyyhp9y.fsf_-_@vigenere.g10code.de> Hi, I can't remember whether I announced it, but since some weeks keys.gnupg.net is a CNAME to pool.sks-keyservers.net and http-keys.gnupg.net is a CNAME to ha.pool.sks-keyservers.net The reason for this change is that it is useless to spend a lot of work in maintaining such a second pool. The folks behing sks-keyservers.net to a very well job. keys.gnupg.org is mentioned in the installed sample config file and thus likely used by many new users. Now it works again. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Tue May 29 19:44:41 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Tue, 29 May 2012 13:44:41 -0400 Subject: changing the default for --keyid-format In-Reply-To: <87y5oahpo7.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <87bol7hufn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FC4F06A.7000501@fifthhorseman.net> <4FC4F9E5.5070007@sixdemonbag.org> <87y5oahpo7.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <4FC50B09.7050108@sixdemonbag.org> On 5/29/12 1:18 PM, Werner Koch wrote: > Frontends should handle this problem. The problem is that most people developing front ends are making them pretty darn user-hostile. A few years ago while taking some HCI courses, I did a usability study on the most common certificate interface -- the tabular widget. It turned out to be just beyond-Godawful. Tabular data is the Right Thing To Do in two major use cases. The first is when you have a noninteractive display of identical field(s) for multiple pieces of data. Consider a printed almanac: if it wants to convey a list of countries and populations, the best way to do it is with a table. Different records (countries), identical fields (population), and since the paper is noninteractive, the table is a win. Now consider if instead of an almanac you have Wolfram Alpha. Typing "population of Switzerland" immediately yields *just* the data you want, and you don't get confused by your eye accidentally jumping a row and reading the population of Sweden instead. A table widget is more prone to misreadings. The second Big Win for tables is when data must be contextualized by other data. Consider a spreadsheet showing profits and losses for different divisions of a business: if all you know is that a given division made $X, you don't know if that's your most profitable division, your least profitable division, or what-have-you. The other data is necessary to put the data you're interested in into a larger context. Now consider the tabular widget as used in PGPkeys, GPA, the Enigmail key manager, etcetera. The certificates don't need to be contextualized: all the data necessary to evaluate a certificate is present in the same record as the certificate. And since it's a graphical application the interface can be interactive, which means the other major use-case isn't applicable here. Enigmail tries to have its cake and eat it too by prominently featuring a large search box at the top of the window. But this isn't a very good solution. In terms of screen real estate, about five-sixths of the screen is taken up by the tabular widget. The search box takes up a relatively small portion. The human eye tends to view large things as more important than small things -- so the center of attention is naturally drawn to the tabular widget, not the search box. Further, the human eye tends to view complex things as more important than simple things -- so the eye is drawn to the tabular widget again, not the search box. I'm grateful Enigmail has a search box in the certificate manager, but I doubt if new users even notice it. According to Google's HCI guys [2], 90% of the U.S. internet-using population doesn't know how to use Control-F to find a word in a document or a page. That's the level of skill most people have with user interfaces -- awful. And if you count up the number of widgets on the screen in your average certificate manager, you'll find that there's more visual complexity there than in Microsoft Word. Anyway. If people are interested in what I found out about effective user-interface design with respect to certificate managers, say the word. Otherwise I'll crawl back under my rock and leave the subject alone for another couple of years. :) From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Tue May 29 19:47:30 2012 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Tue, 29 May 2012 13:47:30 -0400 Subject: changing the default for --keyid-format [was: Re: getting an encrypted file to show what public key was used] In-Reply-To: <4FC4F06A.7000501@fifthhorseman.net> References: <87bol7hufn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FC4F06A.7000501@fifthhorseman.net> Message-ID: <6051AE86-3018-4FE6-8847-52647AD4E1D0@jabberwocky.com> On May 29, 2012, at 11:51 AM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: > On 05/29/2012 11:35 AM, Werner Koch wrote: >> Use >> >> gpg --keyid-format long --decrypt sensitive_file.gpg >> >> to see the non-abbreviated key ID as stored in the file. Use this to >> find the key on a server, etc. > > i've seen a lot of these mistakes where people seem to think that 32-bit > keyids are somehow collision-resistant. For example: > > https://lists.ubuntu.com/archives/uds-announce/2012-May/000234.html > > Perhaps GnuPG should change the default of --keyid-format from "short" > to "long"? certainly, the 64-bit keyID itself is not as > collision-resistant as the full fingerprint, but it does raise the bar > for an attacker (and discourages users from just parrotting the 32-bit > keyid if they don't understand what they're looking at). > > I think switching the default to "long" would be on balance a Good Thing. > > What do other people think? I think that it would bring more confusion than benefit, unfortunately. There is a significant amount of documentation (and even code) that uses OpenPGP in terms of 32-bit key IDs, and if that if we were to change, we'd cause all sorts of problems. Defaults should be conservative. That doesn't mean we can't start encouraging people to use 64-bit IDs, but I don't expect it to be a quick process. What is your concern here, though - accidental or intentional collision? David From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Tue May 29 19:47:31 2012 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Tue, 29 May 2012 13:47:31 -0400 Subject: changing the default for --keyid-format In-Reply-To: <87y5oahpo7.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <87bol7hufn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FC4F06A.7000501@fifthhorseman.net> <4FC4F9E5.5070007@sixdemonbag.org> <87y5oahpo7.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <7F3123EC-25CE-4AB0-BEA8-32D1187BC6E9@jabberwocky.com> On May 29, 2012, at 1:18 PM, Werner Koch wrote: > On Tue, 29 May 2012 18:31, rjh at sixdemonbag.org said: > >> Honestly, this seems like something to bring up to the IETF WG. The RFC >> already has a plethora of implementation recommendations: adding an >> implementation recommendation of "use long key IDs when possible" seems > > I bet that this will immediately start a discussion on a v5 key format > to fix this problem for ?all? time. And obviously the suggestion will > then be to show the full, then, SHA-256 fingerprint. No doubt. V5 is a rather nice way to handle the problem: if a new key format came about, it's reasonable that the "handle" used to refer to it is different. Just like when things went from v3 to v4 and the fingerprint format changed, people understood that these were two different key types and accepted that they would appear different in a UI. I daresay that designing a V5 key format might even be accomplished sooner than rooting out all the (now-incorrect) FAQs and general knowledge of people using OpenPGP to get them to use 64-bit key IDs instead of 32. ;) David From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Tue May 29 19:49:35 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Tue, 29 May 2012 13:49:35 -0400 Subject: changing the default for --keyid-format In-Reply-To: <4FC50B09.7050108@sixdemonbag.org> References: <87bol7hufn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FC4F06A.7000501@fifthhorseman.net> <4FC4F9E5.5070007@sixdemonbag.org> <87y5oahpo7.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FC50B09.7050108@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <4FC50C2F.6040007@sixdemonbag.org> On 5/29/12 1:44 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > According to Google's HCI guys [2], 90% of the U.S. internet-using > population doesn't know how to use Control-F to find a word in a > document or a page. Whoops, editing error. Should've been footnote [1], and I should've listed it as: http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2011/08/crazy-90-percent-of-people-dont-know-how-to-use-ctrl-f/243840/ From sam at samwhited.com Tue May 29 20:05:18 2012 From: sam at samwhited.com (Sam Whited) Date: Tue, 29 May 2012 14:05:18 -0400 Subject: changing the default for --keyid-format [was: Re: getting an encrypted file to show what public key was used] In-Reply-To: <6051AE86-3018-4FE6-8847-52647AD4E1D0@jabberwocky.com> References: <87bol7hufn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FC4F06A.7000501@fifthhorseman.net> <6051AE86-3018-4FE6-8847-52647AD4E1D0@jabberwocky.com> Message-ID: On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 1:47 PM, David Shaw wrote: > On May 29, 2012, at 11:51 AM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: > > What is your concern here, though - accidental or intentional collision? Certainly both; while accidental collision isn't probable, 32-bit IDs aren't exactly collision resistant either. This, coupled with the fact that a nice GPGPU is now relatively inexpensive makes brute forcing collisions not only possible, but relatively easy for a determined attacker. ?Sam -- Sam Whited pub 4096R/FB39BCF7EC2C9934 SamWhited.com sam at samwhited.com 404.492.6008 From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Tue May 29 20:12:51 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Tue, 29 May 2012 14:12:51 -0400 Subject: getting an encrypted file to show what public key was used In-Reply-To: References: <4FC4E4EB.2050501@sixdemonbag.org> <4366338.ofm6LSEQgj@inno> <4FC4EB24.3030100@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <4FC511A3.80803@sixdemonbag.org> On 5/29/12 1:54 PM, Steven Lefevre wrote: > This is, not surprisingly, the case. There was bad logic in my script > and somehow, somewhere, it's using the wrong key for this particular > host. The good news is it's an easy problem to fix. :) Get in touch with your contact over there (preferably via a non-email/non-IM form of contact, like the telephone). After getting in touch with the right person and verifying to your satisfaction that you're really talking to the right person, just ask: "Hey, I need the full fingerprint of your OpenPGP key. Not the short ID, but the full fingerprint. Would you help me with that, please?" Write down the full fingerprint. Then say, "And could you please email me your public key?" Then: $ gpg --delete-key 0xF1940956 Once the email with their certificate arrives, save it to disk and: $ gpg --import $ gpg --edit-key >From the edit-key screen, type 'fingerprint' to check the full fingerprint. Make sure it matches what you were given on the phone. If it matches, then from the edit-key screen, type 'lsign'. This will validate the certificate, and at this point you'll have a fairly high assurance that you're using the correct certificate. :) From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Tue May 29 20:18:37 2012 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Tue, 29 May 2012 14:18:37 -0400 Subject: changing the default for --keyid-format [was: Re: getting an encrypted file to show what public key was used] In-Reply-To: References: <87bol7hufn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FC4F06A.7000501@fifthhorseman.net> <6051AE86-3018-4FE6-8847-52647AD4E1D0@jabberwocky.com> Message-ID: <4E836AA2-7B27-4CFE-A2CE-4A04016F2F8E@jabberwocky.com> On May 29, 2012, at 2:05 PM, Sam Whited wrote: > On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 1:47 PM, David Shaw wrote: >> On May 29, 2012, at 11:51 AM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: >> >> What is your concern here, though - accidental or intentional collision? > > Certainly both; while accidental collision isn't probable, 32-bit IDs > aren't exactly collision resistant either. This, coupled with the fact > that a nice GPGPU is now relatively inexpensive makes brute forcing > collisions not only possible, but relatively easy for a determined > attacker. The reason I bring it up is that using the v3 key attack, 64-bit key IDs have no particular benefit over 32-bit IDs for intentional collisions (i.e. an attacker generating a key with the same key ID as the victim in order to confuse matters and/or steal traffic). It's just as easy to forge 64 bits as it is to forge 32? David From lefevre.10 at osu.edu Tue May 29 19:54:34 2012 From: lefevre.10 at osu.edu (Steven Lefevre) Date: Tue, 29 May 2012 13:54:34 -0400 Subject: getting an encrypted file to show what public key was used In-Reply-To: <4FC4EB24.3030100@sixdemonbag.org> References: <4FC4E4EB.2050501@sixdemonbag.org> <4366338.ofm6LSEQgj@inno> <4FC4EB24.3030100@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 11:28 AM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > > ? ? ? ?1. ?His correspondent said "use certificate 0xF1940956." > ? ? ? ?2. ?He did a gpg --recv-key 0xF1940956. > ? ? ? ?3. ?Quaero Corporation already has a certificate with the > ? ? ? ? ? ?short ID of 0xF1940956 on the keyservers, created > ? ? ? ? ? ?2002-04-25. > ? ? ? ?4. ?He imported Quaero Corporation's certificate > ? ? ? ?5. ?He believes he's using the correct certificate for his > ? ? ? ? ? ?correspondent, since he's using the short ID they > ? ? ? ? ? ?specified > ? ? ? ?6. ?He's actually using Quaero Corporation's certificate > ? ? ? ?7. ?And his correspondents can't read the traffic, since > ? ? ? ? ? ?he's using the wrong certificate. > > I could be wrong, of course, but that's where I'd place my bets. This is, not surprisingly, the case. There was bad logic in my script and somehow, somewhere, it's using the wrong key for this particular host. I was confused about how the remote host could learn the "name" of the public key, but apparently their script looks it up from public sources, or already has it on their keyring, or whatever. I was not aware of a method I could use to tell which key I had just encrypted a file with, but thanks to the replies, I now know that the key ID will let me know :) Steve Lefevre From wk at gnupg.org Tue May 29 21:23:08 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Tue, 29 May 2012 21:23:08 +0200 Subject: changing the default for --keyid-format In-Reply-To: <4FC50B09.7050108@sixdemonbag.org> (Robert J. Hansen's message of "Tue, 29 May 2012 13:44:41 -0400") References: <87bol7hufn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FC4F06A.7000501@fifthhorseman.net> <4FC4F9E5.5070007@sixdemonbag.org> <87y5oahpo7.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FC50B09.7050108@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <87likahjvn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Tue, 29 May 2012 19:44, rjh at sixdemonbag.org said: > Anyway. If people are interested in what I found out about effective > user-interface design with respect to certificate managers, say the > word. Otherwise I'll crawl back under my rock and leave the subject GPA has many different ways to show keys. IMHO the selection box which pops up in GPA, if run as a UI-server, can't figure out the key to use. I have always thought that this is better than the the standard GPA frontpage, which shows all keys; despite that the most common operation then is trying to locate the right key. A search box would make much more sense here. However, changing such a common UI might result in a lot of negative comments - people love what they once learned. Yes, I am interested in your findings. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From wk at gnupg.org Tue May 29 21:29:51 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Tue, 29 May 2012 21:29:51 +0200 Subject: getting an encrypted file to show what public key was used In-Reply-To: (Steven Lefevre's message of "Tue, 29 May 2012 13:54:34 -0400") References: <4FC4E4EB.2050501@sixdemonbag.org> <4366338.ofm6LSEQgj@inno> <4FC4EB24.3030100@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <87hauyhjkg.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Tue, 29 May 2012 19:54, lefevre.10 at osu.edu said: > This is, not surprisingly, the case. There was bad logic in my script > and somehow, somewhere, it's using the wrong key for this particular Speaking of scripts: Scripts should use --with-colons and never try to parse the regular output. --with-colons prints the long bit key ID. Shalom-Salam, Werner p.s. I have said this at least a hundred times, but it is still not known well enough. The small scripts in tools/ use this method and should give the intial idea to look into the man page and check what this --with-colons is about. Would an option --annotate which enables --with-colons, --batch, and --status-fd be helpful? -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From lefevre.10 at osu.edu Tue May 29 21:32:50 2012 From: lefevre.10 at osu.edu (Steven Lefevre) Date: Tue, 29 May 2012 15:32:50 -0400 Subject: getting an encrypted file to show what public key was used In-Reply-To: <87hauyhjkg.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <4FC4E4EB.2050501@sixdemonbag.org> <4366338.ofm6LSEQgj@inno> <4FC4EB24.3030100@sixdemonbag.org> <87hauyhjkg.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 3:29 PM, Werner Koch wrote: > On Tue, 29 May 2012 19:54, lefevre.10 at osu.edu said: > >> This is, not surprisingly, the case. There was bad logic in my script >> and somehow, somewhere, it's using the wrong key for this particular > > Speaking of scripts: ?Scripts should use --with-colons and never try to > parse the regular output. ?--with-colons prints the long bit key ID. > I was being a bit ambiguous -- by 'script' I meant a PHP program, not a shell script :P From dkg at fifthhorseman.net Tue May 29 21:34:33 2012 From: dkg at fifthhorseman.net (Daniel Kahn Gillmor) Date: Tue, 29 May 2012 15:34:33 -0400 Subject: changing the default for --keyid-format [was: Re: getting an encrypted file to show what public key was used] In-Reply-To: <4E836AA2-7B27-4CFE-A2CE-4A04016F2F8E@jabberwocky.com> References: <87bol7hufn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FC4F06A.7000501@fifthhorseman.net> <6051AE86-3018-4FE6-8847-52647AD4E1D0@jabberwocky.com> <4E836AA2-7B27-4CFE-A2CE-4A04016F2F8E@jabberwocky.com> Message-ID: <4FC524C9.9000207@fifthhorseman.net> On 05/29/2012 02:18 PM, David Shaw wrote: > The reason I bring it up is that using the v3 key attack, 64-bit key IDs have no particular benefit over 32-bit IDs for intentional collisions (i.e. an attacker generating a key with the same key ID as the victim in order to confuse matters and/or steal traffic). It's just as easy to forge 64 bits as it is to forge 32? Right, which is why gpg should default to not processing/accepting v3 keys either, frankly. The window for v3 being deprecated started long ago. If we expect people to rely on gpg for any sort of key management, it ought to have reasonably safe and sane defaults. dropping v3 unless explicitly overridden, and defaulting to displaying 64-bit keyids in the places where it must show keyids seems like it would be a reasonable choice. Yes, it might break compatibility with some existing docs. Those docs are likely to be out-of-date, and many of them may well encourage bad practices anyway to someone who doesn't understand what they're seeing. fwiw, i agree with Werner that we should avoid displaying keyids to users wherever we can -- they're not human-friendly identifiers. But if we're going to expose them, we should be exposing them in ways that at least make them somewhat collision-resistant. --dkg -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 1030 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de Tue May 29 22:02:35 2012 From: mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de (Hauke Laging) Date: Tue, 29 May 2012 22:02:35 +0200 Subject: getting an encrypted file to show what public key was used In-Reply-To: <87hauyhjkg.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <87hauyhjkg.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <1758770.LKnn8mVzmY@inno> Am Di 29.05.2012, 21:29:51 schrieb Werner Koch: > I have said this at least a hundred times, but it is still not known > well enough. You probably mean: "Among the readers of this list." How much known may it be in the wild...? > Would an option --annotate which enables > --with-colons, --batch, and --status-fd be helpful? I don't think so because giving --with-colons, --batch, and --status-fd is not the problem. Making this easier should not have a big effect on the problem. The problem is knowledge (and discipline). So the aim should be to spread the knowledge. This could be done by printing a warning to stderr when stdin and stdout are not terminals and these options are not given: "You are probably running gpg non-interactively. In order not to break scripts it is strongly encouraged to use scripted output of gpg only with the options --with-colons, --batch and --status-fd. See http://www.gnupg.org/..." Hauke -- PGP: D44C 6A5B 71B0 427C CED3 025C BD7D 6D27 ECCB 5814 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 555 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Tue May 29 22:30:33 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Tue, 29 May 2012 16:30:33 -0400 Subject: changing the default for --keyid-format In-Reply-To: <87likahjvn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <87bol7hufn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FC4F06A.7000501@fifthhorseman.net> <4FC4F9E5.5070007@sixdemonbag.org> <87y5oahpo7.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FC50B09.7050108@sixdemonbag.org> <87likahjvn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <4FC531E9.2050604@sixdemonbag.org> On 5/29/12 3:23 PM, Werner Koch wrote: > However, changing such a common UI might result in a > lot of negative comments - people love what they once learned. Absolutely. The good news, though, is that (at least in the Free Software world) the 'market' is fragmented. No one particular key manager holds a dominant position. Off the top of my head there's Seahorse, Kgpg, GPA, the Enigmail key manager, and more. It's possible for a new entry to exist without offending the users who are already happy with the existing/dominant certificate management UI. They just won't use the new thing, that's all -- but new users may decide to use the better-designed interface. > Yes, I am interested in your findings. The code we put together was a fairly straightforward UI mockup. One version was in Java (in a vain, misguided attempt at cross-platform support); after that I put together one in Python that directly targeted GNOME 2. It would need some work to overhaul it for GNOME 3 (and possibly a lot of work, given PyGTK has been deprecated in favor of a different kind of binding). That said, if you'll forgive me not having a mockup ready -- 1. The window was almost comically blank: ._________________________________________. | Search for: | | +-----------------------------------------+ | (room for a line of text, begins blank) | +-----------------------------------------+ | (checkbox for 'Show all matches') | +-----------------------------------------+ | | | | | (completely blank | | tabular widget) | | | +-----------------------------------------+ In usability tests, people who already had experience with conventional key managers absolutely hated this arrangement. They wanted to see all the information at once. People who were new to OpenPGP were a little confused: they weren't accustomed to windows that were mostly blank, but they had no difficulty understanding that they needed to interact with the search box first. An early version of this allowed users to view all 1000+ certificates on the keyring by clicking the 'Show all matches' checkbox immediately. This turned out to be a negative experience for some users, who immediately felt overwhelmed by data. For this reason, the checkbox was originally set as insensitive: only once data was entered in the search box and the number of matches ranged between 1 and 50 did the checkbox become active. 2. As users typed things into the searchbox, the line of text would update. For instance, if the user typed 'T' the text would say something like, "55 certificates contain 'T'". At this point the user could click on the checkbox if he/she wished. People seemed to understand that they should keep typing, though. Once enough letters were entered to reduce the matches to under seven certs, the checkbox selected itself and the matching UIDs populated in the widget. And, of course, as soon as the matches went <50 the user could manually select the checkbox. 3. Typing 'RSA', 'DSA' and/or 'ELG' would further restrict keys. Nobody cared about this feature: it was completely unused. Likewise with ">=xxxx" and/or "<=xxxx" to restrict by key length. Nobody cared. In hindsight, this was a horrible misfeature -- what if someone's name contained 'rsa', 'dsa' or 'elg'? For instance, one of my classmates' email addresses was @thetiredsaint.com; had we used his certificate as one of our tests, I suspect people would have been driven up the wall by this misfeature (note the "dsa" in "thetiredsaint"). 4. Searching by a hex string was supported, so long as it was prefixed with 0x. 5. Multiple search terms were treated as logical-ANDs, not logical-ORs. People didn't want/use ORs: nobody wanted "UIDs matching 'John' or 'Smith'", they wanted "UIDs matching 'John' and 'Smith'" -- e.g., Bob Smith would match the first but not the second. 6. Once the tabular widget was displaying UIDs, clicking on a row in the UID would populate its key ID field. This further reduced the cognitive load on people: rather than see 10 UIDs and 10 key IDs (a widget count of 20 spread across two columns), there was a single column of 10 UIDs and, *if a row was selected*, a single key ID shown -- a widget count of 11. Some people liked this, some people absolutely hated it. The ones who hated it tended to be the more experienced computer users. 7. Upon clicking a UID, not only would the key ID field populate, but the line of text would instruct the user "Double-click to view or edit this certificate." Upon double-clicking, congratulations, the mock-up ended -- the mock-up was only meant to test the ease of finding and selecting the desired certificate. Our testing was pretty rough. We had seven test subjects (a very small sample), one of whom was very tech-savvy and the others were a fairly normal cross-section of the undergraduates who were shambling around through the building that day on their way to a university-required math class. The surveys showed that they all considered themselves to be competent with computer interfaces, but only the one considered himself expert. They were tested on both GPA 0.3 (the latest version available at the time) and this mock-up. From a keyring containing 1000+ certificates, we asked them to find some certificates by email address, some by name, some by "a name like, but spelled a little differently" (e.g., "like Bob Johnson, but the spelling of the last name may be wrong"), and by key ID. The results were a mixed bag but on balance positive. The very tech-savvy subject immediately recognized the column headers in GPA controlled per-column sorting, and used this to find desired certificates in approximately the same time as our mock-up. The others generally found the mock-up interface to be much faster than GPA's interface. One subject could not complete the tasks at all with GPA; he didn't see GPA's search box (telling us later that it was just one more widget in a screen full of them), did not know the headers were clickable, and so forth. After spending six minutes trying to find just one certificate, this subject gave up on GPA. The subject who gave up on GPA began his session by maximizing GPA to fill the screen. He was the only subject to do so. He said he thought it would be faster if he could look over more entries at a time, but it appears that all that additional data was more of a cognitive burden than a blessing. After these trials with complete newcomers to OpenPGP, I of course showed the user interface to some veteran OpenPGP users. A few had some mild praise for it, but the overwhelming response was a giant "yech" and a "I hate this interface, it feels so dumbed-down." So, I guess you could say that we came up with an improved user interface for newcomers, but hardly anyone who's invested time in learning the big-tabular-widget style of manager is going to find it an improvement. Proof positive that you can't win 'em all, I guess. :) From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Tue May 29 22:43:07 2012 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Tue, 29 May 2012 16:43:07 -0400 Subject: changing the default for --keyid-format [was: Re: getting an encrypted file to show what public key was used] In-Reply-To: <4FC524C9.9000207@fifthhorseman.net> References: <87bol7hufn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FC4F06A.7000501@fifthhorseman.net> <6051AE86-3018-4FE6-8847-52647AD4E1D0@jabberwocky.com> <4E836AA2-7B27-4CFE-A2CE-4A04016F2F8E@jabberwocky.com> <4FC524C9.9000207@fifthhorseman.net> Message-ID: <19A9C052-221D-4637-B06E-1F0C716A6050@jabberwocky.com> On May 29, 2012, at 3:34 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: > On 05/29/2012 02:18 PM, David Shaw wrote: >> The reason I bring it up is that using the v3 key attack, 64-bit key IDs have no particular benefit over 32-bit IDs for intentional collisions (i.e. an attacker generating a key with the same key ID as the victim in order to confuse matters and/or steal traffic). It's just as easy to forge 64 bits as it is to forge 32? > > Right, which is why gpg should default to not processing/accepting v3 > keys either, frankly. The window for v3 being deprecated started long > ago. If we expect people to rely on gpg for any sort of key management, > it ought to have reasonably safe and sane defaults. While I don't think the world is ready for a change in default visibility from 32 to 64 bit key IDs, I am in favor of this by default. David From wk at gnupg.org Wed May 30 00:14:06 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Wed, 30 May 2012 00:14:06 +0200 Subject: getting an encrypted file to show what public key was used In-Reply-To: <1758770.LKnn8mVzmY@inno> (Hauke Laging's message of "Tue, 29 May 2012 22:02:35 +0200") References: <87hauyhjkg.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <1758770.LKnn8mVzmY@inno> Message-ID: <878vgahbyp.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Tue, 29 May 2012 22:02, mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de said: > "You are probably running gpg non-interactively. In order not to break scripts > it is strongly encouraged to use scripted output of gpg only with the options > --with-colons, --batch and --status-fd. See http://www.gnupg.org/..." Well, scripts won't see that message ;-). They might also assume something about stderr output and break. Well, such a break has the benefit that the authors need to look at the problem. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From reynt0 at cs.albany.edu Wed May 30 03:57:21 2012 From: reynt0 at cs.albany.edu (reynt0) Date: Tue, 29 May 2012 21:57:21 -0400 (EDT) Subject: changing the default for --keyid-format In-Reply-To: <4FC50B09.7050108@sixdemonbag.org> References: <87bol7hufn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FC4F06A.7000501@fifthhorseman.net> <4FC4F9E5.5070007@sixdemonbag.org> <87y5oahpo7.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FC50B09.7050108@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: On Tue, 29 May 2012, Robert J. Hansen wrote: . . . > Tabular data is the Right Thing To Do in two major use cases. > > The first is when you have a noninteractive display of identical > field(s) for multiple pieces of data. Consider a printed almanac: if it > wants to convey a list of countries and populations, the best way to do > it is with a table. Different records (countries), identical fields > (population), and since the paper is noninteractive, the table is a win. . . . > The second Big Win for tables is when data must be contextualized by > other data. Consider a spreadsheet showing profits and losses for > different divisions of a business: if all you know is that a given > division made $X, you don't know if that's your most profitable > division, your least profitable division, or what-have-you. The other > data is necessary to put the data you're interested in into a larger > context. . . . In general, being able to examine variation of content within uniformity of structure is also a way to legitimate the specific content of interest. If someone feeds you just one answer "Special, just for you!", you may feel happy and relaxed, but you missed the chance to see if the result you got makes sense compared to other results. The question of legitimation is actually a broad and significant issue. Referring to RJH's later long description of his work, might this kind of consideration be one possible factor in "experts' liking tabular display more than newbies did? Context would mean more to people who know how to evaluate it. Eg seeing tabular output, they are always a little verifying the current correctness of how the server is working, and so on. If I understand RJH's description corectly, it seemed to me that the interface he described was presenting a combination of context and focus, including some user control over extent of context (possibly not effectively clued control, but that is not unusual for a pilot version of anything). From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Wed May 30 04:03:57 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Tue, 29 May 2012 22:03:57 -0400 Subject: changing the default for --keyid-format In-Reply-To: References: <87bol7hufn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FC4F06A.7000501@fifthhorseman.net> <4FC4F9E5.5070007@sixdemonbag.org> <87y5oahpo7.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FC50B09.7050108@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <4FC5800D.5060906@sixdemonbag.org> On 5/29/12 9:57 PM, reynt0 wrote: > In general, being able to examine variation of content within > uniformity of structure is also a way to legitimate the > specific content of interest. As I said, it's useful when data must be contextualized. For a spreadsheet, the information in one row must be put in the context of information in other rows. This isn't the case for a certificate manager, though: each certificate is its own self-contained entity. Whether I have 500 RSA keys or 1 RSA key doesn't matter to me in the slightest: I just want to look at this *one particular* RSA key, etc. There may be a use case for contextualization in certificates, but if so I haven't found it yet. :) From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Wed May 30 05:07:54 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Tue, 29 May 2012 23:07:54 -0400 Subject: GnuPG 2 + OpenPGP card on F17 Message-ID: <4FC58F0A.7040007@sixdemonbag.org> After upgrading to Fedora 17, something weird seems to be going on with GnuPG 2 and my OpenPGP card. First, card support seems to be provided by a package called gnupg2-smime. That's been installed. Second, ssh-agent is not running (ps ax|grep confirms). Just to be on the safe side I killed off gnome-keyring-daemon as well. Third, gpg-agent is running (ps ax|grep confirms). Sometimes I'm able to query my card (--card-status) when running GnuPG 2 with sudo; other times I get "OpenPGP card not available: Not supported." I'm not able to query my card at all when running as an unprivileged user. Does anyone know what's amiss here? From guyome at lechiennoir.net Wed May 30 08:37:40 2012 From: guyome at lechiennoir.net (Guillaume Lanquepin-Chesnais) Date: Wed, 30 May 2012 08:37:40 +0200 Subject: GnuPG 2 + OpenPGP card on F17 In-Reply-To: <4FC58F0A.7040007@sixdemonbag.org> References: <4FC58F0A.7040007@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <1338359860.2896.4.camel@guyome-laptop> Hi, It seems that the version of gnome shipped with F17 includes a gnome-keyring that supports smartcard (cf http://nlnet.nl/project/seahorse-sc/). You should look into seahorse/key manager if your smartcard is listed in it regards, Guillaume Le mardi 29 mai 2012 ? 23:07 -0400, Robert J. Hansen a ?crit : > After upgrading to Fedora 17, something weird seems to be going on with > GnuPG 2 and my OpenPGP card. > > First, card support seems to be provided by a package called > gnupg2-smime. That's been installed. > > Second, ssh-agent is not running (ps ax|grep confirms). Just to be on > the safe side I killed off gnome-keyring-daemon as well. > > Third, gpg-agent is running (ps ax|grep confirms). > > Sometimes I'm able to query my card (--card-status) when running GnuPG 2 > with sudo; other times I get "OpenPGP card not available: Not > supported." I'm not able to query my card at all when running as an > unprivileged user. > > Does anyone know what's amiss here? > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users -- _/_/_/ Guillaume Lanquepin-Chesnais _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/_/ _/_/_/ _/_/ _/_/ _/ _/_/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/_/_/_/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/_/_/ _/_/_/ _/_/_/ _/_/ _/ _/ _/ _/_/_/ _/ tel : +33 (0)3 55 67 47 90 _/_/ xmpp: guyome at lechiennoir.net From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Wed May 30 10:32:14 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Wed, 30 May 2012 04:32:14 -0400 Subject: GnuPG 2 + OpenPGP card on F17 In-Reply-To: <1338359860.2896.4.camel@guyome-laptop> References: <4FC58F0A.7040007@sixdemonbag.org> <1338359860.2896.4.camel@guyome-laptop> Message-ID: <4FC5DB0E.8020800@sixdemonbag.org> On 05/30/2012 02:37 AM, Guillaume Lanquepin-Chesnais wrote: > It seems that the version of gnome shipped with F17 includes a > gnome-keyring that supports smartcard (cf > http://nlnet.nl/project/seahorse-sc/). You should look into seahorse/key > manager if your smartcard is listed in it If GnuPG can't access it from the command line, Seahorse isn't going to have any better luck. With gnome-keyring-daemon running: [rjh at isaiah Downloads]$ gpg2 --card-status gpg: selecting openpgp failed: Card error gpg: OpenPGP card not available: Card error [rjh at isaiah Downloads]$ sudo gpg2 --card-status gpg: OpenPGP card not available: Not supported From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Wed May 30 10:50:11 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Wed, 30 May 2012 04:50:11 -0400 Subject: GnuPG 2 + OpenPGP card on F17 In-Reply-To: <4FC5DB0E.8020800@sixdemonbag.org> References: <4FC58F0A.7040007@sixdemonbag.org> <1338359860.2896.4.camel@guyome-laptop> <4FC5DB0E.8020800@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <4FC5DF43.2010204@sixdemonbag.org> On 05/30/2012 04:32 AM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > If GnuPG can't access it from the command line, Seahorse isn't going to > have any better luck. > > With gnome-keyring-daemon running: And, after restarting gnome-keyring-daemon: [rjh at isaiah Downloads]$ gpg2 --card-status gpg: selecting openpgp failed: Unsupported certificate gpg: OpenPGP card not available: Unsupported certificate [rjh at isaiah Downloads]$ sudo gpg2 --card-status Application ID ...: D276000124010200000500000D180000 Version ..........: 2.0 Manufacturer .....: ZeitControl ... [snip] ... It seems nondeterministic. Which is, I know, not the case -- but it's incredibly frustrating. At risk of pointing out the obvious, I'm not a newcomer to GnuPG: if I was a newbie facing this, I would likely be overwhelmed by the seeming intractability of getting smartcards working reliably with GNOME 3. I'm frustrated and angry, and I'm just going to leave the problem here for a bit. If anyone has any advice, I'll be coming back to this problem tomorrow. Maybe letting it sit for a while will spur my brain into solving it. From lists at michel-messerschmidt.de Wed May 30 10:08:35 2012 From: lists at michel-messerschmidt.de (Michel Messerschmidt) Date: Wed, 30 May 2012 10:08:35 +0200 Subject: changing the default for --keyid-format In-Reply-To: <4FC5800D.5060906@sixdemonbag.org> References: <87bol7hufn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FC4F06A.7000501@fifthhorseman.net> <4FC4F9E5.5070007@sixdemonbag.org> <87y5oahpo7.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FC50B09.7050108@sixdemonbag.org> <4FC5800D.5060906@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <20120530080835.GA4997@ryu.matrix> On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 10:03:57PM -0400, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > There may be a use case for contextualization in certificates, but if so > I haven't found it yet. :) You may wnat to lookup up all certificates that signed a certificate. Or just get all your certificates displayed. Or all certificates that have been signed with your keys. But this is not to say that a tabular representation helps for these use cases :) From wk at gnupg.org Wed May 30 11:13:03 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Wed, 30 May 2012 11:13:03 +0200 Subject: GnuPG 2 + OpenPGP card on F17 In-Reply-To: <4FC5DF43.2010204@sixdemonbag.org> (Robert J. Hansen's message of "Wed, 30 May 2012 04:50:11 -0400") References: <4FC58F0A.7040007@sixdemonbag.org> <1338359860.2896.4.camel@guyome-laptop> <4FC5DB0E.8020800@sixdemonbag.org> <4FC5DF43.2010204@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <87sjeif2w0.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Wed, 30 May 2012 10:50, rjh at sixdemonbag.org said: > for a bit. If anyone has any advice, I'll be coming back to this > problem tomorrow. Maybe letting it sit for a while will spur my brain > into solving it. The "sudo gpg2" might indicate that root has a running gpg-agent and thus scdaemon. Scdaemon requests exclusive access to the card (but see --timeout) and thus you can't access the card from the user. The usual debug hints are: log-file socket://home/USER/.gnupg/S.log verbose debug 1024 debug 2048 debug-ccid-driver to scdaemon.conf and log-file socket://home/USER/.gnupg/S.log verbose debug 1024 to gpg-agent.conf. Then start in another xterm watchgnupg --force /home/USER/.gnupg/S.log | tee mycombinedlog Run gpg2 --card-status and watch what happens. You may send me the log output. You may also try to stop pcscd and add write access to the reader's USB device. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From n3npq at me.com Tue May 29 19:59:28 2012 From: n3npq at me.com (Jeffrey Johnson) Date: Tue, 29 May 2012 13:59:28 -0400 Subject: [Sks-devel] [FYI] keys.gnupg.net (was: changing the default for --keyid-format) In-Reply-To: <87txyyhp9y.fsf_-_@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <87bol7hufn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FC4F06A.7000501__46282.726157415$1338306735$gmane$org@fifthhorseman.net> <87txyyhp9y.fsf_-_@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <03096F4B-0850-4214-AC1C-3D40BAC7B5CE@me.com> On May 29, 2012, at 1:26 PM, Werner Koch wrote: > Hi, > > I can't remember whether I announced it, but since some weeks > > keys.gnupg.net is a CNAME to pool.sks-keyservers.net > > and > > http-keys.gnupg.net is a CNAME to ha.pool.sks-keyservers.net > > The reason for this change is that it is useless to spend a lot of work > in maintaining such a second pool. The folks behing sks-keyservers.net > to a very well job. keys.gnupg.org is mentioned in the installed sample > config file and thus likely used by many new users. Now it works again. > FWIW, the reasoning is/was similar in RPM choosing the sks-keyservers pool as a default key server configuration: %_hkp_keyserver hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net %_hkp_keyserver_query %{_hkp_keyserver}/pks/lookup?op=get&search= There's no need to reinvent a better infrastructure. So I'll chime in and piggy-back a +1 to Kristian Fiskerstrand here: Nice job! (aside) The previous default of "keys.rpm5.org" might yet have to be resurrected if it is not possible to also use SKS key servers as a notary registrar for automatically generated key pairs generated by every invocation of rpmbuild -ba foo.spec The number of invocations of rpmbuild daily is likely larger than all other pubkey uploads to SKS key servers combined. Which makes me a bit more sensitive to issues of bloat! with CA57AD7C robo-signatures in SKS key servers than most. 73 de Jeff From quannguyen at mbm.vn Wed May 30 11:47:50 2012 From: quannguyen at mbm.vn (=?UTF-8?B?Tmd1eeG7hW4gSOG7k25nIFF1w6Ju?=) Date: Wed, 30 May 2012 16:47:50 +0700 Subject: GnuPG 2 + OpenPGP card on F17 In-Reply-To: <87sjeif2w0.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <4FC58F0A.7040007@sixdemonbag.org> <1338359860.2896.4.camel@guyome-laptop> <4FC5DB0E.8020800@sixdemonbag.org> <4FC5DF43.2010204@sixdemonbag.org> <87sjeif2w0.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <4FC5ECC6.6020701@mbm.vn> Hello Werner, I also encounter this problem on Ubuntu 12.04 I tried to make the log, but both the file S.log and mycombinedlog are empty. Did I wrong somewhere? hongquan at Pangolin ~ $ cat .gnupg/scdaemon.conf log-file socket://home/hongquan/.gnupg/S.log verbose debug 1024 debug 2048 debug-ccid-driver hongquan at Pangolin ~ $ cat .gnupg/gpg-agent.conf log-file socket://home/hongquan/.gnupg/S.log verbose debug 1024 On Wed 30 May 2012 04:13:03 PM ICT, Werner Koch wrote: > On Wed, 30 May 2012 10:50, rjh at sixdemonbag.org said: > >> for a bit. If anyone has any advice, I'll be coming back to this >> problem tomorrow. Maybe letting it sit for a while will spur my brain >> into solving it. > > The "sudo gpg2" might indicate that root has a running gpg-agent and > thus scdaemon. Scdaemon requests exclusive access to the card (but see > --timeout) and thus you can't access the card from the user. > > The usual debug hints are: > > log-file socket://home/USER/.gnupg/S.log > verbose > debug 1024 > debug 2048 > debug-ccid-driver > > to scdaemon.conf and > > log-file socket://home/USER/.gnupg/S.log > verbose > debug 1024 > > to gpg-agent.conf. Then start in another xterm > > watchgnupg --force /home/USER/.gnupg/S.log | tee mycombinedlog > > Run > > gpg2 --card-status > > and watch what happens. You may send me the log output. You may also > try to stop pcscd and add write access to the reader's USB device. > > > Salam-Shalom, > > Werner > -- Regards, Qu?n From wk at gnupg.org Wed May 30 13:26:43 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Wed, 30 May 2012 13:26:43 +0200 Subject: GnuPG 2 + OpenPGP card on F17 In-Reply-To: <4FC5ECC6.6020701@mbm.vn> (=?utf-8?Q?=22Nguy=E1=BB=85n_H?= =?utf-8?Q?=E1=BB=93ng_Qu=C3=A2n=22's?= message of "Wed, 30 May 2012 16:47:50 +0700") References: <4FC58F0A.7040007@sixdemonbag.org> <1338359860.2896.4.camel@guyome-laptop> <4FC5DB0E.8020800@sixdemonbag.org> <4FC5DF43.2010204@sixdemonbag.org> <87sjeif2w0.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FC5ECC6.6020701@mbm.vn> Message-ID: <87d35lgb9o.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Wed, 30 May 2012 11:47, quannguyen at mbm.vn said: > I tried to make the log, but both the file S.log and mycombinedlog are > empty. > Did I wrong somewhere? Did you restart gpg-agent? pkill gpg-agent and check with ps that it has really been killed. You should see a notice in the log as soon as you restart gpg-agent. Check also the owner of the socket: lsof /home/USER/.gnupg/S.gpg-agent Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Wed May 30 14:40:10 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Wed, 30 May 2012 08:40:10 -0400 Subject: GnuPG 2 + OpenPGP card on F17 In-Reply-To: <87sjeif2w0.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <4FC58F0A.7040007@sixdemonbag.org> <1338359860.2896.4.camel@guyome-laptop> <4FC5DB0E.8020800@sixdemonbag.org> <4FC5DF43.2010204@sixdemonbag.org> <87sjeif2w0.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <4FC6152A.8080306@sixdemonbag.org> Thanks very much for being willing to help with this. I appreciate it. After making the debugging changes to scdaemon.conf and gpg-agent.conf, I ps ax|grepped for gpg-agent and killed all running instances. I then logged out of my GNOME 3 session, in order to bring the state to as close to pristine as I could without a full reboot. I removed the card from the reader, restarted GNOME 3, reinserted the card and tried again. After running 'watchgnupg --force /home/rjh/.gnupg/S.log | tee mycombinedlog', I ran 'gpg2 --card-status' and got another round of the 'Unsupported certificate' message. No output was written to the file 'mycombinedlog', which was zero bytes in length. From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Wed May 30 14:54:30 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Wed, 30 May 2012 08:54:30 -0400 Subject: GnuPG 2 + OpenPGP card on F17 In-Reply-To: <87sjeif2w0.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <4FC58F0A.7040007@sixdemonbag.org> <1338359860.2896.4.camel@guyome-laptop> <4FC5DB0E.8020800@sixdemonbag.org> <4FC5DF43.2010204@sixdemonbag.org> <87sjeif2w0.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <4FC61886.8000505@sixdemonbag.org> On 5/30/12 5:13 AM, Werner Koch wrote: > log-file socket://home/USER/.gnupg/S.log Also, should this be socket://home... or socket:///home...? With the former, when I invoke gpg-agent manually I get a message of "can't connect to `home/rjh/.gnupg/S.log': No such file or directory". With the latter, I get a "can't connect to `/home...': Connection refused." Starting over from scratch again I manually removed S.gpg-agent and S.log. S.gpg-agent was recreated automatically, but S.log seemed to not be. From mwood at IUPUI.Edu Wed May 30 14:57:11 2012 From: mwood at IUPUI.Edu (Mark H. Wood) Date: Wed, 30 May 2012 08:57:11 -0400 Subject: getting an encrypted file to show what public key was used In-Reply-To: <4FC4EB24.3030100@sixdemonbag.org> References: <4FC4E4EB.2050501@sixdemonbag.org> <4366338.ofm6LSEQgj@inno> <4FC4EB24.3030100@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <20120530125711.GA25520@IUPUI.Edu> On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 11:28:36AM -0400, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > This goes to underline the importance of proper certificate validation. > If I have the sequence of events correct, then it could have been > avoided entirely if there had been a Step 4.5, "validate the certificate > he just received." Indeed. The problem is much like a hash index. And anyone who's used hash indexing* should know that he must search the indicated "bucket" for the record which actually matches the search key. Hashing only cuts the size of the search space; it doesn't guarantee reducing it to a single-element space. ---------------- * And anyone who puts socks in one drawer and shirts in another has used hash indexing. :-) -- Mark H. Wood, Lead System Programmer mwood at IUPUI.Edu Asking whether markets are efficient is like asking whether people are smart. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 198 bytes Desc: not available URL: From mwood at IUPUI.Edu Wed May 30 15:40:35 2012 From: mwood at IUPUI.Edu (Mark H. Wood) Date: Wed, 30 May 2012 09:40:35 -0400 Subject: changing the default for --keyid-format In-Reply-To: <87likahjvn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <87bol7hufn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FC4F06A.7000501@fifthhorseman.net> <4FC4F9E5.5070007@sixdemonbag.org> <87y5oahpo7.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FC50B09.7050108@sixdemonbag.org> <87likahjvn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <20120530134035.GB25520@IUPUI.Edu> On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 09:23:08PM +0200, Werner Koch wrote: > On Tue, 29 May 2012 19:44, rjh at sixdemonbag.org said: > > > Anyway. If people are interested in what I found out about effective > > user-interface design with respect to certificate managers, say the > > word. Otherwise I'll crawl back under my rock and leave the subject > > GPA has many different ways to show keys. IMHO the selection box which > pops up in GPA, if run as a UI-server, can't figure out the key to use. > I have always thought that this is better than the the standard GPA > frontpage, which shows all keys; despite that the most common operation > then is trying to locate the right key. A search box would make much > more sense here. However, changing such a common UI might result in a > lot of negative comments - people love what they once learned. Oh, how many times have I wondered why GPA has no search tool. There's plenty of unused space to the right of "[bunch of keys] Key manager". To say nothing of the (perhaps peculiar) custom of placing a "Find" operation on Edit menus. The tabular display can stay where it is. Perhaps the search function (when there is one) could scroll it, or sort all of the current hits to the top of the table widget's viewport. I've been meaning to do something about that but, I'm ashamed to say, I haven't gotten it done. -- Mark H. Wood, Lead System Programmer mwood at IUPUI.Edu Asking whether markets are efficient is like asking whether people are smart. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 198 bytes Desc: not available URL: From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Wed May 30 16:16:59 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Wed, 30 May 2012 10:16:59 -0400 Subject: changing the default for --keyid-format In-Reply-To: <20120530134035.GB25520@IUPUI.Edu> References: <87bol7hufn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FC4F06A.7000501@fifthhorseman.net> <4FC4F9E5.5070007@sixdemonbag.org> <87y5oahpo7.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FC50B09.7050108@sixdemonbag.org> <87likahjvn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <20120530134035.GB25520@IUPUI.Edu> Message-ID: <4FC62BDB.6000303@sixdemonbag.org> On 05/30/2012 09:40 AM, Mark H. Wood wrote: > Oh, how many times have I wondered why GPA has no search tool. Taking a look at GPA, it seems that 0.9.0 no longer compiles on a modern UNIX -- it expects libassuan-1.x, apparently, and libassuan's now in a version 2. I wasn't able to get the git checkout to work, either, due to a gettext infrastructure mismatch. The Makefile.in.in came from 0.17, but the autoconf macros on my system are from 0.18. From wk at gnupg.org Wed May 30 16:45:05 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Wed, 30 May 2012 16:45:05 +0200 Subject: changing the default for --keyid-format In-Reply-To: <4FC62BDB.6000303@sixdemonbag.org> (Robert J. Hansen's message of "Wed, 30 May 2012 10:16:59 -0400") References: <87bol7hufn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FC4F06A.7000501@fifthhorseman.net> <4FC4F9E5.5070007@sixdemonbag.org> <87y5oahpo7.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FC50B09.7050108@sixdemonbag.org> <87likahjvn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <20120530134035.GB25520@IUPUI.Edu> <4FC62BDB.6000303@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <87pq9lenim.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Wed, 30 May 2012 16:16, rjh at sixdemonbag.org said: > On 05/30/2012 09:40 AM, Mark H. Wood wrote: >> Oh, how many times have I wondered why GPA has no search tool. > > Taking a look at GPA, it seems that 0.9.0 no longer compiles on a modern > UNIX -- it expects libassuan-1.x, apparently, and libassuan's now in a > version 2. There is a new release: Noteworthy changes in version 0.9.2 (2012-05-02) ------------------------------------------------ * Adjust server mode to modern Libassuan. * Add options --enable-logging for W32. * Add options --gpg-binary, --gpgsm-binary and --debug-edit-fsm. * Properly process CMS data in the clipboard and with the server's VERIFY_FILES and DECRYPT_FILES commands. * Minor code cleanups. Noteworthy changes in version 0.9.1 (2012-04-18) ------------------------------------------------ * The key selection dialogs for encryption and signing do not anymore list expired, revoked or otherwise invalid keys. * If no recipients are given to the server, a generic key selection dialog is now used. * Now works with Libassuan 2.x. * The card manager now displays the ATR for an unknown card. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From wk at gnupg.org Wed May 30 16:46:01 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Wed, 30 May 2012 16:46:01 +0200 Subject: GPA download site (was: changing the default for --keyid-format) In-Reply-To: <4FC62BDB.6000303@sixdemonbag.org> (Robert J. Hansen's message of "Wed, 30 May 2012 10:16:59 -0400") References: <87bol7hufn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FC4F06A.7000501@fifthhorseman.net> <4FC4F9E5.5070007@sixdemonbag.org> <87y5oahpo7.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FC50B09.7050108@sixdemonbag.org> <87likahjvn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <20120530134035.GB25520@IUPUI.Edu> <4FC62BDB.6000303@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <87lik9enh2.fsf_-_@vigenere.g10code.de> The new download site is ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/gpa/ -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Wed May 30 16:54:05 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Wed, 30 May 2012 10:54:05 -0400 Subject: GPA download site In-Reply-To: <87lik9enh2.fsf_-_@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <87bol7hufn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FC4F06A.7000501@fifthhorseman.net> <4FC4F9E5.5070007@sixdemonbag.org> <87y5oahpo7.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FC50B09.7050108@sixdemonbag.org> <87likahjvn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <20120530134035.GB25520@IUPUI.Edu> <4FC62BDB.6000303@sixdemonbag.org> <87lik9enh2.fsf_-_@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <4FC6348D.6000504@sixdemonbag.org> On 05/30/2012 10:46 AM, Werner Koch wrote: > The new download site is > > ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/gpa/ > > You may want to update: http://www.gnupg.org/related_software/gpa/ then, as it points off at a site which only offers 0.9.0 for download. :) From wk at gnupg.org Wed May 30 17:13:06 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Wed, 30 May 2012 17:13:06 +0200 Subject: GPA download site In-Reply-To: <4FC6348D.6000504@sixdemonbag.org> (Robert J. Hansen's message of "Wed, 30 May 2012 10:54:05 -0400") References: <87bol7hufn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FC4F06A.7000501@fifthhorseman.net> <4FC4F9E5.5070007@sixdemonbag.org> <87y5oahpo7.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FC50B09.7050108@sixdemonbag.org> <87likahjvn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <20120530134035.GB25520@IUPUI.Edu> <4FC62BDB.6000303@sixdemonbag.org> <87lik9enh2.fsf_-_@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FC6348D.6000504@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <87d35lem7x.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Wed, 30 May 2012 16:54, rjh at sixdemonbag.org said: > > http://www.gnupg.org/related_software/gpa/ > > then, as it points off at a site which only offers 0.9.0 for download. :) That makes sense. For most other parts of GnuPG we enter the current version number into a file swdb.wml and are done. But not for GPA :-(. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From wk at gnupg.org Wed May 30 16:41:29 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Wed, 30 May 2012 16:41:29 +0200 Subject: GnuPG 2 + OpenPGP card on F17 In-Reply-To: <4FC61886.8000505@sixdemonbag.org> (Robert J. Hansen's message of "Wed, 30 May 2012 08:54:30 -0400") References: <4FC58F0A.7040007@sixdemonbag.org> <1338359860.2896.4.camel@guyome-laptop> <4FC5DB0E.8020800@sixdemonbag.org> <4FC5DF43.2010204@sixdemonbag.org> <87sjeif2w0.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FC61886.8000505@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <87396hem56.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Wed, 30 May 2012 14:54, rjh at sixdemonbag.org said: > Also, should this be socket://home... or socket:///home...? Oops, 3 dashes are correct. > Starting over from scratch again I manually removed S.gpg-agent and > S.log. S.gpg-agent was recreated automatically, but S.log seemed to not be. S.log is created by watchgnupg. However GnuPG always tries to re-connect; thus you may start watchgnupg after gpg-agent. "watchgnupg --force SOCKETFILE" only deletes an existing SOCKETFILE and creates a new one. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From expires2012 at rocketmail.com Wed May 30 21:42:10 2012 From: expires2012 at rocketmail.com (MFPA) Date: Wed, 30 May 2012 20:42:10 +0100 Subject: PGP interoperability In-Reply-To: <4FBF4F65.3000809@vulcan.xs4all.nl> References: <4FBEEC66.6090705@sixdemonbag.org> <4FBF4F65.3000809@vulcan.xs4all.nl> Message-ID: <1924331941.20120530204210@my_localhost> Hi On Friday 25 May 2012 at 10:22:45 AM, in , Johan Wevers wrote: > Maybe the NSA has found a workable solution for > factoring but not for DL? And shared the fact privately with Symantec? -- Best regards MFPA mailto:expires2012 at rocketmail.com Wisdom is a companion to age; yet age may travel alone. From expires2012 at rocketmail.com Wed May 30 22:14:42 2012 From: expires2012 at rocketmail.com (MFPA) Date: Wed, 30 May 2012 21:14:42 +0100 Subject: Some people say longer keys are silly. I think they should be supported by gpg. In-Reply-To: <4FC2DF08.4020507@sixdemonbag.org> References: <20120522.085848.109.2@GGHJK5> <4FBBC86D.30405@sixdemonbag.org> <409096756.20120527232126@my_localhost> <4FC2DF08.4020507@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <682060881.20120530211442@my_localhost> Hi On Monday 28 May 2012 at 3:12:24 AM, in , Robert J. Hansen wrote: > The problem isn't the fraction of the population. The > problem is command and control. That will always be a problem if the planting is uncoordinated. As a thought experiment, what happens when all the "real" protesters have gone on to something else and plants from various agencies make up 100%? -- Best regards MFPA mailto:expires2012 at rocketmail.com When it comes to humility, I'm the greatest. From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Wed May 30 23:30:56 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Wed, 30 May 2012 17:30:56 -0400 Subject: Some people say longer keys are silly. I think they should be supported by gpg. In-Reply-To: <682060881.20120530211442@my_localhost> References: <20120522.085848.109.2@GGHJK5> <4FBBC86D.30405@sixdemonbag.org> <409096756.20120527232126@my_localhost> <4FC2DF08.4020507@sixdemonbag.org> <682060881.20120530211442@my_localhost> Message-ID: <4FC69190.5000702@sixdemonbag.org> On 05/30/2012 04:14 PM, MFPA wrote: > That will always be a problem if the planting is uncoordinated. And if the planting *is* coordinated, why in the world would you ever need a 1 in 6 penetration rate? I'm sorry, but this is rapidly descending down the rabbit-hole of conspiracy theory -- where every plea for sanity and rationality is met by an expansion of the conspiracy theory in order to explain why sanity and rationality don't work in this particular case. The world is not _The Illuminatus! Trilogy_. From jeandavid8 at verizon.net Wed May 30 23:45:05 2012 From: jeandavid8 at verizon.net (Jean-David Beyer) Date: Wed, 30 May 2012 17:45:05 -0400 Subject: Some people say longer keys are silly. I think they should be supported by gpg. In-Reply-To: <682060881.20120530211442@my_localhost> References: <20120522.085848.109.2@GGHJK5> <4FBBC86D.30405@sixdemonbag.org> <409096756.20120527232126@my_localhost> <4FC2DF08.4020507@sixdemonbag.org> <682060881.20120530211442@my_localhost> Message-ID: <4FC694E1.3080200@verizon.net> MFPA wrote: > Hi > > > On Monday 28 May 2012 at 3:12:24 AM, in > , Robert J. Hansen wrote: > > >> The problem isn't the fraction of the population. The >> problem is command and control. > > That will always be a problem if the planting is uncoordinated. > > As a thought experiment, what happens when all the "real" protesters > have gone on to something else and plants from various agencies make > up 100%? > > My mother once told me that it was easy in the late 1930s and 1940s for Communist Party members to identify the FBI informants. The informants were the only ones who paid their dues. Real communists could not afford it. -- .~. Jean-David Beyer Registered Linux User 85642. /V\ PGP-Key: 9A2FC99A Registered Machine 241939. /( )\ Shrewsbury, New Jersey http://counter.li.org ^^-^^ 17:40:01 up 1 day, 2:00, 4 users, load average: 1.26, 1.36, 1.35 From hka at qbs.com.pl Thu May 31 02:33:33 2012 From: hka at qbs.com.pl (Hubert Kario) Date: Thu, 31 May 2012 02:33:33 +0200 Subject: Some people say longer keys are silly. I think they should be supported by gpg. In-Reply-To: <682060881.20120530211442@my_localhost> References: <20120522.085848.109.2@GGHJK5> <4FC2DF08.4020507@sixdemonbag.org> <682060881.20120530211442@my_localhost> Message-ID: <2102286.BNcKiUr4K0@bursa22> On Wednesday 30 of May 2012 21:14:42 MFPA wrote: > Hi > > > On Monday 28 May 2012 at 3:12:24 AM, in > > , Robert J. Hansen wrote: > > The problem isn't the fraction of the population. The > > problem is command and control. > > That will always be a problem if the planting is uncoordinated. > > As a thought experiment, what happens when all the "real" protesters > have gone on to something else and plants from various agencies make > up 100%? Ahh, the Memoirs Found in a Bathtub! Well written book, quite captivating. -- Hubert Kario QBS - Quality Business Software 02-656 Warszawa, ul. Ksawer?w 30/85 tel. +48 (22) 646-61-51, 646-74-24 www.qbs.com.pl From quannguyen at mbm.vn Thu May 31 03:39:42 2012 From: quannguyen at mbm.vn (=?UTF-8?B?Tmd1eeG7hW4gSOG7k25nIFF1w6Ju?=) Date: Thu, 31 May 2012 08:39:42 +0700 Subject: GnuPG 2 + OpenPGP card on F17 In-Reply-To: <87d35lgb9o.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> References: <4FC58F0A.7040007@sixdemonbag.org> <1338359860.2896.4.camel@guyome-laptop> <4FC5DB0E.8020800@sixdemonbag.org> <4FC5DF43.2010204@sixdemonbag.org> <87sjeif2w0.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FC5ECC6.6020701@mbm.vn> <87d35lgb9o.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> Message-ID: <4FC6CBDE.6000903@mbm.vn> Hi, After pkill gpg-agent, it seems that gg-agent still run: hongquan at Pangolin ~ $ pkill gpg-agent hongquan at Pangolin ~ $ ps ax | grep gpg-agent 1991 ? Ss 0:00 /usr/bin/ssh-agent /usr/bin/gpg-agent --daemon --sh --write-env-file=/home/hongquan/.gnupg/gpg-agent-info-Pangolin /usr/bin/dbus-launch --exit-with-session gnome-session --session=ubuntu 1992 ? Zs 0:00 [gpg-agent] 4094 pts/3 S+ 0:00 grep --colour=auto gpg-agent Do you have any idea? On 05/30/2012 06:26 PM, Werner Koch wrote: > Did you restart gpg-agent? > > pkill gpg-agent > > and check with ps that it has really been killed. You should see a > notice in the log as soon as you restart gpg-agent. Check also the > owner of the socket: > > lsof /home/USER/.gnupg/S.gpg-agent > > > Shalom-Salam, > > Werner > > -- Regards, Qu?n From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Thu May 31 03:50:51 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Wed, 30 May 2012 21:50:51 -0400 Subject: GnuPG 2 + OpenPGP card on F17 In-Reply-To: <4FC6CBDE.6000903@mbm.vn> References: <4FC58F0A.7040007@sixdemonbag.org> <1338359860.2896.4.camel@guyome-laptop> <4FC5DB0E.8020800@sixdemonbag.org> <4FC5DF43.2010204@sixdemonbag.org> <87sjeif2w0.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FC5ECC6.6020701@mbm.vn> <87d35lgb9o.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FC6CBDE.6000903@mbm.vn> Message-ID: <4FC6CE7B.8010705@sixdemonbag.org> After more wrestling with this, I'm still no closer to a solution than I was this morning. I was able to recreate Nguy?n's difficulties with an Ubuntu 12.04LTS/64-bit system, though, so we can confirm that one's got problems and it's not simple user error on his part. Or, rather, if it is then I'm making the exact same errors, so... I don't know what the root cause of the problem is yet. I don't want anyone to misread this as "GnuPG 2 sucks," because that's *not at all what I'm saying*. But it does appear that GnuPG 2 has serious problems with smartcards when running under Ubuntu 12.04LTS or Fedora 17. Maybe we should get the Fedora, Debian and Ubuntu GnuPG package maintainers in on this discussion? Perhaps they don't have smart cards with which to test their packages. If so, I would be happy to buy them smart cards and readers for testing purposes. This is important functionality and right now it just doesn't appear to reliably work. From wk at gnupg.org Thu May 31 09:32:27 2012 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Thu, 31 May 2012 09:32:27 +0200 Subject: PGP interoperability In-Reply-To: <1924331941.20120530204210@my_localhost> (MFPA's message of "Wed, 30 May 2012 20:42:10 +0100") References: <4FBEEC66.6090705@sixdemonbag.org> <4FBF4F65.3000809@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <1924331941.20120530204210@my_localhost> Message-ID: <87lik8dcvo.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> On Wed, 30 May 2012 21:42, expires2012 at rocketmail.com said: > And shared the fact privately with Symantec? I heard that it is just a bug introduced by the marketing suits. The PGP library never dropped support for DSA2. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. From mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com Thu May 31 09:53:31 2012 From: mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com (Mika Suomalainen) Date: Thu, 31 May 2012 10:53:31 +0300 Subject: Gnupg-users Digest, Vol 104, Issue 37 In-Reply-To: <4FC4F577.1060405@charter.net> References: <4FC4F577.1060405@charter.net> Message-ID: <4FC7237B.4090008@hotmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 29.05.2012 19:12, Mike Acker wrote: > IMHO(FWIW) it is unlikely, at best, that anyone will attack your > cipher text. haquers work by getting malware into the endpoint > computers > > hence it is that requiring signatures on software distributions is > one of the most critical topics on the table today > > -- /MIKE > > > > _______________________________________________ Gnupg-users > mailing list Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users Could you include the message where you are replying to or at least use correct subject? PS. Please don't use HTML. - -- [Mika Suomalainen](https://mkaysi.github.com/) || [gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net --recv-keys 4DB53CFE82A46728](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/key.txt) || [Why do I sign my emails?](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/WhyDoISignEmails.html) || [Please don't send HTML.](http://mkaysi.github.com/articles/complaining/HTML.html) || [Please don't toppost](http://mkaysi.github.com/articles/complaining/topposting.html) || [This signature](https://gist.github.com/2643070) || -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.19 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJPxyN4AAoJEE21PP6CpGcoPkEP/3u3d5BFqrFdk/gGIopJZDca T/hd6pfQ19jj25UMT4So4MfIDOdW+Al3qxRhWb9FvRICbxZq/wZ9DZBzVoaTGzMP FKl+jjFcsLzIP3MKzWtRpZFN7A43WV0+hSjl0061IJIB88K4Xp7mmreU20ZkQuk1 KDeP9dTceImGOlmPgJu+CjJNofYHxiFJRg1+Wbu91zyr1cEgH1gep5bpozBqUg13 KjyobjGU2Y/3q/VTv2gDlS40zXINCSWkPgkCN/m5DM/vi/RfUmqhnusFThHoDGsH 1orCkHOUlHGaWzxF7/HwzZolqa2E823UsqvngIQ/u1viNgAiKMXGEZhdPEOASDRg Ubd/+l6G3IygBjjsdGTNBZ71XgNa7AE0tMp8nzMuah0/S4xSoSCdRSq6sD2HFrZQ SaygFR2BC8hTWIPCWrz/az1KHVdo/+lmg1djKOo+KSm08Yklkb8F6+2Rrl1D2PKD b+VD8VxsUBtp7Npjkc7YLzZeR8zBbLFxuXymCb5mdKwUnsrXzaMbXdDmAG/rHWVr 7jfoYsgakWd9LwXGrBHDD/z9iFFD0msvuRzSsoDYJPXIdMCvJmB/bnqf0jzr93/A KmV1phEPCP1T+OZuA/nddejirpQ+516szlzvjU30s8/hVpVZEscObbH0pQGVyYnh pyUUhFkXaF/EmvBwdJ8U =uFZF -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com Thu May 31 11:44:22 2012 From: mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com (Mika Suomalainen) Date: Thu, 31 May 2012 12:44:22 +0300 Subject: Setting comments in gpg.conf Message-ID: <4FC73D76.60804@hotmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Hi, Is it possible to put comments to gpg.conf? With comments I mean "gpg - --comment "something". - -- [Mika Suomalainen](https://mkaysi.github.com/) || [gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net --recv-keys 4DB53CFE82A46728](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/key.txt) || [Why do I sign my emails?](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/WhyDoISignEmails.html) || [Please don't send HTML.](http://mkaysi.github.com/articles/complaining/HTML.html) || [Please don't toppost](http://mkaysi.github.com/articles/complaining/topposting.html) || [This signature](https://gist.github.com/2643070) || -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.19 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJPxz1zAAoJEE21PP6CpGcoaVAQAKpNGWZFIPyUZSDlF4l36GFu n8SFjpsvS+m5gLp77A/xrh2wu2ZQX3e5z5vVP40V2ACNwQT1QcLKist3HamkNATt KAVYlLUBCNltyaXNPdgdyCaLllynBTCjZz1nE9+Ohdguzt2spiy3rRubNg82OBTS CP6ik5MpfEuym1vqHGT1tCI3sE6u+aEhInYhbmq1bMVG+uVf9sRnbM2MY7EA+0nX 8r02RDBgN4jGefW/MU1V+QeADZlT211yBfMqM4mXUd0Z9EUo9in08Y/a0OBTrNFU Duoe2L5tBG6W+iftKh68BNcCZb+y05QnYKJ9UGTFrS+Z9el0z7B/2IxgH3SFTpQI VLFyNnYVnI+JpFSRo9NGUs8kmAlLSst7USqn3JJJ6ecxKpBH6ZzWYGl3s3iunzXy 6E4CmdVMuPjJLuNRIuhCoYK9Wng38Q+BlcUYYCXDAPXD1icDwjX7WDzEQ9dkOGzz tofnihJocSePDiNCSsnTrUIFbO8UmTFT6xCwMhQFB6AwNUrq1sQrQJyZH8dW9zEg uyh+Hw0/prKsyqFReXeerOTQ/J1ncqeC7S9BlZV6CB7QSeBIwP5+ieO6rn9Vkjy1 ZjZflimQN2zSqEQrFxBaMg8W8i2X8F6IxTr7qZ9QiOQsdIyBu5+VZPnzmDgFrNrx HYSSZELHqgo7iXmdpfd2 =XiGD -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From peter at digitalbrains.com Thu May 31 11:59:38 2012 From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing) Date: Thu, 31 May 2012 11:59:38 +0200 Subject: Setting comments in gpg.conf In-Reply-To: <4FC73D76.60804@hotmail.com> References: <4FC73D76.60804@hotmail.com> Message-ID: <4FC7410A.6000407@digitalbrains.com> > Is it possible to put comments to gpg.conf? With comments I mean "gpg > --comment "something". Works for me. I just included this line in gpg.conf: comment Works for me It results in this line in an ASCII armoured signed message: Comment: Works for me HTH, Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at http://wwwhome.cs.utwente.nl/~lebbing/pubkey.txt From guyome at lechiennoir.net Thu May 31 17:30:36 2012 From: guyome at lechiennoir.net (Guillaume Lanquepin-Chesnais) Date: Thu, 31 May 2012 11:30:36 -0400 Subject: GnuPG 2 + OpenPGP card on F17 In-Reply-To: <4FC6CE7B.8010705@sixdemonbag.org> References: <4FC58F0A.7040007@sixdemonbag.org> <1338359860.2896.4.camel@guyome-laptop> <4FC5DB0E.8020800@sixdemonbag.org> <4FC5DF43.2010204@sixdemonbag.org> <87sjeif2w0.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FC5ECC6.6020701@mbm.vn> <87d35lgb9o.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4FC6CBDE.6000903@mbm.vn> <4FC6CE7B.8010705@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <1338478236.1716.7.camel@localhost.localdomain> I've just tested Fedora 17 on a Liveusb with gpg. So first, gpg2 nor gpg was able to detech my Gemalto USB Shell Token. Then, I install pcsc-lite and run the pscd daemon. In this case, gpg --card-status --disable-ccid works but not gpg2. gpg2 --card-status gpg: can't connect to the agent - trying fall back gpg: OpenPGP card not available: No SmartCard daemon So it seems that the ccid driver that are included into gpg has a problem. It will try to send some more log later. I hope that the pcscd work-around could help Guillaume On Wed, 2012-05-30 at 21:50 -0400, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > After more wrestling with this, I'm still no closer to a solution than I > was this morning. I was able to recreate Nguy?n's difficulties with an > Ubuntu 12.04LTS/64-bit system, though, so we can confirm that one's got > problems and it's not simple user error on his part. Or, rather, if it > is then I'm making the exact same errors, so... > > I don't know what the root cause of the problem is yet. I don't want > anyone to misread this as "GnuPG 2 sucks," because that's *not at all > what I'm saying*. But it does appear that GnuPG 2 has serious problems > with smartcards when running under Ubuntu 12.04LTS or Fedora 17. > > Maybe we should get the Fedora, Debian and Ubuntu GnuPG package > maintainers in on this discussion? Perhaps they don't have smart cards > with which to test their packages. If so, I would be happy to buy them > smart cards and readers for testing purposes. This is important > functionality and right now it just doesn't appear to reliably work. > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users From mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com Thu May 31 17:13:35 2012 From: mika.henrik.mainio at hotmail.com (Mika Suomalainen) Date: Thu, 31 May 2012 18:13:35 +0300 Subject: Setting comments in gpg.conf In-Reply-To: <4FC7410A.6000407@digitalbrains.com> References: <4FC73D76.60804@hotmail.com> <4FC7410A.6000407@digitalbrains.com> Message-ID: <4FC78A9F.5030506@hotmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 31.05.2012 12:59, Peter Lebbing wrote: >> Is it possible to put comments to gpg.conf? With comments I mean >> "gpg --comment "something". > > Works for me. I just included this line in gpg.conf: > > comment Works for me > > It results in this line in an ASCII armoured signed message: > Comment: Works for me > > HTH, > > Peter. > Thanks, it seems that the problem was that I used line > comment: test and that > made it fail. - -- [Mika Suomalainen](https://mkaysi.github.com/) || [gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net --recv-keys 4DB53CFE82A46728](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/key.txt) || [Why do I sign my emails?](http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/WhyDoISignEmails.html) || [Please don't send HTML.](http://mkaysi.github.com/articles/complaining/HTML.html) || [Please don't toppost](http://mkaysi.github.com/articles/complaining/topposting.html) || [This signature](https://gist.github.com/2643070) || -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.19 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Homepage: http://mkaysi.github.com/ Comment: gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net 82A46728 Comment: Public key: http://mkaysi.github.com/PGP/key.txt Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJPx4qaAAoJEE21PP6CpGcobnsP/1p6vbkWP1rPvid5G5vtoPXX P+l0MQ7LZ13xZK7Z6tGoJ5be/TluwQEPw7XjrgK/GTVzhtNVbkZw3pLSzr6lbZNH Gh7CTzENjC4w+CIBrV+cNpzHpnWEuexP+FEUGF0//jJwcLTrVQsCQGdQTpnaCNo7 DrjHZRAW/cgx4M3TFC8EDIbVbt4qCwBEYH3CO960c2ovofO1PkIFtUuYzlcfYfJa EPZFZt7+1Fp3SGtQtwpuC3r1S0ImvIO7YUut60fPSKgqQgn7NLBamik3Y2jZav7A lxXQZepmyvh0Itt8b62MWv+VDqjzA/t+2+S/53//KU3KaS//DnswYkZDgah6xemz fMrNJ7cVvolpxE387Hz17GinXD3Bn04EWspXhjjFKaQg+zxbn/hU4K5+bg0j1xGm k7Ve5L4dCHILKchJ0ZHjdJo/zFomOxXzbh6MkdaBkcuB5EuBJM+RQzLU2AQPUILD USUCWhWddsAz5d32ZcGxm3R1JWNMipfQXQxGyYBfOYcMd1QjZDFQg+yCNDLNIGM6 Jy+838U8KMqDmO9odL5LHFFULyW/dgZEj5Axgf1fDt1WZK+3+9pFpsj7x9CKENeN xEttokeX/Xq5DVP6r8g4Lb34jbW+plzPDPQmaRj9cGPJ+K7zN9EQQELDGy7VV+DN XNGlSpuMo2ToNyffDzoO =ihxc -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Thu May 31 19:16:17 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Thu, 31 May 2012 13:16:17 -0400 Subject: F17 + smartcards: fixed Message-ID: <4FC7A761.4050508@sixdemonbag.org> As a summary and follow-up: Fedora 17 has problems out-of-the-box with the SCR 3310 and the OpenPGP smartcard. Any card access will fail with a variety of different errors: the only way to use it is to run as root. This is caused by Fedora 17 having inappropriate permissions on the USB device corresponding to the SCR 3310 smartcard reader, and not knowing how to properly configure udev entries. As a fix: 1. Create a new group 'scard'. 2. Determine exactly which device corresponds to the reader. (Mine was /dev/bus/usb/001/010: yours may be different.) 3. Change the group ownership of this device to 'scard'. 4. Populate a udev rules file (I used /etc/udev/rules/92-local-ccid.rules) with the following: # CCID rules for this box ACTION!="add", GOTO="local_ccid_rules_end" SUBSYSTEM=="usb_device", GOTO="local_ccid_rules_real" SUBSYSTEM=="usb", GOTO="local_ccid_rules_real" BUS!="usb", GOTO="local_ccid_rules_end" LABEL="local_ccid_rules_real" ATTR{configuration}=="CCID Class", MODE:="660", GROUP:="scard" # In case the above check did not work, set it explicitly or # this device (SCR3310). ATTR{idVendor}=="04e6", ATTR{idProduct}="5116", MODE:="660", GROUP:="scard" LABEL="local_ccid_rules_end" Note that the "GROUP:='scard'" is part of the line preceding it, *not* its own separate line. 5. Attempt to access the card with gpg2 --card-status. It should work normally. Many thanks to Werner for looking into this. Most of the debugging and fix is due to him: I had little to do with it except writing up the hot wash. From jw72253 at verizon.net Thu May 31 21:19:11 2012 From: jw72253 at verizon.net (John A. Wallace) Date: Thu, 31 May 2012 14:19:11 -0500 Subject: system migration Message-ID: <01c901cd3f62$434d3290$c9e797b0$@net> Hello. I am moving my system onto another machine, and it will require my reinstalling everything, not simply restoring. Are there any instructions related to which files need to be moved, and other considerations, in order to transfer the capabilities of my gnupg application. I am moving it from Windows XP to 64-bit Win 7. It would be helpful to change over the gnupg program as soon as possible since I have files that are encrypted. I am using both of the latest versions, i.e., v 2.0.19 and v 1.4.12, as well as GPA. thanks. John -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Thu May 31 21:28:08 2012 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Thu, 31 May 2012 15:28:08 -0400 Subject: system migration In-Reply-To: <01c901cd3f62$434d3290$c9e797b0$@net> References: <01c901cd3f62$434d3290$c9e797b0$@net> Message-ID: <4FC7C648.50606@sixdemonbag.org> On 5/31/12 3:19 PM, John A. Wallace wrote: > Hello. I am moving my system onto another machine, and it will require > my reinstalling everything, not simply restoring. Are there any > instructions related to which files need to be moved, and other > considerations, in order to transfer the capabilities of my gnupg > application. I am moving it from Windows XP to 64-bit Win 7. Other people will chime in with precise folder paths. I no longer have access to any Windows XP machines, so I can't -- but a little exploration should reveal them. Somewhere on your system you'll have a file called "secring.gpg". In that directory you'll have some (or all) of -- * pubring.gpg * secring.gpg * trustdb.gpg * gpa.conf * gpg-agent.conf * gpg.conf * scdaemon.conf * random_seed Copy over all these files except random_seed. Don't re-use random_seed: sharing the same random_seed between two different machines can potentially be unwise. On the new machine, just install GnuPG from http://www.gpg4win.org. On the new machine, find where GnuPG has placed its gpg.conf file. Drop all the files from the old machine (except random_seed) into that folder, overwriting if necessary. With that, your migration should be complete. From kf at sumptuouscapital.com Thu May 31 23:01:19 2012 From: kf at sumptuouscapital.com (Kristian Fiskerstrand) Date: Thu, 31 May 2012 23:01:19 +0200 Subject: system migration In-Reply-To: <4FC7C648.50606__35276.7587443397$1338492522$gmane$org@sixdemonbag.org> References: <01c901cd3f62$434d3290$c9e797b0$@net> <4FC7C648.50606__35276.7587443397$1338492522$gmane$org@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 On 2012-05-31 21:28, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > On 5/31/12 3:19 PM, John A. Wallace wrote: >> Hello. I am moving my system onto another machine, and it will >> require my reinstalling everything, not simply restoring. Are >> there any instructions related to which files need to be moved, >> and other considerations, in order to transfer the capabilities >> of my gnupg application. I am moving it from Windows XP to 64-bit >> Win 7. > > Other people will chime in with precise folder paths. I no longer > have access to any Windows XP machines, so I can't -- but a little > exploration should reveal them. By default I'd expect this to be in %appdata%\gnupg (typing this into the explorer should give you the full location) - -- - ---------------------------- Kristian Fiskerstrand http://www.sumptuouscapital.com Twitter: @krifisk - ---------------------------- Corruptissima re publica plurim? leges The greater the degeneration of the republic, the more of its laws - ---------------------------- This email was digitally signed using the OpenPGP standard. If you want to read more about this The book: Sending Emails - The Safe Way: An introduction to OpenPGP security is now available in both Amazon Kindle and Paperback format at http://www.amazon.com/dp/B006RSG1S4/ - ---------------------------- Public PGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at http://www.sumptuouscapital.com/pgp/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.19 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQIcBAEBCAAGBQJPx9wfAAoJEBbgz41rC5UITRMQAJLTZY2D/rgv44M9hwpNsGnL tfTAgL91mlCtqHVnrqPF0zDV/5bxTra3ANI9sfWaZ1ACvfgdZzLtgJvsyqwPe5uT bj1gwNbL54ABvCqMXj9dIuBY0MECyb0M8Zy5JOKvcTuPMLN0VXAvo1nFvFCDPBzO R0eK9cbir5/QdI4YCuZvvPYuuOtRpuOVFvOlDM8RZ/iKTVPQ7nZkQ7Yw5xvE0Gmx 6tAwz1J0ZIV1UQtYDPcmtWaMSIR4c+2OHV4S4toq/xDWhN6N1iGHK+asJM7Ym+Id 2GvXtXxa5hja3ubXxj25nMNVwzj4SD6DAsiL63A+KgDNSHESdCen7WtN61LUCOT5 RdFvtrlsqAGnH+lIOuUuFQQnJoPSBe/Dg1hSehpGb3/aRO5yw9XVMr3oEn1VD5WO OcG9QsG0ZTmmDjnFu+Z6F2/y+IDryOwd/peh7EqGyRcSBvZYQ3pQO+QP9GcZ0SFO QD25AmMXSYkRWGN0PdLMAv+zYgoSpoAxIRvRUOUZRUTANuFqS3s5OTYRzwHm4haJ 0MS4sWzfyLpmjj93hOHwdDBSxh6hRDGPMFFwVatSxg4zNDKsMyURgm4xTibvDHCx KKciWJuZkCluKwjxhd9FNDgjde8Kwdm8pgJ9YQx+vc8xwSyTHpohozYDmlfcX491 Kae00iqj+TuBmezW+fjD =xaIi -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From raubvogel at gmail.com Thu May 31 23:04:20 2012 From: raubvogel at gmail.com (Mauricio Tavares) Date: Thu, 31 May 2012 17:04:20 -0400 Subject: Is there a "-----END PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----" tag? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: According to http://www.gnupg.org/gph/en/manual.html#AEN153, Clearsigned documents do not seem to have a ?"-----END PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----" tag. And yet there is a ?"-----END PGP MESSAGE-----" tag for messages encrypted with gnupg. Am I missing something here?