From aef at raxys.net  Sun Mar  1 03:29:44 2015
From: aef at raxys.net (Alexander E. Fischer)
Date: Sun, 01 Mar 2015 03:29:44 +0100
Subject: A forgotten patch?
In-Reply-To: <87fv9ql1uf.fsf__2157.08235414258$1425122871$gmane$org@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <1425088957.14003.87.camel@neoprokrast.monkey.poo>
 <87fv9ql1uf.fsf__2157.08235414258$1425122871$gmane$org@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <1425176984.14003.116.camel@neoprokrast.monkey.poo>

Well thank you for the explanation. Sadly, I think my knowledge about C
is not sufficient to fully judge the situation. Although I have to say,
that the first example sounds a bit like a hack. I just hope you are
right, a lot depends on it.

> Right he lists Microsoft and a German "newspaper", to which many
people
> would never talk, as his clients.
I think the majority of people work for people they don't necessarily
like that much. I suppose it's related to the unfair distribution of
wealth in our world. Being funded by Facebook isn't the most reputable
thing either.

> And why pusblishing a patch and no bug reports?
Is there anything in the patch you would reconsider to accept, if there
was a bug report for the patch? I would gladly write one if that would
help to improve the quality of GnuPG.

Kind regards

Alexander E. Fischer
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From marcozehe-ml at mailbox.org  Sun Mar  1 06:30:02 2015
From: marcozehe-ml at mailbox.org (Marco Zehe)
Date: Sun, 1 Mar 2015 06:30:02 +0100
Subject: Best practice to make one's key known,
 was Re: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption
In-Reply-To: <54F226DC.9010506@dougbarton.email>
References: <000d01d05269$c1726dd0$44574970$@on.yourweb.de>
 <1890860.SDiBssEjyI@inno> <000e01d05280$656fed70$304fc850$@on.yourweb.de>
 <7920271.MAWFr6xyvP@inno>
 <54F05EF5.6050105__7398.9701144912$1425039188$gmane$org@sumptuouscapital.com>
 <54F09ACB.6020108@enigmail.net> <87lhjjm8mn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <BD50EB1B-5FC4-489A-90AA-A8DD4A0BE587@mailbox.org>
 <54F226DC.9010506@dougbarton.email>
Message-ID: <72D7CBEA-A262-4E50-9D97-CC6F6268F512@mailbox.org>

Hi Doug,

> Am 28.02.2015 um 21:36 schrieb Doug Barton <dougb at dougbarton.email>:
> 
> It's overwhelmingly likely that you are overthinking this. :)

Yes, I have been known to have that tendency sometimes. :)

Thanks! Will do as you suggest, then.

Marco

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From js-gnupg-users at webkeks.org  Sun Mar  1 13:21:20 2015
From: js-gnupg-users at webkeks.org (Jonathan Schleifer)
Date: Sun, 1 Mar 2015 13:21:20 +0100
Subject: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption
In-Reply-To: <54F1BEB8.5090603@digitalbrains.com>
References: <000d01d05269$c1726dd0$44574970$@on.yourweb.de>
 <54F061B6.3070205@seichter.de> <20150227234821.GA15748@athena.barrera.io>
 <54F1A86D.1050907@seichter.de> <20150228123619.GA7370@athena.barrera.io>
 <54F1BD40.4080504@seichter.de> <54F1BEB8.5090603@digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <4B188EF8-3D01-461F-BEF9-C8E4504A2301@webkeks.org>

Am 28.02.2015 um 14:12 schrieb Peter Lebbing <peter at digitalbrains.com>:

> On 28/02/15 14:06, Ralph Seichter wrote:
>> but PGP does not work for mass e-mail protection
> 
> Let me stress again that the proper course might be to replace SMTP (e-mail) and
> then work from that. If you have a sieve and wish for something to hold liquids,
> you could plug up all the holes or say "Blow this for a lark" and get a pan.

You mean like BitMessage <https://bitmessage.org/bitmessage.pdf>?

I think it's the only replacement for mail with cryptography from the start. It gets rid of the whole public / private key problem and also gets rid of spam by requiring a proof of work to send something.

--
Jonathan



From js-gnupg-users at webkeks.org  Sun Mar  1 13:27:57 2015
From: js-gnupg-users at webkeks.org (Jonathan Schleifer)
Date: Sun, 1 Mar 2015 13:27:57 +0100
Subject: trust paths
In-Reply-To: <54F205AE.5010307@vulcan.xs4all.nl>
References: <000d01d05269$c1726dd0$44574970$@on.yourweb.de>
 <54F0CFA9.7070601@cardcontact.de> <1425068740.5204.81.camel@scientia.net>
 <1756253.oFcBDuDOmV@inno> <1425072641.5204.95.camel@scientia.net>
 <54F1FD55.8080308@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <1425146173.4857.17.camel@scientia.net>
 <54F205AE.5010307@vulcan.xs4all.nl>
Message-ID: <7E6223D2-9610-435C-B4D1-FC9FB7A1233A@webkeks.org>

Am 28.02.2015 um 19:15 schrieb Johan Wevers <johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl>

> I'm not talking about mathematically proving something. After all, a
> government agency could make a false key with Werner Koch's name on it
> and send someone who looks like him with real ID documents to a
> keysigning party. Government-issued ID's are no mathematical proof either.

FWIF, you don't even need to be a government for that. And you don't need to look like Werner. Some document looking like a government issued ID showing a picture of you with Werner's name will most likely be enough to fool everyone who doesn't know Werner personally to sign this fake key.

> If the key was only on the keyservers, sure, then even I could do that
> myself easily. But I'm talking about keys on places where it is unlikely
> anyone has write access to, like the gnupg website or as a signature in
> mailinglist messages. Sure, it could be spoofed - but only a short time
> before it get noticed.
> 
> It would not be the first time I read about a spoofed gpg key on a Linux
> distro server when the server was hacked. The attack works - but not for
> long.

You are assuming it will be spoofed for everyone. It could just be spoofed for you. Anybody who can MITM you and give you a fake SSL cert that you accept (i.e. every government on the planet, a lot of companies and even some individuals) can give you something spoofed and you would not notice. And there would be no outcry about spoofed keys, because it's just you being affected.

--
Jonathan

From bre at pagekite.net  Sun Mar  1 13:39:36 2015
From: bre at pagekite.net (Bjarni Runar Einarsson)
Date: Sun, 01 Mar 2015 12:39:36 -0000
Subject: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption
In-Reply-To: <4B188EF8-3D01-461F-BEF9-C8E4504A2301@webkeks.org>
References: <4B188EF8-3D01-461F-BEF9-C8E4504A2301@webkeks.org>
Message-ID: <20150301123936-2617-93847-mailpile@slinky>

Jonathan Schleifer <js-gnupg-users at webkeks.org> wrote:
> > Let me stress again that the proper course might be to replace SMTP (e-mail) and
> > then work from that. If you have a sieve and wish for something to hold liquids,
> > you could plug up all the holes or say "Blow this for a lark" and get a pan.
> 
> You mean like BitMessage <https://bitmessage.org/bitmessage.pdf>?
> 
> I think it's the only replacement for mail with cryptography from the
> start. It gets rid of the whole public / private key problem and also
> gets rid of spam by requiring a proof of work to send something.

Bitmessage is a toy. An interesting toy, but it's still just a toy.

You can't propose to replace e-mail, a system used by *billions of
people*, with this:

"Just like Bitcoin transactions and blocks, all users would receive all
messages. They would be responsible for attempting to decode each
message with each of their private keys to see whether the message is
bound for them."
  - <https://bitmessage.org/bitmessage.pdf>

The paper mentions a very hand-wavey, stream sharding concept to improve
scalability, which has not been implemented and there is no math
presented to support the idea that it actually will work.

At scale, any promise of anonymity made by this protocol will be
hampered by the fact that, on average, you have to connect to as many
streams as you have contacts when sending mail, and your contact is
connected to the stream and downloading the mail. Once there are enough
shards to handle global traffic levels, then assuming the network hasn't
already collapsed under its own weight (they talk about hierarchical
shard discovery and signaling between shards), things will be so spread
out that traffic analysis will give very strong clues about who is
talking to whom. How severe this effect is, is for researchers to
quantify - but the Bitmessage paper gives no indication that they're
even aware of the problem.

I'm all for experiments and Bitmessage may flesh these things out over
time, but the paper was written in 2012 and (based on a quick grep of
their github) their codebase still doesn't support more than one stream.
To them, scalability is a "feature" they will implement "later". Until
they do, this is not even remotely a candidate for replacing e-mail.

It's cool tech! It's just not an e-mail replacement.

Having studied the specs for both (various people want us to implement
interesting protocols like this in Mailpile), I'd say DIME is a much
more credible attempt at baking strong crypto into e-mail from the
start, but it is still too new to say much about it.

Cheers,
 - Bjarni

-- 
Sent using Mailpile, Free Software from www.mailpile.is

From peter at digitalbrains.com  Sun Mar  1 14:33:16 2015
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Sun, 01 Mar 2015 14:33:16 +0100
Subject: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption
In-Reply-To: <4B188EF8-3D01-461F-BEF9-C8E4504A2301@webkeks.org>
References: <000d01d05269$c1726dd0$44574970$@on.yourweb.de>
 <54F061B6.3070205@seichter.de> <20150227234821.GA15748@athena.barrera.io>
 <54F1A86D.1050907@seichter.de> <20150228123619.GA7370@athena.barrera.io>
 <54F1BD40.4080504@seichter.de> <54F1BEB8.5090603@digitalbrains.com>
 <4B188EF8-3D01-461F-BEF9-C8E4504A2301@webkeks.org>
Message-ID: <54F3151C.7080806@digitalbrains.com>

On 01/03/15 13:21, Jonathan Schleifer wrote:
> You mean like BitMessage <https://bitmessage.org/bitmessage.pdf>?

It was Werner who floated the idea of replacing SMTP here on gnupg-users. After
thinking about it, it made a lot of sense to me. You could search gnupg-users
for his messages about this. I had a real quick look and couldn't find it just now.

HTH,

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at <http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>


From patrick at enigmail.net  Sun Mar  1 15:41:33 2015
From: patrick at enigmail.net (Patrick Brunschwig)
Date: Sun, 01 Mar 2015 15:41:33 +0100
Subject: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption
In-Reply-To: <87lhjjm8mn.fsf__7019.33337045393$1425067345$gmane$org@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <000d01d05269$c1726dd0$44574970$@on.yourweb.de>
 <1890860.SDiBssEjyI@inno> <000e01d05280$656fed70$304fc850$@on.yourweb.de>
 <7920271.MAWFr6xyvP@inno>
 <54F05EF5.6050105__7398.9701144912$1425039188$gmane$org@sumptuouscapital.com>
 <54F09ACB.6020108@enigmail.net>
 <87lhjjm8mn.fsf__7019.33337045393$1425067345$gmane$org@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <54F3251D.20300@enigmail.net>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256

On 27.02.15 20:56, Werner Koch wrote:
> On Fri, 27 Feb 2015 17:26, patrick at enigmail.net said:
> 
>> that anyone can upload _every_ key to a keyserver is an issue. If
>> keyservers would do some sort of verification (e.g. confirmation
>> of the email addresses) then this would lead to much more
>> reliable data.
> 
> We have such a system. It is called S/MIME.
> 
> Ever tried to find an S/MIME (X.509) key (aka certificate) for an 
> arbitrary mail address?  The only working solution to get such a 
> key is by sending a mail and asking for the key.  You can do the 
> very same with PGP of course.  Keyservers along with visting cards 
> are much nicer.
> 
> So, why is there no public service to distribute X.509 keys? 
> Because nobody want to be legally responsible for such a key
> unless you push a stack of money over the table for a qualified
> signature certificate.

I would not go that far as trying to guarantee the identity of key.
But I think if a keyserver could do some basic verification of keys,
it would make OpenPGP a lot easier to use for email.

The idea I have in mind is roughly as follows: if you upload a key to
a keyserver, the keyserver would send an encrypted email to every UID
in the key. Each encrypted mail contains a unique link to confirm the
email address. Once all email addresses are confirmed, the key is
validated and the keyserver will allow access to it just like with any
regular keyserver.

This way, we have a simple verification of the access to the private
the key, as well as access to the email addresses contained in the UID
by quite a simple means. I would say this is about as reliable as
sending an email to someone requesting their key.

- -Patrick
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v2

iQIcBAEBCAAGBQJU8yUaAAoJENsRh7ndX2k7Iz4P/j+rS8ZzqI62rQfc8RbNfPuT
1tinBE7Bf73PaZ+hpHCdEAcRUGhM64yRtNUAwovQt00sfdalF4WNKzdlItavMMLG
YtsgaEgZNf8JQlhC2u++Pxo7x7YlHXIuU5Wdu7rbSJXTSfacII7QPSIK39iMUDB5
Je4xUiQSBUeFgm0HLIlnuZMn4KLEPIdthss8golOYBZisSJM8lsucneKSH/4z7sf
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Lb4PjICyC/PB6L+thQS8uG6a7CKDV+nU7MIxRzkFtFVmG4L0Ew8JWViQP6tFwUd6
UUxc3DS+kAPprGmG9sOpzf29c3nDkS1Fe697dOtKAexJ3MTT2Ygc1ZbkDGRhtiM8
5ahjYSxtw/cCRKwXOi40DzDlNG3h1L71q87hJk5m+Ithcz4qkCgLdjzisJZBQd2U
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4vjnCrxlE6QAkouU6XjB
=m2JV
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


From kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com  Sun Mar  1 15:58:27 2015
From: kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com (Kristian Fiskerstrand)
Date: Sun, 01 Mar 2015 15:58:27 +0100
Subject: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption
In-Reply-To: <54F3251D.20300@enigmail.net>
References: <000d01d05269$c1726dd0$44574970$@on.yourweb.de>
 <1890860.SDiBssEjyI@inno> <000e01d05280$656fed70$304fc850$@on.yourweb.de>
 <7920271.MAWFr6xyvP@inno>
 <54F05EF5.6050105__7398.9701144912$1425039188$gmane$org@sumptuouscapital.com>
 <54F09ACB.6020108@enigmail.net>
 <87lhjjm8mn.fsf__7019.33337045393$1425067345$gmane$org@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <54F3251D.20300@enigmail.net>
Message-ID: <54F32913.6010803@sumptuouscapital.com>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

On 03/01/2015 03:41 PM, Patrick Brunschwig wrote:
> On 27.02.15 20:56, Werner Koch wrote:
>> On Fri, 27 Feb 2015 17:26, patrick at enigmail.net said:
> 
>>> that anyone can upload _every_ key to a keyserver is an issue.
>>> If keyservers would do some sort of verification (e.g.
>>> confirmation of the email addresses) then this would lead to
>>> much more reliable data.
> 
>> We have such a system. It is called S/MIME.
> 
>> Ever tried to find an S/MIME (X.509) key (aka certificate) for an
>>  arbitrary mail address?  The only working solution to get such a
>>  key is by sending a mail and asking for the key.  You can do the
>>  very same with PGP of course.  Keyservers along with visting
>> cards are much nicer.
> 
>> So, why is there no public service to distribute X.509 keys? 
>> Because nobody want to be legally responsible for such a key 
>> unless you push a stack of money over the table for a qualified 
>> signature certificate.
> 
> I would not go that far as trying to guarantee the identity of
> key. But I think if a keyserver could do some basic verification of
> keys, it would make OpenPGP a lot easier to use for email.
> 
> The idea I have in mind is roughly as follows: if you upload a key
> to a keyserver, the keyserver would send an encrypted email to
> every UID in the key. Each encrypted mail contains a unique link to
> confirm the email address. Once all email addresses are confirmed,
> the key is validated and the keyserver will allow access to it just
> like with any regular keyserver.
> 

You already have a variant of this at https://keyserver.pgp.com
(although I don't recall if they send the requests encrypted, I
haven't looked into the service in years)

In general I believe this to be an insufficient form of identification
that really doesn't provide much of anything useful, but at least the
PGP keyserver does it reasonably sane in its methodology by creating a
signature from their CA on the key. Whether you put any merit to
having such a CA signature or not is left up to the user (excluding
for now the "fun" related to the spammy number of signatures from it)

- -- 
- ----------------------------
Kristian Fiskerstrand
Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com
Twitter: @krifisk
- ----------------------------
Public OpenPGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net
fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3
- ----------------------------
"Excellence is not a singular act but a habit. You are what you do
repeatedly."
(Shaquille O'Neal)
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

iQEcBAEBCgAGBQJU8ykPAAoJEP7VAChXwav67LoIAJdaEldVcwdGAXE0u+Bk4pse
N93PY/LUYiDeEZvnfaa75EBSKBllnYZdDW0Dk9TAPos/PE1XWa4BFN4VIpjpa665
Hy94vpiE2Fvx+MYGO52qz/AHmSMkAD8z3wxIVLX+5MSFLRP/gmJz1E6/2YL9afEt
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hU7MDKhgrARc6ZSpycDbs1kLacgrXBsx2PpvqDPHghU1SuoglkJ8ZFYz/Y725k9z
LPmIvhx7jXHdqVo9JiTeDVubMylU2oqdnjBer9IrVywUCLEwKRGifhFMZOUV52U=
=uiJ3
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


From rpuls at kcore.de  Sun Mar  1 15:32:25 2015
From: rpuls at kcore.de (=?UTF-8?B?UmVuw6k=?= Puls)
Date: Sun, 1 Mar 2015 15:32:25 +0100
Subject: Decrypting PGP/MIME on the command line
Message-ID: <E1YS4v0-0001uj-Qq@talos.kcore.de>

Hi,

is there a command line utility that takes a PGP/MIME encrypted message
(a plain RFC 2822 text file) and outputs an unencrypted copy? The
secret key is available and GnuPG is configured correctly. It is okay
if the process is somewhat lossy; signatures or attachments do not need
to be preserved, although I would not mind that either. :-)

Background: I would like to decrypt e-mails permanently for archiving
and searching, and run this utility over hundreds of e-mails in a
single batch.

Alternatively, if there is a way to permanently decrypt an e-mail in
Claws Mail, that would help me as well. It seems that Enigmail has such
a feature[1] (or will have it soon), but I have not found anything
similar for Claws Mail and would prefer a general-purpose utility which
I can just run as a filter, independent of my e-mail client.

Ren?

[1] http://sourceforge.net/p/enigmail/bugs/1/


From patrick at enigmail.net  Sun Mar  1 16:35:36 2015
From: patrick at enigmail.net (Patrick Brunschwig)
Date: Sun, 01 Mar 2015 16:35:36 +0100
Subject: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption
In-Reply-To: <54F32913.6010803@sumptuouscapital.com>
References: <000d01d05269$c1726dd0$44574970$@on.yourweb.de>
 <1890860.SDiBssEjyI@inno> <000e01d05280$656fed70$304fc850$@on.yourweb.de>
 <7920271.MAWFr6xyvP@inno>
 <54F05EF5.6050105__7398.9701144912$1425039188$gmane$org@sumptuouscapital.com>
 <54F09ACB.6020108@enigmail.net>
 <87lhjjm8mn.fsf__7019.33337045393$1425067345$gmane$org@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <54F3251D.20300@enigmail.net> <54F32913.6010803@sumptuouscapital.com>
Message-ID: <54F331C8.8060107@enigmail.net>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256

On 01.03.15 15:58, Kristian Fiskerstrand wrote:
> On 03/01/2015 03:41 PM, Patrick Brunschwig wrote:
>> On 27.02.15 20:56, Werner Koch wrote:
>>> On Fri, 27 Feb 2015 17:26, patrick at enigmail.net said:
> 
>>>> that anyone can upload _every_ key to a keyserver is an
>>>> issue. If keyservers would do some sort of verification
>>>> (e.g. confirmation of the email addresses) then this would
>>>> lead to much more reliable data.
> 
>>> We have such a system. It is called S/MIME.
> 
>>> Ever tried to find an S/MIME (X.509) key (aka certificate) for
>>> an arbitrary mail address?  The only working solution to get
>>> such a key is by sending a mail and asking for the key.  You
>>> can do the very same with PGP of course.  Keyservers along with
>>> visting cards are much nicer.
> 
>>> So, why is there no public service to distribute X.509 keys? 
>>> Because nobody want to be legally responsible for such a key 
>>> unless you push a stack of money over the table for a qualified
>>>  signature certificate.
> 
>> I would not go that far as trying to guarantee the identity of 
>> key. But I think if a keyserver could do some basic verification
>> of keys, it would make OpenPGP a lot easier to use for email.
> 
>> The idea I have in mind is roughly as follows: if you upload a
>> key to a keyserver, the keyserver would send an encrypted email
>> to every UID in the key. Each encrypted mail contains a unique
>> link to confirm the email address. Once all email addresses are
>> confirmed, the key is validated and the keyserver will allow
>> access to it just like with any regular keyserver.
> 
> 
> You already have a variant of this at https://keyserver.pgp.com 
> (although I don't recall if they send the requests encrypted, I 
> haven't looked into the service in years)
> 
> In general I believe this to be an insufficient form of
> identification that really doesn't provide much of anything useful,
> but at least the PGP keyserver does it reasonably sane in its
> methodology by creating a signature from their CA on the key.
> Whether you put any merit to having such a CA signature or not is
> left up to the user (excluding for now the "fun" related to the
> spammy number of signatures from it)

Yes, I know. The re-confirmation every few months together with
re-signing the keys is among the things I dislike about
keyserver.pgp.com. But in general, I think that keyservers need to go
in that direction if we want to enable easy use of OpenPGP in email
(which requires in some way or another to download missing keys
automatically).

- -Patrick

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v2

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NTwUeRJ/ZIpM4OU0g1/3pXCMRI3xlSz0ts0Dh2ddMo2xcso5kS1X64DzrR6Sj6XT
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ijnCJ7YZNRYTpOwfn2WtN+hP5AksrF1uQwQn/ApbgOVuvPwIl2+MhdbY9wjzv3WB
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tz1R8OIdq4A3ZyHPYXBvvuYe+geZmUEOOAtTA7JDPvXrwrtLeGKvNJ31UaFd7kGd
odk5PNRscWJIeQfSEwNCUyzzKexWjj14OFLCd4D9ylNVEHWhHOCEgMmgZaAVIduH
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Wt5Mq+MmViexsE/J/BFA
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-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


From kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com  Sun Mar  1 16:38:20 2015
From: kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com (Kristian Fiskerstrand)
Date: Sun, 01 Mar 2015 16:38:20 +0100
Subject: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption
In-Reply-To: <54F331C8.8060107@enigmail.net>
References: <000d01d05269$c1726dd0$44574970$@on.yourweb.de>
 <1890860.SDiBssEjyI@inno> <000e01d05280$656fed70$304fc850$@on.yourweb.de>
 <7920271.MAWFr6xyvP@inno>
 <54F05EF5.6050105__7398.9701144912$1425039188$gmane$org@sumptuouscapital.com>
 <54F09ACB.6020108@enigmail.net>
 <87lhjjm8mn.fsf__7019.33337045393$1425067345$gmane$org@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <54F3251D.20300@enigmail.net> <54F32913.6010803@sumptuouscapital.com>
 <54F331C8.8060107@enigmail.net>
Message-ID: <54F3326C.7010001@sumptuouscapital.com>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

On 03/01/2015 04:35 PM, Patrick Brunschwig wrote:
> On 01.03.15 15:58, Kristian Fiskerstrand wrote:
>> On 03/01/2015 03:41 PM, Patrick Brunschwig wrote:
>>> On 27.02.15 20:56, Werner Koch wrote:
>>>> On Fri, 27 Feb 2015 17:26, patrick at enigmail.net said:
> 


..

> 
>> In general I believe this to be an insufficient form of 
>> identification that really doesn't provide much of anything
>> useful, but at least the PGP keyserver does it reasonably sane in
>> its methodology by creating a signature from their CA on the
>> key. Whether you put any merit to having such a CA signature or
>> not is left up to the user (excluding for now the "fun" related
>> to the spammy number of signatures from it)
> 
> Yes, I know. The re-confirmation every few months together with 
> re-signing the keys is among the things I dislike about 
> keyserver.pgp.com. But in general, I think that keyservers need to
> go in that direction if we want to enable easy use of OpenPGP in
> email (which requires in some way or another to download missing
> keys automatically).

You wouldn't need the keyservers to be involved in this at all. Anyone
could set up such a mail verification CA outside of the keyserver network.

- -- 
- ----------------------------
Kristian Fiskerstrand
Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com
Twitter: @krifisk
- ----------------------------
Public OpenPGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net
fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3
- ----------------------------
"The best way to predict the future is to invent it"
(Alan Kay)
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

iQEcBAEBCgAGBQJU8zJoAAoJEP7VAChXwav6vlgH/3ZBDMyOF4TfkDaBb+N5f45n
crBiableZ/2I5Flq/dR5UierB1FtEPKKifdPNG/oa36gqLfFHeVpP8DGOTTGyl5S
pkhR/1SNSKIpQyfCe0nOTeaxsCR0M6lmCudrtFsUf0kokTZ8SnWgwgonP5AQPde6
w+UCXUJmjwQechR6donoHOye19eo6SQI1byo0LpKO1NMl+5ErpCFOJrcnwDE93n1
nEWJA5hytTfM6cvXJkgUJ64WogRxS7xRUbQ4dTVG3wEPl9H+IaIOMCxKWGcq7SNC
hSDa/evtdtWpjo7zSLo2lpVf03fM020ax1PHLBiItJnTAszhvWkA9bfZGrdB1mg=
=EW11
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net  Sun Mar  1 17:15:25 2015
From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA)
Date: Sun, 1 Mar 2015 16:15:25 +0000
Subject: strength of voice authentication [was: Re: German ct magazine
 postulates death of pgp encryption]
In-Reply-To: <54F200CD.6060108@vulcan.xs4all.nl>
References: <000d01d05269$c1726dd0$44574970$@on.yourweb.de>
 <1425060977.5204.10.camel@scientia.net> <54F1B456.2080900@vulcan.xs4all.nl>
 <87a8zycel8.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net> <54F200CD.6060108@vulcan.xs4all.nl>
Message-ID: <94592084.20150301161525@my_localhost>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512



On Saturday 28 February 2015 at 5:54:21 PM, in
<mid:54F200CD.6060108 at vulcan.xs4all.nl>, Johan Wevers wrote:


> For once, it
> requires much contextual knowledge about what both
> persons know of each other.

Why? Most of my phone calls to regular business contacts consist
entirely of discussing the matter at hand, not chit-chat.


- --
Best regards

MFPA                    mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net

Raining cats and dogs is better than hailing taxis.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

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ulmARvmoBeH9NknjJuq8KL3nYCG+TsH3LEx1DrxdUMIGWzRddP5M+8RJABiNpyhM
mfcYqhp+j9XgGrgRfYkE33h59ChkhuZ02WE03NKfbcez2xROQKMuwzjEGZ4e7Il9
5ZXBAncXRTzC/PyFIyUNYTl1I+tMip4fCH0hoaXq6pgJLn1uRNf2J9KKdJV/+7m7
zCDVKokSgP6kYoACh9Uc1NUEKmVO3YTFg9S4Ojg27rNMdpS5eJFB0JrnihOMpPo+
sZpieho+zNt/LhjNPFaC6zgC8G43CmaEnultpBUZvob/aVptJGunSV6GQXwTrvWI
vgQBFgoAZgUCVPM7KF8UgAAAAAAuAChpc3N1ZXItZnByQG5vdGF0aW9ucy5vcGVu
cGdwLmZpZnRoaG9yc2VtYW4ubmV0MzNBQ0VENEVFOTEzNEVFQkRFNkE4NTA2MTcx
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/msZGlMpOABWE3+dzgEAU3ju2z+ErhM38+chFMhS1M5td3yOSKqDA8q6yR4OhwA=
=9nmV
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----



From patrick at enigmail.net  Sun Mar  1 17:21:22 2015
From: patrick at enigmail.net (Patrick Brunschwig)
Date: Sun, 01 Mar 2015 17:21:22 +0100
Subject: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption
In-Reply-To: <54F3326C.7010001__44944.2251855091$1425224369$gmane$org@sumptuouscapital.com>
References: <000d01d05269$c1726dd0$44574970$@on.yourweb.de>
 <1890860.SDiBssEjyI@inno> <000e01d05280$656fed70$304fc850$@on.yourweb.de>
 <7920271.MAWFr6xyvP@inno>
 <54F05EF5.6050105__7398.9701144912$1425039188$gmane$org@sumptuouscapital.com>
 <54F09ACB.6020108@enigmail.net>
 <87lhjjm8mn.fsf__7019.33337045393$1425067345$gmane$org@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <54F3251D.20300@enigmail.net> <54F32913.6010803@sumptuouscapital.com>
 <54F331C8.8060107@enigmail.net>
 <54F3326C.7010001__44944.2251855091$1425224369$gmane$org@sumptuouscapital.com>
Message-ID: <54F33C82.3080606@enigmail.net>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256

On 01.03.15 16:38, Kristian Fiskerstrand wrote:
>>> In general I believe this to be an insufficient form of 
>>> identification that really doesn't provide much of anything 
>>> useful, but at least the PGP keyserver does it reasonably sane
>>> in its methodology by creating a signature from their CA on
>>> the key. Whether you put any merit to having such a CA
>>> signature or not is left up to the user (excluding for now the
>>> "fun" related to the spammy number of signatures from it)
> 
>> Yes, I know. The re-confirmation every few months together with 
>> re-signing the keys is among the things I dislike about 
>> keyserver.pgp.com. But in general, I think that keyservers need
>> to go in that direction if we want to enable easy use of OpenPGP
>> in email (which requires in some way or another to download
>> missing keys automatically).
> 
> You wouldn't need the keyservers to be involved in this at all.
> Anyone could set up such a mail verification CA outside of the
> keyserver network.

Perfectly correct, yes. This is exactly what I'm proposing. I believe
that the current keyserver network cannot do this. I just don't have
the time to (also) work on this...

- -Patrick
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v2

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ajtntcQsdUBvpC/K4gPDg+V1g3EEZkUPHDeKvgCWvZIQ+57zjsg6T/0c4EEfdNWP
jwZDceP17wsLcTy3OdHhVrMJkgF/HFR4GaGzWNUzBFxtfeoK7kNhkvxKDbhajmcY
wiCgzz++cZmi7T4tf/hrdi65zB9zxzIOgvfeJvDpuuCUAGGYNtofJrIL4H3RNlSc
LfEmbpIwEfJltgeaEpfHBRzTtbxzAr7STvYSQNBwcCb+ksa2EWLzpPjbTfBUWaMt
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5a1+xRAo1ZzkHpNUgACI73F/IuNTPXA7bPSa298sLB55teNFjWK5N8oPPs03e4OQ
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0ALTnk9tVO6Qt3vCjR3J
=Mejp
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


From marcozehe-ml at mailbox.org  Sun Mar  1 17:31:23 2015
From: marcozehe-ml at mailbox.org (Marco Zehe)
Date: Sun, 1 Mar 2015 17:31:23 +0100
Subject: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption
In-Reply-To: <54F3251D.20300@enigmail.net>
References: <000d01d05269$c1726dd0$44574970$@on.yourweb.de>
 <1890860.SDiBssEjyI@inno> <000e01d05280$656fed70$304fc850$@on.yourweb.de>
 <7920271.MAWFr6xyvP@inno>
 <54F05EF5.6050105__7398.9701144912$1425039188$gmane$org@sumptuouscapital.com>
 <54F09ACB.6020108@enigmail.net>
 <87lhjjm8mn.fsf__7019.33337045393$1425067345$gmane$org@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <54F3251D.20300@enigmail.net>
Message-ID: <217F8C53-ED46-4C92-8EA6-3015E44A1903@mailbox.org>

Hi Patrick,

> Am 01.03.2015 um 15:41 schrieb Patrick Brunschwig <patrick at enigmail.net>:
> 
> The idea I have in mind is roughly as follows: if you upload a key to
> a keyserver, the keyserver would send an encrypted email to every UID
> in the key. Each encrypted mail contains a unique link to confirm the
> email address. Once all email addresses are confirmed, the key is
> validated and the keyserver will allow access to it just like with any
> regular keyserver.

I like this idea very, very much! This is a confirmation that doesn?t hurt anybody, and it is something that insures on a basic level, that the key isn?t completely bogus.

I have seen part of this in a different context in Mozilla?s Bugzilla, when one uploads one?s public key into the Bugzilla account to be able to receive security-sensitive messages. After submitting the form, Bugzilla sends an encrypted message to the account?s e-mail address, assuming the public key just uploaded belongs to that address. It doesn?t go as far as requiring verification via a link, but it definitely confirms if the key is working for the user.

Marco

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From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net  Sun Mar  1 17:35:20 2015
From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA)
Date: Sun, 1 Mar 2015 16:35:20 +0000
Subject: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption
In-Reply-To: <54F061B6.3070205@seichter.de>
References: <000d01d05269$c1726dd0$44574970$@on.yourweb.de>
 <54F061B6.3070205@seichter.de>
Message-ID: <1464424911.20150301163520@my_localhost>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512



On Friday 27 February 2015 at 12:23:18 PM, in
<mid:54F061B6.3070205 at seichter.de>, Ralph Seichter wrote:


> The thought of letting PGP die as an e-mail encryption
> mechanism for the "masses" (the non-tech-savvy average
> users) and to have it replaced with something my mother
> could use is valid.

Has OpenPGP ever been an e-mail encryption mechanism for the "masses"?
It is certainly not used by most.



> Alice can't just send an e-mail to Bob, she needs to acquire and
> verify Bob's public key first.

Depends on the threat model. If Alice knows Bobs email address and
there is a matching key on the keyservers, isn't it likely to be
better to opportunistically encrypt to that key rather than to send
the message unencrypted?



- --
Best regards

MFPA                    mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net

Was time invented by an Irishman named O'Clock?
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

iQF8BAEBCgBmBQJU8z/JXxSAAAAAAC4AKGlzc3Vlci1mcHJAbm90YXRpb25zLm9w
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Cer+HbiTMz2ivThcb69JndM3aQB/5+DI8l2UJQ2NOpVnIS5OgIvLw8rJd5SujMdx
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vgQBFgoAZgUCVPM/zl8UgAAAAAAuAChpc3N1ZXItZnByQG5vdGF0aW9ucy5vcGVu
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=pfFQ
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----



From marcozehe-ml at mailbox.org  Sun Mar  1 17:36:20 2015
From: marcozehe-ml at mailbox.org (Marco Zehe)
Date: Sun, 1 Mar 2015 17:36:20 +0100
Subject: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption
In-Reply-To: <54F3326C.7010001@sumptuouscapital.com>
References: <000d01d05269$c1726dd0$44574970$@on.yourweb.de>
 <1890860.SDiBssEjyI@inno> <000e01d05280$656fed70$304fc850$@on.yourweb.de>
 <7920271.MAWFr6xyvP@inno>
 <54F05EF5.6050105__7398.9701144912$1425039188$gmane$org@sumptuouscapital.com>
 <54F09ACB.6020108@enigmail.net>
 <87lhjjm8mn.fsf__7019.33337045393$1425067345$gmane$org@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <54F3251D.20300@enigmail.net> <54F32913.6010803@sumptuouscapital.com>
 <54F331C8.8060107@enigmail.net> <54F3326C.7010001@sumptuouscapital.com>
Message-ID: <E2A972CE-A422-4FFD-A4F6-B3584599B86E@mailbox.org>

Hi Kristian,

> Am 01.03.2015 um 16:38 schrieb Kristian Fiskerstrand <kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com>:
> 
> You wouldn't need the keyservers to be involved in this at all. Anyone
> could set up such a mail verification CA outside of the keyserver network.

In theory, yes. And keybase.io goes in that direction, although they don?t do the verification of e-mail addresses themselves, only the e-mail address one signs up with for the account.

But why should key servers not do that? Why add this extra level of complexity?

Marco

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From kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com  Sun Mar  1 17:36:57 2015
From: kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com (Kristian Fiskerstrand)
Date: Sun, 01 Mar 2015 17:36:57 +0100
Subject: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption
In-Reply-To: <217F8C53-ED46-4C92-8EA6-3015E44A1903@mailbox.org>
References: <000d01d05269$c1726dd0$44574970$@on.yourweb.de>
 <1890860.SDiBssEjyI@inno> <000e01d05280$656fed70$304fc850$@on.yourweb.de>
 <7920271.MAWFr6xyvP@inno>
 <54F05EF5.6050105__7398.9701144912$1425039188$gmane$org@sumptuouscapital.com>
 <54F09ACB.6020108@enigmail.net>
 <87lhjjm8mn.fsf__7019.33337045393$1425067345$gmane$org@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <54F3251D.20300@enigmail.net>
 <217F8C53-ED46-4C92-8EA6-3015E44A1903@mailbox.org>
Message-ID: <54F34029.2020703@sumptuouscapital.com>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

On 03/01/2015 05:31 PM, Marco Zehe wrote:
> Hi Patrick,
> 
>> Am 01.03.2015 um 15:41 schrieb Patrick Brunschwig 
>> <patrick at enigmail.net>:
>> 
>> The idea I have in mind is roughly as follows: if you upload a
>> key to a keyserver, the keyserver would send an encrypted email
>> to every UID in the key. Each encrypted mail contains a unique
>> link to confirm the email address. Once all email addresses are
>> confirmed, the key is validated and the keyserver will allow
>> access to it just like with any regular keyserver.
> 
> I like this idea very, very much! This is a confirmation that
> doesn?t hurt anybody, and it is something that insures on a basic
> level, that the key isn?t completely bogus.
> 
> I have seen part of this in a different context in Mozilla?s 
> Bugzilla, when one uploads one?s public key into the Bugzilla
> account to be able to receive security-sensitive messages. After
> submitting the form, Bugzilla sends an encrypted message to the
> account?s e-mail address, assuming the public key just uploaded
> belongs to that address. It doesn?t go as far as requiring
> verification via a link, but it definitely confirms if the key is
> working for the user.

Seriously? Please look at
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=790487 regarding that
implementation, which opens up another can of worms (encrypts to {S,C}
key, not encryption key, dual usage of same key material for different
purposes... BAD)

- -- 
- ----------------------------
Kristian Fiskerstrand
Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com
Twitter: @krifisk
- ----------------------------
Public OpenPGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net
fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3
- ----------------------------
"I have always wished that my computer would be as easy to use as my
telephone.
My wish has come true -- I no longer know how to use my telephone"
(Bjarne Stroustrup, April 1999)
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

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=gvNe
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


From kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com  Sun Mar  1 17:40:48 2015
From: kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com (Kristian Fiskerstrand)
Date: Sun, 01 Mar 2015 17:40:48 +0100
Subject: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption
In-Reply-To: <E2A972CE-A422-4FFD-A4F6-B3584599B86E@mailbox.org>
References: <000d01d05269$c1726dd0$44574970$@on.yourweb.de>
 <1890860.SDiBssEjyI@inno> <000e01d05280$656fed70$304fc850$@on.yourweb.de>
 <7920271.MAWFr6xyvP@inno>
 <54F05EF5.6050105__7398.9701144912$1425039188$gmane$org@sumptuouscapital.com>
 <54F09ACB.6020108@enigmail.net>
 <87lhjjm8mn.fsf__7019.33337045393$1425067345$gmane$org@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <54F3251D.20300@enigmail.net> <54F32913.6010803@sumptuouscapital.com>
 <54F331C8.8060107@enigmail.net> <54F3326C.7010001@sumptuouscapital.com>
 <E2A972CE-A422-4FFD-A4F6-B3584599B86E@mailbox.org>
Message-ID: <54F34110.20207@sumptuouscapital.com>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

On 03/01/2015 05:36 PM, Marco Zehe wrote:
> Hi Kristian,
> 
>> Am 01.03.2015 um 16:38 schrieb Kristian Fiskerstrand 
>> <kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com>:
>> 
>> You wouldn't need the keyservers to be involved in this at all. 
>> Anyone could set up such a mail verification CA outside of the 
>> keyserver network.
> 
> In theory, yes. And keybase.io goes in that direction, although
> they don?t do the verification of e-mail addresses themselves, only
> the e-mail address one signs up with for the account.
> 
> But why should key servers not do that? Why add this extra level
> of complexity?
> 

It isn't more complex, it is LESS complex to do it as a standalone CA.

We currently have about 150 different key servers in the main
gossipping network, you would have to establish severe trust
mechanisms between them as to convey the verification data, change the
gossiping protocol to accomodate this, implement crypto in the
keyservers, possibly have keyservers shut down for legal reasons as
possible verctors of legal attack for some additional data; data that,
in its concept is the job of a CA in the first place.
- -- 
- ----------------------------
Kristian Fiskerstrand
Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com
Twitter: @krifisk
- ----------------------------
Public OpenPGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net
fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3
- ----------------------------
"I have always wished that my computer would be as easy to use as my
telephone.
My wish has come true -- I no longer know how to use my telephone"
(Bjarne Stroustrup, April 1999)
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From mlisten at hammernoch.net  Sun Mar  1 17:42:53 2015
From: mlisten at hammernoch.net (=?UTF-8?B?THVkd2lnIEjDvGdlbHNjaMOkZmVy?=)
Date: Sun, 01 Mar 2015 17:42:53 +0100
Subject: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption
In-Reply-To: <217F8C53-ED46-4C92-8EA6-3015E44A1903@mailbox.org>
References: <000d01d05269$c1726dd0$44574970$@on.yourweb.de>
 <1890860.SDiBssEjyI@inno> <000e01d05280$656fed70$304fc850$@on.yourweb.de>
 <7920271.MAWFr6xyvP@inno>
 <54F05EF5.6050105__7398.9701144912$1425039188$gmane$org@sumptuouscapital.com>
 <54F09ACB.6020108@enigmail.net>
 <87lhjjm8mn.fsf__7019.33337045393$1425067345$gmane$org@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <54F3251D.20300@enigmail.net>
 <217F8C53-ED46-4C92-8EA6-3015E44A1903@mailbox.org>
Message-ID: <54F3418D.6090206@hammernoch.net>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

On 01.03.15 17:31, Marco Zehe wrote:
> Hi Patrick,
> 
>> Am 01.03.2015 um 15:41 schrieb Patrick Brunschwig 
>> <patrick at enigmail.net>:
>> 
>> The idea I have in mind is roughly as follows: if you upload a
>> key to a keyserver, the keyserver would send an encrypted email
>> to every UID in the key. Each encrypted mail contains a unique
>> link to confirm the email address. Once all email addresses are
>> confirmed, the key is validated and the keyserver will allow
>> access to it just like with any regular keyserver.
> 
> I like this idea very, very much! This is a confirmation that
> doesn?t hurt anybody, and it is something that insures on a basic
> level, that the key isn?t completely bogus.

Yes. And it would automate a process which would have to be done
manually during a sensible key verification.

Ludwig
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From marcozehe-ml at mailbox.org  Sun Mar  1 17:45:40 2015
From: marcozehe-ml at mailbox.org (Marco Zehe)
Date: Sun, 1 Mar 2015 17:45:40 +0100
Subject: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption
In-Reply-To: <54F34029.2020703@sumptuouscapital.com>
References: <000d01d05269$c1726dd0$44574970$@on.yourweb.de>
 <1890860.SDiBssEjyI@inno> <000e01d05280$656fed70$304fc850$@on.yourweb.de>
 <7920271.MAWFr6xyvP@inno>
 <54F05EF5.6050105__7398.9701144912$1425039188$gmane$org@sumptuouscapital.com>
 <54F09ACB.6020108@enigmail.net>
 <87lhjjm8mn.fsf__7019.33337045393$1425067345$gmane$org@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <54F3251D.20300@enigmail.net>
 <217F8C53-ED46-4C92-8EA6-3015E44A1903@mailbox.org>
 <54F34029.2020703@sumptuouscapital.com>
Message-ID: <5808CEF4-6372-4E0A-B6AB-47110670DF0A@mailbox.org>

Hi Kristian,

> Am 01.03.2015 um 17:36 schrieb Kristian Fiskerstrand <kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com>:
> 
> Seriously? Please look at
> https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=790487regarding that
> implementation, which opens up another can of worms (encrypts to {S,C}
> key, not encryption key, dual usage of same key material for different
> purposes... BAD)

Do you have any insight to share in that bug that might help my colleagues move fixing it forward? I?m sure it would be highly appreciated! :)

Marco

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From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net  Sun Mar  1 17:45:45 2015
From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA)
Date: Sun, 1 Mar 2015 16:45:45 +0000
Subject: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption
In-Reply-To: <4B188EF8-3D01-461F-BEF9-C8E4504A2301@webkeks.org>
References: <000d01d05269$c1726dd0$44574970$@on.yourweb.de>
 <54F061B6.3070205@seichter.de> <20150227234821.GA15748@athena.barrera.io>
 <54F1A86D.1050907@seichter.de> <20150228123619.GA7370@athena.barrera.io>
 <54F1BD40.4080504@seichter.de> <54F1BEB8.5090603@digitalbrains.com>
 <4B188EF8-3D01-461F-BEF9-C8E4504A2301@webkeks.org>
Message-ID: <10210020677.20150301164545@my_localhost>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512



On Sunday 1 March 2015 at 12:21:20 PM, in
<mid:4B188EF8-3D01-461F-BEF9-C8E4504A2301 at webkeks.org>, Jonathan
Schleifer wrote:


> and also gets rid of spam
> by requiring a proof of work to send something.

Surely, "proof of work" is evidence of performing some otherwise
unnecessary CPU cycles. This wastes energy. In a system used by
billions of people, lots of energy.

- --
Best regards

MFPA                    mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net

The best way to destroy your enemy is to make him your friend.
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From kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com  Sun Mar  1 17:54:14 2015
From: kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com (Kristian Fiskerstrand)
Date: Sun, 01 Mar 2015 17:54:14 +0100
Subject: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption
In-Reply-To: <5808CEF4-6372-4E0A-B6AB-47110670DF0A@mailbox.org>
References: <000d01d05269$c1726dd0$44574970$@on.yourweb.de>
 <1890860.SDiBssEjyI@inno> <000e01d05280$656fed70$304fc850$@on.yourweb.de>
 <7920271.MAWFr6xyvP@inno>
 <54F05EF5.6050105__7398.9701144912$1425039188$gmane$org@sumptuouscapital.com>
 <54F09ACB.6020108@enigmail.net>
 <87lhjjm8mn.fsf__7019.33337045393$1425067345$gmane$org@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <54F3251D.20300@enigmail.net>
 <217F8C53-ED46-4C92-8EA6-3015E44A1903@mailbox.org>
 <54F34029.2020703@sumptuouscapital.com>
 <5808CEF4-6372-4E0A-B6AB-47110670DF0A@mailbox.org>
Message-ID: <54F34436.1020600@sumptuouscapital.com>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

On 03/01/2015 05:45 PM, Marco Zehe wrote:
> Hi Kristian,
> 
>> Am 01.03.2015 um 17:36 schrieb Kristian Fiskerstrand 
>> <kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com>:
>> 
>> Seriously? Please look at 
>> https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=790487regarding that
>>  implementation, which opens up another can of worms (encrypts
>> to {S,C} key, not encryption key, dual usage of same key material
>> for different purposes... BAD)
> 
> Do you have any insight to share in that bug that might help my 
> colleagues move fixing it forward? I?m sure it would be highly 
> appreciated! :)
> 

Since the author's first reaction was closing it WONTFIX I didn't
bother, with that kind of behavior they can't possibly take security
seriously.

The proper solution seems to be a re-implementation of the system to
use gpgme for encryption. I'm also worried about the system's key
management in the case of
	(i) revocations; as I'm not aware of any key refreshes being made,
meaning a revocation certificate uploaded to public keyserver network
would not be honored and still constitute information leak.
	(ii) Ditto for the issue of replacing the subkeys, as key rotation
would not be automatically taken into consideration and would have to
be uploaded manually to each bugzilla implementation using that flawed
piece of software (the securemail extension, not bugzilla itself).

- -- 
- ----------------------------
Kristian Fiskerstrand
Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com
Twitter: @krifisk
- ----------------------------
Public OpenPGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net
fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3
- ----------------------------
Timendi causa est nescire
The cause of fear is ignorance
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From marcozehe-ml at mailbox.org  Sun Mar  1 18:01:05 2015
From: marcozehe-ml at mailbox.org (Marco Zehe)
Date: Sun, 1 Mar 2015 18:01:05 +0100
Subject: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption
In-Reply-To: <54F34436.1020600@sumptuouscapital.com>
References: <000d01d05269$c1726dd0$44574970$@on.yourweb.de>
 <1890860.SDiBssEjyI@inno> <000e01d05280$656fed70$304fc850$@on.yourweb.de>
 <7920271.MAWFr6xyvP@inno>
 <54F05EF5.6050105__7398.9701144912$1425039188$gmane$org@sumptuouscapital.com>
 <54F09ACB.6020108@enigmail.net>
 <87lhjjm8mn.fsf__7019.33337045393$1425067345$gmane$org@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <54F3251D.20300@enigmail.net>
 <217F8C53-ED46-4C92-8EA6-3015E44A1903@mailbox.org>
 <54F34029.2020703@sumptuouscapital.com>
 <5808CEF4-6372-4E0A-B6AB-47110670DF0A@mailbox.org>
 <54F34436.1020600@sumptuouscapital.com>
Message-ID: <D5382379-997C-4E12-A618-22F0C2170F06@mailbox.org>

Hi Kristian,

> Am 01.03.2015 um 17:54 schrieb Kristian Fiskerstrand <kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com>:
> 
> Since the author's first reaction was closing it WONTFIX I didn't
> bother, with that kind of behavior they can't possibly take security
> seriously.

Error in judgement that has since been corrected. These things sometimes happen, but this should definitely not be generalized.

> 
> 
> The proper solution seems to be a re-implementation of the system to
> use gpgme for encryption. I'm also worried about the system's key
> management in the case of
> 	(i) revocations; as I'm not aware of any key refreshes being made,
> meaning a revocation certificate uploaded to public keyserver network
> would not be honored and still constitute information leak.
Yes, the public key doesn?t come from a key server in the first place, but needs to be copy and pasted into a standard HTML textarea while filling in the form for that Securemail extension. So it is the key owner?s responsibility to keep it up to date. As far as I know, there is no interaction with any outside source in this matter.


> 
> 	(ii) Ditto for the issue of replacing the subkeys, as key rotation
> would not be automatically taken into consideration and would have to
> be uploaded manually to each bugzilla implementation using that flawed
> piece of software (the securemail extension, not bugzilla itself).

Yes, these instances are all acting independently, there is no exchange between totally unrelated Bugzilla instances.

Marco

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From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net  Sun Mar  1 18:04:09 2015
From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA)
Date: Sun, 1 Mar 2015 17:04:09 +0000
Subject: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption
In-Reply-To: <54F051D8.8080104@digitalbrains.com>
References: <000d01d05269$c1726dd0$44574970$@on.yourweb.de>
 <54F051D8.8080104@digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <96663679.20150301170409@my_localhost>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512



On Friday 27 February 2015 at 11:15:36 AM, in
<mid:54F051D8.8080104 at digitalbrains.com>, Peter Lebbing wrote:


> So what did this key attract, being on the keyserver
> for four years now?

> 22 Nigerian 419 scams. That's it. Twenty-two! They came
> in batches; I haven't seen anything since March last
> year.

I have such a key up for nearly five years. The only email the
address has received is a test message from myself to check
the address still works.


- --
Best regards

MFPA                    mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net

A bird in the hand makes it awfully hard to blow your nose
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From kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com  Sun Mar  1 18:08:57 2015
From: kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com (Kristian Fiskerstrand)
Date: Sun, 01 Mar 2015 18:08:57 +0100
Subject: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption
In-Reply-To: <D5382379-997C-4E12-A618-22F0C2170F06@mailbox.org>
References: <000d01d05269$c1726dd0$44574970$@on.yourweb.de>
 <1890860.SDiBssEjyI@inno> <000e01d05280$656fed70$304fc850$@on.yourweb.de>
 <7920271.MAWFr6xyvP@inno>
 <54F05EF5.6050105__7398.9701144912$1425039188$gmane$org@sumptuouscapital.com>
 <54F09ACB.6020108@enigmail.net>
 <87lhjjm8mn.fsf__7019.33337045393$1425067345$gmane$org@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <54F3251D.20300@enigmail.net>
 <217F8C53-ED46-4C92-8EA6-3015E44A1903@mailbox.org>
 <54F34029.2020703@sumptuouscapital.com>
 <5808CEF4-6372-4E0A-B6AB-47110670DF0A@mailbox.org>
 <54F34436.1020600@sumptuouscapital.com>
 <D5382379-997C-4E12-A618-22F0C2170F06@mailbox.org>
Message-ID: <54F347A9.5000904@sumptuouscapital.com>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

On 03/01/2015 06:01 PM, Marco Zehe wrote:
> Hi Kristian,
> 
>> Am 01.03.2015 um 17:54 schrieb Kristian Fiskerstrand 
>> <kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com>:
>> 
>> Since the author's first reaction was closing it WONTFIX I didn't
>>  bother, with that kind of behavior they can't possibly take 
>> security seriously.
> 
> Error in judgement that has since been corrected. These things 
> sometimes happen, but this should definitely not be generalized.
> 

fair enough, but it does tell something about culture that it happens,
even if corrected.

>> (ii) Ditto for the issue of replacing the subkeys, as key
>> rotation would not be automatically taken into consideration and
>> would have to be uploaded manually to each bugzilla
>> implementation using that flawed piece of software (the
>> securemail extension, not bugzilla itself).
> 
> Yes, these instances are all acting independently, there is no 
> exchange between totally unrelated Bugzilla instances.

And there shouldn't be interaction between the various bugzilla
instances, but there should be lookups to keyserver networks
(preferably to a locally controlled keyserver to avoid certain
information leakages, but that is another matter). In my own case I'm
on some 10-15 bugzillas, with at least an annual rotation of the
encryption subkey of my main key, meaning I have to manually update
the key in these instances (that currently involve manual key
splitting and pasting non-conforming OpenPGP data) on the bugzillas
that have enabled it. Another issue with the current implementation,
btw, is that there is no way to define group based keys (see gpg's
- --group) , so aliases can't be used e.g. for an alias such as
security at participant.invalid, this should be integrated into the
already existing group restriction possibility in bugzilla), which
ironically will send unencrypted email messages fondly even though
something is restricted...


- -- 
- ----------------------------
Kristian Fiskerstrand
Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com
Twitter: @krifisk
- ----------------------------
Public OpenPGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net
fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3
- ----------------------------
Veni vidi velcro
I came, I saw, I got stuck
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QTnumYKa6cHeZtRLPYLQ56TeazifgYN+3ls9IAlcCn0ydOnlu7T2hK2Vsh8AEG4=
=B5DB
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net  Sun Mar  1 18:11:41 2015
From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA)
Date: Sun, 1 Mar 2015 17:11:41 +0000
Subject: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption
In-Reply-To: <54F3251D.20300@enigmail.net>
References: <000d01d05269$c1726dd0$44574970$@on.yourweb.de>
 <1890860.SDiBssEjyI@inno> <000e01d05280$656fed70$304fc850$@on.yourweb.de>
 <7920271.MAWFr6xyvP@inno>
 <54F05EF5.6050105__7398.9701144912$1425039188$gmane$org@sumptuouscapital.com>
 <54F09ACB.6020108@enigmail.net>
 <87lhjjm8mn.fsf__7019.33337045393$1425067345$gmane$org@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <54F3251D.20300@enigmail.net>
Message-ID: <674922894.20150301171141@my_localhost>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512



On Sunday 1 March 2015 at 2:41:33 PM, in
<mid:54F3251D.20300 at enigmail.net>, Patrick Brunschwig wrote:



> The idea I have in mind is roughly as follows: if you
> upload a key to a keyserver, the keyserver would send
> an encrypted email to every UID in the key. Each
> encrypted mail contains a unique link to confirm the
> email address. Once all email addresses are confirmed,
> the key is validated and the keyserver will allow
> access to it just like with any regular keyserver.

What about keys with UIDs containing no email address?



- --
Best regards

MFPA                    mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net

The best way to destroy your enemy is to make him your friend.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

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TjVql/+1LPEDiEjeWmr8vJnynlmU0HxqhgIITBKzLeVcBPp2fhTGo6s6rE7ruycC
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xb8qjQZ6dPYlUc7EY7BLTf+zZZciML044G6O5lJxuOzYnfbokfan6wwBbOx5YoWI
vgQBFgoAZgUCVPNITl8UgAAAAAAuAChpc3N1ZXItZnByQG5vdGF0aW9ucy5vcGVu
cGdwLmZpZnRoaG9yc2VtYW4ubmV0MzNBQ0VENEVFOTEzNEVFQkRFNkE4NTA2MTcx
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TMBxM3MeGCAw40SdVwEAAd/zbuKIyix8XljvsDp+3onA2XoGfYLDtM/0CUJ/CgY=
=gDmu
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----



From patrick at enigmail.net  Sun Mar  1 18:14:40 2015
From: patrick at enigmail.net (Patrick Brunschwig)
Date: Sun, 01 Mar 2015 18:14:40 +0100
Subject: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption
In-Reply-To: <674922894.20150301171141@my_localhost>
References: <000d01d05269$c1726dd0$44574970$@on.yourweb.de>
 <1890860.SDiBssEjyI@inno> <000e01d05280$656fed70$304fc850$@on.yourweb.de>
 <7920271.MAWFr6xyvP@inno>
 <54F05EF5.6050105__7398.9701144912$1425039188$gmane$org@sumptuouscapital.com>
 <54F09ACB.6020108@enigmail.net>
 <87lhjjm8mn.fsf__7019.33337045393$1425067345$gmane$org@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <54F3251D.20300@enigmail.net> <674922894.20150301171141@my_localhost>
Message-ID: <54F34900.7060706@enigmail.net>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256

On 01.03.15 18:11, MFPA wrote:
> 
> 
> On Sunday 1 March 2015 at 2:41:33 PM, in 
> <mid:54F3251D.20300 at enigmail.net>, Patrick Brunschwig wrote:
> 
> 
> 
>> The idea I have in mind is roughly as follows: if you upload a
>> key to a keyserver, the keyserver would send an encrypted email
>> to every UID in the key. Each encrypted mail contains a unique
>> link to confirm the email address. Once all email addresses are
>> confirmed, the key is validated and the keyserver will allow 
>> access to it just like with any regular keyserver.
> 
> What about keys with UIDs containing no email address?

The purpose of such a keyserver would be primarily targeted to email.
Thus I think such keys should be refused.

- -Patrick


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v2

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yAEOVQDrM3hl0O5NY8fX7Q249HwUWf/db0TC5lAA+he0mC9rjjNaAaq7yLGwTy/O
+vb/BxNRkvppYLKU8/naSSVGEwVfj2tw6y0fQbyfRiNSfh351Q9sVcwC3vTkHnUz
ldb6up4w5tRP6VY6yQ7m+mpAh1V1NX9J+h8Fi/kMGFfd3sfjYLduwPudJ17HmQr1
CAtOx/DnOXvIHMup1ZwENI1shaewNpxQoMHr/xCIEUaM2It8dwcVxdZ3f2KGGZ5F
LdEBEvjRyHPhCT8G8XB3WHoEWWXWrHEC1loy5Fpv6QeCobrkzQetPW6rNCvX8Cyp
nlST6TZoG0wBPonoKPQo+zPYBReBN+eUVuTb4Pe2WyhR4EY/7bsIdEa921lMekh5
fcnaI68McYpK2um6Mq686zArTu/KsJPRp868dVPNIEzW7gIZOjoKIdg0PGPpMQh/
NcpTi1vHeLZg4bYasXxpKG29dsAMfKGw/ImNkTyHhNZAw+1ykIeC4G4F/LFqlMaQ
v+FzDXhpGilTKyqMxmzH
=pm11
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


From kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com  Sun Mar  1 18:34:04 2015
From: kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com (Kristian Fiskerstrand)
Date: Sun, 01 Mar 2015 18:34:04 +0100
Subject: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption
In-Reply-To: <54F347A9.5000904@sumptuouscapital.com>
References: <000d01d05269$c1726dd0$44574970$@on.yourweb.de>
 <1890860.SDiBssEjyI@inno> <000e01d05280$656fed70$304fc850$@on.yourweb.de>
 <7920271.MAWFr6xyvP@inno>
 <54F05EF5.6050105__7398.9701144912$1425039188$gmane$org@sumptuouscapital.com>
 <54F09ACB.6020108@enigmail.net>
 <87lhjjm8mn.fsf__7019.33337045393$1425067345$gmane$org@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <54F3251D.20300@enigmail.net>
 <217F8C53-ED46-4C92-8EA6-3015E44A1903@mailbox.org>
 <54F34029.2020703@sumptuouscapital.com>
 <5808CEF4-6372-4E0A-B6AB-47110670DF0A@mailbox.org>
 <54F34436.1020600@sumptuouscapital.com>
 <D5382379-997C-4E12-A618-22F0C2170F06@mailbox.org>
 <54F347A9.5000904@sumptuouscapital.com>
Message-ID: <54F34D8C.9010706@sumptuouscapital.com>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

On 03/01/2015 06:08 PM, Kristian Fiskerstrand wrote:
> On 03/01/2015 06:01 PM, Marco Zehe wrote:
>> Hi Kristian,
> 
>>> Am 01.03.2015 um 17:54 schrieb Kristian Fiskerstrand 
>>> <kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com>:
>>> 

...

> that have enabled it. Another issue with the current
> implementation, btw, is that there is no way to define group based
> keys (see gpg's --group) , so aliases can't be used e.g. for an
> alias such as security at participant.invalid, this should be
> integrated into the already existing group restriction possibility
> in bugzilla), which ironically will send unencrypted email messages
> fondly even though something is restricted...
> 

To elaborate on this, in the absence of this I would also accept that
bugs that have been restricted simply send a generic update message.
"An update has occured on bug #XXXXXX, please log in to see the update"

- -- 
- ----------------------------
Kristian Fiskerstrand
Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com
Twitter: @krifisk
- ----------------------------
Public OpenPGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net
fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3
- ----------------------------
There are two tragedies in life. One is to lose your heart's desire. The
other is to gain it.
 - George Bernard Shaw
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

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2JI76K0FmeDnpNI/lyB2jFyi2uhfHxSDWIX80rqO+Hc0zMduKJsnAWfsVZmDbiGt
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=RWnn
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


From js-gnupg-users at webkeks.org  Sun Mar  1 19:58:19 2015
From: js-gnupg-users at webkeks.org (Jonathan Schleifer)
Date: Sun, 1 Mar 2015 19:58:19 +0100
Subject: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption
In-Reply-To: <10210020677.20150301164545@my_localhost>
References: <000d01d05269$c1726dd0$44574970$@on.yourweb.de>
 <54F061B6.3070205@seichter.de> <20150227234821.GA15748@athena.barrera.io>
 <54F1A86D.1050907@seichter.de> <20150228123619.GA7370@athena.barrera.io>
 <54F1BD40.4080504@seichter.de> <54F1BEB8.5090603@digitalbrains.com>
 <4B188EF8-3D01-461F-BEF9-C8E4504A2301@webkeks.org>
 <10210020677.20150301164545@my_localhost>
Message-ID: <BD57B3DB-6D9F-4189-93DE-EC7351DD8D60@webkeks.org>

Am 01.03.2015 um 17:45 schrieb MFPA <2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net>:

>> and also gets rid of spam
>> by requiring a proof of work to send something.
> 
> Surely, "proof of work" is evidence of performing some otherwise
> unnecessary CPU cycles. This wastes energy. In a system used by
> billions of people, lots of energy.

That "wasted energy" is a lot less than the energy we currently waste on spam, especially if you take into consideration the amount of human time wasted. The majority of the e-mail traffic is used up by spam.

--
Jonathan



From wk at gnupg.org  Sun Mar  1 20:01:05 2015
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Sun, 01 Mar 2015 20:01:05 +0100
Subject: Decrypting PGP/MIME on the command line
In-Reply-To: <E1YS4v0-0001uj-Qq@talos.kcore.de> (=?utf-8?Q?=22Ren=C3=A9?=
 Puls"'s message of "Sun, 1 Mar 2015 15:32:25 +0100")
References: <E1YS4v0-0001uj-Qq@talos.kcore.de>
Message-ID: <874mq4k0em.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Sun,  1 Mar 2015 15:32, rpuls at kcore.de said:

> is there a command line utility that takes a PGP/MIME encrypted message
> (a plain RFC 2822 text file) and outputs an unencrypted copy? The

Not really.  MIME is a structured format and as such it may result in a
bunch of encrypted, non-nencrypted, signed, unsigned,
message/alternative sub-documents.  Thus it is not easy to write a
general purpose command line tool.

You may start with gpgparsemail which is not installed bald build as
part of gnupg in the tools directory.  It returns an annotated format
which might be easier for further processing steps than plain MIME.

If you only want to decrypt a standard MIME encrypted mail, it is easy.
Simply pipe the entire mail through gpg and you will get the decrypted
MIME container.  Then use mimencode or similar tools.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner


-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From wk at gnupg.org  Sun Mar  1 20:11:10 2015
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Sun, 01 Mar 2015 20:11:10 +0100
Subject: A forgotten patch?
In-Reply-To: <1425176984.14003.116.camel@neoprokrast.monkey.poo> (Alexander
 E. Fischer's message of "Sun, 01 Mar 2015 03:29:44 +0100")
References: <1425088957.14003.87.camel@neoprokrast.monkey.poo>
 <87fv9ql1uf.fsf__2157.08235414258$1425122871$gmane$org@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <1425176984.14003.116.camel@neoprokrast.monkey.poo>
Message-ID: <87zj7wildd.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Sun,  1 Mar 2015 03:29, aef at raxys.net said:

> I think the majority of people work for people they don't necessarily
> like that much. I suppose it's related to the unfair distribution of
> wealth in our world. Being funded by Facebook isn't the most reputable
> thing either.

Yeah right, or Google or Microsoft, or Apple, you name it.

[For some people raised in the 70ies and earlier "Bild" is a paper they
 won't even touch if they are in urgent need for paper. ]

> Is there anything in the patch you would reconsider to accept, if
> there

I have not seen anything - I might have not seen the tree for all the
assert(), though.

> was a bug report for the patch? I would gladly write one if that would

Well written bug reports are always appreciated.


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From m.mansfeld at mansfeld-elektronik.de  Sun Mar  1 21:25:06 2015
From: m.mansfeld at mansfeld-elektronik.de (Matthias Mansfeld)
Date: Sun, 01 Mar 2015 21:25:06 +0100
Subject: New "validating keyserver" architecture (was: Re: German ct magazine
 postulates death of pgp encryption)
In-Reply-To: <54F33C82.3080606@enigmail.net>
References: <000d01d05269$c1726dd0$44574970$@on.yourweb.de>,
 <54F3326C.7010001__44944.2251855091$1425224369$gmane$org@sumptuouscapital.com>,
 <54F33C82.3080606@enigmail.net>
Message-ID: <54F375A2.23880.12EDB28@m.mansfeld.mansfeld-elektronik.de>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256

On 1 Mar 2015 at 17:21, Patrick Brunschwig wrote:

> On 01.03.15 16:38, Kristian Fiskerstrand wrote:
> >>> In general I believe this to be an insufficient form of
> >>> identification that really doesn't provide much of anything
> >>> useful, but at least the PGP keyserver does it reasonably sane in
> >>> its methodology by creating a signature from their CA on the key.
> >>> Whether you put any merit to having such a CA signature or not is
> >>> left up to the user (excluding for now the "fun" related to the
> >>> spammy number of signatures from it)
> >
> >> Yes, I know. The re-confirmation every few months together with
> >> re-signing the keys is among the things I dislike about
> >> keyserver.pgp.com. But in general, I think that keyservers need to
> >> go in that direction if we want to enable easy use of OpenPGP in
> >> email (which requires in some way or another to download missing
> >> keys automatically).
> >
> > You wouldn't need the keyservers to be involved in this at all.
> > Anyone could set up such a mail verification CA outside of the
> > keyserver network.
>
> Perfectly correct, yes. This is exactly what I'm proposing. I believe
> that the current keyserver network cannot do this. I just don't have
> the time to (also) work on this...
>
> - -Patrick

I like this idea very much. (I must admit, I did not take notice of
this feature at keyserver.pgp.com, However, I just tried it, but it
refused my whole pubkey because it contains an expired subkey, but
that's not a problem of the concept...).
Uploadingonly with validation by e-mail to all (or at least a
selected one) user-ids like keyserver.pgp.com does would be a really
huge improvement and would address the initial problem about fake
keys which lead the guy at c't to his PGP bashing.
Key distribution between the keyservers same as now, and deleting a
key on all servers (manually or after "Timeout" without confirmation)
should be possible from any of these servers, not just this one the
key was initially uploaded.

And the objective should be to replace or retrofit the current system
of keyservers. Two concurrent systems would not make OpenPGP more
user friendly.

What about crowdfunding such a development?

Matthias
- --
Matthias Mansfeld Elektronik * Printed Circuit Board Design and
Assembly
Neithardtstr. 3, D-85540 Haar, GERMANY
Phone: +49-89-4620 0937, Fax: +49-89-4620 0938
Internet: http://www.mansfeld-elektronik.de
OpenPGP: http://www.mansfeld-elektronik.de/gnupgkey/mansfeld.asc
Fingerprint: 6563 057D E6B8 9105 1CE4 18D0 4056 1F54 8B59 40EF


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1 - GPGrelay v0.962

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=2TV/
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


From peter at digitalbrains.com  Sun Mar  1 21:54:18 2015
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Sun, 01 Mar 2015 21:54:18 +0100
Subject: Whishlist for next-gen card
In-Reply-To: <54F341B8.8040606@gmail.com>
References: <54E6F12D.40504@gmail.com> <54E87133.2040202@digitalbrains.com>
 <54E8D46E.1080408@gmail.com> <54F0BAC0.7060503@digitalbrains.com>
 <54F0DAA3.9020208@gmail.com> <54F0E668.7020906@digitalbrains.com>
 <54F341B8.8040606@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <54F37C7A.3070800@digitalbrains.com>

On 01/03/15 17:43, NdK wrote:
> while I was talking of remote user auth (so using openpgp card instead of
> ~/.ssh/id_* keys -- something that's already doable).

No, I'm talking about that as well. And I don't think the fingerprint of
the host is part of the signed data or the signature. Why do you think the
fingerprint of the host is part of that?

By /host/ authentication I mean that you verify that the host your are
connecting to is in fact the host you wanted to connect to; and /that/ is
through the public key of the host, of which you can verify the fingerprint.
Let's call this keypair A.

After you've verified the fingerprint, a copy of the hosts' public key, A, is
stored in ~/.ssh/known_hosts on your client machine.

But when the host is authenticating that you are in fact the user you are
claiming to be, you sign a challenge that only you could sign because you have
the private key, let's call it B. That is /user/ authentication.

The host checks that your public key B is in ~/.ssh/authorized_keys on the
server machine; if so, you're authenticated.

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at <http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>


From flapflap at riseup.net  Sun Mar  1 22:01:20 2015
From: flapflap at riseup.net (flapflap)
Date: Sun, 01 Mar 2015 21:01:20 +0000
Subject: strength of voice authentication [was: Re: German ct magazine
 postulates death of pgp encryption]
In-Reply-To: <54F200CD.6060108@vulcan.xs4all.nl>
References: <000d01d05269$c1726dd0$44574970$@on.yourweb.de>
 <1425060977.5204.10.camel@scientia.net> <54F1B456.2080900@vulcan.xs4all.nl>
 <87a8zycel8.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net> <54F200CD.6060108@vulcan.xs4all.nl>
Message-ID: <54F37E20.3020101@riseup.net>

Johan Wevers:
> On 28-02-2015 15:09, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> 
>> We had this discussion recently over on messaging at moderncrypto.org.
> 
> What is described there is a much more confined problem.
> 
>> It's far from "trivial", but breaking voice-based authentication
>> (particularly in the already-noisy realm of mobile phone calls) with
>> high probability doesn't seem to be beyond serious researchers.
> 
> Fooling a computer that a certain voice belongs to someone else, sure,
> I'm sure that is or will be possible. Fooling me that a short, fixed
> string is spoken by someone I know when in fact it is not, sure, that too.
> 
> But fooling me that the person on the other end of the line is someone I
> know well by only technically impersonating his voice while having an
> actual conversation... I don't believe it very likely to happen in the
> near future. Perhaps it could work on someone I barely know, but pick
> only once the wrong person and I might become very suspicious. It
> requires not only changing the voice but also solving a problem much
> harder than the classic Turing test. For once, it requires much
> contextual knowledge about what both persons know of each other.
> 

Apparently, it is very easy to fool people by voice on the telephone.

Just think about the "grandchild trick" ([0], unfortunately not in
English) which is a method where the criminals phone (often elder)
people and tell them that they are a grandchild, nephew, or other remote
relative and need some money for some reason (need a new car and the like).
According to the article, they often start the conversation with a
question like "Guess who's calling?" and then the victims think some
time and seem to remember someone of their family and answer "Hi $Name"
so the callers know a name of a relative they now can impersonate.
You'd think that people are very careful with regard to money, but the
trick is a huge "success" and the criminals got more than CHF 50k _per
case_ in 2013 in Switzerland.

This is because the telephone channel does not prove authenticity of the
caller and thus cannot be secure.

~flapflap

[0] https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enkeltrick

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From kloecker at kde.org  Sun Mar  1 23:25:20 2015
From: kloecker at kde.org (Ingo =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Kl=F6cker?=)
Date: Sun, 1 Mar 2015 23:25:20 +0100
Subject: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption
In-Reply-To: <BD57B3DB-6D9F-4189-93DE-EC7351DD8D60@webkeks.org>
References: <000d01d05269$c1726dd0$44574970$@on.yourweb.de>
 <10210020677.20150301164545@my_localhost>
 <BD57B3DB-6D9F-4189-93DE-EC7351DD8D60@webkeks.org>
Message-ID: <2032941.xNPWa1j001@collossus.ingo-kloecker.de>

On Sunday 01 March 2015 19:58:19 Jonathan Schleifer wrote:
> Am 01.03.2015 um 17:45 schrieb MFPA <2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-
groups at riseup.net>:
> >> and also gets rid of spam
> >> by requiring a proof of work to send something.
> > 
> > Surely, "proof of work" is evidence of performing some otherwise
> > unnecessary CPU cycles. This wastes energy. In a system used by
> > billions of people, lots of energy.
> 
> That "wasted energy" is a lot less than the energy we currently waste on
> spam, especially if you take into consideration the amount of human time
> wasted. The majority of the e-mail traffic is used up by spam.

And most spam is sent by bots. The spammers don't really care how much energy 
the bots burn. Yes, the amount of spam might decrease because the bots cannot 
hammer out that many bitmessages as SMTP messages per second, but your 
hypothesis that BitMessage would get rid of spam is unrealistic.


Regards,
Ingo
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From js-gnupg-users at webkeks.org  Sun Mar  1 23:43:25 2015
From: js-gnupg-users at webkeks.org (Jonathan Schleifer)
Date: Sun, 1 Mar 2015 23:43:25 +0100
Subject: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption
In-Reply-To: <2032941.xNPWa1j001@collossus.ingo-kloecker.de>
References: <000d01d05269$c1726dd0$44574970$@on.yourweb.de>
 <10210020677.20150301164545@my_localhost>
 <BD57B3DB-6D9F-4189-93DE-EC7351DD8D60@webkeks.org>
 <2032941.xNPWa1j001@collossus.ingo-kloecker.de>
Message-ID: <FEA9B942-612B-4E6A-B065-C2C28022715C@webkeks.org>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

Am 01.03.2015 um 23:25 schrieb Ingo Kl?cker <kloecker at kde.org>:

> And most spam is sent by bots. The spammers don't really care how much
> energy the bots burn. Yes, the amount of spam might decrease because
> the bots cannot hammer out that many bitmessages as SMTP messages per
> second, but your hypothesis that BitMessage would get rid of spam is
> unrealistic.

I don't really agree with that. The goal is that the proof of work for a
single message takes 4 minutes. At that rate, sending spam really is not
profitable. In 4 minutes, spammers can currently send hundreds of
thousands of mails. At that rate, they can afford to send it to every
address they can find. With only one mail per machine every 4 minutes,
they really need to be careful where to send it. Let's assume they have
10000 machines (which is unrealistic - most machines are behind a dialup
connection from which no provider will accept mail). That's only 2500
mails a minute. If global spam were just 2500 spam messages a minute,
spam would hardly be a problem.

- --
Jonathan
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Version: GnuPG v2

iF4EARYKAAYFAlTzle0ACgkQM+YcY+tK57UH+wEA2vgeaGeMeZ8daVMhQnJHsibz
CP2bH4N9Jur5NMcu0G4BAACkAVlj0D5KKr6MfMcVb5dYoCRvn5mqOv/eoZPmLKEI
=xAfS
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----



From kloecker at kde.org  Mon Mar  2 00:13:07 2015
From: kloecker at kde.org (Ingo =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Kl=F6cker?=)
Date: Mon, 2 Mar 2015 00:13:07 +0100
Subject: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption
In-Reply-To: <FEA9B942-612B-4E6A-B065-C2C28022715C@webkeks.org>
References: <000d01d05269$c1726dd0$44574970$@on.yourweb.de>
 <2032941.xNPWa1j001@collossus.ingo-kloecker.de>
 <FEA9B942-612B-4E6A-B065-C2C28022715C@webkeks.org>
Message-ID: <1487310.Mu3zK8d9cY@collossus.ingo-kloecker.de>

On Sunday 01 March 2015 23:43:25 Jonathan Schleifer wrote:
> Am 01.03.2015 um 23:25 schrieb Ingo Kl?cker <kloecker at kde.org>:
> > And most spam is sent by bots. The spammers don't really care how much
> > energy the bots burn. Yes, the amount of spam might decrease because
> > the bots cannot hammer out that many bitmessages as SMTP messages per
> > second, but your hypothesis that BitMessage would get rid of spam is
> > unrealistic.
> 
> I don't really agree with that. The goal is that the proof of work for a
> single message takes 4 minutes.

On what kind of hardware? A high-end gamer PC? Or a low end mobile phone?


> At that rate, sending spam really is not
> profitable. In 4 minutes, spammers can currently send hundreds of
> thousands of mails. At that rate, they can afford to send it to every
> address they can find. With only one mail per machine every 4 minutes,
> they really need to be careful where to send it. Let's assume they have
> 10000 machines (which is unrealistic - most machines are behind a dialup
> connection from which no provider will accept mail).

There are much larger bot nets, e.g the ramnit bot net apparently controlled 
3.2 million (!) machines (see http://heise.de/-2559388, in German). And with 
regard to providers not accepting those mails you seem to be missing that the 
bots simply (ab)use the mail accounts of the bot owners.


> That's only 2500
> mails a minute. If global spam were just 2500 spam messages a minute,
> spam would hardly be a problem.

Of course, 800,000 spam messages per minute is still many magnitudes less than 
now.

I don't see BitMessage killing spam. But it will surely kill mailing lists.


Regards,
Ingo
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From js-gnupg-users at webkeks.org  Mon Mar  2 00:23:24 2015
From: js-gnupg-users at webkeks.org (Jonathan Schleifer)
Date: Mon, 2 Mar 2015 00:23:24 +0100
Subject: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption
In-Reply-To: <1487310.Mu3zK8d9cY@collossus.ingo-kloecker.de>
References: <000d01d05269$c1726dd0$44574970$@on.yourweb.de>
 <2032941.xNPWa1j001@collossus.ingo-kloecker.de>
 <FEA9B942-612B-4E6A-B065-C2C28022715C@webkeks.org>
 <1487310.Mu3zK8d9cY@collossus.ingo-kloecker.de>
Message-ID: <20150302002324.4e684759c7745a459bdd0407@webkeks.org>

On Mon, 2 Mar 2015 00:13:07 +0100, Ingo Kl?cker <kloecker at kde.org> wrote:

> On what kind of hardware? A high-end gamer PC? Or a low end mobile phone?

According to the paper, the goal is to take 4 minutes on an average PC and that it shall be adjusted according to hardware improvements.
 
> There are much larger bot nets, e.g the ramnit bot net apparently controlled 
> 3.2 million (!) machines (see http://heise.de/-2559388, in German). And with 
> regard to providers not accepting those mails you seem to be missing that the 
> bots simply (ab)use the mail accounts of the bot owners.

Abusing mail accounts only works if they are mail accounts with crappy hosts. Sane providers will block your account if you start sending 100 mails in 1 minute ;).

> Of course, 800,000 spam messages per minute is still many magnitudes less than 
> now.

The question is if that would still be profitable for spammers. Currently, they just send their spam to millions of addresses hoping that one of them is stupid enough to fall for it. They can do that because it's cheap. But if sending isn't cheap, sending to millions to just get one idiot who falls for it isn't an option anymore.

> I don't see BitMessage killing spam. But it will surely kill mailing lists.

It would just need to be extended to groups. The protocol is not set in stone.

In any case, I'm not suggesting we all switch to BitMessage. I'm just saying this is going in the right direction.

-- 
Jonathan
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From dkg at fifthhorseman.net  Mon Mar  2 00:34:55 2015
From: dkg at fifthhorseman.net (Daniel Kahn Gillmor)
Date: Mon, 02 Mar 2015 00:34:55 +0100
Subject: Decrypting PGP/MIME on the command line
In-Reply-To: <874mq4k0em.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <E1YS4v0-0001uj-Qq@talos.kcore.de>
 <874mq4k0em.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <87sido9tr4.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>

On Sun 2015-03-01 20:01:05 +0100, Werner Koch wrote:
> On Sun,  1 Mar 2015 15:32, rpuls at kcore.de said:
>
>> is there a command line utility that takes a PGP/MIME encrypted message
>> (a plain RFC 2822 text file) and outputs an unencrypted copy? The
>
> Not really.  MIME is a structured format and as such it may result in a
> bunch of encrypted, non-nencrypted, signed, unsigned,
> message/alternative sub-documents.  Thus it is not easy to write a
> general purpose command line tool.

python's email module is quite good for programmatically handling mime
parts if you want to manipulate an e-mail (though it may not be so good
for reconstructing it in some sort of bytewise exact fashion).

> You may start with gpgparsemail which is not installed bald build as
> part of gnupg in the tools directory.  It returns an annotated format
> which might be easier for further processing steps than plain MIME.
>
> If you only want to decrypt a standard MIME encrypted mail, it is easy.
> Simply pipe the entire mail through gpg and you will get the decrypted
> MIME container.

You should also note that any decryption like this is likely to remove
any OpenPGP signature as well, for those MUAs that do the
encryption+signing step all in one OpenPGP piece (i believe that the
gpgtools mail.app plugin places the OpenPGP signature inside a
multipart/signed MIME message, which is then itself encrypted, rather
than placing encryption and signatures all in the OpenPGP part
directly).

A tool that transforms an OpenPGP encrypted+signed MIME message into an
OpenPGP-signed MIME message while retaining the original signature would
be a really nice tool to have.

 --dkg


From dougb at dougbarton.email  Mon Mar  2 00:52:42 2015
From: dougb at dougbarton.email (Doug Barton)
Date: Sun, 01 Mar 2015 15:52:42 -0800
Subject: Decrypting PGP/MIME on the command line
In-Reply-To: <87sido9tr4.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
References: <E1YS4v0-0001uj-Qq@talos.kcore.de>
 <874mq4k0em.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <87sido9tr4.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
Message-ID: <54F3A64A.2000009@dougbarton.email>

On 3/1/15 3:34 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> On Sun 2015-03-01 20:01:05 +0100, Werner Koch wrote:
>> On Sun,  1 Mar 2015 15:32, rpuls at kcore.de said:
>>
>>> is there a command line utility that takes a PGP/MIME encrypted message
>>> (a plain RFC 2822 text file) and outputs an unencrypted copy? The
>>
>> Not really.  MIME is a structured format and as such it may result in a
>> bunch of encrypted, non-nencrypted, signed, unsigned,
>> message/alternative sub-documents.  Thus it is not easy to write a
>> general purpose command line tool.
>
> python's email module is quite good for programmatically handling mime
> parts if you want to manipulate an e-mail (though it may not be so good
> for reconstructing it in some sort of bytewise exact fashion).
>
>> You may start with gpgparsemail which is not installed bald build as
>> part of gnupg in the tools directory.  It returns an annotated format
>> which might be easier for further processing steps than plain MIME.
>>
>> If you only want to decrypt a standard MIME encrypted mail, it is easy.
>> Simply pipe the entire mail through gpg and you will get the decrypted
>> MIME container.
>
> You should also note that any decryption like this is likely to remove
> any OpenPGP signature as well, for those MUAs that do the
> encryption+signing step all in one OpenPGP piece (i believe that the
> gpgtools mail.app plugin places the OpenPGP signature inside a
> multipart/signed MIME message, which is then itself encrypted, rather
> than placing encryption and signatures all in the OpenPGP part
> directly).
>
> A tool that transforms an OpenPGP encrypted+signed MIME message into an
> OpenPGP-signed MIME message while retaining the original signature would
> be a really nice tool to have.

The signature is an attachment on a PGP/MIME message of course, so you'd 
have to preserve the two files separately.

My (Al)pine PGP filters are shell scripts that (amongst other things) 
will verify and decrypt PGP/MIME messages. You could easily adapt that 
code to output the canonical version of the message to a file, along 
with the corresponding signature.

hope this helps,

Doug

https://dougbarton.us/PGP/ppf/index.html



From ml.throttle at xoxy.net  Mon Mar  2 02:45:09 2015
From: ml.throttle at xoxy.net (Helmut Waitzmann)
Date: Mon, 02 Mar 2015 02:45:09 +0100
Subject: How to send a key to a keyserver?
In-Reply-To: <54F05FE1.5030101@sumptuouscapital.com> (Kristian Fiskerstrand's
 message of "Fri, 27 Feb 2015 13:15:29 +0100")
References: <87egpcwq41.fsf@helmutwaitzmann.news.arcor.de>
 <54F05BB2.9030405@nordnet.fr> <54F05FE1.5030101@sumptuouscapital.com>
Message-ID: <87pp8scgu9.fsf@helmutwaitzmann.news.arcor.de>

Kristian Fiskerstrand <kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com> writes:

>On 02/27/2015 12:57 PM, Philip Jackson wrote:
>> On 26/02/15 18:15, Helmut Waitzmann wrote:
>>> I tried
>>> 
>>> gpg2 --verbose --keyserver hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net
>>> --send-keys -- 72ABFF0923A87CF22D0ED7C4FDEE765D017077F1
>>> 
>>> and got the message
>>> 
>>> gpg: sending key FDEE765D017077F1 to hkp server
>>> pool.sks-keyservers.net gpgkeys: HTTP post error 22: The
>>> requested URL returned error: 417 gpg: keyserver internal error 
>>> gpg: keyserver send failed: Keyserver error

>417 really shouldn't happen for any of the servers in the pool, as it
>is explicitly checked that this return code should not be used.

>For 1.4/2.0, please use --keyserver-options debug,verbose to get more
>information about the interaction from the curl helpers, this will be
>useful for debugging.

+ gpg2 --version
gpg (GnuPG) 2.0.14
libgcrypt 1.4.5
Copyright (C) 2009 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
License GPLv3+: GNU GPL version 3 or later <http://gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html>
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.

Home: /home/helmut/helmut/private/.gnupg
Supported algorithms:
Pubkey: RSA, ELG, DSA
Cipher: 3DES, CAST5, BLOWFISH, AES, AES192, AES256, TWOFISH, CAMELLIA128, 
        CAMELLIA192, CAMELLIA256
Hash: MD5, SHA1, RIPEMD160, SHA256, SHA384, SHA512, SHA224
Compression: Uncompressed, ZIP, ZLIB, BZIP2

+ gpg2 --verbose --keyserver-options debug,verbose --keyserver hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net --send-keys -- 72ABFF0923A87CF22D0ED7C4FDEE765D017077F1
gpg: sending key FDEE765D017077F1 to hkp server pool.sks-keyservers.net
gpgkeys: curl version = libcurl/7.21.0 GnuTLS/2.8.6 zlib/1.2.3.4 libidn/1.15
* About to connect() to proxy proxy.zuhause.test port 3128 (#0)
*   Trying 192.168.0.1... * connected
* Connected to proxy.zuhause.test (192.168.0.1) port 3128 (#0)
> POST http://pool.sks-keyservers.net:11371/pks/add HTTP/1.1
Host: pool.sks-keyservers.net:11371
Accept: */*
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Pragma: no-cache
Cache-Control: no-cache
Content-Length: 3239
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Expect: 100-continue

* The requested URL returned error: 417
* Closing connection #0
gpgkeys: HTTP post error 22: The requested URL returned error: 417
gpg: keyserver internal error
gpg: keyserver send failed: Keyserver error
+ printf 'exit code: %s\n' 2
exit code: 2

Ah!  gpg is using my http proxy.  proxy.zuhause.test is only known to my
own DNS service, resolving (after following an alias) to IP address
192.168.0.1.

Issuing same gpg2-command again, after unsetting the environment
variable http_proxy:

+ gpg2 --verbose --keyserver-options debug,verbose --keyserver hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net --send-keys -- 72ABFF0923A87CF22D0ED7C4FDEE765D017077F1
gpg: sending key FDEE765D017077F1 to hkp server pool.sks-keyservers.net
gpgkeys: curl version = libcurl/7.21.0 GnuTLS/2.8.6 zlib/1.2.3.4 libidn/1.15
* About to connect() to pool.sks-keyservers.net port 11371 (#0)
*   Trying 23.226.129.243... * connected
* Connected to pool.sks-keyservers.net (23.226.129.243) port 11371 (#0)
> POST /pks/add HTTP/1.1
Host: pool.sks-keyservers.net:11371
Accept: */*
Pragma: no-cache
Cache-Control: no-cache
Content-Length: 3239
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Expect: 100-continue

< HTTP/1.1 100 Continue
< HTTP/1.1 200 OK
< Date: Mon, 02 Mar 2015 01:31:08 GMT
< Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
< Content-Length: 129
< Connection: keep-alive
< Server: sks_www/1.1.5
< Cache-Control: no-cache
< Pragma: no-cache
< Expires: 0
< X-HKP-Results-Count: 1
< Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
< Via: 1.1 keys.jhcloos.com:11371 (nginx)
< 
* Connection #0 to host pool.sks-keyservers.net left intact
* Closing connection #0
+ printf 'exit code: %s\n' 0
exit code: 0

So it's a problem with my http proxy?


From cp at axs.org  Mon Mar  2 04:50:52 2015
From: cp at axs.org (Chuck Peters)
Date: Mon, 2 Mar 2015 03:50:52 +0000
Subject: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption
In-Reply-To: <54F34110.20207@sumptuouscapital.com>
References: <7920271.MAWFr6xyvP@inno>
 <54F05EF5.6050105__7398.9701144912$1425039188$gmane$org@sumptuouscapital.com>
 <54F09ACB.6020108@enigmail.net>
 <87lhjjm8mn.fsf__7019.33337045393$1425067345$gmane$org@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <54F3251D.20300@enigmail.net>
 <54F32913.6010803@sumptuouscapital.com>
 <54F331C8.8060107@enigmail.net>
 <54F3326C.7010001@sumptuouscapital.com>
 <E2A972CE-A422-4FFD-A4F6-B3584599B86E@mailbox.org>
 <54F34110.20207@sumptuouscapital.com>
Message-ID: <20150302035052.GA20402@xen.axs.org>

Kristian Fiskerstrand said:
> >> 
> >> You wouldn't need the keyservers to be involved in this at all. 
> >> Anyone could set up such a mail verification CA outside of the 
> >> keyserver network.

How about storing keys in a more distributed manner, DNS, in addition to some other method of authentication, DNSSEC and DANE?

Paul Wouters and others are working on it:

Using DANE to Associate OpenPGP public keys with email addresses
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-wouters-dane-openpgp-02

Paul recently gave a presentation about it at an ICANN meeting:
Slides
http://singapore52.icann.org/en/schedule/mon-tech/presentation-new-dnssec-technologies-09feb15-en.pdf
Video, via Adobe Connect starts about 4:49:00 and goes to about 5:08:00:
https://icann.adobeconnect.com/p2j5gtoni79/?launcher=false&fcsContent=true&pbMode=normal
Audio:
http://audio.icann.org/meetings/singapore2015/tech-09feb15-en.mp3

Slide 1 of the presentation shows, not including the title slide, how you can obtain Paul's key with dig and slide 2 shows the easier method using hash-slinger:
openpgpkey --fetch email_address

Slide 5 shows how to create the DNS record:
openpgpkey --create email_address --output rfc

Slide 9 Paul talks about openpgpkey-milter which is a postfix and sendmail plugin to auto-encrypt email. Note it is not recommended for production use yet.


And to make mail servers less NSA friendly we should be setting up DANE and requiring starttls with forward secrecy anyway!  It's on my TODO list!


Chuck



From xavier at maillard.im  Mon Mar  2 06:23:00 2015
From: xavier at maillard.im (Xavier Maillard)
Date: Mon, 02 Mar 2015 06:23:00 +0100
Subject: How to send a key to a keyserver?
In-Reply-To: <87pp8scgu9.fsf@helmutwaitzmann.news.arcor.de>
References: <87egpcwq41.fsf@helmutwaitzmann.news.arcor.de>
 <54F05BB2.9030405@nordnet.fr> <54F05FE1.5030101@sumptuouscapital.com>
 <87pp8scgu9.fsf@helmutwaitzmann.news.arcor.de>
Message-ID: <m0y4ngug5n.fsf@kcals.intra.maillard.im>


Helmut Waitzmann <ml.throttle at xoxy.net> writes:

> So it's a problem with my http proxy?

Seems like actually.

-- Xavier.


From kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com  Mon Mar  2 08:43:21 2015
From: kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com (Kristian Fiskerstrand)
Date: Mon, 02 Mar 2015 08:43:21 +0100
Subject: How to send a key to a keyserver?
In-Reply-To: <87pp8scgu9.fsf@helmutwaitzmann.news.arcor.de>
References: <87egpcwq41.fsf@helmutwaitzmann.news.arcor.de>	<54F05BB2.9030405@nordnet.fr>
 <54F05FE1.5030101@sumptuouscapital.com>
 <87pp8scgu9.fsf@helmutwaitzmann.news.arcor.de>
Message-ID: <54F41499.7070002@sumptuouscapital.com>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

On 03/02/2015 02:45 AM, Helmut Waitzmann wrote:
> Kristian Fiskerstrand <kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com>
> writes:
> 
>> On 02/27/2015 12:57 PM, Philip Jackson wrote:
>>> On 26/02/15 18:15, Helmut Waitzmann wrote:
>>>> I tried
>>>> 
>>>> gpg2 --verbose --keyserver hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net 
>>>> --send-keys -- 72ABFF0923A87CF22D0ED7C4FDEE765D017077F1
>>>> 
>>>> and got the message
>>>> 
>>>> gpg: sending key FDEE765D017077F1 to hkp server 
>>>> pool.sks-keyservers.net gpgkeys: HTTP post error 22: The 
>>>> requested URL returned error: 417 gpg: keyserver internal
>>>> error gpg: keyserver send failed: Keyserver error
> 
>> 417 really shouldn't happen for any of the servers in the pool,
>> as it is explicitly checked that this return code should not be
>> used.
> 
>> For 1.4/2.0, please use --keyserver-options debug,verbose to get
>> more information about the interaction from the curl helpers,
>> this will be useful for debugging.
> 

..

> 
> Ah!  gpg is using my http proxy.  proxy.zuhause.test is only known
> to my own DNS service, resolving (after following an alias) to IP
> address 192.168.0.1.
> 
> Issuing same gpg2-command again, after unsetting the environment 
> variable http_proxy:


..

> 
> So it's a problem with my http proxy?
> 

Anything else would surprise me. A hint is to look for any mismatch
handling of HTTP/1.0 vs HTTP/1.1 with regards to the 100-Expect, you
can find some information on the matter for the keyserver operators at [0]

References:
https://bitbucket.org/skskeyserver/sks-keyserver/wiki/Peering

- -- 
- ----------------------------
Kristian Fiskerstrand
Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com
Twitter: @krifisk
- ----------------------------
Public OpenPGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net
fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3
- ----------------------------
Aurum est Potestas
Gold is power
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From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net  Mon Mar  2 09:20:14 2015
From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA)
Date: Mon, 2 Mar 2015 08:20:14 +0000
Subject: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption
In-Reply-To: <BD57B3DB-6D9F-4189-93DE-EC7351DD8D60@webkeks.org>
References: <000d01d05269$c1726dd0$44574970$@on.yourweb.de>
 <54F061B6.3070205@seichter.de> <20150227234821.GA15748@athena.barrera.io>
 <54F1A86D.1050907@seichter.de> <20150228123619.GA7370@athena.barrera.io>
 <54F1BD40.4080504@seichter.de> <54F1BEB8.5090603@digitalbrains.com>
 <4B188EF8-3D01-461F-BEF9-C8E4504A2301@webkeks.org>
 <10210020677.20150301164545@my_localhost>
 <BD57B3DB-6D9F-4189-93DE-EC7351DD8D60@webkeks.org>
Message-ID: <134737899.20150302082014@my_localhost>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512



On Sunday 1 March 2015 at 6:58:19 PM, in
<mid:BD57B3DB-6D9F-4189-93DE-EC7351DD8D60 at webkeks.org>, Jonathan
Schleifer wrote:


> That "wasted energy" is a lot less than the energy we
> currently waste on spam,

I suspect my computer wastes very little energy in downloading and
storing a few dozen spam messages per month.



> especially if you take into
> consideration the amount of human time wasted.

Most are so obvious that we are talking fractions of a second per
email. Or maybe people who automatically filter their spam spend a
bit less time looking through it for false-positives.



>  The
> majority of the e-mail traffic is used up by spam.

I'm never convinced it is as big an iassue as some make out.


- --
Best regards

MFPA                    mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net

The truth is rarely pure and never simple
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3JuyfEfsCMRsKldfEAJsuipNLK6ccC//t/wfsbHEOsppOL25Tw835WxRk2WOBECI
vgQBFgoAZgUCVPQdY18UgAAAAAAuAChpc3N1ZXItZnByQG5vdGF0aW9ucy5vcGVu
cGdwLmZpZnRoaG9yc2VtYW4ubmV0MzNBQ0VENEVFOTEzNEVFQkRFNkE4NTA2MTcx
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=3dC9
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----



From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net  Mon Mar  2 09:27:10 2015
From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA)
Date: Mon, 2 Mar 2015 08:27:10 +0000
Subject: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption
In-Reply-To: <FEA9B942-612B-4E6A-B065-C2C28022715C@webkeks.org>
References: <000d01d05269$c1726dd0$44574970$@on.yourweb.de>
 <10210020677.20150301164545@my_localhost>
 <BD57B3DB-6D9F-4189-93DE-EC7351DD8D60@webkeks.org>
 <2032941.xNPWa1j001@collossus.ingo-kloecker.de>
 <FEA9B942-612B-4E6A-B065-C2C28022715C@webkeks.org>
Message-ID: <1379061197.20150302082710@my_localhost>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512



On Sunday 1 March 2015 at 10:43:25 PM, in
<mid:FEA9B942-612B-4E6A-B065-C2C28022715C at webkeks.org>, Jonathan
Schleifer wrote:


> The goal is that the
> proof of work for a single message takes 4 minutes.

Currently at work, when I ask somebody a question by email it is not
unusual to see the CC of the question to somebody else and then
receive the answer, all within a few minutes. Holding on to each
message for four minutes before sending would be massively
inefficient.

And four minutes per message would cripple corporate
email servers that serve thousands of staff.


- --
Best regards

MFPA                    mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net

Put knot yore trust inn spel chequers
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

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FQIRYBTyb0Ni7zDS04VvCqkryRPhfHCW7aszvlRUI6w4Uc5/gG63UGHN+nH6ZHTZ
fLWWBnxx6uJkknSDX3lxcpaPXmn2uI71foefZhBevmZM7C68N+EuaGz5SlmwvQ2I
vgQBFgoAZgUCVPQe318UgAAAAAAuAChpc3N1ZXItZnByQG5vdGF0aW9ucy5vcGVu
cGdwLmZpZnRoaG9yc2VtYW4ubmV0MzNBQ0VENEVFOTEzNEVFQkRFNkE4NTA2MTcx
MkJDNDYxQUY3NzhFNAAKCRAXErxGGvd45Hk/AQBX7xpvtBSHGQpZkFpY6KkJqCxU
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=P15E
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----



From kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com  Mon Mar  2 09:51:47 2015
From: kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com (Kristian Fiskerstrand)
Date: Mon, 02 Mar 2015 09:51:47 +0100
Subject: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption
In-Reply-To: <20150302035052.GA20402@xen.axs.org>
References: <7920271.MAWFr6xyvP@inno>
 <54F05EF5.6050105__7398.9701144912$1425039188$gmane$org@sumptuouscapital.com>
 <54F09ACB.6020108@enigmail.net>
 <87lhjjm8mn.fsf__7019.33337045393$1425067345$gmane$org@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <54F3251D.20300@enigmail.net> <54F32913.6010803@sumptuouscapital.com>
 <54F331C8.8060107@enigmail.net> <54F3326C.7010001@sumptuouscapital.com>
 <E2A972CE-A422-4FFD-A4F6-B3584599B86E@mailbox.org>
 <54F34110.20207@sumptuouscapital.com> <20150302035052.GA20402@xen.axs.org>
Message-ID: <54F424A3.6040105@sumptuouscapital.com>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

On 03/02/2015 04:50 AM, Chuck Peters wrote:
> Kristian Fiskerstrand said:
>>>> 
>>>> You wouldn't need the keyservers to be involved in this at
>>>> all. Anyone could set up such a mail verification CA outside
>>>> of the keyserver network.
> 
> How about storing keys in a more distributed manner, DNS, in
> addition to some other method of authentication, DNSSEC and DANE?

See http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-devel/2015-February/029544.html

- -- 
- ----------------------------
Kristian Fiskerstrand
Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com
Twitter: @krifisk
- ----------------------------
Public OpenPGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net
fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3
- ----------------------------
Ab esse ad posse
- From being to knowing
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

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qPB1tOT6xcTrx/Wa+2NXZ4ZPzX7z5uMS/0IJPRvquEDT3FmbNfC+wdcL0FNlWVc=
=/iS8
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


From gnupgpacker at on.yourweb.de  Mon Mar  2 10:16:01 2015
From: gnupgpacker at on.yourweb.de (gnupgpacker)
Date: Mon, 2 Mar 2015 10:16:01 +0100
Subject: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption
In-Reply-To: <54F3251D.20300@enigmail.net>
References: <000d01d05269$c1726dd0$44574970$@on.yourweb.de>
 <1890860.SDiBssEjyI@inno> <000e01d05280$656fed70$304fc850$@on.yourweb.de>
 <7920271.MAWFr6xyvP@inno>
 <54F05EF5.6050105__7398.9701144912$1425039188$gmane$org@sumptuouscapital.com>
 <54F09ACB.6020108@enigmail.net>
 <87lhjjm8mn.fsf__7019.33337045393$1425067345$gmane$org@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <54F3251D.20300@enigmail.net>
Message-ID: <000401d054c9$80c813e0$82583ba0$@on.yourweb.de>

Hello,

> On Behalf Of Patrick Brunschwig
> Sent: Sunday, March 01, 2015 3:42 PM
> The idea I have in mind is roughly as follows: if you upload a key to
> a keyserver, the keyserver would send an encrypted email to every UID
> in the key. Each encrypted mail contains a unique link to confirm the
> email address. Once all email addresses are confirmed, the key is
> validated and the keyserver will allow access to it just like with any
> regular keyserver.
> This way, we have a simple verification of the access to the private
> the key, as well as access to the email addresses contained in the UID
> by quite a simple means. I would say this is about as reliable as
> sending an email to someone requesting their key.

+1 

This procedure should be implemented in keyservers. 

No CA needed, no centralisation necessary => just verifying of existing AND
proper working email addresses.

Additional:
There are lot of old keys on keyservers not being verified in described
manner.
Those keys (or the newer, verified ones) could be marked with a short hint
on keyservers to differ between verified and not verified email addresses.

Facility of deleting own (!) keys on keyserver wanted for old (revoked,
expired, test, failed...) keys. 

Regards, Chris





From stebe at mailbox.org  Mon Mar  2 11:35:19 2015
From: stebe at mailbox.org (Stephan Beck)
Date: Mon, 02 Mar 2015 11:35:19 +0100
Subject: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption
In-Reply-To: <54F1B51B.4060205@digitalbrains.com>
References: <000d01d05269$c1726dd0$44574970$@on.yourweb.de>
 <54F0CFA9.7070601@cardcontact.de> <54F0EA13.7020401@digitalbrains.com>
 <10330032.xGXXIq3lh9@inno> <54F1B51B.4060205@digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <54F43CE7.1070008@mailbox.org>

Am 28.02.2015 um 13:31 schrieb Peter Lebbing:

> PS: By the way, my ISP and some of it's employees are in a perfect position to
> do a man in the middle. 

No doubt about it. And we actually don't know how they "use" their position.
Well, looking at some sort of collaboration published a few weeks ago, we might
have some hints...


>I sure hope they can't "just hack my system" because of
> that position. 

Sticking to that "perfect position argument", in what kind of position are
(would be) the people that control (packaging of) your distro? (Just curious.)

>The one capability certainly does not imply the other.



Cheers,

Stephan



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From bernhard at intevation.de  Mon Mar  2 12:32:40 2015
From: bernhard at intevation.de (Bernhard Reiter)
Date: Mon, 2 Mar 2015 12:32:40 +0100
Subject: A forgotten patch?
In-Reply-To: <87zj7wildd.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <1425088957.14003.87.camel@neoprokrast.monkey.poo>
 <1425176984.14003.116.camel@neoprokrast.monkey.poo>
 <87zj7wildd.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <201503021232.46135.bernhard@intevation.de>

On Sunday 01 March 2015 at 20:11:10, Werner Koch wrote:
> > was a bug report for the patch? I would gladly write one if that would
>
> Well written bug reports are always appreciated.

I believe the main thing that Werner is mentioning here is that
analysis of an unwanted situation and a fix are two different things.
Having a reproducable problem report is very valuable and may be 
easier to agree on as first step. 

Then there are always several ways to improve the situation.
And naturally this may lead to a discussion about what is the best way
to take.

So if anyone find a problem with GnuPG - may it be a defect or a behaviour 
that should be different - best is to get a reproducable behaviour reported 
and get people to agree that it is a problem.

Best Regards,
Bernhard





-- 
www.intevation.de/~bernhard (CEO)    www.fsfe.org (Founding GA Member)
Intevation GmbH, Osnabr?ck, Germany; Amtsgericht Osnabr?ck, HRB 18998
Owned and run by Frank Koormann, Bernhard Reiter, Dr. Jan-Oliver Wagner
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From bernhard at intevation.de  Mon Mar  2 12:35:30 2015
From: bernhard at intevation.de (Bernhard Reiter)
Date: Mon, 2 Mar 2015 12:35:30 +0100
Subject: wiki.gnupg.org (Re: LDAP-based Keyserver)
In-Reply-To: <87y4ni9sza.wl%neal@walfield.org>
References: <87y4ni9sza.wl%neal@walfield.org>
Message-ID: <201503021235.32066.bernhard@intevation.de>

Hi Neal,

On Saturday 28 February 2015 at 12:27:05, Neal H. Walfield wrote:
> ? http://wiki.gnupg.org/LDAPKeyserver

and while you were at it, you have also went through a number of wiki pages 
correcting and improving the format and language! 

Thanks and welcome to the club of wiki.gnupg.org helpers!
(We are always looking for more members! :) )

Bernhard
-- 
www.intevation.de/~bernhard (CEO)    www.fsfe.org (Founding GA Member)
Intevation GmbH, Osnabr?ck, Germany; Amtsgericht Osnabr?ck, HRB 18998
Owned and run by Frank Koormann, Bernhard Reiter, Dr. Jan-Oliver Wagner
-------------- next part --------------
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From wk at gnupg.org  Mon Mar  2 13:20:41 2015
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Mon, 02 Mar 2015 13:20:41 +0100
Subject: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption
In-Reply-To: <FEA9B942-612B-4E6A-B065-C2C28022715C@webkeks.org> (Jonathan
 Schleifer's message of "Sun, 1 Mar 2015 23:43:25 +0100")
References: <000d01d05269$c1726dd0$44574970$@on.yourweb.de>
 <10210020677.20150301164545@my_localhost>
 <BD57B3DB-6D9F-4189-93DE-EC7351DD8D60@webkeks.org>
 <2032941.xNPWa1j001@collossus.ingo-kloecker.de>
 <FEA9B942-612B-4E6A-B065-C2C28022715C@webkeks.org>
Message-ID: <87r3t7h9pi.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Sun,  1 Mar 2015 23:43, js-gnupg-users at webkeks.org said:

> I don't really agree with that. The goal is that the proof of work for a
> single message takes 4 minutes. At that rate, sending spam really is not

So you can send 360 mail a day.  Assuming your 24/7 business make 700
Euro a day each mail costs you 2 Euro - snail mail would be much cheaper
(or de-mail ;-).

We had the discussion on proof-of-work as anti-spam measure more than a
decade ago and the outcome was that it won't work.  I can't see that any
parameters changed since then.



Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From neal at walfield.org  Mon Mar  2 14:33:53 2015
From: neal at walfield.org (Neal H. Walfield)
Date: Mon, 02 Mar 2015 14:33:53 +0100
Subject: wiki.gnupg.org (Re: LDAP-based Keyserver)
In-Reply-To: <201503021235.32066.bernhard@intevation.de>
References: <87y4ni9sza.wl%neal@walfield.org>
 <201503021235.32066.bernhard@intevation.de>
Message-ID: <87sidna5ha.wl%neal@walfield.org>

At Mon, 2 Mar 2015 12:35:30 +0100,
Bernhard Reiter wrote:
> On Saturday 28 February 2015 at 12:27:05, Neal H. Walfield wrote:
> > ? http://wiki.gnupg.org/LDAPKeyserver
> 
> and while you were at it, you have also went through a number of wiki pages 
> correcting and improving the format and language! 

I was found out :)

> Thanks and welcome to the club of wiki.gnupg.org helpers!
> (We are always looking for more members! :) )

wiki.gnupg.org has the potential to be a great resource.  But, it
needs a lot more content.  I think this would be a good place for
recipes, such as , how to generate keys offline [1] or key signing
related practices.

Neal

  [1] http://blog.josefsson.org/2014/06/23/offline-gnupg-master-key-and-subkeys-on-yubikey-neo-smartcard/



From ndk.clanbo at gmail.com  Mon Mar  2 14:38:21 2015
From: ndk.clanbo at gmail.com (NdK)
Date: Mon, 02 Mar 2015 14:38:21 +0100
Subject: Whishlist for next-gen card
In-Reply-To: <54F37C7A.3070800@digitalbrains.com>
References: <54E6F12D.40504@gmail.com> <54E87133.2040202@digitalbrains.com>
 <54E8D46E.1080408@gmail.com> <54F0BAC0.7060503@digitalbrains.com>
 <54F0DAA3.9020208@gmail.com> <54F0E668.7020906@digitalbrains.com>
 <54F341B8.8040606@gmail.com> <54F37C7A.3070800@digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <54F467CD.8020509@gmail.com>

Il 01/03/2015 21:54, Peter Lebbing ha scritto:

> No, I'm talking about that as well. And I don't think the fingerprint of
> the host is part of the signed data or the signature. Why do you think the
> fingerprint of the host is part of that?
Because I didn't remember well the SSH protocol...

> By /host/ authentication I mean that you verify that the host your are
> connecting to is in fact the host you wanted to connect to; and /that/ is
> through the public key of the host, of which you can verify the fingerprint.
> Let's call this keypair A.
That gets verified during initial key setup.

> After you've verified the fingerprint, a copy of the hosts' public key, A, is
> stored in ~/.ssh/known_hosts on your client machine.
Ok, just something to help the user avoid a verification step every time.

> But when the host is authenticating that you are in fact the user you are
> claiming to be, you sign a challenge that only you could sign because you have
> the private key, let's call it B. That is /user/ authentication.
Ok.

> The host checks that your public key B is in ~/.ssh/authorized_keys on the
> server machine; if so, you're authenticated.
Ok.
But the signature contains the session identifier (called H in RFC4257
sec 8), that is derived from the initial key exchange (that should then
be partially handled by the card as well). Luckily there's no need to
recalculate it when keys are refreshed (RFC4257, sec 7.2), so it's
one-time penalty.

So the "card" should receive (and handle) the key exchange, prompting
the user to accept the public key the server sent and then allow the
auth key to just sign data where the session id is the one it
calculated. Might be non-banal to handle concurrent ssh sessions with
overlapping key exchanges (card generates a "blob" --might be
symmetrically encrypted with a key only known to the card-- that's
"cached" by ssh and passed back to the card when a new auth signature is
requested for an existing session id?).

BYtE,
 Diego.


From rpuls at kcore.de  Mon Mar  2 16:40:11 2015
From: rpuls at kcore.de (=?UTF-8?B?UmVuw6k=?= Puls)
Date: Mon, 2 Mar 2015 16:40:11 +0100
Subject: Decrypting PGP/MIME on the command line
In-Reply-To: <87sido9tr4.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
References: <E1YS4v0-0001uj-Qq@talos.kcore.de>
 <874mq4k0em.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <87sido9tr4.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
Message-ID: <E1YSSS8-0004Ej-Cr@talos.kcore.de>

On Mon, 02 Mar 2015 00:34:55 +0100 Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> On Sun 2015-03-01 20:01:05 +0100, Werner Koch wrote:
> > On Sun,  1 Mar 2015 15:32, rpuls at kcore.de said:
> >
> >> is there a command line utility that takes a PGP/MIME encrypted
> >> message (a plain RFC 2822 text file) and outputs an unencrypted
> >> copy? The
> >
> > Not really.  MIME is a structured format and as such it may result
> > in a bunch of encrypted, non-nencrypted, signed, unsigned,
> > message/alternative sub-documents.  Thus it is not easy to write a
> > general purpose command line tool.
> 
> python's email module is quite good for programmatically handling mime
> parts if you want to manipulate an e-mail (though it may not be so
> good for reconstructing it in some sort of bytewise exact fashion).

Python seems to be the best solution for me, at least I have some
experience with the language.

Thank you, also to Werner and Doug, for the suggestions.

> A tool that transforms an OpenPGP encrypted+signed MIME message into
> an OpenPGP-signed MIME message while retaining the original signature
> would be a really nice tool to have.

I will post here if I manage to come up with something useful. :-)

Ren?


From peter at digitalbrains.com  Mon Mar  2 18:53:57 2015
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Mon, 02 Mar 2015 18:53:57 +0100
Subject: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption
In-Reply-To: <54F43CE7.1070008@mailbox.org>
References: <000d01d05269$c1726dd0$44574970$@on.yourweb.de>
 <54F0CFA9.7070601@cardcontact.de> <54F0EA13.7020401@digitalbrains.com>
 <10330032.xGXXIq3lh9@inno> <54F1B51B.4060205@digitalbrains.com>
 <54F43CE7.1070008@mailbox.org>
Message-ID: <54F4A3B5.8010800@digitalbrains.com>

On 02/03/15 11:35, Stephan Beck wrote:
> Sticking to that "perfect position argument", in what kind of position are 
> (would be) the people that control (packaging of) your distro? (Just
> curious.)

I think they basically completely control my system. For individual Debian
Developers, it might need some ingenuity to get something sneaky on my
computer, since they generally only provide source, and the binaries are built
on the Debian infrastructure. Mind you, I say they need some ingenuity, that
is a far shot from "it's difficult". But the keys that the package manager
checks? If you have those, and can get my package manager to download your
stuff, it's trivial to change any file, any binary, any program on my computer.

It has occured to me that I probably could simply local-sign and fully trust
all OpenPGP keys of Debian Developers, since if the holder of said key wanted,
they could simply hardwire my GnuPG installation to effectively do the same
without my consent. But still, I haven't done it :).

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at <http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>


From Deepak.Saxena at safenet-inc.com  Mon Mar  2 16:41:06 2015
From: Deepak.Saxena at safenet-inc.com (Saxena, Deepak)
Date: Mon, 2 Mar 2015 21:11:06 +0530
Subject: GPG4Win 2.2.3 Smart card support
Message-ID: <33B1BAEAF9B37A439F73D9BF6B32ED4205F0096F@NOI1EXCH03.apac.sfnt.local>

Hello,

I am Deepak Saxena from Gemalto (formerly SafeNet Inc) and I am curious if smart cards are supported for storing the keys which will be used to encrypt files or email using gpg4win.
I have installed gpg4win 2.2.3 and want to test SafeNet smart cards.
I am getting following error:

[cid:image001.jpg at 01D0552D.660C8450]

Can  you please update me if third party tokens/smartcard cards are supported in your product.
Is MSCAPI/PKCS11 supported?

--Deepak saxena
+919911641953

The information contained in this electronic mail transmission 
may be privileged and confidential, and therefore, protected 
from disclosure. If you have received this communication in 
error, please notify us immediately by replying to this 
message and deleting it from your computer without copying 
or disclosing it.


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From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net  Mon Mar  2 22:00:23 2015
From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA)
Date: Mon, 2 Mar 2015 21:00:23 +0000
Subject: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption
In-Reply-To: <20150302104012.99d46e72ccd25b087199472f@webkeks.org>
References: <000d01d05269$c1726dd0$44574970$@on.yourweb.de>
 <54F061B6.3070205@seichter.de> <20150227234821.GA15748@athena.barrera.io>
 <54F1A86D.1050907@seichter.de> <20150228123619.GA7370@athena.barrera.io>
 <54F1BD40.4080504@seichter.de> <54F1BEB8.5090603@digitalbrains.com>
 <4B188EF8-3D01-461F-BEF9-C8E4504A2301@webkeks.org>
 <10210020677.20150301164545@my_localhost>
 <BD57B3DB-6D9F-4189-93DE-EC7351DD8D60@webkeks.org>
 <134737899.20150302082014@my_localhost>
 <20150302104012.99d46e72ccd25b087199472f@webkeks.org>
Message-ID: <232704321.20150302210023@my_localhost>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512



On Monday 2 March 2015 at 9:40:12 AM, in
<mid:20150302104012.99d46e72ccd25b087199472f at webkeks.org>, Jonathan
Schleifer wrote:


> It's not only your computer.

Likewise, it is not just my computer that would be wasting orders of
magnitude more energy on "proof of work" for all outgoing messages
than it currently wastes on downloading a little spam.



> Just think about the
> processing power required by spam filters.

I do not use spam filters because I have always regarded a single
missed important message due to a "false positive" from a spam filter
to be a more serious problem than any number of spam messages
received. And if an email provider I use has spam filters that I
cannot effectively opt out of, I still don't pay the electric bill for
their processing power.



> Think about
> the load servers have. Think about wasted harddrive
> space (mail providers do need to store that spam).

I would wager that needless use of HTML in emails probably contributes
far more to un-necessary server load and storage requirements than is
contributed by than spam.



> What does obvious have to do with wasting resources?

If the spam messages were not obvious, far more man-hours would be
wasted in spotting and deleting them. And people's time is the most
precious resource of all.


> Ok, you clearly haven't looked at it *at all*. There is
> no corporate server involved. It's peer-to-peer. And
> the proof of work is done on your local machine.

I don't see corporate iT and data security policies giving up
corporate email servers to allow peer-to-peer communication between
staff's workstations and the outside world anytime soon. I would
expect them to still want to know what staff were sending out, and
maybe encrypt it at the network boundary.


- --
Best regards

MFPA                    mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net

Alcohol and Calculus don't mix. Never drink and derive.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

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bu2qRwXxOsEjK+Ac/Spds2oyHwRjZTg9DT3mm892IBxBwZysLzkGXXtb8VhXmYJv
Y11oenxYBlbzd95a2LYgdEQFhaHPFRjien179g3XroKqdZ3bOs7j6TF/OxP//cxU
OwBC0c6yFkJoj9tEh649LjsVTJyaY6uSN9gWX/Hb3og45RzB9F1FFo/m4yLRMk6I
vgQBFgoAZgUCVPTPeF8UgAAAAAAuAChpc3N1ZXItZnByQG5vdGF0aW9ucy5vcGVu
cGdwLmZpZnRoaG9yc2VtYW4ubmV0MzNBQ0VENEVFOTEzNEVFQkRFNkE4NTA2MTcx
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=ehQz
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----



From johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl  Mon Mar  2 22:16:35 2015
From: johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl (Johan Wevers)
Date: Mon, 02 Mar 2015 22:16:35 +0100
Subject: trust paths
In-Reply-To: <7E6223D2-9610-435C-B4D1-FC9FB7A1233A@webkeks.org>
References: <000d01d05269$c1726dd0$44574970$@on.yourweb.de>
 <54F0CFA9.7070601@cardcontact.de> <1425068740.5204.81.camel@scientia.net>
 <1756253.oFcBDuDOmV@inno> <1425072641.5204.95.camel@scientia.net>
 <54F1FD55.8080308@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <1425146173.4857.17.camel@scientia.net>
 <54F205AE.5010307@vulcan.xs4all.nl>
 <7E6223D2-9610-435C-B4D1-FC9FB7A1233A@webkeks.org>
Message-ID: <54F4D333.5030503@vulcan.xs4all.nl>

On 01-03-2015 13:27, Jonathan Schleifer wrote:

> You are assuming it will be spoofed for everyone. It could just
> be spoofed for you. Anybody who can MITM you and give you a fake
> SSL cert that you accept

Well, perhaps they could if the ONLY way I communicated wit someone
would be electronically. I usually discuss sensitive matters with people
I know personally, so I could compare key ID's when I meet the other in
person. No way to spoof that.

That might not work when whistleblowing to a reporter I don't know
personally bu then, I would either first talk to him personally or
remain completely anonymous.

-- 
ir. J.C.A. Wevers
PGP/GPG public keys at http://www.xs4all.nl/~johanw/pgpkeys.html



From vedaal at nym.hush.com  Mon Mar  2 22:23:23 2015
From: vedaal at nym.hush.com (vedaal at nym.hush.com)
Date: Mon, 02 Mar 2015 16:23:23 -0500
Subject: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption
In-Reply-To: <232704321.20150302210023@my_localhost>
References: <000d01d05269$c1726dd0$44574970$@on.yourweb.de>
 <54F061B6.3070205@seichter.de> <20150227234821.GA15748@athena.barrera.io>
 <54F1A86D.1050907@seichter.de> <20150228123619.GA7370@athena.barrera.io>
 <54F1BD40.4080504@seichter.de> <54F1BEB8.5090603@digitalbrains.com>
 <4B188EF8-3D01-461F-BEF9-C8E4504A2301@webkeks.org>
 <10210020677.20150301164545@my_localhost>
 <BD57B3DB-6D9F-4189-93DE-EC7351DD8D60@webkeks.org>
 <134737899.20150302082014@my_localhost>
 <20150302104012.99d46e72ccd25b087199472f@webkeks.org>
 <232704321.20150302210023@my_localhost> 
Message-ID: <20150302212323.7F50AE044A@smtp.hushmail.com>

This month's Wired has an article about encryption for voice and text using pgp, and intercompatibility between i-phone and android while using it.

http://www.wired.com/2015/03/iphone-app-encrypted-voice-texts/

I wouldn't trust it with my real key, but would make a new 'smartphone' key signed with my real key, and comment it as for phone use only.

If this catches on, as Wired thinks, then it might be a new way of introducing pgp encryption to the general public, and from there it's not such a difficult step to getting phone users to try encrypting e-mails and files,

... and breathe new life into pgp encryption ...



vedaal



From johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl  Mon Mar  2 22:24:45 2015
From: johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl (Johan Wevers)
Date: Mon, 02 Mar 2015 22:24:45 +0100
Subject: strength of voice authentication [was: Re: German ct magazine
 postulates death of pgp encryption]
In-Reply-To: <54F37E20.3020101@riseup.net>
References: <000d01d05269$c1726dd0$44574970$@on.yourweb.de>
 <1425060977.5204.10.camel@scientia.net> <54F1B456.2080900@vulcan.xs4all.nl>
 <87a8zycel8.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net> <54F200CD.6060108@vulcan.xs4all.nl>
 <54F37E20.3020101@riseup.net>
Message-ID: <54F4D51D.1010501@vulcan.xs4all.nl>

On 01-03-2015 22:01, flapflap wrote:

> Just think about the "grandchild trick" ([0], unfortunately not in
> English) which is a method where the criminals phone (often elder)
> people and tell them that they are a grandchild, nephew, or other remote
> relative and need some money for some reason

Ah yes, but then, with such methods a number of failures are to be
expected and the scammers don't care as long as a certain percentage is
fooled. When using this trick to fool someone into telling confidentuial
things it is very uncertain. For once, I've never heard of the police
trying something like this to obtain confessions or information: the
chance of failure in an indivicual case are too big.

-- 
ir. J.C.A. Wevers
PGP/GPG public keys at http://www.xs4all.nl/~johanw/pgpkeys.html



From js-gnupg-users at webkeks.org  Mon Mar  2 22:29:56 2015
From: js-gnupg-users at webkeks.org (Jonathan Schleifer)
Date: Mon, 2 Mar 2015 22:29:56 +0100
Subject: strength of voice authentication [was: Re: German ct magazine
 postulates death of pgp encryption]
In-Reply-To: <54F4D51D.1010501@vulcan.xs4all.nl>
References: <000d01d05269$c1726dd0$44574970$@on.yourweb.de>
 <1425060977.5204.10.camel@scientia.net>
 <54F1B456.2080900@vulcan.xs4all.nl>
 <87a8zycel8.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
 <54F200CD.6060108@vulcan.xs4all.nl> <54F37E20.3020101@riseup.net>
 <54F4D51D.1010501@vulcan.xs4all.nl>
Message-ID: <20150302222956.d0021cc58ddd76f6ca91112e@webkeks.org>

On Mon, 02 Mar 2015 22:24:45 +0100, Johan Wevers <johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl> wrote:

> For once, I've never heard of the police
> trying something like this to obtain confessions or information: the
> chance of failure in an indivicual case are too big.

I'm guessing the reason is more that this would be a legal mine field and most likely completely useless in court.

-- 
Jonathan
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From kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com  Mon Mar  2 22:36:19 2015
From: kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com (Kristian Fiskerstrand)
Date: Mon, 02 Mar 2015 22:36:19 +0100
Subject: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption
In-Reply-To: <54F4458C.7050700@sumptuouscapital.com>
References: <000d01d05269$c1726dd0$44574970$@on.yourweb.de>
 <1890860.SDiBssEjyI@inno> <000e01d05280$656fed70$304fc850$@on.yourweb.de>
 <7920271.MAWFr6xyvP@inno>
 <54F05EF5.6050105__7398.9701144912$1425039188$gmane$org@sumptuouscapital.com>
 <54F09ACB.6020108@enigmail.net>
 <87lhjjm8mn.fsf__7019.33337045393$1425067345$gmane$org@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <54F3251D.20300@enigmail.net> <000401d054c9$80c813e0$82583ba0$@on.yourweb.de>
 <54F4458C.7050700@sumptuouscapital.com>
Message-ID: <54F4D7D3.4080700@sumptuouscapital.com>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

On 03/02/2015 12:12 PM, Kristian Fiskerstrand wrote:
> On 03/02/2015 10:16 AM, gnupgpacker wrote:
>> Hello,

Seems I inadvertently sent this message only directly without CCing
the list

> 
> 
> ..
> 
> 
>> This procedure should be implemented in keyservers.
> 
>> No CA needed, no centralisation necessary => just verifying of 
>> existing AND proper working email addresses.
> 
> This _is_ a CA, granted with weak verification (could arguably say 
> similar to domain validated X.509 certs), but conceptually a CA
> none the less. Such weak verification does not rely on being
> implemented in keyservers, and would be better off outside it.
> 
> 
>> Additional: There are lot of old keys on keyservers not being 
>> verified in described manner.
> 
> Because they are not designed for it, nor need it.
> 
>> Those keys (or the newer, verified ones) could be marked with a 
>> short hint on keyservers to differ between verified and not 
>> verified email addresses.
> 
>> Facility of deleting own (!) keys on keyserver wanted for old 
>> (revoked, expired, test, failed...) keys.
> 
> This could open up to several attacks, in particular where keys
> have been revoked. The keyservers are add only for a reason, and
> should remain so.
> 
> 
> 

- -- 
- ----------------------------
Kristian Fiskerstrand
Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com
Twitter: @krifisk
- ----------------------------
Public OpenPGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net
fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3
- ----------------------------
"Expect the best. Prepare for the worst. Capitalize on what comes."
(Zig Ziglar)
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

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8UUzUmWEFDDF0A4asNX1oVo4xaDmJbbqyBIRzOIkDXsyoyC1vrKdfnA7wODO9U+F
x4DBgOq/IaPVsZggeeEuKc5SoYKXhZ9+eHcPsSCWh0JrHR11YHR9nIV5LuxXoY0d
z0X+afV2cExRRD8iGWb7QIA/sR33V2IaGCUfIwhi4+O+xmzETZTohiO03Jx5hE7H
N/JYSPeNOSaVPPZ+2TNsbYkVs3RMOMdb3TvTZAQCOoNXo28T8nkAg8n0UZA3X9g=
=EpMZ
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


From johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl  Mon Mar  2 23:33:40 2015
From: johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl (Johan Wevers)
Date: Mon, 02 Mar 2015 23:33:40 +0100
Subject: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption
In-Reply-To: <20150302212323.7F50AE044A@smtp.hushmail.com>
References: <000d01d05269$c1726dd0$44574970$@on.yourweb.de>
 <54F061B6.3070205@seichter.de> <20150227234821.GA15748@athena.barrera.io>
 <54F1A86D.1050907@seichter.de> <20150228123619.GA7370@athena.barrera.io>
 <54F1BD40.4080504@seichter.de> <54F1BEB8.5090603@digitalbrains.com>
 <4B188EF8-3D01-461F-BEF9-C8E4504A2301@webkeks.org>
 <10210020677.20150301164545@my_localhost>
 <BD57B3DB-6D9F-4189-93DE-EC7351DD8D60@webkeks.org>
 <134737899.20150302082014@my_localhost>
 <20150302104012.99d46e72ccd25b087199472f@webkeks.org>
 <232704321.20150302210023@my_localhost>
 <20150302212323.7F50AE044A@smtp.hushmail.com>
Message-ID: <54F4E544.9070801@vulcan.xs4all.nl>

On 02-03-2015 22:23, vedaal at nym.hush.com wrote:

> http://www.wired.com/2015/03/iphone-app-encrypted-voice-texts/
> 
> I wouldn't trust it with my real key, but would make a new
> 'smartphone' key signed with my real key, and comment it as
> for phone use only.

You can't, it uses an own key scheme not compatible with openpgp. The
protocol is described on
https://github.com/WhisperSystems/TextSecure/wiki/ProtocolV2, they use
ECC with Curve25519 and AES256. Signatures on a key are not possible.
Only manual verification of the key fingerprint, or, when ypou meet in
person, scanning this number represented in a QR code on screen with the
camera, is possibble.

> If this catches on, as Wired thinks

I use Textsecure quite some time as sms replacement but failed to
convinvce anyone else to use it too (wether as sms replacement or stand
alone chatapp).

-- 
ir. J.C.A. Wevers
PGP/GPG public keys at http://www.xs4all.nl/~johanw/pgpkeys.html



From hans at guardianproject.info  Tue Mar  3 10:18:12 2015
From: hans at guardianproject.info (Hans of Guardian)
Date: Tue, 3 Mar 2015 10:18:12 +0100
Subject: Circumvention Tech Summit in Valencia
Message-ID: <E1B3F2BC-F188-4849-BDF6-CC8943F0F9A0@guardianproject.info>


Are any GnuPG dev people at the Circumvention Tech Summit in Valencia, that is now until Saturaday?  I'm arriving today. It could be useful to have a little GnuPG chat in person.

.hc

From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Tue Mar  3 12:51:52 2015
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Tue, 03 Mar 2015 12:51:52 +0100
Subject: Circumvention Tech Summit in Valencia
In-Reply-To: <E1B3F2BC-F188-4849-BDF6-CC8943F0F9A0@guardianproject.info>
References: <E1B3F2BC-F188-4849-BDF6-CC8943F0F9A0@guardianproject.info>
Message-ID: <54F5A058.8010804@sixdemonbag.org>

> Are any GnuPG dev people at the Circumvention Tech Summit in
> Valencia, that is now until Saturaday?  I'm arriving today. It could
> be useful to have a little GnuPG chat in person.

Daniel Kahn Gillmor and I are both here.  (And in fact, we met briefly,
and much to the surprise of many people here but not to either dkg or
myself, there was mutual respect, goodwill, and a stunning lack of
bloodshed.)  :)

Admittedly, "the GnuPG dev people" is really a one-element list
containing Werner.  But there are certainly people active in the GnuPG
community here.


From kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com  Tue Mar  3 13:34:01 2015
From: kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com (Kristian Fiskerstrand)
Date: Tue, 03 Mar 2015 13:34:01 +0100
Subject: Circumvention Tech Summit in Valencia
In-Reply-To: <54F5A058.8010804@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <E1B3F2BC-F188-4849-BDF6-CC8943F0F9A0@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5A058.8010804@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <54F5AA39.6090009@sumptuouscapital.com>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

On 03/03/2015 12:51 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
>> Are any GnuPG dev people at the Circumvention Tech Summit in 
>> Valencia, that is now until Saturaday?  I'm arriving today. It
>> could be useful to have a little GnuPG chat in person.
> 
> Daniel Kahn Gillmor and I are both here.  (And in fact, we met
> briefly, and much to the surprise of many people here but not to
> either dkg or myself, there was mutual respect, goodwill, and a
> stunning lack of bloodshed.)  :)
> 

Hope you guys have a great time! (and remember to sign each other's
OpenPGP keys) :)


- -- 
- ----------------------------
Kristian Fiskerstrand
Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com
Twitter: @krifisk
- ----------------------------
Public OpenPGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net
fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3
- ----------------------------
Nosce te ipsum!
Know thyself!
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

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K2GjayAx923SmaPsdaCnhqU/gn6hfeQsEYrBP5HXsa9KPMmFukW88SibxRNl5QAF
WxRjKXS2aMNOxh+96xixgAynLeu72Mgdfogth2G8Z1daM6503t7fYtsIFjBITH9X
yKjq1ItuNi8SvK7mimJWFfY+ngh/NSB5SKFHP0YpABI6vRihr7SgTJ8/Gwqj1Exq
11WMMkk36WIO6uRmpdBn5aqseniCEnNyUklP4Uwfgqxe6LDxgtklpnPsOH+MkVY=
=Z2uc
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


From stebe at mailbox.org  Tue Mar  3 13:54:01 2015
From: stebe at mailbox.org (Stephan Beck)
Date: Tue, 03 Mar 2015 13:54:01 +0100
Subject: Fwd: Re: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption
In-Reply-To: <54F4A3B5.8010800@digitalbrains.com>
References: <54F4A3B5.8010800@digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <54F5AEE9.8080207@mailbox.org>

Hi Peter,

as your message hasn't reached the list inspite of being addressed to it, I
resend it.

Thanks

Stephan


-------- Weitergeleitete Nachricht --------
Betreff: Re: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption
Datum: Mon, 02 Mar 2015 18:53:57 +0100
Von: Peter Lebbing <peter at digitalbrains.com>
An: Stephan Beck <stebe at mailbox.org>, gnupg-users at gnupg.org

On 02/03/15 11:35, Stephan Beck wrote:
> Sticking to that "perfect position argument", in what kind of position are 
> (would be) the people that control (packaging of) your distro? (Just
> curious.)

I think they basically completely control my system. For individual Debian
Developers, it might need some ingenuity to get something sneaky on my
computer, since they generally only provide source, and the binaries are built
on the Debian infrastructure. Mind you, I say they need some ingenuity, that
is a far shot from "it's difficult". But the keys that the package manager
checks? If you have those, and can get my package manager to download your
stuff, it's trivial to change any file, any binary, any program on my computer.

It has occured to me that I probably could simply local-sign and fully trust
all OpenPGP keys of Debian Developers, since if the holder of said key wanted,
they could simply hardwire my GnuPG installation to effectively do the same
without my consent. But still, I haven't done it :).

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at <http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>





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From kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com  Tue Mar  3 13:59:54 2015
From: kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com (Kristian Fiskerstrand)
Date: Tue, 03 Mar 2015 13:59:54 +0100
Subject: Fwd: Re: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption
In-Reply-To: <54F5AEE9.8080207@mailbox.org>
References: <54F4A3B5.8010800@digitalbrains.com> <54F5AEE9.8080207@mailbox.org>
Message-ID: <54F5B04A.6000301@sumptuouscapital.com>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

On 03/03/2015 01:54 PM, Stephan Beck wrote:
> Hi Peter,
> 
> as your message hasn't reached the list inspite of being addressed
> to it, I resend it.


Fwiw, it reached the list just fine:
http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/2015-March/052931.html
- -- 
- ----------------------------
Kristian Fiskerstrand
Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com
Twitter: @krifisk
- ----------------------------
Public OpenPGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net
fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3
- ----------------------------
Audaces fortuna iuvat
Fortune favors the brave
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

iQEcBAEBCgAGBQJU9bBFAAoJEP7VAChXwav67NgIAI5R8vDx6cH/X7mtOVz3MdFi
9gT59pDxc+PD3ru3er0gF7k6Y0SGqRBHC9wparTyw/IuVIleziuQPVtMKqAU/sz5
htq9lsjVwRcLtzqSzjAOpF811yx2hpwxz7V5OrXkYinpXx6orfZVFCFSz143lVLX
Kv6a96rsGVbOrEMrepHbCkqzayX1qpj+IHAmO+jKHUXeICporhky2VTTQKQ488Sb
Id1xmEznig/9kUDBmqzGtEQPiNYGXh7Z3X9SWrdT7168ZiT4StnJeGzPjP7W+9gt
pPubbh4R2GKX5tAeYxJfSN+6eHNrOwLtwimHI/SP/PWPzmtxpcMXGtbtkqCReuE=
=wuAX
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


From mailing-lists at asatiifm.net  Tue Mar  3 14:00:27 2015
From: mailing-lists at asatiifm.net (=?windows-1252?Q?Ville_M=E4=E4tt=E4?=)
Date: Tue, 03 Mar 2015 15:00:27 +0200
Subject: Fwd: Re: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption
In-Reply-To: <54F5AEE9.8080207@mailbox.org>
References: <54F4A3B5.8010800@digitalbrains.com> <54F5AEE9.8080207@mailbox.org>
Message-ID: <54F5B06B.8030701@asatiifm.net>

On 03.03.15 14:54, Stephan Beck wrote:
> as your message hasn't reached the list inspite of being addressed to it

It did :).

-- 
Ville

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From brian at minton.name  Tue Mar  3 14:35:18 2015
From: brian at minton.name (Brian Minton)
Date: Tue, 3 Mar 2015 08:35:18 -0500
Subject: Decrypting PGP/MIME on the command line
In-Reply-To: <E1YS4v0-0001uj-Qq@talos.kcore.de>
References: <E1YS4v0-0001uj-Qq@talos.kcore.de>
Message-ID: <CANyOob3eS0wAVmxryO+7dGxveHQ3evy5vxv2PexwJ4Ki6zAMUQ@mail.gmail.com>

Mailpile may be useful.  https://mailpile.is

It lets you scan in a bunch of messages, and decrypt them, and indexes
them, keeping the index and message store encrypted.  It has command
line as well as a gui.

On Sun, Mar 1, 2015 at 9:32 AM, Ren? Puls <rpuls at kcore.de> wrote:
> Hi,
>
> is there a command line utility that takes a PGP/MIME encrypted message
> (a plain RFC 2822 text file) and outputs an unencrypted copy? The
> secret key is available and GnuPG is configured correctly. It is okay
> if the process is somewhat lossy; signatures or attachments do not need
> to be preserved, although I would not mind that either. :-)
>
> Background: I would like to decrypt e-mails permanently for archiving
> and searching, and run this utility over hundreds of e-mails in a
> single batch.
>
> Alternatively, if there is a way to permanently decrypt an e-mail in
> Claws Mail, that would help me as well. It seems that Enigmail has such
> a feature[1] (or will have it soon), but I have not found anything
> similar for Claws Mail and would prefer a general-purpose utility which
> I can just run as a filter, independent of my e-mail client.
>
> Ren?
>
> [1] http://sourceforge.net/p/enigmail/bugs/1/
>
> _______________________________________________
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users


From stebe at mailbox.org  Tue Mar  3 15:40:45 2015
From: stebe at mailbox.org (Stephan Beck)
Date: Tue, 03 Mar 2015 15:40:45 +0100
Subject: Fwd: Re: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption
In-Reply-To: <54F5B06B.8030701@asatiifm.net>
References: <54F4A3B5.8010800@digitalbrains.com>
 <54F5AEE9.8080207@mailbox.org> <54F5B06B.8030701@asatiifm.net>
Message-ID: <54F5C7ED.9080608@mailbox.org>

Am 03.03.2015 um 14:00 schrieb Ville M??tt?:
> On 03.03.15 14:54, Stephan Beck wrote:
>> as your message hasn't reached the list inspite of being addressed to it
> 
> It did :).
> 
Strange, I did only receive the PM, not the listmail, so I thought it might be
useful to resend it. In that case, sorry for the duplication.

Regards

Stephan



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From samir at samirnassar.com  Tue Mar  3 15:44:35 2015
From: samir at samirnassar.com (Samir Nassar)
Date: Tue, 03 Mar 2015 15:44:35 +0100
Subject: Circumvention Tech Summit in Valencia
In-Reply-To: <54F5AA39.6090009@sumptuouscapital.com>
References: <E1B3F2BC-F188-4849-BDF6-CC8943F0F9A0@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5A058.8010804@sixdemonbag.org> <54F5AA39.6090009@sumptuouscapital.com>
Message-ID: <25918770.FihGgUjN1J@unicorn>

On Tuesday, March 03, 2015 01:34:01 PM Kristian Fiskerstrand wrote:
> On 03/03/2015 12:51 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> > Daniel Kahn Gillmor and I are both here.  (And in fact, we met
> > briefly, and much to the surprise of many people here but not to
> > either dkg or myself, there was mutual respect, goodwill, and a
> > stunning lack of bloodshed.)  :)

> Hope you guys have a great time! (and remember to sign each other's
> OpenPGP keys) :)

Non developers are also here and happy to verify OpenPGP certificates as well.

Samir

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From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Tue Mar  3 15:49:41 2015
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Tue, 03 Mar 2015 15:49:41 +0100
Subject: Circumvention Tech Summit in Valencia
In-Reply-To: <25918770.FihGgUjN1J@unicorn>
References: <E1B3F2BC-F188-4849-BDF6-CC8943F0F9A0@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5A058.8010804@sixdemonbag.org> <54F5AA39.6090009@sumptuouscapital.com>
 <25918770.FihGgUjN1J@unicorn>
Message-ID: <54F5CA05.7090205@sixdemonbag.org>

> Non developers are also here and happy to verify OpenPGP certificates
> as well.

And happy to buy people beer.  Thanks again, Samir.  :)

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From hans at guardianproject.info  Tue Mar  3 13:50:24 2015
From: hans at guardianproject.info (Hans of Guardian)
Date: Tue, 3 Mar 2015 13:50:24 +0100
Subject: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption
In-Reply-To: <54F05EF5.6050105@sumptuouscapital.com>
References: <000d01d05269$c1726dd0$44574970$@on.yourweb.de>
 <1890860.SDiBssEjyI@inno> <000e01d05280$656fed70$304fc850$@on.yourweb.de>
 <7920271.MAWFr6xyvP@inno> <54F05EF5.6050105@sumptuouscapital.com>
Message-ID: <8257BF12-09C1-41C2-9C5F-F78CB60FD5A9@guardianproject.info>


On Feb 27, 2015, at 1:11 PM, Kristian Fiskerstrand wrote:

> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA512
> 
> On 02/27/2015 12:43 PM, Hauke Laging wrote:
>> Am Fr 27.02.2015, 12:27:40 schrieb gnupgpacker:
>> 
>>> Maybe implementation with an opt-in could preserve publishing of
>>> faked keys on public keyservers?
>> 
>> We need keyservers which are a lot better that today's. IMHO that
>> also means that a keyserver should tell a client for each offered
>> certificate whether it (or a trusted keyserver) has made such an
>> email verification.
> 
> The keyservers have no role in this, they are pure data store and can
> never act as a CA. That would bring up a can of worm of issues, both
> politically and legally, I wouldn't want to see the first case where a
> keyserver operator was sued for permitting a "fake key" (the term
> itself is very misleading, the key itself isn't fake at all, but a
> fully valid key where the UID has not been mated to its holder through
> proper validation).


The standard PGP keyserver pool is a mess with racist spam, lost keys that will be there forever, etc.  The concept of email validation is very very common and proven in internet service providers.  It is time for OpenPGP keyservers to join the rest of the internet.

Keyservers should not be located in jurisdictions where they could be sued for merely acting as a conduit for data.  There are many countries that meet this criteria.  The US is one good example there: internet service providers are not liable for what their users do.

.hc


> Another way this is being handled in some systems is dedicated
> keyservers for an organization (standard is keys.[domain] in the cases
> I've seen) that looks up key using LDAP. This is a read-only store
> that is connected to the Domain Controller / Active Directory in the
> system I'm thinking of. So at least Symantec Encryption Server checks
> for the existence of such a keyserver when sending and asking it for
> it. The keys are automatically maintained with a short time to expiry
> requiring frequent refreshes. I understand the rationale, but would
> rather see a CA involved in this (i.e a Company Employee CA).
> 
> People need to understand that operational security is critical for
> any security of a system and validate the key through secondary
> channel (fingerprint, algorithm type, key length etc verifiable
> directly or through probabilistic measures e.g. based on historical
> postings on mailing lists over a long time for a project etc).
> 
> - -- 
> - ----------------------------
> Kristian Fiskerstrand
> Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com
> Twitter: @krifisk
> - ----------------------------
> Public OpenPGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net
> fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3
> - ----------------------------
> Ubi mel ibi apes
> Where there's honey, there are bees
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
> 
> iQEcBAEBCgAGBQJU8F7vAAoJEP7VAChXwav6yrwIAI95x/GZrq+5gCYhHjDuCWhv
> a2FB1ki5c5unMzN6gtBjwY0Tf8SfAicnR2NpRn2VUkb68/hVG5H3JEhQcVsLt6Je
> 5LUFR9gjyN8VGoDnMl0g1khxfNcakYh6f1vPmLihfiP4Yh6Pf6PebIkurqhvhwkf
> NnwtIipSipDeXuQgJBMmN9fMXUqkO1uA2tt0tewtIaJy2y+BMmzVbRkpqZocl2z6
> VcwBT/7FUUv4ePdV16xTuim9DvmbsCoPmwl+1XRauEeJsN3AOyE0X/Y/gKYX4QX0
> RWUaCu2b7YRqMYyaYs053EsH+XEAPVOVDnBHUFst/c6j4hIJV7T4zB2mpi5+VKw=
> =IZT3
> -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users



From hans at guardianproject.info  Tue Mar  3 14:00:23 2015
From: hans at guardianproject.info (Hans of Guardian)
Date: Tue, 3 Mar 2015 14:00:23 +0100
Subject: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption
In-Reply-To: <87lhjjm8mn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <000d01d05269$c1726dd0$44574970$@on.yourweb.de>
 <1890860.SDiBssEjyI@inno> <000e01d05280$656fed70$304fc850$@on.yourweb.de>
 <7920271.MAWFr6xyvP@inno>
 <54F05EF5.6050105__7398.9701144912$1425039188$gmane$org@sumptuouscapital.com>
 <54F09ACB.6020108@enigmail.net> <87lhjjm8mn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <865C8D86-B091-4C51-B010-7D3BD4F27818@guardianproject.info>


On Feb 27, 2015, at 8:56 PM, Werner Koch wrote:

> On Fri, 27 Feb 2015 17:26, patrick at enigmail.net said:
> 
>> that anyone can upload _every_ key to a keyserver is an issue. If
>> keyservers would do some sort of verification (e.g. confirmation of
>> the email addresses) then this would lead to much more reliable data.
> 
> We have such a system. It is called S/MIME.
> 
> Ever tried to find an S/MIME (X.509) key (aka certificate) for an
> arbitrary mail address?  The only working solution to get such a key is
> by sending a mail and asking for the key.  You can do the very same with
> PGP of course.  Keyservers along with visting cards are much nicer.
> 
> So, why is there no public service to distribute X.509 keys?  Because
> nobody want to be legally responsible for such a key unless you push a
> stack of money over the table for a qualified signature certificate.
> 
> BTW, even the DFN PGP keyserver (blackhole.pca.dfn.de) had to be shut
> down for similar legal reasons.  However, it is not a problem, we can
> use other keyservers.
> 
>> believe that this would make keyservers more trustworthy than today.
> 
> There is no trust in keyservers by design.  As soon as you start
> changing this you are turning PGP into a centralized system.

Services like keybase.io with poor security practices are going to rapidly take over from the PGP keyserver pool because they address side of the human interaction, unlike the PGP keyservers.  They are easy to use and the follow the very common interaction patterns that basically all web services these days use. That must also be considered when thinking about security.  The PGP keyservers need email validation not as a way to provide any kind of "trusted" status of that key, but rather so enable people to delete keys that should no longer be there, and to prevent keyserver spam and vandalism.  For a good example, search for Richard Stallman and you will see how badly the PGP keyservers are failing.

Another common scenario is that people make mistakes when learning how to use PGP.  There is a common mistake of generating a key to play with, publishing to the keyserver, then deleting.  That key will then be on the keyserver forever with no way to delete it.  That is terrible both security-wise because it is confusing for people who are searching for keys, and it is terrible human-interaction-wise because it adds pointless noise when searching for keys.

.hc



From hans at guardianproject.info  Tue Mar  3 14:29:38 2015
From: hans at guardianproject.info (Hans of Guardian)
Date: Tue, 3 Mar 2015 14:29:38 +0100
Subject: Thoughts on GnuPG and automation
In-Reply-To: <54F07A7D.3040709@digitalbrains.com>
References: <54F04EC5.3000107@guardianproject.info>
 <54F07A7D.3040709@digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <AE0A6C7E-6A40-40C2-A401-0FACB5F84833@guardianproject.info>


On Feb 27, 2015, at 3:09 PM, Peter Lebbing wrote:

> On 27/02/15 12:02, Hans-Christoph Steiner wrote:
>> For example, I think that
>> `gpg --json` is great idea.  I ended up using a Java wrapper of GPGME, which
>> is in turn a wrapper of GnuPG.  I think it makes a lot more sense to have `gpg
>> --json` as the parseble interface, then implement a GPGME-style framework in
>> each language (Python, Java, etc).
> 
> I'd say the JSON interface could just be an additional set of functions in
> GPGME; and GPGME simply talks the old colon-separated protocol to the gpg
> binary. You can't just take out the colon-separated protocol, and that protocol
> has all the information. You could simply have GPGME reformat the output.
> 
> Unless you mean that you want to speak to the gpg binary yourself, without GPGME
> in between. In that, case, I simply think you might be on the wrong track, and
> should use a library. If GPGME itself is a problem because you don't know what
> platform you should compile for, like in Python, then the library could be
> re-implemented in pure Python instead of using a foreign function interface.
> 
> The old calling conventions of the binary cannot change, otherwise you'd break
> everything that already depends on it. And adding multiple ways of doing the
> same thing in the gpg binary seems the wrong place; more code, more chance of
> bugs, etcetera. This is where libraries come in, to save you the burden of
> working with the gpg binary.

It is actually more difficult to wrap GPGME in Java than to have just rewritten GPGME in Java.  GPGME is a fine API for C/C++, it is a bad API for other languages.  You end up with an API that feels like a C API forced into the language, e.g. Java, python, etc.  That makes for more coding mistakes because it feels foreign to the programmer.  More mistakes means more security issues.

.hc

From samir at samirnassar.com  Tue Mar  3 16:10:59 2015
From: samir at samirnassar.com (Samir Nassar)
Date: Tue, 03 Mar 2015 16:10:59 +0100
Subject: Circumvention Tech Summit in Valencia
In-Reply-To: <54F5CA05.7090205@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <E1B3F2BC-F188-4849-BDF6-CC8943F0F9A0@guardianproject.info>
 <25918770.FihGgUjN1J@unicorn> <54F5CA05.7090205@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <3995222.d1cKYBiXjx@unicorn>

On Tuesday, March 03, 2015 03:49:41 PM Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> > Non developers are also here and happy to verify OpenPGP certificates
> > as well.
> 
> And happy to buy people beer.  Thanks again, Samir.  :)

It is in the constitution; if you are a FOSS developer the least I can do is 
provide $beverage.

Samir
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From hans at guardianproject.info  Tue Mar  3 14:33:13 2015
From: hans at guardianproject.info (Hans of Guardian)
Date: Tue, 3 Mar 2015 14:33:13 +0100
Subject: Thoughts on GnuPG and automation
In-Reply-To: <20150227121834-25258-9117-mailpile@slinky>
References: <54F04EC5.3000107@guardianproject.info>
 <20150227121834-25258-9117-mailpile@slinky>
Message-ID: <50378E65-5560-4AE1-9190-959E4435B40B@guardianproject.info>


On Feb 27, 2015, at 1:19 PM, Bjarni Runar Einarsson wrote:

> Hi Hans-Christoph!
> 
> Hans-Christoph Steiner <hans at guardianproject.info> wrote:
>> With all the recent attention to GnuPG and Werner's work, I have begun to
>> think about things differently.  GnuPG has an amazing security track record.
>> It has had few serious security bugs, nothing even close to heartbleed that I
>> know of, and yet it is core to providing security to GNU/Linux distros, as
>> well as protecting people like Laura Poitras and Edward Snowden. So instead
>> of complaining about the difficulties, I now try to think about whether such
>> difficulties might actually be related to what makes GnuPG so solid.
> 
> Some of the more jaded will call this Stockholm syndrome. :-P
> 
> I don't agree with the voices that want to discard PGP and start from
> scratch. There is valuable experience and maturity in this project,
> which is why we care enough to complain when it is hard to work with.
> 
>> anyone interested in providing usable security needs to think hard about this.
>> Sure we can make things easier to use, but it is a very slippery slope
>> towards reducing security.
> 
> I really disagree with this. If a security tool is too hard to
> understand, whether for a developer or user, then insecurity will be the
> inevitable result: people will use it wrong. This is only in part
> GnuPG's resposibility, most of the complexity is inherited from OpenPGP
> and the fact that public/private key crypto and key management are just
> very complex topics.
> 
> This is the one point where I agree with the voices calling for
> abandoning OpenPGP entirely. It can well be argued that the whole
> cryptoscheme has been field tested and proven too complex for humans to
> use correctly. That's not exactly GnuPG's problem either, but these
> voices are becoming louder and, increasingly, there is finally
> competition in this space. The project will get marginalized if
> usability is ignored completely.
> 
> Mailpile's attempt to make OpenPGP easy to use is us stubbornly trying
> to prove that it can be done. But I'm only somewhat optimistic that
> we'll succeed, and we'll only do so if we face reality and drop a large
> number of the features that make PGP what it is - in particular the web
> of trust and default trust model, and who knows what else. I don't mind
> if that code exists inside GnuPG, but Mailpile is absolutely not going
> to be using it.

I think if you actually disagree, you are missing my essential point.  But my guess is that we agree more than disagree.  Of course, I entirely agree that bad usability can also make a technically secure system actually very insecure.  This point is not mutually exclusive with what I said, and indeed both must be taken fully into account.

So for example, we could make PGP email really easy if we consider only a mass surveillance threat model.  Just make all the processes transparent in the background: passphrases, key generation, downloading public keys, etc.  But that would produce a system that would not work for the highly targeted threat models like Edward Snowden and Laura Poitras.  They would need to use a specialized system, and that specialized system might then be a marker of suspicion (for example, lots of governments, including the NSA, already mark all PGP messages as suspicious).  That then makes it a lot harder for people who suddenly realize that they might be under scrutiny.

There is a big tide of thinking about usability of security tools.  This is a great thing, and we need lots of contributions. But what it happening far too often these days is that the new generation are trumpeting "ease of use" above all else.  We are seeing systems like keybase.io that make things really easy, but also expect users to upload their _private_ key to some alpha web service.  That is terrible security practice.

I've also been arguing that we need to make encryption much easier to do.  But we are failing as UX designers if we do not deeply understand the systems that are trying to make easier to use.  And that is why I advocate thinking long and hard about GnuPG, and what makes it hard to use, and what makes it secure.  Only then can we really make solid security usable.


>> I also have to call out that part of the problem that mailpile is continuing:
>> it is generally more fun to write code, rather than figure out someone else's
>> library. That is especially true when its a complicated thing like GnuPG.
>> But in order to have shared maintenance and work, we all need to take
>> responsibility and try to build upon the work of others whenever possible.
>> Mailpile did not do that, and instead wrote yet another incomplete
>> python API for GnuPG.
> 
> Fair enough. We were in a hurry, and we probably did make a mistake
> here. There is a reason why we haven't broken our library out and
> published separately though: we do hope to tear it out and replace it
> with something more standard down the line.
> 
> However, having done the work, I can now state with confidence that the
> complexity of our library is not because GnuPG is doing complex things.
> It is because the GnuPG command line interfaces for automation are
> incomplete and very hard to work with. Libraries might be able to hide
> this fact, but that doesn't make the problem go away - sysadmins and
> scripters everywhere have to deal with this all the time. It's a real
> burden and the source of many, many posts to this list and others.
> 
> It's easy for developers to lose sight of the fact that no matter how
> many libraries exist, most people first encounter gpg at the command
> line. Slowly expanding on that and automating what you have learned is
> the Unix way, and it's a wonderful thing. Whatever the reason, GnuPG is
> not very good at this today.
> 
> Unfortunately lots of existing code depends on these things staying
> unchanged, quirks and all. So it may be too late to fix, realistically
> speaking. Missing flags could be added, but cleaning up the stuff that
> already exists may be impossible. If that's Werner's verdict, then I
> totally understand and promise to stop complaining about it.

I strongly support an effort to make a clean, modern method of interacting with GnuPG.  Then we can make flexible, maintainable, and native-feeling GnuPG libraries.  I think that `gpg --json` encapsulates the idea quite well.  Then --with-colons can remain as is for compatibility.

The big question here is: who is going to do the work?  And I don't think it is a valid question to just punt and say "GnuPG has all this money now".  It is bigger than that.


>> Another possibility is making ASSUAN, the internal protocol between GnuPG
>> components, the API instead of `gpg --json`. This only works on GnuPG 2.1, as
>> far as I understand it, since in 2.1, even commands like gpg communicate with
>> gpg-agent using ASSUAN, and it is actually gpg-agent that does all the work.
> 
> FWIW, I took a lok at Assuan a while back, and I really like it.
> Replacing Assuan with JSON might help the project interface with the
> rest of the world, but that's the only argument in its favour; Assuan is
> definitely more suited to the things that GPG has to do. There is also a
> nice little Python library for interacting with it, so if gpg-agent ends
> up exposing an Assuan interface which can do all the stuff people do
> with GPGME, then I'll be very happy to switch to that.
> 
> Very happy! :-)

Werner wasn't too keen in the past, but maybe there are some new thoughts on this.  `gpg --json` seems like a worthwhile fallback for public ASSUAN.


>> Contrary to the mailpile write-ups, I think that having all the work
>> happen in gpg-agent makes sense, as long as there is a good API to it.
> 
> I think you misunderstood my complaint. I don't mind if the agent is a
> persistance daemon that provides GPG-related services, that's all well
> and good. It's good process separation and I have no problem with that.
> 
> My gripe with the agent, is the agent is controlling the UI of
> authentication. This breaks Mailpile, and this is one of the key areas
> where GnuPG crosses the imaginary line between library/utility and
> "application". Fixing this was point 1. in my list of suggestions and explaining why it was necessary was the bulk of the post.
> 
> I took a look at the kludge Werner directed me towards in his previous
> mail - as far as I can tell, I can't use it unless I run my own
> dedicated gpg-agent with a custom configuration and custom keyring.
> Because gpg-agent controls the UI.
> 
> I can do that. I can run a dedicated gpg-agent just for Mailpile and
> have a dedicated keyring. That'll work fine for most people and some may
> even prefer it. Only the folks on this list and folks that already have
> PGP keys will be unhappy that suddenly they have two keyrings to worry
> about, not just one... and for people wanting to keep their keychains in
> sync, we will have made key management even harder than it already is.
> 
> As far as I can tell, those are the options available to me at the
> moment, unless I just stick with gnupg 1.4.x.

My guess is that you can achieve whatever you want to achieve using a custom pinentry.  But my memory is rusting, and Abel Luck, the other main dev on the Android port, did the bulk of that work.

.hc




From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Tue Mar  3 16:15:45 2015
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Tue, 03 Mar 2015 16:15:45 +0100
Subject: Circumvention Tech Summit in Valencia
In-Reply-To: <3995222.d1cKYBiXjx@unicorn>
References: <E1B3F2BC-F188-4849-BDF6-CC8943F0F9A0@guardianproject.info>
 <25918770.FihGgUjN1J@unicorn> <54F5CA05.7090205@sixdemonbag.org>
 <3995222.d1cKYBiXjx@unicorn>
Message-ID: <54F5D021.1070009@sixdemonbag.org>

> It is in the constitution; if you are a FOSS developer the least I
> can do is provide $beverage.

I'm glad I contribute code to a couple of small FOSS digital forensics
projects, then.  Because I've never contributed a single line of code to
GnuPG or Enigmail.  :)



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From wk at gnupg.org  Tue Mar  3 16:14:15 2015
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Tue, 03 Mar 2015 16:14:15 +0100
Subject: Circumvention Tech Summit in Valencia
In-Reply-To: <54F5A058.8010804@sixdemonbag.org> (Robert J. Hansen's message of
 "Tue, 03 Mar 2015 12:51:52 +0100")
References: <E1B3F2BC-F188-4849-BDF6-CC8943F0F9A0@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5A058.8010804@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <87ioeidsfs.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Tue,  3 Mar 2015 12:51, rjh at sixdemonbag.org said:

> Admittedly, "the GnuPG dev people" is really a one-element list
> containing Werner.  But there are certainly people active in the GnuPG

The web page lists more and several more have write access to
git.gnupg.org.  I considered to affend but the number of open bugs keeps
me working here.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com  Tue Mar  3 16:20:34 2015
From: kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com (Kristian Fiskerstrand)
Date: Tue, 03 Mar 2015 16:20:34 +0100
Subject: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption
In-Reply-To: <8257BF12-09C1-41C2-9C5F-F78CB60FD5A9@guardianproject.info>
References: <000d01d05269$c1726dd0$44574970$@on.yourweb.de>
 <1890860.SDiBssEjyI@inno> <000e01d05280$656fed70$304fc850$@on.yourweb.de>
 <7920271.MAWFr6xyvP@inno> <54F05EF5.6050105@sumptuouscapital.com>
 <8257BF12-09C1-41C2-9C5F-F78CB60FD5A9@guardianproject.info>
Message-ID: <54F5D142.3090200@sumptuouscapital.com>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

On 03/03/2015 01:50 PM, Hans of Guardian wrote:
> 
> On Feb 27, 2015, at 1:11 PM, Kristian Fiskerstrand wrote:
> 
> On 02/27/2015 12:43 PM, Hauke Laging wrote:
>>>> Am Fr 27.02.2015, 12:27:40 schrieb gnupgpacker:
>>>> 
>>>>> Maybe implementation with an opt-in could preserve
>>>>> publishing of faked keys on public keyservers?
>>>> 
>>>> We need keyservers which are a lot better that today's. IMHO 
>>>> that also means that a keyserver should tell a client for
>>>> each offered certificate whether it (or a trusted keyserver)
>>>> has made such an email verification.
> 
> The keyservers have no role in this, they are pure data store and 
> can never act as a CA. That would bring up a can of worm of
> issues, both politically and legally, I wouldn't want to see the
> first case where a keyserver operator was sued for permitting a
> "fake key" (the term itself is very misleading, the key itself
> isn't fake at all, but a fully valid key where the UID has not been
> mated to its holder through proper validation).
> 
> 
>> The standard PGP keyserver pool is a mess with racist spam, lost 
>> keys that will be there forever, etc.  The concept of email 
>> validation is very very common and proven in internet service 
>> providers.

And anyone is free to set up a CA that performs this validation and
signs the returned key.

>> It is time for OpenPGP keyservers to join the rest of the
>> internet.
> 

They are already quite up to date, SKS 1.1.5+ (development master)
even supports the experimental Ed25519 draft used by GnuPG. What you
are proposing here isn't about joining the rest of the internet, it is
about subverting the security by introducing a false sense of security
and even worse, that opens up well known attack vectors.

By the way, an OpenPGP key is fully valid without any email address as
part of any UID.

- -- 
- ----------------------------
Kristian Fiskerstrand
Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com
Twitter: @krifisk
- ----------------------------
Public OpenPGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net
fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3
- ----------------------------
Acta est fabula
So ends the story
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From kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com  Tue Mar  3 16:22:56 2015
From: kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com (Kristian Fiskerstrand)
Date: Tue, 03 Mar 2015 16:22:56 +0100
Subject: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption
In-Reply-To: <54F5D142.3090200@sumptuouscapital.com>
References: <000d01d05269$c1726dd0$44574970$@on.yourweb.de>
 <1890860.SDiBssEjyI@inno> <000e01d05280$656fed70$304fc850$@on.yourweb.de>
 <7920271.MAWFr6xyvP@inno> <54F05EF5.6050105@sumptuouscapital.com>
 <8257BF12-09C1-41C2-9C5F-F78CB60FD5A9@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5D142.3090200@sumptuouscapital.com>
Message-ID: <54F5D1D0.1050008@sumptuouscapital.com>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

On 03/03/2015 04:20 PM, Kristian Fiskerstrand wrote:
> On 03/03/2015 01:50 PM, Hans of Guardian wrote:
> 
>> On Feb 27, 2015, at 1:11 PM, Kristian Fiskerstrand wrote:
> 


...

> 
>>> The standard PGP keyserver pool is a mess with racist spam,
>>> lost keys that will be there forever, etc.  The concept of
>>> email validation is very very common and proven in internet
>>> service providers.
> 
> And anyone is free to set up a CA that performs this validation
> and signs the returned key.
> 
>>> It is time for OpenPGP keyservers to join the rest of the 
>>> internet.
> 
> 
> They are already quite up to date, SKS 1.1.5+ (development master) 
> even supports the experimental Ed25519 draft used by GnuPG. What
> you are proposing here isn't about joining the rest of the
> internet, it is about subverting the security by introducing a
> false sense of security and even worse, that opens up well known
> attack vectors.
> 
> By the way, an OpenPGP key is fully valid without any email address
> as part of any UID.

For completeness, going to include some of the template for my
response to delete key requests;

But your situation is a good example of why one should never trust
a key based on email address in UID alone, but need to verify
fingerprint, creation type, key algorithm etc with the perceived
owner and certify/sign the key.

If you google you'll find some more detailed explanations as to
why you can't delete a key from a keyserver.

Long story short, even if it was technically possible the social
protocol is missing. Speaking more generally, there might've been
two (or more) people sharing the same name, and email addresses
change over time, if the previous user deleted his email, it
wouldn't make the key any less valid that someone else take over
the email address.

This is why one should never trust email address alone, but always
verify keys through other means (mainly fpr, creation date, algo,
size). That several keys exists for a single address is, from a
cryptographical and security point of view irrelevant, as it is
only applicable as a potential issue if people don't follow proper
procedure for due dilligence.


- -- 
- ----------------------------
Kristian Fiskerstrand
Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com
Twitter: @krifisk
- ----------------------------
Public OpenPGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net
fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3
- ----------------------------
Aquila non capit muscas
The eagle does not hunt flies
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From brian at minton.name  Tue Mar  3 16:23:13 2015
From: brian at minton.name (Brian Minton)
Date: Tue, 03 Mar 2015 10:23:13 -0500
Subject: Thoughts on GnuPG and automation
In-Reply-To: <87mw3y94fj.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
References: <54F04EC5.3000107@guardianproject.info>
 <20150227121834-25258-9117-mailpile@slinky>
 <87mw3y94fj.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
Message-ID: <54F5D1E1.5030405@minton.name>

It breaks mailpile because gpg-agent is not session aware.  A user could
be logged in locally, using mailpile, and a remote attacker could access
the web interface of that locally running mailpile instance, which since
it is talking to the same gpg-agent, would think the remote user is
logged in (or more precisely, has the private key).

I think that one solution would be to have mailpile use a per-session
gpg home dir.

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From kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com  Tue Mar  3 16:32:41 2015
From: kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com (Kristian Fiskerstrand)
Date: Tue, 03 Mar 2015 16:32:41 +0100
Subject: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption
In-Reply-To: <865C8D86-B091-4C51-B010-7D3BD4F27818@guardianproject.info>
References: <000d01d05269$c1726dd0$44574970$@on.yourweb.de>
 <1890860.SDiBssEjyI@inno> <000e01d05280$656fed70$304fc850$@on.yourweb.de>
 <7920271.MAWFr6xyvP@inno>
 <54F05EF5.6050105__7398.9701144912$1425039188$gmane$org@sumptuouscapital.com>
 <54F09ACB.6020108@enigmail.net> <87lhjjm8mn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <865C8D86-B091-4C51-B010-7D3BD4F27818@guardianproject.info>
Message-ID: <54F5D419.6040206@sumptuouscapital.com>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
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On 03/03/2015 02:00 PM, Hans of Guardian wrote:
> 
> On Feb 27, 2015, at 8:56 PM, Werner Koch wrote:
> 


...

> 
> Services like keybase.io with poor security practices are going to 
> rapidly take over from the PGP keyserver pool because they address 
> side of the human interaction, unlike the PGP keyservers.  They
> are easy to use and the follow the very common interaction patterns
> that basically all web services these days use. That must also be 
> considered when thinking about security.  The PGP keyservers need 
> email validation not as a way to provide any kind of "trusted"
> status of that key, but rather so enable people to delete keys that
> should no longer be there, and to prevent keyserver spam and
> vandalism.  For a good example, search for Richard Stallman and you
> will see how badly the PGP keyservers are failing.

I fail to see how this is a failure on the side of the keyservers, it
is part of the expected practise and a fully understood scenario,
which is why it is mandated to conduct key verification through secure
channels.

> 
> Another common scenario is that people make mistakes when learning 
> how to use PGP.  There is a common mistake of generating a key to 
> play with, publishing to the keyserver, then deleting.  That key
> will then be on the keyserver forever with no way to delete it.
> That is terrible both security-wise because it is confusing for
> people who are searching for keys, and it is terrible
> human-interaction-wise because it adds pointless noise when
> searching for keys.

It doesn't affect neither security nor the user at all, the first
because the key anyways needs to be verified, the second because the
key anyways needs to be verified.

- -- 
- ----------------------------
Kristian Fiskerstrand
Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com
Twitter: @krifisk
- ----------------------------
Public OpenPGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net
fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3
- ----------------------------
Aquila non capit muscas
The eagle does not hunt flies
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-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


From peter at digitalbrains.com  Tue Mar  3 16:43:12 2015
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Tue, 03 Mar 2015 16:43:12 +0100
Subject: Thoughts on GnuPG and automation
In-Reply-To: <AE0A6C7E-6A40-40C2-A401-0FACB5F84833@guardianproject.info>
References: <54F04EC5.3000107@guardianproject.info>
 <54F07A7D.3040709@digitalbrains.com>
 <AE0A6C7E-6A40-40C2-A401-0FACB5F84833@guardianproject.info>
Message-ID: <54F5D690.9030607@digitalbrains.com>

On 03/03/15 14:29, Hans of Guardian wrote:
> It is actually more difficult to wrap GPGME in Java than to have just
> rewritten GPGME in Java.

In my opinion, if this is the case, then that is indeed the proper
solution: write a general-purpose library ? la GPGME, but don't call gpg
directly from your application.

Calling the gpg binary is indeed an API, as was said here. It's the API
GPGME uses, for instance. GPGME does not somehow load gpg in its address
space or something; it simply invokes gpg, in a separate process.

That calling the gpg binary is an API doesn't make it the right API for
other programs to use. The right API in general would be GPGME or an
alternative to GPGME.

Just like libc is the proper API for a program to use instead of
directly issuing syscalls to the Linux kernel. The syscall interface is
an API; it's just not the right one in many cases.

At least, this is my view of it.

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at <http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>


From MichaelQuigley at TheWay.Org  Tue Mar  3 16:02:43 2015
From: MichaelQuigley at TheWay.Org (MichaelQuigley at TheWay.Org)
Date: Tue, 3 Mar 2015 10:02:43 -0500
Subject: Fwd: Re: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption
In-Reply-To: <mailman.20595.1425393685.28939.gnupg-users@gnupg.org>
References: <mailman.20595.1425393685.28939.gnupg-users@gnupg.org>
Message-ID: <OFE8A483BF.FDF79F0E-ON85257DFD.00525E79-85257DFD.0052A593@TheWay.org>

"Gnupg-users" <gnupg-users-bounces at gnupg.org> wrote on 03/03/2015 09:41:25 
AM:
> ----- Message from Stephan Beck <stebe at mailbox.org> on Tue, 03 Mar 
> 2015 15:40:45 +0100 -----
> 
> To: gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> 
> Subject: Re: Fwd: Re: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp 
encryption
> 
> Am 03.03.2015 um 14:00 schrieb Ville M??tt?:
> > On 03.03.15 14:54, Stephan Beck wrote:
> >> as your message hasn't reached the list inspite of being addressed to 
it
> > 
> > It did :).
> > 
> Strange, I did only receive the PM, not the listmail, so I thought it 
might be
> useful to resend it. In that case, sorry for the duplication.
> 
> Regards
> 
> Stephan

I believe if you are personally addressed, the list management software 
doesn't send you a duplicate copy of the message.
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From calestyo at scientia.net  Tue Mar  3 16:48:31 2015
From: calestyo at scientia.net (Christoph Anton Mitterer)
Date: Tue, 03 Mar 2015 16:48:31 +0100
Subject: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption
In-Reply-To: <865C8D86-B091-4C51-B010-7D3BD4F27818@guardianproject.info>
References: <000d01d05269$c1726dd0$44574970$@on.yourweb.de>
 <1890860.SDiBssEjyI@inno> <000e01d05280$656fed70$304fc850$@on.yourweb.de>
 <7920271.MAWFr6xyvP@inno>
 <54F05EF5.6050105__7398.9701144912$1425039188$gmane$org@sumptuouscapital.com>
 <54F09ACB.6020108@enigmail.net> <87lhjjm8mn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <865C8D86-B091-4C51-B010-7D3BD4F27818@guardianproject.info>
Message-ID: <1425397711.4798.22.camel@scientia.net>

On Tue, 2015-03-03 at 14:00 +0100, Hans of Guardian wrote:
> The PGP keyservers need email validation
no it's pretty useless from a security POV and they don't need it.

> not as a way to provide any kind of "trusted" status of that key, but
> rather so enable people to delete keys that should no longer be there,
> and to prevent keyserver spam and vandalism.
Unfortunately it seems that you miss(understand) some of the basic
paradigms of security here:
Actually the opposite is the case - removing keys from the keyservers
(even if they're allegedly spam) would be a big security compromise of
the whole system, as potentially important information (revocation
certs, valid keys, etc.) would be removed as well.

And who should in the end decide which key respectively which identity
is valid?
For there may be many Richard Stallmans, and if even such famous person
uses an address like stallman at gmail.com, he could later give it up and
someone else takes it (or vice-versa).
If such keys would then considered spam,... then good night.


> Another common scenario is that people make mistakes when learning how
> to use PGP.  There is a common mistake of generating a key to play
> with, publishing to the keyserver, then deleting.
While that's unfortunate... it's part of the game and as long as you
aren't a keyserver operator/developer this shouldn't make you any
concerns - unless of course you use the keyservers to authenticate (i.e.
only one Richard Stallman -> that must be him) ... but then you're
doomed anyway and no one will, should or could help you.

> That is terrible both security-wise because
Actually the contrary as laid out above.

For that reasons the keyserver used to generally refuse removal of keys
for years, and exceptions where only made on selective servers and then
only to obey some stupid laws which actually degrade security here.


Cheers,
Chris.

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From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Tue Mar  3 16:53:14 2015
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Tue, 03 Mar 2015 16:53:14 +0100
Subject: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption
In-Reply-To: <54F5D419.6040206@sumptuouscapital.com>
References: <000d01d05269$c1726dd0$44574970$@on.yourweb.de>
 <1890860.SDiBssEjyI@inno> <000e01d05280$656fed70$304fc850$@on.yourweb.de>
 <7920271.MAWFr6xyvP@inno>
 <54F05EF5.6050105__7398.9701144912$1425039188$gmane$org@sumptuouscapital.com>
 <54F09ACB.6020108@enigmail.net> <87lhjjm8mn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <865C8D86-B091-4C51-B010-7D3BD4F27818@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5D419.6040206@sumptuouscapital.com>
Message-ID: <54F5D8EA.4040003@sixdemonbag.org>

>> Services like keybase.io with poor security practices...
> 
> I fail to see how this is a failure on the side of the keyservers...

I fully agree with Kristian.

I further don't see how keybase.io amounts to "poor security practice".
 The Web of Trust is, itself, a poor practice because it's
rarely-if-ever used in practice; even something like TOFU is far
superior to the Web of Trust in most real-world environments.

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From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Tue Mar  3 17:01:34 2015
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Tue, 03 Mar 2015 17:01:34 +0100
Subject: Thoughts on GnuPG and automation
In-Reply-To: <50378E65-5560-4AE1-9190-959E4435B40B@guardianproject.info>
References: <54F04EC5.3000107@guardianproject.info>
 <20150227121834-25258-9117-mailpile@slinky>
 <50378E65-5560-4AE1-9190-959E4435B40B@guardianproject.info>
Message-ID: <54F5DADE.3030507@sixdemonbag.org>

Hans, please trim your quoted material.

> They would need to use a specialized system, and that specialized
> system might then be a marker of suspicion (for example, lots of
> governments, including the NSA, already mark all PGP messages as
> suspicious).

Unless you've got a desk somewhere deep inside Fort Meade and you're
sitting in on briefings the rest of us aren't, you don't know this.

There's a lot of panic and paranoia in the air already without people
making it worse by treating what they *think* is true as if they *know*
it's true.

(I don't know if what he's claiming is true or false... but I *do* know
that I don't believe his certainty, and I wouldn't believe anyone else
who claimed to be certain, either!)

> trumpeting "ease of use" above all else.  We are seeing systems like 
> keybase.io that make things really easy, but also expect users to 
> upload their _private_ key to some alpha web service.

keybase doesn't expect users to upload the private key.  It works just
fine if you don't, and in fact you have to go through an extra couple of
steps to put the private key on the keybase servers.

For some use cases this is a good practice.  For many more it's a bad
practice.  But it's way too facile to simply say,

> That is terrible security practice.


From hans at guardianproject.info  Tue Mar  3 17:28:12 2015
From: hans at guardianproject.info (Hans of Guardian)
Date: Tue, 3 Mar 2015 17:28:12 +0100
Subject: Thoughts on GnuPG and automation
In-Reply-To: <54F5D1E1.5030405@minton.name>
References: <54F04EC5.3000107@guardianproject.info>
 <20150227121834-25258-9117-mailpile@slinky>
 <87mw3y94fj.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net> <54F5D1E1.5030405@minton.name>
Message-ID: <E7828233-1E82-451E-B3E2-55F5644BA6BB@guardianproject.info>


Yeah, mailpile has a very unusual architecture, so its no surprise it'll need some unusual tricks.  Unusual tricks in software that aims to be secure generally make me nervous since it is important to keep code readable and understandable for both the core devs, but also contributors, auditors, etc.

.hc

On Mar 3, 2015, at 4:23 PM, Brian Minton wrote:

> It breaks mailpile because gpg-agent is not session aware.  A user could
> be logged in locally, using mailpile, and a remote attacker could access
> the web interface of that locally running mailpile instance, which since
> it is talking to the same gpg-agent, would think the remote user is
> logged in (or more precisely, has the private key).
> 
> I think that one solution would be to have mailpile use a per-session
> gpg home dir.
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users



From hans at guardianproject.info  Tue Mar  3 17:33:14 2015
From: hans at guardianproject.info (Hans of Guardian)
Date: Tue, 3 Mar 2015 17:33:14 +0100
Subject: Thoughts on GnuPG and automation
In-Reply-To: <54F5D690.9030607@digitalbrains.com>
References: <54F04EC5.3000107@guardianproject.info>
 <54F07A7D.3040709@digitalbrains.com>
 <AE0A6C7E-6A40-40C2-A401-0FACB5F84833@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5D690.9030607@digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <D8E88427-D1D6-4C67-A1D0-29CFD37075F2@guardianproject.info>


On Mar 3, 2015, at 4:43 PM, Peter Lebbing wrote:

> On 03/03/15 14:29, Hans of Guardian wrote:
>> It is actually more difficult to wrap GPGME in Java than to have just
>> rewritten GPGME in Java.
> 
> In my opinion, if this is the case, then that is indeed the proper
> solution: write a general-purpose library ? la GPGME, but don't call gpg
> directly from your application.
> 
> Calling the gpg binary is indeed an API, as was said here. It's the API
> GPGME uses, for instance. GPGME does not somehow load gpg in its address
> space or something; it simply invokes gpg, in a separate process.
> 
> That calling the gpg binary is an API doesn't make it the right API for
> other programs to use. The right API in general would be GPGME or an
> alternative to GPGME.
> 
> Just like libc is the proper API for a program to use instead of
> directly issuing syscalls to the Linux kernel. The syscall interface is
> an API; it's just not the right one in many cases.
> 
> At least, this is my view of it.
> 
> Peter.

Different programming languages and operating systems can have very different ways of launching and handling external processes.  By forcing them all to launch GPG in the UNIX way makes for complicated and weird software.  For example, Android works very differently than any UNIX or even Windows, especially when it comes to launching and managing processes.

At the risk of being repetitive: Android runs the Linux kernel, but is it far far far from being UNIX or GNU/Linux.

.hc

From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Tue Mar  3 17:49:42 2015
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Tue, 03 Mar 2015 17:49:42 +0100
Subject: Thoughts on GnuPG and automation
In-Reply-To: <D8E88427-D1D6-4C67-A1D0-29CFD37075F2@guardianproject.info>
References: <54F04EC5.3000107@guardianproject.info>
 <54F07A7D.3040709@digitalbrains.com>
 <AE0A6C7E-6A40-40C2-A401-0FACB5F84833@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5D690.9030607@digitalbrains.com>
 <D8E88427-D1D6-4C67-A1D0-29CFD37075F2@guardianproject.info>
Message-ID: <54F5E626.5010808@sixdemonbag.org>

> Different programming languages and operating systems can have very 
> different ways of launching and handling external processes.

Eh.  Different operating systems, sure: that's the nature of kernels.
They provide different syscalls, and that's at root how you launch an
external process -- by making syscalls.

But different programming languages can have very different ways of
launching and handling external processes?  I've never seen that to be
true.  C#'s Process, C's fork/exec, Python's subprocess, Go's
syscall.StartProcess()... it's all pretty much identical.  There are a
couple of exotics, but they're exotic.

> By forcing them all to launch GPG in the UNIX way makes for
> complicated and weird software.

It *can* make for complicated and weird software.  I don't doubt that
GnuPG doesn't fit well into the Android model, but this isn't a reason
to do GPGME differently.

If I'm Count Rugen, I'm not going to complain that glovemakers need to
change the way they do things to accommodate my six fingers.  I'm going
to acknowledge that my hands are quite a lot different from the
glovemakers' models, and rather than tell the glovemakers how
five-fingered gloves are a mistake because they don't account for the
possibility of six, I'm just going to hire a tailor to make my gloves.

(Count Rugen: the six-fingered villain from _The Princess Bride_.)


From hans at guardianproject.info  Tue Mar  3 18:26:03 2015
From: hans at guardianproject.info (Hans of Guardian)
Date: Tue, 3 Mar 2015 18:26:03 +0100
Subject: Thoughts on GnuPG and automation
In-Reply-To: <54F5DADE.3030507@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <54F04EC5.3000107@guardianproject.info>
 <20150227121834-25258-9117-mailpile@slinky>
 <50378E65-5560-4AE1-9190-959E4435B40B@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5DADE.3030507@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <B44176D7-D624-43D7-9B1A-DBADEC0E3A67@guardianproject.info>


On Mar 3, 2015, at 5:01 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:

> Hans, please trim your quoted material.
> 
>> They would need to use a specialized system, and that specialized
>> system might then be a marker of suspicion (for example, lots of
>> governments, including the NSA, already mark all PGP messages as
>> suspicious).
> 
> Unless you've got a desk somewhere deep inside Fort Meade and you're
> sitting in on briefings the rest of us aren't, you don't know this.
> 
> There's a lot of panic and paranoia in the air already without people
> making it worse by treating what they *think* is true as if they *know*
> it's true.
> 
> (I don't know if what he's claiming is true or false... but I *do* know
> that I don't believe his certainty, and I wouldn't believe anyone else
> who claimed to be certain, either!)

This is definitely public information from the Snowden leaks.  There is also quite a bit of information about other governments doing similar things.  Here's one example article:

http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2013/06/20/leaked-nsa-doc-says-it-can-collect-and-keep-your-encrypted-data-as-long-as-it-takes-to-crack-it/

> 
>> trumpeting "ease of use" above all else.  We are seeing systems like 
>> keybase.io that make things really easy, but also expect users to 
>> upload their _private_ key to some alpha web service.
> 
> keybase doesn't expect users to upload the private key.  It works just
> fine if you don't, and in fact you have to go through an extra couple of
> steps to put the private key on the keybase servers.
> 
> For some use cases this is a good practice.  For many more it's a bad
> practice.  But it's way too facile to simply say,
> 
>> That is terrible security practice.

keybase has started to downplay the private key stuff.  When it started, you had to upload your private key to use the service.

Uploading your private key to keybase sets people up for a centralized system with terrible security. It'll be an obvious target, and they are a startup doing webby things, which also has a terrible security track record.  There are so many exploits in ruby, javascript, etc.  The fact that they even considered this an option just shows that they only care about easy, not about secure.

.hc

From hans at guardianproject.info  Tue Mar  3 18:29:40 2015
From: hans at guardianproject.info (Hans of Guardian)
Date: Tue, 3 Mar 2015 18:29:40 +0100
Subject: Thoughts on GnuPG and automation
In-Reply-To: <54F5E626.5010808@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <54F04EC5.3000107@guardianproject.info>
 <54F07A7D.3040709@digitalbrains.com>
 <AE0A6C7E-6A40-40C2-A401-0FACB5F84833@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5D690.9030607@digitalbrains.com>
 <D8E88427-D1D6-4C67-A1D0-29CFD37075F2@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5E626.5010808@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <F3B37AE1-A4D6-421A-A847-CE994F24C818@guardianproject.info>


On Mar 3, 2015, at 5:49 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:

>> Different programming languages and operating systems can have very 
>> different ways of launching and handling external processes.
> 
> Eh.  Different operating systems, sure: that's the nature of kernels.
> They provide different syscalls, and that's at root how you launch an
> external process -- by making syscalls.
> 
> But different programming languages can have very different ways of
> launching and handling external processes?  I've never seen that to be
> true.  C#'s Process, C's fork/exec, Python's subprocess, Go's
> syscall.StartProcess()... it's all pretty much identical.  There are a
> couple of exotics, but they're exotic.
> 
>> By forcing them all to launch GPG in the UNIX way makes for
>> complicated and weird software.
> 
> It *can* make for complicated and weird software.  I don't doubt that
> GnuPG doesn't fit well into the Android model, but this isn't a reason
> to do GPGME differently.
> 
> If I'm Count Rugen, I'm not going to complain that glovemakers need to
> change the way they do things to accommodate my six fingers.  I'm going
> to acknowledge that my hands are quite a lot different from the
> glovemakers' models, and rather than tell the glovemakers how
> five-fingered gloves are a mistake because they don't account for the
> possibility of six, I'm just going to hire a tailor to make my gloves.
> 
> (Count Rugen: the six-fingered villain from _The Princess Bride_.)

Android has an installed base of hundreds of millions.  Desktop UNIX is the exotic system here as compared to Windows, Android, etc.

.hc

From peter at digitalbrains.com  Tue Mar  3 19:09:32 2015
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Tue, 03 Mar 2015 19:09:32 +0100
Subject: Thoughts on GnuPG and automation
In-Reply-To: <F3B37AE1-A4D6-421A-A847-CE994F24C818@guardianproject.info>
References: <54F04EC5.3000107@guardianproject.info>
 <54F07A7D.3040709@digitalbrains.com>
 <AE0A6C7E-6A40-40C2-A401-0FACB5F84833@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5D690.9030607@digitalbrains.com>
 <D8E88427-D1D6-4C67-A1D0-29CFD37075F2@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5E626.5010808@sixdemonbag.org>
 <F3B37AE1-A4D6-421A-A847-CE994F24C818@guardianproject.info>
Message-ID: <54F5F8DC.8030804@digitalbrains.com>

On 03/03/15 18:29, Hans of Guardian wrote:
> Android has an installed base of hundreds of millions.  Desktop UNIX
> is the exotic system here as compared to Windows, Android, etc.

I have no idea about how difficult it is to launch the gpg binary with a
few pipes attached to a few file descriptors and perhaps anything else
you need.

But I fail to see why you brought it up.

I thought we were discussing two alternatives:

- Call gpg directly
- Use a library such as GPGME that calls gpg for you

In both cases, the gpg binary is executed as a separate process. So it
seems to me any issues with this are the same in both cases. In fact, if
it indeed is tricky as you say, you're better off if you have a library
do this for you, so you don't have to get it right in each and every
application.

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at <http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>


From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Tue Mar  3 19:31:14 2015
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Tue, 03 Mar 2015 19:31:14 +0100
Subject: Thoughts on GnuPG and automation
In-Reply-To: <B44176D7-D624-43D7-9B1A-DBADEC0E3A67@guardianproject.info>
References: <54F04EC5.3000107@guardianproject.info>
 <20150227121834-25258-9117-mailpile@slinky>
 <50378E65-5560-4AE1-9190-959E4435B40B@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5DADE.3030507@sixdemonbag.org>
 <B44176D7-D624-43D7-9B1A-DBADEC0E3A67@guardianproject.info>
Message-ID: <54F5FDF2.5030306@sixdemonbag.org>

> This is definitely public information from the Snowden leaks.  There 
> is also quite a bit of information about other governments doing 
> similar things.  Here's one example article:

If all encrypted traffic is deemed suspicious, then 99.9999999% of the
suspicious set -- Amazon transactions, Google searches, SMTP transfers,
instant messaging, OkCupid profiles, iTunes purchases, and more -- is
totally clean.  You'd have statistically better odds by arresting random
people on suspicion of murder.  The policy would be completely
pants-on-head absurd.

This leads to a different question: "Is it more likely that this is the
real pants-on-head absurd policy, or that the _Forbes_ journo has
profoundly misunderstood the subject?"

Just because something's been published doesn't mean it should be
trusted.  Bring your brain -- and when someone tells you something that
supports your worldview, look at that thing hard and twice.


From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Tue Mar  3 19:35:40 2015
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Tue, 03 Mar 2015 19:35:40 +0100
Subject: Thoughts on GnuPG and automation
In-Reply-To: <F3B37AE1-A4D6-421A-A847-CE994F24C818@guardianproject.info>
References: <54F04EC5.3000107@guardianproject.info>
 <54F07A7D.3040709@digitalbrains.com>
 <AE0A6C7E-6A40-40C2-A401-0FACB5F84833@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5D690.9030607@digitalbrains.com>
 <D8E88427-D1D6-4C67-A1D0-29CFD37075F2@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5E626.5010808@sixdemonbag.org>
 <F3B37AE1-A4D6-421A-A847-CE994F24C818@guardianproject.info>
Message-ID: <54F5FEFC.8020405@sixdemonbag.org>

> Android has an installed base of hundreds of millions.

So?

GnuPG and GPGME are products of their birth, just like anything else.
It was built for desktop operating systems.  If you want to make it live
in the mobile space, go with God and I wish you all the luck in the
world -- but if GPGME isn't working well for you, the burden is on you
to do something better.  The burden isn't on GPGME to totally change how
it does things.

I really don't understand what you're getting at here.


From wk at gnupg.org  Tue Mar  3 20:52:36 2015
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Tue, 03 Mar 2015 20:52:36 +0100
Subject: Thoughts on GnuPG and automation
In-Reply-To: <AE0A6C7E-6A40-40C2-A401-0FACB5F84833@guardianproject.info> (Hans
 of Guardian's message of "Tue, 3 Mar 2015 14:29:38 +0100")
References: <54F04EC5.3000107@guardianproject.info>
 <54F07A7D.3040709@digitalbrains.com>
 <AE0A6C7E-6A40-40C2-A401-0FACB5F84833@guardianproject.info>
Message-ID: <87twy1dfjv.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Tue,  3 Mar 2015 14:29, hans at guardianproject.info said:

> It is actually more difficult to wrap GPGME in Java than to have just
> rewritten GPGME in Java.  GPGME is a fine API for C/C++, it is a bad

Sorry, but that is not your problem.  The problem on Android seems to be
that it is not easy to install anything else than plain Java apps.

We have GPGME bindings for all kind of languages from Ada over Java to
Scheme.  Thus I can't see the problem - need another kind of data object
to be handled in GPGME?  No problem, it can easily be done.  Is the
event loop the problem?  That is somewhat harder to get right but that
is always the case if you use a library.

I don't really understand your complaints given that we worked together
to port GnuPG to Android.  GPGME is just a small thing on top of it and
way easier than GnuPG itself.  It has nothing to do with fork+exec -
GnuPG uses that itself a lot.

In 2010 we ported GnuPG and GPGME and Kontact (includes KMail) to
Windows Mobile 6.5.  I can tell you, that was a task but we finally did
it.  And the problems were not due to GnuPG (even that it ate up many of
the scarce process slots) but due to the shear amount of memory KDE
stuff required.  Consider as an example this: On Windows CE (the kernel
of Windows Mobile), you don't have stdout and stdin, nor is there a way
to inherit or pass on file descriptors.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From kloecker at kde.org  Tue Mar  3 21:24:15 2015
From: kloecker at kde.org (Ingo =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Kl=F6cker?=)
Date: Tue, 3 Mar 2015 21:24:15 +0100
Subject: Thoughts on GnuPG and automation
In-Reply-To: <54F5FDF2.5030306@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <54F04EC5.3000107@guardianproject.info>
 <B44176D7-D624-43D7-9B1A-DBADEC0E3A67@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5FDF2.5030306@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <20078833.0pHQCTGTDG@collossus.ingo-kloecker.de>

On Tuesday 03 March 2015 19:31:14 Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> > This is definitely public information from the Snowden leaks.  There
> > is also quite a bit of information about other governments doing
> 
> > similar things.  Here's one example article:
> If all encrypted traffic is deemed suspicious, then 99.9999999% of the
> suspicious set -- Amazon transactions, Google searches, SMTP transfers,
> instant messaging, OkCupid profiles, iTunes purchases, and more -- is
> totally clean.  You'd have statistically better odds by arresting random
> people on suspicion of murder.  The policy would be completely
> pants-on-head absurd.

After the recent terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels some German 
politicians are again arguing that we need Vorratsdatenspeicherung (data 
retention, i.e. storage of all communication meta data for 6 months) in 
Germany to prevent such attacks. Obviously, 99.9999999 % of this data will be 
completely unrelated to terrorist attacks, i.e. totally clean as you put it. 
You'd have statistically better odds by arresting random people on suspicion 
of terror. Still this completely pants-on-head absurd policy will become 
reality if those German politicians get what they want.


> This leads to a different question: "Is it more likely that this is the
> real pants-on-head absurd policy, or that the _Forbes_ journo has
> profoundly misunderstood the subject?"

Well, the Guardian wrote

"However, alongside those provisions [to minimise data collected from US 
persons; I.K.], the Fisa court-approved policies allow the NSA to:

[...]

? Retain and make use of "inadvertently acquired" domestic communications if 
they contain usable intelligence, information on criminal activity, threat of 
harm to people or property, are encrypted, or are believed to contain any 
information relevant to cybersecurity;"

Full article: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/20/fisa-court-nsa-without-warrant

Specifically, see Exhibit B, Section 5 (3) a.
http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jun/20/exhibit-b-nsa-procedures-document


Moreover, see the recent article

http://justsecurity.org/19308/congress-latest-rules-long-spies-hold-encrypted-data-familiar/

which claims

"The Intelligence Authorization Act of 2015, which passed Congress this last 
December, should bring the question back to the fore. It established retention 
guidelines for communications collected under Executive Order 12333 and 
included an exception that allows NSA to keep ?incidentally? collected 
encrypted communications for an indefinite period of time."


So, you are right, that the articles do not claim that the NSA collects and 
keeps all encrypted communication forever.


Regards,
Ingo
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From hans at guardianproject.info  Tue Mar  3 21:29:08 2015
From: hans at guardianproject.info (Hans of Guardian)
Date: Tue, 3 Mar 2015 21:29:08 +0100
Subject: Thoughts on GnuPG and automation
In-Reply-To: <54F5F8DC.8030804@digitalbrains.com>
References: <54F04EC5.3000107@guardianproject.info>
 <54F07A7D.3040709@digitalbrains.com>
 <AE0A6C7E-6A40-40C2-A401-0FACB5F84833@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5D690.9030607@digitalbrains.com>
 <D8E88427-D1D6-4C67-A1D0-29CFD37075F2@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5E626.5010808@sixdemonbag.org>
 <F3B37AE1-A4D6-421A-A847-CE994F24C818@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5F8DC.8030804@digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <D9ABA4AE-6C5E-443C-8334-27C6C529930F@guardianproject.info>


On Mar 3, 2015, at 7:09 PM, Peter Lebbing wrote:

> On 03/03/15 18:29, Hans of Guardian wrote:
>> Android has an installed base of hundreds of millions.  Desktop UNIX
>> is the exotic system here as compared to Windows, Android, etc.
> 
> I have no idea about how difficult it is to launch the gpg binary with a
> few pipes attached to a few file descriptors and perhaps anything else
> you need.
> 
> But I fail to see why you brought it up.
> 
> I thought we were discussing two alternatives:
> 
> - Call gpg directly
> - Use a library such as GPGME that calls gpg for you
> 
> In both cases, the gpg binary is executed as a separate process. So it
> seems to me any issues with this are the same in both cases. In fact, if
> it indeed is tricky as you say, you're better off if you have a library
> do this for you, so you don't have to get it right in each and every
> application.
> 
> Peter.

GPGME is that library that wraps gpg execution, and I've spent weeks of my life working GPGME on Android.  The way that GPGME wraps gpg is built entirely on UNIX assumptions, which is turns out that Windows works actually pretty close to that.  Android, on the other hand is a very different story. Some key differences:

* Android will kill apps when it needs to, app lifecycle is automatically managed,
 the app has no control over it, and often zero warning is given

* Android was not meant to support launching processes from a shell/terminal,
 it was there for core debugging, then opened up on demand from devs, but it
 is very much a second class citizen to a Java Android app.

* all apps are child processes of 'zygote'

* there is no way to install shared libraries to be shared by apps

There are other differences as well.  And iOS actually works a lot like Android, but also blends some UNIX stuff in.  I think we can also find similar issues when looking at how to make a proper Python API for GnuPG (though probably not as extreme).

.hc

From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net  Tue Mar  3 21:33:17 2015
From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA)
Date: Tue, 3 Mar 2015 20:33:17 +0000
Subject: Duplicate copies of list messages when you are also addressed
 personally [Was: Re: Fwd: Re: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp
 encryption]
In-Reply-To: <54F5C7ED.9080608@mailbox.org>
References: <mailman.20595.1425393685.28939.gnupg-users@gnupg.org>
 <OFE8A483BF.FDF79F0E-ON85257DFD.00525E79-85257DFD.0052A593@TheWay.org>
 <54F5C7ED.9080608@mailbox.org>
Message-ID: <1774836432.20150303203317@my_localhost>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512



On Tuesday 3 March 2015 at 3:02:43 PM, in
<mid:OFE8A483BF.FDF79F0E-ON85257DFD.00525E79-85257DFD.0052A593 at TheWay.org>,
MichaelQuigley at TheWay.Org wrote:



> I believe if you are personally addressed, the list
> management software doesn't send you a duplicate copy
> of the message.

The option is set at
<https://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/options/gnupg-users>.

    "Avoid duplicate copies of messages?

    When you are listed explicitly in the To: or Cc: headers of a
    list message, you can opt to not receive another copy from the
    mailing list. Select Yes to avoid receiving copies from the
    mailing list; select No to receive copies. "






- --
Best regards

MFPA                    mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net

War is a matter of vital importance to the State.
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From brad at fineby.me.uk  Tue Mar  3 21:38:02 2015
From: brad at fineby.me.uk (Brad Rogers)
Date: Tue, 3 Mar 2015 20:38:02 +0000
Subject: Thoughts on GnuPG and automation
In-Reply-To: <20078833.0pHQCTGTDG@collossus.ingo-kloecker.de>
References: <54F04EC5.3000107@guardianproject.info>
 <B44176D7-D624-43D7-9B1A-DBADEC0E3A67@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5FDF2.5030306@sixdemonbag.org>
 <20078833.0pHQCTGTDG@collossus.ingo-kloecker.de>
Message-ID: <20150303203802.6ab7551c@abydos.stargate.org.uk>

On Tue, 3 Mar 2015 21:24:15 +0100
Ingo Kl?cker <kloecker at kde.org> wrote:

Hello Ingo,

>of terror. Still this completely pants-on-head absurd policy will
>become reality if those German politicians get what they want.

It's not just in Germany:  Politicians across the world utilise similar
scaremongering tactics to justify their paranoid, and xenophobic, vision
of society.

-- 
 Regards  _
         / )           "The blindingly obvious is
        / _)rad        never immediately apparent"
Just coz they do it in the movies, don't mean to say that it's cool
Keep It Clean - The Vibrators
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From m.mansfeld at mansfeld-elektronik.de  Tue Mar  3 21:42:53 2015
From: m.mansfeld at mansfeld-elektronik.de (Matthias Mansfeld)
Date: Tue, 03 Mar 2015 21:42:53 +0100
Subject: Newspeek, (was: Re: Thoughts on GnuPG and automation)
In-Reply-To: <20078833.0pHQCTGTDG@collossus.ingo-kloecker.de>
References: <54F04EC5.3000107@guardianproject.info>,
 <54F5FDF2.5030306@sixdemonbag.org>,
 <20078833.0pHQCTGTDG@collossus.ingo-kloecker.de>
Message-ID: <54F61CCD.11863.40B9F01@m.mansfeld.mansfeld-elektronik.de>

On 3 Mar 2015 at 21:24, Ingo Kl?cker wrote:

[..]
> After the recent terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels some German
> politicians are again arguing that we need Vorratsdatenspeicherung
> (data retention, i.e. storage of all communication meta data for 6
> months) in Germany to prevent such attacks. 

We here in Germany use newspeek and call this now "Digitale 
Spurensicherung" = "digital forensics"

See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZCSei796yHA
made by our CSU here in Bavaria. Only in German language, but there 
is no difference with or without text. Simplification beyond 
recognition, and everything is fine, just fine and easy... :-/

Regards
Matthias
--
OpenPGP: http://www.mansfeld-elektronik.de/gnupgkey/mansfeld.asc
Fingerprint: 6563 057D E6B8 9105 1CE4 18D0 4056 1F54 8B59 40EF




From s.murthy at mykolab.com  Tue Mar  3 21:47:54 2015
From: s.murthy at mykolab.com (Sandeep Murthy)
Date: Wed, 4 Mar 2015 07:47:54 +1100
Subject: Thoughts on GnuPG and automation
In-Reply-To: <20078833.0pHQCTGTDG@collossus.ingo-kloecker.de>
References: <54F04EC5.3000107@guardianproject.info>
 <B44176D7-D624-43D7-9B1A-DBADEC0E3A67@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5FDF2.5030306@sixdemonbag.org>
 <20078833.0pHQCTGTDG@collossus.ingo-kloecker.de>
Message-ID: <38BC893A-6452-4157-B9F3-9592F6B5FBF5@mykolab.com>

> On 4 Mar 2015, at 07:24, Ingo Kl?cker <kloecker at kde.org> wrote:

> After the recent terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels some German
> politicians are again arguing that we need Vorratsdatenspeicherung (data
> retention, i.e. storage of all communication meta data for 6 months) in
> Germany to prevent such attacks. Obviously, 99.9999999 % of this data will be
> completely unrelated to terrorist attacks, i.e. totally clean as you put it.
> You'd have statistically better odds by arresting random people on suspicion
> of terror. Still this completely pants-on-head absurd policy will become
> reality if those German politicians get what they want.
> 

In Australia this idea, unfortunately, may become reality - a proposed
change to existing laws to require companies to retain metadata is being
debated in parliament, although public opinion is against data retention.
Hopefully this change will fail.

Once such a data retention law is in place it is dangerous because inevitably
there is a ?mission creep? that sets in - it is not hard to imagine one day that
encryption software users, maybe GPG users, will be required to disclose
information about the way they use it.  I think in the UK recently the PM
made some ambiguous comments which can be interpreted as seeking a
ban on end-to-end encryption software by private users on the grounds that
terrorists benefit just as much as ordinary law-abiding citizens from using
encryption.  Of course this shows he just does not understand the issues
involved and this idea will not go anywhere.

Sandeep Murthy
s.murthy at mykolab.com



From m.mansfeld at mansfeld-elektronik.de  Tue Mar  3 22:02:10 2015
From: m.mansfeld at mansfeld-elektronik.de (Matthias Mansfeld)
Date: Tue, 03 Mar 2015 22:02:10 +0100
Subject: Thoughts on GnuPG and automation
In-Reply-To: <38BC893A-6452-4157-B9F3-9592F6B5FBF5@mykolab.com>
References: <54F04EC5.3000107@guardianproject.info>,
 <20078833.0pHQCTGTDG@collossus.ingo-kloecker.de>,
 <38BC893A-6452-4157-B9F3-9592F6B5FBF5@mykolab.com>
Message-ID: <54F62152.31716.41D4677@m.mansfeld.mansfeld-elektronik.de>

On 4 Mar 2015 at 7:47, Sandeep Murthy wrote:

[...]
> Once such a data retention law is in place it is dangerous because
> inevitably there is a "mission creep" that sets in - it is not
> hard to imagine one day that encryption software users, maybe GPG
> users, will be required to disclose information about the way they use
> it.  I think in the UK recently the PM made some ambiguous comments
> which can be interpreted as seeking a ban on end-to-end encryption
> software by private users on the grounds that terrorists benefit just
> as much as ordinary law-abiding citizens from using encryption.  Of
> course this shows he just does not understand the issues involved and
> this idea will not go anywhere.

I assume everybody here knows http://xkcd.com/538/

....... and stuff like this is law in some countries. Coercive 
detention, or (if we just forget "law, what the f*** is law") some 
fine ideas used against unlawful combatants......

Today in paranoid mode
Matthias

--
Unsere Korrespondenz kann mitgelesen werden. Wollen Sie das 
erschweren, mailen wir uns gerne mit (Open)PGP verschl?sselt.
-- 
Matthias Mansfeld Elektronik * Leiterplattenlayout
Neithardtstr. 3, 85540 Haar; Tel.: 089/4620 093-7, Fax: -8
Internet: http://www.mansfeld-elektronik.de
OpenPGP: http://www.mansfeld-elektronik.de/gnupgkey/mansfeld.asc
Fingerprint: 6563 057D E6B8 9105 1CE4 18D0 4056 1F54 8B59 40EF



From hans at guardianproject.info  Wed Mar  4 00:50:44 2015
From: hans at guardianproject.info (Hans of Guardian)
Date: Wed, 4 Mar 2015 00:50:44 +0100
Subject: Thoughts on GnuPG and automation
In-Reply-To: <54F5FDF2.5030306@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <54F04EC5.3000107@guardianproject.info>
 <20150227121834-25258-9117-mailpile@slinky>
 <50378E65-5560-4AE1-9190-959E4435B40B@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5DADE.3030507@sixdemonbag.org>
 <B44176D7-D624-43D7-9B1A-DBADEC0E3A67@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5FDF2.5030306@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <2062B95D-BD0D-4756-9CDF-AD785954D595@guardianproject.info>


On Mar 3, 2015, at 7:31 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:

>> This is definitely public information from the Snowden leaks.  There 
>> is also quite a bit of information about other governments doing 
>> similar things.  Here's one example article:
> 
> If all encrypted traffic is deemed suspicious, then 99.9999999% of the
> suspicious set -- Amazon transactions, Google searches, SMTP transfers,
> instant messaging, OkCupid profiles, iTunes purchases, and more -- is
> totally clean.  You'd have statistically better odds by arresting random
> people on suspicion of murder.  The policy would be completely
> pants-on-head absurd.
> 
> This leads to a different question: "Is it more likely that this is the
> real pants-on-head absurd policy, or that the _Forbes_ journo has
> profoundly misunderstood the subject?"
> 
> Just because something's been published doesn't mean it should be
> trusted.  Bring your brain -- and when someone tells you something that
> supports your worldview, look at that thing hard and twice.

If you are interested, you should read the details.  Because you are missing some key details here.  I believe they log all PGP encrypted communication.  That would be easy for them to do.  I don't know about HTTPS.

.hc

From hans at guardianproject.info  Wed Mar  4 00:55:28 2015
From: hans at guardianproject.info (Hans of Guardian)
Date: Wed, 4 Mar 2015 00:55:28 +0100
Subject: Thoughts on GnuPG and automation
In-Reply-To: <54F5F8DC.8030804@digitalbrains.com>
References: <54F04EC5.3000107@guardianproject.info>
 <54F07A7D.3040709@digitalbrains.com>
 <AE0A6C7E-6A40-40C2-A401-0FACB5F84833@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5D690.9030607@digitalbrains.com>
 <D8E88427-D1D6-4C67-A1D0-29CFD37075F2@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5E626.5010808@sixdemonbag.org>
 <F3B37AE1-A4D6-421A-A847-CE994F24C818@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5F8DC.8030804@digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <69155963-925D-4776-9CC8-79504432FA87@guardianproject.info>


On Mar 3, 2015, at 7:09 PM, Peter Lebbing wrote:

> On 03/03/15 18:29, Hans of Guardian wrote:
>> Android has an installed base of hundreds of millions.  Desktop UNIX
>> is the exotic system here as compared to Windows, Android, etc.
> 
> I have no idea about how difficult it is to launch the gpg binary with a
> few pipes attached to a few file descriptors and perhaps anything else
> you need.
> 
> But I fail to see why you brought it up.
> 
> I thought we were discussing two alternatives:
> 
> - Call gpg directly
> - Use a library such as GPGME that calls gpg for you
> 
> In both cases, the gpg binary is executed as a separate process. So it
> seems to me any issues with this are the same in both cases. In fact, if
> it indeed is tricky as you say, you're better off if you have a library
> do this for you, so you don't have to get it right in each and every
> application.
> 
> Peter.

In Android, you can't really have shared libraries.  Apps share functionality at a higher level (aka Activities and Services).  So GnuPG-for-Android _is_ the shared library in effect, since it provides OpenPGP via Activities.

No one is saying that each app should have a custom wrapper for GnuPG.  What I think mailpile is saying, and what I'm trying to say is that for programming environments where GPGME does not make sense, there should be the ability to easily make a native version of what GPGME is doing.

.hc

From hans at guardianproject.info  Wed Mar  4 00:57:46 2015
From: hans at guardianproject.info (Hans of Guardian)
Date: Wed, 4 Mar 2015 00:57:46 +0100
Subject: Thoughts on GnuPG and automation
In-Reply-To: <87twy1dfjv.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <54F04EC5.3000107@guardianproject.info>
 <54F07A7D.3040709@digitalbrains.com>
 <AE0A6C7E-6A40-40C2-A401-0FACB5F84833@guardianproject.info>
 <87twy1dfjv.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <87F1333F-A27B-48B3-A763-D937B39562ED@guardianproject.info>


On Mar 3, 2015, at 8:52 PM, Werner Koch wrote:

> On Tue,  3 Mar 2015 14:29, hans at guardianproject.info said:
> 
>> It is actually more difficult to wrap GPGME in Java than to have just
>> rewritten GPGME in Java.  GPGME is a fine API for C/C++, it is a bad
> 
> Sorry, but that is not your problem.  The problem on Android seems to be
> that it is not easy to install anything else than plain Java apps.
> 
> We have GPGME bindings for all kind of languages from Ada over Java to
> Scheme.  Thus I can't see the problem - need another kind of data object
> to be handled in GPGME?  No problem, it can easily be done.  Is the
> event loop the problem?  That is somewhat harder to get right but that
> is always the case if you use a library.
> 
> I don't really understand your complaints given that we worked together
> to port GnuPG to Android.  GPGME is just a small thing on top of it and
> way easier than GnuPG itself.  It has nothing to do with fork+exec -
> GnuPG uses that itself a lot.
> 
> In 2010 we ported GnuPG and GPGME and Kontact (includes KMail) to
> Windows Mobile 6.5.  I can tell you, that was a task but we finally did
> it.  And the problems were not due to GnuPG (even that it ate up many of
> the scarce process slots) but due to the shear amount of memory KDE
> stuff required.  Consider as an example this: On Windows CE (the kernel
> of Windows Mobile), you don't have stdout and stdin, nor is there a way
> to inherit or pass on file descriptors.

And that is why this thread is going on, so hopefully we can come to an agreement that there are many areas where GnuPG can be used but GPGME is a bad solution to do it.  That is all I ask really from this thread at this point.  The bizarre Java wrapper of GPGME was not the biggest part of the problem of the GnuPG-for-Android port, but it was nonetheless a real problem.   Sure it is possible to use GPGME with Java, but it is not good, and ill-fitting APIs make for bad software, which in turn often leads to bad security.  It also took a lot of time.  In retrospect, I think it would have been quicker to write a native GPGME in Java on Android than to continue the work on the gnupg-for-java wrapper.

Now I'm trying to convey my experience of what I learned by actually getting GPGME working on Android, and how the situation can be improved.  It turns out that I came to some quite similar conclusions to the mailpile team: there needs to be a shared interface for native frameworks, GPGME is not the way for many popular environments.

.hc

From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Wed Mar  4 01:40:52 2015
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Wed, 04 Mar 2015 01:40:52 +0100
Subject: Thoughts on GnuPG and automation
In-Reply-To: <2062B95D-BD0D-4756-9CDF-AD785954D595@guardianproject.info>
References: <54F04EC5.3000107@guardianproject.info>
 <20150227121834-25258-9117-mailpile@slinky>
 <50378E65-5560-4AE1-9190-959E4435B40B@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5DADE.3030507@sixdemonbag.org>
 <B44176D7-D624-43D7-9B1A-DBADEC0E3A67@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5FDF2.5030306@sixdemonbag.org>
 <2062B95D-BD0D-4756-9CDF-AD785954D595@guardianproject.info>
Message-ID: <54F65494.1070708@sixdemonbag.org>

> If you are interested, you should read the details.

Did.  Have.

> Because you are missing some key details here.

In other words, "you're wrong, but I'm not going to present any evidence
or reasoning, I'm just going to make vague statements about how you're
missing details which I am privy to."

> I believe they log all PGP encrypted communication.

At this point, you saying that you believe something -- without
supporting evidence -- no longer carries any weight with me.  If you're
going to present this without evidence, I'm going to reject it without
comment.


From robertc at broadcom.com  Wed Mar  4 01:43:29 2015
From: robertc at broadcom.com (Bob (Robert) Cavanaugh)
Date: Wed, 4 Mar 2015 00:43:29 +0000
Subject: Thoughts on GnuPG and automation
In-Reply-To: <69155963-925D-4776-9CC8-79504432FA87@guardianproject.info>
References: <54F04EC5.3000107@guardianproject.info>
 <54F07A7D.3040709@digitalbrains.com>
 <AE0A6C7E-6A40-40C2-A401-0FACB5F84833@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5D690.9030607@digitalbrains.com>
 <D8E88427-D1D6-4C67-A1D0-29CFD37075F2@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5E626.5010808@sixdemonbag.org>
 <F3B37AE1-A4D6-421A-A847-CE994F24C818@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5F8DC.8030804@digitalbrains.com>
 <69155963-925D-4776-9CC8-79504432FA87@guardianproject.info>
Message-ID: <8F0B09FC6339FA439524099BFCABC11F2D3C2F9A@IRVEXCHMB11.corp.ad.broadcom.com>

Native to what? Processor, OS?
I think Peter and the group already adequately answered this: If GPGME is not providing an interface that meets Android requirements, then look into how GPGME interfaces to GPG and emulate that interface.
For you to request that the interface be changed can be likened to someone requesting that I2C be changed because you have a hard time implementing it. This is pretty much a non-starter IMHO. Implementing interfaces to existing infrastructures is bread-and-butter to software development. Stop asking for fundamental infrastructure changes and start solving your problem. The group has literally hundreds of m-y that can be used productively to help you do this, but harness the group's power in a constructive manner.

Bob Cavanaugh



-----Original Message-----
From: Gnupg-users [mailto:gnupg-users-bounces at gnupg.org] On Behalf Of Hans of Guardian
Sent: Tuesday, March 03, 2015 3:55 PM
To: Peter Lebbing
Cc: gnupg
Subject: Re: Thoughts on GnuPG and automation


On Mar 3, 2015, at 7:09 PM, Peter Lebbing wrote:


In Android, you can't really have shared libraries.  Apps share functionality at a higher level (aka Activities and Services).  So GnuPG-for-Android _is_ the shared library in effect, since it provides OpenPGP via Activities.

No one is saying that each app should have a custom wrapper for GnuPG.  What I think mailpile is saying, and what I'm trying to say is that for programming environments where GPGME does not make sense, there should be the ability to easily make a native version of what GPGME is doing.

.hc
_______________________________________________
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users


From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Wed Mar  4 01:45:12 2015
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Wed, 04 Mar 2015 01:45:12 +0100
Subject: Thoughts on GnuPG and automation
In-Reply-To: <87F1333F-A27B-48B3-A763-D937B39562ED@guardianproject.info>
References: <54F04EC5.3000107@guardianproject.info>
 <54F07A7D.3040709@digitalbrains.com>
 <AE0A6C7E-6A40-40C2-A401-0FACB5F84833@guardianproject.info>
 <87twy1dfjv.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <87F1333F-A27B-48B3-A763-D937B39562ED@guardianproject.info>
Message-ID: <54F65598.50100@sixdemonbag.org>

> And that is why this thread is going on, so hopefully we can come to 
> an agreement that there are many areas where GnuPG can be used but 
> GPGME is a bad solution to do it.

Maybe I'm a little irritable here, but -- pretty much everyone who's
ever hacked on GnuPG has found situations where GPGME isn't a good
solution, sometimes for architectural reasons and sometimes for API
reasons and sometimes for language binding reasons and sometimes for
licensing reasons and... etc.

No one has ever said GPGME is the all-purpose, all-in-one solution.  No
one.  So why are we having this discussion?  What was the point in even
bringing it up?


From wk at gnupg.org  Wed Mar  4 09:58:28 2015
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Wed, 04 Mar 2015 09:58:28 +0100
Subject: gpgme and Java (was: Thoughts on GnuPG and automation)
In-Reply-To: <87F1333F-A27B-48B3-A763-D937B39562ED@guardianproject.info> (Hans
 of Guardian's message of "Wed, 4 Mar 2015 00:57:46 +0100")
References: <54F04EC5.3000107@guardianproject.info>
 <54F07A7D.3040709@digitalbrains.com>
 <AE0A6C7E-6A40-40C2-A401-0FACB5F84833@guardianproject.info>
 <87twy1dfjv.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <87F1333F-A27B-48B3-A763-D937B39562ED@guardianproject.info>
Message-ID: <87385lcf63.fsf_-_@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Wed,  4 Mar 2015 00:57, hans at guardianproject.info said:

> thread at this point.  The bizarre Java wrapper of GPGME was not the
> biggest part of the problem of the GnuPG-for-Android port, but it was
> nonetheless a real problem.  Sure it is possible to use GPGME with

You mean Stefan's decade old Java binding?  Well, there was not much
interest in it for years and if there is now a need for a proper Java
binding, it should be done.

> Java, but it is not good, and ill-fitting APIs make for bad software,
> which in turn often leads to bad security.  It also took a lot of

Please describe the problems you have with the API so that we actually
have something to talk about. 


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner


-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From wk at gnupg.org  Wed Mar  4 09:55:07 2015
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Wed, 04 Mar 2015 09:55:07 +0100
Subject: Thoughts on GnuPG and automation
In-Reply-To: <54F65598.50100@sixdemonbag.org> (Robert J. Hansen's message of
 "Wed, 04 Mar 2015 01:45:12 +0100")
References: <54F04EC5.3000107@guardianproject.info>
 <54F07A7D.3040709@digitalbrains.com>
 <AE0A6C7E-6A40-40C2-A401-0FACB5F84833@guardianproject.info>
 <87twy1dfjv.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <87F1333F-A27B-48B3-A763-D937B39562ED@guardianproject.info>
 <54F65598.50100@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <877fuxcfbo.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Wed,  4 Mar 2015 01:45, rjh at sixdemonbag.org said:

> ever hacked on GnuPG has found situations where GPGME isn't a good
> solution, sometimes for architectural reasons and sometimes for API
> reasons and sometimes for language binding reasons and sometimes for
> licensing reasons and... etc.

It can't be that bad:

  $ apt-cache rdepends libgpgme11 | wc -l
  84

and the majority of problems I hear are by projects which do not use
GPGME.  So I wonder a bit about your statement.

Right, it is not easy to control the advanced features of OpenPGP with
GPGME. It can be done and there is quite some example code available.
Please also consider that GPGME is not an OpenPGP thing but a protocol
independent library for off-line encryption protocols (actually it is
also possible to do add online things with it).  GPGME works on all kind
of platforms, form WindowsCE over Android to any Unix system.  There are
two open bugs out of 69 filed bugs over the last 10 years.  Development
might have been a bit slower in the last 2 years after Marcus had to
leave us. 

If there are real problems and not just a "I do not like the
open-process-close" paradigm, this should be raised and discussed
(gnupg-devel).  In particular problems with language binding should be
solved and if possible I'd like to add the language binding to the gpgme
release to be sure that it is a one-stop-solution.

> No one has ever said GPGME is the all-purpose, all-in-one solution.  No
> one.  So why are we having this discussion?  What was the point in even

Right, key signing and such is not a primary goal of GPGME.  It is about
bread-and-butter encryption services.  we always said, that if there is
a real need for a new interface we will add that.  But before we do that
it is important to see whether such a use pattern actually works.

GPGME is under the LGPGv2.1+ - this is the most liberal copyleft license
I know.  On purpose this has not been changed to GPLv3 or LGPGv3 so that
it can even be used by evil DRM riddled proprietary software.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From wk at gnupg.org  Wed Mar  4 10:04:05 2015
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Wed, 04 Mar 2015 10:04:05 +0100
Subject: Thoughts on GnuPG and automation
In-Reply-To: <2062B95D-BD0D-4756-9CDF-AD785954D595@guardianproject.info> (Hans
 of Guardian's message of "Wed, 4 Mar 2015 00:50:44 +0100")
References: <54F04EC5.3000107@guardianproject.info>
 <20150227121834-25258-9117-mailpile@slinky>
 <50378E65-5560-4AE1-9190-959E4435B40B@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5DADE.3030507@sixdemonbag.org>
 <B44176D7-D624-43D7-9B1A-DBADEC0E3A67@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5FDF2.5030306@sixdemonbag.org>
 <2062B95D-BD0D-4756-9CDF-AD785954D595@guardianproject.info>
Message-ID: <87y4ndb0ca.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Wed,  4 Mar 2015 00:50, hans at guardianproject.info said:

> If you are interested, you should read the details.  Because you are
> missing some key details here.  I believe they log all PGP encrypted
> communication.  That would be easy for them to do.  I don't know about
> HTTPS.

I don't known for sure about encrypted mail but it is known that https
connection information is recorded and stored for future attacks:

    For its part, Britain's GCHQ collects information about encryption
    using the TLS and SSL protocols -- the protocols https connections
    are encrypted with -- in a database called "FLYING PIG." The British
    spies produce weekly "trends reports" to catalog which services use
    the most SSL connections and save details about those
    connections. Sites like Facebook, Twitter, Hotmail, Yahoo and
    Apple's iCloud service top the charts, and the number of catalogued
    SSL connections for one week is in the many billions -- for the top
    40 sites alone.

<http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/inside-the-nsa-s-war-on-internet-security-a-1010361.html>


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From wk at gnupg.org  Wed Mar  4 10:07:43 2015
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Wed, 04 Mar 2015 10:07:43 +0100
Subject: Thoughts on GnuPG and automation
In-Reply-To: <8F0B09FC6339FA439524099BFCABC11F2D3C2F9A@IRVEXCHMB11.corp.ad.broadcom.com>
 (Bob Cavanaugh's message of "Wed, 4 Mar 2015 00:43:29 +0000")
References: <54F04EC5.3000107@guardianproject.info>
 <54F07A7D.3040709@digitalbrains.com>
 <AE0A6C7E-6A40-40C2-A401-0FACB5F84833@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5D690.9030607@digitalbrains.com>
 <D8E88427-D1D6-4C67-A1D0-29CFD37075F2@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5E626.5010808@sixdemonbag.org>
 <F3B37AE1-A4D6-421A-A847-CE994F24C818@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5F8DC.8030804@digitalbrains.com>
 <69155963-925D-4776-9CC8-79504432FA87@guardianproject.info>
 <8F0B09FC6339FA439524099BFCABC11F2D3C2F9A@IRVEXCHMB11.corp.ad.broadcom.com>
Message-ID: <87twy1b068.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Wed,  4 Mar 2015 01:43, robertc at broadcom.com said:

> I think Peter and the group already adequately answered this: If GPGME
> is not providing an interface that meets Android requirements, then
> look into how GPGME interfaces to GPG and emulate that interface.

FWIW, EasyPG, the GnuPG interface used by Emacs, is more or less exactly
modelled after GPGME - in Elisp of course.  This is due to an Emacs
policy to keep the C-written core small with not to much dependencies.


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Wed Mar  4 10:50:53 2015
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Wed, 04 Mar 2015 10:50:53 +0100
Subject: Thoughts on GnuPG and automation
In-Reply-To: <87y4ndb0ca.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <54F04EC5.3000107@guardianproject.info>	<20150227121834-25258-9117-mailpile@slinky>	<50378E65-5560-4AE1-9190-959E4435B40B@guardianproject.info>	<54F5DADE.3030507@sixdemonbag.org>	<B44176D7-D624-43D7-9B1A-DBADEC0E3A67@guardianproject.info>	<54F5FDF2.5030306@sixdemonbag.org>	<2062B95D-BD0D-4756-9CDF-AD785954D595@guardianproject.info>
 <87y4ndb0ca.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <54F6D57D.6020903@sixdemonbag.org>

> I don't known for sure about encrypted mail but it is known that 
> https connection information is recorded and stored for future 
> attacks:

Perhaps.  Plausible, even, given storage requirements for connection
information.  But storing traffic, when 99.999999% of it is good --
that's ridiculous.

The reason why I'm so fervent about stomping down on fashionable
misinformation, by the way, is because the people propagating these
things are *hurting* *people*.

Security is as much a state of mind as it is a state of reality.  Here
in the United States, violent crime is down 50% since the 1990s, and
crimes against children are down even more than that.  Yet, due to a
steady stream of awful news stories, most people feel they're in more
danger than ever before, and parents are genuinely afraid to let their
kids play outdoors.  The last time we've been this safe in our
communities was the early 1970s, and we feel like we're under siege.

That's no way to live.  When people feel like they're under siege they
act like they're under siege.  Personal relationships fray.  People stop
trusting each other.  Happiness plummets.  Suffering increases.

We face a lot of threats on the electronic front, yes.  We absolutely
need to face these threats squarely.  If we pretend a real threat
doesn't exist, that's terrible for our overall health as a society.

But if we pretend a false threat *does* exist... that's just as bad.

The possibility of widespread metadata collection is real, troubling,
and the free countries of the world need to engage in some spirited
discussion about it.

The possibility of *every encrypted communication* being intercepted and
stored for later exploitation ... is not real, and we need to stop
treating it as such.

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From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Wed Mar  4 10:57:57 2015
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Wed, 04 Mar 2015 10:57:57 +0100
Subject: Thoughts on GnuPG and automation
In-Reply-To: <877fuxcfbo.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <54F04EC5.3000107@guardianproject.info>	<54F07A7D.3040709@digitalbrains.com>	<AE0A6C7E-6A40-40C2-A401-0FACB5F84833@guardianproject.info>	<87twy1dfjv.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>	<87F1333F-A27B-48B3-A763-D937B39562ED@guardianproject.info>	<54F65598.50100@sixdemonbag.org>
 <877fuxcfbo.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <54F6D725.9040301@sixdemonbag.org>

> It can't be that bad:
> 
> $ apt-cache rdepends libgpgme11 | wc -l 84
> 
> and the majority of problems I hear are by projects which do not use 
> GPGME.  So I wonder a bit about your statement.

You're looking at FOSS projects that have successfully used GPGME, but
that doesn't tell you about proprietary projects that have chosen not to
use GPGME.  I've had clients refuse to use GPGME because of the
licensing, even under the LGPLv2.1.  (Foolish, I know.)  Other times
I've discovered GPGME doesn't support a particular feature I need, like
discovering the default preference lists that are currently in use.  Etc.

This doesn't impact my opinion of GPGME as a tool.  It just means that,
like all tools, there are environments where other tools are better ideas.


From wk at gnupg.org  Wed Mar  4 11:01:16 2015
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Wed, 04 Mar 2015 11:01:16 +0100
Subject: Thoughts on GnuPG and automation
In-Reply-To: <D9ABA4AE-6C5E-443C-8334-27C6C529930F@guardianproject.info> (Hans
 of Guardian's message of "Tue, 3 Mar 2015 21:29:08 +0100")
References: <54F04EC5.3000107@guardianproject.info>
 <54F07A7D.3040709@digitalbrains.com>
 <AE0A6C7E-6A40-40C2-A401-0FACB5F84833@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5D690.9030607@digitalbrains.com>
 <D8E88427-D1D6-4C67-A1D0-29CFD37075F2@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5E626.5010808@sixdemonbag.org>
 <F3B37AE1-A4D6-421A-A847-CE994F24C818@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5F8DC.8030804@digitalbrains.com>
 <D9ABA4AE-6C5E-443C-8334-27C6C529930F@guardianproject.info>
Message-ID: <87mw3taxoz.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Tue,  3 Mar 2015 21:29, hans at guardianproject.info said:

> * Android will kill apps when it needs to, app lifecycle is automatically managed,
>  the app has no control over it, and often zero warning is given

That is the same as with Linux.  Ever heard of the OOM killer?

> * Android was not meant to support launching processes from a shell/terminal,
>  it was there for core debugging, then opened up on demand from devs, but it
>  is very much a second class citizen to a Java Android app.

Why do you want to launch a process from a shell or terminal (actually a
shell is just an interpreter which has options to be used on a tty (job
control etc.))

> * all apps are child processes of 'zygote'

All processes excuted from GPGME are children of init. What is the
problem?

> * there is no way to install shared libraries to be shared by apps

I can't comment on this.

> There are other differences as well.  And iOS actually works a lot

Given that we worked together on adding features to GnuPG and GPGME for
use on Android I can't see your point.  Given that Android uses a Unix
kernel it is much more Unix than Windows or VMS.

You are thinking in the context of an application which runs on that
Android Unix kernel.  That might be indeed limited.  However we are
hackers and we can find ways to make almost everything work.

Shall we sit down and talk about the Android problems?  If we can do that
close to my place I will be available most of the time.  If it is better
for you to do it somewhere else, like Berlin, we need a bit more
planning.  Travel expenses should not be a concern.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From peter at digitalbrains.com  Wed Mar  4 11:10:52 2015
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Wed, 04 Mar 2015 11:10:52 +0100
Subject: Thoughts on GnuPG and automation
In-Reply-To: <69155963-925D-4776-9CC8-79504432FA87@guardianproject.info>
References: <54F04EC5.3000107@guardianproject.info>
 <54F07A7D.3040709@digitalbrains.com>
 <AE0A6C7E-6A40-40C2-A401-0FACB5F84833@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5D690.9030607@digitalbrains.com>
 <D8E88427-D1D6-4C67-A1D0-29CFD37075F2@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5E626.5010808@sixdemonbag.org>
 <F3B37AE1-A4D6-421A-A847-CE994F24C818@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5F8DC.8030804@digitalbrains.com>
 <69155963-925D-4776-9CC8-79504432FA87@guardianproject.info>
Message-ID: <54F6DA2C.5020607@digitalbrains.com>

On 04/03/15 00:55, Hans of Guardian wrote:
> [...] what I'm trying to say is that for programming environments
> where GPGME does not make sense, there should be the ability to
> easily make a native version of what GPGME is doing.

Couldn't this be achieved by writing a C program that, for instance,
talks via JSON to you, and itself uses GPGME to call the gpg binary?

<Your easily written native library>
[JSON]
<Program written in C>
[GPGME]
<gpg binary>

I think there is opposition to adding more stuff to the gpg binary. I
don't think there is opposition to you writing a program that uses GPGME
:). If it's good, it might be picked up for wider inclusion.

Since your Java/Python/etc program needs to install gpg anyway, it could
install the other C program as well. Packaging and distribution
definitely isn't a solved problem, but a separate one from what we are
now discussing, so let's not muddle this discussion by including it just
now.

Peter.

PS: When I say "you could write" I mean "someone could write"

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at <http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>


From daniele at grinta.net  Wed Mar  4 11:25:23 2015
From: daniele at grinta.net (Daniele Nicolodi)
Date: Wed, 04 Mar 2015 11:25:23 +0100
Subject: Thoughts on GnuPG and automation
In-Reply-To: <AE0A6C7E-6A40-40C2-A401-0FACB5F84833@guardianproject.info>
References: <54F04EC5.3000107@guardianproject.info>
 <54F07A7D.3040709@digitalbrains.com>
 <AE0A6C7E-6A40-40C2-A401-0FACB5F84833@guardianproject.info>
Message-ID: <54F6DD93.9060203@grinta.net>

On 03/03/15 14:29, Hans of Guardian wrote:
> It is actually more difficult to wrap GPGME in Java than to have just
> rewritten GPGME in Java.  GPGME is a fine API for C/C++, it is a bad
> API for other languages.  You end up with an API that feels like a C
> API forced into the language, e.g. Java, python, etc.  That makes for
> more coding mistakes because it feels foreign to the programmer.
> More mistakes means more security issues.

Hello,

I have no idea about the Java tooling for interfacing to external
libraries, but (after seeing so many complaints on the mailing list)
I've recently started to work on Python bindings to GPGME using Cython,
and so far it has been an extremely smooth process and the resulting
Python API feels quite pythonic (I haven't started with the asynchronous
calls yet, those will probably be harder to map in a pythonic way).

The fact that writing the bindings is quite easy, is due indeed to the
fact that GPGME is a fine API for C (and to Cython to a large extent).

Cheers,
Daniele



From wk at gnupg.org  Wed Mar  4 11:36:25 2015
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Wed, 04 Mar 2015 11:36:25 +0100
Subject: Thoughts on GnuPG and automation
In-Reply-To: <54F6D57D.6020903@sixdemonbag.org> (Robert J. Hansen's message of
 "Wed, 04 Mar 2015 10:50:53 +0100")
References: <54F04EC5.3000107@guardianproject.info>
 <20150227121834-25258-9117-mailpile@slinky>
 <50378E65-5560-4AE1-9190-959E4435B40B@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5DADE.3030507@sixdemonbag.org>
 <B44176D7-D624-43D7-9B1A-DBADEC0E3A67@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5FDF2.5030306@sixdemonbag.org>
 <2062B95D-BD0D-4756-9CDF-AD785954D595@guardianproject.info>
 <87y4ndb0ca.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <54F6D57D.6020903@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <87bnk9aw2e.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Wed,  4 Mar 2015 10:50, rjh at sixdemonbag.org said:
>> I don't known for sure about encrypted mail but it is known that 
>> https connection information is recorded and stored for future 
>> attacks:
>
> Perhaps.  Plausible, even, given storage requirements for connection
> information.  But storing traffic, when 99.999999% of it is good --
> that's ridiculous.

That has not been said.  From my understanding the FLYING PIG thing is
about extracting information from all gathered TLS handshakes.  This
shall either be used as a tool to decrypt suspicious connections or to
research weaknesses in TLS.  The authors of the article should be able
to explain that more in terms we understand - shall I ask them?

> That's no way to live.  When people feel like they're under siege they
> act like they're under siege.  Personal relationships fray.  People stop
> trusting each other.  Happiness plummets.  Suffering increases.

I fully agree with you on that.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From wk at gnupg.org  Wed Mar  4 11:48:16 2015
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Wed, 04 Mar 2015 11:48:16 +0100
Subject: Thoughts on GnuPG and automation
In-Reply-To: <54F6D725.9040301@sixdemonbag.org> (Robert J. Hansen's message of
 "Wed, 04 Mar 2015 10:57:57 +0100")
References: <54F04EC5.3000107@guardianproject.info>
 <54F07A7D.3040709@digitalbrains.com>
 <AE0A6C7E-6A40-40C2-A401-0FACB5F84833@guardianproject.info>
 <87twy1dfjv.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <87F1333F-A27B-48B3-A763-D937B39562ED@guardianproject.info>
 <54F65598.50100@sixdemonbag.org> <877fuxcfbo.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <54F6D725.9040301@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <877fuxavin.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Wed,  4 Mar 2015 10:57, rjh at sixdemonbag.org said:

> You're looking at FOSS projects that have successfully used GPGME, but

Sure.

> that doesn't tell you about proprietary projects that have chosen not to
> use GPGME.  I've had clients refuse to use GPGME because of the
> licensing, even under the LGPLv2.1.  (Foolish, I know.)  Other times

And I have had several hints that it was used anyway and violating the
license.  But that is another story.

If there is a compelling reason to change the license, like to increase
the adaption of mail encryption, I am willing to consider that.  I am
able do that for most of the code but there are some practical
drawbacks, like the ability to share code between the other libraries.

> I've discovered GPGME doesn't support a particular feature I need, like
> discovering the default preference lists that are currently in use.  Etc.

The bug tracker allows to file feature requests ...


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner


-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Wed Mar  4 11:51:45 2015
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Wed, 04 Mar 2015 11:51:45 +0100
Subject: Thoughts on GnuPG and automation
In-Reply-To: <87bnk9aw2e.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <54F04EC5.3000107@guardianproject.info>	<20150227121834-25258-9117-mailpile@slinky>	<50378E65-5560-4AE1-9190-959E4435B40B@guardianproject.info>	<54F5DADE.3030507@sixdemonbag.org>	<B44176D7-D624-43D7-9B1A-DBADEC0E3A67@guardianproject.info>	<54F5FDF2.5030306@sixdemonbag.org>	<2062B95D-BD0D-4756-9CDF-AD785954D595@guardianproject.info>	<87y4ndb0ca.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>	<54F6D57D.6020903@sixdemonbag.org>
 <87bnk9aw2e.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <54F6E3C1.405@sixdemonbag.org>

> That has not been said.

Not by you, correct.  I've heard it from others.


From wk at gnupg.org  Wed Mar  4 11:59:03 2015
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Wed, 04 Mar 2015 11:59:03 +0100
Subject: Thoughts on GnuPG and automation
In-Reply-To: <54F6DA2C.5020607@digitalbrains.com> (Peter Lebbing's message of
 "Wed, 04 Mar 2015 11:10:52 +0100")
References: <54F04EC5.3000107@guardianproject.info>
 <54F07A7D.3040709@digitalbrains.com>
 <AE0A6C7E-6A40-40C2-A401-0FACB5F84833@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5D690.9030607@digitalbrains.com>
 <D8E88427-D1D6-4C67-A1D0-29CFD37075F2@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5E626.5010808@sixdemonbag.org>
 <F3B37AE1-A4D6-421A-A847-CE994F24C818@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5F8DC.8030804@digitalbrains.com>
 <69155963-925D-4776-9CC8-79504432FA87@guardianproject.info>
 <54F6DA2C.5020607@digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <871tl5av0o.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Wed,  4 Mar 2015 11:10, peter at digitalbrains.com said:

> <Your easily written native library>
> [JSON]
> <Program written in C>
> [GPGME]

That <Program written in C> already exists: gpgme-tool.  It creates
output in XML but adding an option for JSON output should be
straightforward.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner


-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From wk at gnupg.org  Wed Mar  4 13:00:18 2015
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Wed, 04 Mar 2015 13:00:18 +0100
Subject: Thoughts on GnuPG and automation
In-Reply-To: <54F5D1E1.5030405@minton.name> (Brian Minton's message of "Tue,
 03 Mar 2015 10:23:13 -0500")
References: <54F04EC5.3000107@guardianproject.info>
 <20150227121834-25258-9117-mailpile@slinky>
 <87mw3y94fj.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
 <54F5D1E1.5030405@minton.name>
Message-ID: <87mw3t9dm5.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Tue,  3 Mar 2015 16:23, brian at minton.name said:
> It breaks mailpile because gpg-agent is not session aware.  A user could
> be logged in locally, using mailpile, and a remote attacker could access
> the web interface of that locally running mailpile instance, which since
> it is talking to the same gpg-agent, would think the remote user is

How do you distinguish between a remote user and a remote hacker?  I use
my Gnus MUA most of the time locally, but if need arise I can also login
from remote and use the very same process and gpg-agent.

It is also questionable what remote means: Client-server is a core
principle of Unix and in particular X11.

> I think that one solution would be to have mailpile use a per-session
> gpg home dir.

That is an architectural decision.

BTW, gpg-agent has this --extra-socket feature which distinguishes
between remote and local use (modulo some discussed changes).  It would
be easy to extend it in a way that gpg can tell gpg-agent to act as if
it was used via --extra-socket.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From steve at secretvolcanobase.org  Wed Mar  4 11:52:22 2015
From: steve at secretvolcanobase.org (Steve Jones)
Date: Wed, 4 Mar 2015 10:52:22 +0000
Subject: Thoughts on GnuPG and automation
In-Reply-To: <54F6D57D.6020903@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <54F04EC5.3000107@guardianproject.info>
 <20150227121834-25258-9117-mailpile@slinky>
 <50378E65-5560-4AE1-9190-959E4435B40B@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5DADE.3030507@sixdemonbag.org>
 <B44176D7-D624-43D7-9B1A-DBADEC0E3A67@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5FDF2.5030306@sixdemonbag.org>
 <2062B95D-BD0D-4756-9CDF-AD785954D595@guardianproject.info>
 <87y4ndb0ca.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <54F6D57D.6020903@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <20150304105222.23996f36@steves-laptop>

On Wed, 04 Mar 2015 10:50:53 +0100
"Robert J. Hansen" <rjh at sixdemonbag.org> wrote:

> The possibility of *every encrypted communication* being intercepted
> and stored for later exploitation ... is not real, and we need to stop
> treating it as such.

I remember when we used to think this about the NSA or GCHQ taking in
every single email that crossed their borders.

-- 
Steve Jones <steve at secretvolcanobase.org>
Key fingerprint: 3550 BFC8 D7BA 4286 0FBC  4272 2AC8 A680 7167 C896
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From bre at pagekite.net  Wed Mar  4 17:21:05 2015
From: bre at pagekite.net (Bjarni Runar Einarsson)
Date: Wed, 04 Mar 2015 16:21:05 -0000
Subject: Thoughts on GnuPG and automation
In-Reply-To: <87mw3t9dm5.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <87mw3t9dm5.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <20150304162017-26425-11039-mailpile@slinky>

Werner Koch <wk at gnupg.org> wrote:
> 
> > I think that one solution would be to have mailpile use a per-session
> > gpg home dir.
> 
> That is an architectural decision.
> 
> BTW, gpg-agent has this --extra-socket feature which distinguishes
> between remote and local use (modulo some discussed changes).  It would
> be easy to extend it in a way that gpg can tell gpg-agent to act as if
> it was used via --extra-socket.

Hi Werner!

In order to use that in current releases of GnuPG, then Mailpile needs
to run its own gpg-agent, correct? And in order to use a custom pinentry
as discussed elsewhere? Can I run multiple agents off the same keychain,
or do I also need to create a separate gpg home dir for each one?

I ask, because although current users of GnuPG are proportionally very
few, they are still a group I consider important. I expect many such
users to become quite annoyed if Mailpile doesn't integrate cleanly with
their existing keychain.

Regarding other topics broached on this thread, I think it is very
interesting to hear that GPGME is basically the "official"
implementation of something that wraps the gpg binary. I hadn't looked
deeply enough into GPGME to be aware of this.

I will probably take a peek at the GPGME source to see if I missed some
more elegant ways to solve things. In particular, both generating keys
and editing the UID list on a key are quite gross in Mailpile's wrapper
and I wonder if GPGME offers a better implementation?

GPGME proponents will be frustrated to hear that this knowledge actually
makes me feel much better about Mailpile's decision to wrap gpg
directly: it means I've removed two layers of abstraction between my
code and gpg! Win! Although supposedly such layers are supposed to help
developers (and people will continue to accuse me of NIH and whatnot),
in my experience on other projects, they've more often than not been
sources of additional architectural constraints and bugs of their own.
OpenSSL wrapper libraries for Python are a prime example, for one. More
code: more bugs.

This is one of the reasons having a native "protocol" such as JSON or
Assuan in the gpg binary itself (or the gpg-agent if things move there)
appeals to me so much.

With a well designed protocol, wrapper libraries almost become
unnecessary and layers and layers of code can just be stripped away and
discarded. Consider that with a protocol approach, new features in gpg
become available immediately to all applications speaking the protocol.
With two layers of wrappers, we have to wait for GPGME to get updated
and THEN wait for the Python wrappers to get updated. We're all
overworked, so removing layers that need to be kept up-to-date and in
lockstep is a hugely valuable investment. A well defined protocol also
has the potential to eliminate mountains of platform-specific hacks - if
you can talk to the protocol server, things work, no matter whether it's
a fifo in the file system, stdio or a TCP/IP connection to a remote box.
So people can choose the transport that best suits their platform and
just get on with "real work".

Anyway, I'm very glad this discussion is taking place. In my opinion, if
GnuPG wants to be a platform other apps can build on, these interfaces
matter a great deal. Whether there are hacks or workarounds is kind of
irrelevant; if developers are unhappy they'll just go develop something
else. This stuff matters.

Thanks for the comments,
 - Bjarni

-- 
Sent using Mailpile, Free Software from www.mailpile.is
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From paulo at mlopes.net  Wed Mar  4 20:14:14 2015
From: paulo at mlopes.net (Paulo Lopes)
Date: Wed, 4 Mar 2015 20:14:14 +0100 (CET)
Subject: where can one find an official gnupg project statement on the state
 of sub project?
Message-ID: <18364009.16951.1425496454366.JavaMail.open-xchange@app1.ox.privateemail.com>

Hello,

I am a active use of gnupg and gnupg smart card, and unfortunately my OSS
contributions are to other projects where I do have more experience so I totally
understand any reply to my question.

Currently I use:

* gnupg
* gnupg2
* poldi

And did use:

* scute

It turns out that gnupg and gnupg2 are live and kicking, however the other 2
projects seem to be dorment for long time without any updates.

I do use poldi as a pam because it allows me to setup SUDO not using the sudoers
file but using my gnupg card. Now until recently I've been mostly developing in
Debian and Ubuntu but more recently I needed to upgrade my development
environments to Fedora and openSUSE. In these 2 distros there is no official
packages for poldi. After a quick search on google it turns out that poldi has
been removed in the latest openSUSE  releases and fedora has no maintainer for
it.

Maybe the reason for dropping poldi was due to build issues that have already
been fixed on git master? master was updated 9 months ago but the latest release
0.4.1 is 6 years old. Same for scute however i did stop using it.

Now that there seems to be some extra momentum in the project with the amazing
funding campaign, what are the plans for the sub projects?

And in the case that poldi is not going to be develop, are there any recommended
alternatives?

Thanks!
Paulo


From mailing-lists at asatiifm.net  Wed Mar  4 21:19:46 2015
From: mailing-lists at asatiifm.net (=?windows-1252?Q?Ville_M=E4=E4tt=E4?=)
Date: Wed, 04 Mar 2015 22:19:46 +0200
Subject: Thoughts on GnuPG and automation
In-Reply-To: <69155963-925D-4776-9CC8-79504432FA87@guardianproject.info>
References: <54F04EC5.3000107@guardianproject.info>
 <54F07A7D.3040709@digitalbrains.com>
 <AE0A6C7E-6A40-40C2-A401-0FACB5F84833@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5D690.9030607@digitalbrains.com>
 <D8E88427-D1D6-4C67-A1D0-29CFD37075F2@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5E626.5010808@sixdemonbag.org>
 <F3B37AE1-A4D6-421A-A847-CE994F24C818@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5F8DC.8030804@digitalbrains.com>
 <69155963-925D-4776-9CC8-79504432FA87@guardianproject.info>
Message-ID: <54F768E2.9030403@asatiifm.net>

On 04.03.15 01:55, Hans of Guardian wrote:
> In Android, you can't really have shared libraries.  Apps share functionality at a higher level (aka Activities and Services).

Qt applications can share Qt libraries [1] with an external dependency
called Ministro [2].

[1]: http://doc.qt.io/qtcreator/creator-deploying-android.html
[2]:
https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.kde.necessitas.ministro

-- 
Ville

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From mailing-lists at asatiifm.net  Wed Mar  4 22:04:52 2015
From: mailing-lists at asatiifm.net (=?windows-1252?Q?Ville_M=E4=E4tt=E4?=)
Date: Wed, 04 Mar 2015 23:04:52 +0200
Subject: Thoughts on GnuPG and automation
In-Reply-To: <20150304162017-26425-11039-mailpile@slinky>
References: <87mw3t9dm5.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <20150304162017-26425-11039-mailpile@slinky>
Message-ID: <54F77374.6000504@asatiifm.net>

On 04.03.15 18:21, Bjarni Runar Einarsson wrote:
> GPGME proponents will be frustrated to hear that this knowledge actually
> makes me feel much better about Mailpile's decision to wrap gpg
> directly: it means I've removed two layers of abstraction between my
> code and gpg! Win! Although supposedly such layers are supposed to help
> developers (and people will continue to accuse me of NIH and whatnot),
> in my experience on other projects, they've more often than not been
> sources of additional architectural constraints and bugs of their own.

Separation of concerns. Separating different, sufficiently unrelated,
functionality into their own layer / process / service can be just as
beneficial as on a normal *NIX using multiple processes to achieve a
given task. I.e. the so called "UNIX philosophy" [1].

> OpenSSL wrapper libraries for Python are a prime example, for one. More
> code: more bugs.

Implementing something in one monolithic binary instead of two or more
separate binaries does not necessarily mean much more code. We can
always screw up wherever the functionality is.

> This is one of the reasons having a native "protocol" such as JSON or
> Assuan in the gpg binary itself (or the gpg-agent if things move there)
> appeals to me so much.

I'm not taking sides one way or the other right now on this one?

> With two layers of wrappers, we have to wait for GPGME to get updated
> and THEN wait for the Python wrappers to get updated.

With separate layers they can be updated separately. There is no need
for every single GPG user to update the binary if a change in some
layered feature needs to be updated.

If features live in a separate layer, certainly there needs to be some
coordination and care that a change does not break some dependant layer.
But that's not really anything new and one needs to always be careful
with such things whether with monolithic and modular binaries alike.

> A well defined protocol also
> has the potential to eliminate mountains of platform-specific hacks

So it has.

[1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unix_philosophy

-- 
Ville

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From mailing-lists at asatiifm.net  Wed Mar  4 22:09:03 2015
From: mailing-lists at asatiifm.net (=?windows-1252?Q?Ville_M=E4=E4tt=E4?=)
Date: Wed, 04 Mar 2015 23:09:03 +0200
Subject: Thoughts on GnuPG and automation
In-Reply-To: <877fuxavin.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <54F04EC5.3000107@guardianproject.info>
 <54F07A7D.3040709@digitalbrains.com>
 <AE0A6C7E-6A40-40C2-A401-0FACB5F84833@guardianproject.info>
 <87twy1dfjv.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <87F1333F-A27B-48B3-A763-D937B39562ED@guardianproject.info>
 <54F65598.50100@sixdemonbag.org> <877fuxcfbo.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <54F6D725.9040301@sixdemonbag.org> <877fuxavin.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <54F7746F.80204@asatiifm.net>

On 04.03.15 12:48, Werner Koch wrote:
>> that doesn't tell you about proprietary projects that have chosen not to
>> > use GPGME.  I've had clients refuse to use GPGME because of the
>> > licensing, even under the LGPLv2.1.  (Foolish, I know.)  Other times
> And I have had several hints that it was used anyway and violating the
> license.  But that is another story.
> 
> If there is a compelling reason to change the license, like to increase
> the adaption of mail encryption, I am willing to consider that.  I am
> able do that for most of the code but there are some practical
> drawbacks, like the ability to share code between the other libraries.
> 

I'd rather not have a license changed off copyleft.

-- 
Ville

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From wk at gnupg.org  Thu Mar  5 10:34:16 2015
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Thu, 05 Mar 2015 10:34:16 +0100
Subject: where can one find an official gnupg project statement on the
 state of sub project?
In-Reply-To: <18364009.16951.1425496454366.JavaMail.open-xchange@app1.ox.privateemail.com>
 (Paulo Lopes's message of "Wed, 4 Mar 2015 20:14:14 +0100 (CET)")
References: <18364009.16951.1425496454366.JavaMail.open-xchange@app1.ox.privateemail.com>
Message-ID: <87oao77ppj.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Wed,  4 Mar 2015 20:14, paulo at mlopes.net said:

> It turns out that gnupg and gnupg2 are live and kicking, however the other 2
> projects seem to be dorment for long time without any updates.

Right I have not looked at scrute and poldi for a long time.  There
seems to be not enough interest.  However, I think that gniibe is
maintaining them for Debian.

> Maybe the reason for dropping poldi was due to build issues that have already
> been fixed on git master? master was updated 9 months ago but the latest release
> 0.4.1 is 6 years old. Same for scute however i did stop using it.

Do you think we should do a new release for poldi?

> Now that there seems to be some extra momentum in the project with the amazing
> funding campaign, what are the plans for the sub projects?

Working on GnuPG 2.1 has top prioroty right now.  If there is enough
interest in Poldi, the development shoudl be taken up again.  Is there?

Regarding Scute, I expect that we will start to work on it again in
ralation to Thunderbird.  I know of at least one project which plans to
start working on Thunderbird.

I'll put a note into the Wiki.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From pmlopes at gmail.com  Thu Mar  5 11:33:00 2015
From: pmlopes at gmail.com (Paulo Lopes)
Date: Thu, 5 Mar 2015 11:33:00 +0100
Subject: where can one find an official gnupg project statement on the
 state of sub project?
In-Reply-To: <87oao77ppj.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <18364009.16951.1425496454366.JavaMail.open-xchange@app1.ox.privateemail.com>
 <87oao77ppj.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <CAPdn05_OU7YsT8MCk05-7d4LXiVPYHnJ_euHE5Z+t8obA1kW8A@mail.gmail.com>

On Thu, Mar 5, 2015 at 10:34 AM, Werner Koch <wk at gnupg.org> wrote:

> On Wed,  4 Mar 2015 20:14, paulo at mlopes.net said:
>
> > It turns out that gnupg and gnupg2 are live and kicking, however the
> other 2
> > projects seem to be dorment for long time without any updates.
>
> Right I have not looked at scrute and poldi for a long time.  There
> seems to be not enough interest.  However, I think that gniibe is
> maintaining them for Debian.
>
> > Maybe the reason for dropping poldi was due to build issues that have
> already
> > been fixed on git master? master was updated 9 months ago but the latest
> release
> > 0.4.1 is 6 years old. Same for scute however i did stop using it.
>
> Do you think we should do a new release for poldi?
>

If I could suggest something else, what about having official packages, say:

* official ppa for ubuntu
* official rpm for RHEL/Centos/Fedora/SUSE
* official Arch AUR

Of course this is quite some work and lots of distros are not here but for
example this would mean that gnupg users would always have an official
build unlike for example:

as of today (March 5, 2015) ubuntu 14.04 LTS is still offering gnupg 1.4.16
even though there have been security issues fixed in 1.4.17, 1.4.18 and
1.4.19. In a way a uninformed user that is under the impression that gnupg
is secure due to the fact that the distro he/she uses does not update the
packages in time is using vulnerable software while the project has already
issued security fixes long time ago...

Again this is just an idea that requires quite some work and thought...



> > Now that there seems to be some extra momentum in the project with the
> amazing
> > funding campaign, what are the plans for the sub projects?
>
> Working on GnuPG 2.1 has top prioroty right now.  If there is enough
> interest in Poldi, the development shoudl be taken up again.  Is there?
>
> Regarding Scute, I expect that we will start to work on it again in
> ralation to Thunderbird.  I know of at least one project which plans to
> start working on Thunderbird.
>
> I'll put a note into the Wiki.
>
>
> Shalom-Salam,
>
>    Werner
>
> --
> Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
>



-- 
Paulo Lopes
www.jetdrone.com
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From philip.jackson at nordnet.fr  Thu Mar  5 13:22:24 2015
From: philip.jackson at nordnet.fr (Philip Jackson)
Date: Thu, 05 Mar 2015 13:22:24 +0100
Subject: where can one find an official gnupg project statement on the
 state of sub project?
In-Reply-To: <CAPdn05_OU7YsT8MCk05-7d4LXiVPYHnJ_euHE5Z+t8obA1kW8A@mail.gmail.com>
References: <18364009.16951.1425496454366.JavaMail.open-xchange@app1.ox.privateemail.com>
 <87oao77ppj.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <CAPdn05_OU7YsT8MCk05-7d4LXiVPYHnJ_euHE5Z+t8obA1kW8A@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <54F84A80.3020604@nordnet.fr>

On 05/03/15 11:33, Paulo Lopes wrote:
> If I could suggest something else, what about having official packages, say:
> 
> * official ppa for ubuntu
> * official rpm for RHEL/Centos/Fedora/SUSE
> * official Arch AUR
> 
> Of course this is quite some work and lots of distros are not here but for
> example this would mean that gnupg users would always have an official build
> unlike for example:
> 
> as of today (March 5, 2015) ubuntu 14.04 LTS is still offering gnupg 1.4.16 even
> though there have been security issues fixed in 1.4.17, 1.4.18 and 1.4.19. In a
> way a uninformed user that is under the impression that gnupg is secure due to
> the fact that the distro he/she uses does not update the packages in time is
> using vulnerable software while the project has already issued security fixes
> long time ago...
> 
> Again this is just an idea that requires quite some work and thought...

Wow .... at last someone has said it.  What a good idea !! For gnupg 2.1.2 as
well ...

This might encourage distros to be a little more adventurous and also spread the
workload from distro maintainers to include other volunteers.

At present, the concensus of many threads is that encryption in general is just
too difficult for the average email user to use willingly and successfully.  The
'average email user' just has his burden increased exponentially if he has to
build everything from source as well in order to follow the progress of the
'industry'.

Philip

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From peter at digitalbrains.com  Thu Mar  5 15:10:25 2015
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Thu, 05 Mar 2015 15:10:25 +0100
Subject: where can one find an official gnupg project statement on the
 state of sub project?
In-Reply-To: <CAPdn05_OU7YsT8MCk05-7d4LXiVPYHnJ_euHE5Z+t8obA1kW8A@mail.gmail.com>
References: <18364009.16951.1425496454366.JavaMail.open-xchange@app1.ox.privateemail.com>
 <87oao77ppj.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <CAPdn05_OU7YsT8MCk05-7d4LXiVPYHnJ_euHE5Z+t8obA1kW8A@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <54F863D1.3010706@digitalbrains.com>

On 05/03/15 11:33, Paulo Lopes wrote:
> as of today (March 5, 2015) ubuntu 14.04 LTS is still offering gnupg
>  1.4.16 even though there have been security issues fixed in 1.4.17,
>  1.4.18 and 1.4.19. In a way a uninformed user that is under the 
> impression that gnupg is secure due to the fact that the distro 
> he/she uses does not update the packages in time is using vulnerable 
> software while the project has already issued security fixes long 
> time ago...

I think you'll find that many distributions in fact backport security
fixes. Especially if they amount to more than a DoS. Debian, for
instance, has a policy to try and avoid new versions of software in
their stable version, favouring backporting fixes.

Why do you think an "official" (wouldn't be my words) package maintained
by an official GnuPG upstream, for instance, would be better than what
dkg does for Debian, for instance?

Which distribution's packaging are you dissatisfied with particularly,
and shouldn't you take this up with the maintainers of the package
rather than asking here for a different package for your distro?

I think sticking with your distribution's repository offers many
advantages: it works out of the box, you get security updates without
having to enter an additional repository in your package management, and
it leaves time for upstream GnuPG to focus on their software, leaving
packaging, and for instance packaging policy changes in a distribution,
to other people.

Plus, a fair number of distributions use GnuPG to authenticate the
software in their repository. It's part of the very core of the
distribution. It needs to be in the main repository, it needs to receive
security fixes. If you feel the packaging of GnuPG is lacking in your
distribution, you should definitely take that up with the maintainers there.

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at <http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>


From robert.deroy at mail.ru  Wed Mar  4 12:29:47 2015
From: robert.deroy at mail.ru (=?UTF-8?B?Um9iZXJ0IERlcm95?=)
Date: Wed, 04 Mar 2015 14:29:47 +0300
Subject: =?UTF-8?B?Z3BnIGluIGEgY3liZXJjYWbDqQ==?=
Message-ID: <1425468587.871457089@f386.i.mail.ru>



Good Morning.


Sorry, because my english is not very good.


How could i do for use gpg on a usb key, because i have no computer, i only go in cybercaf?.

I want to use the last version, 2.1.1, with gpa.


Thank you very much for your answer.


Robert Deroy
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From js-gnupg-users at webkeks.org  Thu Mar  5 18:30:45 2015
From: js-gnupg-users at webkeks.org (Jonathan Schleifer)
Date: Thu, 5 Mar 2015 18:30:45 +0100
Subject: gpg in a =?ISO-8859-1?Q?cybercaf=E9?=
In-Reply-To: <1425468587.871457089@f386.i.mail.ru>
References: <1425468587.871457089@f386.i.mail.ru>
Message-ID: <20150305183045.0a84427bb224d379f41d4152@webkeks.org>

On Wed, 04 Mar 2015 14:29:47 +0300, Robert Deroy <robert.deroy at mail.ru> wrote:

> How could i do for use gpg on a usb key, because i have no computer, i only go in cybercaf?.
> 
> I want to use the last version, 2.1.1, with gpa.

I woudl recommend to boot off a Tails USB stick, as everything else would be way too risky in a public place. Don't even think about just running the executable on some system! Tails is - as far as I know - the only system designed to still provide security in the environment of a caf?. It goes so far as so try to wipe the memory when you shut down.

And here's the catch: It comes with GnuPG - but GnuPG 2.0.x AFAIK. Are you positive you absolutely need 2.1? The main reason to require 2.1 is to use ECC, I guess.

--
Jonathan
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From dgouttegattat at incenp.org  Thu Mar  5 19:26:09 2015
From: dgouttegattat at incenp.org (Damien Goutte-Gattat)
Date: Thu, 05 Mar 2015 19:26:09 +0100
Subject: where can one find an official gnupg project statement on the
 state of sub project?
In-Reply-To: <87oao77ppj.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <18364009.16951.1425496454366.JavaMail.open-xchange@app1.ox.privateemail.com>
 <87oao77ppj.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <54F89FC1.8040700@incenp.org>

On 03/05/2015 10:34 AM, Werner Koch wrote:
> Regarding Scute, I expect that we will start to work on it again in
> ralation to Thunderbird.  I know of at least one project which plans to
> start working on Thunderbird.

Well, if you plan to work on Scute and release a new version, please 
consider applying your own patch for support of TLS 1.2. You posted that 
patch on the gnupg-devel list some months ago [1], but it never made its 
way to the public repository.

This patch is not only useful for TLS 1.2, it also makes Scute work with 
Thunderbird to apply S/MIME signatures to emails, and even with 
LibreOffice to sign OpenDocument files (well, with LibreOffice it only 
works if the card PIN has already been verified; otherwise LibreOffice 
crashes, but I don?t think this is Scute?s fault).

And although I didn?t have the chance to test, I suspect that with this 
patch, Scute could also work with GNOME Evolution.

May I remind you also of a patch I posted in january [2], which fixes a 
bug that caused Scute to fail to sign anything in some occasions (only 
when used with GnuPG 2.1, not 2.0).


Damien


[1] http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-devel/2014-September/028750.html

[2] http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-devel/2015-January/029440.html


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From rpuls at kcore.de  Thu Mar  5 22:34:14 2015
From: rpuls at kcore.de (=?UTF-8?B?UmVuw6k=?= Puls)
Date: Thu, 5 Mar 2015 22:34:14 +0100
Subject: Decrypting PGP/MIME on the command line
References: <E1YS4v0-0001uj-Qq@talos.kcore.de>
 <874mq4k0em.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <87sido9tr4.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
Message-ID: <E1YTdPQ-0004fo-2j@talos.kcore.de>

On Mon, 2 Mar 2015 16:40:11 +0100 Ren? Puls wrote:
> > A tool that transforms an OpenPGP encrypted+signed MIME message into
> > an OpenPGP-signed MIME message while retaining the original
> > signature would be a really nice tool to have.
> 
> I will post here if I manage to come up with something useful. :-)

Here is my first attempt (Python 3.4 and GPGME bindings required):

https://github.com/kianga/pgpmime

Needless to say, this is HIGHLY EXPERIMENTAL ? use at your own risk,
and keep backups of your e-mails! However, any feedback, patches or
pull requests are appreciated.

Current limitations:

- Tested against PGP/MIME encrypted messages created by Claws Mail only

- Does not handle inline PGP encrypted messages at all

More details are in the README.

To my surprise, it does seem to preserve signatures, but only if they
are not part of the encrypted message itself, but rather a separate
attachment inside the message.

It also does some strange things with the MIME structure: the resulting
message is a multipart/mixed with a single sub-part. My Claws Mail will
display this like any other message, but I have not tested it with other
mail clients yet.

Again, feedback is welcome, and please make backups. :-)

Ren?


From flapflap at riseup.net  Thu Mar  5 23:27:36 2015
From: flapflap at riseup.net (flapflap)
Date: Thu, 05 Mar 2015 22:27:36 +0000
Subject: gpg in a =?windows-1252?Q?cybercaf=E9?=
In-Reply-To: <20150305183045.0a84427bb224d379f41d4152@webkeks.org>
References: <1425468587.871457089@f386.i.mail.ru>
 <20150305183045.0a84427bb224d379f41d4152@webkeks.org>
Message-ID: <54F8D858.7080307@riseup.net>

Jonathan Schleifer:
> On Wed, 04 Mar 2015 14:29:47 +0300, Robert Deroy <robert.deroy at mail.ru> wrote:
> 
>> How could i do for use gpg on a usb key, because i have no computer, i only go in cybercaf?.
>>
>> I want to use the last version, 2.1.1, with gpa.
> 
> I woudl recommend to boot off a Tails USB stick, as everything else would be way too risky in a public place. Don't even think about just running the executable on some system! Tails is - as far as I know - the only system designed to still provide security in the environment of a caf?. It goes so far as so try to wipe the memory when you shut down.

FWIW: Tails https://tails.boum.org/

Despite Tails' aim to protect its users and their communication, you
would still put a lot of trust in other people when using it in an
internet caf? and Tails could not protect you.

A simple thing an attacker (evil internet caf? owner, previous users)
could do is to install a keylogger or another hardware implant in the
computer that you cannot see.  The attacker could then easily record
your keystrokes when you type in the passphrase to your key.  As a
countermeasure, Tails also ships with Florence [0], a virtual keyboard
that you can use to type instead of the hardware keyboard.

But even if you use the virtual keyboard, there could be a camera behind
you watching your screen (and keystrokes), or the cable from the
computer to the monitor could split the signals to a video recorder or
other implants inside the monitor.

Personally, I'd rather ask a close and trustworthy friend whether I
could use their computer instead of an internet caf?, library, or other
publicly accessible location where I don't know the people behind.  But
of course, there may be situations where these are the only options.

> And here's the catch: It comes with GnuPG - but GnuPG 2.0.x AFAIK. Are you positive you absolutely need 2.1? The main reason to require 2.1 is to use ECC, I guess.

The current version (1.3) of Tails comes with GnuPG 1.4.12.

However, if you require a more/the most recent GnuPG you could
build/install it manually but it requires some additional steps:

- You can /download and verify/ the Tails ISO image [1] and then burn it
  onto a DVD [2].
- You can now boot Tails from the DVD.
- When it has booted you can plug in a USB stick (>=4GB) and use the
  small tool /Tails Installer/ [3] to copy the image from the DVD
  to the USB stick.
- Shutdown, remove the DVD from the DVD drive, and boot from the USB
  stick.
- Tails offers a /persistence feature/ [4] which is an encrypted volume
  using the remaining space of the USB stick (so there is the plain
  unencrypted Tails installation and an encrypted partition).
  When you reboot from the USB stick/SD Card with enabled persistence
  feature, the welcome screen /Tails Greeter/ lets you enter the
  passphrase to unlock the persistent volume.  _Unfortunately, it is
  not possible to enter the passphrase using Florence here_!
- In your home directory, there's now a directory "Persistent" that is
  stored in the encrypted volume and the data you put there stay there
  even when you reboot Tails (but not on outside directories).

As next steps you would install tools needed to build GnuPG, download
and verify the GnuPG sources, and build your GnuPG.

- In /Tails Greeter/ you can set a root password, so you can
    `sudo apt-get install gcc binutils'
  and all the other build tools and libraries afterwards.
  You can even install these additional software packages [5] on every
  session (though it is an experimental feature and not presented in
  the assistants).
- Then you can download the GnuPG sources to your ~/Persistent
  directory, verify the signature, and build GnuPG.


If you have further questions regarding Tails, you can read the
documentation [6] (there's a lot of it!) or write an email to their
mailing lists
  tails-support-private at boum.org [7] (private/non-public)
  tails-support at boum.org [7] (public)

HTH,
~flapflap

[0]
https://tails.boum.org/doc/encryption_and_privacy/virtual_keyboard/index.en.html
[1] https://tails.boum.org/download/index.en.html
[2] https://tails.boum.org/doc/first_steps/dvd/index.en.html
[3] https://tails.boum.org/doc/first_steps/installation/index.en.html
[4] https://tails.boum.org/doc/first_steps/persistence/index.en.html
[5]
https://tails.boum.org/doc/first_steps/persistence/configure/index.en.html#index14h2
[6] https://tails.boum.org/doc/index.en.html
[7] https://tails.boum.org/support/index.en.html


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From htd+ml at fritha.org  Fri Mar  6 09:12:42 2015
From: htd+ml at fritha.org (Heinz Diehl)
Date: Fri, 6 Mar 2015 09:12:42 +0100
Subject: gpg in a =?iso-8859-1?Q?cybercaf=E9?=
In-Reply-To: <1425468587.871457089@f386.i.mail.ru>
References: <1425468587.871457089@f386.i.mail.ru>
Message-ID: <20150306081242.GB1899@fritha.org>

On 05.03.2015, Robert Deroy wrote: 

> How could i do for use gpg on a usb key, because i have no computer, i only go in cybercaf?.

Don't do it, it's not safe.

In case you're allowed to boot from an external medium, this still won't be
secure. Because you have no control over the hardware built into the computer,
a keylogger could read your input (read: passphrase), and somebody else with
remote access could copy your secret key.

After all, it boils down to what your thread model is, and how much unsecurity
you can live with. If your data is crucial: don't do it.



From wk at gnupg.org  Fri Mar  6 11:05:18 2015
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Fri, 06 Mar 2015 11:05:18 +0100
Subject: gpg in a =?utf-8?Q?cybercaf=C3=A9?=
In-Reply-To: <20150306081242.GB1899@fritha.org> (Heinz Diehl's message of
 "Fri, 6 Mar 2015 09:12:42 +0100")
References: <1425468587.871457089@f386.i.mail.ru>
 <20150306081242.GB1899@fritha.org>
Message-ID: <87egp24f1d.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Fri,  6 Mar 2015 09:12, htd+ml at fritha.org said:

> In case you're allowed to boot from an external medium, this still won't be
> secure. Because you have no control over the hardware built into the computer,

Does not even need to be hardware: A (remotely) modified firmware might
first boot you into a virtual machine and only then boot the OS from
disk or USB.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From felix.klee at inka.de  Fri Mar  6 13:50:22 2015
From: felix.klee at inka.de (Felix E. Klee)
Date: Fri, 6 Mar 2015 12:50:22 +0000
Subject: Trezor - Could this be the model for a PGP crypto device?
Message-ID: <CA+m_8J1ReYd2zw7s=Pbw16ezKBwJXoVqbsFYqX3yyc1opE7WDQ@mail.gmail.com>

Yesterday in Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, I attended a [talk][1] by Marek
Palatinus, one of the relatively early Bitcoin miners and cofounder of
[SatoshiLabs][2]. He gave an introduction to his path into Bitcoin, and
things that went wrong, and then he presented the [Trezor][3] crypto
device.

The Trezor has a little display and two buttons. It generates and stores
your private key which is used for identifying your address in the
Bitcoin network. The Bitcoins that you own are associated with your
address. Connected via USB to a computer, the Trezor signs Bitcoin
transactions.

Marek later explained to me that the Bitcoin crypto standard is
different from those used with PGP.

After the talk, I hammered him with questions:

  * What if I lose the device or if it breaks? For backup, the device
    presents a list of 24 English words, that the user should write down
    and keep on paper in a safe place. Using this list, the private key
    can be recreated.

  * What if Eve wants to access the device without my authorization?
    There is a PIN.

  * How is the key generated? With an RNG on the device, using entropy
    gathered from the connected computer.

  * There?s no PIN pad on the device; Couldn?t malware sniff the PIN?
    The device has a little screen that displays a matrix of nine
    numbers. On the computer?s screen appears the same matrix without
    numbers, and one clicks on these with the mouse.

  * Do I have to enter the PIN for every transaction? Only once, then
    the device remains activated.

  * Once the device is activated, couldn?t malware do arbitrary
    transactions? For every transaction there is information displayed
    on the device?s display, and it has to be confirmed with the press
    of a button on the device.

  * Can I trust the firmware? [Source code][4] is available. Users can
    check the code, compile it, and flash their own version.

  * What if Eve modifies the firmware in a malignant way and flashs it
    to the device? Flashing unsigned firmware causes the private key to
    be erased by the bootloader.

  * Can I trust the bootloader? Source code is available as well.

Of course there could still be backdoors. However, at the moment I
cannot see what can be done better, other than building your own
hardware, ideally down to chip manufacturing level.

[1]: http://www.meetup.com/lpa-tech/events/220413356/
[2]: http://satoshilabs.com/
[3]: http://satoshilabs.com/trezor/
[4]: https://github.com/trezor/


From michard.antoine at gmail.com  Fri Mar  6 14:05:42 2015
From: michard.antoine at gmail.com (Antoine Michard)
Date: Fri, 6 Mar 2015 14:05:42 +0100
Subject: Trezor - Could this be the model for a PGP crypto device?
In-Reply-To: <CA+m_8J1ReYd2zw7s=Pbw16ezKBwJXoVqbsFYqX3yyc1opE7WDQ@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CA+m_8J1ReYd2zw7s=Pbw16ezKBwJXoVqbsFYqX3yyc1opE7WDQ@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <CADw6Qk51rTPn9Lm7sNN1spaY02e6ZQNgCkAkMgfpCggcJVNycQ@mail.gmail.com>

Hi Felix,

I've got one of this device ! Work like a charm !
Love the idea that everything was encrypt inside of the device, nothing on
the computer.
Try to restore my wallet, again no problem !!!

I will love to see one of this device for PGP.
I'm thinking to use a smartcard inside Gemalto K50 but on a computer
without GPG is useless...
Same thing about NitroKeys

Last thing: For Trezor, you have to install a bridge compatible on Windows,
MacOSX and Linux.
Of course, source code is available: https://github.com/trezor/trezord

2015-03-06 13:50 GMT+01:00 Felix E. Klee <felix.klee at inka.de>:

> Yesterday in Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, I attended a [talk][1] by Marek
> Palatinus, one of the relatively early Bitcoin miners and cofounder of
> [SatoshiLabs][2]. He gave an introduction to his path into Bitcoin, and
> things that went wrong, and then he presented the [Trezor][3] crypto
> device.
>
> The Trezor has a little display and two buttons. It generates and stores
> your private key which is used for identifying your address in the
> Bitcoin network. The Bitcoins that you own are associated with your
> address. Connected via USB to a computer, the Trezor signs Bitcoin
> transactions.
>
> Marek later explained to me that the Bitcoin crypto standard is
> different from those used with PGP.
>
> After the talk, I hammered him with questions:
>
>   * What if I lose the device or if it breaks? For backup, the device
>     presents a list of 24 English words, that the user should write down
>     and keep on paper in a safe place. Using this list, the private key
>     can be recreated.
>
>   * What if Eve wants to access the device without my authorization?
>     There is a PIN.
>
>   * How is the key generated? With an RNG on the device, using entropy
>     gathered from the connected computer.
>
>   * There?s no PIN pad on the device; Couldn?t malware sniff the PIN?
>     The device has a little screen that displays a matrix of nine
>     numbers. On the computer?s screen appears the same matrix without
>     numbers, and one clicks on these with the mouse.
>
>   * Do I have to enter the PIN for every transaction? Only once, then
>     the device remains activated.
>
>   * Once the device is activated, couldn?t malware do arbitrary
>     transactions? For every transaction there is information displayed
>     on the device?s display, and it has to be confirmed with the press
>     of a button on the device.
>
>   * Can I trust the firmware? [Source code][4] is available. Users can
>     check the code, compile it, and flash their own version.
>
>   * What if Eve modifies the firmware in a malignant way and flashs it
>     to the device? Flashing unsigned firmware causes the private key to
>     be erased by the bootloader.
>
>   * Can I trust the bootloader? Source code is available as well.
>
> Of course there could still be backdoors. However, at the moment I
> cannot see what can be done better, other than building your own
> hardware, ideally down to chip manufacturing level.
>
> [1]: http://www.meetup.com/lpa-tech/events/220413356/
> [2]: http://satoshilabs.com/
> [3]: http://satoshilabs.com/trezor/
> [4]: https://github.com/trezor/
>
> _______________________________________________
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
>



-- 
Antoine Michard
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From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Fri Mar  6 17:45:46 2015
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Fri, 06 Mar 2015 17:45:46 +0100
Subject: where can one find an official gnupg project statement on the
 state of sub project?
In-Reply-To: <54F84A80.3020604@nordnet.fr>
References: <18364009.16951.1425496454366.JavaMail.open-xchange@app1.ox.privateemail.com>
 <87oao77ppj.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <CAPdn05_OU7YsT8MCk05-7d4LXiVPYHnJ_euHE5Z+t8obA1kW8A@mail.gmail.com>
 <54F84A80.3020604@nordnet.fr>
Message-ID: <54F9D9BA.4050803@sixdemonbag.org>

> Wow .... at last someone has said it.  What a good idea !! For gnupg
> 2.1.2 as well ...

I think this is a bad idea.

Third-party software repositories are beyond the capabilities of many
users, particularly casual ones.  Their distro came with certain
repositories pre-configured.  So for us to say, "oh, and by the way, you
need to add this new third-party distro, and then do these steps to
replace your old distro-provided package with a new one," runs smack in
the face of

> At present, the [consensus] of many threads is that encryption in
> general is just too difficult for the average email user to use
> willingly and successfully.  The 'average email user' just has his
> burden increased exponentially if he has to build everything from
> source as well in order to follow the progress of the 'industry'.

We're not going to make things better by demanding casual users develop
even more skills.



From gniibe at fsij.org  Sat Mar  7 01:44:56 2015
From: gniibe at fsij.org (NIIBE Yutaka)
Date: Sat, 07 Mar 2015 09:44:56 +0900
Subject: Trezor - Could this be the model for a PGP crypto device?
In-Reply-To: <CA+m_8J1ReYd2zw7s=Pbw16ezKBwJXoVqbsFYqX3yyc1opE7WDQ@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CA+m_8J1ReYd2zw7s=Pbw16ezKBwJXoVqbsFYqX3yyc1opE7WDQ@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <54FA4A08.50006@fsij.org>

On 03/06/2015 09:50 PM, Felix E. Klee wrote:
> Marek later explained to me that the Bitcoin crypto standard is
> different from those used with PGP.

Do you mean the curve of secp256k1?

GnuPG modern 2.1.x with development version of libgcrypt support
secp256k1.

Development version of Gnuk also supports secp256k1.

It was introduced to GnuPG and Gnuk, so that we can sign the
transactions of Bitcoin with GnuPG (and using Gnuk Token, if you
have).  That was the intention.

I also asked Kristian for SKS server.  And the support was added.

I considered some enhancement to existing Bitcion client (such as
Electrum), so that it can ask signing to GnuPG.

However, nothing more happened beyond these lower level implementation
enhancement.

Perhaps, there wouldn't be enough demand (other than my own hack
value).

I had to stop my development for Bitcoin, because of infamous
"BITTOKOIN" fraud in Japan.  After all, their customers had no idea
about controlling their own private keys and their computation by
themselves, it could never be the potential market of Gnuk Token (or
GnuPG).

... and I think that there is some interoperability issue(s) for
handling of secp256k1 key in GnuPG implementation which doesn't
support the specific curve (or ECC at all) and/or some? keyservers.

I got report that my key on keyservers are huge, and it seems because
of the subkey of secp256k1.  I haven't examined the detail of this
issue yet, and I don't know the cause of this trouble.

So, I never recommend to join the experiment of secp256k1, now.


If some people still want this direction, a person can check my subkey
of secp256k1 (available in keyservers) with GnuPG modern and
development version of libgcrypt.  Then, he can see my Bitcoin address
by a tool I posted last year (gpgkey2bc) [0].  And if he really wish
to do so, he can send some Bitcoin to that address.

When the amount of Bitcoin into the specific address will be much, it
will be perhaps enough pressure to move my development to this area,
back again.


Well, I don't believe the device with good UI, in general.  UI is (or
can be) most complex component in a system.  If there is a better UI,
it means (for me, at least) that the system is more complex to make
audit more difficult.  And, in general, the hardware (MCU) requirement
from good UI is rather bigger than the one from ECC itself.  If a
system will have a much power, power will corrupt.  We could learn
from the architecture of phone (with better UI).


[0] gpgkey2bc: Generating address of Bitcoin from public key:
https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-devel/2014-January/028147.html
-- 


From dsaklad at gnu.org  Sat Mar  7 03:05:10 2015
From: dsaklad at gnu.org (Don Saklad)
Date: Fri, 06 Mar 2015 21:05:10 -0500
Subject: Anything that just works easily for folks?... without knowing this
 stuff.
Message-ID: <5i8uf9o949.fsf@fencepost.gnu.org>

Anything that just works easily for folks?... without knowing this stuff.


From clif at eugeneweb.com  Sat Mar  7 05:12:24 2015
From: clif at eugeneweb.com (Mr. Clif)
Date: Fri, 06 Mar 2015 20:12:24 -0800
Subject: A beautiful banker woman talks about the failed war on drugs in Latin
 America
Message-ID: <54FA7AA8.3080103@eugeneweb.com>


She is on some global council to change drug policy:

http://www.ted.com/talks/ilona_szabo_de_carvalho_4_lessons_i_learned_from_taking_a_stand_against_drugs_and_gun_violence#t-380552

     Clif


From felix.klee at inka.de  Sat Mar  7 16:09:43 2015
From: felix.klee at inka.de (Felix E. Klee)
Date: Sat, 7 Mar 2015 15:09:43 +0000
Subject: Trezor - Could this be the model for a PGP crypto device?
In-Reply-To: <54FA4A08.50006@fsij.org>
References: <CA+m_8J1ReYd2zw7s=Pbw16ezKBwJXoVqbsFYqX3yyc1opE7WDQ@mail.gmail.com>
 <54FA4A08.50006@fsij.org>
Message-ID: <CA+m_8J10OpZXdPSbV=5irkQ4yMN3AKWUwbodQts94ZWY1OC35Q@mail.gmail.com>

On Sat, Mar 7, 2015 at 12:44 AM, NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe at fsij.org> wrote:
> Well, I don't believe the device with good UI, in general.

It?s not about the UI being pretty. What I like about Trezor is that
it?s small yet has basically an external PIN pad, and every transaction
has to be confirmed by the push of a button. So, unless there are
backdoors (which also could be at chip level) or bugs, malware cannot
sniff the PIN nor can it do unattended transactions.


From jackyalcine at gmail.com  Sat Mar  7 09:04:44 2015
From: jackyalcine at gmail.com (Jacky Alcine)
Date: Sat, 07 Mar 2015 03:04:44 -0500
Subject: Anything that just works easily for folks?... without knowing
 this stuff.
In-Reply-To: <5i8uf9o949.fsf@fencepost.gnu.org>
References: <5i8uf9o949.fsf@fencepost.gnu.org>
Message-ID: <1633638.HTNhLanb3K@stark>

On Friday, March 06, 2015 09:05:10 PM Don Saklad wrote:
> Anything that just works easily for folks?... without knowing this stuff.

What?s ?this? stuff?

-- 
Jacky Alcine
https://jacky.wtf
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From matt at mattrude.com  Sat Mar  7 21:56:17 2015
From: matt at mattrude.com (Matt Rude)
Date: Sat, 07 Mar 2015 14:56:17 -0600
Subject: Anything that just works easily for folks?... without
 knowing this stuff.
In-Reply-To: <5i8uf9o949.fsf@fencepost.gnu.org>
References: <5i8uf9o949.fsf@fencepost.gnu.org>
Message-ID: <54FB65F1.6040505@mattrude.com>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

On 3/6/2015 8:05 PM, Don Saklad wrote:
> Anything that just works easily for folks?... 
> without knowing this stuff.

I think were going to need a bit more to go on. What
are you trying to do?

- -Matt
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From jeandavid8 at verizon.net  Sat Mar  7 20:38:30 2015
From: jeandavid8 at verizon.net (Jean-David Beyer)
Date: Sat, 07 Mar 2015 14:38:30 -0500
Subject: gpg in a =?ISO-8859-1?Q?cybercaf=E9?=
In-Reply-To: <87egp24f1d.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <1425468587.871457089@f386.i.mail.ru>
 <20150306081242.GB1899@fritha.org> <87egp24f1d.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <54FB53B6.7060606@verizon.net>

On 03/06/2015 05:05 AM, Werner Koch wrote:
> On Fri,  6 Mar 2015 09:12, htd+ml at fritha.org said:
> 
>> In case you're allowed to boot from an external medium, this still won't be
>> secure. Because you have no control over the hardware built into the computer,
> 
> Does not even need to be hardware: A (remotely) modified firmware might
> first boot you into a virtual machine and only then boot the OS from
> disk or USB.
> 
> 
I built a virtual machine once.

I had a computer with no memory management hardware. And I had a FORTRAN
compiler for it that worked pretty well, but if I wrote too many
EQUIVALENCE statements, the computer crashed. A FORTRAN compiler is
pretty big and inspecting all its code was out of the question.

I wrote a program for a virtual machine that had all the same
instructions as the real hardware did, so that was trivial: took less
than a day to write it. But it had a little extra feature: memory
management. The virtual machine ran as its input, the binary
instructions of the programs that would normally run on the real
machine. Like the OS, the compilers, etc. The easiest way to tell if the
real machine was running or the virtual machine was that the virtual
machine ran about 20x slower.

I loaded the virtual machine and started it up. Then I invoked the
FORTRAN compiler and presented it with a program with a lot of
EQUIVALENCE statements, and saw that it was over-writing the interrupt
vectors at the bottom of RAM, and further, what the offending
instruction was. The original compiler had a bug were an index register
needed to be specified, and it was omitted. Pretty simple.

Now a black hat could easily put any old virtual machine on that
machine, so doing nasty things would have been pretty easy. I suppose it
is a little more difficult at a cyber cafe or public library. But not if
I owned the cafe or worked in the library.

-- 
  .~.  Jean-David Beyer          Registered Linux User 85642.
  /V\  PGP-Key:166D840A 0C610C8B Registered Machine  1935521.
 /( )\ Shrewsbury, New Jersey    http://linuxcounter.net
 ^^-^^ 14:25:01 up 6 days, 22:33, 2 users, load average: 4.02, 4.07, 4.11


From dsaklad at gnu.org  Mon Mar  9 06:19:28 2015
From: dsaklad at gnu.org (Don Warner Saklad)
Date: Mon, 09 Mar 2015 01:19:28 -0400
Subject: Anything that just works easily for folks?... without knowing
 this stuff.
In-Reply-To: <1633638.HTNhLanb3K@stark> (message from Jacky Alcine on Sat,
 07 Mar 2015 03:04:44 -0500)
Message-ID: <5itwxueoin.fsf@fencepost.gnu.org>

It's too complicated to setup, a too complicated learning curve to
setup... How to make it easier needs to be a greater priority.


From m.mansfeld at mansfeld-elektronik.de  Mon Mar  9 12:37:27 2015
From: m.mansfeld at mansfeld-elektronik.de (Matthias Mansfeld)
Date: Mon, 09 Mar 2015 12:37:27 +0100
Subject: Heise: De-Mail integrates End-2-End Encryption with PGP
Message-ID: <54FD85F7.16230.FC73C76@m.mansfeld.mansfeld-elektronik.de>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256

At heise.de: De-Mail integrates End-2-End Encryption with PGP

Currently only in German language, but I assume everybody here who is
involved especially in semi-official German mail infrastructures like
De-Mail can read and understand this stuff..

Original headline:
"De-Mail integriert Ende-zu-Ende-Verschl?sselung mit PGP"
http://heise.de/-2570632

Anybody here from the GnuPG developers involved in that stuff?

I don't know whether that stuff is a good idea or not.......

Regards
Matthias

- --
OpenPGP: http://www.mansfeld-elektronik.de/gnupgkey/mansfeld.asc
Fingerprint: 6563 057D E6B8 9105 1CE4 18D0 4056 1F54 8B59 40EF


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1 - GPGrelay v0.962

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=MeIO
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


From wk at gnupg.org  Mon Mar  9 13:08:40 2015
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Mon, 09 Mar 2015 13:08:40 +0100
Subject: Heise: De-Mail integrates End-2-End Encryption with PGP
In-Reply-To: <54FD85F7.16230.FC73C76@m.mansfeld.mansfeld-elektronik.de>
 (Matthias Mansfeld's message of "Mon, 09 Mar 2015 12:37:27 +0100")
References: <54FD85F7.16230.FC73C76@m.mansfeld.mansfeld-elektronik.de>
Message-ID: <87k2yqz83b.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Mon,  9 Mar 2015 12:37, m.mansfeld at mansfeld-elektronik.de said:

> Anybody here from the GnuPG developers involved in that stuff?

Not that I know.

Keep in mind that De-mail system has a serious problem: As soon as you
register an account you are legally forced to check that account timely.
All de-mails send to your account are considered delivered after (iirc)
3 days as an affidavit of service.  Thus deadlines commence at that time
even if you are on vacation and are not able to check your account.

Better don't even not apply for a gratis account.


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From jeandavid8 at verizon.net  Mon Mar  9 14:42:28 2015
From: jeandavid8 at verizon.net (Jean-David Beyer)
Date: Mon, 09 Mar 2015 09:42:28 -0400
Subject: Anything that just works easily for folks?... without knowing this
 stuff.
In-Reply-To: <5itwxueoin.fsf@fencepost.gnu.org>
References: <5itwxueoin.fsf@fencepost.gnu.org>
Message-ID: <54FDA344.9010301@verizon.net>

On 03/09/2015 01:19 AM, Don Warner Saklad wrote:
> It's too complicated to setup, a too complicated learning curve to
> setup... How to make it easier needs to be a greater priority.
> 
Albert Einstein is credited with saying:

Everything should be made as simple as possible: BUT NO SIMPLER.


-- 
  .~.  Jean-David Beyer          Registered Linux User 85642.
  /V\  PGP-Key:166D840A 0C610C8B Registered Machine  1935521.
 /( )\ Shrewsbury, New Jersey    http://linuxcounter.net
 ^^-^^ 09:40:01 up 8 days, 16:48, 2 users, load average: 5.03, 4.93, 4.78


From maricelgregoraschko at yahoo.com  Mon Mar  9 18:15:14 2015
From: maricelgregoraschko at yahoo.com (Maricel Gregoraschko)
Date: Mon, 9 Mar 2015 17:15:14 +0000 (UTC)
Subject: AES-NI, symmetric key generation
Message-ID: <2060751138.1681310.1425921314299.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com>

Hello All,I would first like to thank you for your effort and time developing gnupgp.I have a couple of questions:
1. Does GnuGP (in particular, the Windows binaries distributed for gpg4win) use AES-NI, the Intel dedicated AES instruction set? There are some concerns, I'm not sure how realistic, about backdoors built into the CPU themselves.?I noticed there is an option to "configure", --disable-aesni-support. Where can I get the full configure command as it was used to build the posted gpg4win binaries, to check if that switch was present or not?Also is there any option to turn hardware acceleration on or off at runtime??
2. ?When using symmetric encryption and providing a passphrase, I understand the actual encryption key is generated on the spot, used to do the encryption, and then discarded from memory and not stored anywhere, is that correct??If the user wanted, can they dump the encryption key to store it securely, and use it to decrypt, instead of the password?Is there a guarantee that the key derivation (passphrase to key) algorithm does not change between versions of GnuPG, so that a file encrypted with a passphrase and a previous GnuPG version can be decrypted with the same passphrase and a newer GnuPG version (i.e., the same key is generated from the passphrase)?

Thank you very much for your support.
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From hans at guardianproject.info  Mon Mar  9 20:01:40 2015
From: hans at guardianproject.info (Hans-Christoph Steiner)
Date: Mon, 09 Mar 2015 15:01:40 -0400
Subject: gpgme and Java
In-Reply-To: <87385lcf63.fsf_-_@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <54F04EC5.3000107@guardianproject.info>	<54F07A7D.3040709@digitalbrains.com>	<AE0A6C7E-6A40-40C2-A401-0FACB5F84833@guardianproject.info>	<87twy1dfjv.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>	<87F1333F-A27B-48B3-A763-D937B39562ED@guardianproject.info>
 <87385lcf63.fsf_-_@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <54FDEE14.4060604@guardianproject.info>


Werner Koch:
> On Wed,  4 Mar 2015 00:57, hans at guardianproject.info said:
> 
>> thread at this point.  The bizarre Java wrapper of GPGME was not the
>> biggest part of the problem of the GnuPG-for-Android port, but it was
>> nonetheless a real problem.  Sure it is possible to use GPGME with
> 
> You mean Stefan's decade old Java binding?  Well, there was not much
> interest in it for years and if there is now a need for a proper Java
> binding, it should be done.

I guess you forget that we worked a lot on it, ported it to GnuPG 2.1 and
recent GPGME versions, and added features.  There have been some other
projects starting to use our version as well.

https://github.com/guardianproject/gnupg-for-java


>> Java, but it is not good, and ill-fitting APIs make for bad software,
>> which in turn often leads to bad security.  It also took a lot of
> 
> Please describe the problems you have with the API so that we actually
> have something to talk about.

Its been a long while since I was working on the guts of this, so the details
escape me.  I can only say now what I remember without digging into the code
again.  One thing that is very clear to me: we spent a ton of time figuring
out how to debug on Android, then actually running the debugging processes.
That would have been drastically easier if we had been working with pure Java
code that talked to the GnuPG processes.  The Android tools are all about
Java.  And having all those layers of code wrapping code makes debugging also
much harder.

Another thing I remember clearly is that I had to first thing about
implementing new features in JNI, then in Java.  There are also a lot of times
where data structures should be passed between Java and JNI, and that is
generally a painful process in JNI.  A pure Java interface to the GnuPG
processes would totally eliminate that.

At this point, I've done a lot of various things on Android, including running
native processes, and JNI code.  Working with a Java wrapper of GPGME made
implementing things take many more hours, probably like 3-4 times as much, as
I would expect from more native Android development.

.hc

-- 
PGP fingerprint: 5E61 C878 0F86 295C E17D  8677 9F0F E587 374B BE81
https://pgp.mit.edu/pks/lookup?op=vindex&search=0x9F0FE587374BBE81


From hans at guardianproject.info  Mon Mar  9 20:07:31 2015
From: hans at guardianproject.info (Hans-Christoph Steiner)
Date: Mon, 09 Mar 2015 15:07:31 -0400
Subject: Thoughts on GnuPG and automation
In-Reply-To: <8F0B09FC6339FA439524099BFCABC11F2D3C2F9A@IRVEXCHMB11.corp.ad.broadcom.com>
References: <54F04EC5.3000107@guardianproject.info>
 <54F07A7D.3040709@digitalbrains.com>
 <AE0A6C7E-6A40-40C2-A401-0FACB5F84833@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5D690.9030607@digitalbrains.com>
 <D8E88427-D1D6-4C67-A1D0-29CFD37075F2@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5E626.5010808@sixdemonbag.org>
 <F3B37AE1-A4D6-421A-A847-CE994F24C818@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5F8DC.8030804@digitalbrains.com>
 <69155963-925D-4776-9CC8-79504432FA87@guardianproject.info>
 <8F0B09FC6339FA439524099BFCABC11F2D3C2F9A@IRVEXCHMB11.corp.ad.broadcom.com>
Message-ID: <54FDEF73.8020907@guardianproject.info>


Why do I get so many responses like this on this list?  I've spent a ton of
time solving our own problems with the Android port, we also made sure to take
out a support contract with Werner to pay him to answer our questions.  I only
wish we'd had more so we could pay him for all the work he has done, but we
have long since run out of money for working on GnuPG.  I continue this on my
own time because I believe it is important.

The point of this discussion is to talk about an shared architecture for using
GnuPG outside of C/C++ on UNIX.  That's why Bjarni started it, and that's why
I've joined in here.  It seems that half of this thread has been griping about
the discussion process.  We need a little more faith in each other so we can
have productive discussions and further our shared goals.

.hc

Bob (Robert) Cavanaugh:
> Native to what? Processor, OS?
> I think Peter and the group already adequately answered this: If GPGME is not providing an interface that meets Android requirements, then look into how GPGME interfaces to GPG and emulate that interface.
> For you to request that the interface be changed can be likened to someone requesting that I2C be changed because you have a hard time implementing it. This is pretty much a non-starter IMHO. Implementing interfaces to existing infrastructures is bread-and-butter to software development. Stop asking for fundamental infrastructure changes and start solving your problem. The group has literally hundreds of m-y that can be used productively to help you do this, but harness the group's power in a constructive manner.
> 
> Bob Cavanaugh
> 
> 
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Gnupg-users [mailto:gnupg-users-bounces at gnupg.org] On Behalf Of Hans of Guardian
> Sent: Tuesday, March 03, 2015 3:55 PM
> To: Peter Lebbing
> Cc: gnupg
> Subject: Re: Thoughts on GnuPG and automation
> 
> 
> On Mar 3, 2015, at 7:09 PM, Peter Lebbing wrote:
> 
> 
> In Android, you can't really have shared libraries.  Apps share functionality at a higher level (aka Activities and Services).  So GnuPG-for-Android _is_ the shared library in effect, since it provides OpenPGP via Activities.
> 
> No one is saying that each app should have a custom wrapper for GnuPG.  What I think mailpile is saying, and what I'm trying to say is that for programming environments where GPGME does not make sense, there should be the ability to easily make a native version of what GPGME is doing.
> 
> .hc
> _______________________________________________
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
> 

-- 
PGP fingerprint: 5E61 C878 0F86 295C E17D  8677 9F0F E587 374B BE81
https://pgp.mit.edu/pks/lookup?op=vindex&search=0x9F0FE587374BBE81


From hans at guardianproject.info  Mon Mar  9 20:22:04 2015
From: hans at guardianproject.info (Hans-Christoph Steiner)
Date: Mon, 09 Mar 2015 15:22:04 -0400
Subject: Thoughts on GnuPG and automation
In-Reply-To: <87mw3taxoz.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <54F04EC5.3000107@guardianproject.info>	<54F07A7D.3040709@digitalbrains.com>	<AE0A6C7E-6A40-40C2-A401-0FACB5F84833@guardianproject.info>	<54F5D690.9030607@digitalbrains.com>	<D8E88427-D1D6-4C67-A1D0-29CFD37075F2@guardianproject.info>	<54F5E626.5010808@sixdemonbag.org>	<F3B37AE1-A4D6-421A-A847-CE994F24C818@guardianproject.info>	<54F5F8DC.8030804@digitalbrains.com>	<D9ABA4AE-6C5E-443C-8334-27C6C529930F@guardianproject.info>
 <87mw3taxoz.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <54FDF2DC.9070802@guardianproject.info>


Werner Koch:
> On Tue,  3 Mar 2015 21:29, hans at guardianproject.info said:
> 
>> * Android will kill apps when it needs to, app lifecycle is automatically managed,
>>  the app has no control over it, and often zero warning is given
> 
> That is the same as with Linux.  Ever heard of the OOM killer?

OOM killer is only comparable to the Android lifecycle in that it has the
power to kill processes.  In Android, apps are killed regularly, often many
times a day.  GNU/Linux was designed around the user telling a process to end
(i.e. File->Quit or TERM).  OOM killer is only a last resort in extreme
situations. Android is designed around the system entirely determining when
apps are terminated.


>> * Android was not meant to support launching processes from a shell/terminal,
>>  it was there for core debugging, then opened up on demand from devs, but it
>>  is very much a second class citizen to a Java Android app.
> 
> Why do you want to launch a process from a shell or terminal (actually a
> shell is just an interpreter which has options to be used on a tty (job
> control etc.))
>
>> * all apps are child processes of 'zygote'
> 
> All processes excuted from GPGME are children of init. What is the
> problem?
>
>> * there is no way to install shared libraries to be shared by apps
> 
> I can't comment on this.
> 
>> There are other differences as well.  And iOS actually works a lot
> 
> Given that we worked together on adding features to GnuPG and GPGME for
> use on Android I can't see your point.  Given that Android uses a Unix
> kernel it is much more Unix than Windows or VMS.
> 
> You are thinking in the context of an application which runs on that
> Android Unix kernel.  That might be indeed limited.  However we are
> hackers and we can find ways to make almost everything work.

It is a Linux kernel, which is most often used in UNIX-style OSes.  But
Android does not follow UNIX style, and Linux does not require an OS to follow
them either.  For example, in Android, UIDs and GIDs represent system
permissions, not users and groups.  You are going to be confusing things if
you expect Android's Linux kernel to provide a UNIX environment for you.  Even
when Android's Linux kernel does support UNIX-ish things like symlinks, the
Android runtime layer does not treat them as first class citizens.  Even
things like mount paths work differently in Android.  A given mount path can
have multiple simulatenous locations mounted to it, one per Android user account.


> Shall we sit down and talk about the Android problems?  If we can do that
> close to my place I will be available most of the time.  If it is better
> for you to do it somewhere else, like Berlin, we need a bit more
> planning.  Travel expenses should not be a concern.

Sure, that sounds good.  I'm sorry I can't make the April meeting.  I'll be
back in Europe this summer indefinitely.  I might be able to put together a
multi-pronged trip to your area of the world, if that makes sense.  But
perhaps it makes the most sense to have a meeting at a relevant conference or
similar thing.

.hc

-- 
PGP fingerprint: 5E61 C878 0F86 295C E17D  8677 9F0F E587 374B BE81
https://pgp.mit.edu/pks/lookup?op=vindex&search=0x9F0FE587374BBE81


From hans at guardianproject.info  Mon Mar  9 20:27:10 2015
From: hans at guardianproject.info (Hans-Christoph Steiner)
Date: Mon, 09 Mar 2015 15:27:10 -0400
Subject: cython wrapping gpgme WAS: Thoughts on GnuPG and automation
In-Reply-To: <54F6DD93.9060203@grinta.net>
References: <54F04EC5.3000107@guardianproject.info>
 <54F07A7D.3040709@digitalbrains.com>
 <AE0A6C7E-6A40-40C2-A401-0FACB5F84833@guardianproject.info>
 <54F6DD93.9060203@grinta.net>
Message-ID: <54FDF40E.1060403@guardianproject.info>


Daniele Nicolodi:
> On 03/03/15 14:29, Hans of Guardian wrote:
>> It is actually more difficult to wrap GPGME in Java than to have just
>> rewritten GPGME in Java.  GPGME is a fine API for C/C++, it is a bad
>> API for other languages.  You end up with an API that feels like a C
>> API forced into the language, e.g. Java, python, etc.  That makes for
>> more coding mistakes because it feels foreign to the programmer.
>> More mistakes means more security issues.
> 
> Hello,
> 
> I have no idea about the Java tooling for interfacing to external
> libraries, but (after seeing so many complaints on the mailing list)
> I've recently started to work on Python bindings to GPGME using Cython,
> and so far it has been an extremely smooth process and the resulting
> Python API feels quite pythonic (I haven't started with the asynchronous
> calls yet, those will probably be harder to map in a pythonic way).
> 
> The fact that writing the bindings is quite easy, is due indeed to the
> fact that GPGME is a fine API for C (and to Cython to a large extent).

There are other C-Python wrappers of GPGME, like pyme.  I hope you're aware of
those, and have studied them.  One thing that GnuPG suffers from is many
people starting their own wrappers, but few people finishing them or
contributing to existing ones.  That is not a sustainable situation.

http://pyme.sourceforge.net/
https://launchpad.net/pygpgme
http://www.red-dove.com/python_gnupg/
https://bitbucket.org/vinay.sajip/python-gnupg
https://github.com/isislovecruft/python-gnupg

.hc

-- 
PGP fingerprint: 5E61 C878 0F86 295C E17D  8677 9F0F E587 374B BE81
https://pgp.mit.edu/pks/lookup?op=vindex&search=0x9F0FE587374BBE81


From robertc at broadcom.com  Mon Mar  9 22:10:32 2015
From: robertc at broadcom.com (Bob (Robert) Cavanaugh)
Date: Mon, 9 Mar 2015 21:10:32 +0000
Subject: Thoughts on GnuPG and automation
In-Reply-To: <54FDEF73.8020907@guardianproject.info>
References: <54F04EC5.3000107@guardianproject.info>
 <54F07A7D.3040709@digitalbrains.com>
 <AE0A6C7E-6A40-40C2-A401-0FACB5F84833@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5D690.9030607@digitalbrains.com>
 <D8E88427-D1D6-4C67-A1D0-29CFD37075F2@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5E626.5010808@sixdemonbag.org>
 <F3B37AE1-A4D6-421A-A847-CE994F24C818@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5F8DC.8030804@digitalbrains.com>
 <69155963-925D-4776-9CC8-79504432FA87@guardianproject.info>
 <8F0B09FC6339FA439524099BFCABC11F2D3C2F9A@IRVEXCHMB11.corp.ad.broadcom.com>
 <54FDEF73.8020907@guardianproject.info>
Message-ID: <8F0B09FC6339FA439524099BFCABC11F2D3C6486@IRVEXCHMB11.corp.ad.broadcom.com>

Hi Hans,
Wanted to respond to your post wondering why you are getting the responses you are. 

In another thread you write:
"There are other C-Python wrappers of GPGME, like pyme.  I hope you're aware of those, and have studied them.  One thing that GnuPG suffers from is many people starting their own wrappers, but few people finishing them or contributing to existing ones.  That is not a sustainable situation."

This is the problem. You frame the dialog as blaming GnuPG and the design choices made in its implementation. Direct case in point: It is certainly not Werner's or any other principal GnuPG developer's issue if and when someone else independently took on a project to wrap GnuPG or GPGME. The fact that  these people might have bitten off more than they can chew is completely irrelevant to the canonical implementation and frankly should be irrelevant to this discussion. When I said approach this in a constructive manner I meant this: You have some requirements. In your estimation these requirements are not met with the current toolset. Then instead of explicitly expecting this group to implement a paradigm shift (and forgive me if I misunderstand you, but that is what I infer you are asking for) generate a proposal for an Android-centric API. Or, if you feel that the infrastructure cannot support it, take the completely open sources Werner and group have provided and generate your own system that meets your needs. If possible,  (and here again I am clarifying my original post) work with the people on this group to help you use the existing tools to get your requirements met. But speaking as a professional engineer of 25+ years experience, you will not get your desired results by starting the conversation impuning the work that went before and claiming that what you are asking for is far superior. If it is not your intent to convey that message then please review what you write before you send it, because that message was received loud and clear.

Thanks,
 
Bob Cavanaugh


> -----Original Message-----
> From: Hans-Christoph Steiner [mailto:hans at guardianproject.info]
> Sent: Monday, March 09, 2015 12:08 PM
> To: Bob (Robert) Cavanaugh; Peter Lebbing
> Cc: gnupg
> Subject: Re: Thoughts on GnuPG and automation
> 
> 
> Why do I get so many responses like this on this list?  I've spent a ton of time
> solving our own problems with the Android port, we also made sure to take
> out a support contract with Werner to pay him to answer our questions.  I
> only wish we'd had more so we could pay him for all the work he has done,
> but we have long since run out of money for working on GnuPG.  I continue
> this on my own time because I believe it is important.
> 
> The point of this discussion is to talk about an shared architecture for using
> GnuPG outside of C/C++ on UNIX.  That's why Bjarni started it, and that's
> why I've joined in here.  It seems that half of this thread has been griping
> about the discussion process.  We need a little more faith in each other so we
> can have productive discussions and further our shared goals.
> 
> .hc
> 
> Bob (Robert) Cavanaugh:
> > Native to what? Processor, OS?
> > I think Peter and the group already adequately answered this: If GPGME is
> not providing an interface that meets Android requirements, then look into
> how GPGME interfaces to GPG and emulate that interface.
> > For you to request that the interface be changed can be likened to
> someone requesting that I2C be changed because you have a hard time
> implementing it. This is pretty much a non-starter IMHO. Implementing
> interfaces to existing infrastructures is bread-and-butter to software
> development. Stop asking for fundamental infrastructure changes and start
> solving your problem. The group has literally hundreds of m-y that can be
> used productively to help you do this, but harness the group's power in a
> constructive manner.
> >
> > Bob Cavanaugh
> >
> >
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Gnupg-users [mailto:gnupg-users-bounces at gnupg.org] On Behalf
> Of
> > Hans of Guardian
> > Sent: Tuesday, March 03, 2015 3:55 PM
> > To: Peter Lebbing
> > Cc: gnupg
> > Subject: Re: Thoughts on GnuPG and automation
> >
> >
> > On Mar 3, 2015, at 7:09 PM, Peter Lebbing wrote:
> >
> >
> > In Android, you can't really have shared libraries.  Apps share functionality
> at a higher level (aka Activities and Services).  So GnuPG-for-Android _is_ the
> shared library in effect, since it provides OpenPGP via Activities.
> >
> > No one is saying that each app should have a custom wrapper for GnuPG.
> What I think mailpile is saying, and what I'm trying to say is that for
> programming environments where GPGME does not make sense, there
> should be the ability to easily make a native version of what GPGME is doing.
> >
> > .hc
> > _______________________________________________
> > Gnupg-users mailing list
> > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
> >
> 
> --
> PGP fingerprint: 5E61 C878 0F86 295C E17D  8677 9F0F E587 374B BE81
> https://pgp.mit.edu/pks/lookup?op=vindex&search=0x9F0FE587374BBE81

From hans at guardianproject.info  Mon Mar  9 22:21:40 2015
From: hans at guardianproject.info (Hans-Christoph Steiner)
Date: Mon, 09 Mar 2015 17:21:40 -0400
Subject: Thoughts on GnuPG and automation
In-Reply-To: <8F0B09FC6339FA439524099BFCABC11F2D3C6486@IRVEXCHMB11.corp.ad.broadcom.com>
References: <54F04EC5.3000107@guardianproject.info>
 <54F07A7D.3040709@digitalbrains.com>
 <AE0A6C7E-6A40-40C2-A401-0FACB5F84833@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5D690.9030607@digitalbrains.com>
 <D8E88427-D1D6-4C67-A1D0-29CFD37075F2@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5E626.5010808@sixdemonbag.org>
 <F3B37AE1-A4D6-421A-A847-CE994F24C818@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5F8DC.8030804@digitalbrains.com>
 <69155963-925D-4776-9CC8-79504432FA87@guardianproject.info>
 <8F0B09FC6339FA439524099BFCABC11F2D3C2F9A@IRVEXCHMB11.corp.ad.broadcom.com>
 <54FDEF73.8020907@guardianproject.info>
 <8F0B09FC6339FA439524099BFCABC11F2D3C6486@IRVEXCHMB11.corp.ad.broadcom.com>
Message-ID: <54FE0EE4.9070904@guardianproject.info>


I expect a discussion about what is working and what is not working with GPGME
and various GnuPG APIs.  I'm just trying to convey my experience with
GnuPG-for-Android, gnupg-for-java, and a little bit with Python.  I hope this
will spur people to offer their experience, and generate new ideas and
approaches.  gpgme-tool is one version of that, `gpg --json` is another.

.hc

Bob (Robert) Cavanaugh:
> Hi Hans,
> Wanted to respond to your post wondering why you are getting the responses you are. 
> 
> In another thread you write:
> "There are other C-Python wrappers of GPGME, like pyme.  I hope you're aware of those, and have studied them.  One thing that GnuPG suffers from is many people starting their own wrappers, but few people finishing them or contributing to existing ones.  That is not a sustainable situation."
> 
> This is the problem. You frame the dialog as blaming GnuPG and the design choices made in its implementation. Direct case in point: It is certainly not Werner's or any other principal GnuPG developer's issue if and when someone else independently took on a project to wrap GnuPG or GPGME. The fact that  these people might have bitten off more than they can chew is completely irrelevant to the canonical implementation and frankly should be irrelevant to this discussion. When I said approach this in a constructive manner I meant this: You have some requirements. In your estimation these requirements are not met with the current toolset. Then instead of explicitly expecting this group to implement a paradigm shift (and forgive me if I misunderstand you, but that is what I infer you are asking for) generate a proposal for an Android-centric API. Or, if you feel that the infrastructure cannot support it, take the completely open sources Werner and group have provided and generate your ow
 n
 system that meets your needs. If possible,  (and here again I am clarifying my original post) work with the people on this group to help you use the existing tools to get your requirements met. But speaking as a professional engineer of 25+ years experience, you will not get your desired results by starting the conversation impuning the work that went before and claiming that what you are asking for is far superior. If it is not your intent to convey that message then please review what you write before you send it, because that message was received loud and clear.
> 
> Thanks,
>  
> Bob Cavanaugh
> 
> 
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Hans-Christoph Steiner [mailto:hans at guardianproject.info]
>> Sent: Monday, March 09, 2015 12:08 PM
>> To: Bob (Robert) Cavanaugh; Peter Lebbing
>> Cc: gnupg
>> Subject: Re: Thoughts on GnuPG and automation
>>
>>
>> Why do I get so many responses like this on this list?  I've spent a ton of time
>> solving our own problems with the Android port, we also made sure to take
>> out a support contract with Werner to pay him to answer our questions.  I
>> only wish we'd had more so we could pay him for all the work he has done,
>> but we have long since run out of money for working on GnuPG.  I continue
>> this on my own time because I believe it is important.
>>
>> The point of this discussion is to talk about an shared architecture for using
>> GnuPG outside of C/C++ on UNIX.  That's why Bjarni started it, and that's
>> why I've joined in here.  It seems that half of this thread has been griping
>> about the discussion process.  We need a little more faith in each other so we
>> can have productive discussions and further our shared goals.
>>
>> .hc
>>
>> Bob (Robert) Cavanaugh:
>>> Native to what? Processor, OS?
>>> I think Peter and the group already adequately answered this: If GPGME is
>> not providing an interface that meets Android requirements, then look into
>> how GPGME interfaces to GPG and emulate that interface.
>>> For you to request that the interface be changed can be likened to
>> someone requesting that I2C be changed because you have a hard time
>> implementing it. This is pretty much a non-starter IMHO. Implementing
>> interfaces to existing infrastructures is bread-and-butter to software
>> development. Stop asking for fundamental infrastructure changes and start
>> solving your problem. The group has literally hundreds of m-y that can be
>> used productively to help you do this, but harness the group's power in a
>> constructive manner.
>>>
>>> Bob Cavanaugh
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> -----Original Message-----
>>> From: Gnupg-users [mailto:gnupg-users-bounces at gnupg.org] On Behalf
>> Of
>>> Hans of Guardian
>>> Sent: Tuesday, March 03, 2015 3:55 PM
>>> To: Peter Lebbing
>>> Cc: gnupg
>>> Subject: Re: Thoughts on GnuPG and automation
>>>
>>>
>>> On Mar 3, 2015, at 7:09 PM, Peter Lebbing wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> In Android, you can't really have shared libraries.  Apps share functionality
>> at a higher level (aka Activities and Services).  So GnuPG-for-Android _is_ the
>> shared library in effect, since it provides OpenPGP via Activities.
>>>
>>> No one is saying that each app should have a custom wrapper for GnuPG.
>> What I think mailpile is saying, and what I'm trying to say is that for
>> programming environments where GPGME does not make sense, there
>> should be the ability to easily make a native version of what GPGME is doing.
>>>
>>> .hc
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> Gnupg-users mailing list
>>> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
>>> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
>>>
>>
>> --
>> PGP fingerprint: 5E61 C878 0F86 295C E17D  8677 9F0F E587 374B BE81
>> https://pgp.mit.edu/pks/lookup?op=vindex&search=0x9F0FE587374BBE81

-- 
PGP fingerprint: 5E61 C878 0F86 295C E17D  8677 9F0F E587 374B BE81
https://pgp.mit.edu/pks/lookup?op=vindex&search=0x9F0FE587374BBE81


From robertc at broadcom.com  Mon Mar  9 22:23:23 2015
From: robertc at broadcom.com (Bob (Robert) Cavanaugh)
Date: Mon, 9 Mar 2015 21:23:23 +0000
Subject: Thoughts on GnuPG and automation
In-Reply-To: <54FE0EE4.9070904@guardianproject.info>
References: <54F04EC5.3000107@guardianproject.info>
 <54F07A7D.3040709@digitalbrains.com>
 <AE0A6C7E-6A40-40C2-A401-0FACB5F84833@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5D690.9030607@digitalbrains.com>
 <D8E88427-D1D6-4C67-A1D0-29CFD37075F2@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5E626.5010808@sixdemonbag.org>
 <F3B37AE1-A4D6-421A-A847-CE994F24C818@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5F8DC.8030804@digitalbrains.com>
 <69155963-925D-4776-9CC8-79504432FA87@guardianproject.info>
 <8F0B09FC6339FA439524099BFCABC11F2D3C2F9A@IRVEXCHMB11.corp.ad.broadcom.com>
 <54FDEF73.8020907@guardianproject.info>
 <8F0B09FC6339FA439524099BFCABC11F2D3C6486@IRVEXCHMB11.corp.ad.broadcom.com>
 <54FE0EE4.9070904@guardianproject.info>
Message-ID: <8F0B09FC6339FA439524099BFCABC11F2D3C64F8@IRVEXCHMB11.corp.ad.broadcom.com>

If that is the goal, that is a fair one.

Thanks,
 
Bob Cavanaugh


> -----Original Message-----
> From: Hans-Christoph Steiner [mailto:hans at guardianproject.info]
> Sent: Monday, March 09, 2015 2:22 PM
> To: Bob (Robert) Cavanaugh; Peter Lebbing
> Cc: gnupg
> Subject: Re: Thoughts on GnuPG and automation
> 
> 
> I expect a discussion about what is working and what is not working with
> GPGME and various GnuPG APIs.  I'm just trying to convey my experience
> with GnuPG-for-Android, gnupg-for-java, and a little bit with Python.  I hope
> this will spur people to offer their experience, and generate new ideas and
> approaches.  gpgme-tool is one version of that, `gpg --json` is another.
> 
> .hc
> 
> Bob (Robert) Cavanaugh:
> > Hi Hans,
> > Wanted to respond to your post wondering why you are getting the
> responses you are.
> >
> > In another thread you write:
> > "There are other C-Python wrappers of GPGME, like pyme.  I hope you're
> aware of those, and have studied them.  One thing that GnuPG suffers from
> is many people starting their own wrappers, but few people finishing them
> or contributing to existing ones.  That is not a sustainable situation."
> >
> > This is the problem. You frame the dialog as blaming GnuPG and the
> > design choices made in its implementation. Direct case in point: It is
> > certainly not Werner's or any other principal GnuPG developer's issue
> > if and when someone else independently took on a project to wrap GnuPG
> > or GPGME. The fact that  these people might have bitten off more than
> > they can chew is completely irrelevant to the canonical implementation
> > and frankly should be irrelevant to this discussion. When I said
> > approach this in a constructive manner I meant this: You have some
> > requirements. In your estimation these requirements are not met with
> > the current toolset. Then instead of explicitly expecting this group
> > to implement a paradigm shift (and forgive me if I misunderstand you,
> > but that is what I infer you are asking for) generate a proposal for
> > an Android-centric API. Or, if you feel that the infrastructure cannot
> > support it, take the completely open sources Werner and group have
> > provided and generate your ow
>  n
>  system that meets your needs. If possible,  (and here again I am clarifying
> my original post) work with the people on this group to help you use the
> existing tools to get your requirements met. But speaking as a professional
> engineer of 25+ years experience, you will not get your desired results by
> starting the conversation impuning the work that went before and claiming
> that what you are asking for is far superior. If it is not your intent to convey
> that message then please review what you write before you send it, because
> that message was received loud and clear.
> >
> > Thanks,
> >
> > Bob Cavanaugh
> >
> >
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: Hans-Christoph Steiner [mailto:hans at guardianproject.info]
> >> Sent: Monday, March 09, 2015 12:08 PM
> >> To: Bob (Robert) Cavanaugh; Peter Lebbing
> >> Cc: gnupg
> >> Subject: Re: Thoughts on GnuPG and automation
> >>
> >>
> >> Why do I get so many responses like this on this list?  I've spent a
> >> ton of time solving our own problems with the Android port, we also
> >> made sure to take out a support contract with Werner to pay him to
> >> answer our questions.  I only wish we'd had more so we could pay him
> >> for all the work he has done, but we have long since run out of money
> >> for working on GnuPG.  I continue this on my own time because I believe
> it is important.
> >>
> >> The point of this discussion is to talk about an shared architecture
> >> for using GnuPG outside of C/C++ on UNIX.  That's why Bjarni started
> >> it, and that's why I've joined in here.  It seems that half of this
> >> thread has been griping about the discussion process.  We need a
> >> little more faith in each other so we can have productive discussions and
> further our shared goals.
> >>
> >> .hc
> >>
> >> Bob (Robert) Cavanaugh:
> >>> Native to what? Processor, OS?
> >>> I think Peter and the group already adequately answered this: If
> >>> GPGME is
> >> not providing an interface that meets Android requirements, then look
> >> into how GPGME interfaces to GPG and emulate that interface.
> >>> For you to request that the interface be changed can be likened to
> >> someone requesting that I2C be changed because you have a hard time
> >> implementing it. This is pretty much a non-starter IMHO. Implementing
> >> interfaces to existing infrastructures is bread-and-butter to
> >> software development. Stop asking for fundamental infrastructure
> >> changes and start solving your problem. The group has literally
> >> hundreds of m-y that can be used productively to help you do this,
> >> but harness the group's power in a constructive manner.
> >>>
> >>> Bob Cavanaugh
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> -----Original Message-----
> >>> From: Gnupg-users [mailto:gnupg-users-bounces at gnupg.org] On
> Behalf
> >> Of
> >>> Hans of Guardian
> >>> Sent: Tuesday, March 03, 2015 3:55 PM
> >>> To: Peter Lebbing
> >>> Cc: gnupg
> >>> Subject: Re: Thoughts on GnuPG and automation
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> On Mar 3, 2015, at 7:09 PM, Peter Lebbing wrote:
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> In Android, you can't really have shared libraries.  Apps share
> >>> functionality
> >> at a higher level (aka Activities and Services).  So
> >> GnuPG-for-Android _is_ the shared library in effect, since it provides
> OpenPGP via Activities.
> >>>
> >>> No one is saying that each app should have a custom wrapper for
> GnuPG.
> >> What I think mailpile is saying, and what I'm trying to say is that
> >> for programming environments where GPGME does not make sense,
> there
> >> should be the ability to easily make a native version of what GPGME is
> doing.
> >>>
> >>> .hc
> >>> _______________________________________________
> >>> Gnupg-users mailing list
> >>> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> >>> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
> >>>
> >>
> >> --
> >> PGP fingerprint: 5E61 C878 0F86 295C E17D  8677 9F0F E587 374B BE81
> >>
> https://pgp.mit.edu/pks/lookup?op=vindex&search=0x9F0FE587374BBE81
> 
> --
> PGP fingerprint: 5E61 C878 0F86 295C E17D  8677 9F0F E587 374B BE81
> https://pgp.mit.edu/pks/lookup?op=vindex&search=0x9F0FE587374BBE81

From daniele at grinta.net  Mon Mar  9 22:40:33 2015
From: daniele at grinta.net (Daniele Nicolodi)
Date: Mon, 09 Mar 2015 22:40:33 +0100
Subject: cython wrapping gpgme WAS: Thoughts on GnuPG and automation
In-Reply-To: <54FDF40E.1060403@guardianproject.info>
References: <54F04EC5.3000107@guardianproject.info>
 <54F07A7D.3040709@digitalbrains.com>
 <AE0A6C7E-6A40-40C2-A401-0FACB5F84833@guardianproject.info>
 <54F6DD93.9060203@grinta.net> <54FDF40E.1060403@guardianproject.info>
Message-ID: <54FE1351.7080500@grinta.net>

On 09/03/15 20:27, Hans-Christoph Steiner wrote:
>> I have no idea about the Java tooling for interfacing to external
>> libraries, but (after seeing so many complaints on the mailing list)
>> I've recently started to work on Python bindings to GPGME using Cython,
>> and so far it has been an extremely smooth process and the resulting
>> Python API feels quite pythonic (I haven't started with the asynchronous
>> calls yet, those will probably be harder to map in a pythonic way).
>>
>> The fact that writing the bindings is quite easy, is due indeed to the
>> fact that GPGME is a fine API for C (and to Cython to a large extent).
> 
> There are other C-Python wrappers of GPGME, like pyme.  I hope you're aware of
> those, and have studied them.  One thing that GnuPG suffers from is many
> people starting their own wrappers, but few people finishing them or
> contributing to existing ones.  That is not a sustainable situation.


Hello Hans-Christoph,

yes, I'm aware that there are other wrappers for GPGME. I cannot say
that I studied them in detail, but I can give you my reasons why I
started to work on a new one.   I'm doing this in my (quite scarce)
spare time, so the first requirements is that the development should be fun.

> http://pyme.sourceforge.net/

I knew this one. It is based on SWIG, and my experience with SWIG is
such that I want to stay as far as I can from that horrible mess.

> https://launchpad.net/pygpgme

I didn't know this one. It is interesting. However, it is written
directly in C using the CPython extension API and this makes development
quite tedious. There is probably something to learn from this project.

> http://www.red-dove.com/python_gnupg/
> https://bitbucket.org/vinay.sajip/python-gnupg
> https://github.com/isislovecruft/python-gnupg

Those, as far as I know, work using the gpg command line, not the GPGME
library and are all based on the same code. Unfortunately the gpg
command line does not make some operations easy to script, therefore
those are quite limited.

Cheers,
Daniele



From dougb at dougbarton.email  Mon Mar  9 22:41:44 2015
From: dougb at dougbarton.email (Doug Barton)
Date: Mon, 09 Mar 2015 14:41:44 -0700
Subject: Thoughts on GnuPG and automation
In-Reply-To: <8F0B09FC6339FA439524099BFCABC11F2D3C6486@IRVEXCHMB11.corp.ad.broadcom.com>
References: <54F04EC5.3000107@guardianproject.info>
 <54F07A7D.3040709@digitalbrains.com>
 <AE0A6C7E-6A40-40C2-A401-0FACB5F84833@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5D690.9030607@digitalbrains.com>
 <D8E88427-D1D6-4C67-A1D0-29CFD37075F2@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5E626.5010808@sixdemonbag.org>
 <F3B37AE1-A4D6-421A-A847-CE994F24C818@guardianproject.info>
 <54F5F8DC.8030804@digitalbrains.com>
 <69155963-925D-4776-9CC8-79504432FA87@guardianproject.info>
 <8F0B09FC6339FA439524099BFCABC11F2D3C2F9A@IRVEXCHMB11.corp.ad.broadcom.com>
 <54FDEF73.8020907@guardianproject.info>
 <8F0B09FC6339FA439524099BFCABC11F2D3C6486@IRVEXCHMB11.corp.ad.broadcom.com>
Message-ID: <54FE1398.7010800@dougbarton.email>

On 3/9/15 2:10 PM, Bob (Robert) Cavanaugh wrote:
> you will not get your desired results by starting the conversation impuning the work that went before and claiming that what you are asking for is far superior

OTOH, it's often useful when talking about a possible direction for new 
projects to have a frank and honest discussion about what did and did 
not work in old ones.

Just as you pointed out that the slights you perceived Hans-Christoph 
offering on GnuPG are unfair because it's not responsible for what other 
project teams have started and failed to complete; it's equally 
unreasonable for you to infer that he was offering that slight, and for 
the same reason.

The way I read Hans-Christoph's message was that there is a lack of 
coordination amongst various teams who have started API, wrapper, or 
other projects based on GnuPG tools, and that this fragmentation has 
harmed those efforts in various ways (including diverting precious 
resources to projects with little or no chance of success). And that it 
would be nice if we could take a hard look at what the real world 
requirements are for APIs and/or wrappers for various platforms, and 
have some coordinated effort put into work in this area.

Both of those sound like perfectly reasonable observations to me, and I 
did not perceive any suggested slight by Hans-Christoph at any point in 
the conversation.

FWIW,

Doug



From akbrandt at gmail.com  Mon Mar  9 22:06:28 2015
From: akbrandt at gmail.com (Andy Brandt)
Date: Mon, 9 Mar 2015 22:06:28 +0100
Subject: A strange problem with GnuPG & PSI/PSI+
Message-ID: <CAPvpBftkh-3YL1m2VUA=+5b2T_-20ZVJ2J-HLXPmCBfQ9UcMqA@mail.gmail.com>

I have a strange problem with GnuPG, that I have discovered when trying to
get PSI to work with it.

The scenario is pretty simple - I configure PSI for GnuPG encrypted
messaging, then I do a test with another user. When I send a message to him
all works ok, the message is encrypted and decrypts ok on the other end.
When he sends me an encrypted message I do get the pinentry-qt4 window,
there I enter my key password, but then instead of decrypted content I get
"---BEGIN PGP---" message in Psi's chat window.

To eliminate PSI as being the source of the problem (esp. since I used
config files from Windows) I installed PSI+ and configured the account by
hand from scratch. Same problem. But it doesn't end here.

If I run gpg -d from the command line and paste the encrypted message from
the PSI chat window and end with ^D the behavior is strange, because
instead of decrypting the message to stdout it hangs and I have to hit ^C
to get back to shell (if password was not provided before pinentry-qt4
appears again, on subsequent invocations it does not because gpg-agent
keeps the password for a while). If I instead put the same message into a
file and again run gpg -d file.txt then it decrypts correctly typing the
result to stdout. This strange behavior leads me to believe the problem I
encounter is with the GnuPG, not Psi/Psi+.

I checked the gpg.conf but found nothing out of the ordinary there. I know
the other user's setup works, because when I boot into Windows (where I
have ident or talk with him from another machine everything works and he is
not changing his configuration.

I'm out of ideas for now, the Suse forum was unable to help me, so any help
would be greatly appreciated.

I use OpenSuse 13.2, versions:
- gpg (GnuPG) 2.0.26
libgcrypt 1.6.1
- Psi 0.15-patched
- Psi+ 0.16.376 (2014-07-23)

-- 
Regards,
Andy

"Environment for Agile Teams <http://bit.ly/environmentforagileteams>" - my
book for managers & founders
My blog http://pragmaticleader.net/
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From holtzm at cox.net  Mon Mar  9 21:05:44 2015
From: holtzm at cox.net (Bob Holtzman)
Date: Mon, 9 Mar 2015 13:05:44 -0700
Subject: Anything that just works easily for folks?... without knowing
 this stuff.
In-Reply-To: <5itwxueoin.fsf@fencepost.gnu.org>
References: <1633638.HTNhLanb3K@stark>
 <5itwxueoin.fsf@fencepost.gnu.org>
Message-ID: <20150309200543.GA2286@cox.net>

On Mon, Mar 09, 2015 at 01:19:28AM -0400, Don Warner Saklad wrote:
> It's too complicated to setup, a too complicated learning curve to
> setup... How to make it easier needs to be a greater priority.

Hand holding is down the hall on the left.

-- 
Bob Holtzman
Giant intergalactic brain-sucking hyperbacteria 
came to Earth to rape our women and create a race 
of mindless zombies.  Look!  It's working!
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From imeil8 at eml.cc  Tue Mar 10 00:06:16 2015
From: imeil8 at eml.cc (imeil8 at eml.cc)
Date: Mon, 09 Mar 2015 19:06:16 -0400
Subject: Suggestions for a Practical Scheme to Manage Multiple Identities?
Message-ID: <1425942376.1466427.238101265.24AEC46F@webmail.messagingengine.com>

Hi Folks-

I have two identities with corresponding key pairs, one for work related
needs and one for everything else. At the moment the keys for work live
on my work machine and my everything else keys live on my laptop which I
may or may not have access to at any given moment. The problem is
sometimes I need my everything else identity at work and vice versa.

Work is Ubuntu and home is Debian if that makes a difference to
anything. The Debian is Wheezy and and the Ubuntu is 14.04. I'm using
whichever gnupg is current in the repos NOT gnupg2 (sidebar issue: is
there any pressing reason why I should switch to gnupg2?). Both my work
and home machines are secure enough: I _think_. The disks are encrypted
and the security settings are mostly in the sane to somewhat-paranoid
range. I suppose my laptop is vulnerable to theft while I'm in transit
but in that state the the disk encryption would be in effect. 

I _think_ the best scheme would be to combine the two identities onto a
single keyring and write that out to an easily transported flash memory
device and point gnupg to the to the flash device to find whichever key
is needed. I _think_ I'm reasonably comfortable maintaining the security
of the portable flash device and would place backups of my key
revocation on my home and work machines in order to quickly revoke the
keys in the event of loss.

FWIW, my private keys have unreasonably long passphrases that I _think_
can withstand brute-forcing for a length of time sufficient for me to
discover the loss of my flash device and issue a revocation and take
steps to protect any files that may be vulnerable should the key become
available in the wild.

I have nothing against using a smartcard assuming there is no problem
with storing multiple 2048 keys, the card is reasonably inexpensive, and
can be had without jumping through hoops to find a vendor.

If there is really good reason why using a portable flash device is a
bad idea, I'd like to know about it. I read a discussion in the archives
about it and concluded that it will likely serve my needs fairly well.
So this is not a question about portable flash drives vs. smartcards per
se. I _think_ I understand those risks and trade-offs but if there is
something I'm missing then, of course, I'd like to know. Mainly, this is
a key organization question: what is the best way to organize my
identities so that I can access them as needed across my various
machines?

Thanks very much in advance.

-Chris


From carolyn at anhalt.org  Tue Mar 10 00:06:02 2015
From: carolyn at anhalt.org (Carolyn Anhalt)
Date: Mon, 9 Mar 2015 19:06:02 -0400
Subject: Anything that just works easily for folks?... without knowing
 this stuff.
In-Reply-To: <54FDA344.9010301@verizon.net>
References: <5itwxueoin.fsf@fencepost.gnu.org> <54FDA344.9010301@verizon.net>
Message-ID: <CANtR-8Jd=w3iDUTSVLEsk3h6KCJVsxXR2Drxt4sMdAtVH0ay3Q@mail.gmail.com>

On Mon, Mar 9, 2015 at 9:42 AM, Jean-David Beyer <jeandavid8 at verizon.net> wrote:
> On 03/09/2015 01:19 AM, Don Warner Saklad wrote:
>> It's too complicated to setup, a too complicated learning curve to
>> setup... How to make it easier needs to be a greater priority.
>>
> Albert Einstein is credited with saying:
>
> Everything should be made as simple as possible: BUT NO SIMPLER.


So true... Mailpile has actually managed to capture the simplicity at
just about the right level, I think. It has a great interface to walk
you through creating your key and setting it up to work with just
about any existing mail account. It's not quite ready for general
release, but the beta has been working pretty well for a while now.
Definitely support them if you can!

Until it's ready, I've found Mailvelope to be fairly simple as well
for webmail interfaces, which is about as simple as email gets these
days. Would either of those work for you?


From gniibe at fsij.org  Tue Mar 10 03:41:38 2015
From: gniibe at fsij.org (NIIBE Yutaka)
Date: Tue, 10 Mar 2015 11:41:38 +0900
Subject: Suggestions for a Practical Scheme to Manage Multiple Identities?
In-Reply-To: <1425942376.1466427.238101265.24AEC46F@webmail.messagingengine.com>
References: <1425942376.1466427.238101265.24AEC46F@webmail.messagingengine.com>
Message-ID: <54FE59E2.4080907@fsij.org>

On 03/10/2015 08:06 AM, imeil8 at eml.cc wrote:
> So this is not a question about portable flash drives vs. smartcards per
> se. I _think_ I understand those risks and trade-offs but if there is
> something I'm missing then, of course, I'd like to know.

I had an experience that one of my family members took my portable
flash drive for his/her own purpose (and it took hours/days for me to
realize the fact).

This might be another risk.

With this experience, I abandoned adding the feature of storage to
Gnuk, even if I know the usefulness.

If it's useful for you, it would be also useful for them, that might
be a risk.

P.S.  I maintain Gauche, a Scheme interpreter, in Debian.  Since the
site is named "Practical Scheme" [0], at first glance, I completely
misunderstood your subject.

[0] Practical Scheme: http://practical-scheme.net/index.html
-- 


From Deepak.Saxena at safenet-inc.com  Tue Mar 10 05:30:47 2015
From: Deepak.Saxena at safenet-inc.com (Saxena, Deepak)
Date: Tue, 10 Mar 2015 10:00:47 +0530
Subject: GPG4Win 2.2.3 Smart card support
Message-ID: <33B1BAEAF9B37A439F73D9BF6B32ED4205FAB671@NOI1EXCH03.apac.sfnt.local>


Hello,

I am Deepak Saxena from Gemalto (formerly SafeNet Inc) and I am curious if smart cards are supported for storing the keys which will be used to encrypt files or email using gpg4win.
I have installed gpg4win 2.2.3 and want to test SafeNet smart cards.
I am getting following error:

[cid:image003.jpg at 01D05B18.7E9178F0]

Can  you please update me if third party tokens/smartcard cards are supported in your product.
Is MSCAPI/PKCS11 supported?

--Deepak Saxena
+919911641953

The information contained in this electronic mail transmission 
may be privileged and confidential, and therefore, protected 
from disclosure. If you have received this communication in 
error, please notify us immediately by replying to this 
message and deleting it from your computer without copying 
or disclosing it.


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From gniibe at fsij.org  Tue Mar 10 05:35:27 2015
From: gniibe at fsij.org (NIIBE Yutaka)
Date: Tue, 10 Mar 2015 13:35:27 +0900
Subject: Trezor - Could this be the model for a PGP crypto device?
In-Reply-To: <CA+m_8J10OpZXdPSbV=5irkQ4yMN3AKWUwbodQts94ZWY1OC35Q@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CA+m_8J1ReYd2zw7s=Pbw16ezKBwJXoVqbsFYqX3yyc1opE7WDQ@mail.gmail.com>
 <54FA4A08.50006@fsij.org>
 <CA+m_8J10OpZXdPSbV=5irkQ4yMN3AKWUwbodQts94ZWY1OC35Q@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <54FE748F.3040400@fsij.org>

On 03/08/2015 12:09 AM, Felix E. Klee wrote:
> It?s not about the UI being pretty. What I like about Trezor is that
> it?s small yet has basically an external PIN pad, and every transaction
> has to be confirmed by the push of a button. So, unless there are
> backdoors (which also could be at chip level) or bugs, malware cannot
> sniff the PIN nor can it do unattended transactions.

Thanks for your explanation.  I see your point.

Confirmation push button would be a good idea, and I have been
considering how we can enhance the OpenPGPcard specification so that
we could do something like that for future implementation(s).

Still immature, but my current idea is something like following.
Basically, OpenPGPcard requires another authentication (confirmation)
to get the result of signing/decryption.

    Host PC                               OpenPGPcard
           command: PSO =>
                        <= response: 0x61<LENGTH>

               command: VERIFY with 0x84 or something different ==>
                        <= response: 0x9000 OK

           command: GET_RESPONSE ==>
                        <= response: <DATA> of result of PSO

I don't know if this kind of nested transaction is allowed or not in
ISO 7816.  If it's not allowed, there would be another way to do that.

My point is that: if it's ok protocolwise, the confirmation feature
can be implemented by OpenPGPcard using existing cardreader with
pinpad.
-- 


From gniibe at fsij.org  Tue Mar 10 06:45:58 2015
From: gniibe at fsij.org (NIIBE Yutaka)
Date: Tue, 10 Mar 2015 14:45:58 +0900
Subject: GPG4Win 2.2.3 Smart card support
In-Reply-To: <33B1BAEAF9B37A439F73D9BF6B32ED4205FAB671@NOI1EXCH03.apac.sfnt.local>
References: <33B1BAEAF9B37A439F73D9BF6B32ED4205FAB671@NOI1EXCH03.apac.sfnt.local>
Message-ID: <54FE8516.3020906@fsij.org>

Hello,

This is second time for me to receive the message like:

> The information contained in this electronic mail transmission 
> may be privileged and confidential, and therefore, protected 
> from disclosure. If you have received this communication in 
> error, please notify us immediately by replying to this 
> message and deleting it from your computer without copying 
> or disclosing it.

I can't answer to a message saying like this.  Perhaps, so can't
everyone (and that would be the reason why you didn't get reply).

Thus, this is not the reply, but a monologue of mine.

In January, I wrote a message to this list:

    https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/2015-January/052298.html

It may help somehow, but it should be just a coincidence.
-- 


From Deepak.Saxena at safenet-inc.com  Tue Mar 10 08:14:25 2015
From: Deepak.Saxena at safenet-inc.com (Saxena, Deepak)
Date: Tue, 10 Mar 2015 12:44:25 +0530
Subject: GPG4Win 2.2.3 Smart card support
In-Reply-To: <54FE8516.3020906@fsij.org>
References: <33B1BAEAF9B37A439F73D9BF6B32ED4205FAB671@NOI1EXCH03.apac.sfnt.local>
 <54FE8516.3020906@fsij.org>
Message-ID: <33B1BAEAF9B37A439F73D9BF6B32ED4205FAB777@NOI1EXCH03.apac.sfnt.local>

Hi Yutaka,

I am trying to test file encryption with SafeNet smart cards. (CardOs/ Java and other tokens).
I am getting error message: The card application is not yet supported.

I have dll libraries for my tokens but I am new to GPG4Win.
Can you please guide me the way to import the library or steps by how can I configure GPG4win to support these tokens/ smartcards.

I can see the list of supported tokens as:
https://wiki.debian.org/GnuPG/CCID_Driver

It it anyhow possible to support other tokens??


-----Original Message-----
From: NIIBE Yutaka [mailto:gniibe at fsij.org] 
Sent: Tuesday, March 10, 2015 11:16 AM
To: Saxena, Deepak
Cc: gnupg-users at gnupg.org
Subject: Re: GPG4Win 2.2.3 Smart card support

Hello,

This is second time for me to receive the message like:

> The information contained in this electronic mail transmission may be 
> privileged and confidential, and therefore, protected from disclosure. 
> If you have received this communication in error, please notify us 
> immediately by replying to this message and deleting it from your 
> computer without copying or disclosing it.

I can't answer to a message saying like this.  Perhaps, so can't everyone (and that would be the reason why you didn't get reply).

Thus, this is not the reply, but a monologue of mine.

In January, I wrote a message to this list:

    https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/2015-January/052298.html

It may help somehow, but it should be just a coincidence.
-- 
The information contained in this electronic mail transmission 
may be privileged and confidential, and therefore, protected 
from disclosure. If you have received this communication in 
error, please notify us immediately by replying to this 
message and deleting it from your computer without copying 
or disclosing it.




From aheinecke at intevation.de  Tue Mar 10 10:05:19 2015
From: aheinecke at intevation.de (Andre Heinecke)
Date: Tue, 10 Mar 2015 10:05:19 +0100
Subject: AES-NI, symmetric key generation
In-Reply-To: <2060751138.1681310.1425921314299.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com>
References: <2060751138.1681310.1425921314299.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <2938915.M7XCH4dMtl@esus>

Hi,

To answer your first question regarding gpg4win:

On Monday, March 09, 2015 05:15:14 PM Maricel Gregoraschko wrote:
> Hello All,I would first like to thank you for your effort and time
> developing gnupgp.I have a couple of questions: 1. Does GnuGP (in
> particular, the Windows binaries distributed for gpg4win) use AES-NI, the
> Intel dedicated AES instruction set?

No, it has been disabled due to a bug. I've opened gnupg/issue1919 to track 
this.

> There are some concerns, I'm not sure
> how realistic, about backdoors built into the CPU themselves. 

AES is an algorithm that produces deterministic results. Not really something 
to backdoor like a RNG. 

> I noticed
> there is an option to "configure", --disable-aesni-support. Where can I get
> the full configure command as it was used to build the posted gpg4win
> binaries, to check if that switch was present or not?

http://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=gpg4win.git;a=blob;f=src/Makefile.am

Look for gpg4win_pkg_<package>_configure (e.g. gpg4win_pkg_libgcrypt_configure)

> Also is there any
> option to turn hardware acceleration on or off at runtime? 

No.

Regards,
Andre

-- 
Andre Heinecke |  ++49-541-335083-262  |  http://www.intevation.de/
Intevation GmbH, Neuer Graben 17, 49074 Osnabr?ck | AG Osnabr?ck, HR B 18998
Gesch?ftsf?hrer: Frank Koormann, Bernhard Reiter, Dr. Jan-Oliver Wagner
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From wk at gnupg.org  Tue Mar 10 11:25:14 2015
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Tue, 10 Mar 2015 11:25:14 +0100
Subject: GPG4Win 2.2.3 Smart card support
In-Reply-To: <33B1BAEAF9B37A439F73D9BF6B32ED4205FAB777@NOI1EXCH03.apac.sfnt.local>
 (Deepak Saxena's message of "Tue, 10 Mar 2015 12:44:25 +0530")
References: <33B1BAEAF9B37A439F73D9BF6B32ED4205FAB671@NOI1EXCH03.apac.sfnt.local>
 <54FE8516.3020906@fsij.org>
 <33B1BAEAF9B37A439F73D9BF6B32ED4205FAB777@NOI1EXCH03.apac.sfnt.local>
Message-ID: <87ioe9taid.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Tue, 10 Mar 2015 08:14, Deepak.Saxena at safenet-inc.com said:

> I am trying to test file encryption with SafeNet smart cards. (CardOs/ Java and other tokens).
> I am getting error message: The card application is not yet supported.

You need to write an application which GnuPG knows about.  The source
files scd/app-*.c implement the hist part of the card applictions.  If
you card has a pkcs#15 structure it would be used, if not you need to
provide the specifications for the card and write such an application
driver or find someone who is interested in doing that.

You may however use the card directly sending the respecive APDUs to the
card.  You can test this with gpg-connect-agent; use 

  scd serialno undefined

to convince scdaemon to use the card without any known application and
then run

 scd help apdu

to learn about the APDU command.

> I can see the list of supported tokens as:
> https://wiki.debian.org/GnuPG/CCID_Driver

This is a lower layer.  On Windows pkcs at 11 is used and AFAICS it works
for you.


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner


p.s.
> The information contained in this electronic mail transmission 
> may be privileged and confidential, and therefore, protected 
> from disclosure. If you have received this communication in 
> error, please notify us immediately by replying to this 

Did the GCHQ complied with that request when they grabbed all those SIM
card keys? ;-)

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From js-gnupg-users at webkeks.org  Tue Mar 10 13:18:34 2015
From: js-gnupg-users at webkeks.org (Jonathan Schleifer)
Date: Tue, 10 Mar 2015 13:18:34 +0100
Subject: Trezor - Could this be the model for a PGP crypto device?
In-Reply-To: <54FE748F.3040400@fsij.org>
References: <CA+m_8J1ReYd2zw7s=Pbw16ezKBwJXoVqbsFYqX3yyc1opE7WDQ@mail.gmail.com>
 <54FA4A08.50006@fsij.org>
 <CA+m_8J10OpZXdPSbV=5irkQ4yMN3AKWUwbodQts94ZWY1OC35Q@mail.gmail.com>
 <54FE748F.3040400@fsij.org>
Message-ID: <20150310131834.455fb87c06755124a4351e7f@webkeks.org>

On Tue, 10 Mar 2015 13:35:27 +0900, NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe at fsij.org> wrote:

> Confirmation push button would be a good idea, and I have been
> considering how we can enhance the OpenPGPcard specification so that
> we could do something like that for future implementation(s).

Does this really need to be part of the specification? For example, the Gnuk could just delay signing / decryption / authentication until the button has been pressed and return an error if it doesn't get pressed within a certain amount of time.

-- 
Jonathan
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From js-gnupg-users at webkeks.org  Tue Mar 10 13:23:22 2015
From: js-gnupg-users at webkeks.org (Jonathan Schleifer)
Date: Tue, 10 Mar 2015 13:23:22 +0100
Subject: gpg in a =?ISO-8859-1?Q?cybercaf=E9?=
In-Reply-To: <54F8D858.7080307@riseup.net>
References: <1425468587.871457089@f386.i.mail.ru>
 <20150305183045.0a84427bb224d379f41d4152@webkeks.org>
 <54F8D858.7080307@riseup.net>
Message-ID: <20150310132322.c69406fe8db7765f1f429a67@webkeks.org>

On Thu, 05 Mar 2015 22:27:36 +0000, flapflap <flapflap at riseup.net> wrote:

> The current version (1.3) of Tails comes with GnuPG 1.4.12.

That's just not true. Not only is the gpg2 command available, but the change log even explicitly states that GnuPG 2 was added to improve smartcard support.

--
Jonathan
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From wk at gnupg.org  Tue Mar 10 15:58:05 2015
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Tue, 10 Mar 2015 15:58:05 +0100
Subject: AES-NI, symmetric key generation
In-Reply-To: <2938915.M7XCH4dMtl@esus> (Andre Heinecke's message of "Tue, 10
 Mar 2015 10:05:19 +0100")
References: <2060751138.1681310.1425921314299.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com>
 <2938915.M7XCH4dMtl@esus>
Message-ID: <877fuoucg2.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Tue, 10 Mar 2015 10:05, aheinecke at intevation.de said:

>> Also is there any
>> option to turn hardware acceleration on or off at runtime? 

You can globally disable certain hardware features: Create a file

--8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8---
# We do not want to use AES-NI
intel-aesni
--8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8---

and store it as /etc/gcrypt/hwf.deny . This should work also on Windows
if you copy that file to every drive.  The list of hardware
features in the current development version is:

    { HWF_PADLOCK_RNG, "padlock-rng" },
    { HWF_PADLOCK_AES, "padlock-aes" },
    { HWF_PADLOCK_SHA, "padlock-sha" },
    { HWF_PADLOCK_MMUL,"padlock-mmul"},
    { HWF_INTEL_CPU,   "intel-cpu" },
    { HWF_INTEL_BMI2,  "intel-bmi2" },
    { HWF_INTEL_SSSE3, "intel-ssse3" },
    { HWF_INTEL_PCLMUL,"intel-pclmul" },
    { HWF_INTEL_AESNI, "intel-aesni" },
    { HWF_INTEL_RDRAND,"intel-rdrand" },
    { HWF_INTEL_AVX,   "intel-avx" },
    { HWF_INTEL_AVX2,  "intel-avx2" },
    { HWF_ARM_NEON,    "arm-neon" }

Libgcrypt 1.6 has less features.

BTW, I just pushed a change for 2.1 to show the used Libgcrypt
configuration:

--8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8---
$ gpg --list-gcrypt-config
version:1.6.3-beta12:
ciphers:arcfour:blowfish:cast5:des:aes:twofish:serpent:rfc2268:seed:camellia:idea:salsa20:gost28147:
pubkeys:dsa:elgamal:rsa:ecc:
digests:crc:gostr3411-94:md4:md5:rmd160:sha1:sha256:sha512:tiger:whirlpool:stribog:
rnd-mod:linux:
cpu-arch:x86:
mpi-asm:amd64/mpih-add1.S:amd64/mpih-sub1.S:amd64/mpih-mul1.S:amd64/mpih-mul2.S:amd64/mpih-mul3.S:amd64/mpih-lshift.S:amd64/mpih-rshift.S:
threads:none:
hwflist:intel-cpu:intel-ssse3:intel-pclmul:intel-aesni:intel-avx:
fips-mode:n:n:
rng-type:standard:1:
--8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8---


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner


-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From pete at heypete.com  Tue Mar 10 15:36:36 2015
From: pete at heypete.com (Pete Stephenson)
Date: Tue, 10 Mar 2015 15:36:36 +0100
Subject: AES-NI, symmetric key generation
In-Reply-To: <2060751138.1681310.1425921314299.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com>
References: <2060751138.1681310.1425921314299.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <54FF0174.7060301@heypete.com>

On 3/9/2015 6:15 PM, Maricel Gregoraschko wrote:
> Hello All,

Hi!

> 2.  When using symmetric encryption and providing a passphrase, I
> understand the actual encryption key is generated on the spot, used to
> do the encryption, and then discarded from memory and not stored
> anywhere, is that correct?

Correct.

> If the user wanted, can they dump the encryption key to store it
> securely, and use it to decrypt, instead of the password?

Yes, but the security is only as strong as the weakest link: if one uses
a weak passphrase to encrypt a message, an adversary could guess the
password.

If one used a long random string as a passphrase, this is functionally
equivalent to a strong key, so why bother with using the key itself to
decrypt instead of the passphrase?

You can show the symmetric session key for a message using the
"--show-session-key" option.

Here's an example of text I encrypted with "gpg --symmetric":
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Version: GnuPG v1

jA0EAwMCYFod0NxVEONgySM6oLcax81PoXTPKk2R+zdP2XZ+rA1ILbKy3+sg0xs8
B8SW2A==
=Iz40
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----

The passphrase is "test" (no quotes).

pete at kaylee:~$ gpg --show-session-key < example.txt
[prompt for password]
gpg: CAST5 encrypted data
gpg: gpg-agent is not available in this session
gpg: encrypted with 1 passphrase
gpg: session key: `3:62A2421F805F6CB1767A9DF07983ADDF'
gpg: example.txt: unknown suffix

Later, I can use gpg with the "--override-session-key" option to supply
the decryption key directly. Use "gpg --override-session-key [session
key]", using the format given above:

pete at kaylee:~$ gpg --override-session-key
3:62A2421F805F6CB1767A9DF07983ADDF < example.txt
gpg: CAST5 encrypted data
gpg: encrypted with 1 passphrase
Hello world!
gpg: WARNING: message was not integrity protected

See the manpage or https://www.gnupg.org/documentation/manpage.html for
more details.

One interesting note about show/override-session-key: if one is
compelled to decrypt a message (or else...), one can use those options
on messages encrypted using GnuPG's symmetric or the more usual
asymmetric (i.e., public key) encryption methods. The manpage says,
"This option is normally not used but comes handy in case someone forces
you to reveal the content of an encrypted message; using this option you
can do this without handing out the secret key."

In other words, if you're compelled to decrypt a message that was
encrypted to your public key, you don't need to hand over your private
key (which would allow someone to decrypt all your messages, sign new
messages, etc.). Instead, you would just hand over the encrypted message
and the session key used to encrypt it. Since each message uses a new,
random session key, only that single message can be decrypted and your
private key is not compromised.

Cheers!
-Pete



From mailing-lists at asatiifm.net  Tue Mar 10 17:56:27 2015
From: mailing-lists at asatiifm.net (=?windows-1252?Q?Ville_M=E4=E4tt=E4?=)
Date: Tue, 10 Mar 2015 18:56:27 +0200
Subject: Suggestions for a Practical Scheme to Manage Multiple Identities?
In-Reply-To: <54FE59E2.4080907@fsij.org>
References: <1425942376.1466427.238101265.24AEC46F@webmail.messagingengine.com>
 <54FE59E2.4080907@fsij.org>
Message-ID: <54FF223B.4030805@asatiifm.net>

On 10.03.15 04:41, NIIBE Yutaka wrote:
>> So this is not a question about portable flash drives vs. smartcards per
>> > se. I _think_ I understand those risks and trade-offs but if there is
>> > something I'm missing then, of course, I'd like to know.
> I had an experience that one of my family members took my portable
> flash drive for his/her own purpose (and it took hours/days for me to
> realize the fact).
> 
> This might be another risk.

On top of all the other problems of a general purpose storage device.

I'd say just go with a smartcard or purpose built token device [1][2].

As for the multiple identities, different smartcards as needed. That
makes the reader the only device to carry and the cards you can cut
(some precut) to SIM-card size to make carrying easy. And there are
small readers available.

[1]: http://www.seeedstudio.com/wiki/index.php?title=FST-01
[2]: http://www.fsij.org/doc-gnuk/

-- 
Ville

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From wk at gnupg.org  Tue Mar 10 19:38:45 2015
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Tue, 10 Mar 2015 19:38:45 +0100
Subject: GnuPG News for February 2015
Message-ID: <87oao0puiy.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

Hi!

Find below the plain text version of 
https://gnupg.org/blog/20150310-gnupg-in-february.html


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner



1 GnuPG News for February 2015
??????????????????????????????

  Indeed, very exiting news this month: The financial crisis of The
  GnuPG Project is over.  Due to an unexpected amount of donations
  received in the first days of February we can keep on working for at
  least the next 2 or 3 years.

  How did this happen?  At the [31C3] Nico Josattis arranged an
  Interview with [Julia Angwin] who writes for [ProPublica].  Eventually
  on the 5th her [article] was published and immediately received a lot
  of attention.  Not only at the ProPublica site but at many other news
  site as well.  While checking my mail on that evening, I noticed more
  than thousand notification mails for donations and even better: that
  continuous stream of donations did not stop for the next days.  Alone
  on the first day we received more than 120,000?? and thus more than
  our initial goal.  I even had to fix the script building the donation
  progress bar to not overflow the right margin the same night.  I also
  received a call from one of the Stripe founders who offered yearly
  donations from Stripe and Facebook each at 50,0000?$.  Amazing.

  I like to *thank everyone* for supporting the project, be it small or
  large individual donations, helping users, providing corporate
  sponsorship, working on the software, and for all the encouraging
  words by mail, blogs, and even postcards.

  Due to that new publicity for GnuPG, I received many requests for
  interviews and for several days journalists and photographers visited
  me in my office.  They wrote several articles for German papers and
  radio stations, for example in the [taz], the [S?ddeutsche Zeitung],
  and the [Deutsche Welle]. I hope these articles help to keep up the
  awareness for the importance of privacy issues.

  GnuPG does not stand alone: there are many other projects, often
  unknown to most people, which are essential to keep the free Internet
  running.  Many of them are run by volunteers who spend a lot of unpaid
  time on them.  They need our support as well!

  Now what to do with all that money?  Before a final plan can be
  drafted, tax issues need to be resolved.  Given that g10^code (the
  legal entity behind the project) is not a charity, we need to find a
  way to stretch the use of the money beyond this year.  My tax advisor
  is currently looking into this and I will report on the outcome in
  another blog entry.

  Regardless of this I started to look out for a second developer and
  fortunately [Neal Walfield] was searching for a job and accepted my
  offer to work on GnuPG.  Neal is well known for his work on modern
  operating systems and I consider him an excellent hacker.  I am glad
  to have him on board.


  [31C3] https://events.ccc.de/congress/2014/wiki/Main_Page

  [Julia Angwin] http://juliaangwin.com

  [ProPublica] http://www.propublica.org

  [article]
  http://www.propublica.org/article/the-worlds-email-encryption-software-relies-on-one-guy-who-is-going-broke

  [taz] http://www.taz.de/Verschluesselung-mit-GnuPG/!154635/

  [S?ddeutsche Zeitung]
  http://www.sueddeutsche.de/digital/verschluesselungssoftware-gnu-pg-wie-ein-mann-das-e-mail-geheimnis-verteidigt-1.2355155

  [Deutsche Welle] http://dw.de/p/1Eebj

  [Neal Walfield] http://walfield.org


1.1 Release status
??????????????????

  GnuPG [2.1.2] was released on the 11th, [2.0.27] on the 18th, and
  [1.4.19] on the 27th.

  The 1.4.19 release features a fix for a new side channel attack on the
  Elgamal encryption (which used to be the default public key encryption
  algorithm until 2009).  Go ahead and read how Genkin?s group describes
  the [details] of this attack.  The release also includes a mitigation
  for another SCA to be described in the forthcoming paper /Last-Level
  Cache Side-Channel Attacks are Practical/ by Yarom et al.

  Libgcrypt [1.6.3] was released on the 27th to fix the described SCAs
  for GnuPG 2.0 and 2.1.


  [2.1.2]
  https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-announce/2015q1/000361.html

  [2.0.27]
  http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-announce/2015q1/000362.html

  [1.4.19]
  http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-announce/2015q1/000363.html

  [details] http://www.cs.tau.ac.il/~tromer/radioexp/

  [1.6.3]
  http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-announce/2015q1/000364.html


1.2 Released and not yet released changes
?????????????????????????????????????????

  Several segfaults due to NULL-derefs and invalid memory reads when
  using garbled keyrings were fixed.  These unlikely exploitable bugs
  were detected by fuzzing instrumented versions of GnuPG; [Hanno B?ck's
  report] has some details.  A long standing implementation flaw copying
  memory stored values to integers variables was also found and fixed.
  These bug fixes have been backported to 2.0 and 1.4; Daniel Kahn
  Gillmor was kind enough to help with this.

  The decade old PKA system was modernized.  The formerly used TXT
  records haven been replaced with CERT records of the IPGP type, and
  the local part of the mail address is now hashed and base32 encoded to
  support all valid mail addresses.  This has been backported to 1.4.19.
  The new option `--print-pka-records' for 2.1 can be used to create
  zone files for PKA.

  The removal of the PGP-2 support from 2.1 turned out to be more
  complicated than expected.  Another bug related to this only showed up
  and was fixed after the release of 2.1.2.

  To help people not fluent in the spelling alphabet or when using small
  fonts the option `--with-icao-spelling' has been added to 2.1:
  ?????
  ? pub   dsa2048/F2AD85AC1E42B367 2007-12-31 [expires: 2018-12-31]
  ?       Key fingerprint = 8061 5870 F5BA D690 3336  86D0 F2AD 85AC 1E42 B367
  ?                         "Eight Zero Six One  Five Eight Seven Zero
  ?                          Foxtrot Five Bravo Alfa  Delta Six Niner Zero
  ?                          Three Three Three Six  Eight Six Delta Zero
  ?                          Foxtrot Two Alfa Delta  Eight Five Alfa Charlie
  ?                          One Echo Four Two  Bravo Three Six Seven"
  ?????

  The dropped support for LDAP keyserver will be re-introduced with
  2.1.3.  Neal started to work on this and published a detailed
  description on how to setup such an [LDAP server].


  [Hanno B?ck's report]
  https://blog.fuzzing-project.org/5-Multiple-issues-in-GnuPG-found-through-keyring-fuzzing-TFPA-0012015.html

  [LDAP server] https://wiki.gnupg.org/LDAPKeyserver


2 About this news posting
?????????????????????????

  I try to write a news posting every month.  However, other work may
  have a higher priority (e.g. security fixes) and thus I won?t promise
  any fix publication date.  If you have an interesting topic for a news
  posting, please feel free to mail me or gnupg-users at .  A summary of
  the mailing list discussion would be a nice to have.




-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From maricelgregoraschko at yahoo.com  Tue Mar 10 20:28:21 2015
From: maricelgregoraschko at yahoo.com (Maricel Gregoraschko)
Date: Tue, 10 Mar 2015 19:28:21 +0000 (UTC)
Subject: AES-NI, symmetric key generation
In-Reply-To: <54FF0174.7060301@heypete.com>
References: <54FF0174.7060301@heypete.com>
Message-ID: <1847944164.2940725.1426015701245.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com>

Pete,Very useful info about using --show-session-key to avoid revealing your private asymmetric key.In your example ("gpg --show-session-key < example.txt") , had you somehow set up gpg to use symmetric by default, rather than asymmetric + symmetric?If I explicitly pass --symmetric, --show-session-key does nothing (gpg4win) (and I guess the key is not really a random "session" key as when sending a PGP message) but rather the key deterministically generated from the passphrase.
I agree, using key instead of passphrase doesn't enhance security (assuming an attacker knows that the key was derived from a passphrase and with what key derivation algorithm? I assume the randomness/entropy of the key itself is high enough regardless of the passphrase strength?).?The reason I was asking if it's a possibility to store the symmetric key to decrypt with later, was to protect against future changes in the key derivation algorithm, that would make gpg generate a different key for the same passphrase, useless to decrypt previously encrypted data.Thank you for your support.
      From: Pete Stephenson <pete at heypete.com>
 To: Maricel Gregoraschko <maricelgregoraschko at yahoo.com> 
Cc: gnupg-users at gnupg.org 
 Sent: Tuesday, March 10, 2015 10:36 AM
 Subject: Re: AES-NI, symmetric key generation
   
On 3/9/2015 6:15 PM, Maricel Gregoraschko wrote:
> Hello All,

Hi!

> 2.? When using symmetric encryption and providing a passphrase, I
> understand the actual encryption key is generated on the spot, used to
> do the encryption, and then discarded from memory and not stored
> anywhere, is that correct?

Correct.

> If the user wanted, can they dump the encryption key to store it
> securely, and use it to decrypt, instead of the password?

Yes, but the security is only as strong as the weakest link: if one uses
a weak passphrase to encrypt a message, an adversary could guess the
password.

If one used a long random string as a passphrase, this is functionally
equivalent to a strong key, so why bother with using the key itself to
decrypt instead of the passphrase?

You can show the symmetric session key for a message using the
"--show-session-key" option.

Here's an example of text I encrypted with "gpg --symmetric":
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Version: GnuPG v1

jA0EAwMCYFod0NxVEONgySM6oLcax81PoXTPKk2R+zdP2XZ+rA1ILbKy3+sg0xs8
B8SW2A==
=Iz40
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----

The passphrase is "test" (no quotes).

pete at kaylee:~$ gpg --show-session-key < example.txt
[prompt for password]
gpg: CAST5 encrypted data
gpg: gpg-agent is not available in this session
gpg: encrypted with 1 passphrase
gpg: session key: `3:62A2421F805F6CB1767A9DF07983ADDF'
gpg: example.txt: unknown suffix

Later, I can use gpg with the "--override-session-key" option to supply
the decryption key directly. Use "gpg --override-session-key [session
key]", using the format given above:

pete at kaylee:~$ gpg --override-session-key
3:62A2421F805F6CB1767A9DF07983ADDF < example.txt
gpg: CAST5 encrypted data
gpg: encrypted with 1 passphrase
Hello world!
gpg: WARNING: message was not integrity protected

See the manpage or https://www.gnupg.org/documentation/manpage.html for
more details.

One interesting note about show/override-session-key: if one is
compelled to decrypt a message (or else...), one can use those options
on messages encrypted using GnuPG's symmetric or the more usual
asymmetric (i.e., public key) encryption methods. The manpage says,
"This option is normally not used but comes handy in case someone forces
you to reveal the content of an encrypted message; using this option you
can do this without handing out the secret key."

In other words, if you're compelled to decrypt a message that was
encrypted to your public key, you don't need to hand over your private
key (which would allow someone to decrypt all your messages, sign new
messages, etc.). Instead, you would just hand over the encrypted message
and the session key used to encrypt it. Since each message uses a new,
random session key, only that single message can be decrypted and your
private key is not compromised.

Cheers!
-Pete





  
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From maricelgregoraschko at yahoo.com  Tue Mar 10 20:33:39 2015
From: maricelgregoraschko at yahoo.com (Maricel Gregoraschko)
Date: Tue, 10 Mar 2015 19:33:39 +0000 (UTC)
Subject: AES-NI, symmetric key generation
In-Reply-To: <2938915.M7XCH4dMtl@esus>
References: <2938915.M7XCH4dMtl@esus>
Message-ID: <646335208.2968758.1426016019492.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com>

> AES is an algorithm that produces deterministic results. Not really something?
to backdoor like a RNG.?
I admit I haven't looked at the AES-NI instruction set, but I've read that it could be easy for the CPU to reconstruct the key from a sequence of calls typical to AES encryption/decryption (I think implementations even use Intel-provided code), and store it for later retrieval through a secret CPU instruction set.      From: Andre Heinecke <aheinecke at intevation.de>
 To: gnupg-users at gnupg.org; Maricel Gregoraschko <maricelgregoraschko at yahoo.com> 
 Sent: Tuesday, March 10, 2015 5:05 AM
 Subject: Re: AES-NI, symmetric key generation
   
Hi,

To answer your first question regarding gpg4win:

On Monday, March 09, 2015 05:15:14 PM Maricel Gregoraschko wrote:
> Hello All,I would first like to thank you for your effort and time
> developing gnupgp.I have a couple of questions: 1. Does GnuGP (in
> particular, the Windows binaries distributed for gpg4win) use AES-NI, the
> Intel dedicated AES instruction set?

No, it has been disabled due to a bug. I've opened gnupg/issue1919 to track 
this.

> There are some concerns, I'm not sure
> how realistic, about backdoors built into the CPU themselves. 

AES is an algorithm that produces deterministic results. Not really something 
to backdoor like a RNG. 

> I noticed
> there is an option to "configure", --disable-aesni-support. Where can I get
> the full configure command as it was used to build the posted gpg4win
> binaries, to check if that switch was present or not?

http://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=gpg4win.git;a=blob;f=src/Makefile.am

Look for gpg4win_pkg_<package>_configure (e.g. gpg4win_pkg_libgcrypt_configure)



> Also is there any
> option to turn hardware acceleration on or off at runtime? 

No.

Regards,
Andre

-- 
Andre Heinecke |? ++49-541-335083-262? |? http://www.intevation.de/
Intevation GmbH, Neuer Graben 17, 49074 Osnabr?ck | AG Osnabr?ck, HR B 18998
Gesch?ftsf?hrer: Frank Koormann, Bernhard Reiter, Dr. Jan-Oliver Wagner

  
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From maricelgregoraschko at yahoo.com  Tue Mar 10 20:39:45 2015
From: maricelgregoraschko at yahoo.com (Maricel Gregoraschko)
Date: Tue, 10 Mar 2015 19:39:45 +0000 (UTC)
Subject: AES-NI, symmetric key generation
In-Reply-To: <877fuoucg2.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <877fuoucg2.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <135913303.2983865.1426016385331.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com>

Thanks Werner.On Windows, you mean on each drive letter, in the root directory? (e.g. c:\hwf.deny, d:\hwf.deny, etc.?).Also would there be a way to make gpg display which hardware features are being used when encrypting/decrypting (to confirm that the deny file was correctly placed and actually had an effect)??Thank you.
      From: Werner Koch <wk at gnupg.org>
 To: Andre Heinecke <aheinecke at intevation.de> 
Cc: gnupg-users at gnupg.org; Maricel Gregoraschko <maricelgregoraschko at yahoo.com> 
 Sent: Tuesday, March 10, 2015 10:58 AM
 Subject: Re: AES-NI, symmetric key generation
   
On Tue, 10 Mar 2015 10:05, aheinecke at intevation.de said:



>> Also is there any
>> option to turn hardware acceleration on or off at runtime? 

You can globally disable certain hardware features: Create a file

--8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8---
# We do not want to use AES-NI
intel-aesni
--8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8---

and store it as /etc/gcrypt/hwf.deny . This should work also on Windows
if you copy that file to every drive.? The list of hardware
features in the current development version is:

? ? { HWF_PADLOCK_RNG, "padlock-rng" },
? ? { HWF_PADLOCK_AES, "padlock-aes" },
? ? { HWF_PADLOCK_SHA, "padlock-sha" },
? ? { HWF_PADLOCK_MMUL,"padlock-mmul"},
? ? { HWF_INTEL_CPU,? "intel-cpu" },
? ? { HWF_INTEL_BMI2,? "intel-bmi2" },
? ? { HWF_INTEL_SSSE3, "intel-ssse3" },
? ? { HWF_INTEL_PCLMUL,"intel-pclmul" },
? ? { HWF_INTEL_AESNI, "intel-aesni" },
? ? { HWF_INTEL_RDRAND,"intel-rdrand" },
? ? { HWF_INTEL_AVX,? "intel-avx" },
? ? { HWF_INTEL_AVX2,? "intel-avx2" },
? ? { HWF_ARM_NEON,? ? "arm-neon" }

Libgcrypt 1.6 has less features.

BTW, I just pushed a change for 2.1 to show the used Libgcrypt
configuration:

--8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8---
$ gpg --list-gcrypt-config
version:1.6.3-beta12:
ciphers:arcfour:blowfish:cast5:des:aes:twofish:serpent:rfc2268:seed:camellia:idea:salsa20:gost28147:
pubkeys:dsa:elgamal:rsa:ecc:
digests:crc:gostr3411-94:md4:md5:rmd160:sha1:sha256:sha512:tiger:whirlpool:stribog:
rnd-mod:linux:
cpu-arch:x86:
mpi-asm:amd64/mpih-add1.S:amd64/mpih-sub1.S:amd64/mpih-mul1.S:amd64/mpih-mul2.S:amd64/mpih-mul3.S:amd64/mpih-lshift.S:amd64/mpih-rshift.S:
threads:none:
hwflist:intel-cpu:intel-ssse3:intel-pclmul:intel-aesni:intel-avx:
fips-mode:n:n:
rng-type:standard:1:
--8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8---


Shalom-Salam,

? Werner


-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.? Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



  
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From vedaal at nym.hush.com  Tue Mar 10 21:42:51 2015
From: vedaal at nym.hush.com (vedaal at nym.hush.com)
Date: Tue, 10 Mar 2015 16:42:51 -0400
Subject: AES-NI, symmetric key generation
In-Reply-To: <1847944164.2940725.1426015701245.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com>
References: <54FF0174.7060301@heypete.com>
 <1847944164.2940725.1426015701245.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com> 
Message-ID: <20150310204252.04E94E03D4@smtp.hushmail.com>

On 3/10/2015 at 4:19 PM, "Maricel Gregoraschko" <maricelgregoraschko at yahoo.com> wrote:

>I agree, using key instead of passphrase doesn't enhance security 
>(assuming an attacker knows that the key was derived from a 
>passphrase and with what key derivation algorithm? I assume the 
>randomness/entropy of the key itself is high enough regardless of 
>the passphrase strength?).?The reason I was asking if it's a 
>possibility to store the symmetric key to decrypt with later, was 
>to protect against future changes in the key derivation algorithm, 
>that would make gpg generate a different key for the same 
>passphrase, useless to decrypt previously encrypted data.Thank you 
>for your support.

-----

If you don't want to keep your passsphrase, and want only to keep the session key,
and you want this to have no weakness because of a questionably strong enough password that was used to generate the key,
then there is an easy way to do what you want:

[1] Encrypt a test message to any of your own keys.

[2] Decrypt this test message, with the option of --show-session-key

[3] Use this session key as the 64 character password for your symmetric encryption, (and save it, or you won't be able to decrypt the symmetric message).

[4] Decrypt your symmetrically encrypted file or message, using the option of --show-session-key

[5] Save this session key, and if you wish, you can destroy the first one. (you can always get it back by decrypting your message of step [1] ).


The string-to-key part of generating the session key for the symmetrically encrypted message, will be using a random 64 character GnuPG generated session key as it's password.

You can't find a better password (especially even one that you don't have to remember ;-)   )


vedaal



From wk at gnupg.org  Tue Mar 10 22:08:50 2015
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Tue, 10 Mar 2015 22:08:50 +0100
Subject: AES-NI, symmetric key generation
In-Reply-To: <135913303.2983865.1426016385331.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com>
 (Maricel Gregoraschko's message of "Tue, 10 Mar 2015 19:39:45 +0000
 (UTC)")
References: <877fuoucg2.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <135913303.2983865.1426016385331.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <8761a8pnkt.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Tue, 10 Mar 2015 20:39, maricelgregoraschko at yahoo.com said:
> Thanks Werner.On Windows, you mean on each drive letter, in the root
> directory? (e.g. c:\hwf.deny, d:\hwf.deny, etc.?).Also would there be

Yes, that was the idea.  The file names should however be

  c:\etc\gcrypt\hwf.deny
  d:\etc\gcrypt\hwf.deny

I have not tested this.

> a way to make gpg display which hardware features are being used when
> encrypting/decrypting (to confirm that the deny file was correctly
> placed and actually had an effect)??Thank you.  From: Werner Koch

Not yet. 2.1.3 will have a command to list it.  You may simply encrypt a
large file and compare the times.  It is way faster with AES-NI enabled.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From wk at gnupg.org  Tue Mar 10 22:13:34 2015
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Tue, 10 Mar 2015 22:13:34 +0100
Subject: AES-NI, symmetric key generation
In-Reply-To: <646335208.2968758.1426016019492.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com>
 (Maricel Gregoraschko's message of "Tue, 10 Mar 2015 19:33:39 +0000
 (UTC)")
References: <2938915.M7XCH4dMtl@esus>
 <646335208.2968758.1426016019492.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <871tkwpncx.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Tue, 10 Mar 2015 20:33, maricelgregoraschko at yahoo.com said:

> I admit I haven't looked at the AES-NI instruction set, but I've read
> that it could be easy for the CPU to reconstruct the key from a

Possible.  It is also easy to detect the instructions used for software
based AES keyscheduling and leak the key from that knowledge.  I'd pick
AES-NI for its better performace and SCA resistance.

RDRAND for random numbers is a different story.  No sane crypto tool
should soley rely on this instruction.


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From pete at heypete.com  Tue Mar 10 22:32:11 2015
From: pete at heypete.com (Pete Stephenson)
Date: Tue, 10 Mar 2015 22:32:11 +0100
Subject: AES-NI, symmetric key generation
In-Reply-To: <1847944164.2940725.1426015701245.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com>
References: <54FF0174.7060301@heypete.com>
 <1847944164.2940725.1426015701245.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <54FF62DB.6000009@heypete.com>

On 3/10/2015 8:28 PM, Maricel Gregoraschko wrote:
> Pete,
> Very useful info about using --show-session-key to avoid revealing your
> private asymmetric key.

No worries.

> In your example ("gpg --show-session-key < example.txt") , had you
> somehow set up gpg to use symmetric by default, rather than asymmetric +
> symmetric?

No. It was a nearly "out of the box" setup with only some minor changes
to my gpg.conf file in regards to accessing keyservers. Nothing that
would affect the modes of encryption.

> If I explicitly pass --symmetric, --show-session-key does nothing
> (gpg4win) (and I guess the key is not really a random "session" key as
> when sending a PGP message) but rather the key deterministically
> generated from the passphrase.

Works fine for me. Try copy-pasting the text into the command prompt
rather than reading from a file. Use Ctrl-Z then Enter to tell GnuPG
you're done entering a message and it should start processing things.

Here's an encrypted message I generated with "gpg --symmetric --armor"
on GPG4Win 2.2.3:

-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Version: GnuPG v2

jA0EAwMC2lG4z3grm9G1ySTYXvITlKTun7NvaLnznJZI4AhGJyTk+rFkAdufNRzB
cC6eqAI=
=j73k
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----

(password is "test" with no quotes)

gpg --show-session-key yields a session key of
"3:C4A5BBCBB7C8F846FCA3A9BDDED0EB7F".

The same message encrypted a few seconds later with the same password
yields:

-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Version: GnuPG v2

jA0EAwMCgnIlCp86aLq1ySQt2veDYta5U1uxPiust4siTyduBe7+CVhupax2HKeI
Zcm3Rx0=
=kZPs
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----

and a session key of "3:A81A96428D44DEAD3A6079CC22145B51

It appears that GnuPG uses the iterated-and-salted secret-to-key method
(see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#section-3.7.1.3 ) to generate
the session key.

You're right: the key is derived from a passphrase and so is not truly
random, but the salt is random which helps a bit. Of course, the salt is
not encrypted, so the message protection depends only on the strength of
your passphrase.

> I agree, using key instead of passphrase doesn't enhance security
> (assuming an attacker knows that the key was derived from a passphrase
> and with what key derivation algorithm? I assume the randomness/entropy
> of the key itself is high enough regardless of the passphrase strength?). 

The attacker would be able determine quite a bit of information about
how the message was encrypted (as this same information would be needed
by a legitimate user to decrypt the message):

Here's an excerpt from the double-verbose (-vv) output from the second
encrypted message above (all this is available without entering the
passphrase):

:symkey enc packet: version 4, cipher 3, s2k 3, hash 2
        salt 8272250a9f3a68ba, count 2752512 (181)

The attacker would know the cipher being used (cipher 3 = CAST5), the
fact that the key is derived from a user-provided string (the fact that
s2k is used), which string-to-key algorithm is used (s2k 3 =
iterated-and-salted), the hash used (hash 2 = SHA-1), the salt, and the
number of times to iterate the S2K algorithm.

The attacker won't know the strength of your passphrase -- it could be
"cat" or a long string of random characters -- but it tells them that
the key was generated using user-provided input.

> The reason I was asking if it's a possibility to store the symmetric key
> to decrypt with later, was to protect against future changes in the key
> derivation algorithm, that would make gpg generate a different key for
> the same passphrase, useless to decrypt previously encrypted data.

GnuPG follows the OpenPGP standard (RFC 4880). The standard defines
certain key derivation algorithms and provides the ability to add new
ones if needed. Adding new key derivation algorithms in the future
should not have any affect on existing encrypted messages.

Since each message clearly identifies the algorithm used to encrypt it,
future versions of GnuPG should have no problem decrypting it. Indeed,
the current version of GnuPG is able to decrypt messages generated from
old (even ancient!) versions of PGP and GnuPG with few, if any, issues.

Cheers!
-Pete


From gniibe at fsij.org  Wed Mar 11 06:04:50 2015
From: gniibe at fsij.org (NIIBE Yutaka)
Date: Wed, 11 Mar 2015 14:04:50 +0900
Subject: Trezor - Could this be the model for a PGP crypto device?
In-Reply-To: <20150310131834.455fb87c06755124a4351e7f@webkeks.org>
References: <CA+m_8J1ReYd2zw7s=Pbw16ezKBwJXoVqbsFYqX3yyc1opE7WDQ@mail.gmail.com>
 <54FA4A08.50006@fsij.org>
 <CA+m_8J10OpZXdPSbV=5irkQ4yMN3AKWUwbodQts94ZWY1OC35Q@mail.gmail.com>
 <54FE748F.3040400@fsij.org>
 <20150310131834.455fb87c06755124a4351e7f@webkeks.org>
Message-ID: <54FFCCF2.6060408@fsij.org>

On 03/10/2015 09:18 PM, Jonathan Schleifer wrote:
> Does this really need to be part of the specification? For example,
> the Gnuk could just delay signing / decryption / authentication
> until the button has been pressed and return an error if it doesn't
> get pressed within a certain amount of time.

Good point.

Yes, it is possible to implement "ack" button in a way you describe.
But, technically, it's not good for the underlying layer to impose
this kind of "snatch".  It is better for Host PC to know the
interaction.

Besides, when possible, I don't want a feature to be implemented only
for Gnuk.   I don't want to differentiate, but to collaborate.

Well, I realized that my idea of yesterday was not good.  According to
ISO 7816-4, no command is allowed before GET RESPONSE.

So, we could consider something like this:

    Host PC                               OpenPGPcard

           command: PSO =>
                        <= response: 0x9F<LENGTH>

           command: VERIFY with 0x84  ==>
                        (or something different than 0x81, 0x82, or 0x83)
                        <= response: 0x9000 OK

           command: GET DATA on some pseudo Data Object  ==>
                        <= response: <DATA> of result of PSO

It seems for me that we can use 0x9F<LENGTH> to let host PC the length
of data.  (while 0x61<LENGTH> expects succeeding GET RESPONSE.)

This can be done with smartcard + cardreader with pinpad.
-- 


From xavier at maillard.im  Wed Mar 11 07:18:15 2015
From: xavier at maillard.im (Xavier Maillard)
Date: Wed, 11 Mar 2015 07:18:15 +0100
Subject: [cygwin] gpg-agent with ssh support ?
Message-ID: <86mw3koy54.fsf@kcals2.maillard.im>

Hi all,

On my workstation, I have installed cygwin and GPG4win which is
bundled with a version of gpg-agent (cygwin comes whith oldies and
no gpg-agent AFAICS).

I enabled ssh support in the gpg-agent.conf file as usual and I
clearly see the socket files for both GNUpg and SSH.

When starting a cygwin terminal and trying to decrypt one file using
gpg --decrypt file.gpg, pinentry comes in and asks for my passphrase
(and then cache it into gpg-agent).

On the other hand, trying to add an identify file into the agent
fails.

It tells it can't connect to the agent.
In fact, after hours of trial and errors, I gave up launching
ssh-agent manually.

Do you know a way to fix that and only use gpg-agent as my sole agent
entry point for both gpg and ssh ?

Regards
-- Xavier.
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From wk at gnupg.org  Wed Mar 11 11:15:58 2015
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Wed, 11 Mar 2015 11:15:58 +0100
Subject: [cygwin] gpg-agent with ssh support ?
In-Reply-To: <86mw3koy54.fsf@kcals2.maillard.im> (Xavier Maillard's message of
 "Wed, 11 Mar 2015 07:18:15 +0100")
References: <86mw3koy54.fsf@kcals2.maillard.im>
Message-ID: <87egovon4x.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Wed, 11 Mar 2015 07:18, xavier at maillard.im said:

> I enabled ssh support in the gpg-agent.conf file as usual and I
> clearly see the socket files for both GNUpg and SSH.

The Unix Domain Socket emulation used by Cygwin is different from the
emulation used by GnuPG on Windows.  Recall that Cygwin is its own OS on
top of Windows.  You may try to build GnuPG for Cygwin and install this.
However, I would not suggest this.

The standard ssh client on Windows seems to be Putty; you may use it
with the native GnuPG for Windows (i.e. Gpg4win) by using the option
--enable-putty-support instead of --enable-ssh-support.

> Do you know a way to fix that and only use gpg-agent as my sole agent
> entry point for both gpg and ssh ?

IIRC, gniibe once posted a description on how Cygwin's socket emulation
works on Windows.  It might be possible to add this to gpg-agent.


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From brian at minton.name  Wed Mar 11 14:28:10 2015
From: brian at minton.name (Brian Minton)
Date: Wed, 11 Mar 2015 09:28:10 -0400
Subject: [cygwin] gpg-agent with ssh support ?
In-Reply-To: <87egovon4x.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <86mw3koy54.fsf@kcals2.maillard.im>
 <87egovon4x.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <CANyOob35Yrg3r1PiKjKoKFdxUgs3WpFhF=kxoKf7bzv7=v_MfQ@mail.gmail.com>

I would like to second the request for this feature.

On Wed, Mar 11, 2015, 6:23 AM Werner Koch <wk at gnupg.org> wrote:

> On Wed, 11 Mar 2015 07:18, xavier at maillard.im said:
>
> > I enabled ssh support in the gpg-agent.conf file as usual and I
> > clearly see the socket files for both GNUpg and SSH.
>
> The Unix Domain Socket emulation used by Cygwin is different from the
> emulation used by GnuPG on Windows.  Recall that Cygwin is its own OS on
> top of Windows.  You may try to build GnuPG for Cygwin and install this.
> However, I would not suggest this.
>
> The standard ssh client on Windows seems to be Putty; you may use it
> with the native GnuPG for Windows (i.e. Gpg4win) by using the option
> --enable-putty-support instead of --enable-ssh-support.
>
> > Do you know a way to fix that and only use gpg-agent as my sole agent
> > entry point for both gpg and ssh ?
>
> IIRC, gniibe once posted a description on how Cygwin's socket emulation
> works on Windows.  It might be possible to add this to gpg-agent.
>
>
> Salam-Shalom,
>
>    Werner
>
> --
> Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
>
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From brian at minton.name  Wed Mar 11 15:12:59 2015
From: brian at minton.name (Brian Minton)
Date: Wed, 11 Mar 2015 10:12:59 -0400
Subject: bugs.gnupg.org TLS certificate
Message-ID: <CANyOob3zTYfjr9fg8PGFcEkn0cE9OoxwYqrFVZsKqbdYMZbqUA@mail.gmail.com>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256

I wanted to report a bug of gnupg, but my browser complained about the
certificate (self-signed, and for kerckhoffs.g10code.com) rather than
bugs.gnupg.org.  I noticed that https://gnupg.org has a trusted certificate
from Gandi Standard SSL CA, but bugs.gnupg.org (and other sites such as
git.gnupg.org) don't use that certificate.  Have you considered a wildcard
certificate?  I know this has been discussed before, e.g. at
https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/2013-December/048415.html

thanks,
- --
Brian Minton
brian at minton.name
http://brian.minton.name
Live long, and prosper longer!
OpenPGP fingerprint = 8213 71DD 4665 CF4F AE20  2206 0424 DC19 B678 A1A9
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1

iF4EAREIAAYFAlT95+kACgkQa46zoGXPuql5WQD/ekTmNWoSkZmaBN4R24Y59cHt
rOYzvL0k0kWWOKTt0dwA/1T+07f4PT8zH5QQJdQxcK8HvoxZeJHbwH1uJqIrzKv1
=9aIo
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


From wk at gnupg.org  Wed Mar 11 17:38:54 2015
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Wed, 11 Mar 2015 17:38:54 +0100
Subject: bugs.gnupg.org TLS certificate
In-Reply-To: <CANyOob3zTYfjr9fg8PGFcEkn0cE9OoxwYqrFVZsKqbdYMZbqUA@mail.gmail.com>
 (Brian Minton's message of "Wed, 11 Mar 2015 10:12:59 -0400")
References: <CANyOob3zTYfjr9fg8PGFcEkn0cE9OoxwYqrFVZsKqbdYMZbqUA@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <87zj7jlc9t.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Wed, 11 Mar 2015 15:12, brian at minton.name said:

> git.gnupg.org) don't use that certificate.  Have you considered a wildcard
> certificate?  I know this has been discussed before, e.g. at

Too expensive ;-).  To stop all these complaints I will add a so called
real certificate but first I need to move the tracker to another
machine.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Wed Mar 11 18:10:08 2015
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Wed, 11 Mar 2015 13:10:08 -0400
Subject: Enigmail speed geeking
Message-ID: <550076F0.70507@sixdemonbag.org>

At the Circumvention Tech Festival there was an event called
speed-geeking, where the people responsible for a tool would speak for a
few minutes on something related to the tool and field a few minutes of
Q&A from the audience about the tool.  I received a number of requests
afterwards to reprise my Enigmail speed-geeking presentation, so I wrote
it up and put it online.

"Things you're doing wrong with Enigmail" is a short (500-word) essay on
four mistakes I repeatedly see Enigmail users making.  However, it's not
limited to Enigmail: most of the content is broadly applicable to any
cryptosystem.

http://robert-hansen.com/?p=83




From dougb at dougbarton.email  Wed Mar 11 18:23:16 2015
From: dougb at dougbarton.email (Doug Barton)
Date: Wed, 11 Mar 2015 10:23:16 -0700
Subject: [cygwin] gpg-agent with ssh support ?
In-Reply-To: <87egovon4x.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <86mw3koy54.fsf@kcals2.maillard.im>
 <87egovon4x.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <55007A04.9010808@dougbarton.email>

On 3/11/15 3:15 AM, Werner Koch wrote:
> The standard ssh client on Windows seems to be Putty; you may use it
> with the native GnuPG for Windows (i.e. Gpg4win) by using the option
> --enable-putty-support instead of --enable-ssh-support.

PuTTY also has its own agent support, which works quite well. I'm not 
sure why it's necessary to reinvent the wheel here. :)

Doug



From maricelgregoraschko at yahoo.com  Wed Mar 11 18:55:20 2015
From: maricelgregoraschko at yahoo.com (Maricel Gregoraschko)
Date: Wed, 11 Mar 2015 17:55:20 +0000 (UTC)
Subject: AES-NI, symmetric key generation
In-Reply-To: <54FF62DB.6000009@heypete.com>
References: <54FF62DB.6000009@heypete.com>
Message-ID: <575607817.3958641.1426096520303.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com>

Thank you Pete for clearing things up. Makes a lot of sense to store passphrase-to-key identification data, in addition to actual algorithm used, in the output message rather than have the decryptor just assume things.
I figured out how to use --show-session-key: in my tests it doesn't show the key when encrypting, only when decrypting, that's good enough, I'm ok with doing a test decryption just to show the key.
One more question: Is there any standardization in output formats between encryption programs and libraries, for example say you encrypt with AES128 in CBC, with the same key (directly or via passphrase), and since the output will have to have, in addition to the actual ciphertext, algorithm indentification on it, possible pasphrase-to-key, plus mode-specific data such as the iv/nonce, is there a specification of the format of how these come in?Thanks!


      From: Pete Stephenson <pete at heypete.com>
 To: Maricel Gregoraschko <maricelgregoraschko at yahoo.com>; gnupg-users at gnupg.org 
 Sent: Tuesday, March 10, 2015 5:32 PM
 Subject: Re: AES-NI, symmetric key generation
   
On 3/10/2015 8:28 PM, Maricel Gregoraschko wrote:
> Pete,
> Very useful info about using --show-session-key to avoid revealing your
> private asymmetric key.

No worries.

> In your example ("gpg --show-session-key < example.txt") , had you
> somehow set up gpg to use symmetric by default, rather than asymmetric +
> symmetric?

No. It was a nearly "out of the box" setup with only some minor changes
to my gpg.conf file in regards to accessing keyservers. Nothing that
would affect the modes of encryption.

> If I explicitly pass --symmetric, --show-session-key does nothing
> (gpg4win) (and I guess the key is not really a random "session" key as
> when sending a PGP message) but rather the key deterministically
> generated from the passphrase.

Works fine for me. Try copy-pasting the text into the command prompt
rather than reading from a file. Use Ctrl-Z then Enter to tell GnuPG
you're done entering a message and it should start processing things.

Here's an encrypted message I generated with "gpg --symmetric --armor"
on GPG4Win 2.2.3:

-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Version: GnuPG v2

jA0EAwMC2lG4z3grm9G1ySTYXvITlKTun7NvaLnznJZI4AhGJyTk+rFkAdufNRzB
cC6eqAI=
=j73k
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----

(password is "test" with no quotes)

gpg --show-session-key yields a session key of
"3:C4A5BBCBB7C8F846FCA3A9BDDED0EB7F".

The same message encrypted a few seconds later with the same password
yields:

-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Version: GnuPG v2

jA0EAwMCgnIlCp86aLq1ySQt2veDYta5U1uxPiust4siTyduBe7+CVhupax2HKeI
Zcm3Rx0=
=kZPs
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----

and a session key of "3:A81A96428D44DEAD3A6079CC22145B51

It appears that GnuPG uses the iterated-and-salted secret-to-key method
(see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#section-3.7.1.3 ) to generate
the session key.

You're right: the key is derived from a passphrase and so is not truly
random, but the salt is random which helps a bit. Of course, the salt is
not encrypted, so the message protection depends only on the strength of
your passphrase.

> I agree, using key instead of passphrase doesn't enhance security
> (assuming an attacker knows that the key was derived from a passphrase
> and with what key derivation algorithm? I assume the randomness/entropy
> of the key itself is high enough regardless of the passphrase strength?). 

The attacker would be able determine quite a bit of information about
how the message was encrypted (as this same information would be needed
by a legitimate user to decrypt the message):

Here's an excerpt from the double-verbose (-vv) output from the second
encrypted message above (all this is available without entering the
passphrase):

:symkey enc packet: version 4, cipher 3, s2k 3, hash 2
? ? ? ? salt 8272250a9f3a68ba, count 2752512 (181)

The attacker would know the cipher being used (cipher 3 = CAST5), the
fact that the key is derived from a user-provided string (the fact that
s2k is used), which string-to-key algorithm is used (s2k 3 =
iterated-and-salted), the hash used (hash 2 = SHA-1), the salt, and the
number of times to iterate the S2K algorithm.

The attacker won't know the strength of your passphrase -- it could be
"cat" or a long string of random characters -- but it tells them that
the key was generated using user-provided input.

> The reason I was asking if it's a possibility to store the symmetric key
> to decrypt with later, was to protect against future changes in the key
> derivation algorithm, that would make gpg generate a different key for
> the same passphrase, useless to decrypt previously encrypted data.

GnuPG follows the OpenPGP standard (RFC 4880). The standard defines
certain key derivation algorithms and provides the ability to add new
ones if needed. Adding new key derivation algorithms in the future
should not have any affect on existing encrypted messages.

Since each message clearly identifies the algorithm used to encrypt it,
future versions of GnuPG should have no problem decrypting it. Indeed,
the current version of GnuPG is able to decrypt messages generated from
old (even ancient!) versions of PGP and GnuPG with few, if any, issues.



Cheers!
-Pete


  
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From maricelgregoraschko at yahoo.com  Wed Mar 11 18:59:10 2015
From: maricelgregoraschko at yahoo.com (Maricel Gregoraschko)
Date: Wed, 11 Mar 2015 17:59:10 +0000 (UTC)
Subject: AES-NI, symmetric key generation
In-Reply-To: <20150310204252.04E94E03D4@smtp.hushmail.com>
References: <20150310204252.04E94E03D4@smtp.hushmail.com>
Message-ID: <2019083499.3942100.1426096750887.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com>

Thanks Vedaal, yep that would be one mighty strong password!
      From: "vedaal at nym.hush.com" <vedaal at nym.hush.com>
 To: Maricel Gregoraschko <maricelgregoraschko at yahoo.com>; gnupg-users at gnupg.org 
 Sent: Tuesday, March 10, 2015 4:42 PM
 Subject: Re: AES-NI, symmetric key generation
   
On 3/10/2015 at 4:19 PM, "Maricel Gregoraschko" <maricelgregoraschko at yahoo.com> wrote:



>I agree, using key instead of passphrase doesn't enhance security 
>(assuming an attacker knows that the key was derived from a 
>passphrase and with what key derivation algorithm? I assume the 
>randomness/entropy of the key itself is high enough regardless of 
>the passphrase strength?).?The reason I was asking if it's a 
>possibility to store the symmetric key to decrypt with later, was 
>to protect against future changes in the key derivation algorithm, 
>that would make gpg generate a different key for the same 
>passphrase, useless to decrypt previously encrypted data.Thank you 
>for your support.

-----

If you don't want to keep your passsphrase, and want only to keep the session key,
and you want this to have no weakness because of a questionably strong enough password that was used to generate the key,
then there is an easy way to do what you want:

[1] Encrypt a test message to any of your own keys.

[2] Decrypt this test message, with the option of --show-session-key

[3] Use this session key as the 64 character password for your symmetric encryption, (and save it, or you won't be able to decrypt the symmetric message).

[4] Decrypt your symmetrically encrypted file or message, using the option of --show-session-key

[5] Save this session key, and if you wish, you can destroy the first one. (you can always get it back by decrypting your message of step [1] ).


The string-to-key part of generating the session key for the symmetrically encrypted message, will be using a random 64 character GnuPG generated session key as it's password.

You can't find a better password (especially even one that you don't have to remember ;-)? )


vedaal



  
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From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Wed Mar 11 19:13:47 2015
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Wed, 11 Mar 2015 14:13:47 -0400
Subject: AES-NI, symmetric key generation
In-Reply-To: <2019083499.3942100.1426096750887.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com>
References: <20150310204252.04E94E03D4@smtp.hushmail.com>
 <2019083499.3942100.1426096750887.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <550085DB.9010306@sixdemonbag.org>

> Thanks Vedaal, yep that would be one mighty strong password!

It's also way overkill.  :)

"gpg --armor --gen-rand 1 16" will produce a (relatively) short
passphrase suitable for pretty much any imaginable usage.  128 shannons
of entropy's nothing to sneeze at.


From peter at digitalbrains.com  Wed Mar 11 20:06:54 2015
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Wed, 11 Mar 2015 20:06:54 +0100
Subject: AES-NI, symmetric key generation
In-Reply-To: <575607817.3958641.1426096520303.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com>
References: <54FF62DB.6000009@heypete.com>
 <575607817.3958641.1426096520303.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <5500924E.4020408@digitalbrains.com>

On 11/03/15 18:55, Maricel Gregoraschko wrote:
> One more question: Is there any standardization in output formats 
> between encryption programs and libraries, for example say you
> encrypt with AES128 in CBC, with the same key (directly or via
> passphrase), and since the output will have to have, in addition to
> the actual ciphertext, algorithm indentification on it, possible
> pasphrase-to-key, plus mode-specific data such as the iv/nonce, is
> there a specification of the format of how these come in?

The passphrase-based encryption of GnuPG is entirely specified in RFC
4880, and there is no reason to worry that future versions of GnuPG
cannot read a symmetrically encrypted file created now.

Also, it is *not* the case that the key used to encrypt the data is the
key derived from your password!

The key to encrypt the data, the session key, is randomly generated. The
passphrase is used to derive a key, and this derived key is used to
encrypt the session key, and only the session key!

However, I do notice that RFC 4880 allows the use of a password-derived
key to encrypt the data[1]. I don't think GnuPG will generate such
OpenPGP messages, but it might accept and decrypt them.

HTH,

Peter.

[1] RFC 4880 section 5.3:

> If the encrypted session key is not present (which can be detected on
> the basis of packet length and S2K specifier size), then the S2K 
> algorithm applied to the passphrase produces the session key for 
> decrypting the file, using the symmetric cipher algorithm from the 
> Symmetric-Key Encrypted Session Key packet.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at <http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>


From pete at heypete.com  Wed Mar 11 20:39:58 2015
From: pete at heypete.com (Pete Stephenson)
Date: Wed, 11 Mar 2015 20:39:58 +0100
Subject: AES-NI, symmetric key generation
In-Reply-To: <575607817.3958641.1426096520303.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com>
References: <54FF62DB.6000009@heypete.com>
 <575607817.3958641.1426096520303.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <55009A0E.9010207@heypete.com>

On 3/11/2015 6:55 PM, Maricel Gregoraschko wrote:
> Thank you Pete for clearing things up. Makes a lot of sense to store
> passphrase-to-key identification data, in addition to actual algorithm
> used, in the output message rather than have the decryptor just assume
> things.

Indeed. The folks who created the OpenPGP standard were quite
forward-thinking in regards to such things.

> I figured out how to use --show-session-key: in my tests it doesn't show
> the key when encrypting, only when decrypting, that's good enough, I'm
> ok with doing a test decryption just to show the key.

Ah, that was my mistake: I forgot to specify that --show-session-key
only works when decrypting a message. Considering the intended purpose
of that option (being compelled to turn over a key), I suppose that's a
reasonable limitation in when it can be used.

> One more question: Is there any standardization in output formats
> between encryption programs and libraries, for example say you encrypt
> with AES128 in CBC, with the same key (directly or via passphrase), and
> since the output will have to have, in addition to the actual
> ciphertext, algorithm indentification on it, possible pasphrase-to-key,
> plus mode-specific data such as the iv/nonce, is there a specification
> of the format of how these come in?

You'd have to ask Werner, the head developer, about that.

RFC 4880 completely specifies how the algorithms are implemented. In
theory, it should be possible to split a message into it's various
packets (gpgsplit is designed to do this), then decrypt the
symmetrically-encrypted packet using the method specified in the RFC,
but I have not attempted to do this.

Cheers!
-Pete


From maricelgregoraschko at yahoo.com  Wed Mar 11 20:50:16 2015
From: maricelgregoraschko at yahoo.com (Maricel Gregoraschko)
Date: Wed, 11 Mar 2015 19:50:16 +0000 (UTC)
Subject: AES-NI, symmetric key generation
In-Reply-To: <5500924E.4020408@digitalbrains.com>
References: <5500924E.4020408@digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <1273048816.4094696.1426103416800.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com>

Peter,My understanding was that if you don't pass --symmetric, then a session key is generated, with which the clear text is (symmetrically) encrypted and then the session key is encrypted (asymmetrically) with the public key.?Conversely, if you do pass --symmetric, then there is no random-generated "session" key, and gpg simply generates a symmetric key from the passphrase, that it encrypts the clear text with. Are you saying that that is not the case, and there there is a session key, used to encrypt the clear text, and the session key gets encrypted, again, symmetrically with the passphrase-generated key?
However my question regarding the standardization format was not necessarily related to the OpenPGP protocol, but rather, at the most basic level of symmetric encryption in general: you have a key, a cleartext, a symmetric block cipher algorithm and a mode of operation . Is the format of the output standardized within this context, of a symmetric block cipher encryption, rather than as part of OpenPGP? Would another software or encryption library be able to decrypt a text symmetrically encrypted with gpg, not taking into account additional layers of asymmetric encryption?Thank you for your help.
      From: Peter Lebbing <peter at digitalbrains.com>
 To: Maricel Gregoraschko <maricelgregoraschko at yahoo.com>; Gnupg-users <Gnupg-users at gnupg.org> 
 Sent: Wednesday, March 11, 2015 3:06 PM
 Subject: Re: AES-NI, symmetric key generation
   
On 11/03/15 18:55, Maricel Gregoraschko wrote:


> One more question: Is there any standardization in output formats 
> between encryption programs and libraries, for example say you
> encrypt with AES128 in CBC, with the same key (directly or via
> passphrase), and since the output will have to have, in addition to
> the actual ciphertext, algorithm indentification on it, possible
> pasphrase-to-key, plus mode-specific data such as the iv/nonce, is
> there a specification of the format of how these come in?

The passphrase-based encryption of GnuPG is entirely specified in RFC
4880, and there is no reason to worry that future versions of GnuPG
cannot read a symmetrically encrypted file created now.

Also, it is *not* the case that the key used to encrypt the data is the
key derived from your password!

The key to encrypt the data, the session key, is randomly generated. The
passphrase is used to derive a key, and this derived key is used to
encrypt the session key, and only the session key!

However, I do notice that RFC 4880 allows the use of a password-derived
key to encrypt the data[1]. I don't think GnuPG will generate such
OpenPGP messages, but it might accept and decrypt them.

HTH,

Peter.

[1] RFC 4880 section 5.3:

> If the encrypted session key is not present (which can be detected on
> the basis of packet length and S2K specifier size), then the S2K 
> algorithm applied to the passphrase produces the session key for 
> decrypting the file, using the symmetric cipher algorithm from the 
> Symmetric-Key Encrypted Session Key packet.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at <http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>


  
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From stebe at mailbox.org  Wed Mar 11 23:30:52 2015
From: stebe at mailbox.org (Stephan Beck)
Date: Wed, 11 Mar 2015 23:30:52 +0100
Subject: Enigmail speed geeking
In-Reply-To: <550076F0.70507@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <550076F0.70507@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <5500C21C.1000607@mailbox.org>

Hi Robert,

Am 11.03.2015 um 18:10 schrieb Robert J. Hansen:

> "Things you're doing wrong with Enigmail" is a short (500-word) essay on
> four mistakes I repeatedly see Enigmail users making.  However, it's not
> limited to Enigmail: most of the content is broadly applicable to any
> cryptosystem.
> 
> http://robert-hansen.com/?p=83


I enjoyed reading your blog. In particular, the about page is really worth reading.
As to your enigmail essay, point 1, would you go that far that keeping keys on
hard disk is unsafe and using a smart card is a must? I joined the list some
weeks ago and half of the messages (I'm exaggerating) were/are about smart
cards, so I take up this point here, although you might not have implied it.

TIA

Stephan



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From xavier at maillard.im  Thu Mar 12 06:27:09 2015
From: xavier at maillard.im (Xavier Maillard)
Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2015 06:27:09 +0100
Subject: [cygwin] gpg-agent with ssh support ?
In-Reply-To: <55007A04.9010808@dougbarton.email>
References: <86mw3koy54.fsf@kcals2.maillard.im>
 <87egovon4x.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <55007A04.9010808@dougbarton.email>
Message-ID: <86mw3ieqfm.fsf@kcals2.maillard.im>


Doug Barton <dougb at dougbarton.email> writes:

> On 3/11/15 3:15 AM, Werner Koch wrote:
>> The standard ssh client on Windows seems to be Putty; you may use it
>> with the native GnuPG for Windows (i.e. Gpg4win) by using the option
>> --enable-putty-support instead of --enable-ssh-support.
>
> PuTTY also has its own agent support, which works quite well. I'm not
> sure why it's necessary to reinvent the wheel here. :)

Still, one has to install a new piece of software but, in my case, it
can be ok.

So, just to be sure I understand:

1. install putty
2. put enable-putty-support into gpg-agent.conf
3. gpg-connect-agent reloadagent /bye
4. enjoy ?

Regards
-- Xavier.


From dougb at dougbarton.email  Thu Mar 12 07:20:09 2015
From: dougb at dougbarton.email (Doug Barton)
Date: Wed, 11 Mar 2015 23:20:09 -0700
Subject: [cygwin] gpg-agent with ssh support ?
In-Reply-To: <86mw3ieqfm.fsf@kcals2.maillard.im>
References: <86mw3koy54.fsf@kcals2.maillard.im>
 <87egovon4x.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <55007A04.9010808@dougbarton.email>
 <86mw3ieqfm.fsf@kcals2.maillard.im>
Message-ID: <55013019.8090209@dougbarton.email>

On 3/11/15 10:27 PM, Xavier Maillard wrote:
>
> Doug Barton <dougb at dougbarton.email> writes:
>
>> On 3/11/15 3:15 AM, Werner Koch wrote:
>>> The standard ssh client on Windows seems to be Putty; you may use it
>>> with the native GnuPG for Windows (i.e. Gpg4win) by using the option
>>> --enable-putty-support instead of --enable-ssh-support.
>>
>> PuTTY also has its own agent support, which works quite well. I'm not
>> sure why it's necessary to reinvent the wheel here. :)
>
> Still, one has to install a new piece of software but, in my case, it
> can be ok.
>
> So, just to be sure I understand:
>
> 1. install putty

2. Use PuTTY's agent, called Pageant.
http://the.earth.li/~sgtatham/putty/0.64/htmldoc/Chapter9.html#pageant

It comes in the PuTTY package, so nothing new to install.

Starting and running gpg-agent so that you can use it with ssh is very 
different from the "easy" socket method that is used for simple password 
entry.

If you have an actual reason to try and fit the square peg into the 
round hole, or if you're the kind of person who likes to do things the 
hard way for whatever reason, then I wish you the best of luck.

Otherwise, there is an easy way to solve your problem on the Windows 
platform, you should strongly consider it.

Good luck,

Doug



From xavier at maillard.im  Thu Mar 12 07:30:42 2015
From: xavier at maillard.im (Xavier Maillard)
Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2015 07:30:42 +0100
Subject: [cygwin] gpg-agent with ssh support ?
In-Reply-To: <55013019.8090209@dougbarton.email>
References: <86mw3koy54.fsf@kcals2.maillard.im>
 <87egovon4x.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <55007A04.9010808@dougbarton.email>
 <86mw3ieqfm.fsf@kcals2.maillard.im> <55013019.8090209@dougbarton.email>
Message-ID: <868uf2enhp.fsf@kcals2.maillard.im>


Doug Barton <dougb at dougbarton.email> writes:

> Otherwise, there is an easy way to solve your problem on the Windows
> platform, you should strongly consider it.

I fear I do not understand. Did I miss something ? Off course I'd
rather go the easy way ! :D

Regards
-- Xavier.


From Deepak.Saxena at safenet-inc.com  Thu Mar 12 07:39:32 2015
From: Deepak.Saxena at safenet-inc.com (Saxena, Deepak)
Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2015 12:09:32 +0530
Subject: [cygwin] gpg-agent with ssh support ?
In-Reply-To: <55013019.8090209@dougbarton.email>
References: <86mw3koy54.fsf@kcals2.maillard.im>
 <87egovon4x.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <55007A04.9010808@dougbarton.email>
 <86mw3ieqfm.fsf@kcals2.maillard.im> <55013019.8090209@dougbarton.email>
Message-ID: <33B1BAEAF9B37A439F73D9BF6B32ED420608C8CC@NOI1EXCH03.apac.sfnt.local>

Hi,

I am curious on how/if gpg4win integrates with Windows credential providers. We at SafeNet have smart cards and middleware for our smartcard, SAC, registers itself as a credential provider any Windows application that leverages MS crypto libraries can integrate with it.

Can anyone help me with that?

-- Deepak Saxena
The information contained in this electronic mail transmission 
may be privileged and confidential, and therefore, protected 
from disclosure. If you have received this communication in 
error, please notify us immediately by replying to this 
message and deleting it from your computer without copying 
or disclosing it.




From dougb at dougbarton.email  Thu Mar 12 07:47:50 2015
From: dougb at dougbarton.email (Doug Barton)
Date: Wed, 11 Mar 2015 23:47:50 -0700
Subject: [cygwin] gpg-agent with ssh support ?
In-Reply-To: <868uf2enhp.fsf@kcals2.maillard.im>
References: <86mw3koy54.fsf@kcals2.maillard.im>
 <87egovon4x.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <55007A04.9010808@dougbarton.email>
 <86mw3ieqfm.fsf@kcals2.maillard.im> <55013019.8090209@dougbarton.email>
 <868uf2enhp.fsf@kcals2.maillard.im>
Message-ID: <55013696.2060506@dougbarton.email>

On 3/11/15 11:30 PM, Xavier Maillard wrote:
>
> Doug Barton <dougb at dougbarton.email> writes:
>
>> Otherwise, there is an easy way to solve your problem on the Windows
>> platform, you should strongly consider it.
>
> I fear I do not understand. Did I miss something ? Off course I'd
> rather go the easy way ! :D

Try reading my previous post, and the web page that I included the URL 
for. It will explain it for you. :)

Doug




From wk at gnupg.org  Thu Mar 12 10:56:47 2015
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2015 10:56:47 +0100
Subject: AES-NI, symmetric key generation
In-Reply-To: <55009A0E.9010207@heypete.com> (Pete Stephenson's message of
 "Wed, 11 Mar 2015 20:39:58 +0100")
References: <54FF62DB.6000009@heypete.com>
 <575607817.3958641.1426096520303.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com>
 <55009A0E.9010207@heypete.com>
Message-ID: <87r3suk080.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Wed, 11 Mar 2015 20:39, pete at heypete.com said:

>> One more question: Is there any standardization in output formats
>> between encryption programs and libraries, for example say you encrypt
>> with AES128 in CBC, with the same key (directly or via passphrase), and
>> since the output will have to have, in addition to the actual
>> ciphertext, algorithm indentification on it, possible pasphrase-to-key,
>> plus mode-specific data such as the iv/nonce, is there a specification
>> of the format of how these come in?
>
> You'd have to ask Werner, the head developer, about that.

Sorry, I do not understand the question.  The format is defined by the
OpenPGP standard or the CMS standard (aka S/MIME).  There are also some
other less common formats.

Or is the question how applications present this to the user or whether
a standard API is defined?  That is not defined by one of these
protocols.


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From wk at gnupg.org  Thu Mar 12 10:59:49 2015
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2015 10:59:49 +0100
Subject: [cygwin] gpg-agent with ssh support ?
In-Reply-To: <55007A04.9010808@dougbarton.email> (Doug Barton's message of
 "Wed, 11 Mar 2015 10:23:16 -0700")
References: <86mw3koy54.fsf@kcals2.maillard.im>
 <87egovon4x.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <55007A04.9010808@dougbarton.email>
Message-ID: <87mw3ik02y.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Wed, 11 Mar 2015 18:23, dougb at dougbarton.email said:

> PuTTY also has its own agent support, which works quite well. I'm not
> sure why it's necessary to reinvent the wheel here. :)

Because that integrates seemless with GnuPG.  For example you can use
your OpenPGP card (or other supoorted smartcards) for ssh.  No need for
the ssh-add kludge.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From pete at heypete.com  Thu Mar 12 11:08:50 2015
From: pete at heypete.com (Pete Stephenson)
Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2015 11:08:50 +0100
Subject: AES-NI, symmetric key generation
In-Reply-To: <87r3suk080.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <54FF62DB.6000009@heypete.com>
 <575607817.3958641.1426096520303.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com>
 <55009A0E.9010207@heypete.com> <87r3suk080.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <CA+4dSw58m4BMxePJrdMKi2UAfJS8RdebwUHoUrY6MGd6epy9Kw@mail.gmail.com>

On Thu, Mar 12, 2015 at 10:56 AM, Werner Koch <wk at gnupg.org> wrote:
> On Wed, 11 Mar 2015 20:39, pete at heypete.com said:
>
>>> One more question: Is there any standardization in output formats
>>> between encryption programs and libraries, for example say you encrypt
>>> with AES128 in CBC, with the same key (directly or via passphrase), and
>>> since the output will have to have, in addition to the actual
>>> ciphertext, algorithm indentification on it, possible pasphrase-to-key,
>>> plus mode-specific data such as the iv/nonce, is there a specification
>>> of the format of how these come in?
>>
>> You'd have to ask Werner, the head developer, about that.
>
> Sorry, I do not understand the question.  The format is defined by the
> OpenPGP standard or the CMS standard (aka S/MIME).  There are also some
> other less common formats.
>
> Or is the question how applications present this to the user or whether
> a standard API is defined?  That is not defined by one of these
> protocols.

I (perhaps incorrectly) interpreted the question as "If GnuPG makes
backwards-incompatible changes in the future, would it be possible for
one who knows the encryption algorithm used, key, etc. of a message to
decrypt that message with other, non-GnuPG tools?"

For example, if one knows that CAST5-CFB, ZIP, and salted-and-iterated
S2K was used (as well as the value of the salt and number of
iterations), might one be able to decrypt the message using OpenSSL
and other common utilities? I suspect yes, as the encryption and
compression methods are standards, but doing so would probably be
non-trivial.

I could be wrong with both the interpretation of the question and the
answer, though.

Cheers!
-Pete

-- 
Pete Stephenson


From wk at gnupg.org  Thu Mar 12 13:36:01 2015
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2015 13:36:01 +0100
Subject: AES-NI, symmetric key generation
In-Reply-To: <CA+4dSw58m4BMxePJrdMKi2UAfJS8RdebwUHoUrY6MGd6epy9Kw@mail.gmail.com>
 (Pete Stephenson's message of "Thu, 12 Mar 2015 11:08:50 +0100")
References: <54FF62DB.6000009@heypete.com>
 <575607817.3958641.1426096520303.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com>
 <55009A0E.9010207@heypete.com> <87r3suk080.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <CA+4dSw58m4BMxePJrdMKi2UAfJS8RdebwUHoUrY6MGd6epy9Kw@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <87385aiea6.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Thu, 12 Mar 2015 11:08, pete at heypete.com said:

> I (perhaps incorrectly) interpreted the question as "If GnuPG makes
> backwards-incompatible changes in the future, would it be possible for
> one who knows the encryption algorithm used, key, etc. of a message to
> decrypt that message with other, non-GnuPG tools?"

Sure.  As long as the tool understand the OpenPGP protocol.

> For example, if one knows that CAST5-CFB, ZIP, and salted-and-iterated
> S2K was used (as well as the value of the salt and number of
> iterations), might one be able to decrypt the message using OpenSSL
> and other common utilities? I suspect yes, as the encryption and

Yes.  Many years ago there used to be a toolset with reference
implementation based on OpenSSL.  IIRC, it was also available as a
printed book.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Thu Mar 12 16:51:15 2015
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2015 11:51:15 -0400
Subject: Enigmail speed geeking
In-Reply-To: <5500C21C.1000607@mailbox.org>
References: <550076F0.70507@sixdemonbag.org> <5500C21C.1000607@mailbox.org>
Message-ID: <5501B5F3.5030503@sixdemonbag.org>

> As to your enigmail essay, point 1, would you go that far that
> keeping keys on hard disk is unsafe and using a smart card is a
> must?

For many users, smart cards are a good idea.  (I've got one myself.)
But for just as many users, smart cards are inconvenient and overkill.
Frankly, they have awful usability, just terrible.  When I receive an
email message encrypted to my smart card key, finding the smart card is
easy -- it's in my wallet -- but finding the smart card *reader* is the
sort of thing that leads me to crazed conspiracy theories.  Is the
reader attached to my laptop?  Did I leave it at the office?  Did I kick
it under the sofa?  Did the space aliens from Zarbnulax take it?

The upshot of it is that whenever I want to decrypt messages sent to my
smart card, in the best case scenario (I remember where the reader is
and it's within a few meters of my desk) it takes me 30-45 seconds to
read the message.  In the worst-case scenario, I'm in Valencia, Spain,
and my reader is in Washington, D.C., and there's no way I'm reading
this traffic until I get home.  (And in case you're wondering, yes, that
really happened to me.)

If email crypto makes it hard to read email, few people will adopt the
technology.  We want technologies that make our lives easier, not
harder.  Smart cards, although a really good idea in certain
environments, make crypto harder in a lot of environments.  I'm not sure
the (marginal) additional security from using a smart card is worth the
(very real) usability expense.

Is it unsafe to keep your keys on your hard disk?  Dunno.  Depends a lot
on your situation.

Is using a smart card a must?  Dunno.  Depends a lot on your situation.

Hope this helps.  :)

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From andreas.schwier.ml at cardcontact.de  Thu Mar 12 17:13:52 2015
From: andreas.schwier.ml at cardcontact.de (Andreas Schwier)
Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2015 17:13:52 +0100
Subject: Enigmail speed geeking
In-Reply-To: <5501B5F3.5030503@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <550076F0.70507@sixdemonbag.org> <5500C21C.1000607@mailbox.org>
 <5501B5F3.5030503@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <5501BB40.9060604@cardcontact.de>

On 03/12/2015 04:51 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> For many users, smart cards are a good idea.  (I've got one myself.)
> But for just as many users, smart cards are inconvenient and overkill.
> Frankly, they have awful usability, just terrible.  When I receive an
> email message encrypted to my smart card key, finding the smart card is
> easy -- it's in my wallet -- but finding the smart card *reader* is the
> sort of thing that leads me to crazed conspiracy theories.  Is the
> reader attached to my laptop?  Did I leave it at the office?  Did I kick
> it under the sofa?  Did the space aliens from Zarbnulax take it?
There are USB-Sticks with an embedded smart card controller that take
away the burden to find a working card reader (which _is_ a real pain).
The one we use has a standard CCID interface that works without driver
installation on the majority of operating systems.

-- 

    ---------    CardContact Software & System Consulting
   |.##> <##.|   Andreas Schwier
   |#       #|   Sch?lerweg 38
   |#       #|   32429 Minden, Germany
   |'##> <##'|   Phone +49 571 56149
    ---------    http://www.cardcontact.de
                 http://www.tscons.de
                 http://www.openscdp.org
                 http://www.smartcard-hsm.com



From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Thu Mar 12 17:25:27 2015
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2015 12:25:27 -0400
Subject: Enigmail speed geeking
In-Reply-To: <5501BB40.9060604@cardcontact.de>
References: <550076F0.70507@sixdemonbag.org> <5500C21C.1000607@mailbox.org>
 <5501B5F3.5030503@sixdemonbag.org> <5501BB40.9060604@cardcontact.de>
Message-ID: <5501BDF7.8020904@sixdemonbag.org>

> There are USB-Sticks with an embedded smart card controller that
> take away the burden to find a working card reader (which _is_ a real
> pain). The one we use has a standard CCID interface that works
> without driver installation on the majority of operating systems.

Yeah -- back in 2000 I used a Rainbow iKey, which was one of the first
USB tokens.  Then I discovered the downside of USB tokens: they don't
take well to going through the wash.  (You know how when you pull
clothes out of the dryer they've got all kinds of static electricity on
them?  USB tokens don't take kindly to that.)

I dunno, maybe today we've got USB tokens that can survive the wash.
Wouldn't surprise me.  Unfortunately, I don't have the money to make a
good empirical test.


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From mailing-lists at asatiifm.net  Thu Mar 12 17:52:46 2015
From: mailing-lists at asatiifm.net (=?windows-1252?Q?Ville_M=E4=E4tt=E4?=)
Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2015 18:52:46 +0200
Subject: Enigmail speed geeking
In-Reply-To: <5501BDF7.8020904@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <550076F0.70507@sixdemonbag.org> <5500C21C.1000607@mailbox.org>
 <5501B5F3.5030503@sixdemonbag.org> <5501BB40.9060604@cardcontact.de>
 <5501BDF7.8020904@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <5501C45E.4030704@asatiifm.net>

> But for just as many users, smart cards are inconvenient and overkill.
> Frankly, they have awful usability, just terrible.
?
> finding the smart card is
> easy -- it's in my wallet -- but finding the smart card *reader* is the
> sort of thing that leads me to crazed conspiracy theories.

That's quite a personal issue to count as a failing of smart cards. That
whole rant about the reader being MIA is, /for me personally/, a
complete non-issue. I keep it attached to the smart card.

> I'm not sure
> the (marginal) additional security from using a smart card is worth the
> (very real) usability expense.

Oh, you mean like being able to use a more humane PIN / passphrase?

On 12.03.15 18:25, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> Then I discovered the downside of USB tokens: they don't
> take well to going through the wash.

Are you serious? I wouldn't know but I'm guessing the computer you use
to decrypt those messages won't take too well to water either.

Sure you need a reader and sure, you shouldn't throw the reader into
water but come on. You go out of your way to make them sound like
something completely unusable. I think they add security and depending
on the user and use case they either add inconvenience minutely or the
complete opposite, they add usability.

-- 
Ville

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From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Thu Mar 12 18:21:56 2015
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2015 13:21:56 -0400
Subject: Enigmail speed geeking
In-Reply-To: <5501C45E.4030704@asatiifm.net>
References: <550076F0.70507@sixdemonbag.org> <5500C21C.1000607@mailbox.org>
 <5501B5F3.5030503@sixdemonbag.org> <5501BB40.9060604@cardcontact.de>
 <5501BDF7.8020904@sixdemonbag.org> <5501C45E.4030704@asatiifm.net>
Message-ID: <5501CB34.6000000@sixdemonbag.org>

> That's quite a personal issue to count as a failing of smart cards.

Sure!  And I even said that.  "For many users, smart cards are a good
idea.  (I've got one myself.)  But for just as many users, smart cards
are inconvenient and overkill."  Your use case isn't my use case.

That said, I've heard from enough people over the years sharing the "I
can never find a reader when I need one" problem for me to think I'm not
alone.

>> I'm not sure the (marginal) additional security from using a smart 
>> card is worth the (very real) usability expense.
> 
> Oh, you mean like being able to use a more humane PIN / passphrase?

Depends on the user.  I personally have three different 128-bit
passphrases memorized (sixteen random bytes base-64 encoded).  Other
people have trouble remembering their four-digit ATM PIN code.

Will I get additional security from using a smart card?  Depends on my
specific usage and my goals, but in most of my cases, no.  Enough to
justify the usability expense?  Again: it depends on my specific usage
and my goals, but in most of my cases, no.

But that doesn't mean I don't use my smart card.  I do.  I just use it
in use cases where it makes sense to do it.

>> Then I discovered the downside of USB tokens: they don't take well 
>> to going through the wash.
> 
> Are you serious? I wouldn't know but I'm guessing the computer you 
> use to decrypt those messages won't take too well to water either.

Probably not, but in my defense, Apple didn't put a hole in my laptop
and give me a glossy brochure showing a MacBook Pro hanging off my
keychain, either.  Rainbow Technologies did, and what happened to the
token after that was predictable.  It went where my car keys did.
Namely, the wash.

> Sure you need a reader and sure, you shouldn't throw the reader into
> water but come on. You go out of your way to make them sound like 
> something completely unusable.

Not "completely unusable".  In the best case, a smart card adds 30-45
seconds to my operation time.  That's a price I'm willing to pay for
certain operations.  For others, it's not.

If you think I'm portraying them as "completely unusable," then I think
you didn't bother to read my message very closely.  Their usability and
appropriateness is *intensely* dependent on the user and the operating
environment.  For some users they make a lot of sense.  For others, they
don't.

> I think they add security and depending on the user and use case
> they either add inconvenience minutely or the complete opposite, they
> add usability.

The number of environments, number of users, and number of use cases, is
way too vast to be able to make a glib statement like this.  You're just
wrong.  :)

The answer is, "it depends."

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From stebe at mailbox.org  Thu Mar 12 18:55:08 2015
From: stebe at mailbox.org (Stephan Beck)
Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2015 18:55:08 +0100
Subject: Enigmail speed geeking
In-Reply-To: <5501B5F3.5030503@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <550076F0.70507@sixdemonbag.org> <5500C21C.1000607@mailbox.org>
 <5501B5F3.5030503@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <5501D2FC.4090008@mailbox.org>

Am 12.03.2015 um 16:51 schrieb Robert J. Hansen:
>> As to your enigmail essay, point 1, would you go that far that
>> keeping keys on hard disk is unsafe and using a smart card is a
>> must?

> 
> If email crypto makes it hard to read email, few people will adopt the
> technology.  We want technologies that make our lives easier, not
> harder.  Smart cards, although a really good idea in certain
> environments, make crypto harder in a lot of environments.  I'm not sure
> the (marginal) additional security from using a smart card is worth the
> (very real) usability expense.
> 
> Is it unsafe to keep your keys on your hard disk?  Dunno.  Depends a lot
> on your situation.

> 
> Is using a smart card a must?  Dunno.  Depends a lot on your situation.
> 
> Hope this helps.  :)


Yes, thanks a lot. From your answer I deduce that a single-user,
non-professional environment may not require use of a smart card,
or may not require it with the necessity it may have in high-security
environments. As Andreas pointed out in his message, there are the USB
sticks as, for instance, the Yubico Key that my email provider offers or has
been offering for a while. I was actually thinking about moving in that direction.
As to the "email crypto (devices/technology/software) have to be easy to use"
and "it makes crypto harder" arguments, that's certainly true for extending
(mass) usage. But on an individual level, I guess it also depends on how much
you love (playing with) software and related devices and are already used to it.
The cries for simplifying GnuPG, for instance, that have been resounding
throughout this list lately may be reasonable up to some point,
but, in my case, I like it (and the WoT as a central concept behind it) too much
to ever change (to another mail/file encryption software). And for me there is a
bunch of commands/options yet to be discovered!

Stephan


> 
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
> 




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From mailing-lists at asatiifm.net  Thu Mar 12 19:43:46 2015
From: mailing-lists at asatiifm.net (=?windows-1252?Q?Ville_M=E4=E4tt=E4?=)
Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2015 20:43:46 +0200
Subject: Enigmail speed geeking
In-Reply-To: <5501CB34.6000000@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <550076F0.70507@sixdemonbag.org> <5500C21C.1000607@mailbox.org>
 <5501B5F3.5030503@sixdemonbag.org> <5501BB40.9060604@cardcontact.de>
 <5501BDF7.8020904@sixdemonbag.org> <5501C45E.4030704@asatiifm.net>
 <5501CB34.6000000@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <5501DE62.4080509@asatiifm.net>

On 12.03.15 19:21, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> If you think I'm portraying them as "completely unusable," then I think
> you didn't bother to read my message very closely.

I read both of your messages quite closely. Had you merely pointed out
the downsides of having to carry a card, a reader etc. I would probably
have just agreed with you and likely just read and said nothing. My
point was that you wrote multiple paragraphs worth of stories on two
emails from which I really got the impression that people should just
not bother.

On 12.03.15 19:55, Stephan Beck wrote:
>> Yes, thanks a lot. From your answer I deduce that a single-user,
>> non-professional environment may not require use of a smart card,
>> or may not require it with the necessity it may have in high-security
>> environments.

It would appear so did Stephan.

>> I think they add security and depending on the user and use case
>> they either add inconvenience minutely or the complete opposite, they
>> add usability.
> 
> The number of environments, number of users, and number of use cases, is
> way too vast to be able to make a glib statement like this.  You're just
> wrong.  
> 
> The answer is, "it depends."
> 

Isn't "it depends" exactly what I said :)? I think you went a bit
overboard with the stories and wanted to point that out, that's all.
Smart cards are not some scary thing only "necessary" in "high-security
environments". Whatever that might mean.

-- 
Ville

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From jose.castillo at gmail.com  Thu Mar 12 19:36:53 2015
From: jose.castillo at gmail.com (Joey Castillo)
Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2015 14:36:53 -0400
Subject: Whishlist for next-gen card
Message-ID: <CAAocvpuYqbGFJBsnFRUvubT4dbHV5Hv1sKscbCnVGH+j0hdjOA@mail.gmail.com>

>
> On 20/02/15 09:32, NdK wrote:
> > 1 - support for more keys (expired ENC keys, multiple signature keys)
>

At the very least, adding expired ENC keys to the card spec is a really
great suggestion. I'm trying to pitch people on using smart cards to secure
their email, and one common question I get is "What happens if I lose my
card?" Telling them they have to generate a new key is a bitter pill if it
means they can't decrypt their old emails.

This feature is not without precedent; the NIST standard for CAC/PIV cards
includes fields for 20 retired "key management" keys, which are used to
decrypt old messages. [1] I think this one feature would go a long way to
making smart cards a more accessible solution for everyday use.

[1]:
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-73-3/sp800-73-3_PART4_piv-transitional-interface-data-model-spec.pdf
in item 2.4.7, "Key History Object".

-- 

Joey Castillo
www.joeycastillo.com
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From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Thu Mar 12 19:52:36 2015
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2015 14:52:36 -0400
Subject: Enigmail speed geeking
In-Reply-To: <5501DE62.4080509@asatiifm.net>
References: <550076F0.70507@sixdemonbag.org> <5500C21C.1000607@mailbox.org>
 <5501B5F3.5030503@sixdemonbag.org> <5501BB40.9060604@cardcontact.de>
 <5501BDF7.8020904@sixdemonbag.org> <5501C45E.4030704@asatiifm.net>
 <5501CB34.6000000@sixdemonbag.org> <5501DE62.4080509@asatiifm.net>
Message-ID: <5501E074.5080609@sixdemonbag.org>

> My point was that you wrote multiple paragraphs worth of stories on 
> two emails from which I really got the impression that people should
> just not bother.

In response to someone who was thinking that storing keys on your hard
drive was categorically unsafe, and that smart cards were categorically
necessary, yes.  If you want to illustrate that smart cards are not
categorically necessary, you don't highlight instances where they're
useful and/or necessary: you highlight instances where they're not.  Had
the original poster said, "Is it correct to say there's no real use case
for smart cards?", I would have talked about situations where they're a
real benefit.

>>> I think they add security and depending on the user and use case 
>>> they either add inconvenience minutely or the complete opposite,
>>> they add usability.
>> 
>> The number of environments, number of users, and number of use 
>> cases, is way too vast to be able to make a glib statement like 
>> this.  You're just wrong.
>> 
>> The answer is, "it depends."
> 
> Isn't "it depends" exactly what I said :)?

No.  You said they add security, period, and that they either
inconvenience minutely or add convenience.  That's not an "it depends"
answer.  That's a "this is true in all times and situations" answer, and
that's exactly wrong.  They do *not* add security in all times and
situations, and they do *not* only ever cause minute inconvenience.


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From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Thu Mar 12 20:04:26 2015
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2015 15:04:26 -0400
Subject: Enigmail speed geeking
In-Reply-To: <5501D2FC.4090008@mailbox.org>
References: <550076F0.70507@sixdemonbag.org> <5500C21C.1000607@mailbox.org>
 <5501B5F3.5030503@sixdemonbag.org> <5501D2FC.4090008@mailbox.org>
Message-ID: <5501E33A.9090804@sixdemonbag.org>

> Yes, thanks a lot. From your answer I deduce that a single-user, 
> non-professional environment may not require use of a smart card, or 
> may not require it with the necessity it may have in high-security 
> environments.

Yep!  And just as importantly: it may require it.  It depends on your
threat model and what you need to defend against.  Ultimately, it's a
judgment call.

> But on an individual level, I guess it also depends on how much you 
> love (playing with) software and related devices and are already
> used to it.

This, too!  If you want to play around with them and have fun, don't let
me stop you.  :)

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From dougb at dougbarton.email  Thu Mar 12 20:04:36 2015
From: dougb at dougbarton.email (Doug Barton)
Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2015 12:04:36 -0700
Subject: [cygwin] gpg-agent with ssh support ?
In-Reply-To: <87mw3ik02y.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <86mw3koy54.fsf@kcals2.maillard.im>	<87egovon4x.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>	<55007A04.9010808@dougbarton.email>
 <87mw3ik02y.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <5501E344.4060105@dougbarton.email>

On 3/12/15 2:59 AM, Werner Koch wrote:
> On Wed, 11 Mar 2015 18:23, dougb at dougbarton.email said:
>
>> PuTTY also has its own agent support, which works quite well. I'm not
>> sure why it's necessary to reinvent the wheel here. :)
>
> Because that integrates seemless with GnuPG.  For example you can use
> your OpenPGP card (or other supoorted smartcards) for ssh.  No need for
> the ssh-add kludge.

And that would be a good reason, sure. But I don't get the impression 
that the OP has one of those. :)

Doug




From dougb at dougbarton.email  Thu Mar 12 20:17:57 2015
From: dougb at dougbarton.email (Doug Barton)
Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2015 12:17:57 -0700
Subject: Enigmail speed geeking
In-Reply-To: <5501B5F3.5030503@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <550076F0.70507@sixdemonbag.org> <5500C21C.1000607@mailbox.org>
 <5501B5F3.5030503@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <5501E665.1000801@dougbarton.email>

On 3/12/15 8:51 AM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> For many users, smart cards are a good idea.  (I've got one myself.)
> But for just as many users, smart cards are inconvenient and overkill.

I would go so far as to say for the vast majority of users they are 
totally unnecessary. It's cool to play with smart cards, and I'm all in 
favor of that sort of thing ... but for the overwhelming number of PGP 
users the threat model just isn't there.

Further, the inconvenience of having to deal with generating and 
socializing a new key if your smart card gets lost, becomes inoperable, 
etc. is way too high a cost for near-zero benefit.

FWIW,

Doug



From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Thu Mar 12 20:44:31 2015
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2015 15:44:31 -0400
Subject: Enigmail speed geeking
In-Reply-To: <5501E665.1000801@dougbarton.email>
References: <550076F0.70507@sixdemonbag.org> <5500C21C.1000607@mailbox.org>
 <5501B5F3.5030503@sixdemonbag.org> <5501E665.1000801@dougbarton.email>
Message-ID: <5501EC9F.9080906@sixdemonbag.org>

> I would go so far as to say for the vast majority of users they are 
> totally unnecessary. It's cool to play with smart cards, and I'm all
> in favor of that sort of thing ... but for the overwhelming number of
> PGP users the threat model just isn't there.

I dunno.  I think there are some good arguments for regular users
employing them; I just don't think those arguments are all that compelling.

For instance, I have my smartcard cross-signed with my usual certificate
(0xD6B98E10).  If you trust 0xD6B98E10, you'll probably also trust my
smartcard certificate -- and vice-versa.  Now let's say that in a couple
of years 0xD6B98E10 gets compromised.  I revoke the certificate,
propagate the revocation, and generate a new cert (0xBADD00D5).  I sign
0xBADD00D5 with the smartcard cert and put it up on the servers.  Etc.
People can see 0xBADD00D5 is signed by my smartcard and can have
confidence this is my new certificate.

This is basically the idea of the "offline master signing key" that a
lot of people talk about, but a lot more convenient due to the smartcard
form-factor.  I don't have to worry about air-gapping the signing
system, I just have to worry about finding the card reader when it comes
time to generate a new cert.

> Further, the inconvenience of having to deal with generating and 
> socializing a new key if your smart card gets lost, becomes
> inoperable, etc. is way too high a cost for near-zero benefit.

Yep.  Don't lose 'em.


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From mailing-lists at asatiifm.net  Thu Mar 12 20:49:08 2015
From: mailing-lists at asatiifm.net (=?windows-1252?Q?Ville_M=E4=E4tt=E4?=)
Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2015 21:49:08 +0200
Subject: Enigmail speed geeking
In-Reply-To: <5501E074.5080609@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <550076F0.70507@sixdemonbag.org> <5500C21C.1000607@mailbox.org>
 <5501B5F3.5030503@sixdemonbag.org> <5501BB40.9060604@cardcontact.de>
 <5501BDF7.8020904@sixdemonbag.org> <5501C45E.4030704@asatiifm.net>
 <5501CB34.6000000@sixdemonbag.org> <5501DE62.4080509@asatiifm.net>
 <5501E074.5080609@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <5501EDB4.4030604@asatiifm.net>

On 12.03.15 20:52, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
>> My point was that you wrote multiple paragraphs worth of stories on 
>> > two emails from which I really got the impression that people should
>> > just not bother.
> In response to someone who was thinking that storing keys on your hard
> drive was categorically unsafe, and that smart cards were categorically
> necessary, yes.

Absolutely. I agree. I think the difference of opinion here stems from
how I read the reply you sent. After the first couple sentences it's not
much about answering the question anymore :).

The questions was: Are smart cards a must? No they are not.

>>> The answer is, "it depends."
>>
>> Isn't "it depends" exactly what I said ?
> 
> No.  You said they add security, period, and that they either
> inconvenience minutely or add convenience.

All things being equal, they do practically add security, period :).
Well, you're quite right that it's impossible to say that they would add
security in all situations. Maybe they could also weaken it in some. But
you can use the same passphrase with or without the card. You can have
your subkeys on the card or on the computer. Maybe you can fill in the
rest. I.e. all things being equal:

The card can and on defaults probably will limit the amount of
passphrase attempts. And then it locks. Is it absolutely secure against
hacking? No. But it should be quite difficult to hack. And an important
point if to only have subkeys in there that you can revoke.

> That's not an "it depends"
> answer.  That's a "this is true in all times and situations" answer, and
> that's exactly wrong.

I said "depending on the user and use case". It is an it depends answer.

> They do *not* add security in all times and
> situations

I'm not making such a claim. The world is not black and white. Yes or no
only. I'm not talking about some theoretical, mathematically proven
statement that smart cards are more secure in every possible way. They
are not.

>, and they do *not* only ever cause minute inconvenience.

I don't know how you count the 30-45 second number from before but for
me it adds 1-10 seconds, maybe. Hard to estimate but it doesn't really
add any inconvenience to my use. And obviously, that's quite subjective.

I'm not even trying to make a point that they would be more secure all
the time. But, practically, they can be a cheap and convenient way to
add security. Everyone has to evaluate their use case though.

Here's an example. Is it better to store secret keys on each computer or
a smart card? I use multiple different computers and think that it's
more secure to have the keys on my smart card. So, more security by not
having to distribute the secret keys to all those computers. I'd say
that's convenient security as the secret keys come with me to whichever
computer I happen to be using.

-- 
Ville

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From brian at minton.name  Thu Mar 12 21:13:40 2015
From: brian at minton.name (Brian Minton)
Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2015 16:13:40 -0400
Subject: [cygwin] gpg-agent with ssh support ?
In-Reply-To: <5501E344.4060105@dougbarton.email>
References: <86mw3koy54.fsf@kcals2.maillard.im>
 <87egovon4x.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <55007A04.9010808@dougbarton.email> <87mw3ik02y.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <5501E344.4060105@dougbarton.email>
Message-ID: <CANyOob218q6GyzR+HGaiOEgBPzA5DNpC27xssdGrit==ZHum5g@mail.gmail.com>

Another option that I often use is https://github.com/wesleyd/charade,
which opens a unix domain socket on cygwin, connected to Pageant, so
cygwin programs and windows programs that use PuTTY can share the same
authentication.  Another similar program is
http://github.com/cuviper/ssh-pageant

On Thu, Mar 12, 2015 at 3:04 PM, Doug Barton <dougb at dougbarton.email> wrote:
> On 3/12/15 2:59 AM, Werner Koch wrote:
>>
>> On Wed, 11 Mar 2015 18:23, dougb at dougbarton.email said:
>>
>>> PuTTY also has its own agent support, which works quite well. I'm not
>>> sure why it's necessary to reinvent the wheel here. :)
>>
>>
>> Because that integrates seemless with GnuPG.  For example you can use
>> your OpenPGP card (or other supoorted smartcards) for ssh.  No need for
>> the ssh-add kludge.
>
>
> And that would be a good reason, sure. But I don't get the impression that
> the OP has one of those. :)
>
> Doug
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users


From stebe at mailbox.org  Fri Mar 13 00:00:16 2015
From: stebe at mailbox.org (Stephan Beck)
Date: Fri, 13 Mar 2015 00:00:16 +0100
Subject: Question concerning OpenLDAP PGP Keyserver setup guide
 (wiki.gnupg.org)
Message-ID: <55021A80.40203@mailbox.org>

Hi,

reproducing the OpenLDAP PGP keyserver setup guide on http://wiki.gnupg.org,
published by Neal, I get the following error message:

ldapmodify: wrong attributeType at line 5, entry "olcDatabase={1}hdb,cn=config"

I am reproducing the guide on debian stable (main sources only), which uses
"hdb" (not "mdb") database format, OpenLDAP3, being the server package slapd.

To see the error message in its context:


$ sudo ldapsearch -LLL -Y EXTERNAL -H ldapi:/// -b "cn=config"  | grep olcDatabase:
SASL/EXTERNAL authentication started
SASL username: gidNumber=0+uidNumber=0,cn=peercred,cn=external,cn=auth
SASL SSF: 0
olcDatabase: {-1}frontend
olcDatabase: {0}config
olcDatabase: {1}hdb


$ sudo ldapmodify -Y EXTERNAL -H ldapi:/// -f /tmp/keyserver-acls.ldif
SASL/EXTERNAL authentication started
SASL username: gidNumber=0+uidNumber=0,cn=peercred,cn=external,cn=auth
SASL SSF: 0
ldapmodify: wrong attributeType at line 5, entry "olcDatabase={1}hdb,cn=config"


contents of keyserver-acls.ldif are as follows:


# userPassword may be written only by users themselves
dn: olcDatabase={1}hdb,cn=config
changetype: modify
add: olcAccess
# Allow access via localhost to add or modify keys.
# Allow authenticated PGP Users to update keys.
# Allow anyone else to read the keys.
olcAccess: {2} to dn.subtree="ou=PGP Keys,dc=FOO,dc=EXAMPLE,dc=ORG"
  by peername.ip=127.0.0.1 write
  by peername.ip=:: write
  by dn.regex="^uid=([^,]+),ou=PGP Users,dc=FOO,dc=EXAMPLE,dc=ORG" write
  by * read

# Allow any connection to localhost to update the PGP keys
# (including removing them!)  This is only needed if the anonymous
# updates from localhost are desired.
dn: cn=config
add: olcAllows
olcAllows: update_anon
--------------------------------------------------------------------------

It seems that the error message indicates that line 5

by peername.ip=127.0.0.1 write

has a a wrong attribute type.

I checked the LDAP for Rocket scientists guide on zytrax.com (1) and (3) for
hours, and also some documentation about the peername.ip attribute, but I cannot
figure out what's wrong.
I found that there are 2 ways of using the peername.[ip] attribute.

If you use it with ipv4 you do not have to put peername.ipv4, but just
peername.ip, being the value (127.0.0.1) that which defines the format (ipv4).
With ipv6 you would have to specify it, i.e. peername.ipv6=[ipv6]

The other way is using "peername.[type]" but that's not the case here.


Is there anyone who can lend me a hand?

TIA

Stephan

Note: On slapd debconf install I used FOO.EXAMPLE.ORG, so whenever the wiki
guide uses dc=EXAMPLE,dc=ORG I use dc=FOO,dc=EXAMPLE,dc=ORG

(1) http://www.zytrax.com/books/ldap/ch6
(2) http://www.zytrax.com/books/ldap/ch3



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From hugo at barrera.io  Fri Mar 13 00:21:58 2015
From: hugo at barrera.io (Hugo Osvaldo Barrera)
Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2015 20:21:58 -0300
Subject: bugs.gnupg.org TLS certificate
In-Reply-To: <87zj7jlc9t.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <CANyOob3zTYfjr9fg8PGFcEkn0cE9OoxwYqrFVZsKqbdYMZbqUA@mail.gmail.com>
 <87zj7jlc9t.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <20150312232158.GB18878@athena.barrera.io>

On 2015-03-11 17:38, Werner Koch wrote:
> On Wed, 11 Mar 2015 15:12, brian at minton.name said:
> 
> > git.gnupg.org) don't use that certificate.  Have you considered a wildcard
> > certificate?  I know this has been discussed before, e.g. at
> 
> Too expensive ;-).  To stop all these complaints I will add a so called
> real certificate but first I need to move the tracker to another
> machine.
> 
> 
> Shalom-Salam,
> 
>    Werner

No need for a wildcard one. Just get one free certificate for each subdomain
from StartSSL.

Cheers,

-- 
Hugo Osvaldo Barrera
A: Because we read from top to bottom, left to right.
Q: Why should I start my reply below the quoted text?
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From pete at heypete.com  Fri Mar 13 00:32:00 2015
From: pete at heypete.com (Pete Stephenson)
Date: Fri, 13 Mar 2015 00:32:00 +0100
Subject: bugs.gnupg.org TLS certificate
In-Reply-To: <20150312232158.GB18878@athena.barrera.io>
References: <CANyOob3zTYfjr9fg8PGFcEkn0cE9OoxwYqrFVZsKqbdYMZbqUA@mail.gmail.com>
 <87zj7jlc9t.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <20150312232158.GB18878@athena.barrera.io>
Message-ID: <CA+4dSw60VrdnUS2MKfe4hZiwFb0Ss3qE+NCoeWkXHKEXrTWVKA@mail.gmail.com>

On Fri, Mar 13, 2015 at 12:21 AM, Hugo Osvaldo Barrera <hugo at barrera.io> wrote:
> On 2015-03-11 17:38, Werner Koch wrote:
>> On Wed, 11 Mar 2015 15:12, brian at minton.name said:
>>
>> > git.gnupg.org) don't use that certificate.  Have you considered a wildcard
>> > certificate?  I know this has been discussed before, e.g. at
>>
>> Too expensive ;-).  To stop all these complaints I will add a so called
>> real certificate but first I need to move the tracker to another
>> machine.
>>
>>
>> Shalom-Salam,
>>
>>    Werner
>
> No need for a wildcard one. Just get one free certificate for each subdomain
> from StartSSL.

StartSSL's a great choice, as one can issue as many certificates as
one wishes for validated domain names.

Alternatively, several CAs[1][2] offer free certificates to
open-source projects. Resellers[3][4] also offer quite
reasonably-priced ($9 USD/year) certs as a standard price.

Cheers!
-Pete
Full disclosure: I'm a paying customer of StartSSL, Gandi, and
NameCheap, and have several certificates from each for different
purposes. Other than being a customer, I have no other interest in
those organizations.

[1] https://www.godaddy.com/ssl/ssl-open-source.aspx
[2] https://www.globalsign.com/en/ssl/ssl-open-source/
[3] https://www.namecheap.com/security/ssl-certificates/domain-validation.aspx
[4] https://www.gandi.net/ssl/standard

-- 
Pete Stephenson


From mick.crane at gmail.com  Fri Mar 13 00:47:28 2015
From: mick.crane at gmail.com (Mick Crane)
Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2015 23:47:28 +0000
Subject: bugs.gnupg.org TLS certificate
In-Reply-To: <20150312232158.GB18878@athena.barrera.io>
References: <CANyOob3zTYfjr9fg8PGFcEkn0cE9OoxwYqrFVZsKqbdYMZbqUA@mail.gmail.com>
 <87zj7jlc9t.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <20150312232158.GB18878@athena.barrera.io>
Message-ID: <A2FE6A6B-3F78-42E8-84FB-C9A95023A8E0@gmail.com>



>> On 12 Mar 2015, at 23:21, Hugo Osvaldo Barrera <hugo at barrera.io> wrote:
>> 
>> On 2015-03-11 17:38, Werner Koch wrote:
>> On Wed, 11 Mar 2015 15:12, brian at minton.name said:
>> 
>>> git.gnupg.org) don't use that certificate.  Have you considered a wildcard
>>> certificate?  I know this has been discussed before, e.g. at
>> 
>> Too expensive ;-).  To stop all these complaints I will add a so called
>> real certificate but first I need to move the tracker to another
>> machine.
>> 
>> 
>> Shalom-Salam,
>> 
>>  Werner
> 
> No need for a wildcard one. Just get one free certificate for each subdomain
> from StartSSL.

I think Werner can make his own authority and certificate ?
That sort of information stuff used to much more readily accessible on the net, like how to run your own DNS.
For forgetful people is difficult to track things down now with so much available.
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From avi.wiki at gmail.com  Fri Mar 13 03:27:05 2015
From: avi.wiki at gmail.com (Avi)
Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2015 22:27:05 -0400
Subject: bugs.gnupg.org TLS certificate
In-Reply-To: <A2FE6A6B-3F78-42E8-84FB-C9A95023A8E0@gmail.com>
References: <CANyOob3zTYfjr9fg8PGFcEkn0cE9OoxwYqrFVZsKqbdYMZbqUA@mail.gmail.com>
 <87zj7jlc9t.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <20150312232158.GB18878@athena.barrera.io>
 <A2FE6A6B-3F78-42E8-84FB-C9A95023A8E0@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <CAF5O_jzGR480U_hszGOkQfOHe7Ceui+3q1wsQrmmDcK=3hcrcw@mail.gmail.com>

I have no opinion one way or the other re: StartSSL, but there are those
who do:

<
https://danconnor.com/post/50f65364a0fd5fd1f7000001/avoid_startcom_startssl_like_the_plague_
>
<https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=994033>
<
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140409/11442426859/shameful-security-startcom-charges-people-to-revoke-ssl-certs-vulnerable-to-heartbleed.shtml
>

etc.

Avi


----
User:Avraham

pub 3072D/F80E29F9 1/30/2009 Avi (Wikimedia-related key) <avi.wiki at gmail.com
>
   Primary key fingerprint: 167C 063F 7981 A1F6 71EC ABAA 0D62 B019 F80E
29F9

On Thu, Mar 12, 2015 at 7:47 PM, Mick Crane <mick.crane at gmail.com> wrote:

>
>
> On 12 Mar 2015, at 23:21, Hugo Osvaldo Barrera <hugo at barrera.io> wrote:
>
>
> On 2015-03-11 17:38, Werner Koch wrote:
>
> On Wed, 11 Mar 2015 15:12, brian at minton.name said:
>
>
> git.gnupg.org) don't use that certificate.  Have you considered a wildcard
>
> certificate?  I know this has been discussed before, e.g. at
>
>
> Too expensive ;-).  To stop all these complaints I will add a so called
>
> real certificate but first I need to move the tracker to another
>
> machine.
>
>
>
> Shalom-Salam,
>
>
>  Werner
>
>
> No need for a wildcard one. Just get one free certificate for each
> subdomain
>
> from StartSSL.
>
>
> I think Werner can make his own authority and certificate ?
> That sort of information stuff used to much more readily accessible on the
> net, like how to run your own DNS.
> For forgetful people is difficult to track things down now with so much
> available.
>
> _______________________________________________
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
>
>
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From dougb at dougbarton.email  Fri Mar 13 04:57:45 2015
From: dougb at dougbarton.email (Doug Barton)
Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2015 20:57:45 -0700
Subject: bugs.gnupg.org TLS certificate
In-Reply-To: <CAF5O_jzGR480U_hszGOkQfOHe7Ceui+3q1wsQrmmDcK=3hcrcw@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CANyOob3zTYfjr9fg8PGFcEkn0cE9OoxwYqrFVZsKqbdYMZbqUA@mail.gmail.com>
 <87zj7jlc9t.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <20150312232158.GB18878@athena.barrera.io>
 <A2FE6A6B-3F78-42E8-84FB-C9A95023A8E0@gmail.com>
 <CAF5O_jzGR480U_hszGOkQfOHe7Ceui+3q1wsQrmmDcK=3hcrcw@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <55026039.9060205@dougbarton.email>

It's quite disingenuous to say you don't have an opinion, when obviously 
you do.

This topic was debated at length on this list when Heartbleed happened. 
There are two camps:

1. Those who think that if you offer any kind of free service, you have 
to offer all related services for free as well. "I want it, so you must 
give it to me."

2. Those who think that companies like StartSSL who are offering 
tremendous value to the community for free have the right to recoup some 
of their operational expenses for requests that go outside the norm, 
and/or cannot be handled with an automated system.

If you are in the first camp, you have every right to your belief, but 
that belief does not match up with the real world.

If you are in the second camp, pull up a chair, I've got a cooler full 
of $BEVERAGE that I'll be happy to share. :)

Doug


On 3/12/15 7:27 PM, Avi wrote:
> I have no opinion one way or the other re: StartSSL, but there are those
> who do:
>
> <https://danconnor.com/post/50f65364a0fd5fd1f7000001/avoid_startcom_startssl_like_the_plague_>
> <https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=994033>
> <https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140409/11442426859/shameful-security-startcom-charges-people-to-revoke-ssl-certs-vulnerable-to-heartbleed.shtml>
>
> etc.
>
> Avi
>
>
> ----
> User:Avraham
>
> pub 3072D/F80E29F9 1/30/2009 Avi (Wikimedia-related key)
> <avi.wiki at gmail.com <mailto:avi.wiki at gmail.com>>
>     Primary key fingerprint: 167C 063F 7981 A1F6 71EC ABAA 0D62 B019
> F80E 29F9
>
> On Thu, Mar 12, 2015 at 7:47 PM, Mick Crane <mick.crane at gmail.com
> <mailto:mick.crane at gmail.com>> wrote:
>
>
>
>>>     On 12 Mar 2015, at 23:21, Hugo Osvaldo Barrera <hugo at barrera.io
>>>     <mailto:hugo at barrera.io>> wrote:
>>>
>>>     On 2015-03-11 17:38, Werner Koch wrote:
>>>     On Wed, 11 Mar 2015 15:12, brian at minton.name
>>>     <mailto:brian at minton.name> said:
>>>
>>>>     git.gnupg.org <http://git.gnupg.org/>) don't use that
>>>>     certificate.  Have you considered a wildcard
>>>>     certificate?  I know this has been discussed before, e.g. at
>>>
>>>     Too expensive ;-).  To stop all these complaints I will add a so
>>>     called
>>>     real certificate but first I need to move the tracker to another
>>>     machine.
>>>
>>>
>>>     Shalom-Salam,
>>>
>>>      Werner
>>
>>     No need for a wildcard one. Just get one free certificate for each
>>     subdomain
>>     from StartSSL.




From avi.wiki at gmail.com  Fri Mar 13 05:24:33 2015
From: avi.wiki at gmail.com (Avi)
Date: Fri, 13 Mar 2015 00:24:33 -0400
Subject: bugs.gnupg.org TLS certificate
In-Reply-To: <55026039.9060205@dougbarton.email>
References: <CANyOob3zTYfjr9fg8PGFcEkn0cE9OoxwYqrFVZsKqbdYMZbqUA@mail.gmail.com>
 <87zj7jlc9t.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <20150312232158.GB18878@athena.barrera.io>
 <A2FE6A6B-3F78-42E8-84FB-C9A95023A8E0@gmail.com>
 <CAF5O_jzGR480U_hszGOkQfOHe7Ceui+3q1wsQrmmDcK=3hcrcw@mail.gmail.com>
 <55026039.9060205@dougbarton.email>
Message-ID: <CAF5O_jzOmXwAPyLJzs6ex6xRGPuuEsCRXjNpdsKwJ6jNYG3TNA@mail.gmail.com>

No, Doug, I really don't have an opinion. To do so, I would have had to
given some thought to the relative merits of both sides and crystallized an
opinion. Since SSL certificates do not directly apply to me at this moment,
I have not given it the attention it deserves, and so I cannot in good
faith have a reasoned opinion; so I don't--out of ignorance if you wish. My
point in posting those links was that I remembered seeing this in the past,
and thought it fair to bring to Werner's attention that there was some
controversy, so that he can, if he wishes, research both sides and come to
his own measured opinion.

Avi

Avi

----
User:Avraham

pub 3072D/F80E29F9 1/30/2009 Avi (Wikimedia-related key) <avi.wiki at gmail.com
>
   Primary key fingerprint: 167C 063F 7981 A1F6 71EC ABAA 0D62 B019 F80E
29F9

On Thu, Mar 12, 2015 at 11:57 PM, Doug Barton <dougb at dougbarton.email>
wrote:

> It's quite disingenuous to say you don't have an opinion, when obviously
> you do.
>
> This topic was debated at length on this list when Heartbleed happened.
> There are two camps:
>
> 1. Those who think that if you offer any kind of free service, you have to
> offer all related services for free as well. "I want it, so you must give
> it to me."
>
> 2. Those who think that companies like StartSSL who are offering
> tremendous value to the community for free have the right to recoup some of
> their operational expenses for requests that go outside the norm, and/or
> cannot be handled with an automated system.
>
> If you are in the first camp, you have every right to your belief, but
> that belief does not match up with the real world.
>
> If you are in the second camp, pull up a chair, I've got a cooler full of
> $BEVERAGE that I'll be happy to share. :)
>
> Doug
>
>
> On 3/12/15 7:27 PM, Avi wrote:
>
>> I have no opinion one way or the other re: StartSSL, but there are those
>> who do:
>>
>> <https://danconnor.com/post/50f65364a0fd5fd1f7000001/
>> avoid_startcom_startssl_like_the_plague_>
>> <https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=994033>
>> <https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140409/11442426859/
>> shameful-security-startcom-charges-people-to-revoke-ssl-
>> certs-vulnerable-to-heartbleed.shtml>
>>
>> etc.
>>
>> Avi
>>
>>
>> ----
>> User:Avraham
>>
>> pub 3072D/F80E29F9 1/30/2009 Avi (Wikimedia-related key)
>> <avi.wiki at gmail.com <mailto:avi.wiki at gmail.com>>
>>     Primary key fingerprint: 167C 063F 7981 A1F6 71EC ABAA 0D62 B019
>> F80E 29F9
>>
>> On Thu, Mar 12, 2015 at 7:47 PM, Mick Crane <mick.crane at gmail.com
>> <mailto:mick.crane at gmail.com>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>      On 12 Mar 2015, at 23:21, Hugo Osvaldo Barrera <hugo at barrera.io
>>>>     <mailto:hugo at barrera.io>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>     On 2015-03-11 17:38, Werner Koch wrote:
>>>>     On Wed, 11 Mar 2015 15:12, brian at minton.name
>>>>     <mailto:brian at minton.name> said:
>>>>
>>>>      git.gnupg.org <http://git.gnupg.org/>) don't use that
>>>>>     certificate.  Have you considered a wildcard
>>>>>     certificate?  I know this has been discussed before, e.g. at
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>     Too expensive ;-).  To stop all these complaints I will add a so
>>>>     called
>>>>     real certificate but first I need to move the tracker to another
>>>>     machine.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>     Shalom-Salam,
>>>>
>>>>      Werner
>>>>
>>>
>>>     No need for a wildcard one. Just get one free certificate for each
>>>     subdomain
>>>     from StartSSL.
>>>
>>
>
>
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From xavier at maillard.im  Fri Mar 13 06:39:38 2015
From: xavier at maillard.im (Xavier Maillard)
Date: Fri, 13 Mar 2015 06:39:38 +0100
Subject: [cygwin] gpg-agent with ssh support ?
In-Reply-To: <5501E344.4060105@dougbarton.email>
References: <86mw3koy54.fsf@kcals2.maillard.im>
 <87egovon4x.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <55007A04.9010808@dougbarton.email>
 <87mw3ik02y.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <5501E344.4060105@dougbarton.email>
Message-ID: <86twxpmp5x.fsf@kcals2.maillard.im>


Doug Barton <dougb at dougbarton.email> writes:

> On 3/12/15 2:59 AM, Werner Koch wrote:
>> On Wed, 11 Mar 2015 18:23, dougb at dougbarton.email said:
>>
>>> PuTTY also has its own agent support, which works quite well. I'm not
>>> sure why it's necessary to reinvent the wheel here. :)
>>
>> Because that integrates seemless with GnuPG.  For example you can use
>> your OpenPGP card (or other supoorted smartcards) for ssh.  No need for
>> the ssh-add kludge.
>
> And that would be a good reason, sure. But I don't get the impression
> that the OP has one of those. :)

Exact but I plan to get one in a quite short time ;) I am just
studying the smartcard market to choose a good one (any suggestion ?
:)).

Regards
-- Xavier.


From wk at gnupg.org  Fri Mar 13 08:21:16 2015
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Fri, 13 Mar 2015 08:21:16 +0100
Subject: bugs.gnupg.org TLS certificate
In-Reply-To: <20150312232158.GB18878@athena.barrera.io> (Hugo Osvaldo
 Barrera's message of "Thu, 12 Mar 2015 20:21:58 -0300")
References: <CANyOob3zTYfjr9fg8PGFcEkn0cE9OoxwYqrFVZsKqbdYMZbqUA@mail.gmail.com>
 <87zj7jlc9t.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <20150312232158.GB18878@athena.barrera.io>
Message-ID: <87y4n1fjmb.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Fri, 13 Mar 2015 00:21, hugo at barrera.io said:

> No need for a wildcard one. Just get one free certificate for each subdomain
> from StartSSL.

Definitely not.  It far easier to pay 10 Euro a year for one from
Gandi.  But that is all not an issue, migrating Roundup to a newer
version is more work.


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From hugo at barrera.io  Fri Mar 13 09:55:53 2015
From: hugo at barrera.io (Hugo Osvaldo Barrera)
Date: Fri, 13 Mar 2015 05:55:53 -0300
Subject: bugs.gnupg.org TLS certificate
In-Reply-To: <87y4n1fjmb.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <CANyOob3zTYfjr9fg8PGFcEkn0cE9OoxwYqrFVZsKqbdYMZbqUA@mail.gmail.com>
 <87zj7jlc9t.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <20150312232158.GB18878@athena.barrera.io>
 <87y4n1fjmb.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <20150313085553.GA3688@athena.barrera.io>

On 2015-03-13 08:21, Werner Koch wrote:
> On Fri, 13 Mar 2015 00:21, hugo at barrera.io said:
> 
> > No need for a wildcard one. Just get one free certificate for each subdomain
> > from StartSSL.
> 
> Definitely not.  It far easier to pay 10 Euro a year for one from
> Gandi.  But that is all not an issue, migrating Roundup to a newer
> version is more work.
> 
> 

I don't see what's easier (maybe it takes a few minutes less?), nor the point
in paying for something you can have for free with the same quality.

Personally, I can eat almost a week with 10 Euros, so I'd very much go with the
free version.

-- 
Hugo Osvaldo Barrera
A: Because we read from top to bottom, left to right.
Q: Why should I start my reply below the quoted text?
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From peter at digitalbrains.com  Fri Mar 13 11:25:58 2015
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Fri, 13 Mar 2015 11:25:58 +0100
Subject: Enigmail speed geeking
In-Reply-To: <5501E665.1000801@dougbarton.email>
References: <550076F0.70507@sixdemonbag.org> <5500C21C.1000607@mailbox.org>
 <5501B5F3.5030503@sixdemonbag.org> <5501E665.1000801@dougbarton.email>
Message-ID: <5502BB36.20106@digitalbrains.com>

On 12/03/15 20:17, Doug Barton wrote:
> Further, the inconvenience of having to deal with generating and
> socializing a new key if your smart card gets lost, becomes inoperable,
> etc. is way too high a cost for near-zero benefit.

And what if your hard drive holding your on-disk key crashes? Do you
also "socialize" a new key?

Of course not (I hope). You keep a backup of your key in a safe place.
This goes for smartcard keys as well. The situation is the same whether
you use a smartcard or not.

For signing subkeys, a backup isn't very necessary, not for on-disk keys
or for smartcard keys. But for your primary key and especially
encryption subkeys, this is important.

Not having a backup of your encryption subkeys means a not very robust
single point of failure, and if that hard disk crashes, or the file
system is corrupted, or your smartcard dies, you suddenly lose access to
all your encrypted files.

I cannot fathom why you would not have at the very least one backup of
your encryption subkey. It sounds like a phenomenally bad idea.

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at <http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>


From mwood at IUPUI.Edu  Fri Mar 13 14:04:30 2015
From: mwood at IUPUI.Edu (Mark H. Wood)
Date: Fri, 13 Mar 2015 09:04:30 -0400
Subject: bugs.gnupg.org TLS certificate
In-Reply-To: <20150313085553.GA3688@athena.barrera.io>
References: <CANyOob3zTYfjr9fg8PGFcEkn0cE9OoxwYqrFVZsKqbdYMZbqUA@mail.gmail.com>
 <87zj7jlc9t.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <20150312232158.GB18878@athena.barrera.io>
 <87y4n1fjmb.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <20150313085553.GA3688@athena.barrera.io>
Message-ID: <20150313130430.GA31437@IUPUI.Edu>

On Fri, Mar 13, 2015 at 05:55:53AM -0300, Hugo Osvaldo Barrera wrote:
> On 2015-03-13 08:21, Werner Koch wrote:
> > On Fri, 13 Mar 2015 00:21, hugo at barrera.io said:
> > 
> > > No need for a wildcard one. Just get one free certificate for each subdomain
> > > from StartSSL.
> > 
> > Definitely not.  It far easier to pay 10 Euro a year for one from
> > Gandi.  But that is all not an issue, migrating Roundup to a newer
> > version is more work.
> > 
> > 
> 
> I don't see what's easier (maybe it takes a few minutes less?), nor the point
> in paying for something you can have for free with the same quality.

That is precisely the issue with free or even cheap certificates:
they are likely *not* of the same quality.

A few years ago, I ordered my first certificate from a well-known CA.
They charged us $159.00.  I *know* that they check up on new
applicants: our security officer got a phone call from them, asking if
I was legitimately representing the organization.  That certificate
certified more than just "probably the same host that presented this
certificate to you last time."

A CA that charges nothing cannot afford to do much (any?) checking of
the assertions in my CSR.  The resulting signature thus cannot have
some of the meaning that a more thoroughly investigated CSR can
support.

A free cert. may have all of the qualities that you need, but I
recommend that you think as carefully about your choice of CA as you
do about who you would have sign a PGP key.  The more you depend on
a certificate for *establishing* trust, the more it's going to cost
you, because it's going to cost the issuer more to provide that
assurance while protecting his own reputation.

-- 
Mark H. Wood
Lead Technology Analyst

University Library
Indiana University - Purdue University Indianapolis
755 W. Michigan Street
Indianapolis, IN 46202
317-274-0749
www.ulib.iupui.edu
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From wk at gnupg.org  Fri Mar 13 14:27:47 2015
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Fri, 13 Mar 2015 14:27:47 +0100
Subject: bugs.gnupg.org TLS certificate
In-Reply-To: <20150313130430.GA31437@IUPUI.Edu> (Mark H. Wood's message of
 "Fri, 13 Mar 2015 09:04:30 -0400")
References: <CANyOob3zTYfjr9fg8PGFcEkn0cE9OoxwYqrFVZsKqbdYMZbqUA@mail.gmail.com>
 <87zj7jlc9t.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <20150312232158.GB18878@athena.barrera.io>
 <87y4n1fjmb.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <20150313085553.GA3688@athena.barrera.io>
 <20150313130430.GA31437@IUPUI.Edu>
Message-ID: <871tktf2ng.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Fri, 13 Mar 2015 14:04, mwood at IUPUI.Edu said:

> A CA that charges nothing cannot afford to do much (any?) checking of
> the assertions in my CSR.  The resulting signature thus cannot have
> some of the meaning that a more thoroughly investigated CSR can

Given the implicit cross certification of all CA in the browsers this
does not matter.  Except for those who tightly control their Root CA but
that is a rare case and not really practical.

The more expensive CAs are only selling you a fashionable background
color for your the client's address bar.


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From mailing-lists at asatiifm.net  Fri Mar 13 14:57:16 2015
From: mailing-lists at asatiifm.net (=?windows-1252?Q?Ville_M=E4=E4tt=E4?=)
Date: Fri, 13 Mar 2015 15:57:16 +0200
Subject: bugs.gnupg.org TLS certificate
In-Reply-To: <20150313130430.GA31437@IUPUI.Edu>
References: <CANyOob3zTYfjr9fg8PGFcEkn0cE9OoxwYqrFVZsKqbdYMZbqUA@mail.gmail.com>
 <87zj7jlc9t.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <20150312232158.GB18878@athena.barrera.io>
 <87y4n1fjmb.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <20150313085553.GA3688@athena.barrera.io> <20150313130430.GA31437@IUPUI.Edu>
Message-ID: <5502ECBC.9040807@asatiifm.net>

On 13.03.15 15:04, Mark H. Wood wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 13, 2015 at 05:55:53AM -0300, Hugo Osvaldo Barrera wrote:
>> > On 2015-03-13 08:21, Werner Koch wrote:
>>> > > On Fri, 13 Mar 2015 00:21, hugo at barrera.io said:
>>> > > 
>>>> > > > No need for a wildcard one. Just get one free certificate for each subdomain
>>>> > > > from StartSSL.
>>> > > 
>>> > > Definitely not.  It far easier to pay 10 Euro a year for one from
>>> > > Gandi.  But that is all not an issue, migrating Roundup to a newer
>>> > > version is more work.
>>> > > 
>>> > > 
>> > 
>> > I don't see what's easier (maybe it takes a few minutes less?), nor the point
>> > in paying for something you can have for free with the same quality.
> That is precisely the issue with free or even cheap certificates:
> they are likely *not* of the same quality.
> 
> A few years ago, I ordered my first certificate from a well-known CA.
> They charged us $159.00.  I *know* that they check up on new
> applicants: our security officer got a phone call from them, asking if
> I was legitimately representing the organization.  That certificate
> certified more than just "probably the same host that presented this
> certificate to you last time."

The CA cartel has specified clear and binding rules for the
participating CAs as to what level of validation is required. This is
overly simplified but they are essentially:

Domain validation (Class 1)
Organization validation (Class 2)
Extended Validation (Class 3)

Any automatically validated, i.e. some file on a URL or DNS check etc.
is a Class 1 cert. The rest require filing paper work and usually take
from hours to days to complete. And there is no reason for anyone to try
guessing which level a cert belongs to, they tell you the validation
beforehand.

> A CA that charges nothing cannot afford to do much (any?) checking of
> the assertions in my CSR.
?
> A free cert. may have all of the qualities that you need, but I
> recommend that you think as carefully about your choice of CA as you
> do about who you would have sign a PGP key.

Many CAs will be happy to sell a Class 1 certificate for 100-200$ or
more. Paying money for a cert doesn't necessarily make it any more
"certified". The CA business is a badly monopolized cartel where the old
farts have dug in years ago and are just counting the money :).

Am Organization cert is the same regardless of where it comes from (in
the cartel). They have their own auditing and other requirements that
make sure of it. And for the end user of a site it (should be) of no
concern which CA is behind the cert. Just what level of validation is
the cert. And how many users actually care? Not many (except for the
branded "green bar").

-- 
Ville

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From mailing-lists at asatiifm.net  Fri Mar 13 15:02:26 2015
From: mailing-lists at asatiifm.net (=?windows-1252?Q?Ville_M=E4=E4tt=E4?=)
Date: Fri, 13 Mar 2015 16:02:26 +0200
Subject: bugs.gnupg.org TLS certificate
In-Reply-To: <871tktf2ng.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <CANyOob3zTYfjr9fg8PGFcEkn0cE9OoxwYqrFVZsKqbdYMZbqUA@mail.gmail.com>
 <87zj7jlc9t.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <20150312232158.GB18878@athena.barrera.io>
 <87y4n1fjmb.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <20150313085553.GA3688@athena.barrera.io> <20150313130430.GA31437@IUPUI.Edu>
 <871tktf2ng.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <5502EDF2.8000202@asatiifm.net>

On 13.03.15 15:27, Werner Koch wrote:
> The more expensive CAs are only selling you a fashionable background
> color for your the client's address bar.

Essentially, that's it :).

There are however clearly defined hard requirements to the Extended
Validation, aka "green bar" level. That is, more involved validation of
the organization and the person requesting the certificate. But those EV
certs can be had for cheaper than hundreds of dollars per year.

-- 
Ville

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From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Fri Mar 13 15:08:46 2015
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Fri, 13 Mar 2015 10:08:46 -0400
Subject: Enigmail speed geeking
In-Reply-To: <5502BB36.20106@digitalbrains.com>
References: <550076F0.70507@sixdemonbag.org> <5500C21C.1000607@mailbox.org>
 <5501B5F3.5030503@sixdemonbag.org> <5501E665.1000801@dougbarton.email>
 <5502BB36.20106@digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <5502EF6E.3040302@sixdemonbag.org>

> Of course not (I hope). You keep a backup of your key in a safe
> place. This goes for smartcard keys as well. The situation is the
> same whether you use a smartcard or not.

This is not true.  There are a lot of use cases where "there are no
backups of this smart-card key" are baked into the security model.
That's why we can create keys on the card directly: that way they never
need to exist outside of the card.

> Not having a backup of your encryption subkeys means a not very
> robust single point of failure, and if that hard disk crashes, or the
> file system is corrupted, or your smartcard dies, you suddenly lose
> access to all your encrypted files.

Yes, and in some security models that's preferable to having a backup
copy somewhere.

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From peter at digitalbrains.com  Fri Mar 13 15:22:20 2015
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Fri, 13 Mar 2015 15:22:20 +0100
Subject: Enigmail speed geeking
In-Reply-To: <5502EF6E.3040302@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <550076F0.70507@sixdemonbag.org> <5500C21C.1000607@mailbox.org>
 <5501B5F3.5030503@sixdemonbag.org> <5501E665.1000801@dougbarton.email>
 <5502BB36.20106@digitalbrains.com> <5502EF6E.3040302@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <d809914c7b1290e9793a1d53ffd77e7e@butters.digitalbrains.com>

I interpreted Dougs message as saying that a disadvantage of 
smartcards, as opposed to on-disk keys, is that you lose the key when 
the smartcard stops functioning. I was replying to this statement by 
Doug:

> Further, the inconvenience of having to deal with generating and 
> socializing a new key if your smart card gets lost, becomes inoperable, 
> etc. is way too high a cost for near-zero benefit.

So I say: you should use backups, duh.

The fact that you /can/ use a smartcard without a backup, which as you 
say can be advantageous, by no means implies that you /cannot/ keep a 
backup. This is what I was saying.

HTH,

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at 
<http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>


From brian at minton.name  Fri Mar 13 15:31:11 2015
From: brian at minton.name (Brian Minton)
Date: Fri, 13 Mar 2015 10:31:11 -0400
Subject: Enigmail speed geeking
In-Reply-To: <d809914c7b1290e9793a1d53ffd77e7e@butters.digitalbrains.com>
References: <550076F0.70507@sixdemonbag.org> <5500C21C.1000607@mailbox.org>
 <5501B5F3.5030503@sixdemonbag.org> <5501E665.1000801@dougbarton.email>
 <5502BB36.20106@digitalbrains.com> <5502EF6E.3040302@sixdemonbag.org>
 <d809914c7b1290e9793a1d53ffd77e7e@butters.digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <CANyOob3bECBW5SQBcksgURBtw5KVPxZ6zTpdhdFuo_kK9W8E8g@mail.gmail.com>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256

If a key is generated externally, a backup can be taken before the key
is moved to the card.  For a key generated on the card, there is (by
design), no way to extract the secret key, including for the purpose of
backing it up
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1

iF4EAREIAAYFAlUC9JUACgkQa46zoGXPuqlGIwD+MqwlNB6gkMnOlNDITREhS0W6
0r8PkacHiQckvJTgZ8UA/33GtkpcUCSzSemcfCYx+AnZ3bDct9xaDtBORe6PyMPk
=NmcR
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


From peter at digitalbrains.com  Fri Mar 13 15:40:17 2015
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Fri, 13 Mar 2015 15:40:17 +0100
Subject: Enigmail speed geeking
In-Reply-To: <CANyOob3bECBW5SQBcksgURBtw5KVPxZ6zTpdhdFuo_kK9W8E8g@mail.gmail.com>
References: <550076F0.70507@sixdemonbag.org> <5500C21C.1000607@mailbox.org>
 <5501B5F3.5030503@sixdemonbag.org> <5501E665.1000801@dougbarton.email>
 <5502BB36.20106@digitalbrains.com> <5502EF6E.3040302@sixdemonbag.org>
 <d809914c7b1290e9793a1d53ffd77e7e@butters.digitalbrains.com>
 <CANyOob3bECBW5SQBcksgURBtw5KVPxZ6zTpdhdFuo_kK9W8E8g@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <5cda1031caf0f94f8eff9c414aaf4955@butters.digitalbrains.com>

On 2015-03-13 15:31, Brian Minton wrote:
> If a key is generated externally, a backup can be taken before the 
> key
> is moved to the card.  For a key generated on the card, there is (by
> design), no way to extract the secret key, including for the purpose 
> of
> backing it up

When you ask GnuPG to create an on-card key, it will ask you whether 
you want to keep a backup of the key or not.

If you choose to proceed without a backup, the key is generated 
on-card. I consider this the inferior of the two methods because I trust 
the RNG of Linux much more than I trust the RNG of a smartcard that 
costs a few euros to produce.

If you choose to have a backup, GnuPG will create the key just as it 
would for a normal on-disk key, and then upload that key to the 
smartcard and keep a backup file. This thus uses the RNG of your PC; on 
which I would be running Linux.

You could then discard the backup if you want to have the quality of 
the RNG of the PC but don't want the backup.

HTH,

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at 
<http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>


From dougb at dougbarton.email  Fri Mar 13 19:17:27 2015
From: dougb at dougbarton.email (Doug Barton)
Date: Fri, 13 Mar 2015 11:17:27 -0700
Subject: Enigmail speed geeking
In-Reply-To: <d809914c7b1290e9793a1d53ffd77e7e@butters.digitalbrains.com>
References: <550076F0.70507@sixdemonbag.org> <5500C21C.1000607@mailbox.org>
 <5501B5F3.5030503@sixdemonbag.org> <5501E665.1000801@dougbarton.email>
 <5502BB36.20106@digitalbrains.com> <5502EF6E.3040302@sixdemonbag.org>
 <d809914c7b1290e9793a1d53ffd77e7e@butters.digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <550329B7.8080000@dougbarton.email>

On 3/13/15 7:22 AM, Peter Lebbing wrote:
> I interpreted Dougs message as saying that a disadvantage of smartcards,
> as opposed to on-disk keys, is that you lose the key when the smartcard
> stops functioning. I was replying to this statement by Doug:
>
>> Further, the inconvenience of having to deal with generating and
>> socializing a new key if your smart card gets lost, becomes
>> inoperable, etc. is way too high a cost for near-zero benefit.
>
> So I say: you should use backups, duh.
>
> The fact that you /can/ use a smartcard without a backup, which as you
> say can be advantageous, by no means implies that you /cannot/ keep a
> backup. This is what I was saying.

Seriously? Wasn't it obvious from the context of what Robert and I wrote 
that we were talking about keys that existed only on a card? And even if 
that bit of subtlety escaped you, isn't it even more obvious that if you 
have a backup copy of the key already then the point I was making 
doesn't apply?

If neither of those things were obvious to you from the thread then 
maybe you should reconsider whether you should be posting on the topic 
at all.

Doug



From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Fri Mar 13 19:23:35 2015
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Fri, 13 Mar 2015 14:23:35 -0400
Subject: Enigmail speed geeking
In-Reply-To: <550329B7.8080000@dougbarton.email>
References: <550076F0.70507@sixdemonbag.org> <5500C21C.1000607@mailbox.org>
 <5501B5F3.5030503@sixdemonbag.org> <5501E665.1000801@dougbarton.email>
 <5502BB36.20106@digitalbrains.com> <5502EF6E.3040302@sixdemonbag.org>
 <d809914c7b1290e9793a1d53ffd77e7e@butters.digitalbrains.com>
 <550329B7.8080000@dougbarton.email>
Message-ID: <55032B27.8000503@sixdemonbag.org>

> Seriously? Wasn't it obvious from the context of what Robert and I
> wrote that we were talking about keys that existed only on a card?

Let's calm things down, folks.  :)

We're communicating in a text medium.  Sometimes, things we think are
obvious aren't obvious to others.  Let's take a deep breath and remember
that everyone's discussing things in good faith, okay?  :)

Nothing but peace here, guys.

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From dougb at dougbarton.email  Fri Mar 13 19:54:18 2015
From: dougb at dougbarton.email (Doug Barton)
Date: Fri, 13 Mar 2015 11:54:18 -0700
Subject: Enigmail speed geeking
In-Reply-To: <55032B27.8000503@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <550076F0.70507@sixdemonbag.org> <5500C21C.1000607@mailbox.org>
 <5501B5F3.5030503@sixdemonbag.org> <5501E665.1000801@dougbarton.email>
 <5502BB36.20106@digitalbrains.com> <5502EF6E.3040302@sixdemonbag.org>
 <d809914c7b1290e9793a1d53ffd77e7e@butters.digitalbrains.com>
 <550329B7.8080000@dougbarton.email> <55032B27.8000503@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <5503325A.5020808@dougbarton.email>

On 3/13/15 11:23 AM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
>> Seriously? Wasn't it obvious from the context of what Robert and
>> I wrote that we were talking about keys that existed only on a
>> card?
>
> Let's calm things down, folks.  :)

FWIW, I'm perfectly calm, as in the sense of not angry. But it is a
major source of frustration when folks take comments out of context to
use the tiniest bit of leverage with which to forward an agenda. It's
not only intellectually dishonest, but it's a massive waste of
everyone's time when the conversation devolves into the degree that
some argument is correct in some context, no matter how far removed it
is from the actual point under discussion.

Calling "BS" on that rhetorical technique may get me a shiny new
"Curmudgeon" badge to add to my collection, but I still think it's a
worthwhile exercise.

Doug



From antony at blazrsoft.com  Fri Mar 13 20:23:30 2015
From: antony at blazrsoft.com (Antony Prince)
Date: Fri, 13 Mar 2015 15:23:30 -0400
Subject: bugs.gnupg.org TLS certificate
In-Reply-To: <5502EDF2.8000202@asatiifm.net>
References: <CANyOob3zTYfjr9fg8PGFcEkn0cE9OoxwYqrFVZsKqbdYMZbqUA@mail.gmail.com>
 <87zj7jlc9t.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <20150312232158.GB18878@athena.barrera.io>
 <87y4n1fjmb.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <20150313085553.GA3688@athena.barrera.io> <20150313130430.GA31437@IUPUI.Edu>
 <871tktf2ng.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <5502EDF2.8000202@asatiifm.net>
Message-ID: <55033932.6000403@blazrsoft.com>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256

On 3/13/2015 10:02 AM, Ville M??tt? wrote:
> On 13.03.15 15:27, Werner Koch wrote:
>> The more expensive CAs are only selling you a fashionable background
>> color for your the client's address bar.
> 
> Essentially, that's it :).
> 
> There are however clearly defined hard requirements to the Extended
> Validation, aka "green bar" level. That is, more involved validation of
> the organization and the person requesting the certificate. But those EV
> certs can be had for cheaper than hundreds of dollars per year.
> 
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
> 

This topic brought to mind some interesting proposed RFCs that could
essentially eliminate the need for centralized certificate authorities.
Just wanted to get some opinions on the topics since its related to
certificate issues and the slavery of security to an external authority.
The combination of DNSSEC[1] and DANE[2] authentication can essentially
make a self-signed certificate as legitimate as one signed by an
"official" CA (if I'm not mistaken). There were some security
implications IIRC, but not being a professional on the subject, I'm not
sure what they were. I started implementing them on my own website and I
am very interested in seeing these proposals become official standards.
I'm also interested on anyone else's thoughts who might have more
insight into the downsides or repercussions of relying strictly on such
a system (if external CA's no longer existed, for example).


[1]https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4035
[2]https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6698

- -- 

Antony Prince

Key ID: 0x4F040744
Fingerprint: FE96 5B7F A708 18D3 B74B  959F A6E1 6242 4F04 0744
URL:
https://hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0xA6E162424F040744
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v2

iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJVAzkuAAoJEKbhYkJPBAdEYQkIAJtCFlUcXZP7jFBD8Ken4wvK
62TOFcwR8S8No0xmeFgCevwCzkB9B+wzFkI6mX1MvXIMZyhHUNstVqKw9Lq2lOj/
DTdyiV6L/XiZ9GpQd/2Ekd6GhwPGD4aoyenzrPsx1O0Ox5Wqc8cdG52qSiyaiQmT
jCHy2A4TED087jtfzR7sBbHmHUatNQD5hYzAmK9ZJocfzUMrZO7hzhRfwA2lzLon
UQdER3G+ob8L5/TpG/4Q3JoHCyECis3fws0HgUYobZz76zcQILod2nXTwlaEYFws
4Byz+iN7UEUWW+bFsDdOhHcZ2qP/sEbDKn9D1UKG+Y7xpIb9hHZinhlDPKg65Dk=
=wVE0
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


From jose.castillo at gmail.com  Fri Mar 13 21:13:38 2015
From: jose.castillo at gmail.com (Joey Castillo)
Date: Fri, 13 Mar 2015 16:13:38 -0400
Subject: Making the case for smart cards for the average user
Message-ID: <CAAocvpv5ChY9NKpkz0utkiyuNQay2n=DpPWcP1z7A0CoVf631A@mail.gmail.com>

Hi there,

I'm working on a Kickstarter right now that aims to popularize smart
cards as an easier way for the average user to adopt GnuPG.

https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/joeycastillo/signet-simple-online-privacy-cards

Putting aside any security benefits, smart cards seem simpler to use
for the average person. Unlocking a card with a PIN is a metaphor that
people already know and use with bank cards. Choosing and memorizing a
strong passphrase, by comparison, is something the average user is
likely to have trouble with.

Moreover, we're a multi-screen environment now; people expect to have
access to their stuff across devices. With a smart card they can keep
their secret keys in one place, as opposed to creating multiple points
of potential compromise. Plus by integrating NFC technology, we open
up the potential for use on smartphones and tablets, which is where
most people's computing is moving anyway.

Of course smart cards aren't some kind of magic bullet, but if the
goal is to drive wider adoption of GnuPG and OpenPGP based
cryptography, I can't shake the feeling that smart cards are a huge
part of the answer. Thoughts?

-- 

Joey Castillo
www.joeycastillo.com


From peter at digitalbrains.com  Fri Mar 13 22:17:23 2015
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Fri, 13 Mar 2015 22:17:23 +0100
Subject: Enigmail speed geeking
In-Reply-To: <5503325A.5020808@dougbarton.email>
References: <550076F0.70507@sixdemonbag.org> <5500C21C.1000607@mailbox.org>
 <5501B5F3.5030503@sixdemonbag.org> <5501E665.1000801@dougbarton.email>
 <5502BB36.20106@digitalbrains.com> <5502EF6E.3040302@sixdemonbag.org>
 <d809914c7b1290e9793a1d53ffd77e7e@butters.digitalbrains.com>
 <550329B7.8080000@dougbarton.email> <55032B27.8000503@sixdemonbag.org>
 <5503325A.5020808@dougbarton.email>
Message-ID: <202ba66fd7f4e5145b2f99c088100486@butters.digitalbrains.com>

On 2015-03-13 19:54, Doug Barton wrote:
> But it is a
> major source of frustration when folks take comments out of context 
> to
> use the tiniest bit of leverage with which to forward an agenda.

WHAT?!?!

It is true, text is a truly god awful medium to communicate in.

We are apparently completely unaware of each other's intentions. I 
honestly thought you thought a disadvantage of using a smartcard is that 
you lose the key once it breaks. It quite surprised me, but I've seen 
smart people have odd misconceptions of things[1], so I simply sought to 
rectify it.

Let's put this whole thing to rest. Nobody thinks you can't have a 
backup of a smartcard key, nobody thinks that a smartcard without a 
backup is a useless thing, and we should all go and read a nice book. 
Perhaps even for the third time, in my case. It's a nice book!

Peter.

[1] Sometimes in the mirror ;P

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at 
<http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>


From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Fri Mar 13 22:20:39 2015
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Fri, 13 Mar 2015 17:20:39 -0400
Subject: Making the case for smart cards for the average user
In-Reply-To: <CAAocvpv5ChY9NKpkz0utkiyuNQay2n=DpPWcP1z7A0CoVf631A@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAAocvpv5ChY9NKpkz0utkiyuNQay2n=DpPWcP1z7A0CoVf631A@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <550354A7.6080804@sixdemonbag.org>

> Of course smart cards aren't some kind of magic bullet, but if the 
> goal is to drive wider adoption of GnuPG and OpenPGP based 
> cryptography, I can't shake the feeling that smart cards are a huge 
> part of the answer. Thoughts?

(ObWarning: no facts, just opinions.)

I think the biggest problem we face, to be honest, is our conviction
that there's an answer out there and we just have to find it.  It seems
to me far more likely that it's like curing cancer -- if/when we finally
cure cancer, we won't cure cancer, because there is no single thing,
"cancer".  Cancer is a name we give to literally thousands of distinct
different diseases which have exactly one thing in common: uncontrolled
cell growth.  Leukemia isn't glioblastoma, and my wanting to keep my
email safe against sneaking sysadmins isn't the same as a human rights
worker in Syria who's living under persistent surveillance.

In a similar vein, I don't think we will ever reach "the answer" for
email crypto.  There are too many people with too many different use
cases, skill levels, threat models, needs, and so on.  Our obsession
with finding "the answer" seems to blind us to the possibilities of
making small positive changes in small communities, with the idea that
if we do this enough times, for enough small communities, we might be
able to make a difference overall.

So -- no, I actually don't hold out much hope for your project.  Smart
cards are not part of the answer, because I don't think there's an
answer to be had.

But smart cards could definitely be a part of many small answers.  :)


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From peter at digitalbrains.com  Fri Mar 13 22:26:21 2015
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Fri, 13 Mar 2015 22:26:21 +0100
Subject: Enigmail speed geeking
In-Reply-To: <5cda1031caf0f94f8eff9c414aaf4955@butters.digitalbrains.com>
References: <550076F0.70507@sixdemonbag.org> <5500C21C.1000607@mailbox.org>
 <5501B5F3.5030503@sixdemonbag.org> <5501E665.1000801@dougbarton.email>
 <5502BB36.20106@digitalbrains.com> <5502EF6E.3040302@sixdemonbag.org>
 <d809914c7b1290e9793a1d53ffd77e7e@butters.digitalbrains.com>
 <CANyOob3bECBW5SQBcksgURBtw5KVPxZ6zTpdhdFuo_kK9W8E8g@mail.gmail.com>
 <5cda1031caf0f94f8eff9c414aaf4955@butters.digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <c14447642c73c374d1c6e9dd130de569@butters.digitalbrains.com>

On 2015-03-13 15:40, Peter Lebbing wrote:
> I consider this the inferior of the two methods because I
> trust the RNG of Linux much more than I trust the RNG of a smartcard
> that costs a few euros to produce.

Make that: I trust the RNG of GnuPG. There's more to it than what is 
provided by the Linux kernel. I should have acknowledged this extra work 
done by the GnuPG developers.

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at 
<http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>


From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Fri Mar 13 22:33:05 2015
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Fri, 13 Mar 2015 17:33:05 -0400
Subject: Enigmail speed geeking
In-Reply-To: <c14447642c73c374d1c6e9dd130de569@butters.digitalbrains.com>
References: <550076F0.70507@sixdemonbag.org> <5500C21C.1000607@mailbox.org>
 <5501B5F3.5030503@sixdemonbag.org> <5501E665.1000801@dougbarton.email>
 <5502BB36.20106@digitalbrains.com> <5502EF6E.3040302@sixdemonbag.org>
 <d809914c7b1290e9793a1d53ffd77e7e@butters.digitalbrains.com>
 <CANyOob3bECBW5SQBcksgURBtw5KVPxZ6zTpdhdFuo_kK9W8E8g@mail.gmail.com>
 <5cda1031caf0f94f8eff9c414aaf4955@butters.digitalbrains.com>
 <c14447642c73c374d1c6e9dd130de569@butters.digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <55035791.6070102@sixdemonbag.org>

> Make that: I trust the RNG of GnuPG. There's more to it than what is 
> provided by the Linux kernel.

Be careful.  When was the last time you checked the GnuPG code?  And
when was the last time you checked the options your distro maintainer
used to build your GnuPG?  :)

GnuPG doesn't have one RNG.  It has *many* RNGs.  Some of them are
really just thin wrappers over lower-level OS facilities.  And if you
don't trust /dev/urandom, I'd suggest using a different operating
system, because that's a game-over compromise.  It's like not trusting
CryptGenRand on Win32.

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From stebe at mailbox.org  Fri Mar 13 23:19:53 2015
From: stebe at mailbox.org (Stephan Beck)
Date: Fri, 13 Mar 2015 23:19:53 +0100
Subject: Enigmail speed geeking
In-Reply-To: <55035791.6070102@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <550076F0.70507@sixdemonbag.org> <5500C21C.1000607@mailbox.org>
 <5501B5F3.5030503@sixdemonbag.org> <5501E665.1000801@dougbarton.email>
 <5502BB36.20106@digitalbrains.com> <5502EF6E.3040302@sixdemonbag.org>
 <d809914c7b1290e9793a1d53ffd77e7e@butters.digitalbrains.com>
 <CANyOob3bECBW5SQBcksgURBtw5KVPxZ6zTpdhdFuo_kK9W8E8g@mail.gmail.com>
 <5cda1031caf0f94f8eff9c414aaf4955@butters.digitalbrains.com>
 <c14447642c73c374d1c6e9dd130de569@butters.digitalbrains.com>
 <55035791.6070102@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <55036289.7020001@mailbox.org>

Am 13.03.2015 um 22:33 schrieb Robert J. Hansen:

> GnuPG doesn't have one RNG.  It has *many* RNGs.  Some of them are
> really just thin wrappers over lower-level OS facilities.  And if you
> don't trust /dev/urandom, I'd suggest using a different operating
> system, because that's a game-over compromise.  

Wouldn't the installation of haveged, at least for GNU/linux distros, extend the
possibilities of traditional /dev/(u)random based RNG? Wouldn't GnuPG benefit
from it? No expert, just curious, prepared to receive a game-over knockout. :)

Stephan

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From dgouttegattat at incenp.org  Fri Mar 13 23:31:08 2015
From: dgouttegattat at incenp.org (Damien Goutte-Gattat)
Date: Fri, 13 Mar 2015 23:31:08 +0100
Subject: bugs.gnupg.org TLS certificate
In-Reply-To: <55033932.6000403@blazrsoft.com>
References: <CANyOob3zTYfjr9fg8PGFcEkn0cE9OoxwYqrFVZsKqbdYMZbqUA@mail.gmail.com>
 <87zj7jlc9t.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <20150312232158.GB18878@athena.barrera.io>
 <87y4n1fjmb.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <20150313085553.GA3688@athena.barrera.io> <20150313130430.GA31437@IUPUI.Edu>
 <871tktf2ng.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <5502EDF2.8000202@asatiifm.net>
 <55033932.6000403@blazrsoft.com>
Message-ID: <5503652C.2010306@incenp.org>

On 03/13/2015 08:23 PM, Antony Prince wrote:
> I am very interested in seeing these proposals become official standards.

The fact that they are called ?proposed standards? does not really mean 
anything. Many widely deployed and successful IETF protocols are still 
officially considered ?proposed standard? and not ?Internet standard?, 
that does not make them less official.

DNSSEC and DANE are as much ?official standards? as, for example, 
OpenPGP (RFC 4880) and the X.509 PKI system (RFC 5280).


> I'm also interested on anyone else's thoughts who might have more
> insight into the downsides or repercussions of relying strictly on such
> a system (if external CA's no longer existed, for example).

I don?t have any more insight, but I?d say that the main downside of 
both DNSSEC and DANE is that almost no TLS client implements them?

As far as I know, most if not all of the DNS resolvers immediately 
available on a client system don?t perform DNSSEC validation.

Even if we assume that the system DNS resolver is DNSSEC-capable, I 
don?t know of any browser (or any other kind of TLS client software) 
that care about DNSSEC and/or TLSA records. For Firefox, you have to 
install a third-party extension [1], and for Chrome, support of DANE is 
not on Google?s agenda [2] (they prefer to rely on Certificate 
Transparency [3] instead, which in my opinion does not solve any of the 
main problems of the PKIX system, but this is another subject).

I am, too, very interested in DANE, and in fact I have great hopes in it 
(all my TLS servers have TLSA records, and my browser can check them). 
But we are very far from the point where nobody would need to rely on 
?trusted? external CAs.


[1] https://www.dnssec-validator.cz/

[2] https://www.imperialviolet.org/2015/01/17/notdane.html

[3] http://www.certificate-transparency.org/what-is-ct

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From dougb at dougbarton.email  Fri Mar 13 23:31:48 2015
From: dougb at dougbarton.email (Doug Barton)
Date: Fri, 13 Mar 2015 15:31:48 -0700
Subject: Enigmail speed geeking
In-Reply-To: <202ba66fd7f4e5145b2f99c088100486@butters.digitalbrains.com>
References: <550076F0.70507@sixdemonbag.org> <5500C21C.1000607@mailbox.org>
 <5501B5F3.5030503@sixdemonbag.org> <5501E665.1000801@dougbarton.email>
 <5502BB36.20106@digitalbrains.com> <5502EF6E.3040302@sixdemonbag.org>
 <d809914c7b1290e9793a1d53ffd77e7e@butters.digitalbrains.com>
 <550329B7.8080000@dougbarton.email> <55032B27.8000503@sixdemonbag.org>
 <5503325A.5020808@dougbarton.email>
 <202ba66fd7f4e5145b2f99c088100486@butters.digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <55036554.7050806@dougbarton.email>

On 3/13/15 2:17 PM, Peter Lebbing wrote:
> On 2015-03-13 19:54, Doug Barton wrote:
>> But it is a
>> major source of frustration when folks take comments out of context to
>> use the tiniest bit of leverage with which to forward an agenda.
>
> WHAT?!?!
>
> It is true, text is a truly god awful medium to communicate in.
>
> We are apparently completely unaware of each other's intentions. I
> honestly thought you thought a disadvantage of using a smartcard is that
> you lose the key once it breaks. It quite surprised me, but I've seen
> smart people have odd misconceptions of things[1], so I simply sought to
> rectify it.
>
> Let's put this whole thing to rest. Nobody thinks you can't have a
> backup of a smartcard key, nobody thinks that a smartcard without a
> backup is a useless thing, and we should all go and read a nice book.
> Perhaps even for the third time, in my case. It's a nice book!
>
> Peter.
>
> [1] Sometimes in the mirror ;P

Thank you for clarifying.

Doug



From stebe at mailbox.org  Fri Mar 13 23:56:55 2015
From: stebe at mailbox.org (Stephan Beck)
Date: Fri, 13 Mar 2015 23:56:55 +0100
Subject: Question concerning OpenLDAP PGP Keyserver setup guide
 (wiki.gnupg.org)
In-Reply-To: <55021A80.40203@mailbox.org>
References: <55021A80.40203@mailbox.org>
Message-ID: <55036B37.9000704@mailbox.org>

Obviously, this ** has to be OpenLDAP(slapd)2.4.31 not 3, sorry! Still stuck in
there, though.

Am 13.03.2015 um 00:00 schrieb Stephan Beck:
> Hi,
> 
> reproducing the OpenLDAP PGP keyserver setup guide on http://wiki.gnupg.org,
> published by Neal, I get the following error message:
> 
> ldapmodify: wrong attributeType at line 5, entry "olcDatabase={1}hdb,cn=config"
> 
> I am reproducing the guide on debian stable (main sources only), which uses
> "hdb" (not "mdb") database format, *OpenLDAP3*, being the server package slapd.
> 
> To see the error message in its context:
> 
> 
> $ sudo ldapsearch -LLL -Y EXTERNAL -H ldapi:/// -b "cn=config"  | grep olcDatabase:
> SASL/EXTERNAL authentication started
> SASL username: gidNumber=0+uidNumber=0,cn=peercred,cn=external,cn=auth
> SASL SSF: 0
> olcDatabase: {-1}frontend
> olcDatabase: {0}config
> olcDatabase: {1}hdb
> 
> 
> $ sudo ldapmodify -Y EXTERNAL -H ldapi:/// -f /tmp/keyserver-acls.ldif
> SASL/EXTERNAL authentication started
> SASL username: gidNumber=0+uidNumber=0,cn=peercred,cn=external,cn=auth
> SASL SSF: 0
> ldapmodify: wrong attributeType at line 5, entry "olcDatabase={1}hdb,cn=config"
> 
> 
> contents of keyserver-acls.ldif are as follows:
> 
> 
> # userPassword may be written only by users themselves
> dn: olcDatabase={1}hdb,cn=config
> changetype: modify
> add: olcAccess
> # Allow access via localhost to add or modify keys.
> # Allow authenticated PGP Users to update keys.
> # Allow anyone else to read the keys.
> olcAccess: {2} to dn.subtree="ou=PGP Keys,dc=FOO,dc=EXAMPLE,dc=ORG"
>   by peername.ip=127.0.0.1 write
>   by peername.ip=:: write
>   by dn.regex="^uid=([^,]+),ou=PGP Users,dc=FOO,dc=EXAMPLE,dc=ORG" write
>   by * read
> 
> # Allow any connection to localhost to update the PGP keys
> # (including removing them!)  This is only needed if the anonymous
> # updates from localhost are desired.
> dn: cn=config
> add: olcAllows
> olcAllows: update_anon
> --------------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> It seems that the error message indicates that line 5
> 
> by peername.ip=127.0.0.1 write
> 
> has a a wrong attribute type.
> 
> I checked the LDAP for Rocket scientists guide on zytrax.com (1) and (3) for
> hours, and also some documentation about the peername.ip attribute, but I cannot
> figure out what's wrong.
> I found that there are 2 ways of using the peername.[ip] attribute.
> 
> If you use it with ipv4 you do not have to put peername.ipv4, but just
> peername.ip, being the value (127.0.0.1) that which defines the format (ipv4).
> With ipv6 you would have to specify it, i.e. peername.ipv6=[ipv6]
> 
> The other way is using "peername.[type]" but that's not the case here.
> 
> 
> Is there anyone who can lend me a hand?
> 
> TIA
> 
> Stephan
> 
> Note: On slapd debconf install I used FOO.EXAMPLE.ORG, so whenever the wiki
> guide uses dc=EXAMPLE,dc=ORG I use dc=FOO,dc=EXAMPLE,dc=ORG
> 
> (1) http://www.zytrax.com/books/ldap/ch6
> (2) http://www.zytrax.com/books/ldap/ch3
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
> 




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From antony at blazrsoft.com  Sat Mar 14 02:28:47 2015
From: antony at blazrsoft.com (Antony Prince)
Date: Fri, 13 Mar 2015 21:28:47 -0400
Subject: bugs.gnupg.org TLS certificate
In-Reply-To: <5503652C.2010306@incenp.org>
References: <CANyOob3zTYfjr9fg8PGFcEkn0cE9OoxwYqrFVZsKqbdYMZbqUA@mail.gmail.com>
 <87zj7jlc9t.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <20150312232158.GB18878@athena.barrera.io>
 <87y4n1fjmb.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <20150313085553.GA3688@athena.barrera.io> <20150313130430.GA31437@IUPUI.Edu>
 <871tktf2ng.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <5502EDF2.8000202@asatiifm.net>
 <55033932.6000403@blazrsoft.com> <5503652C.2010306@incenp.org>
Message-ID: <55038ECF.3000802@blazrsoft.com>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256

On 3/13/2015 6:31 PM, Damien Goutte-Gattat wrote:
> The fact that they are called ?proposed standards? does not really mean
> anything. Many widely deployed and successful IETF protocols are still
> officially considered ?proposed standard? and not ?Internet standard?,
> that does not make them less official.

I know what you mean. They were proposed years ago and still maintain
the "proposed" status.

> I don?t have any more insight, but I?d say that the main downside of
> both DNSSEC and DANE is that almost no TLS client implements them?
> 
> As far as I know, most if not all of the DNS resolvers immediately
> available on a client system don?t perform DNSSEC validation.

I use BIND(named) as my DNS server and it is DNSSEC capable as well as
DLV-Lookaside capable. Google's public DNS server are also capable of
both as well since I used them a lot for DNS record timeout testing
among other things.

> Even if we assume that the system DNS resolver is DNSSEC-capable, I
> don?t know of any browser (or any other kind of TLS client software)
> that care about DNSSEC and/or TLSA records. For Firefox, you have to
> install a third-party extension [1], and for Chrome, support of DANE is
> not on Google?s agenda [2] (they prefer to rely on Certificate
> Transparency [3] instead, which in my opinion does not solve any of the
> main problems of the PKIX system, but this is another subject).

I have the Firefox extension myself and refuse to use Chrome since, IMO,
its nothing more than a bloated version of the Gecko engine which does a
lot of useless crap I'm not interested in. Your mileage may vary. LOL.
But that is another problem with its adoption as a standard is that most
(if not all) mainstream browsers don't support it natively.

> I am, too, very interested in DANE, and in fact I have great hopes in it
> (all my TLS servers have TLSA records, and my browser can check them).
> But we are very far from the point where nobody would need to rely on
> ?trusted? external CAs.

This I think is the main problem. It's adoption has not become
mainstream. I'm of the conspiracy theory opinion that its the CA's who
are making sure it stays in the background because otherwise they could
potentially lose their entire market if everyone realized they didn't
need a CA to properly and securely validate their certificates. (Pure
personal opinion here, no facts to back it up). My domain is secured via
DNSSEC and all my certificates have TLSA records to back them up. I'm no
professional at server administration, so if I can do it, anyone can.
Its disheartening to see something so promising pushed to the side for
so long when it could be a major benefit as far as internet security is
concerned. Thanks for your reply BTW. :)

- -- 

Antony Prince

Key ID: 0x4F040744
Fingerprint: FE96 5B7F A708 18D3 B74B  959F A6E1 6242 4F04 0744
URL:
https://hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0xA6E162424F040744
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TrBx+GNhbziFGHFDOo8i4uAwio4ydG1VfdgbZazbxt2pf+Bgj3rvpzPE8iKtozk=
=YDqt
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


From antony at blazrsoft.com  Sat Mar 14 02:35:56 2015
From: antony at blazrsoft.com (Antony Prince)
Date: Fri, 13 Mar 2015 21:35:56 -0400
Subject: bugs.gnupg.org TLS certificate
In-Reply-To: <55038ECF.3000802@blazrsoft.com>
References: <CANyOob3zTYfjr9fg8PGFcEkn0cE9OoxwYqrFVZsKqbdYMZbqUA@mail.gmail.com>
 <87zj7jlc9t.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <20150312232158.GB18878@athena.barrera.io>
 <87y4n1fjmb.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <20150313085553.GA3688@athena.barrera.io> <20150313130430.GA31437@IUPUI.Edu>
 <871tktf2ng.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <5502EDF2.8000202@asatiifm.net>
 <55033932.6000403@blazrsoft.com> <5503652C.2010306@incenp.org>
 <55038ECF.3000802@blazrsoft.com>
Message-ID: <5503907C.8080603@blazrsoft.com>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
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On 3/13/2015 9:28 PM, Antony Prince wrote:
>> As far as I know, most if not all of the DNS resolvers
>> immediately
>>> available on a client system don?t perform DNSSEC validation.
> I use BIND(named) as my DNS server and it is DNSSEC capable as well
> as DLV-Lookaside capable. Google's public DNS server are also
> capable of both as well since I used them a lot for DNS record
> timeout testing among other things.
> 


My mistake. You said resolvers, not servers. Only a minor difference
there. Great! The server supports it! The resolver doesn't care! ;-)

- -- 

Antony Prince

Key ID: 0x4F040744
Fingerprint: FE96 5B7F A708 18D3 B74B  959F A6E1 6242 4F04 0744
URL:
https://hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0xA6E162424F040744
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v2

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=9mpV
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


From peter at digitalbrains.com  Sat Mar 14 10:59:02 2015
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Sat, 14 Mar 2015 10:59:02 +0100
Subject: Enigmail speed geeking
In-Reply-To: <55035791.6070102@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <550076F0.70507@sixdemonbag.org> <5500C21C.1000607@mailbox.org>
 <5501B5F3.5030503@sixdemonbag.org> <5501E665.1000801@dougbarton.email>
 <5502BB36.20106@digitalbrains.com> <5502EF6E.3040302@sixdemonbag.org>
 <d809914c7b1290e9793a1d53ffd77e7e@butters.digitalbrains.com>
 <CANyOob3bECBW5SQBcksgURBtw5KVPxZ6zTpdhdFuo_kK9W8E8g@mail.gmail.com>
 <5cda1031caf0f94f8eff9c414aaf4955@butters.digitalbrains.com>
 <c14447642c73c374d1c6e9dd130de569@butters.digitalbrains.com>
 <55035791.6070102@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <55040666.5090306@digitalbrains.com>

On 13/03/15 22:33, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> And if you don't trust /dev/urandom, I'd suggest using a different 
> operating system, because that's a game-over compromise.

I trust both /dev/random and the sanity of the default settings of
GnuPG. And when I'm generating a key in GnuPG, I put my trust in both. I
don't know what is all going on in GnuPG for generating the highest
quality of randomness, but it's more than "cat /dev/random". It was
simply incomplete to just say "Linux's RNG", and it didn't acknowledge
the effort the GnuPG developers put into the code that generates the
randomness.

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at <http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>


From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net  Sat Mar 14 13:53:55 2015
From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA)
Date: Sat, 14 Mar 2015 12:53:55 +0000
Subject: Making the case for smart cards for the average user
In-Reply-To: <CAAocvpv5ChY9NKpkz0utkiyuNQay2n=DpPWcP1z7A0CoVf631A@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAAocvpv5ChY9NKpkz0utkiyuNQay2n=DpPWcP1z7A0CoVf631A@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <1479786172.20150314125355@my_localhost>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512



On Friday 13 March 2015 at 8:13:38 PM, in
<mid:CAAocvpv5ChY9NKpkz0utkiyuNQay2n=DpPWcP1z7A0CoVf631A at mail.gmail.com>,
Joey Castillo wrote:


> Unlocking a card
> with a PIN is a metaphor that people already know and
> use with bank cards.

Yes, and a sizeable minority have problems with this method of using
bank cards.



> Choosing and memorizing a strong
> passphrase, by comparison, is something the average
> user is likely to have trouble with.

This trouble goes away for the "average user" who uses a password
manager.



> Moreover, we're a multi-screen environment now; people
> expect to have access to their stuff across devices.
> With a smart card they can keep their secret keys in
> one place, as opposed to creating multiple points of
> potential compromise.

It there not still potential compromise each time you use it, such as
the possibility of malware substituting the message?



> Plus by integrating NFC
> technology, we open up the potential for use on
> smartphones and tablets, which is where most people's
> computing is moving anyway.

How secure is the NFC communication? Could a situation be contrived
where the person next to you in a crowd managed to get you to sign a
message on their device instead of your own?


- --
Best regards

MFPA                    mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net

The best way to destroy your enemy is to make him your friend.
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From flapflap at riseup.net  Sat Mar 14 17:40:57 2015
From: flapflap at riseup.net (flapflap)
Date: Sat, 14 Mar 2015 16:40:57 +0000
Subject: gpg in a =?windows-1252?Q?cybercaf=E9?=
In-Reply-To: <20150310132322.c69406fe8db7765f1f429a67@webkeks.org>
References: <1425468587.871457089@f386.i.mail.ru>
 <20150305183045.0a84427bb224d379f41d4152@webkeks.org>
 <54F8D858.7080307@riseup.net>
 <20150310132322.c69406fe8db7765f1f429a67@webkeks.org>
Message-ID: <55046499.5020203@riseup.net>

Jonathan Schleifer:
> On Thu, 05 Mar 2015 22:27:36 +0000, flapflap <flapflap at riseup.net> wrote:
> 
>> The current version (1.3) of Tails comes with GnuPG 1.4.12.
> 
> That's just not true. Not only is the gpg2 command available, but the change log even explicitly states that GnuPG 2 was added to improve smartcard support.

oh sorry, I have missed that. I just tried `gpg --version' and not `gpg2
--version'.

amnesia at amnesia:~$ gpg --version
gpg (GnuPG) 1.4.12
[...]

amnesia at amnesia:~$ gpg2 --version
gpg (GnuPG) 2.0.25
libgcrypt 1.5.0
[...]

~flapflap

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From philip.jackson at nordnet.fr  Sat Mar 14 17:52:54 2015
From: philip.jackson at nordnet.fr (Philip Jackson)
Date: Sat, 14 Mar 2015 17:52:54 +0100
Subject: Making the case for smart cards for the average user
In-Reply-To: <CAAocvpv5ChY9NKpkz0utkiyuNQay2n=DpPWcP1z7A0CoVf631A@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAAocvpv5ChY9NKpkz0utkiyuNQay2n=DpPWcP1z7A0CoVf631A@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <55046766.4020203@nordnet.fr>

On 13/03/15 21:13, Joey Castillo wrote:
> Hi there,
> 
> I'm working on a Kickstarter right now that aims to popularize smart
> cards as an easier way for the average user to adopt GnuPG.
> 
> https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/joeycastillo/signet-simple-online-privacy-cards
> 
Geographic distribution of the product seems to be limited to US only - at least
for your sponsors.

Philip






From jose.castillo at gmail.com  Sat Mar 14 22:00:08 2015
From: jose.castillo at gmail.com (Joey Castillo)
Date: Sat, 14 Mar 2015 17:00:08 -0400
Subject: Making the case for smart cards for the average user
Message-ID: <CAAocvpuOT+Ezp6p3Genj4qrFiW4kN84aQxMJyw+mELah-GXL-Q@mail.gmail.com>

I'll concede the first point: some minority of people won't get it
even if we make it simpler. As to the second one: even with a password
manager, the security of that still depends on choosing and guarding a
complex password to secure the password store. It's passwords all the
way down.

>> With a smart card they can keep their secret keys in
>> one place, as opposed to creating multiple points of
>> potential compromise.
>
> It there not still potential compromise each time you use it, such as
> the possibility of malware substituting the message?

Certainly; if your system is compromised by malware it could
substitute the message, store session keys, or keylog your PIN for
that matter. If your system is compromised, all bets are off. The
difference is that with your keys on a smart card, at least such a
breach won't compromise your secret key material. And you can prevent
further unauthorized use by simply removing the card; this is not
possible if the attacker has stolen your keyring and passphrase.

Without smart cards, if I want to use GnuPG on my laptop, my iPhone
and my Nexus 7, I have to put my secret key on each of those devices
and enter my passphrase into each of those devices. This dramatically
increases the surface area available for an attack on my secret keys.

> How secure is the NFC communication? Could a situation be contrived
> where the person next to you in a crowd managed to get you to sign a
> message on their device instead of your own?

In practice, you have to more or less touch the card to the device
you're using it with; an attacker would have to generate an RF field
that overpowers the one generated by the device. But yes: with
specialized equipment and close proximity, an attacker could
theoretically modify data or eavesdrop. [1] It's a tradeoff: in
exchange for better security for my secret key material, I'm exposing
myself to a threat from a determined, active attacker that's able to
get specialized gear into the same room as me while I'm using my card.
For some minority of people, that may be a reasonable concern; for
most people, it really isn't.

Also, there's nothing preventing us from better securing the NFC
channel in a future card specification; in particular, NFC's
resistance to man in the middle attacks makes it easy to establish a
shared secret to secure the channel, as proposed in a 2010 standard.
[2]

[1]: http://events.iaik.tugraz.at/RFIDSec06/Program/papers/002%20-%20Security%20in%20NFC.pdf
[2]: http://www.ecma-international.org/publications/files/ECMA-ST/ECMA-386.pdf

-- 

Joey Castillo
www.joeycastillo.com


From jose.castillo at gmail.com  Sat Mar 14 22:23:45 2015
From: jose.castillo at gmail.com (Joey Castillo)
Date: Sat, 14 Mar 2015 17:23:45 -0400
Subject: Making the case for smart cards for the average user
Message-ID: <CAAocvpsO7DD-44hJvr1_m07M2BXGLPMuc1C+NPM0t6Qe1sD5kw@mail.gmail.com>

On 14/03/15 17:52, Philip Jackson wrote:
> https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/joeycastillo/signet-simple-online-privacy-cards
>
> Geographic distribution of the product seems to be limited
> to US only - at least for your sponsors.

I desperately wanted to make it worldwide, but feared running afoul of
U.S. cryptographic export laws. Since both GnuPG and the smart card
application are open source, my sense was that it would be exempt from
export controls, but I didn't want to check the box without speaking
to a lawyer.

To quote the OpenSSL foundation [1], "U.S. exports controls are
complex and quite nonsensical from the perspective of the uninitiated
professional software developer."

[1]: http://www.opensslfoundation.com/export/README.blurb

--

Joey Castillo
www.joeycastillo.com


From jose.castillo at gmail.com  Sat Mar 14 23:37:18 2015
From: jose.castillo at gmail.com (Joey Castillo)
Date: Sat, 14 Mar 2015 18:37:18 -0400
Subject: Making the case for smart cards for the average user
Message-ID: <CAAocvpvEqs-tQ-rEki8AX3spdSt8P5TG0+KoXVtufW0Azy9wDQ@mail.gmail.com>

On 13/03/15 17:20, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> (ObWarning: no facts, just opinions.)
>
> I think the biggest problem we face, to be honest, is our conviction
> that there's an answer out there and we just have to find it.
> ...

Thanks for your thoughtful response. I think it's absolutely true that
different people have different security needs, but I wonder if we
can't make progress for an average person's use case.

I'm recalling a message you wrote some months ago making the point
that GnuPG is a cryptographic toolbox, but that it does not provide
policy. That's one of the things I've been trying to get at with this
project, writing guidelines for the people who participate on how they
should use the tools. The goal is to simplify not just everyday things
like how to make a key or encrypt an email, but also more complex
things like "what is my identity and how do I verify it?" [1]

I'm certain that this is not "the answer" for everyone's use case, and
I also know that even if this Kickstarter project gets funded, the end
result will be a small community, not a world-changing critical mass
of people. But it might provide a collaborative place where we can
test out a policy framework and see how well it performs for people
who aren't as intimately familiar with the tools.

That's the thing that excites me, and the thing that I think might
make a difference. Because if the human rights worker in Syria wants
to communicate securely with, say, an academic in the U.S., we have to
figure out a simple way to introduce that person to the tools as well.

[1]: https://github.com/josecastillo/signet/blob/master/guidelines.md#certification-and-trust

-- 

Joey Castillo
www.joeycastillo.com


From gniibe at fsij.org  Sun Mar 15 09:47:51 2015
From: gniibe at fsij.org (NIIBE Yutaka)
Date: Sun, 15 Mar 2015 17:47:51 +0900
Subject: Making the case for smart cards for the average user
In-Reply-To: <CAAocvpv5ChY9NKpkz0utkiyuNQay2n=DpPWcP1z7A0CoVf631A@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAAocvpv5ChY9NKpkz0utkiyuNQay2n=DpPWcP1z7A0CoVf631A@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <55054737.90304@fsij.org>

On 03/14/2015 05:13 AM, Joey Castillo wrote:
> Of course smart cards aren't some kind of magic bullet, but if the
> goal is to drive wider adoption of GnuPG and OpenPGP based
> cryptography, I can't shake the feeling that smart cards are a huge
> part of the answer. Thoughts?

I think that smartcard is _not_ the "must", and having private keys on
host PC as files are good, given the condition where user keeps
computer safe.  If a user is good at administrating POSIX system (or
whatever operating system) and managing specific files, it would be
safer than using unfamiliar hardware.  And... users should keep their
computer safe from the beginning, you know.

Well, when I needed to make copies of private keys (for multiple
computers), I felt anxious.  This is a major reason why I started
using OpenPGPcard, and then, I started to develop Gnuk.

For myself and for the one of release keys of GnuPG, I use Gnuk
Tokens.

However, please note that the situation is not that perfect.

Please note that I have been doing my best to improve GnuPG's
smartcard support (especially about its stability), now, it only
supports basic smartcard things.  For example, you can easily find a
lack of multiple cards / tokens support.  We need more improvements
here (and there).

I'm happy that I can see people discuss about using smartcard/token
for GnuPG nowadays.  I interpret it as the stability/usefulness of
scdaemon.  If not, please file a bug report or two. :-)


>From here, it's tl;dr. :-)  It is a somehow long story.

The culture/practice around smartcard, especially the industry (in
Japan), is not friendly to free software development.  Basically, they
require NDA here and there.  Although many engineers just say "we
support FLOSS", there are conflicts in practice, when they try to give
technical information to outside.

In general, for free software, it is difficult (or simply no way
sometimes) to support existing smartcards.  It is mostly similar for
smartcard readers, although the situation is better than the smartcard
itself.

When I started Gnuk on 2010, I had expected it were the (last)
missing piece.  I soon realized that I was wrong.  And we still have
many things to do in 2015.

I worked and I am working for:

    * Firmware as free software: Gnuk
    * TRNG implementation: NeuG
    * Reference hardware: FST-01
    * Software improvements on host PC: scdaemon

... while I highly depend on:

    * Improvements of development environment: GCC, OpenOCD, KiCAD, etc.

... and I would like to do something around:

    * Improvements on OpenPGPcard specification

Well, I'm afraid... the situation around smartcard for GnuPG is not
yet mature enough to invite average users.

My focus is on the development of those things, and my work is
supported by the sales of FST-01.  Since the situation is not mature
enough (for me), I am caught in a dilemma: I want to sell more FST-01,
but selling more FST-01 now means more possible troubles (to me).

If someone is a user of GnuPG already, I could invite him to use Gnuk
Token.  I mean, I could sell FST-01 with Gnuk to him, and I would say
that the access using SSH could be also safe and easier.

However, if it is the first time for him to use any tool of Free
Software, it would be difficult for me to help him effectively.  When
I need to start from the explanation of the difference of proprietary
software and free software, I would hesitate in some occasions.  Yes,
I _do_ or I try to do so (not always, but most cases), but my physical
body and my hours are limited.

Or, if it is the first time for him to use any smartcard/token on his
system, it would be difficult for me to help him effectively.

Because of this situation, I don't advertise FST-01 much to general
public, while I believe Gnuk Token would be better solution in many
cases.  I think that it's ready for the evaluation by developers and
experienced users of Free Software.
-- 


From al-gnupg_users at none.at  Sun Mar 15 10:43:32 2015
From: al-gnupg_users at none.at (Aleksandar Lazic)
Date: Sun, 15 Mar 2015 10:43:32 +0100
Subject: Making the case for smart cards for the average user
In-Reply-To: <CAAocvpv5ChY9NKpkz0utkiyuNQay2n=DpPWcP1z7A0CoVf631A@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAAocvpv5ChY9NKpkz0utkiyuNQay2n=DpPWcP1z7A0CoVf631A@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <2648f241dfefd05ddd272e5b43591f79@none.at>

Hi.

Am 13-03-2015 21:13, schrieb Joey Castillo:
> Hi there,
> 
> I'm working on a Kickstarter right now that aims to popularize smart
> cards as an easier way for the average user to adopt GnuPG.
> 
> https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/joeycastillo/signet-simple-online-privacy-cards
> 
> Putting aside any security benefits, smart cards seem simpler to use
> for the average person. Unlocking a card with a PIN is a metaphor that
> people already know and use with bank cards. Choosing and memorizing a
> strong passphrase, by comparison, is something the average user is
> likely to have trouble with.

[snipp]

Today a lot of people sends there mail over smart phone (Androdid, 
IPhone, Blackberry, ....)
How can I use "any" smartcard with this devices?

BR Aleks


From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Sun Mar 15 13:57:21 2015
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Sun, 15 Mar 2015 08:57:21 -0400
Subject: Making the case for smart cards for the average user
In-Reply-To: <CAAocvpvEqs-tQ-rEki8AX3spdSt8P5TG0+KoXVtufW0Azy9wDQ@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAAocvpvEqs-tQ-rEki8AX3spdSt8P5TG0+KoXVtufW0Azy9wDQ@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <550581B1.2030701@sixdemonbag.org>

> Thanks for your thoughtful response. I think it's absolutely true
> that different people have different security needs, but I wonder if
> we can't make progress for an average person's use case.

I disagree: I don't believe there is an "average person" or an "average
use case".

But please, don't mistake this for discouragement!  I just want to
caution you against judging your efforts by an impossible standard.
Your efforts are very unlikely to be "the solution", because (IMO) there
is no single solution.  But that does not invalidate the benefit some
will receive from what you do.

Really, please read this as strong encouragement.  But please don't
judge your success by an unachievable goal.  You deserve better
treatment than that.  :)


From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Sun Mar 15 13:59:42 2015
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Sun, 15 Mar 2015 08:59:42 -0400
Subject: Enigmail speed geeking
In-Reply-To: <55036289.7020001@mailbox.org>
References: <550076F0.70507@sixdemonbag.org> <5500C21C.1000607@mailbox.org>
 <5501B5F3.5030503@sixdemonbag.org> <5501E665.1000801@dougbarton.email>
 <5502BB36.20106@digitalbrains.com> <5502EF6E.3040302@sixdemonbag.org>
 <d809914c7b1290e9793a1d53ffd77e7e@butters.digitalbrains.com>
 <CANyOob3bECBW5SQBcksgURBtw5KVPxZ6zTpdhdFuo_kK9W8E8g@mail.gmail.com>
 <5cda1031caf0f94f8eff9c414aaf4955@butters.digitalbrains.com>
 <c14447642c73c374d1c6e9dd130de569@butters.digitalbrains.com>
 <55035791.6070102@sixdemonbag.org> <55036289.7020001@mailbox.org>
Message-ID: <5505823E.5070704@sixdemonbag.org>

> Wouldn't the installation of haveged, at least for GNU/linux distros,
> extend the possibilities of traditional /dev/(u)random based RNG?

No idea -- I haven't looked at haveged.  Sorry.  :(


From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net  Sun Mar 15 14:06:40 2015
From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA)
Date: Sun, 15 Mar 2015 13:06:40 +0000
Subject: Making the case for smart cards for the average user
In-Reply-To: <CAAocvpuOT+Ezp6p3Genj4qrFiW4kN84aQxMJyw+mELah-GXL-Q@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAAocvpuOT+Ezp6p3Genj4qrFiW4kN84aQxMJyw+mELah-GXL-Q@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <1713955696.20150315130640@my_localhost>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

Hi


On Saturday 14 March 2015 at 9:00:08 PM, in
<mid:CAAocvpuOT+Ezp6p3Genj4qrFiW4kN84aQxMJyw+mELah-GXL-Q at mail.gmail.com>,
Joey Castillo wrote:

First [OT], I'll point out that your message didn't thread below my
message to which you replied. Your message arrived missing the
"In-Reply-To:" and "References:" headers, which would have enabled
this to happen.



> even with a password manager, the security
> of that still depends on choosing and guarding a
> complex password to secure the password store. It's
> passwords all the way down.

Fair enough, the user needs a password for the password manager. But
it is no extra effort to have the password manager remember a complex
password for the key.



> Certainly; if your system is compromised by malware it
> could substitute the message, store session keys, or
> keylog your PIN for that matter. If your system is
> compromised, all bets are off.

Pretty much any system *could* be compromised. Should we say all bets
are off because there is a possibility the system might be
compromised?



> The difference is that
> with your keys on a smart card, at least such a breach
> won't compromise your secret key material.

Good point. We are told that smartcard design precludes copying the
key material without physically destroying the card and applying some
pretty heavy-duty forensics. But do we *know* this to be true, or is
it just collective wishful thinking?



> Without smart cards, if I want to use GnuPG on my
> laptop, my iPhone and my Nexus 7, I have to put my
> secret key on each of those devices and enter my
> passphrase into each of those devices. This
> dramatically increases the surface area available for
> an attack on my secret keys.

The secret key material is safe if it is protected by a
suitably-strong passphrase. Passphrase-compromise is the issue on any
networked device (even an air-gapped device that occasionally
receives/sends files by sneakernet).



> tradeoff: in exchange for better security for my secret
> key material, I'm exposing myself to a threat from a
> determined, active attacker that's able to get
> specialized gear into the same room as me while I'm
> using my card. For some minority of people, that may be
> a reasonable concern; for most people, it really isn't.

Sounds like less of an issue than NFC payments from credit/debit cards
with no requirement for a PIN or a signature.

PIN-entry being on the Android device you are using presumably means
that an attacker who managed to evesdrop your NFC connection would be
able to record the signal containing the PIN. Which they may then be
able to re-send, hypothetically allowing them to continue signing or
decrypting so long as your card was within range of their equipment.
How is this type of threat mitigated against in your current
specification?



> Also, there's nothing preventing us from better
> securing the NFC channel in a future card
> specification; in particular, NFC's resistance to man
> in the middle attacks makes it easy to establish a
> shared secret to secure the channel, as proposed in a
> 2010 standard. [2]

That would be a future solution to my question above. (-:


- --
Best regards

MFPA                  <mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net>

Put knot yore trust inn spel chequers
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From stebe at mailbox.org  Sun Mar 15 16:32:54 2015
From: stebe at mailbox.org (Stephan Beck)
Date: Sun, 15 Mar 2015 16:32:54 +0100
Subject: Enigmail speed geeking
In-Reply-To: <5505823E.5070704@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <550076F0.70507@sixdemonbag.org> <5500C21C.1000607@mailbox.org>
 <5501B5F3.5030503@sixdemonbag.org> <5501E665.1000801@dougbarton.email>
 <5502BB36.20106@digitalbrains.com> <5502EF6E.3040302@sixdemonbag.org>
 <d809914c7b1290e9793a1d53ffd77e7e@butters.digitalbrains.com>
 <CANyOob3bECBW5SQBcksgURBtw5KVPxZ6zTpdhdFuo_kK9W8E8g@mail.gmail.com>
 <5cda1031caf0f94f8eff9c414aaf4955@butters.digitalbrains.com>
 <c14447642c73c374d1c6e9dd130de569@butters.digitalbrains.com>
 <55035791.6070102@sixdemonbag.org> <55036289.7020001@mailbox.org>
 <5505823E.5070704@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <5505A626.80700@mailbox.org>

Am 15.03.2015 um 13:59 schrieb Robert J. Hansen:
>> Wouldn't the installation of haveged, at least for GNU/linux distros,
>> extend the possibilities of traditional /dev/(u)random based RNG?
> 
> No idea -- I haven't looked at haveged.  Sorry.  :(


Well, I forgot to include relevant information (see below)
I came across haveged while installing the OTR extension of my IM/Chat package.
It was developped by the Caps group within IRISA/INRIA, Rennes, France.

Quoting the abstract of a HAVEGE publication:

The availability of a random number generator with high cryptographic qualities
on a computer is one of the central issues of cryptographic implementations.
HAVEGE (HArdware Volatile Entropy Gathering and Expansion) is a new software
heuristic for generating unpredictable random numbers on PC s and workstations.
PCs and workstations are built around modern superscalar microprocessors. These
processors feature complex hardware mechanisms that aim to increase performance.
A significant part of the global state of the microprocessor is not
architecturally visible through the instruction set (e.g. caches, branch
predictors and buffers). HAVEGE leverages the uncertainty introduced in the
internal states of the processor by external events. HAVEGE combines
entropy/uncertainty gathering from the architecturally invisible states of a
modern superscalar microprocessor with pseudo-random number generation. First we
show that the hardware clock cycle counter of the processor can be used to
gather part of the uncertainty introduced by operating system interruptions in
the internal state of the processor. Tens of thousands of unpredictable bits can
be gathered per operating system interruption in average. Then, we show how this
entropy gathering technique can be combined with pseudo-random number generation
in HAVEGE. Since the internal state of HAVEGE includes thousands of internal
volatile hardware states, HAVEGE features a very high security level. HAVEGE
also reaches an unprecedented throughput for a software unpredictable random
number generator: more than 100 Mbits/s with off-the-shelf workstations and PCs.

A. Seznec, N. Sendrier, "HArdware Volatile Entropy Gathering and Expansion:
generating unpredictable random numbers at user level", INRIA Research Report,
RR-4592, October 2002
Source: https://www.irisa.fr/caps/projects/hipsor/publi.php

Now, I'll look for information on how RNG in GnuPG exactly works. It *seems*
that haveged should impact on the gathering of entropy (available) at the moment
of keypair generation on any GNU/Linux PC/laptop equipped with it (specific
versions are availabe for other OS as well). As to the other precise
operations/occasions on which GnuPG makes use of RNG, other than the "keypair
generation moment", I'm not sure whether it would benefit from haveged
at all.

Cheers,

Stephan

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From stebe at mailbox.org  Sun Mar 15 19:53:14 2015
From: stebe at mailbox.org (Stephan Beck)
Date: Sun, 15 Mar 2015 19:53:14 +0100
Subject: Enigmail speed geeking
In-Reply-To: <5505A626.80700@mailbox.org>
References: <550076F0.70507@sixdemonbag.org> <5500C21C.1000607@mailbox.org>
 <5501B5F3.5030503@sixdemonbag.org> <5501E665.1000801@dougbarton.email>
 <5502BB36.20106@digitalbrains.com> <5502EF6E.3040302@sixdemonbag.org>
 <d809914c7b1290e9793a1d53ffd77e7e@butters.digitalbrains.com>
 <CANyOob3bECBW5SQBcksgURBtw5KVPxZ6zTpdhdFuo_kK9W8E8g@mail.gmail.com>
 <5cda1031caf0f94f8eff9c414aaf4955@butters.digitalbrains.com>
 <c14447642c73c374d1c6e9dd130de569@butters.digitalbrains.com>
 <55035791.6070102@sixdemonbag.org> <55036289.7020001@mailbox.org>
 <5505823E.5070704@sixdemonbag.org> <5505A626.80700@mailbox.org>
Message-ID: <5505D51A.90704@mailbox.org>

Am 15.03.2015 um 16:32 schrieb Stephan Beck:
> Am 15.03.2015 um 13:59 schrieb Robert J. Hansen:
>>> Wouldn't the installation of haveged, at least for GNU/linux distros,
>>> extend the possibilities of traditional /dev/(u)random based RNG?
>>
>> No idea -- I haven't looked at haveged.  Sorry.  :(

> 
> Now, I'll look for information on how RNG in GnuPG exactly works.

Answerung myself :-) after having read some chapters in the libgcrypt manual, I
guess, in order to work with GnuPG, haveged would have to be configured in a
similar way as, for instance, the egd (1). Without doing so, it would probably
be ignored by GnuPG.

Cheers,

Stephan

(1) #when compiling, by adding

--enable-static-rnd=egd (to ./configure)

#when using a pre-compiled version that has a different configuration, by using
#a loadable extension module, adding

load-extension rndegd	

#to the ~/.gnupg/options file, or by typing

--load-extension=rndegd

#on the command line while GnuPG is running



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From wk at gnupg.org  Sun Mar 15 20:50:01 2015
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Sun, 15 Mar 2015 20:50:01 +0100
Subject: Enigmail speed geeking
In-Reply-To: <5505A626.80700@mailbox.org> (Stephan Beck's message of "Sun, 15
 Mar 2015 16:32:54 +0100")
References: <550076F0.70507@sixdemonbag.org> <5500C21C.1000607@mailbox.org>
 <5501B5F3.5030503@sixdemonbag.org> <5501E665.1000801@dougbarton.email>
 <5502BB36.20106@digitalbrains.com> <5502EF6E.3040302@sixdemonbag.org>
 <d809914c7b1290e9793a1d53ffd77e7e@butters.digitalbrains.com>
 <CANyOob3bECBW5SQBcksgURBtw5KVPxZ6zTpdhdFuo_kK9W8E8g@mail.gmail.com>
 <5cda1031caf0f94f8eff9c414aaf4955@butters.digitalbrains.com>
 <c14447642c73c374d1c6e9dd130de569@butters.digitalbrains.com>
 <55035791.6070102@sixdemonbag.org> <55036289.7020001@mailbox.org>
 <5505823E.5070704@sixdemonbag.org> <5505A626.80700@mailbox.org>
Message-ID: <87sid69h1y.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Sun, 15 Mar 2015 16:32, stebe at mailbox.org said:

> Now, I'll look for information on how RNG in GnuPG exactly works. It *seems*
> that haveged should impact on the gathering of entropy (available) at the moment
> of keypair generation on any GNU/Linux PC/laptop equipped with it (specific

You can find this in the Libgcrypt manual:

  Libgcrypt provides 3 levels or random quality: The level
  'GCRY_VERY_STRONG_RANDOM' usually used for key generation, the level
  'GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM' for all other strong random requirements and the
  function 'gcry_create_nonce' which is used for weaker usages like
  nonces.  There is also a level 'GCRY_WEAK_RANDOM' which in general maps
  to 'GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM' except when used with the function
  'gcry_mpi_randomize', where it randomizes an multi-precision-integer
  using the 'gcry_create_nonce' function.
  
  There are two distinct random generators available:
  
     * The Continuously Seeded Pseudo Random Number Generator (CSPRNG),
       which is based on the classic GnuPG derived big pool
       implementation.  Implemented in 'random/random-csprng.c' and used
       by default.
     * A FIPS approved ANSI X9.31 PRNG using AES with a 128 bit key.
       Implemented in 'random/random-fips.c' and used if Libgcrypt is in
       FIPS mode.
  
  Both generators make use of so-called entropy gathering modules:
  
  rndlinux
       Uses the operating system provided '/dev/random' and '/dev/urandom'
       devices.
  
  rndunix
       Runs several operating system commands to collect entropy from
       sources like virtual machine and process statistics.  It is a kind
       of poor-man's '/dev/random' implementation.  It is not available in
       FIPS mode.
  
  rndegd
       Uses the operating system provided Entropy Gathering Daemon (EGD).
       The EGD basically uses the same algorithms as rndunix does.
       However as a system daemon it keeps on running and thus can serve
       several processes requiring entropy input and does not waste
       collected entropy if the application does not need all the
       collected entropy.  It is not available in FIPS mode.
  
  rndw32
       Targeted for the Microsoft Windows OS. It uses certain properties
       of that system and is the only gathering module available for that
       OS.
  
  rndhw
       Extra module to collect additional entropy by utilizing a hardware
       random number generator.  As of now the only supported hardware RNG
       is the Padlock engine of VIA (Centaur) CPUs.  It is not available
       in FIPS mode.
  

  16.6.1 Description of the CSPRNG
  --------------------------------
  
  This random number generator is loosely modelled after the one described
  in Peter Gutmann's paper: "Software Generation of Practically Strong
  Random Numbers".(1)
  
     A pool of 600 bytes is used and mixed using the core RIPE-MD160 hash
  transform function.  Several extra features are used to make the robust
  against a wide variety of attacks and to protect against failures of
  subsystems.  The state of the generator may be saved to a file and
  initially seed form a file.
  
     Depending on how Libgcrypt was build the generator is able to select
  the best working entropy gathering module.  It makes use of the slow and
  fast collection methods and requires the pool to initially seeded form
  the slow gatherer or a seed file.  An entropy estimation is used to mix
  in enough data from the gather modules before returning the actual
  random output.  Process fork detection and protection is implemented.
  
     The implementation of the nonce generator (for 'gcry_create_nonce')
  is a straightforward repeated hash design: A 28 byte buffer is initially
  seeded with the PID and the time in seconds in the first 20 bytes and
  with 8 bytes of random taken from the 'GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM' generator.
  Random numbers are then created by hashing all the 28 bytes with SHA-1
  and saving that again in the first 20 bytes.  The hash is also returned
  as result.
  
     ---------- Footnotes ----------
  
     (1) Also described in chapter 6 of his book "Cryptographic Security
  Architecture", New York, 2004, ISBN 0-387-95387-6.
  


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner
  

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From jose.castillo at gmail.com  Sun Mar 15 23:24:29 2015
From: jose.castillo at gmail.com (Jose Castillo)
Date: Sun, 15 Mar 2015 18:24:29 -0400
Subject: Making the case for smart cards for the average user
In-Reply-To: <1713955696.20150315130640@my_localhost>
References: <CAAocvpuOT+Ezp6p3Genj4qrFiW4kN84aQxMJyw+mELah-GXL-Q@mail.gmail.com>
 <1713955696.20150315130640@my_localhost>
Message-ID: <354B50B8-9726-487A-A7A5-E7FD5839F95C@gmail.com>

Sorry about the improper threading; I?ve switched off digest mode, hopefully this will help. 

> On Mar 15, 2015, at 9:06 AM, MFPA wrote:
> Pretty much any system *could* be compromised. Should
> we say all bets are off because there is a possibility the
> system might be compromised?

I may have phrased my point inartfully. I think the goal here is to minimize the harm done in the case of compromise. An attacker substituting a message and convincing your smart card to sign it is bad, but it?s not as bad as leaking secret key material that the attacker can use at will. 

> We are told that smartcard design precludes copying the
> key material without physically destroying the card and
> applying some pretty heavy-duty forensics. But do we
> *know* this to be true, or is it just collective wishful thinking?

The smart card runs code based on a specification. [1] The specification does not allow exporting a secret key, and we write code that adheres to that specification. We know that much to be true. You do have to trust the firmware and the operating system on the smart card, but that?s made easier by the fact that chips in these cards [2] and the operating system [3] are certified to be secure based on international standards, and are widely deployed in sensitive areas like access control, payments and telephone SIM cards. 

I think it?s encouraging, in a perverse way, to hear that when GCHQ sought to compromise SIM card encryption keys [4], they had to resort to spying on the employees generating them. If the smart card firmware or operating system were backdoored, they would not have had to go to such lengths. 

> PIN-entry being on the Android device you are using
> presumably means that an attacker who managed to
> evesdrop your NFC connection would be able to record
> the signal containing the PIN.

Yes, this is a concern. It requires physical proximity of a few meters and some kind of specialized equipment, but it?s theoretically possible. 

> Which they may then be able to re-send, hypothetically
> allowing them to continue signing or decrypting so long
> as your card was within range of their equipment. How
> is this type of threat mitigated against in your current
> specification?

With NFC the main mitigation is physical rather than cryptographic in nature. Since the card has no battery, the attacker would have to supply an RF field sufficient for powering up the chip to perform the math and transmit a response. In theory, that maxes out at 10 centimeters; in practice, it?s about half that. You can negate this attack with an RF blocking sleeve, which I?ll almost certainly be adding to the kit after this conversation. 

I admit that this may not be sufficient for some people?s security needs, but my sense is that more people are vulnerable to passphrase-sniffing malware than they are to someone sneaking very close to them with an evil device. The former attack scales quite easily; the latter attack does not ? and again, the evil device attack still won't expose secret key material. 

Thank you for your critical responses, by the way; I appreciate the chance to be transparent about the challenges involved. 

[1]: http://www.g10code.com/docs/openpgp-card-2.0.pdf
[2]: http://www.nxp.com/documents/data_sheet/P5CX012_02X_40_73_80_144_FAM_SDS.pdf
[3]: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/ppfiles/ANSSI-CC-profil_PP-2010-03en.pdf
[4]: https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/02/19/great-sim-heist/

-- 

Joey Castillo
www.joeycastillo.com



From stebe at mailbox.org  Sun Mar 15 23:38:27 2015
From: stebe at mailbox.org (Stephan Beck)
Date: Sun, 15 Mar 2015 23:38:27 +0100
Subject: Enigmail speed geeking
In-Reply-To: <87sid69h1y.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <550076F0.70507@sixdemonbag.org>
 <5500C21C.1000607@mailbox.org>	<5501B5F3.5030503@sixdemonbag.org>
 <5501E665.1000801@dougbarton.email>	<5502BB36.20106@digitalbrains.com>
 <5502EF6E.3040302@sixdemonbag.org>	<d809914c7b1290e9793a1d53ffd77e7e@butters.digitalbrains.com>	<CANyOob3bECBW5SQBcksgURBtw5KVPxZ6zTpdhdFuo_kK9W8E8g@mail.gmail.com>	<5cda1031caf0f94f8eff9c414aaf4955@butters.digitalbrains.com>	<c14447642c73c374d1c6e9dd130de569@butters.digitalbrains.com>	<55035791.6070102@sixdemonbag.org>
 <55036289.7020001@mailbox.org>	<5505823E.5070704@sixdemonbag.org>
 <5505A626.80700@mailbox.org> <87sid69h1y.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <550609E3.6010705@mailbox.org>

Am 15.03.2015 um 20:50 schrieb Werner Koch:
> On Sun, 15 Mar 2015 16:32, stebe at mailbox.org said:
> 
>> Now, I'll look for information on how RNG in GnuPG exactly works. It *seems*
>> that haveged should impact on the gathering of entropy (available) at the moment
>> of keypair generation on any GNU/Linux PC/laptop equipped with it (specific
> 
> You can find this in the Libgcrypt manual:
> 

Thanks, Werner. I read that, but I was particularly interested in how to get
GnuPG work with haveged.
So, I guess it would not be possible for an interested user to have GnuPG work
with haveged by using configuration files or load instructions (similar to egd)
and a strong dedication.
It does require to be implemented first in GnuPG/libgcrypt by modifying
source code, doesn't it? The latter would be certainly out of my reach, far off
the shore in (the Atlantic) C :)
If it were at all feasible/possible to do it by using the approach mentioned
first I would have given it a try, and published a howto in the wiki.

Stephan



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From johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl  Mon Mar 16 01:06:17 2015
From: johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl (Johan Wevers)
Date: Mon, 16 Mar 2015 01:06:17 +0100
Subject: Making the case for smart cards for the average user
In-Reply-To: <354B50B8-9726-487A-A7A5-E7FD5839F95C@gmail.com>
References: <CAAocvpuOT+Ezp6p3Genj4qrFiW4kN84aQxMJyw+mELah-GXL-Q@mail.gmail.com>
 <1713955696.20150315130640@my_localhost>
 <354B50B8-9726-487A-A7A5-E7FD5839F95C@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <55061E79.1000908@vulcan.xs4all.nl>

On 15-03-2015 23:24, Jose Castillo wrote:

> but my sense is that more people are vulnerable to passphrase-sniffing
> malware than they are to someone sneaking very close to them with
> an evil device.

However, perhaps even more people are vulnerable to confisquation by
authorities. If they find a pgp card, some may even force you to give
them access (UK, the minister in The Netherlands who pushed for such a
law has fortunately been forced to resign for something else). Hiding
the key, or, in case that is not possbible, having access to a copy
yourself afterward may be more usefull.

I don't know how those pgp cards look, but perhaps it would be wise to
print something on them that they are yet another loyalty card.

-- 
ir. J.C.A. Wevers
PGP/GPG public keys at http://www.xs4all.nl/~johanw/pgpkeys.html



From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net  Mon Mar 16 02:24:42 2015
From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA)
Date: Mon, 16 Mar 2015 01:24:42 +0000
Subject: Making the case for smart cards for the average user
In-Reply-To: <354B50B8-9726-487A-A7A5-E7FD5839F95C@gmail.com>
References: <CAAocvpuOT+Ezp6p3Genj4qrFiW4kN84aQxMJyw+mELah-GXL-Q@mail.gmail.com>
 <1713955696.20150315130640@my_localhost>
 <354B50B8-9726-487A-A7A5-E7FD5839F95C@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <1115630030.20150316012442@my_localhost>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

Hi


On Sunday 15 March 2015 at 10:24:29 PM, in
<mid:354B50B8-9726-487A-A7A5-E7FD5839F95C at gmail.com>, Jose Castillo
wrote:


> Sorry about the improper threading; I?ve switched off
> digest mode, hopefully this will help.

That one threaded properly. Thanks.


> I may have phrased my point inartfully. I think the
> goal here is to minimize the harm done in the case of
> compromise.

That should be a goal everywhere. (-;



> You do
> have to trust the firmware and the operating system on
> the smart card,

I thought there were some open-source smart cards around.



> but that?s made easier by the fact that
> chips in these cards [2] and the operating system [3]
> are certified to be secure based on international
> standards, and are widely deployed in sensitive areas
> like access control, payments and telephone SIM cards.

It's quite a few years since I heard of SIM cards being cloned. I
guess the spec was improved. (-;



> With NFC the main mitigation is physical rather than
> cryptographic in nature. Since the card has no battery,
> the attacker would have to supply an RF field
> sufficient for powering up the chip to perform the math
> and transmit a response. In theory, that maxes out at
> 10 centimeters; in practice, it?s about half that.

I thought it could be done from a few yards away, if the attacker used
bigger aerials. [0] says that for passports, the RFID tag can be
powered up from about 50cm away and messages can be sent and received
over several metres.



> You
> can negate this attack with an RF blocking sleeve,
> which I?ll almost certainly be adding to the kit after
> this conversation.

Glad to hear it. Shame the banks who issue NFC-enabled payment cards
don't provide such sleeves. Although, Faraday-cage wallets and
passport holders are available.


> Thank you for your critical responses, by the way; I
> appreciate the chance to be transparent about the
> challenges involved.

Thank you. I have enjoyed the discussion, and hope to have

[0] <http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~tpc/Papers/PassportTrace.pdf>




- --
Best regards

MFPA                  <mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net>

Dollar sign - An S that's been double crossed
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-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----



From wk at gnupg.org  Mon Mar 16 08:48:07 2015
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Mon, 16 Mar 2015 08:48:07 +0100
Subject: Enigmail speed geeking
In-Reply-To: <550609E3.6010705@mailbox.org> (Stephan Beck's message of "Sun,
 15 Mar 2015 23:38:27 +0100")
References: <550076F0.70507@sixdemonbag.org> <5500C21C.1000607@mailbox.org>
 <5501B5F3.5030503@sixdemonbag.org> <5501E665.1000801@dougbarton.email>
 <5502BB36.20106@digitalbrains.com> <5502EF6E.3040302@sixdemonbag.org>
 <d809914c7b1290e9793a1d53ffd77e7e@butters.digitalbrains.com>
 <CANyOob3bECBW5SQBcksgURBtw5KVPxZ6zTpdhdFuo_kK9W8E8g@mail.gmail.com>
 <5cda1031caf0f94f8eff9c414aaf4955@butters.digitalbrains.com>
 <c14447642c73c374d1c6e9dd130de569@butters.digitalbrains.com>
 <55035791.6070102@sixdemonbag.org> <55036289.7020001@mailbox.org>
 <5505823E.5070704@sixdemonbag.org> <5505A626.80700@mailbox.org>
 <87sid69h1y.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <550609E3.6010705@mailbox.org>
Message-ID: <87d2499ydk.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Sun, 15 Mar 2015 23:38, stebe at mailbox.org said:

> Thanks, Werner. I read that, but I was particularly interested in how to get
> GnuPG work with haveged.

You should feed it into /dev/random or get into the kernel proper.  This
way all applications can benefit from it.

> So, I guess it would not be possible for an interested user to have GnuPG work
> with haveged by using configuration files or load instructions

This requires to add a new entropy gathering module or add it to
rndlinux.c.  However, I assume that proper output of haveged is pretty
system and compiler dependent.  Thus it belongs into the OS kernel.


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From stebe at mailbox.org  Mon Mar 16 10:09:24 2015
From: stebe at mailbox.org (Stephan Beck)
Date: Mon, 16 Mar 2015 10:09:24 +0100
Subject: Enigmail speed geeking
In-Reply-To: <87d2499ydk.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <550076F0.70507@sixdemonbag.org>
 <5500C21C.1000607@mailbox.org>	<5501B5F3.5030503@sixdemonbag.org>
 <5501E665.1000801@dougbarton.email>	<5502BB36.20106@digitalbrains.com>
 <5502EF6E.3040302@sixdemonbag.org>	<d809914c7b1290e9793a1d53ffd77e7e@butters.digitalbrains.com>	<CANyOob3bECBW5SQBcksgURBtw5KVPxZ6zTpdhdFuo_kK9W8E8g@mail.gmail.com>	<5cda1031caf0f94f8eff9c414aaf4955@butters.digitalbrains.com>	<c14447642c73c374d1c6e9dd130de569@butters.digitalbrains.com>	<55035791.6070102@sixdemonbag.org>
 <55036289.7020001@mailbox.org>	<5505823E.5070704@sixdemonbag.org>
 <5505A626.80700@mailbox.org>	<87sid69h1y.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <550609E3.6010705@mailbox.org> <87d2499ydk.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <55069DC4.4080008@mailbox.org>

Am 16.03.2015 um 08:48 schrieb Werner Koch:
> On Sun, 15 Mar 2015 23:38, stebe at mailbox.org said:
> 
>> Thanks, Werner. I read that, but I was particularly interested in how to get
>> GnuPG work with haveged.
> 
> You should feed it into /dev/random or get into the kernel proper.  This
> way all applications can benefit from it.

Ok, thanks, properly enabled and working

[README]
[...]
Non-zero "-r" options are used to test the haveged random number generator; The
random number generator will be configured, the initial data collection pass
will be executed, configuration details will be written to stdout, and a "-r"
KB sample of output will be written to the sample output file for all "-r" > 1.
[...]

$ sudo haveged -r 2
Writing 2 K byte output to sample


Cheers,
Stephan


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From peter at digitalbrains.com  Mon Mar 16 11:16:44 2015
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Mon, 16 Mar 2015 11:16:44 +0100
Subject: Making the case for smart cards for the average user
In-Reply-To: <354B50B8-9726-487A-A7A5-E7FD5839F95C@gmail.com>
References: <CAAocvpuOT+Ezp6p3Genj4qrFiW4kN84aQxMJyw+mELah-GXL-Q@mail.gmail.com>
 <1713955696.20150315130640@my_localhost>
 <354B50B8-9726-487A-A7A5-E7FD5839F95C@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <5506AD8C.4010105@digitalbrains.com>

On 15/03/15 23:24, Jose Castillo wrote:
> I think it?s encouraging, in a perverse way, to hear that when GCHQ
> sought to compromise SIM card encryption keys [4], they had to resort
> to spying on the employees generating them.

Perhaps the SIM cards are relatively well protected from remote access;
the session keys for GSM communication are not. IIRC, it requires an
on-line attack and would leave traces as soon as GSM network operators
started looking for such attacks, so it's less sneaky. But there were
two interesting talks on the subject at the 31C3:

http://media.ccc.de/browse/congress/2014/31c3_-_6249_-_en_-_saal_1_-_201412271715_-_ss7_locate_track_manipulate_-_tobias_engel.html#video

http://media.ccc.de/browse/congress/2014/31c3_-_6122_-_en_-_saal_1_-_201412271830_-_mobile_self-defense_-_karsten_nohl.html#video

Apparently GCHQ still wanted the SIM keys, though :).

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at <http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>


From d.costaras at gmail.com  Mon Mar 16 14:36:22 2015
From: d.costaras at gmail.com (Donavan-Ross Costaras)
Date: Mon, 16 Mar 2015 15:36:22 +0200
Subject: possible sshcontrol flag for ssh key comment?
Message-ID: <CA+cdw5iN3gkzkyn_va41ExARAR-SaJDHhJU8+GrwjG+2pnLTUw@mail.gmail.com>

Hi,

I'm pretty new to pgp and gpg so please bare with me.

I'm using gnupg 2.1.2 and trying to use an authentication sub key for ssh
logins. I'm also attempting to not go via converting the gpg key into an
ssh key. I.e. I use the new --key-grip option and load the key-grip
straight into .gnupg/sshcontrol

All's groovy until I tried to use it for gitolite. Gitolite uses the
presented ssh key as authentication against it's collection of ssh pub
keys. So in order to authenticate with the correct user you need to present
the correct key.

To present the correct key I use .ssh/confg to define the identityFile (ssh
key) used for that user.

The problem is I can't add an ssh comment if I don't put the key through
something like monkeyshere or gpgkey2ssh. With the comment being the
virtual ssh key location .ssh/config works as normal for defining hosts and
associated keys.

So, in my limited understanding, would it not be useful to be able to set
the ssh key comment in the .gnupg/sshcontrol file as a flag? So that if I
add the keygrip to sshcontrol and do ssh-add -L I would be presented with:

ssh-rsa ***key*** comment-as-flag

as apposed to:

ssh-rsa ***key*** (none)

Or am I being silly and should just go via transforming in into an actual
ssh key and importing that via ssh-add. Does that not create two keys from
one though?

I think I'm subscribed to the list but in case I'm not please cc me.

Thanks,
Donavan
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From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net  Tue Mar 17 01:55:51 2015
From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA)
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 00:55:51 +0000
Subject: Making the case for smart cards for the average user
In-Reply-To: <CAAocvpvEqs-tQ-rEki8AX3spdSt8P5TG0+KoXVtufW0Azy9wDQ@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAAocvpvEqs-tQ-rEki8AX3spdSt8P5TG0+KoXVtufW0Azy9wDQ@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <277590791.20150317005551@my_localhost>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512



On Saturday 14 March 2015 at 10:37:18 PM, in
<mid:CAAocvpvEqs-tQ-rEki8AX3spdSt8P5TG0+KoXVtufW0Azy9wDQ at mail.gmail.com>,
Joey Castillo wrote:


> The goal is to simplify
> not just everyday things like how to make a key or
> encrypt an email, but also more complex things like
> "what is my identity and how do I verify it?" [1]
> [1]:
> https://github.com/josecastillo/signet/blob/master/guidelines.md#certification-and-trust


Although I don't really like email addresses in the UIDs of my keys, I
quite like the simplicity of your "email address only" simplified UID
format. However, I would urge you to reconsider your decision to drop
the angle brackets. At least one MUA (the MUA I am using to write this
message) sends the email address enclosed in angle brackets as the
search string for GnuPG to locate the key. No angle brackets around
the email address means no key found.

Your proposed "automated email verification service" will beat the PGP
Global Directory's verification check by encrypting the verification
message to confirm that the user is in control of the key as well as
the email address. But it retains the problem of relatively frequent
verification signatures accumulating; I don't know a solution to that.
If a user has multiple email addresses, does the "automated email
verification service" send a different encrypted verification link to
each address, and then only sign the UIDs that the user verified? And
is there the option to reply to email rather than click a link?

Finally, if the person at the other end is able to decrypt my message
and reply to me, then the key and the email address are controlled by
the same person. What assurance does the verification service add?


- --
Best regards

MFPA                  <mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net>

Can you imagine a world with no hypothetical situations?
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From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net  Tue Mar 17 02:05:16 2015
From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA)
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 01:05:16 +0000
Subject: Making the case for smart cards for the average user
In-Reply-To: <277590791.20150317005551@my_localhost>
References: <CAAocvpvEqs-tQ-rEki8AX3spdSt8P5TG0+KoXVtufW0Azy9wDQ@mail.gmail.com>
 <277590791.20150317005551@my_localhost>
Message-ID: <0126592.20150317010516@my_localhost>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512



On Tuesday 17 March 2015 at 12:55:51 AM, in
<mid:277590791.20150317005551 at my_localhost>, MFPA (me)  wrote:


> If a user has multiple email
> addresses, does the "automated email verification
> service" send a different encrypted verification link
> to each address, and then only sign the UIDs that the
> user verified? And is there the option to reply to
> email rather than click a link?

Thinking about it, you don't need the user to click a link or to reply
to an email at all. If you sign the UID and enclose the signed copy of
the key in an encrypted email to the address in the UID, they don't
get access to the certification unless they control both the email
address and the key.


- --
Best regards

MFPA                  <mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net>

Everyone makes mistakes. It is what you do afterwards that counts.
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From pmlopes at gmail.com  Tue Mar 17 15:48:54 2015
From: pmlopes at gmail.com (Paulo Lopes)
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 15:48:54 +0100
Subject: what is the proper way to load gpg-agent with systemd
Message-ID: <CAPdn058xZjD2cib6WoGJf2cT5vkrznA2iP9xVru7C4KtGg5UUA@mail.gmail.com>

Hello,

I've been using my gpg card with success in Ubuntu for a while but as
everyone knows the init system is switching from upstart to systemd as it
is happening on Debian and the vast majority of other distributions.

In the "past" one could start gpg-agent from the script that boots Xorg or
even the gnome-keyring and we could "inject" a couple of variables into the
session like

GPG_AGENT_INFO
SSH_AGENT_PID
SSH_AUTH_SOCK

and all applications spawned from that process inherit those vars, however
systemd does not inherit vars from its unit files (and my experience with
systemd is extremely low so i could be saying something wrong here).

It would be nice to have some documentation on gnupg site describing the
best way to work with systemd...
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From peter at digitalbrains.com  Tue Mar 17 18:35:13 2015
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 18:35:13 +0100
Subject: possible sshcontrol flag for ssh key comment?
In-Reply-To: <CA+cdw5iN3gkzkyn_va41ExARAR-SaJDHhJU8+GrwjG+2pnLTUw@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CA+cdw5iN3gkzkyn_va41ExARAR-SaJDHhJU8+GrwjG+2pnLTUw@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <550865D1.10008@digitalbrains.com>

On 2015-03-16 14:36, Donavan-Ross Costaras wrote:
> Hi,

Hi!

I don't fully understand what you're trying to accomplish, or what you
exactly need. Sorry about that. I hope my reply might help you though.

> To present the correct key I use .ssh/confg to define the 
> identityFile (ssh key) used for that user.

I don't think "identityFile" still does anything when you use an agent,
or at least with GnuPG as an agent. Because it is the agent's
responsibility to keep keys, and you're changing the config for the ssh
program, which merely asks the agent what it has. I think.

> The problem is I cant add an ssh comment if I dont put the key 
> through something like monkeyshere or gpgkey2ssh.

With SSH2 keys, the comment is simply appended to the public key.
There's nothing more to it.

So I went with the following workflow:

First, I added the key in ~/.ssh/id_rsa to the gpg-agent. The public key
for that is already in ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub, so I didn't need to extract
that from the agent.

Then, I inserted my OpenPGP smartcard with an authentication key. I
understand you're probably not using a smartcard, but I'm talking about
what I did :). It hopefully allows you to adapt it to your situation.

The smartcard key is automatically added to the ssh agent component of
gpg-agent. But, like you, I still need it's public key in SSH format to
paste in ~/.ssh/authorized_keys on the machines I want to login to, like
you need it to give to gitolite.

I do:

$ ssh-add -L
ssh-rsa AAAAB3N[...]TrnoZzZdHJ cardno:000500000241
ssh-rsa AAAAB3N[...]TAiuL0Iw== /home/peter/.ssh/id_rsa
$

Now gpg-agent was kind enough to provide a comment that allows me to
distinguish them on sight. If there is no comment field, simply look at
the actual base64 key to see which one you're /not/ interested in, by
comparing to ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub, for instance.

Now I copy the line ending in "cardno:[...]241" to the clipboard, and
open an editor for the new file ~/.ssh/id_card.pub. I paste from the
clipboard, but change the end:

ssh-rsa AAAAB3N[...]TrnoZzZdHJ peter at OpenPGPCard

All my SSH keys are of the form peter at hostname, and usually stored in
~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub. The filename and comment form are just to fit in with
the rest. It's free-format.

Now whenever I need to add that public key to a ~/.ssh/authorized_keys,
I don't use ssh-add -L, I simply open ~/.ssh/id_card.pub and copy it
from there. As I said, in SSH2 public keys, the comment is just text
appended to the key; there's nothing relating to it in that blob of
base64. You can just edit it with a text editor and store the result
wherever you like.

HTH,

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at <http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>


From dkg at fifthhorseman.net  Tue Mar 17 18:38:03 2015
From: dkg at fifthhorseman.net (Daniel Kahn Gillmor)
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 13:38:03 -0400
Subject: Making the case for smart cards for the average user
In-Reply-To: <277590791.20150317005551@my_localhost>
References: <CAAocvpvEqs-tQ-rEki8AX3spdSt8P5TG0+KoXVtufW0Azy9wDQ@mail.gmail.com>
 <277590791.20150317005551@my_localhost>
Message-ID: <87lhivpls4.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>

On Mon 2015-03-16 20:55:51 -0400, MFPA wrote:

> Although I don't really like email addresses in the UIDs of my keys, I
> quite like the simplicity of your "email address only" simplified UID
> format. However, I would urge you to reconsider your decision to drop
> the angle brackets. At least one MUA (the MUA I am using to write this
> message) sends the email address enclosed in angle brackets as the
> search string for GnuPG to locate the key. No angle brackets around
> the email address means no key found.

This might be a bug (or at least a well-warranted feature enhancement)
in GnuPG.

I've just opened https://bugs.g10code.com/gnupg/issue1927 to track it.

     --dkg


From CRivard at merkleinc.com  Tue Mar 17 15:23:57 2015
From: CRivard at merkleinc.com (Clark Rivard)
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 14:23:57 +0000
Subject: Copy Current GPG Installation to Another Server
Message-ID: <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A000C0@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>

I currently have GPG 1.4.8 installed on a Windows server.  Can the c:\Programs Files (x86)\GNU\ directory simply be copied to another server and used or do I need to go through the "download and installation" process on the new server?   Thanks.



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From dougb at dougbarton.email  Tue Mar 17 19:15:42 2015
From: dougb at dougbarton.email (Doug Barton)
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 11:15:42 -0700
Subject: Copy Current GPG Installation to Another Server
In-Reply-To: <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A000C0@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
References: <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A000C0@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
Message-ID: <55086F4E.20302@dougbarton.email>

On 3/17/15 7:23 AM, Clark Rivard wrote:
> I currently have GPG 1.4.8 installed on a Windows server.  Can the
> c:\Programs Files (x86)\GNU\ directory simply be copied to another
> server and used or do I need to go through the ?download and
> installation? process on the new server? Thanks.

1.4.8 is dangerously old. You should download the new version and 
install in both locations.

ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/binary/

hope this helps,

Doug



From dougb at dougbarton.email  Tue Mar 17 19:19:20 2015
From: dougb at dougbarton.email (Doug Barton)
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 11:19:20 -0700
Subject: what is the proper way to load gpg-agent with systemd
In-Reply-To: <CAPdn058xZjD2cib6WoGJf2cT5vkrznA2iP9xVru7C4KtGg5UUA@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAPdn058xZjD2cib6WoGJf2cT5vkrznA2iP9xVru7C4KtGg5UUA@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <55087028.6020608@dougbarton.email>

On 3/17/15 7:48 AM, Paulo Lopes wrote:
> Hello,
>
> I've been using my gpg card with success in Ubuntu for a while but as
> everyone knows the init system is switching from upstart to systemd as
> it is happening on Debian and the vast majority of other distributions.
>
> In the "past" one could start gpg-agent from the script that boots Xorg

Are you using the ssh-agent capabilities? If not, you don't need to do 
anything special to start the agent, it will use the socket method by 
default.

Also, do you have any evidence that the method you are currently using 
won't work with systemd? X starts well after the low-level system stuff 
is up and running, I'm having a hard time imagining why you couldn't 
continue doing what you're doing.

Doug



From dougb at dougbarton.email  Tue Mar 17 20:20:50 2015
From: dougb at dougbarton.email (Doug Barton)
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 12:20:50 -0700
Subject: what is the proper way to load gpg-agent with systemd
In-Reply-To: <CAPdn058UmNpEa3csvQc6MzBT+Pdq_N00Y0auyq62mw8NcRwgdQ@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAPdn058xZjD2cib6WoGJf2cT5vkrznA2iP9xVru7C4KtGg5UUA@mail.gmail.com>	<55087028.6020608@dougbarton.email>
 <CAPdn058UmNpEa3csvQc6MzBT+Pdq_N00Y0auyq62mw8NcRwgdQ@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <55087E92.3050608@dougbarton.email>

Are you using gpg-agent to handle ssh agent responsibilities, yes or no?



From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net  Tue Mar 17 20:31:49 2015
From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA)
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 19:31:49 +0000
Subject: Making the case for smart cards for the average user
In-Reply-To: <87lhivpls4.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
References: <CAAocvpvEqs-tQ-rEki8AX3spdSt8P5TG0+KoXVtufW0Azy9wDQ@mail.gmail.com>
 <277590791.20150317005551@my_localhost>
 <87lhivpls4.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
Message-ID: <137410941.20150317193149@my_localhost>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512



On Tuesday 17 March 2015 at 5:38:03 PM, in
<mid:87lhivpls4.fsf at alice.fifthhorseman.net>, Daniel Kahn Gillmor
wrote:




> This might be a bug (or at least a well-warranted
> feature enhancement) in GnuPG.

> I've just opened
> https://bugs.g10code.com/gnupg/issue1927 to track it.

Thanks.

- --
Best regards

MFPA                  <mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net>

Take my advice - I don't use it anyway.
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From CRivard at merkleinc.com  Tue Mar 17 20:32:12 2015
From: CRivard at merkleinc.com (Clark Rivard)
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 19:32:12 +0000
Subject: what is the proper way to load gpg-agent with systemd
In-Reply-To: <55087E92.3050608@dougbarton.email>
References: <CAPdn058xZjD2cib6WoGJf2cT5vkrznA2iP9xVru7C4KtGg5UUA@mail.gmail.com>
 <55087028.6020608@dougbarton.email>
 <CAPdn058UmNpEa3csvQc6MzBT+Pdq_N00Y0auyq62mw8NcRwgdQ@mail.gmail.com>
 <55087E92.3050608@dougbarton.email>
Message-ID: <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A002C0@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>

I am running gpg command so I believe yes is the answer.  (I am a novice at this so still learning.)  

-----Original Message-----
From: Gnupg-users [mailto:gnupg-users-bounces at gnupg.org] On Behalf Of Doug Barton
Sent: Tuesday, March 17, 2015 2:21 PM
To: Paulo Lopes
Cc: gnupg-users at gnupg.org
Subject: Re: what is the proper way to load gpg-agent with systemd

Are you using gpg-agent to handle ssh agent responsibilities, yes or no?


_______________________________________________
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users


From dougb at dougbarton.email  Tue Mar 17 20:36:47 2015
From: dougb at dougbarton.email (Doug Barton)
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 12:36:47 -0700
Subject: what is the proper way to load gpg-agent with systemd
In-Reply-To: <hXSCj31GVd0x.mm4HDxbr@privateemail.com>
References: <hXSCj31GVd0x.mm4HDxbr@privateemail.com>
Message-ID: <5508824F.10803@dougbarton.email>

Ok, then you need to start the agent prior to or during the X startup, 
so that the variables are available to your environment (as you were 
doing previously).

So, why are you trying to start the agent with systemd? What method were 
you using previously, and did you try it in the new OS version?

Doug



From pmlopes at gmail.com  Tue Mar 17 19:43:02 2015
From: pmlopes at gmail.com (Paulo Lopes)
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 19:43:02 +0100
Subject: what is the proper way to load gpg-agent with systemd
In-Reply-To: <55087028.6020608@dougbarton.email>
References: <CAPdn058xZjD2cib6WoGJf2cT5vkrznA2iP9xVru7C4KtGg5UUA@mail.gmail.com>
 <55087028.6020608@dougbarton.email>
Message-ID: <CAPdn058UmNpEa3csvQc6MzBT+Pdq_N00Y0auyq62mw8NcRwgdQ@mail.gmail.com>

On Tue, Mar 17, 2015 at 7:19 PM, Doug Barton <dougb at dougbarton.email> wrote:

> On 3/17/15 7:48 AM, Paulo Lopes wrote:
>
>> Hello,
>>
>> I've been using my gpg card with success in Ubuntu for a while but as
>> everyone knows the init system is switching from upstart to systemd as
>> it is happening on Debian and the vast majority of other distributions.
>>
>> In the "past" one could start gpg-agent from the script that boots Xorg
>>
>
> Are you using the ssh-agent capabilities? If not, you don't need to do
> anything special to start the agent, it will use the socket method by
> default.
>

So what I did was to create a user unit file like this on ~/.local/:

[Unit]
Description=gpg-agent
ConditionFileIsExecutable=/usr/bin/gpg-agent

[Service]
ExecStart=/usr/bin/gpg-agent --daemon --enable-ssh-support
--scdaemon-program /usr/libexec/scdaemon --use-standard-socket --log-file
~/.gnupg/gpg-agent.log --write-env-file %h/$
ExecStop=/usr/bin/pkill gpg-agent
Type=forking
Restart=always

[Install]
WantedBy=default.target


Now what happens is that i start a java application "IntelliJ" and when i
try to get git to fetch some code it complains that the it cannot sign the
key. However if i use "pass" then the pinentry popup shows i enter my pin
and from there the git stuff works from intellij.

So it feels quite strange that i need to do all this juggling to get it
working :/

But i read about socket activation in your message so i guess my unit file
is wrong, could you share how to use socket activation? And if does that
how do you set the SSH agent variables?




>
> Also, do you have any evidence that the method you are currently using
> won't work with systemd? X starts well after the low-level system stuff is
> up and running, I'm having a hard time imagining why you couldn't continue
> doing what you're doing.
>
> Doug
>
>


-- 
Paulo Lopes
www.jetdrone.com
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From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Tue Mar 17 20:44:47 2015
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 15:44:47 -0400
Subject: Defaults
Message-ID: <5508842F.1010101@sixdemonbag.org>

Given that 2.1 introduces a lot of new capabilities (mostly with respect
to ECC), I think now, early on in the 2.1 series, would be a good time
to discuss changing the defaults for newly-generated certificates.

In a nutshell:

	* Offer Brainpool-512 and RSA-3072 as options for
	  newly-generated certificates
	* Use AES256 for a symmetric cipher
	* Raise a warning if the user attempts to encrypt more
	  than 4 GiB with an old (64-bit block) cipher
	* Only use CAST5 if the user explicitly requests it via
	  default-cipher-preferences: prefer 3DES over CAST5
	* Only use IDEA if the user explicitly requests it via
	  default-cipher-preferences: prefer 3DES over IDEA
	* Use SHA256 for RSA-3072/-4096 signatures and SHA512
	  for Brainpool-512

Rationale:

	* Although there's nothing per se *wrong* with the current
	  default of RSA-2048, realistically, 112 shannons of
	  uncertainty is not enough to inspire long-term confidence
	* Originally, a lot of smart cards couldn't support more
	  than RSA-2048.  While this is still true on some platforms
	  (it's hard to find RSA-3072 JavaCards), this does not
	  appear to be generally true any more.
	* AES256 is a world standard for symmetric encryption and
	  appears to be resisting cryptanalysis better than AES128[*]
	* A good rule of thumb is, "have twice as many bits of hash
	  as there are shannons of uncertainty in the key."  RSA-3072
	  provides ~128 shannons of uncertainty, hence SHA256.
	  Brainpool-512 provides ~256 shannons of uncertainty, hence
	  the recommendation for SHA512.
	* CAST5 is not in good health: as was recently mentioned in
	  the IETF WG mailing list, the Canadians themselves still
	  allow it to be used for applications requiring 128 shannons
	  of uncertainty... but not for secrets that need to be kept
	  for more than a week.  That doesn't inspire much confidence
	  in the long-term prospects of CAST5.
	* Attacks on IDEA haven't been getting much better, but IDEA's
	  been giving me the heebie-jeebies for about fifteen years
	  now.  I'd *really* prefer it if we got rid of it altogether.
	  Barring that, "only allow it to be used by explicit command"
	  will work for me.
	* 3DES is still the Rock of Gibraltar.  Big, slow, ungainly,
	  and strong.  It's nobody's idea of a good modern cipher, but
	  I still think it's a better bet than IDEA or CAST5 today.
	* CFB modes will potentially recycle internal states after
	  2**(blocksize/2) blocks [**].  For a 64-bit block cipher,
	  that's 32GiB of data.  Given that we now have thumb drives
	  larger than that, we need to consider the possibility users
	  will be using GnuPG as a bulk encryption tool and warn them
	  about potentially unsafe uses.  If 2**32 blocks (32 GiB)
	  tends to be about the point at which we recycle state,
	  let's declare 4 GiB to be the point at which we warn users
	  against using a 64-bit block cipher.
	* We've needed to make all these changes for years now.  I've
	  always said we should defer on making big changes to the
	  defaults until we had ECC in place for users to migrate to.
	  Well, we've got ECC: let's start encouraging users to use it.
	  And while we're at it, let's see about making these other
	  overdue changes.


[*] As I read the tea leaves, I'm more convinced of AES256's long-term
strength than I am of AES128's.  However, the idea that either one of
them is somehow 'weak' is just ludicrous.  If you use AES128, don't
panic.  :)

[**] Don't believe me, though.  I haven't done any serious crypto work
in years and my memory could be off.  I vividly recall this warning in
both _Applied Cryptography_ and the _Handbook of Applied Cryptography_,
and I think it was also given in _Practical Cryptography_ and maybe
_Security Engineering_.  Check this before you believe it!



Thoughts?

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From dougb at dougbarton.email  Tue Mar 17 21:07:40 2015
From: dougb at dougbarton.email (Doug Barton)
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 13:07:40 -0700
Subject: what is the proper way to load gpg-agent with systemd
In-Reply-To: <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A002C0@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
References: <CAPdn058xZjD2cib6WoGJf2cT5vkrznA2iP9xVru7C4KtGg5UUA@mail.gmail.com>	<55087028.6020608@dougbarton.email>
 <CAPdn058UmNpEa3csvQc6MzBT+Pdq_N00Y0auyq62mw8NcRwgdQ@mail.gmail.com>
 <55087E92.3050608@dougbarton.email>
 <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A002C0@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
Message-ID: <5508898C.1090905@dougbarton.email>

That question was for Paulo, not you. :)  And FWIW, since you're using 
GnuPG 1.x the answer is no.

Doug


On 3/17/15 12:32 PM, Clark Rivard wrote:
> I am running gpg command so I believe yes is the answer.  (I am a novice at this so still learning.)
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Gnupg-users [mailto:gnupg-users-bounces at gnupg.org] On Behalf Of Doug Barton
> Sent: Tuesday, March 17, 2015 2:21 PM
> To: Paulo Lopes
> Cc: gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> Subject: Re: what is the proper way to load gpg-agent with systemd
>
> Are you using gpg-agent to handle ssh agent responsibilities, yes or no?



From CRivard at merkleinc.com  Tue Mar 17 21:09:32 2015
From: CRivard at merkleinc.com (Clark Rivard)
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 20:09:32 +0000
Subject: what is the proper way to load gpg-agent with systemd
In-Reply-To: <5508898C.1090905@dougbarton.email>
References: <CAPdn058xZjD2cib6WoGJf2cT5vkrznA2iP9xVru7C4KtGg5UUA@mail.gmail.com>
 <55087028.6020608@dougbarton.email>
 <CAPdn058UmNpEa3csvQc6MzBT+Pdq_N00Y0auyq62mw8NcRwgdQ@mail.gmail.com>
 <55087E92.3050608@dougbarton.email>
 <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A002C0@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <5508898C.1090905@dougbarton.email>
Message-ID: <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A00322@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>

OK - thanks.

-----Original Message-----
From: Doug Barton [mailto:dougb at dougbarton.email] 
Sent: Tuesday, March 17, 2015 3:08 PM
To: Clark Rivard; Paulo Lopes
Cc: gnupg-users at gnupg.org
Subject: Re: what is the proper way to load gpg-agent with systemd

That question was for Paulo, not you. :)  And FWIW, since you're using GnuPG 1.x the answer is no.

Doug


On 3/17/15 12:32 PM, Clark Rivard wrote:
> I am running gpg command so I believe yes is the answer.  (I am a 
> novice at this so still learning.)
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Gnupg-users [mailto:gnupg-users-bounces at gnupg.org] On Behalf Of 
> Doug Barton
> Sent: Tuesday, March 17, 2015 2:21 PM
> To: Paulo Lopes
> Cc: gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> Subject: Re: what is the proper way to load gpg-agent with systemd
>
> Are you using gpg-agent to handle ssh agent responsibilities, yes or no?


From iericf at openmailbox.org  Tue Mar 17 20:00:05 2015
From: iericf at openmailbox.org (Eric F)
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 20:00:05 +0100
Subject: Article in Forbes.
Message-ID: <550879B5.5010108@openmailbox.org>

Perhaps not directly gnupg related, more OS X related. But, with both
GPGtools an GnuPG for OS X I'll post it here... (and there was this OS X
sec. discussion the other week) :)

It's seem like ?Gatekeeper? is only using http if I read it correctly.

Ex-NSA Researcher Finds Sneaky Way Past Apple Mac's Gatekeeper
http://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2015/03/17/apple-mac-gatekeeper-bypass-exacerbated-by-unencrypted-av-downloads/

?He found around 150 on his own machine, including hugely popular
software like Microsoft Word and Excel, Apple?s own iCloud Photos and
Dropbox. The list also included Apple?s developer tool *XCODE and email
encryption key management software GPG Keychain, both of which he abused
in his proof of concept attacks*.?


I have no idea how this works, but one question that came in mind was if
a hijacked ?GPG Keychain? on a Mac computer could form a threat to gpg
on other platforms?

Anyway, interesting reading. Just wanted to share.

/Eric
-------------- next part --------------
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From dougb at dougbarton.email  Tue Mar 17 21:27:32 2015
From: dougb at dougbarton.email (Doug Barton)
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 13:27:32 -0700
Subject: Copy Current GPG Installation to Another Server
In-Reply-To: <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A00348@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
References: <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A000C0@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <55086F4E.20302@dougbarton.email>
 <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A00282@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <55088955.6080308@dougbarton.email>
 <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A00348@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
Message-ID: <55088E34.2000102@dougbarton.email>

Please keep things on the list so that the most users can be helped.

You need to run the --recv-key command first, or the --verify command 
will continue to fail.

Try this:

gpg --keyserver hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net --recv-key 4F25E3B6

Doug


On 3/17/15 1:23 PM, Clark Rivard wrote:
> Doug
>
> I ran the verify command and then tried the recv-key command but it came back with these messages
>
> 	"no keyserver known <use option --keyserver>"
> 	"keyserver receive failed: bad URI"
>
> I looked up the keyserver option but don?t know what keyserver name to use?
>
> Thanks.
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Doug Barton [mailto:dougb at dougbarton.email]
> Sent: Tuesday, March 17, 2015 3:07 PM
> To: Clark Rivard
> Subject: Re: Copy Current GPG Installation to Another Server
>
> You need to download the key referenced in the first message:
>
> gpg --recv-key 4F25E3B6
>
> then do your verify command again:
>
> gpg --verify gnupg-w32cli-1.4.19.exe.sig gnupg-w32cli-1.4.19.exe
>
> and you should get a result like this:
>
> gpg: Signature made Fri Feb 27 00:55:58 2015 PST using RSA key ID 4F25E3B6
> gpg: Good signature from "Werner Koch (dist sig)" [unknown]
> gpg: WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature!
> gpg:          There is no indication that the signature belongs to the
> owner.
>
> You can safely ignore the warning, it simply means that you have not validated the key yourself, which when it comes to signed packages is not really a necessity.
>
> hope this helps,
>
> Doug
>
>
> On 3/17/15 12:17 PM, Clark Rivard wrote:
>> Thanks for your fast response, Doug.
>>
>> I am new to this so am struggling through for the first time.
>>
>> I downloaded Version 1.4.19 and am "Checking the Integrity".  I have a version of gpg installed (by someone else a long time ago).
>> I ran the "gpg" command to check whether the signature file matches
>> the source file.  I get two messages back
>>
>> 	"Signature made 02/27/15 03:55:58 using RSA key ID...		
>> 	"Can't check signature: public key not found"
>>
>> The ID shown with the first message is a valid ID for Werner Koch per the documentation I have.
>> The second line confuses me - makes me wonder if the integrity has been checked.
>>
>> Has the integrity been properly checked or do I need to do more?   Any help you can provide is much appreciated.
>>
>> Clark
>>
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Doug Barton [mailto:dougb at dougbarton.email]
>> Sent: Tuesday, March 17, 2015 1:16 PM
>> To: Clark Rivard; gnupg-users at gnupg.org
>> Subject: Re: Copy Current GPG Installation to Another Server
>>
>> On 3/17/15 7:23 AM, Clark Rivard wrote:
>>> I currently have GPG 1.4.8 installed on a Windows server.  Can the
>>> c:\Programs Files (x86)\GNU\ directory simply be copied to another
>>> server and used or do I need to go through the ?download and
>>> installation? process on the new server? Thanks.
>>
>> 1.4.8 is dangerously old. You should download the new version and install in both locations.
>>
>> ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/binary/
>>
>> hope this helps,
>>
>> Doug
>>
>



From paulo at mlopes.net  Tue Mar 17 20:26:17 2015
From: paulo at mlopes.net (Paulo Lopes)
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 20:26:17 +0100
Subject: what is the proper way to load gpg-agent with systemd
Message-ID: <hXSCj31GVd0x.mm4HDxbr@privateemail.com>

Yes!

-----Original Message-----
From: Doug Barton
Sent:  17/03/2015, 20:20 
To: Paulo Lopes
Cc: "gnupg-users at gnupg.org"
Subject: Re: what is the proper way to load gpg-agent with systemd


Are you using gpg-agent to handle ssh agent responsibilities, yes or no?




From CRivard at merkleinc.com  Tue Mar 17 21:42:48 2015
From: CRivard at merkleinc.com (Clark Rivard)
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 20:42:48 +0000
Subject: Copy Current GPG Installation to Another Server
In-Reply-To: <55088E34.2000102@dougbarton.email>
References: <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A000C0@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <55086F4E.20302@dougbarton.email>
 <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A00282@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <55088955.6080308@dougbarton.email>
 <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A00348@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <55088E34.2000102@dougbarton.email>
Message-ID: <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A0036C@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>

I ran the recv-key command again and got a message about "requesting key...from hkp server pool..." but then got "HTTP fetch error 7 couldn't connect: No error" 

Any ideas?  


-----Original Message-----
From: Doug Barton [mailto:dougb at dougbarton.email] 
Sent: Tuesday, March 17, 2015 3:28 PM
To: Clark Rivard
Cc: GnuPG Users
Subject: Re: Copy Current GPG Installation to Another Server

Please keep things on the list so that the most users can be helped.

You need to run the --recv-key command first, or the --verify command will continue to fail.

Try this:

gpg --keyserver hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net --recv-key 4F25E3B6

Doug


On 3/17/15 1:23 PM, Clark Rivard wrote:
> Doug
>
> I ran the verify command and then tried the recv-key command but it 
> came back with these messages
>
> 	"no keyserver known <use option --keyserver>"
> 	"keyserver receive failed: bad URI"
>
> I looked up the keyserver option but don?t know what keyserver name to use?
>
> Thanks.
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Doug Barton [mailto:dougb at dougbarton.email]
> Sent: Tuesday, March 17, 2015 3:07 PM
> To: Clark Rivard
> Subject: Re: Copy Current GPG Installation to Another Server
>
> You need to download the key referenced in the first message:
>
> gpg --recv-key 4F25E3B6
>
> then do your verify command again:
>
> gpg --verify gnupg-w32cli-1.4.19.exe.sig gnupg-w32cli-1.4.19.exe
>
> and you should get a result like this:
>
> gpg: Signature made Fri Feb 27 00:55:58 2015 PST using RSA key ID 
> 4F25E3B6
> gpg: Good signature from "Werner Koch (dist sig)" [unknown]
> gpg: WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature!
> gpg:          There is no indication that the signature belongs to the
> owner.
>
> You can safely ignore the warning, it simply means that you have not validated the key yourself, which when it comes to signed packages is not really a necessity.
>
> hope this helps,
>
> Doug
>
>
> On 3/17/15 12:17 PM, Clark Rivard wrote:
>> Thanks for your fast response, Doug.
>>
>> I am new to this so am struggling through for the first time.
>>
>> I downloaded Version 1.4.19 and am "Checking the Integrity".  I have a version of gpg installed (by someone else a long time ago).
>> I ran the "gpg" command to check whether the signature file matches 
>> the source file.  I get two messages back
>>
>> 	"Signature made 02/27/15 03:55:58 using RSA key ID...		
>> 	"Can't check signature: public key not found"
>>
>> The ID shown with the first message is a valid ID for Werner Koch per the documentation I have.
>> The second line confuses me - makes me wonder if the integrity has been checked.
>>
>> Has the integrity been properly checked or do I need to do more?   Any help you can provide is much appreciated.
>>
>> Clark
>>
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Doug Barton [mailto:dougb at dougbarton.email]
>> Sent: Tuesday, March 17, 2015 1:16 PM
>> To: Clark Rivard; gnupg-users at gnupg.org
>> Subject: Re: Copy Current GPG Installation to Another Server
>>
>> On 3/17/15 7:23 AM, Clark Rivard wrote:
>>> I currently have GPG 1.4.8 installed on a Windows server.  Can the 
>>> c:\Programs Files (x86)\GNU\ directory simply be copied to another 
>>> server and used or do I need to go through the ?download and 
>>> installation? process on the new server? Thanks.
>>
>> 1.4.8 is dangerously old. You should download the new version and install in both locations.
>>
>> ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/binary/
>>
>> hope this helps,
>>
>> Doug
>>
>


From dougb at dougbarton.email  Tue Mar 17 21:46:22 2015
From: dougb at dougbarton.email (Doug Barton)
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 13:46:22 -0700
Subject: Copy Current GPG Installation to Another Server
In-Reply-To: <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A0036C@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
References: <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A000C0@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <55086F4E.20302@dougbarton.email>
 <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A00282@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <55088955.6080308@dougbarton.email>
 <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A00348@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <55088E34.2000102@dougbarton.email>
 <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A0036C@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
Message-ID: <5508929E.3080002@dougbarton.email>

On 3/17/15 1:42 PM, Clark Rivard wrote:
> I ran the recv-key command again and got a message about "requesting key...from hkp server pool..." but then got "HTTP fetch error 7 couldn't connect: No error"
>
> Any ideas?

Try it a few more times, you may have gotten a bad server from the pool. 
If it still doesn't work, try the following:

hkp://keys.gnupg.net
hkp://subkeys.pgp.net
hkp://pgp.mit.edu

... and of course all of this assumes that the systems in question have 
network connectivity ...

Doug



From peter at digitalbrains.com  Tue Mar 17 21:54:36 2015
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 21:54:36 +0100
Subject: Copy Current GPG Installation to Another Server
In-Reply-To: <55088E34.2000102@dougbarton.email>
References: <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A000C0@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <55086F4E.20302@dougbarton.email>
 <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A00282@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <55088955.6080308@dougbarton.email>
 <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A00348@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <55088E34.2000102@dougbarton.email>
Message-ID: <5508948C.3000503@digitalbrains.com>

>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Doug Barton [mailto:dougb at dougbarton.email]
>> Sent: Tuesday, March 17, 2015 3:07 PM
>> To: Clark Rivard
>> Subject: Re: Copy Current GPG Installation to Another Server
>> gpg: Signature made Fri Feb 27 00:55:58 2015 PST using RSA key ID
>> 4F25E3B6
>> gpg: Good signature from "Werner Koch (dist sig)" [unknown]
>> gpg: WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature!
>> gpg:          There is no indication that the signature belongs to the
>> owner.
>>
>> You can safely ignore the warning, it simply means that you have not
>> validated the key yourself, which when it comes to signed packages is
>> not really a necessity.

Why is that? I understand getting a validated key can be tricky in
practice, but on the other hand, using *just* a short key ID to do your
verification feels like the other end of the spectrum... I think you
should at least verify the fingerprint on a web site or something.

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at <http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>


From robertc at broadcom.com  Tue Mar 17 21:59:24 2015
From: robertc at broadcom.com (Bob (Robert) Cavanaugh)
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 20:59:24 +0000
Subject: Defaults
In-Reply-To: <5508842F.1010101@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <5508842F.1010101@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <8F0B09FC6339FA439524099BFCABC11F2D3CB930@IRVEXCHMB11.corp.ad.broadcom.com>

My vote is for the defaults Robert is proposing. Definitely in keeping with what else I have been reading.

Thanks,
 
Bob Cavanaugh


> -----Original Message-----
> From: Gnupg-users [mailto:gnupg-users-
> bounces+robertc=broadcom.com at gnupg.org] On Behalf Of Robert J.
> Hansen
> Sent: Tuesday, March 17, 2015 12:45 PM
> To: gnupg
> Subject: Defaults
> 
> Given that 2.1 introduces a lot of new capabilities (mostly with respect to
> ECC), I think now, early on in the 2.1 series, would be a good time to discuss
> changing the defaults for newly-generated certificates.
> 
> In a nutshell:
> 
> 	* Offer Brainpool-512 and RSA-3072 as options for
> 	  newly-generated certificates
> 	* Use AES256 for a symmetric cipher
> 	* Raise a warning if the user attempts to encrypt more
> 	  than 4 GiB with an old (64-bit block) cipher
> 	* Only use CAST5 if the user explicitly requests it via
> 	  default-cipher-preferences: prefer 3DES over CAST5
> 	* Only use IDEA if the user explicitly requests it via
> 	  default-cipher-preferences: prefer 3DES over IDEA
> 	* Use SHA256 for RSA-3072/-4096 signatures and SHA512
> 	  for Brainpool-512
> 
> Rationale:
> 
> 	* Although there's nothing per se *wrong* with the current
> 	  default of RSA-2048, realistically, 112 shannons of
> 	  uncertainty is not enough to inspire long-term confidence
> 	* Originally, a lot of smart cards couldn't support more
> 	  than RSA-2048.  While this is still true on some platforms
> 	  (it's hard to find RSA-3072 JavaCards), this does not
> 	  appear to be generally true any more.
> 	* AES256 is a world standard for symmetric encryption and
> 	  appears to be resisting cryptanalysis better than AES128[*]
> 	* A good rule of thumb is, "have twice as many bits of hash
> 	  as there are shannons of uncertainty in the key."  RSA-3072
> 	  provides ~128 shannons of uncertainty, hence SHA256.
> 	  Brainpool-512 provides ~256 shannons of uncertainty, hence
> 	  the recommendation for SHA512.
> 	* CAST5 is not in good health: as was recently mentioned in
> 	  the IETF WG mailing list, the Canadians themselves still
> 	  allow it to be used for applications requiring 128 shannons
> 	  of uncertainty... but not for secrets that need to be kept
> 	  for more than a week.  That doesn't inspire much confidence
> 	  in the long-term prospects of CAST5.
> 	* Attacks on IDEA haven't been getting much better, but IDEA's
> 	  been giving me the heebie-jeebies for about fifteen years
> 	  now.  I'd *really* prefer it if we got rid of it altogether.
> 	  Barring that, "only allow it to be used by explicit command"
> 	  will work for me.
> 	* 3DES is still the Rock of Gibraltar.  Big, slow, ungainly,
> 	  and strong.  It's nobody's idea of a good modern cipher, but
> 	  I still think it's a better bet than IDEA or CAST5 today.
> 	* CFB modes will potentially recycle internal states after
> 	  2**(blocksize/2) blocks [**].  For a 64-bit block cipher,
> 	  that's 32GiB of data.  Given that we now have thumb drives
> 	  larger than that, we need to consider the possibility users
> 	  will be using GnuPG as a bulk encryption tool and warn them
> 	  about potentially unsafe uses.  If 2**32 blocks (32 GiB)
> 	  tends to be about the point at which we recycle state,
> 	  let's declare 4 GiB to be the point at which we warn users
> 	  against using a 64-bit block cipher.
> 	* We've needed to make all these changes for years now.  I've
> 	  always said we should defer on making big changes to the
> 	  defaults until we had ECC in place for users to migrate to.
> 	  Well, we've got ECC: let's start encouraging users to use it.
> 	  And while we're at it, let's see about making these other
> 	  overdue changes.
> 
> 
> [*] As I read the tea leaves, I'm more convinced of AES256's long-term
> strength than I am of AES128's.  However, the idea that either one of them is
> somehow 'weak' is just ludicrous.  If you use AES128, don't panic.  :)
> 
> [**] Don't believe me, though.  I haven't done any serious crypto work in
> years and my memory could be off.  I vividly recall this warning in both
> _Applied Cryptography_ and the _Handbook of Applied Cryptography_, and I
> think it was also given in _Practical Cryptography_ and maybe _Security
> Engineering_.  Check this before you believe it!
> 
> 
> 
> Thoughts?


From dougb at dougbarton.email  Tue Mar 17 22:04:13 2015
From: dougb at dougbarton.email (Doug Barton)
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 14:04:13 -0700
Subject: Copy Current GPG Installation to Another Server
In-Reply-To: <5508948C.3000503@digitalbrains.com>
References: <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A000C0@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <55086F4E.20302@dougbarton.email>
 <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A00282@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <55088955.6080308@dougbarton.email>
 <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A00348@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <55088E34.2000102@dougbarton.email> <5508948C.3000503@digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <550896CD.5000507@dougbarton.email>

On 3/17/15 1:54 PM, Peter Lebbing wrote:
>>> -----Original Message-----
>>> From: Doug Barton [mailto:dougb at dougbarton.email]
>>> Sent: Tuesday, March 17, 2015 3:07 PM
>>> To: Clark Rivard
>>> Subject: Re: Copy Current GPG Installation to Another Server
>>> gpg: Signature made Fri Feb 27 00:55:58 2015 PST using RSA key ID
>>> 4F25E3B6
>>> gpg: Good signature from "Werner Koch (dist sig)" [unknown]
>>> gpg: WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature!
>>> gpg:          There is no indication that the signature belongs to the
>>> owner.
>>>
>>> You can safely ignore the warning, it simply means that you have not
>>> validated the key yourself, which when it comes to signed packages is
>>> not really a necessity.
>
> Why is that?

Because in this situation you're often dealing with beginners who don't 
understand the subtleties involved in validating keys.

> I understand getting a validated key can be tricky in
> practice, but on the other hand, using *just* a short key ID to do your
> verification feels like the other end of the spectrum... I think you
> should at least verify the fingerprint on a web site or something.

Assuming you get the package, the signature, and the fingerprint from 
the same *.gnupg.org resources, what does that buy you?

If you've somehow downloaded the wrong key by short Id, the signature 
won't validate. If you have the right key, it will. That's enough to 
tell the user that the contents of the package are unaltered.

More extensive checking would be great, but would require a lot of 
documentation to teach the users how to do it ... are you volunteering 
to write it? :)

Doug




From CRivard at merkleinc.com  Tue Mar 17 22:09:43 2015
From: CRivard at merkleinc.com (Clark Rivard)
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 21:09:43 +0000
Subject: Copy Current GPG Installation to Another Server
In-Reply-To: <5508929E.3080002@dougbarton.email>
References: <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A000C0@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <55086F4E.20302@dougbarton.email>
 <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A00282@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <55088955.6080308@dougbarton.email>
 <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A00348@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <55088E34.2000102@dougbarton.email>
 <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A0036C@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <5508929E.3080002@dougbarton.email>
Message-ID: <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A003A0@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>

I tried all of the options below but still got the "HTTP fetch error 7".   

I used the "sha1sum" option and got the expected result - does this verify the integrity adequately?  

-----Original Message-----
From: Doug Barton [mailto:dougb at dougbarton.email] 
Sent: Tuesday, March 17, 2015 3:46 PM
To: Clark Rivard
Cc: GnuPG Users
Subject: Re: Copy Current GPG Installation to Another Server

On 3/17/15 1:42 PM, Clark Rivard wrote:
> I ran the recv-key command again and got a message about "requesting key...from hkp server pool..." but then got "HTTP fetch error 7 couldn't connect: No error"
>
> Any ideas?

Try it a few more times, you may have gotten a bad server from the pool. 
If it still doesn't work, try the following:

hkp://keys.gnupg.net
hkp://subkeys.pgp.net
hkp://pgp.mit.edu

... and of course all of this assumes that the systems in question have network connectivity ...

Doug


From dougb at dougbarton.email  Tue Mar 17 22:15:07 2015
From: dougb at dougbarton.email (Doug Barton)
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 14:15:07 -0700
Subject: Copy Current GPG Installation to Another Server
In-Reply-To: <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A003A0@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
References: <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A000C0@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <55086F4E.20302@dougbarton.email>
 <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A00282@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <55088955.6080308@dougbarton.email>
 <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A00348@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <55088E34.2000102@dougbarton.email>
 <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A0036C@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <5508929E.3080002@dougbarton.email>
 <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A003A0@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
Message-ID: <5508995B.2070009@dougbarton.email>

On 3/17/15 2:09 PM, Clark Rivard wrote:
> I tried all of the options below but still got the "HTTP fetch error 7".

That would indicate that the system(s) do not have access to the 
Internet. Is that an expected result?

> I used the "sha1sum" option and got the expected result - does this verify the integrity adequately?

I can't tell you what is adequate for your situation. You have to make 
that judgement yourself.

Doug


> -----Original Message-----
> From: Doug Barton [mailto:dougb at dougbarton.email]
> Sent: Tuesday, March 17, 2015 3:46 PM
> To: Clark Rivard
> Cc: GnuPG Users
> Subject: Re: Copy Current GPG Installation to Another Server
>
> On 3/17/15 1:42 PM, Clark Rivard wrote:
>> I ran the recv-key command again and got a message about "requesting key...from hkp server pool..." but then got "HTTP fetch error 7 couldn't connect: No error"
>>
>> Any ideas?
>
> Try it a few more times, you may have gotten a bad server from the pool.
> If it still doesn't work, try the following:
>
> hkp://keys.gnupg.net
> hkp://subkeys.pgp.net
> hkp://pgp.mit.edu
>
> ... and of course all of this assumes that the systems in question have network connectivity ...
>
> Doug
>



From peter at digitalbrains.com  Tue Mar 17 22:15:15 2015
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 22:15:15 +0100
Subject: Copy Current GPG Installation to Another Server
In-Reply-To: <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A003A0@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
References: <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A000C0@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <55086F4E.20302@dougbarton.email>
 <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A00282@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <55088955.6080308@dougbarton.email>
 <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A00348@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <55088E34.2000102@dougbarton.email>
 <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A0036C@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <5508929E.3080002@dougbarton.email>
 <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A003A0@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
Message-ID: <55089963.2060005@digitalbrains.com>

On 17/03/15 22:09, Clark Rivard wrote:
> I used the "sha1sum" option and got the expected result - does this verify the integrity adequately?  

It's just as good as verifying the signature of a key with short ID 4F25E3B6. As
you can soon see elsewhere in this thread, I don't think it practically adds
anything. Proper verification of the key requires not relying on the short key
ID, or even the long one for that matter. It means you check the fingerprint of
the key, which is much longer.

HTH,

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at <http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>


From peter at digitalbrains.com  Tue Mar 17 22:19:07 2015
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 22:19:07 +0100
Subject: Copy Current GPG Installation to Another Server
In-Reply-To: <550896CD.5000507@dougbarton.email>
References: <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A000C0@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <55086F4E.20302@dougbarton.email>
 <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A00282@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <55088955.6080308@dougbarton.email>
 <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A00348@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <55088E34.2000102@dougbarton.email> <5508948C.3000503@digitalbrains.com>
 <550896CD.5000507@dougbarton.email>
Message-ID: <55089A4B.9080204@digitalbrains.com>

On 17/03/15 22:04, Doug Barton wrote:
> Assuming you get the package, the signature, and the fingerprint from the same
> *.gnupg.org resources, what does that buy you?

Assuming they're all protected by https, nothing.

What does verification of that signature buy you though? That your download
wasn't corrupted?

> If you've somehow downloaded the wrong key by short Id, the signature won't
> validate. If you have the right key, it will. That's enough to tell the user
> that the contents of the package are unaltered.

If I were to place something nefarious inside a GnuPG download, I'd sign the
result with a key I created with the short key ID 4F25E3B6. That way, your
--recv-key command will retrieve both my key and Werners, and the signature will
happily validate. Creating a short key ID collision is peanuts and can be done
with off-the-shelf software on a laptop.

This rakes in not just the people who don't check the signature, but also all
those who just verify the short key ID. Since it's hardly any effort, I'd do it,
even though it probably only gains me a few percent coverage.

> More extensive checking would be great, but would require a lot of documentation
> to teach the users how to do it ... are you volunteering to write it? :)

No, but I'm also not telling people they can verify using the short key ID. No
guidance is better than wrong guidance, IMHO. No offence meant, I appreciate you
helping him out. I'm just trying to give some constructive criticism.

HTH,

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at <http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>


From rpuls at kcore.de  Tue Mar 17 22:23:24 2015
From: rpuls at kcore.de (=?UTF-8?B?UmVuw6k=?= Puls)
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 22:23:24 +0100
Subject: Defaults
In-Reply-To: <5508842F.1010101@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <5508842F.1010101@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <20150317222324.1535fde8@kcore.de>

On Tue, 17 Mar 2015 15:44:47 -0400 Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> [*] As I read the tea leaves, I'm more convinced of AES256's long-term
> strength than I am of AES128's.  However, the idea that either one of
> them is somehow 'weak' is just ludicrous.  If you use AES128, don't
> panic.  :)

I remember reading about an attack that works better against AES-256
than AES-128:

https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2009/07/another_new_aes.html

Bruce Schneier wrote:

> And for new applications I suggest that people don't use AES-256.
> AES-128 provides more than enough security margin for the forseeable
> future. But if you're already using AES-256, there's no reason to
> change.

I am not qualified to argue for or against either cipher, but I wonder
if this advice from 2009 is still valid today.

Ren?


From CRivard at merkleinc.com  Tue Mar 17 22:27:24 2015
From: CRivard at merkleinc.com (Clark Rivard)
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 21:27:24 +0000
Subject: Copy Current GPG Installation to Another Server
In-Reply-To: <55089A4B.9080204@digitalbrains.com>
References: <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A000C0@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <55086F4E.20302@dougbarton.email>
 <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A00282@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <55088955.6080308@dougbarton.email>
 <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A00348@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <55088E34.2000102@dougbarton.email> <5508948C.3000503@digitalbrains.com>
 <550896CD.5000507@dougbarton.email> <55089A4B.9080204@digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A003EB@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>

How do you check the fingerprint? 

-----Original Message-----
From: Gnupg-users [mailto:gnupg-users-bounces at gnupg.org] On Behalf Of Peter Lebbing
Sent: Tuesday, March 17, 2015 4:19 PM
To: Doug Barton
Cc: GnuPG Users
Subject: Re: Copy Current GPG Installation to Another Server

On 17/03/15 22:04, Doug Barton wrote:
> Assuming you get the package, the signature, and the fingerprint from 
> the same *.gnupg.org resources, what does that buy you?

Assuming they're all protected by https, nothing.

What does verification of that signature buy you though? That your download wasn't corrupted?

> If you've somehow downloaded the wrong key by short Id, the signature 
> won't validate. If you have the right key, it will. That's enough to 
> tell the user that the contents of the package are unaltered.

If I were to place something nefarious inside a GnuPG download, I'd sign the result with a key I created with the short key ID 4F25E3B6. That way, your --recv-key command will retrieve both my key and Werners, and the signature will happily validate. Creating a short key ID collision is peanuts and can be done with off-the-shelf software on a laptop.

This rakes in not just the people who don't check the signature, but also all those who just verify the short key ID. Since it's hardly any effort, I'd do it, even though it probably only gains me a few percent coverage.

> More extensive checking would be great, but would require a lot of 
> documentation to teach the users how to do it ... are you volunteering 
> to write it? :)

No, but I'm also not telling people they can verify using the short key ID. No guidance is better than wrong guidance, IMHO. No offence meant, I appreciate you helping him out. I'm just trying to give some constructive criticism.

HTH,

Peter.

--
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at <http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>

_______________________________________________
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users


From dougb at dougbarton.email  Tue Mar 17 22:33:03 2015
From: dougb at dougbarton.email (Doug Barton)
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 14:33:03 -0700
Subject: Copy Current GPG Installation to Another Server
In-Reply-To: <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A003EB@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
References: <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A000C0@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <55086F4E.20302@dougbarton.email>
 <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A00282@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <55088955.6080308@dougbarton.email>
 <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A00348@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <55088E34.2000102@dougbarton.email> <5508948C.3000503@digitalbrains.com>
 <550896CD.5000507@dougbarton.email> <55089A4B.9080204@digitalbrains.com>
 <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A003EB@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
Message-ID: <55089D8F.2040800@dougbarton.email>

On 3/17/15 2:27 PM, Clark Rivard wrote:
> How do you check the fingerprint?

Step 1 is that you have to get a validated version of the fingerprint of 
the key that you would have been using to verify the package if you 
could have downloaded that key in the first place.

The concept of validating keys is a much more advanced topic, and while 
I admire Peter's enthusiasm, isn't really a useful exercise for you to 
engage in at this point, especially since you can't seem to download the 
key that you would be validating with the fingerprint in the first place.

Doug




From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Tue Mar 17 22:33:48 2015
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 17:33:48 -0400
Subject: Defaults
In-Reply-To: <20150317222324.1535fde8@kcore.de>
References: <5508842F.1010101@sixdemonbag.org>
 <20150317222324.1535fde8@kcore.de>
Message-ID: <55089DBC.5070004@sixdemonbag.org>

> I remember reading about an attack that works better against AES-256 
> than AES-128:

That one's a related-key attack, which requires the attacker to have a
significant number of keys that have some mathematical relationship to
each other.

OpenPGP uses random nonces for symmetric keys (or iterated hashing,
which does a pretty good job of destroying mathematical relationships),
so this attack is a complete nonissue for OpenPGP.  :)

> I am not qualified to argue for or against either cipher, but I
> wonder if this advice from 2009 is still valid today.

The biggest reason, IMO, to move to 256-bit ciphers is because it will
hopefully quell the voices who are screaming that 128-bit crypto is
somehow insufficient.  It's not, and no one has ever presented any
serious evidence that it is, but these arguments crop up with great
regularity nevertheless.

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From dougb at dougbarton.email  Tue Mar 17 22:34:17 2015
From: dougb at dougbarton.email (Doug Barton)
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 14:34:17 -0700
Subject: Copy Current GPG Installation to Another Server
In-Reply-To: <55089A4B.9080204@digitalbrains.com>
References: <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A000C0@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <55086F4E.20302@dougbarton.email>
 <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A00282@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <55088955.6080308@dougbarton.email>
 <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A00348@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <55088E34.2000102@dougbarton.email> <5508948C.3000503@digitalbrains.com>
 <550896CD.5000507@dougbarton.email> <55089A4B.9080204@digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <55089DD9.8030407@dougbarton.email>

On 3/17/15 2:19 PM, Peter Lebbing wrote:
> On 17/03/15 22:04, Doug Barton wrote:
>> Assuming you get the package, the signature, and the fingerprint from the same
>> *.gnupg.org resources, what does that buy you?
>
> Assuming they're all protected by https, nothing.

I think you missed my point. If all three resources related to 
verification are provided by the same source, then verifying the 
fingerprint gets you zero added security. It's more or less equivalent 
to using a hash by itself.

> What does verification of that signature buy you though? That your download
> wasn't corrupted?

I covered that later in the message, but basically, yes.

>> If you've somehow downloaded the wrong key by short Id, the signature won't
>> validate. If you have the right key, it will. That's enough to tell the user
>> that the contents of the package are unaltered.
>
> If I were to place something nefarious inside a GnuPG download,

So to start with, that's a pretty big hurdle to jump, and if you have 
access to do that, then you almost certainly have access to do other 
things like changing the fingerprint to verify.

So in my threat model once Eve has access to the site where the 
downloads are posted, it's already game over. You can posit a threat 
model where Eve has access to one thing, but not the other, and that's 
fine; but there are way too many technical and social engineering tricks 
that can be performed if you have access to just the downloads. Your 
idea of "verify the fingerprint from a web page" provides little to no 
improved security in a world where the nefarious actor has no access to 
the downloads in the first place, and zero when they do.

> I'd sign the
> result with a key I created with the short key ID 4F25E3B6.

Why would you bother? Why not just sign it with a completely new key, 
and include in the comments something like "2015 Q1 Signing key for 
official purposes?" That's enough social engineering to "catch" the 
overwhelming majority of users, even the ones sophisticated enough to 
actually review the key that they just downloaded.

> That way, your
> --recv-key command will retrieve both my key and Werners, and the signature will
> happily validate. Creating a short key ID collision is peanuts and can be done
> with off-the-shelf software on a laptop.

... even assuming that this is relevant ...

> This rakes in not just the people who don't check the signature,

when the malicious actor has access to the downloads, those people are 
already hosed, regardless of what extra security you're suggesting.

> but also all
> those who just verify the short key ID. Since it's hardly any effort, I'd do it,
> even though it probably only gains me a few percent coverage.

... and as above, it's totally unnecessary.

>> More extensive checking would be great, but would require a lot of documentation
>> to teach the users how to do it ... are you volunteering to write it? :)
>
> No, but I'm also not telling people they can verify using the short key ID. No
> guidance is better than wrong guidance, IMHO.

In the first place, I disagree with your premise that no guidance is 
better. If for no other reason than providing the "wrong" guidance is 
likely to spur the people with the "right" answer into responding when 
they otherwise would not.

I also disagree with you that I'm providing the wrong guidance. :)

Doug



From peter at digitalbrains.com  Tue Mar 17 22:56:15 2015
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 22:56:15 +0100
Subject: Copy Current GPG Installation to Another Server
In-Reply-To: <55089DD9.8030407@dougbarton.email>
References: <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A000C0@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <55086F4E.20302@dougbarton.email>
 <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A00282@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <55088955.6080308@dougbarton.email>
 <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A00348@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <55088E34.2000102@dougbarton.email> <5508948C.3000503@digitalbrains.com>
 <550896CD.5000507@dougbarton.email> <55089A4B.9080204@digitalbrains.com>
 <55089DD9.8030407@dougbarton.email>
Message-ID: <5508A2FF.1030307@digitalbrains.com>

On 17/03/15 22:34, Doug Barton wrote:
>> Assuming they're all protected by https, nothing.
> 
> I think you missed my point. If all three resources related to verification are
> provided by the same source, then verifying the fingerprint gets you zero added
> security. It's more or less equivalent to using a hash by itself.

No, I think that's what I mean as well. If they all come from the same source,
it gets you nothing to check the signature. So I don't see why you would verify
the signature at all.

> So to start with, that's a pretty big hurdle to jump, and if you have access to
> do that, then you almost certainly have access to do other things like changing
> the fingerprint to verify.

By creating a short key ID collision, I'm also getting those people that read
your e-mail or a similar thing somewhere on the web, and just download the short
key ID. I'm also getting those people that get a "BAD signature" and then do a
new --recv-key with the short key ID in an unfortunate attempt to get it to
verify ("hmmm, maybe it has expired?").

Like you said, I passed a big hurdle. I'm either MITM, or I write-accessed the
ftp server of gnupg.org. Why stop there when it's so little effort to create a
short key ID collision? It sounds fun in a perverse way.

But back to my primary objection:

I consider it bad advice to tell someone to rely on the short key ID. Sounds
like a bad habit potentially getting bootstrapped to me.

That's really all this is about.

You could also say they should check the sha1sum, like Clark ended up doing. Or
typing

gpg --fingerprint -k 4F25E3B6

and checking it says

pub   2048R/4F25E3B6 2011-01-12 [expires: 2019-12-31]
      Key fingerprint = D869 2123 C406 5DEA 5E0F  3AB5 249B 39D2 4F25 E3B6
uid       [  full  ] Werner Koch (dist sig)
sub   2048R/AC87C71A 2011-01-12 [expires: 2019-12-31]

with a little caveat that you should actually get the fingerprint from somewhere
trusted, not from a stranger. That would already go a long way. When I include
non-trivial code to be entered on someone's PC, I always include the disclaimer
"Please understand what you are doing here, never enter on your PC what a
stranger on the internet tells you to". At least, I think and hope I do, might
have forgotten in my enthousiasm sometimes.

Or don't check at all and simply see if it crashes during installation. I
wouldn't be surprised if it included a checksum in the .exe as part of the
installer.

But we obviously disagree in an informed way. I know I can be rather principal.
Thanks for appreciating my enthousiasm though :).

HTH,

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at <http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>


From pete at heypete.com  Tue Mar 17 22:58:47 2015
From: pete at heypete.com (Pete Stephenson)
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 22:58:47 +0100
Subject: Defaults
In-Reply-To: <5508842F.1010101@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <5508842F.1010101@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <5508A397.50301@heypete.com>

On 3/17/2015 8:44 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> Given that 2.1 introduces a lot of new capabilities (mostly with respect
> to ECC), I think now, early on in the 2.1 series, would be a good time
> to discuss changing the defaults for newly-generated certificates.
> 
> In a nutshell:
> 
> 	* Offer Brainpool-512 and RSA-3072 as options for
> 	  newly-generated certificates

I mostly agree. However, I have a few minor points:

- Above RSA-2048, keys and signatures become quite large. DSA signatures
increase slightly, but are considerably smaller than RSA signatures.

As long as we're considering "legacy" algorithms like RSA and DSA, is
there any particular reason for preferring RSA over DSA at such key
lengths? I know that DSA is only defined up to DSA-3072, so those who
wish to use larger keys would need to use RSA or ECC, but why not use
DSA as the default?

Is Deterministic DSA only available in 2.1, or do 1.x and 2.0.x also
have that feature?

- The Brainpool curves are similar in structure to the NIST curves,
though their curve parameters are chosen in a clear, open manner. While
that leads to increased trust that the parameters aren't chosen for
nefarious purposes, if one is already making a major change to ECC, why
not use some other, more modern curve that's designed at a high-security
level?

Curve M-511 comes to mind, as it's similar to Curve25519 (which GnuPG
already implements).

See http://safecurves.cr.yp.to/ -- djb and Lange clearly lay out their
criteria for different curves and why they're categorized they way they
are. I'm nothing more than an interested amateur in this subject, but
why not benefit from their efforts?

> 	* Use AES256 for a symmetric cipher
> 	* Raise a warning if the user attempts to encrypt more
> 	  than 4 GiB with an old (64-bit block) cipher

Agreed.

> 	* Only use CAST5 if the user explicitly requests it via
> 	  default-cipher-preferences: prefer 3DES over CAST5

(Rationale)
> 	* CAST5 is not in good health: as was recently mentioned in
> 	  the IETF WG mailing list, the Canadians themselves still
> 	  allow it to be used for applications requiring 128 shannons
> 	  of uncertainty... but not for secrets that need to be kept
> 	  for more than a week.  That doesn't inspire much confidence
> 	  in the long-term prospects of CAST5.

Do you have a link to this discussion on the IETF list? I suspect the
community here would be very interested.

> 	* Only use IDEA if the user explicitly requests it via
> 	  default-cipher-preferences: prefer 3DES over IDEA

(Rationale)
> 	* Attacks on IDEA haven't been getting much better, but IDEA's
> 	  been giving me the heebie-jeebies for about fifteen years
> 	  now.  I'd *really* prefer it if we got rid of it altogether.
> 	  Barring that, "only allow it to be used by explicit command"
> 	  will work for me.

Is there something particular about IDEA that concerns you?

> 	* Use SHA256 for RSA-3072/-4096 signatures and SHA512
> 	  for Brainpool-512

Agreed.

> 	* We've needed to make all these changes for years now.  I've
> 	  always said we should defer on making big changes to the
> 	  defaults until we had ECC in place for users to migrate to.
> 	  Well, we've got ECC: let's start encouraging users to use it.
> 	  And while we're at it, let's see about making these other
> 	  overdue changes.

Alas, a lot of Linux distributions are quite slow-moving: it's unlikely
that distributions like Debian and Ubuntu will have GnuPG 2.1.x
available (let alone installed by default) for several years.

Yes, the changes should be made, but ECC support won't be widely
available to most users for some time.

Cheers!
-Pete


From peter at digitalbrains.com  Tue Mar 17 23:02:11 2015
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 23:02:11 +0100
Subject: Copy Current GPG Installation to Another Server
In-Reply-To: <5508A2FF.1030307@digitalbrains.com>
References: <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A000C0@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <55086F4E.20302@dougbarton.email>
 <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A00282@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <55088955.6080308@dougbarton.email>
 <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A00348@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <55088E34.2000102@dougbarton.email> <5508948C.3000503@digitalbrains.com>
 <550896CD.5000507@dougbarton.email> <55089A4B.9080204@digitalbrains.com>
 <55089DD9.8030407@dougbarton.email> <5508A2FF.1030307@digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <5508A463.5090204@digitalbrains.com>

On 17/03/15 22:56, Peter Lebbing wrote:
> and checking it says
> 
> pub   2048R/4F25E3B6 2011-01-12 [expires: 2019-12-31]
>       Key fingerprint = D869 2123 C406 5DEA 5E0F  3AB5 249B 39D2 4F25 E3B6
> uid       [  full  ] Werner Koch (dist sig)
> sub   2048R/AC87C71A 2011-01-12 [expires: 2019-12-31]

Hah! Obviously it wouldn't say "full", firstly because you need list-options
show-uid-validity in your gpg.conf, and secondly because the whole issue here is
you didn't have a trust path to that key. I met Werner at the 31C3 this
December, so I can in fact now finally check the validity of this key! :)

Should properly read stuff I copy-paste before I send the message...

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at <http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>


From dougb at dougbarton.email  Tue Mar 17 23:18:30 2015
From: dougb at dougbarton.email (Doug Barton)
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 15:18:30 -0700
Subject: Copy Current GPG Installation to Another Server
In-Reply-To: <5508A2FF.1030307@digitalbrains.com>
References: <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A000C0@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <55086F4E.20302@dougbarton.email>
 <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A00282@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <55088955.6080308@dougbarton.email>
 <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A00348@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <55088E34.2000102@dougbarton.email> <5508948C.3000503@digitalbrains.com>
 <550896CD.5000507@dougbarton.email> <55089A4B.9080204@digitalbrains.com>
 <55089DD9.8030407@dougbarton.email> <5508A2FF.1030307@digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <5508A836.9010509@dougbarton.email>

On 3/17/15 2:56 PM, Peter Lebbing wrote:
> On 17/03/15 22:34, Doug Barton wrote:
>>> Assuming they're all protected by https, nothing.
>>
>> I think you missed my point. If all three resources related to verification are
>> provided by the same source, then verifying the fingerprint gets you zero added
>> security. It's more or less equivalent to using a hash by itself.
>
> No, I think that's what I mean as well. If they all come from the same source,
> it gets you nothing to check the signature. So I don't see why you would verify
> the signature at all.

Because it tells you that the package was not tampered with. I've 
covered this several times now.

>> So to start with, that's a pretty big hurdle to jump, and if you have access to
>> do that, then you almost certainly have access to do other things like changing
>> the fingerprint to verify.
>
> By creating a short key ID collision, I'm also getting those people that read
> your e-mail or a similar thing somewhere on the web, and just download the short
> key ID. I'm also getting those people that get a "BAD signature" and then do a
> new --recv-key with the short key ID in an unfortunate attempt to get it to
> verify ("hmmm, maybe it has expired?").

Again, I think you're missing the bigger picture here. If you have write 
access to the FTP site, why would you even bother creating the signature 
for your malicious package with a key that has the same short key Id?

You're trying to defend against an incredibly unlikely threat model. If 
I download 'malicious package' + 'signature for malicious package 
created by key controlled by malicious actor,' one of two things is 
overwhelmingly likely to happen:

1. I blindly import the key, verify the signature, and move on; or
2. I import the key, perform a cursory review, verify the signature, and 
move on.

Either way, your short key Id collision is out of spec. The user in this 
situation has no way to know that there should be a short key Id other 
than the one that is related to the signature that they have in hand. 
Since both the package and the signature are under Eve's control, the 
threat model you are suggesting is a complete red herring.

> But back to my primary objection:
>
> I consider it bad advice to tell someone to rely on the short key ID. Sounds
> like a bad habit potentially getting bootstrapped to me.
>
> That's really all this is about.

Thank you for confirming your real motives. :) I understand in theory 
that relying solely on the short key Id is not a good practice in a 
situation where you want things to be "very secure." But we do indeed 
have a bootstrapping issue here, which is, "Where do you start when it 
comes to rank beginners?" I think you are asking way too much, and 
giving near-zero value in return.

> You could also say they should check the sha1sum, like Clark ended up doing. Or
> typing
>
> gpg --fingerprint -k 4F25E3B6
>
> and checking it says
>
> pub   2048R/4F25E3B6 2011-01-12 [expires: 2019-12-31]
>        Key fingerprint = D869 2123 C406 5DEA 5E0F  3AB5 249B 39D2 4F25 E3B6
> uid       [  full  ] Werner Koch (dist sig)
> sub   2048R/AC87C71A 2011-01-12 [expires: 2019-12-31]
>
> with a little caveat that you should actually get the fingerprint from somewhere
> trusted, not from a stranger.

Sure, but now you've entered a very sticky briar patch, with a lot of 
bootstrapping knowledge that is not easy for a rank beginner to grasp. 
You and I "get" what you're talking about, but that knowledge came from 
experience. (and again, the extra security that you get is of very 
limited value at this stage of the game)

Doug



From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Tue Mar 17 23:25:12 2015
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 18:25:12 -0400
Subject: Defaults
In-Reply-To: <5508A397.50301@heypete.com>
References: <5508842F.1010101@sixdemonbag.org> <5508A397.50301@heypete.com>
Message-ID: <5508A9C8.2030401@sixdemonbag.org>

> As long as we're considering "legacy" algorithms like RSA and DSA,
> is there any particular reason for preferring RSA over DSA at such
> key lengths?

I have reasons to prefer RSA, yes, but whether they'll convince you is a
different matter.  :)

Where signature size matters most is in email.  An RSA-3072 signature's
size is significant (says the sophist, surreptitiously suggesting
alliteration on several syllables) on a 512-byte message; there, the
overhead is huge.  On a 5MiB file, the signature's insignificant.

In email, the way of the future is PGP/MIME.  For years I've advocated
inline PGP and said PGP/MIME wasn't ready for prime time, but I'm now at
the point where I believe PGP/MIME is ready to be the default.  And in
PGP/MIME messages, the end-user never sees the signature block, so
there's very little for users to get upset over.  The size difference
between a DSA-3072 signature and an RSA-3072 signature is unlikely to
make a dent in anyone's mobile data plan, either.

So the main advantage DSA has over RSA -- smaller signature size -- is
irrelevant.

And although it genuinely pains me to say this, I can understand why
some OpenPGP users mistrust DSA.  I don't mistrust it and I think people
who do mistrust it are doing so erroneously, but I understand.  NIST's
reputation has taken a pounding in the last few years.

Frankly, people trust RSA more.  I personally think that's foolish:
they're both rock-solid algorithms.  But I understand it, at the same
time, and a decent respect for the concerns of others causes me to
recommend RSA.  I frankly have no preference between RSA and DSA; some
other people in the community trust RSA more; so, okay, let's go for RSA.

> - The Brainpool curves are similar in structure to the NIST curves, 
> though their curve parameters are chosen in a clear, open manner.
> While that leads to increased trust that the parameters aren't chosen
> for nefarious purposes, if one is already making a major change to
> ECC, why not use some other, more modern curve that's designed at a
> high-security level?

Because at present GnuPG supports the following curves:

	* NIST
		o P-256
		o P-384
		o P-521
	* Brainpool
		o P-256
		o P-384
		o P-512

I cannot in good conscience recommend changing the defaults to an
algorithm not yet supported by GnuPG.  :)

> Do you have a link to this discussion on the IETF list? I suspect
> the community here would be very interested.

https://www.cse-cst.gc.ca/en/node/227/html/15164

Looking over it again, it turns out the Canadians are distrustful of
128-bit crypto *in general*.  None of them are approved for periods
longer than seven days.

> Is there something particular about IDEA that concerns you?

About fifteen years ago I learned about a miss-in-the-middle attack on
IDEA that broke 4.5 of 8.5 rounds (by ... Biham, I think).  That made my
eyebrows go up.  It wasn't a full break, but it sure as hell was
interesting, and attacks only ever get better over time.  That was when
IDEA started giving me the heebie-jeebies.

Khovratovich presented a break against full (8.5-round) IDEA in 2012.
This attack isn't huge -- it reduces 128 shannons of uncertainty to 126,
more or less -- but, at the same time, it's freaking enormous.  From
here on out, every improvement is going to reduce the effective strength
of IDEA.  We're no longer playing games of trying to extend things to
the full cipher: for the last three years we've been watching the full
IDEA be subjected to real attacks.

So far those attacks haven't been successful.  Like I said, a
two-shannon reduction isn't much.

But imagine what it's going to be like in another five years.

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From kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com  Tue Mar 17 23:25:23 2015
From: kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com (Kristian Fiskerstrand)
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 23:25:23 +0100
Subject: Defaults
In-Reply-To: <5508A397.50301@heypete.com>
References: <5508842F.1010101@sixdemonbag.org> <5508A397.50301@heypete.com>
Message-ID: <5508A9D3.40206@sumptuouscapital.com>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

On 03/17/2015 10:58 PM, Pete Stephenson wrote:
> On 3/17/2015 8:44 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:

...

> Is Deterministic DSA only available in 2.1, or do 1.x and 2.0.x
> also have that feature?
> 

RFC6979 is used for gnupg 2.0 compiled with libgcrypt >= 1.6.0


- -- 
- ----------------------------
Kristian Fiskerstrand
Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com
Twitter: @krifisk
- ----------------------------
Public OpenPGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net
fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3
- ----------------------------
Aurum est Potestas
Gold is power
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

iQEcBAEBCgAGBQJVCKnNAAoJEP7VAChXwav6B+AH/jAPCf2xeXW8/PGplQzUVMOT
fsdFjS29lSxGhiRCbUqZyC1nU/7KL2d3R//d05A7tKSvhz01MzG1yLTPjZG7J22U
viMsa2lp8zwWWAqqgefB7qoip389nluzi/3Qcq/WCoRj0T19X5I1iFfV5pYft3zO
IsGOR9qKbOBlF+PRWQOLwyRkJ93qnT3tY6kZG6GbcZWLdHfVw6uRlewJEzPftpkZ
nFwjcy2iVHZF/KHqyQ2CurPu4lqljOxijmae2OKk2EHCUBcCOqLrSq46eOzaLqX6
MLNZfi20ra3YRFMQ3F1Vzw4VAB2pxweNflMSEkdURSFhkwBJNkm5/NqmV0BkhVM=
=s11V
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


From dkg at fifthhorseman.net  Tue Mar 17 23:26:02 2015
From: dkg at fifthhorseman.net (Daniel Kahn Gillmor)
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 18:26:02 -0400
Subject: Defaults
In-Reply-To: <5508A397.50301@heypete.com>
References: <5508842F.1010101@sixdemonbag.org> <5508A397.50301@heypete.com>
Message-ID: <87fv93ntvp.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>

On Tue 2015-03-17 17:58:47 -0400, Pete Stephenson wrote:
> Alas, a lot of Linux distributions are quite slow-moving: it's unlikely
> that distributions like Debian and Ubuntu will have GnuPG 2.1.x
> available (let alone installed by default) for several years.

For debian stable, this is likely to be the case because of where we
were in the release cycle when 2.1 was finally released.

I hope to have 2.1.x in debian testing and unstable shortly after we
manage to release jessie, and hope to move to it as the default either
for "stretch" (the release after jessie) or (if things turn out to be
much more complicated than i'd like) stretch+1.

> Yes, the changes should be made, but ECC support won't be widely
> available to most users for some time.

I agree that defaulting to brainpool-512 right now would be a mistake.

Defaulting to RSA 3072 seems reasonable to me, though.

    --dkg


From Cathy.Smith at pnnl.gov  Tue Mar 17 22:23:37 2015
From: Cathy.Smith at pnnl.gov (Smith, Cathy)
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 21:23:37 +0000
Subject: Copy Current GPG Installation to Another Server
In-Reply-To: <55086F4E.20302@dougbarton.email>
References: <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A000C0@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <55086F4E.20302@dougbarton.email>
Message-ID: <270838A78E5A5342BB9669898FB4CF2011D28E6F@EX10MBOX01.pnnl.gov>

I would think you can copy your keyring over, though.  I did that when converting from an old, unsupported version of PGP to GPG.  But that was Solaris to Linux.  You mileage may vary.


Regards,


Cathy

---
Cathy L. Smith
IT Engineer

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
Operated by Battelle for the
U.S. Department of Energy

Phone:????? 509.375.2687
Fax:??? ????509.375.2330
Email:????? cathy.smith at pnnl.gov


-----Original Message-----
From: Gnupg-users [mailto:gnupg-users-bounces at gnupg.org] On Behalf Of Doug Barton
Sent: Tuesday, March 17, 2015 11:16 AM
To: Clark Rivard; gnupg-users at gnupg.org
Subject: Re: Copy Current GPG Installation to Another Server

On 3/17/15 7:23 AM, Clark Rivard wrote:
> I currently have GPG 1.4.8 installed on a Windows server.  Can the 
> c:\Programs Files (x86)\GNU\ directory simply be copied to another 
> server and used or do I need to go through the ?download and 
> installation? process on the new server? Thanks.

1.4.8 is dangerously old. You should download the new version and install in both locations.

ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/binary/

hope this helps,

Doug


_______________________________________________
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Tue Mar 17 23:27:56 2015
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 18:27:56 -0400
Subject: Defaults
In-Reply-To: <5508A9C8.2030401@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <5508842F.1010101@sixdemonbag.org> <5508A397.50301@heypete.com>
 <5508A9C8.2030401@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <5508AA6C.5010409@sixdemonbag.org>

> I have reasons to prefer RSA, yes, but whether they'll convince you 
> is a different matter.  :)

D'oh!  Forgot to mention an important one --

RSA-3072 keys can be moved to smart cards, and/or generated on the same.
Very few smart cards support DSA.  :)


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From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Tue Mar 17 23:37:40 2015
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 18:37:40 -0400
Subject: Defaults
In-Reply-To: <87fv93ntvp.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
References: <5508842F.1010101@sixdemonbag.org> <5508A397.50301@heypete.com>
 <87fv93ntvp.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
Message-ID: <5508ACB4.3080202@sixdemonbag.org>

> I agree that defaulting to brainpool-512 right now would be a
> mistake.
> 
> Defaulting to RSA 3072 seems reasonable to me, though.

I think it's best to minimize the number of times we change the
defaults.  If we change them too often it causes users to wonder if
there's some weakness in OpenPGP -- after all, why else would we need to
constantly play catch-up?  (Note that I don't agree with this; I just
understand it.)

So if we're looking at a situation where we think that within the next
five years we'll want to make ECC the default, I think it would be best
to get that option out in front of users now.  Default to RSA-3072,
sure, but let's get users accustomed to seeing ECC as an option so that
when we migrate fully to ECC-by-default nobody gets surprised.

I freely admit this is a human-factors argument and not a technical
argument, though.  :)


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From pete at heypete.com  Tue Mar 17 23:46:36 2015
From: pete at heypete.com (Pete Stephenson)
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 23:46:36 +0100
Subject: Defaults
In-Reply-To: <5508A9C8.2030401@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <5508842F.1010101@sixdemonbag.org> <5508A397.50301@heypete.com>
 <5508A9C8.2030401@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <5508AECC.6010703@heypete.com>

On 3/17/2015 11:25 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
>> As long as we're considering "legacy" algorithms like RSA and DSA,
>> is there any particular reason for preferring RSA over DSA at such
>> key lengths?
> 
> I have reasons to prefer RSA, yes, but whether they'll convince you is a
> different matter.  :)
> 
> Where signature size matters most is in email.

[snip]

Agreed. It's always a bit tedious to see large in-line signatures with
short messages. PGP/MIME, as you say, alleviates this issue somewhat by
hiding the signature, but it also tends to be somewhat fragile when
mailing lists are involved...but that's a different story altogether.

> And although it genuinely pains me to say this, I can understand why
> some OpenPGP users mistrust DSA.  I don't mistrust it and I think people
> who do mistrust it are doing so erroneously, but I understand.  NIST's
> reputation has taken a pounding in the last few years.

Yeah. I'm skeptical of non-RFC6979 DSA simply because it can fail
catastrophically if insufficient entropy is not available when making a
signature. RSA only requires entropy when generating a new key, while
DSA needs it for key and signature generation.

If DSA uses RFC6979 I have no issues with it.

>> - The Brainpool curves are similar in structure to the NIST curves, 
>> though their curve parameters are chosen in a clear, open manner.
>> While that leads to increased trust that the parameters aren't chosen
>> for nefarious purposes, if one is already making a major change to
>> ECC, why not use some other, more modern curve that's designed at a
>> high-security level?
> 
> Because at present GnuPG supports the following curves:
> 
> 	* NIST
> 		o P-256
> 		o P-384
> 		o P-521
> 	* Brainpool
> 		o P-256
> 		o P-384
> 		o P-512
> 
> I cannot in good conscience recommend changing the defaults to an
> algorithm not yet supported by GnuPG.  :)

*laughs* Indeed!

I hope that everyone understood my point to be "Since GnuPG is already
making a major change by implementing ECC, it'd probably be a good idea
to Do Things Right The First Time(tm), implement strong curves, and make
them the default."

Of course, it'd be a good thing to work with developers of other
OpenPGP-compatible software to ensure that such algorithms would be
widely supported even though the standards don't yet include such
algorithms.

>> Do you have a link to this discussion on the IETF list? I suspect
>> the community here would be very interested.
> 
> https://www.cse-cst.gc.ca/en/node/227/html/15164
> 
> Looking over it again, it turns out the Canadians are distrustful of
> 128-bit crypto *in general*.  None of them are approved for periods
> longer than seven days.

True, but that's not uncommon: OpenVPN in TLS mode renegotiates a new
session key ever hour by default. GnuPG generates new session keys with
each message. Are there any common cryptographic implementations that
would use the same symmetric key for long periods of time?

>> Is there something particular about IDEA that concerns you?
> 
> About fifteen years ago I learned about a miss-in-the-middle attack on
> IDEA that broke 4.5 of 8.5 rounds (by ... Biham, I think).  That made my
> eyebrows go up.  It wasn't a full break, but it sure as hell was
> interesting, and attacks only ever get better over time.  That was when
> IDEA started giving me the heebie-jeebies.
> 
> Khovratovich presented a break against full (8.5-round) IDEA in 2012.
> This attack isn't huge -- it reduces 128 shannons of uncertainty to 126,
> more or less -- but, at the same time, it's freaking enormous.  From
> here on out, every improvement is going to reduce the effective strength
> of IDEA.  We're no longer playing games of trying to extend things to
> the full cipher: for the last three years we've been watching the full
> IDEA be subjected to real attacks.
> 
> So far those attacks haven't been successful.  Like I said, a
> two-shannon reduction isn't much.
> 
> But imagine what it's going to be like in another five years.

Interesting, thanks.

Cheers!
-Pete



From dgouttegattat at incenp.org  Tue Mar 17 23:53:42 2015
From: dgouttegattat at incenp.org (Damien Goutte-Gattat)
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 23:53:42 +0100
Subject: Defaults
In-Reply-To: <5508842F.1010101@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <5508842F.1010101@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <5508B076.5060607@incenp.org>

On 03/17/2015 08:44 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> Given that 2.1 introduces a lot of new capabilities (mostly with respect
> to ECC), I think now, early on in the 2.1 series, would be a good time
> to discuss changing the defaults for newly-generated certificates.

Some of the defaults you propose are already there. If I look at a 
freshly generated key pair with GnuPG 2.1, the default preferred 
algorithms are:

Cipher: AES256, AES192, AES, 3DES
Digest: SHA256, SHA384, SHA512, SHA224, SHA1

So, AES256 is already the default symmetric cipher (CAST5 and IDEA are 
not even in the list and must both be explicitly requested by the user), 
and SHA256 is already the default hash algorithm.


> 	* Use SHA256 for RSA-3072/-4096 signatures and SHA512
> 	  for Brainpool-512

Do you mean signatures in general, or key signatures (certifications)? 
For key signatures, SHA-1 is still the default for RSA keys, but 
signatures on (EC)DSA keys will use up to SHA-512 depending on the key 
size (SHA-256 for a Brainpool-256 key, SHA-512 for a BrainpoolP512 key).

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From dkg at fifthhorseman.net  Tue Mar 17 23:53:48 2015
From: dkg at fifthhorseman.net (Daniel Kahn Gillmor)
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 18:53:48 -0400
Subject: Defaults
In-Reply-To: <5508ACB4.3080202@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <5508842F.1010101@sixdemonbag.org> <5508A397.50301@heypete.com>
 <87fv93ntvp.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net> <5508ACB4.3080202@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <87a8zbnslf.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>

On Tue 2015-03-17 18:37:40 -0400, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
>> I agree that defaulting to brainpool-512 right now would be a
>> mistake.
>> 
>> Defaulting to RSA 3072 seems reasonable to me, though.
>
> I think it's best to minimize the number of times we change the
> defaults.  If we change them too often it causes users to wonder if
> there's some weakness in OpenPGP -- after all, why else would we need to
> constantly play catch-up?  (Note that I don't agree with this; I just
> understand it.)

by this argument, you should have pushed for RSA 3072 during the last
defaults change, since it would have lasted longer than 2048 ;)

> So if we're looking at a situation where we think that within the next
> five years we'll want to make ECC the default, I think it would be best
> to get that option out in front of users now.  Default to RSA-3072,
> sure, but let's get users accustomed to seeing ECC as an option so that
> when we migrate fully to ECC-by-default nobody gets surprised.

Except that by the time we're ready to adopt ECC by default we may very
well want to use Goldilocks (Hamburg's 448-bit curve), since that seems
to be the high-strength curve that the CFRG is heading toward (yes,
goldilocks is not yet specified for OpenPGP; we'd need to do that
first).

Brainpool-512 is incompatible with some of the other work going on in
the OpenPGP ecosystem (e.g. yahoo and google's work on the e2e webmail
app, which supports P-256 and P-512).

At any rate, changes are afoot, and i don't think we should be afraid to
update the defaults if we think a new set is reasonable.

   --dkg


From marco at marcoamorales.com  Tue Mar 17 21:59:39 2015
From: marco at marcoamorales.com (Marco Morales)
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 15:59:39 -0500
Subject: what is the proper way to load gpg-agent with systemd
In-Reply-To: <5508824F.10803@dougbarton.email>
References: <hXSCj31GVd0x.mm4HDxbr@privateemail.com>
 <5508824F.10803@dougbarton.email>
Message-ID: <CAEpJ+pJC=Ez-QUT-kJEaHBw08q=OG3vodOMgOFBNeZ4U84xbgg@mail.gmail.com>

I recommend starting it from a script in /etc/profile.d/

If you're running >2.1 then you don't need to do the env-file thing. Here's
an example:

https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/GnuPG#gpg-agent

On Tue, Mar 17, 2015 at 2:36 PM, Doug Barton <dougb at dougbarton.email> wrote:

> Ok, then you need to start the agent prior to or during the X startup, so
> that the variables are available to your environment (as you were doing
> previously).
>
> So, why are you trying to start the agent with systemd? What method were
> you using previously, and did you try it in the new OS version?
>
> Doug
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
>
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From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Tue Mar 17 23:58:23 2015
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 18:58:23 -0400
Subject: Defaults
In-Reply-To: <87a8zbnslf.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
References: <5508842F.1010101@sixdemonbag.org> <5508A397.50301@heypete.com>
 <87fv93ntvp.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net> <5508ACB4.3080202@sixdemonbag.org>
 <87a8zbnslf.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
Message-ID: <5508B18F.2030902@sixdemonbag.org>

> by this argument, you should have pushed for RSA 3072 during the
> last defaults change, since it would have lasted longer than 2048 ;)

You're absolutely right, I should have.  :)  I took my eye off the ball
and didn't notice we were changing defaults, otherwise I would've argued
then for RSA-3072.

> At any rate, changes are afoot, and i don't think we should be afraid
> to update the defaults if we think a new set is reasonable.

Point, point.  The ECC ecosystem isn't mature enough to encourage users
to migrate to it.

Okay, so drop the ECC recommendations from my suggestions.
RSA-3072/SHA-256 + one of the modern 128-bit block ciphers, plus strong
recommendations against CAST5, IDEA, or using 64-bit block ciphers to do
bulk encryption.  So far that all seems pretty uncontroversial.  :)



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From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Wed Mar 18 00:09:44 2015
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 19:09:44 -0400
Subject: Defaults
In-Reply-To: <5508AECC.6010703@heypete.com>
References: <5508842F.1010101@sixdemonbag.org> <5508A397.50301@heypete.com>
 <5508A9C8.2030401@sixdemonbag.org> <5508AECC.6010703@heypete.com>
Message-ID: <5508B438.6080103@sixdemonbag.org>

>> Looking over it again, it turns out the Canadians are distrustful
>> of 128-bit crypto *in general*.  None of them are approved for
>> periods longer than seven days.
> 
> True, but that's not uncommon: OpenVPN in TLS mode renegotiates a
> new session key ever hour by default. GnuPG generates new session
> keys with each message. Are there any common cryptographic
> implementations that would use the same symmetric key for long
> periods of time?

Point: this is probably not indicative of Canadian distrust in AES-128,
CAST5, or 3DES, so much as it is the Canadians codifying an existing
best practice.

However, using the same symmetric key for long periods isn't at all
uncommon.  I last changed the passphrase on my key a little over a year
ago, for instance, so I'm empirical evidence of at least one person
who's been using a symmetric key for over a year.  :)


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From samir at samirnassar.com  Wed Mar 18 00:16:01 2015
From: samir at samirnassar.com (Samir Nassar)
Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2015 00:16:01 +0100
Subject: Defaults
In-Reply-To: <87a8zbnslf.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
References: <5508842F.1010101@sixdemonbag.org>
 <5508ACB4.3080202@sixdemonbag.org> <87a8zbnslf.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
Message-ID: <1585979.a9G2xs8tRz@lathe>

On Tuesday, March 17, 2015 06:53:48 PM Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> Brainpool-512 is incompatible with some of the other work going on in
> the OpenPGP ecosystem (e.g. yahoo and google's work on the e2e webmail
> app, which supports P-256 and P-512).

Well, the Yahoo! folks are not 100% committed to OpenPGP compatibility, 
according to statements on Twitter. Of course this may or may not change (or 
it could all be a misunderstanding), in case it isn't though, I don't see what 
E2E-compatability adds. If the projects make a solid commitment to OpenPGP 
compatibility and back it up then that changes things.

> At any rate, changes are afoot, and i don't think we should be afraid to
> update the defaults if we think a new set is reasonable.

Hear hear. There are many times where GnuPG setting the pace would have helped 
those of us helping others understand how to use PGP.

Samir
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From peter at digitalbrains.com  Wed Mar 18 00:17:40 2015
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2015 00:17:40 +0100
Subject: Copy Current GPG Installation to Another Server
In-Reply-To: <5508A836.9010509@dougbarton.email>
References: <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A000C0@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <55086F4E.20302@dougbarton.email>
 <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A00282@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <55088955.6080308@dougbarton.email>
 <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A00348@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <55088E34.2000102@dougbarton.email> <5508948C.3000503@digitalbrains.com>
 <550896CD.5000507@dougbarton.email> <55089A4B.9080204@digitalbrains.com>
 <55089DD9.8030407@dougbarton.email> <5508A2FF.1030307@digitalbrains.com>
 <5508A836.9010509@dougbarton.email>
Message-ID: <1a6efef8cad10bf7829edf6b29938f98@butters.digitalbrains.com>

On 2015-03-17 23:18, Doug Barton wrote:
> I think you are asking way too much, and
> giving near-zero value in return.

I'm not asking for anything. I suggested they check the plain SHA1 
checksum or even not check at all! I'm merely opposed to making people 
think the short key ID is any good for verification purposes, or that 
"when it comes to signed packages [it] is not really a necessity" to 
check the validity of the signing key.

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at 
<http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>



From kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com  Wed Mar 18 00:25:25 2015
From: kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com (Kristian Fiskerstrand)
Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2015 00:25:25 +0100
Subject: Copy Current GPG Installation to Another Server
In-Reply-To: <5508A463.5090204@digitalbrains.com>
References: <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A000C0@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <55086F4E.20302@dougbarton.email>
 <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A00282@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <55088955.6080308@dougbarton.email>
 <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A00348@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <55088E34.2000102@dougbarton.email> <5508948C.3000503@digitalbrains.com>
 <550896CD.5000507@dougbarton.email> <55089A4B.9080204@digitalbrains.com>
 <55089DD9.8030407@dougbarton.email> <5508A2FF.1030307@digitalbrains.com>
 <5508A463.5090204@digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <5508B7E5.5050408@sumptuouscapital.com>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

On 03/17/2015 11:02 PM, Peter Lebbing wrote:
> On 17/03/15 22:56, Peter Lebbing wrote:
>> and checking it says
>> 
>> pub   2048R/4F25E3B6 2011-01-12 [expires: 2019-12-31] Key
>> fingerprint = D869 2123 C406 5DEA 5E0F  3AB5 249B 39D2 4F25 E3B6 
>> uid       [  full  ] Werner Koch (dist sig) sub   2048R/AC87C71A
>> 2011-01-12 [expires: 2019-12-31]
> 
> Hah! Obviously it wouldn't say "full", firstly because you need
> list-options show-uid-validity in your gpg.conf,

list-options show-uid-validity is the default since GnuPG 2.0.24

- -- 
- ----------------------------
Kristian Fiskerstrand
Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com
Twitter: @krifisk
- ----------------------------
Public OpenPGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net
fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3
- ----------------------------
"If you choose to sail upon the seas of banking, build your bank as
you would your boat, with the strength to sail safely through any storm."
(Jacob Safra (1891?1963))
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

iQEcBAEBCgAGBQJVCLfhAAoJEP7VAChXwav6g3kIAJB9J93I7Exa+b0GZMzpYEYZ
0i3XcjNS3kkxtbi8SoXLIaKRtzrwHBInHurVXeMNJjPMLuWuaErmeu/CGiObMnXx
nojuzHQ8YEArjz9GU5/rmbTaPU6d3FZ5O4opvNSDIHwKfBgP0EGvOnE/Yh2lbFHu
yfOFb9deUaJv5SvnvAGIPipL8/0msROq7jhfwSMm8m4VHFpFMslnDkiorH6TFd98
E3in8yTeuJYvKMZP1T9h12r800Uax3O0VO7a8Byy4DYRz0Xxotwt2Zmrc7BOpvR4
8PGSdl6cRhyztzgumpoXa2IhFzbcOF0onY1XZjZgjKPzPF4V3hkzhSBlATwr+kg=
=MQYo
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


From dkg at fifthhorseman.net  Wed Mar 18 00:28:47 2015
From: dkg at fifthhorseman.net (Daniel Kahn Gillmor)
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 19:28:47 -0400
Subject: Defaults
In-Reply-To: <5508B076.5060607@incenp.org>
References: <5508842F.1010101@sixdemonbag.org> <5508B076.5060607@incenp.org>
Message-ID: <87vbhzmceo.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>

On Tue 2015-03-17 18:53:42 -0400, Damien Goutte-Gattat wrote:
> Do you mean signatures in general, or key signatures (certifications)? 
> For key signatures, SHA-1 is still the default for RSA keys

Is this correct?  I think we should be defaulting to SHA-256 for RSA
certifications these days.

If we want to cater to users who really want their certifications to
have compatibility with buggy 10-year-old clients that don't have
SHA-256, we should make it easy for them to make a SHA-1 certification
with a 1-second-earlier timestamp.

> but signatures on (EC)DSA keys will use up to SHA-512 depending on the
> key size (SHA-256 for a Brainpool-256 key, SHA-512 for a BrainpoolP512
> key).

I think you mean signatures *by* (EC)DSA keys, not *on* (EC)DSA keys,
right?

  --dkg


From pete at heypete.com  Tue Mar 17 23:26:21 2015
From: pete at heypete.com (Pete Stephenson)
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 23:26:21 +0100
Subject: Defaults
In-Reply-To: <5508A9D3.40206@sumptuouscapital.com>
References: <5508842F.1010101@sixdemonbag.org> <5508A397.50301@heypete.com>
 <5508A9D3.40206@sumptuouscapital.com>
Message-ID: <5508AA0D.1020402@heypete.com>

On 3/17/2015 11:25 PM, Kristian Fiskerstrand wrote:
> On 03/17/2015 10:58 PM, Pete Stephenson wrote:
>> On 3/17/2015 8:44 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> 
> ...
> 
>> Is Deterministic DSA only available in 2.1, or do 1.x and 2.0.x
>> also have that feature?
> 
> 
> RFC6979 is used for gnupg 2.0 compiled with libgcrypt >= 1.6.0

Excellent. That's exactly what I hoped to hear.

Cheers!
-Pete



From kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com  Wed Mar 18 00:34:45 2015
From: kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com (Kristian Fiskerstrand)
Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2015 00:34:45 +0100
Subject: Copy Current GPG Installation to Another Server
In-Reply-To: <550896CD.5000507@dougbarton.email>
References: <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A000C0@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <55086F4E.20302@dougbarton.email>
 <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A00282@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <55088955.6080308@dougbarton.email>
 <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A00348@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <55088E34.2000102@dougbarton.email> <5508948C.3000503@digitalbrains.com>
 <550896CD.5000507@dougbarton.email>
Message-ID: <5508BA15.4040104@sumptuouscapital.com>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

On 03/17/2015 10:04 PM, Doug Barton wrote:
> On 3/17/15 1:54 PM, Peter Lebbing wrote:
>>>> -----Original Message-----



> 
> Assuming you get the package, the signature, and the fingerprint
> from the same *.gnupg.org resources, what does that buy you?

Strictly speaking there could be multiple servers hosting the various
resources and only one of which is compromised. It is also quite
common to download the source from mirror rather than *.gnupg.org directly

> 
> More extensive checking would be great, but would require a lot of 
> documentation to teach the users how to do it ... are you
> volunteering to write it? :)
> 

Its included in every announcement[0]. Just a verification by
cross-checking this information in various archives [1] mirroring the
announcement reduce the likelihood of an active compromise, and is a
far better to try to bootstrap a key validity in the absence of a
direct key path.

References:
[0] http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-announce/2015q1/000362.html
[1] http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.org.fsf.announce/2278

- -- 
- ----------------------------
Kristian Fiskerstrand
Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com
Twitter: @krifisk
- ----------------------------
Public OpenPGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net
fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3
- ----------------------------
"If you choose to sail upon the seas of banking, build your bank as
you would your boat, with the strength to sail safely through any storm."
(Jacob Safra (1891?1963))
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

iQEcBAEBCgAGBQJVCLoKAAoJEP7VAChXwav6cpgIALaRMFFd4kLC7edFmkEcYTyl
2GmgxHG7wVYMI/F06DpO4ifMJPQJ/wqadTJPN4o64sjd6PEL5rvWeD+hlA8a+kyj
8PSW3ENzgKCwV72XAzqDzYnvD3i/N0ZV02Wbi0k4gc4SfS98ZPbOroqTqMHcUjVi
OHh+QpnyPGBgWDAq3+MbRxscWSPQFaW9P9HzMKF5Nnu3oWz/dp327YmB1i9176Nw
UoKfhFR6YoPTXBt8WN0QQWAY4ZKRYfRRn63FJYwQSXjhYbz4sn4dPZUjKvej3OH/
ziTFUig62O0owaCK7AaiSbl3qJnL+li1ve0lcnz5bnegck+aYq4ukCp9ZeEvA88=
=MQjq
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


From dgouttegattat at incenp.org  Wed Mar 18 01:12:16 2015
From: dgouttegattat at incenp.org (Damien Goutte-Gattat)
Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2015 01:12:16 +0100
Subject: Defaults
In-Reply-To: <87vbhzmceo.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
References: <5508842F.1010101@sixdemonbag.org> <5508B076.5060607@incenp.org>
 <87vbhzmceo.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
Message-ID: <5508C2E0.7090702@incenp.org>

On 03/18/2015 12:28 AM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> On Tue 2015-03-17 18:53:42 -0400, Damien Goutte-Gattat wrote:
>> Do you mean signatures in general, or key signatures (certifications)?
>> For key signatures, SHA-1 is still the default for RSA keys
>
> Is this correct?  I think we should be defaulting to SHA-256 for RSA
> certifications these days.

Actually no, it is not. My mistake.

SHA-256 is the default cert-digest-algo since GnuPG 2.1.0.


>> but signatures on (EC)DSA keys will use up to SHA-512 depending on the
>> key size (SHA-256 for a Brainpool-256 key, SHA-512 for a BrainpoolP512
>> key).

I meant *on*, but now I realize I was only thinking about *self* 
signatures, where the signing key and the signed key happen to be the same.

In the more general case you are right of course: the default hash 
algorithm is determined by the type and size of the *signing* key, not 
of the key that is about to be signed.

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From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Wed Mar 18 01:34:42 2015
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 20:34:42 -0400
Subject: Defaults
In-Reply-To: <5508B076.5060607@incenp.org>
References: <5508842F.1010101@sixdemonbag.org> <5508B076.5060607@incenp.org>
Message-ID: <5508C822.20103@sixdemonbag.org>

> Some of the defaults you propose are already there.

Yes.  My list was comprehensive ("what the new set should be"), not
differential ("what needs changing").  :)

> So, AES256 is already the default symmetric cipher (CAST5 and IDEA
> are not even in the list and must both be explicitly requested by the
> user), and SHA256 is already the default hash algorithm.

Your key pref isn't what matters: it's your default-cipher-prefs.  :)

CAST5 may not be the default choice anymore, but it can still be
selected (I believe) if the recipient's key prefs list it.  I think this
shouldn't be supported; CAST5 should only be used if (a) it's in the
recipient's key prefs and (b) it's explicitly listed in
default-cipher-prefs.

> Do you mean signatures in general, or key signatures
> (certifications)?

The former, although I think setting cert-digest-algo SHA256 by default
may be worth discussing.

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From dougb at dougbarton.email  Wed Mar 18 02:02:21 2015
From: dougb at dougbarton.email (Doug Barton)
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 18:02:21 -0700
Subject: Copy Current GPG Installation to Another Server
In-Reply-To: <1a6efef8cad10bf7829edf6b29938f98@butters.digitalbrains.com>
References: <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A000C0@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <55086F4E.20302@dougbarton.email>
 <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A00282@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <55088955.6080308@dougbarton.email>
 <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A00348@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <55088E34.2000102@dougbarton.email> <5508948C.3000503@digitalbrains.com>
 <550896CD.5000507@dougbarton.email> <55089A4B.9080204@digitalbrains.com>
 <55089DD9.8030407@dougbarton.email> <5508A2FF.1030307@digitalbrains.com>
 <5508A836.9010509@dougbarton.email>
 <1a6efef8cad10bf7829edf6b29938f98@butters.digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <5508CE9D.3020607@dougbarton.email>

On 3/17/15 4:17 PM, Peter Lebbing wrote:
> On 2015-03-17 23:18, Doug Barton wrote:
>> I think you are asking way too much, and
>> giving near-zero value in return.
>
> I'm not asking for anything.

Originally you suggested that they verify the fingerprint, and use that 
to retrieve the key. Glad to see now that you realize that was not the 
right course of action. :)

> I suggested they check the plain SHA1
> checksum or even not check at all!

I would argue that verifying the signature when available is slightly 
better, but I won't quibble on this point. For most users it is true 
that the checksum is likely to be "just as good" as a signature 
verification.

> I'm merely opposed to making people
> think the short key ID is any good for verification purposes, or that
> "when it comes to signed packages [it] is not really a necessity" to
> check the validity of the signing key.

We will have to agree to disagree on this point.

Doug



From dougb at dougbarton.email  Wed Mar 18 02:12:35 2015
From: dougb at dougbarton.email (Doug Barton)
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 18:12:35 -0700
Subject: Copy Current GPG Installation to Another Server
In-Reply-To: <5508BA15.4040104@sumptuouscapital.com>
References: <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A000C0@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <55086F4E.20302@dougbarton.email>
 <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A00282@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <55088955.6080308@dougbarton.email>
 <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A00348@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <55088E34.2000102@dougbarton.email> <5508948C.3000503@digitalbrains.com>
 <550896CD.5000507@dougbarton.email> <5508BA15.4040104@sumptuouscapital.com>
Message-ID: <5508D103.2020603@dougbarton.email>

On 3/17/15 4:34 PM, Kristian Fiskerstrand wrote:
> On 03/17/2015 10:04 PM, Doug Barton wrote:
>> On 3/17/15 1:54 PM, Peter Lebbing wrote:
>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>
>
>
>
>> Assuming you get the package, the signature, and the fingerprint
>> from the same *.gnupg.org resources, what does that buy you?
>
> Strictly speaking there could be multiple servers hosting the various
> resources and only one of which is compromised.

I conceded from the start that there are scenarios where Peter's threat 
model is valid. However they are overwhelmingly unlikely.

You also seem to be ignoring the bootstrapping problem of educating the 
new users on doing proper validity checking for fingerprints, keys, etc.

> It is also quite
> common to download the source from mirror rather than *.gnupg.org directly

Yes, and mirrors, by definition, are copies of the original. So either 
they are all compromised (because the master is), or the subset of 
systems that get compromised will auto-correct at whatever interval they 
are set up to mirror the master.

So the scenario where "download the package and signature from one site 
and verify the fingerprint from another site provided by the same 
operator" is useful still falls into the "incredibly unlikely" category.

>> More extensive checking would be great, but would require a lot of
>> documentation to teach the users how to do it ... are you
>> volunteering to write it? :)
>
>
> Its included in every announcement[0]. Just a verification by
> cross-checking this information in various archives [1] mirroring the
> announcement reduce the likelihood of an active compromise, and is a
> far better to try to bootstrap a key validity in the absence of a
> direct key path.
>
> References:
> [0] http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-announce/2015q1/000362.html
> [1] http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.org.fsf.announce/2278

The announcements are of no use to the user going to the FTP site to 
download a new package unless they happen to be on the mailing list. And 
in any case, the archives and gmane.org mirror fall into the "same 
operator" trap described above.

The thing I'm trying to avoid here is adding complexity that does 
nothing but satisfy the OCD of experienced users who know the 
good/right/best way of doing things and add no real value to new users 
who are just trying to get started with the software.

If there were a comprehensive new-user guide that could explain all of 
this stuff that would be a valuable addition. But there isn't, and I'm 
not going to write one. So personally I'll settle for offering practical 
advice to folks at the level I think they're ready to deal with it. If 
you want to do more, then $DEITY bless you, I look forward to seeing 
your efforts.

Doug


From dkg at fifthhorseman.net  Wed Mar 18 02:28:36 2015
From: dkg at fifthhorseman.net (Daniel Kahn Gillmor)
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 21:28:36 -0400
Subject: what is the proper way to load gpg-agent with systemd
In-Reply-To: <CAPdn058UmNpEa3csvQc6MzBT+Pdq_N00Y0auyq62mw8NcRwgdQ@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAPdn058xZjD2cib6WoGJf2cT5vkrznA2iP9xVru7C4KtGg5UUA@mail.gmail.com>
 <55087028.6020608@dougbarton.email>
 <CAPdn058UmNpEa3csvQc6MzBT+Pdq_N00Y0auyq62mw8NcRwgdQ@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <873853m6uz.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>

On Tue 2015-03-17 14:43:02 -0400, Paulo Lopes wrote:
> So what I did was to create a user unit file like this on ~/.local/:
>
> [Unit]
> Description=gpg-agent
> ConditionFileIsExecutable=/usr/bin/gpg-agent
>
> [Service]
> ExecStart=/usr/bin/gpg-agent --daemon --enable-ssh-support
> --scdaemon-program /usr/libexec/scdaemon --use-standard-socket --log-file
> ~/.gnupg/gpg-agent.log --write-env-file %h/$
> ExecStop=/usr/bin/pkill gpg-agent
> Type=forking
> Restart=always
>
> [Install]
> WantedBy=default.target
>
>
> Now what happens is that i start a java application "IntelliJ" and when i
> try to get git to fetch some code it complains that the it cannot sign the
> key. However if i use "pass" then the pinentry popup shows i enter my pin
> and from there the git stuff works from intellij.

I don't know what "pass" is, but i guess it's how you trigger pinentry
to talk to your agent?

it sounds to me like you're saying that the agent started by systemd
doesn't know how to find your X11 session properly, so it doesn't know
how to launch pinentry on its own.

Does that sounds like an accurate characterization?

have you tried adding the following line to the [Service] stanza in your
.service file?

Environment=DISPLAY=:0

Try that, and then a full machine shutdown, restart, and login.  It's a
workaround at best (your $DISPLAY won't always be :0) but if it works
for you, you'll know that this is at least the right diagnosis.

hth,

    --dkg


From brian at minton.name  Wed Mar 18 02:35:46 2015
From: brian at minton.name (Brian Minton)
Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2015 01:35:46 +0000
Subject: Making the case for smart cards for the average user
References: <CAAocvpvEqs-tQ-rEki8AX3spdSt8P5TG0+KoXVtufW0Azy9wDQ@mail.gmail.com>
 <277590791.20150317005551@my_localhost>
 <87lhivpls4.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
 <137410941.20150317193149@my_localhost>
Message-ID: <CANyOob084py4p7corVNONTQO=WHhTBViUoFc8teRTHSHX+MHHw@mail.gmail.com>

I thought keyservers strip all punctuation. So <foo at example.com> becomes
foo example com.

On Tue, Mar 17, 2015, 3:33 PM MFPA <2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net>
wrote:

> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA512
>
>
>
> On Tuesday 17 March 2015 at 5:38:03 PM, in
> <mid:87lhivpls4.fsf at alice.fifthhorseman.net>, Daniel Kahn Gillmor
> wrote:
>
>
>
>
> > This might be a bug (or at least a well-warranted
> > feature enhancement) in GnuPG.
>
> > I've just opened
> > https://bugs.g10code.com/gnupg/issue1927 to track it.
>
> Thanks.
>
> - --
> Best regards
>
> MFPA                  <mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net>
>
> Take my advice - I don't use it anyway.
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
>
> iQF8BAEBCgBmBQJVCIEoXxSAAAAAAC4AKGlzc3Vlci1mcHJAbm90YXRpb25zLm9w
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> QjdDNzRDRUIzMUYyNUYwAAoJEGt8dM6zHyXwAVYIAKYbEhLI9Iuiy87J7iuyPXWz
> 67f+oq8iiBq2V6/CcuS+5u5LJKhKhdeBbnSZLwXrEv6C7uRNAbvS3uLa0um2kQ3s
> 6L9rTmmsbuVURYcAsYsRdYSnPjB2G2t6ocCc9FwZMnsv6H5TCskrnsO82PcvjWjo
> wlTzU/ESlujVirFYZKe0Cx+bhSb1FVG4kRcc657RoV6/HE6+kKEudIXn4JExyHmJ
> 8uNbsY6b2HEj8wxjEoTa54b0lSpb1XWQawolyxk7fVwqgKcpxBizvgqHEVWzuhH+
> 7skCdSZpX+bjBSb5ZyFA3dWanjc184zh+SH/oEWOsJ7VmcGuwPg3hJy8Kg5hhguI
> vgQBFgoAZgUCVQiBRV8UgAAAAAAuAChpc3N1ZXItZnByQG5vdGF0aW9ucy5vcGVu
> cGdwLmZpZnRoaG9yc2VtYW4ubmV0MzNBQ0VENEVFOTEzNEVFQkRFNkE4NTA2MTcx
> MkJDNDYxQUY3NzhFNAAKCRAXErxGGvd45AG5AQBAJJysXSkrs+kxTsXOf5dFzG7y
> +Tvzagn5cESWj7KSggEAs+rcnGKH9b6AY3eduOVKJ4vwUGgmn6vujD6yOUZs7Qw=
> =b48P
> -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
>
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From dkg at fifthhorseman.net  Wed Mar 18 02:43:18 2015
From: dkg at fifthhorseman.net (Daniel Kahn Gillmor)
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 21:43:18 -0400
Subject: Making the case for smart cards for the average user
In-Reply-To: <CANyOob084py4p7corVNONTQO=WHhTBViUoFc8teRTHSHX+MHHw@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAAocvpvEqs-tQ-rEki8AX3spdSt8P5TG0+KoXVtufW0Azy9wDQ@mail.gmail.com>
 <277590791.20150317005551@my_localhost>
 <87lhivpls4.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
 <137410941.20150317193149@my_localhost>
 <CANyOob084py4p7corVNONTQO=WHhTBViUoFc8teRTHSHX+MHHw@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <87r3snkrm1.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>

On Tue 2015-03-17 21:35:46 -0400, Brian Minton wrote:
> I thought keyservers strip all punctuation. So <foo at example.com> becomes
> foo example com.

This discussion has been about gnupg and its own keyring, not
necessarily about keyservers.  The bug report i filed referred to local
gpg activity, not keyserver activity.

    --dkg


From wk at gnupg.org  Wed Mar 18 09:09:30 2015
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2015 09:09:30 +0100
Subject: Defaults
In-Reply-To: <5508842F.1010101@sixdemonbag.org> (Robert J. Hansen's message of
 "Tue, 17 Mar 2015 15:44:47 -0400")
References: <5508842F.1010101@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <87k2ye20cl.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Tue, 17 Mar 2015 20:44, rjh at sixdemonbag.org said:
> Given that 2.1 introduces a lot of new capabilities (mostly with respect
> to ECC), I think now, early on in the 2.1 series, would be a good time
> to discuss changing the defaults for newly-generated certificates.

Let's do a quick check of the status quo (I removed some of the extra
diagnostics from the examples):

Create a new key:

  $ gpg --no-options --quick-gen-key 'test key <foo at example.org>'
  About to create a key for:
      "test key <foo at example.org>"
  
  Continue? (Y/n) y
  public and secret key created and signed.
  
  pub   rsa2048/50C4476F 2015-03-18
        Key fingerprint = 11E9 91C2 36E0 21A6 1E35  A682 68CC E4C2 50C4 476F
  uid       [ultimate] test key <foo at example.org>
  sub   rsa2048/807D0FF4 2015-03-18
  
What are the preferences:  
  
  $ gpg --no-options --edit-key 50C4476F
  gpg (GnuPG) 2.1.3-beta26; Copyright (C) 2015 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
  Secret key is available.
  
  pub  rsa2048/50C4476F
       created: 2015-03-18  expires: never       usage: SC  
       trust: ultimate      validity: ultimate
  sub  rsa2048/807D0FF4
       created: 2015-03-18  expires: never       usage: E   
  [ultimate] (1). test key <foo at example.org>
  
  gpg> showpref
  [ultimate] (1). test key <foo at example.org>
       Cipher: AES256, AES192, AES, 3DES
       Digest: SHA256, SHA384, SHA512, SHA224, SHA1
       Compression: ZLIB, BZIP2, ZIP, Uncompressed
       Features: MDC, Keyserver no-modify

Sign something (there is only the above new key in the keyring):

  $ fortune | gpg --no-options --clearsign -v 
  -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
  Hash: SHA256
  
  Whenever people agree with me I always feel I must be wrong.
                  -- Oscar Wilde
  gpg: RSA/SHA256 signature from: "50C4476F test key <foo at example.org>"
  -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
  Version: GnuPG v2
  
  iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJVCSpjAAoJEGjM5MJQxEdvQOUH/1G0xVxUppAHjqy6E5h8Pds+
  R9IhpACMwx+b01KudyTQ1rw1Y6Gy47vRhtaZaY9H7g9Ua8N7CtDWDUlbN/A+vovr
  7NX7yh8VXNqTYg9iCbwtL3KrN5b+gImWC7XxKgmJ5MqtRdOnjrGRG+R/1Yz/K6+3
  dKtD+o7WSToWiZRaqraIEFaHuHHPhhTbZd9rPkkoVhR8IfuwVP9WiWgL1En1khiC
  jNN4XBTO6JYm9wxYnbKTr5pIkNIdkXJEXSSO0VDu+jcx0eXiQlHVM2Za+8F0e59o
  rhaD61+7MFRp7W85eq9DphK8ZQkYSiVFmxP05KtBn0ym+CWyOZQTknJTZq2rpGI=
  =TRJn
  -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
   
Do an symmetric encryption:
 
  $ fortune | gpg --no-options -ca -v         
  gpg: using cipher AES
  gpg: writing to stdout
  -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
  Version: GnuPG v2
  
  jA0EBwMCEKZ9P8JsqIXk0n0BXv33OI6+DtCIKj4eizkTHI4uFnlwYxa8mGDmNPZX
  7f8Q0f5L621bNvyIgCrV+gmfMXbXd2jtUXOAu0Q/g9gpkNEQhEJKcFBk1VDaAM0j
  dg8LeF/iT8HUjSmsWXbOCvYRh3MtIbYSEC299yBZJ+gG44Akgypl80dubLXhcA==
  =doWz
  -----END PGP MESSAGE-----


Now:

> 	* Offer Brainpool-512 and RSA-3072 as options for
> 	  newly-generated certificates

The default is RSA-2048 but there is an option to create RSA-3072.  GUIs
may choose there own defaults.

Using Brainpool as default for ECC (by the time we can get ECC out of
the export mode) is obvious something the German secret services would
like to see.  Given recent revelations about the BSI and its support for
"remote forensic toolkits" (aka Federal Trojan Tool) won't convince
people that Brainpool curves are safer than NIST curves.  Anyway the
plan is to make Curve25519 the default for ECC.  There are also options
for stronger ECC curves not related to US or European standard bodies.

> 	* Use AES256 for a symmetric cipher

As shown above AES128 (AES) is the default for symmetric encryption.
Symmetric encryption is for whatever reasons commonly used for bulk data
encryption and performace si a matter here:

 AES            |  nanosecs/byte   mebibytes/sec   cycles/byte
        CFB enc |      1.77 ns/B     537.9 MiB/s      4.08 c/B
        CFB dec |     0.365 ns/B    2612.1 MiB/s     0.840 c/B
 AES256 
        CFB enc |      2.47 ns/B     386.5 MiB/s      5.67 c/B
        CFB dec |     0.530 ns/B    1799.4 MiB/s      1.22 c/B

Thus on my X220 you get a 40% speedup by using 128 bit AES.  Well, the
number are from Libgcrypt and don't include the overhead due to the
protocol but it is faster.

For public key encryption AES-256 will anyway be used by default.

> 	* Raise a warning if the user attempts to encrypt more
> 	  than 4 GiB with an old (64-bit block) cipher

Except for 3DES there is no 64 bit block cipher in the preferences:

       Cipher: AES256, AES192, AES, 3DES

A key capable of only 3DES will be rare and must have been created on
purpose or by very old software.  They want 3DES and thus they get it.

> 	* Only use CAST5 if the user explicitly requests it via
> 	  default-cipher-preferences: prefer 3DES over CAST5

Already done.  See above.

> 	* Only use IDEA if the user explicitly requests it via
> 	  default-cipher-preferences: prefer 3DES over IDEA

IDEA is not included in the preferences.

> 	* Use SHA256 for RSA-3072/-4096 signatures and SHA512
> 	  for Brainpool-512

Already used even for RSA-2048.  See example above.

> 	* CAST5 is not in good health: as was recently mentioned in
> 	  the IETF WG mailing list, the Canadians themselves still

I have seen no arguments why CAST5-128 as used by OpenPGP is now weaker
than other 64 ciphers.  BTW, the post mentioning CAST5 also falsely
claimed that CAST5 is a 128 bit blocksize cipher.  Maybe the confusion
comes from the fact CAST is actually a method to create block ciphers.
But we it is not used anway.

> 	* 3DES is still the Rock of Gibraltar.  Big, slow, ungainly,
> 	  and strong.  It's nobody's idea of a good modern cipher, but

Here are the numbers; for fairness AES-NI (Intel's AES hardware support)
has been disabled:

 AES            |  nanosecs/byte   mebibytes/sec   cycles/byte
        CFB enc |      3.88 ns/B     245.8 MiB/s      8.92 c/B
        CFB dec |      3.18 ns/B     299.6 MiB/s      7.32 c/B
 3DES
        CFB enc |     37.69 ns/B     25.30 MiB/s     86.69 c/B
        CFB dec |     20.04 ns/B     47.58 MiB/s     46.10 c/B


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner


-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From dgouttegattat at incenp.org  Wed Mar 18 13:12:29 2015
From: dgouttegattat at incenp.org (Damien Goutte-Gattat)
Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2015 13:12:29 +0100
Subject: Defaults
In-Reply-To: <5508C822.20103@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <5508842F.1010101@sixdemonbag.org> <5508B076.5060607@incenp.org>
 <5508C822.20103@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <55096BAD.6040801@incenp.org>

On 03/18/2015 01:34 AM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> I think this shouldn't be supported; CAST5 should only be used if (a) it's in the
> recipient's key prefs and (b) it's explicitly listed in
> default-cipher-prefs.

I don?t think that ignoring the recipient?s preferences should be the 
default behavior. The recipient?s choices should be honored by default 
*unless* you explicitly decide against it.

If you want to ignore a particular cipher, you could use the 
--disable-cipher-algo option. Disable CAST5 and it will never be 
selected by GnuPG even if it appears on the recipient?s list.


>> Do you mean signatures in general, or key signatures
>> (certifications)?
>
> The former, although I think setting cert-digest-algo SHA256 by default
> may be worth discussing.

Not anymore, it?s already done. :) I was wrong on that point, SHA-1 is 
no longer used by default for certifications since GnuPG 2.1.0.


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From mwalter at paragon-csi.com  Wed Mar 18 13:18:11 2015
From: mwalter at paragon-csi.com (Mark Walter)
Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2015 08:18:11 -0400
Subject: What am I doing wrong? 
Message-ID: <79E1EB8865153D49AC2ACFBDED5F2584C3D7A31B86@pcsimail.paragon-csi.com>

Hello all.

I'm having issues with encrypt and decrypt and I know it's something I'm doing wrong. I created a key with Kelopatra. Imported it into GNU Privacy Assistant. It shows up as Fully Valid.

Next, to test, I created the text file test.txt and used the following command to encrypt it.
gpg -e -u myuser at domain.net -r myuser at domain.net test.txt

The file test.txt.gpg showed up in my folder.

Next, I tried to decrypt it using the following syntax.
gpg -d test.txt.gpg

And I get the following error.
Gpg decryption failed: No secret key

Not sure what I'm doing wrong here. This used to not be an issue.

This is Windows Server 2012.

Thanks in advance	

Mark Walter

Business to Business Data Integration Specialist
Certified IBM System i Specialist
Paragon Consulting Services, Inc.
mwalter at paragon-csi.com
717-764-7909 ext. 20


From dkg at fifthhorseman.net  Wed Mar 18 13:38:14 2015
From: dkg at fifthhorseman.net (Daniel Kahn Gillmor)
Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2015 08:38:14 -0400
Subject: What am I doing wrong?
In-Reply-To: <79E1EB8865153D49AC2ACFBDED5F2584C3D7A31B86@pcsimail.paragon-csi.com>
References: <79E1EB8865153D49AC2ACFBDED5F2584C3D7A31B86@pcsimail.paragon-csi.com>
Message-ID: <87h9tijxah.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>

On Wed 2015-03-18 08:18:11 -0400, Mark Walter wrote:

> I'm having issues with encrypt and decrypt and I know it's something
> I'm doing wrong. I created a key with Kelopatra. Imported it into GNU
> Privacy Assistant. It shows up as Fully Valid.
>
> Next, to test, I created the text file test.txt and used the following command to encrypt it.
> gpg -e -u myuser at domain.net -r myuser at domain.net test.txt

the -u myuser at domain.net is not doing anything here, because this is
doing encryption and not signing.  so no secret key material is used in
this step.

> The file test.txt.gpg showed up in my folder.
>
> Next, I tried to decrypt it using the following syntax.
> gpg -d test.txt.gpg
>
> And I get the following error.
> Gpg decryption failed: No secret key
>
> Not sure what I'm doing wrong here. This used to not be an issue.

It sounds to me like you imported your public key but not your secret
key.

Does your key show up in the output of "gpg --list-secret-keys"  ?

     --dkg


From mwalter at paragon-csi.com  Wed Mar 18 13:59:11 2015
From: mwalter at paragon-csi.com (Mark Walter)
Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2015 08:59:11 -0400
Subject: What am I doing wrong?
In-Reply-To: <87h9tijxah.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
References: <79E1EB8865153D49AC2ACFBDED5F2584C3D7A31B86@pcsimail.paragon-csi.com>
 <87h9tijxah.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
Message-ID: <79E1EB8865153D49AC2ACFBDED5F2584C3D7A31B9A@pcsimail.paragon-csi.com>

No, Only the Private keys show up. What I tried to create and test was a public key to give to a partner for encrypting files sent to us.

Thanks.

Mark Walter

Business to Business Data Integration Specialist
Certified IBM System i Specialist
Paragon Consulting Services, Inc.
mwalter at paragon-csi.com
717-764-7909 ext. 20


-----Original Message-----
From: Daniel Kahn Gillmor [mailto:dkg at fifthhorseman.net] 
Sent: Wednesday, March 18, 2015 8:38 AM
To: Mark Walter; gnupg-users at gnupg.org
Subject: Re: What am I doing wrong?

On Wed 2015-03-18 08:18:11 -0400, Mark Walter wrote:

> I'm having issues with encrypt and decrypt and I know it's something 
> I'm doing wrong. I created a key with Kelopatra. Imported it into GNU 
> Privacy Assistant. It shows up as Fully Valid.
>
> Next, to test, I created the text file test.txt and used the following command to encrypt it.
> gpg -e -u myuser at domain.net -r myuser at domain.net test.txt

the -u myuser at domain.net is not doing anything here, because this is doing encryption and not signing.  so no secret key material is used in this step.

> The file test.txt.gpg showed up in my folder.
>
> Next, I tried to decrypt it using the following syntax.
> gpg -d test.txt.gpg
>
> And I get the following error.
> Gpg decryption failed: No secret key
>
> Not sure what I'm doing wrong here. This used to not be an issue.

It sounds to me like you imported your public key but not your secret key.

Does your key show up in the output of "gpg --list-secret-keys"  ?

     --dkg

-----
No virus found in this message.
Checked by AVG - www.avg.com
Version: 2015.0.5751 / Virus Database: 4306/9322 - Release Date: 03/17/15


From david at gbenet.com  Wed Mar 18 22:07:32 2015
From: david at gbenet.com (david at gbenet.com)
Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2015 21:07:32 +0000
Subject: What am I doing wrong?
In-Reply-To: <79E1EB8865153D49AC2ACFBDED5F2584C3D7A31B86@pcsimail.paragon-csi.com>
References: <79E1EB8865153D49AC2ACFBDED5F2584C3D7A31B86@pcsimail.paragon-csi.com>
Message-ID: <5509E914.8020700@gbenet.com>

On 18/03/15 12:18, Mark Walter wrote:
> Hello all.
> 
> I'm having issues with encrypt and decrypt and I know it's something I'm doing wrong. I created a key with Kelopatra. Imported it into GNU Privacy Assistant. It shows up as Fully Valid.
> 
> Next, to test, I created the text file test.txt and used the following command to encrypt it.
> gpg -e -u myuser at domain.net -r myuser at domain.net test.txt
> 
> The file test.txt.gpg showed up in my folder.
> 
> Next, I tried to decrypt it using the following syntax.
> gpg -d test.txt.gpg
> 
> And I get the following error.
> Gpg decryption failed: No secret key
> 
> Not sure what I'm doing wrong here. This used to not be an issue.
> 
> This is Windows Server 2012.
> 
> Thanks in advance	
> 
> Mark Walter
> 
> Business to Business Data Integration Specialist
> Certified IBM System i Specialist
> Paragon Consulting Services, Inc.
> mwalter at paragon-csi.com
> 717-764-7909 ext. 20
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
> 
So you created a private and public key - then encrypted a file and you entered your
passphrase (password you created when generating your keys)?

David


-- 
?See the sanity of the man! No gods, no angels, no demons, no body. Nothing of the
kind.Stern, sane,every brain-cell perfect and complete even at the moment of death. No
delusion.? https://linuxcounter.net/user/512854.html - http://gbenet.com

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From mwalter at paragon-csi.com  Wed Mar 18 15:13:32 2015
From: mwalter at paragon-csi.com (Mark Walter)
Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2015 10:13:32 -0400
Subject: What am I doing wrong?
In-Reply-To: <5509E914.8020700@gbenet.com>
References: <79E1EB8865153D49AC2ACFBDED5F2584C3D7A31B86@pcsimail.paragon-csi.com>
 <5509E914.8020700@gbenet.com>
Message-ID: <79E1EB8865153D49AC2ACFBDED5F2584C3D7A31BD2@pcsimail.paragon-csi.com>

Thanks so much for the help everyone. I believe I have this working as I need it. 

Mark Walter

Business to Business Data Integration Specialist
Certified IBM System i Specialist
Paragon Consulting Services, Inc.
mwalter at paragon-csi.com
717-764-7909 ext. 20


-----Original Message-----
From: Gnupg-users [mailto:gnupg-users-bounces at gnupg.org] On Behalf Of david at gbenet.com
Sent: Wednesday, March 18, 2015 5:08 PM
To: gnupg-users at gnupg.org
Subject: Re: What am I doing wrong?
Importance: Low

On 18/03/15 12:18, Mark Walter wrote:
> Hello all.
> 
> I'm having issues with encrypt and decrypt and I know it's something I'm doing wrong. I created a key with Kelopatra. Imported it into GNU Privacy Assistant. It shows up as Fully Valid.
> 
> Next, to test, I created the text file test.txt and used the following command to encrypt it.
> gpg -e -u myuser at domain.net -r myuser at domain.net test.txt
> 
> The file test.txt.gpg showed up in my folder.
> 
> Next, I tried to decrypt it using the following syntax.
> gpg -d test.txt.gpg
> 
> And I get the following error.
> Gpg decryption failed: No secret key
> 
> Not sure what I'm doing wrong here. This used to not be an issue.
> 
> This is Windows Server 2012.
> 
> Thanks in advance	
> 
> Mark Walter
> 
> Business to Business Data Integration Specialist Certified IBM System 
> i Specialist Paragon Consulting Services, Inc.
> mwalter at paragon-csi.com
> 717-764-7909 ext. 20
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
> 
So you created a private and public key - then encrypted a file and you entered your passphrase (password you created when generating your keys)?

David


--
?See the sanity of the man! No gods, no angels, no demons, no body. Nothing of the kind.Stern, sane,every brain-cell perfect and complete even at the moment of death. No delusion.? https://linuxcounter.net/user/512854.html - http://gbenet.com


-----
No virus found in this message.
Checked by AVG - www.avg.com
Version: 2015.0.5751 / Virus Database: 4306/9322 - Release Date: 03/17/15

From samir at samirnassar.com  Wed Mar 18 15:54:43 2015
From: samir at samirnassar.com (Samir Nassar)
Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2015 15:54:43 +0100
Subject: SKS Keyserver, HKPS, and GnuPG 2.1
Message-ID: <9234986.JL3FiFvT8u@lathe>

Hello,

I originally posted this on the sks-devel mailing list, but after thinking 
about it, I believe this might be something I am doing wrong on the GnuPG 
side.:

I set up a keyserver at keyserver.myriapolis.net.

What I have done so far:

Installed sks (1.1.5) from wheezy-backports

SKS is behind a nginx reverse proxy using the instructions from: 
https://bitbucket.org/skskeyserver/sks-keyserver/wiki/Peering

I can access SKS on the web through:
https://keyserver.myriapolis.net:11371/
https://keyserver.myriapolis.net:443/
http://keyserver.myriapolis.net:80/

When I access the keyserver through:

gpg-connect-agent --verbose --dirmngr 'keyserver 
http://keyserver.myriapolis.net' 'ks_get 1e42b367' /bye things work.

WHen I try the following:

gpg-connect-agent --verbose --dirmngr 'keyserver 
https://keyserver.myriapolis.net' 'ks_get 1e42b367' /bye

gpg-connect-agent --verbose --dirmngr 'keyserver 
https://keyserver.myriapolis.net:11371' 'ks_get 1e42b367' /bye

gpg-connect-agent --verbose --dirmngr 'keyserver 
hkps://keyserver.myriapolis.net:11371' 'ks_get 1e42b367' /bye

I get the following error: ERR 1 General error <Unspecified source>

dirmngr.conf contains:

hkp-cacert /home/snassar/.gnupg/myriapolis.net.crt

Any pointers would be lovely.

Samir
PGP Fingerprint: 19AE 0BC4 7DA8 4683 3AB6 9A53 69A7 5542 488B 4A1A
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From jose.castillo at gmail.com  Wed Mar 18 19:18:57 2015
From: jose.castillo at gmail.com (Jose Castillo)
Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2015 14:18:57 -0400
Subject: Email-only UIDs and verification (was: Making the case for smart
 cards for the average user)
In-Reply-To: <277590791.20150317005551@my_localhost>
References: <CAAocvpvEqs-tQ-rEki8AX3spdSt8P5TG0+KoXVtufW0Azy9wDQ@mail.gmail.com>
 <277590791.20150317005551@my_localhost>
Message-ID: <16C07A2D-8B6D-48E5-9BC3-B6AE5D0935D9@gmail.com>

On Mar 16, 2015, at 8:55 PM, MFPA <2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net> wrote:
> I would urge you to
> reconsider your decision to drop the angle brackets. At
> least one MUA (the MUA I am using to write this message)
> sends the email address enclosed in angle brackets as the
> search string for GnuPG to locate the key. No angle
> brackets around the email address means no key found.

Good point, I?ll make that change. As a sidenote, I notice that when I?m generating a key interactively, I get an error message of 'Name must be at least 5 characters long? when I try to make an email-only UID. It works in batch mode, and obviously with the allow-freeform-uid option, but just thought it was interesting to point out. Someone attempting to make such a UID in the interactive mode might be forgiven for putting their email address in the ?name? field as a workaround. 

> Thinking about it, you don't need the user to click a link or to
> reply to an email at all. If you sign the UID and enclose the
> signed copy of the key in an encrypted email to the address
> in the UID, they don?t get access to the certification unless
> they control both the email address and the key.

This is a very good point, and I can see making this change. 

> But it retains the problem of relatively frequent
> verification signatures accumulating; I don't know
> a solution to that.

This was in reference to the PGP global directory?s verification check. Having never used it I?m curious why the validity period is only two weeks. Does the user have to re-verify their email address every two weeks? That seems excessive. Moving to an annual validity period (or through the expiration of the domain name if it?s expiring sooner) allows for disused keys to expire, while still giving you the option to revoke a UID or key sooner if necessary. 

> Finally, if the person at the other end is able to
> decrypt my message and reply to me, then the
> key and the email address are controlled by
> the same person. What assurance does the
> verification service add?

In the case of establishing communication with someone you haven?t yet met, it gives you an assurance that a third party has verified that they were in control of the address on a given date within the last year. If I query your email address and find four keys, I don?t know what to do; but if one of them is trusted by the email verification service, which I trust, then there?s only one valid key. 

-- 

Joey Castillo
www.joeycastillo.com



From kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com  Wed Mar 18 19:28:31 2015
From: kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com (Kristian Fiskerstrand)
Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2015 19:28:31 +0100
Subject: SKS Keyserver, HKPS, and GnuPG 2.1
In-Reply-To: <9234986.JL3FiFvT8u@lathe>
References: <9234986.JL3FiFvT8u@lathe>
Message-ID: <5509C3CF.6050307@sumptuouscapital.com>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

On 03/18/2015 03:54 PM, Samir Nassar wrote:
> Hello,
> 
> I originally posted this on the sks-devel mailing list, but after
> thinking about it, I believe this might be something I am doing
> wrong on the GnuPG side.:
> 
> I set up a keyserver at keyserver.myriapolis.net.
> 


...

> 
> I get the following error: ERR 1 General error <Unspecified
> source>
> 

Likely related to the PTR issues[0, 1], its already in the roadmap[2]

References:
[0] http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-devel/2015-February/029491.html
[1] http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-devel/2014-May/028458.html
[2] https://gnupg.org/roadmap.html

- -- 
- ----------------------------
Kristian Fiskerstrand
Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com
Twitter: @krifisk
- ----------------------------
Public OpenPGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net
fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3
- ----------------------------
Nihil lacrima citius arescit
Nothing dries more quickly than a tear
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

iQEcBAEBCgAGBQJVCcPLAAoJEP7VAChXwav6cj4H/iFdJjkiuhWL/wE+V/X+DxIU
0p/BpiOJkt0rzgFoX5pWcEedZxDyxLkOLlIDeMIkqxdpP0CeELf+YohqoGY+0iUE
yZy5joiJqK8XMADqT5FpB301ULvRkyXiGdKFolR4uE0XBOEJx0ZY9UKG20BG0wsW
JUBIT21Kzpd4vfAEO7To8oWsxTodkdwBOSq8U0+wlMJR3eYhBAEd2hzS31N6jbvb
EC5vGKeXCFT6VJOpsW9mkLxdczWzpo/PorSnMAb8r6OAE7DIbI+p5M9FfIBBNJb1
bWsM50BQAgSsv7TA91Aa+9rmYshseTTBLiw9gJNCytd+ed3TaoBk0vo9pL1l1NA=
=1mc4
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


From samir at samirnassar.com  Wed Mar 18 20:39:42 2015
From: samir at samirnassar.com (Samir Nassar)
Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2015 20:39:42 +0100
Subject: SKS Keyserver, HKPS, and GnuPG 2.1
In-Reply-To: <5509C3CF.6050307@sumptuouscapital.com>
References: <9234986.JL3FiFvT8u@lathe> <5509C3CF.6050307@sumptuouscapital.com>
Message-ID: <7784377.oXVs1OqzQ9@lathe>

On Wednesday, March 18, 2015 07:28:31 PM Kristian Fiskerstrand wrote:
> Likely related to the PTR issues[0, 1], its already in the roadmap[2]

Thank you Kristian,

So I understand this better. When using non-encrypted connections GnuPG 
doesn't have a problem, but when I am using a wildcard certificate GPG 2.1 has 
a problem?

Is there anything I can do to mitigate for now?
 
Samir
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From kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com  Wed Mar 18 20:54:47 2015
From: kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com (Kristian Fiskerstrand)
Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2015 20:54:47 +0100
Subject: SKS Keyserver, HKPS, and GnuPG 2.1
In-Reply-To: <7784377.oXVs1OqzQ9@lathe>
References: <9234986.JL3FiFvT8u@lathe> <5509C3CF.6050307@sumptuouscapital.com>
 <7784377.oXVs1OqzQ9@lathe>
Message-ID: <5509D807.4060808@sumptuouscapital.com>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

On 03/18/2015 08:39 PM, Samir Nassar wrote:
> On Wednesday, March 18, 2015 07:28:31 PM Kristian Fiskerstrand
> wrote:
>> Likely related to the PTR issues[0, 1], its already in the
>> roadmap[2]
> 
> Thank you Kristian,
> 
> So I understand this better. When using non-encrypted connections
> GnuPG doesn't have a problem, but when I am using a wildcard
> certificate GPG 2.1 has a problem?
> 
> Is there anything I can do to mitigate for now?

Hmm, I didn't notice that it was a wildcard cert, that should also
support holdfast.myriapolis.net in the cert matching, however it
results a redirect and 	404 for [0]. If you add this as a vhost I
suspect it will work in your configuration.

References:
[0] https://holdfast.myriapolis.net/pks/lookup?op=stats

- -- 
- ----------------------------
Kristian Fiskerstrand
Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com
Twitter: @krifisk
- ----------------------------
Public OpenPGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net
fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3
- ----------------------------
Acta est fabula
So ends the story
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

iQEcBAEBCgAGBQJVCdgDAAoJEP7VAChXwav6KAYH/jXuBobsYer/R16EFNHeCyz5
wa+9azd3oJP0t/ucVwM59vCv5dGbG4bRGqoNOp5pE9D7/BDY/F+7Y4UGJKsT1z5D
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wsnNynaXREWybQ2bkImHN4NyRzfSRbm50TNPl7RxuKQcOfkO3RC/2hhwrjoALUs=
=IGgm
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


From samir at samirnassar.com  Wed Mar 18 21:13:30 2015
From: samir at samirnassar.com (Samir Nassar)
Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2015 21:13:30 +0100
Subject: SKS Keyserver, HKPS, and GnuPG 2.1
In-Reply-To: <5509D807.4060808@sumptuouscapital.com>
References: <9234986.JL3FiFvT8u@lathe> <7784377.oXVs1OqzQ9@lathe>
 <5509D807.4060808@sumptuouscapital.com>
Message-ID: <2316925.XUNha6tViu@lathe>

On Wednesday, March 18, 2015 08:54:47 PM Kristian Fiskerstrand wrote:
> Hmm, I didn't notice that it was a wildcard cert, that should also
> support holdfast.myriapolis.net in the cert matching, however it
> results a redirect and 	404 for [0]. If you add this as a vhost I
> suspect it will work in your configuration.

I configured nginx to also server up holdfast.myriapolis.net on port 11371

testing with:

gpg-connect-agent --verbose --dirmngr 'keyserver 
https://keyserver.myriapolis.net:11371' 'ks_get 1e42b367' /bye

gpg-connect-agent --verbose --dirmngr 'keyserver 
https://holdfast.myriapolis.net:11371' 'ks_get 1e42b367' /bye

and with:

gpg-connect-agent --verbose --dirmngr 'keyserver 
hkps://keyserver.myriapolis.net:11371' 'ks_get 1e42b367' /bye

gpg-connect-agent --verbose --dirmngr 'keyserver 
hkps://holdfast.myriapolis.net:11371' 'ks_get 1e42b367' /bye

Gives this result:

OK
ERR 1 General error <Unspecified source>
gpg-connect-agent: closing connection to agent
 
Samir
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From kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com  Wed Mar 18 21:21:08 2015
From: kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com (Kristian Fiskerstrand)
Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2015 21:21:08 +0100
Subject: SKS Keyserver, HKPS, and GnuPG 2.1
In-Reply-To: <2316925.XUNha6tViu@lathe>
References: <9234986.JL3FiFvT8u@lathe> <7784377.oXVs1OqzQ9@lathe>
 <5509D807.4060808@sumptuouscapital.com> <2316925.XUNha6tViu@lathe>
Message-ID: <5509DE34.8010406@sumptuouscapital.com>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

On 03/18/2015 09:13 PM, Samir Nassar wrote:
> On Wednesday, March 18, 2015 08:54:47 PM Kristian Fiskerstrand 
> wrote:
>> Hmm, I didn't notice that it was a wildcard cert, that should 
>> also support holdfast.myriapolis.net in the cert matching, 
>> however it results a redirect and 	404 for [0]. If you add this 
>> as a vhost I suspect it will work in your configuration.
> 
> I configured nginx to also server up holdfast.myriapolis.net on 
> port 11371

11371 is expected to be for HKP, so requiring this to be TLS is bad
practice.

> 
> testing with:
> 
> gpg-connect-agent --verbose --dirmngr 'keyserver 
> https://keyserver.myriapolis.net:11371' 'ks_get 1e42b367' /bye
> 
> gpg-connect-agent --verbose --dirmngr 'keyserver 
> https://holdfast.myriapolis.net:11371' 'ks_get 1e42b367' /bye

https shouldn't work in this regard, it require the API from HKP protocol

> 
> and with:
> 
> gpg-connect-agent --verbose --dirmngr 'keyserver 
> hkps://keyserver.myriapolis.net:11371' 'ks_get 1e42b367' /bye
> 
> gpg-connect-agent --verbose --dirmngr 'keyserver 
> hkps://holdfast.myriapolis.net:11371' 'ks_get 1e42b367' /bye
> 

What if you just update the keyserver in gpg.conf and kill the dirmngr
(it will auto-restart)?


> Gives this result:
> 
> OK ERR 1 General error <Unspecified source> gpg-connect-agent: 
> closing connection to agent

increase verbosity, e.g. gpg --debug-level guru --search
blah at invaliddomain.com , alternatively specify debug / debug-level in
dirmngr.conf along with a log-file

> 
> Samir
> 
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________ Gnupg-users
> mailing list Gnupg-users at gnupg.org 
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
> 


- -- 
- ----------------------------
Kristian Fiskerstrand
Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com
Twitter: @krifisk
- ----------------------------
Public OpenPGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net
fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3
- ----------------------------
Testis unus, testis nullus
A single witness is no witness
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

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=VVlz
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


From jackyalcine at gmail.com  Wed Mar 18 11:27:10 2015
From: jackyalcine at gmail.com (Jacky Alcine)
Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2015 06:27:10 -0400
Subject: what is the proper way to load gpg-agent with systemd
In-Reply-To: <CAPdn058xZjD2cib6WoGJf2cT5vkrznA2iP9xVru7C4KtGg5UUA@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAPdn058xZjD2cib6WoGJf2cT5vkrznA2iP9xVru7C4KtGg5UUA@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <1908899.LrhJSW71ZN@stark>

On Tuesday, March 17, 2015 03:48:54 PM Paulo Lopes wrote:
> Hello,
> 
> I've been using my gpg card with success in Ubuntu for a while but as
> everyone knows the init system is switching from upstart to systemd as it
> is happening on Debian and the vast majority of other distributions.
> 
> In the "past" one could start gpg-agent from the script that boots Xorg or
> even the gnome-keyring and we could "inject" a couple of variables into the
> session like
> 
> GPG_AGENT_INFO
> SSH_AGENT_PID
> SSH_AUTH_SOCK
> 
> and all applications spawned from that process inherit those vars, however
> systemd does not inherit vars from its unit files (and my experience with
> systemd is extremely low so i could be saying something wrong here).
> 
> It would be nice to have some documentation on gnupg site describing the
> best way to work with systemd...

You might want to ask the systemd-users mailing list about that.
-- 
Jacky Alcine
https://jacky.wtf
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From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net  Wed Mar 18 22:00:06 2015
From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA)
Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2015 21:00:06 +0000
Subject: Defaults
In-Reply-To: <87k2ye20cl.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <5508842F.1010101@sixdemonbag.org>
 <87k2ye20cl.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <2510117142.20150318210006@my_localhost>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512



On Wednesday 18 March 2015 at 8:09:30 AM, in
<mid:87k2ye20cl.fsf at vigenere.g10code.de>, Werner Koch wrote:



>
>   created: 2015-03-18  expires: never

Just wondering why we want keys to never expire by default.
Why is that better than a default validity period of "X" years?


- --
Best regards

MFPA                  <mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net>

Adults are obsolete children.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

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From samir at samirnassar.com  Wed Mar 18 22:08:26 2015
From: samir at samirnassar.com (Samir Nassar)
Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2015 22:08:26 +0100
Subject: SKS Keyserver, HKPS, and GnuPG 2.1
In-Reply-To: <5509DE34.8010406@sumptuouscapital.com>
References: <9234986.JL3FiFvT8u@lathe> <2316925.XUNha6tViu@lathe>
 <5509DE34.8010406@sumptuouscapital.com>
Message-ID: <2469357.e4KVUOf5oW@lathe>

On Wednesday, March 18, 2015 09:21:08 PM Kristian Fiskerstrand wrote:
> 11371 is expected to be for HKP, so requiring this to be TLS is bad
> practice.

Oh oops. Fixed now.
 
> > gpg-connect-agent --verbose --dirmngr 'keyserver
> > hkps://keyserver.myriapolis.net:11371' 'ks_get 1e42b367' /bye
> > 
> > gpg-connect-agent --verbose --dirmngr 'keyserver
> > hkps://holdfast.myriapolis.net:11371' 'ks_get 1e42b367' /bye
> 
> What if you just update the keyserver in gpg.conf and kill the dirmngr
> (it will auto-restart)?

Done

> increase verbosity, e.g. gpg --debug-level guru --search
> blah at invaliddomain.com , alternatively specify debug / debug-level in
> dirmngr.conf along with a log-file

$ gpg --debug-level guru --search samir at samirnassar.com
gpg: enabled debug flags: packet mpi cipher filter iobuf memory cache memstat 
trust hashing extprog cardio assuan clock
gpg: DBG: [not enabled in the source] start
gpg: DBG: chan_3 <- # Home: /home/<user>/.gnupg
gpg: DBG: chan_3 <- # Config: /home/<user>/.gnupg/dirmngr.conf
gpg: DBG: chan_3 <- OK Dirmngr 2.1.2 at your service
gpg: DBG: chan_4 <- # Home: /home/<user>/.gnupg
gpg: DBG: chan_4 <- # Config: /home/<user>/.gnupg/dirmngr.conf
gpg: DBG: chan_4 <- OK Dirmngr 2.1.2 at your service
gpg: DBG: connection to the dirmngr established
gpg: DBG: chan_4 -> KEYSERVER --clear hkps://keyserver.myriapolis.net
gpg: DBG: chan_4 <- OK
gpg: DBG: chan_4 -> KS_SEARCH -- samir at samirnassar.com
gpg: DBG: chan_4 <- ERR 1 General error <Unspecified source>
gpg: error searching keyserver: General error
gpg: keyserver search failed: General error
gpg: DBG: chan_4 -> BYE
gpg: DBG: [not enabled in the source] stop
gpg: random usage: poolsize=600 mixed=0 polls=0/0 added=0/0
              outmix=0 getlvl1=0/0 getlvl2=0/0
gpg: secmem usage: 0/32768 bytes in 0 blocks
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From kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com  Wed Mar 18 22:14:53 2015
From: kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com (Kristian Fiskerstrand)
Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2015 22:14:53 +0100
Subject: SKS Keyserver, HKPS, and GnuPG 2.1
In-Reply-To: <2469357.e4KVUOf5oW@lathe>
References: <9234986.JL3FiFvT8u@lathe> <2316925.XUNha6tViu@lathe>
 <5509DE34.8010406@sumptuouscapital.com> <2469357.e4KVUOf5oW@lathe>
Message-ID: <5509EACD.3040509@sumptuouscapital.com>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

On 03/18/2015 10:08 PM, Samir Nassar wrote:
> On Wednesday, March 18, 2015 09:21:08 PM Kristian Fiskerstrand
> wrote:
>> 11371 is expected to be for HKP, so requiring this to be TLS is
>> bad practice.
> 

...

> gpg: DBG: chan_4 <- ERR 1 General error <Unspecified source> gpg:
> error searching keyserver: General error gpg: keyserver search
> failed: General error gpg: DBG: chan_4 -> BYE gpg: DBG: [not
> enabled in the source] stop gpg: random usage: poolsize=600 mixed=0
> polls=0/0 added=0/0 outmix=0 getlvl1=0/0 getlvl2=0/0 gpg: secmem
> usage: 0/32768 bytes in 0 blocks

Are you only experiencing issues with your own server or with HKPS in
general? Is dirmngr compiled with gnutls support?

gpg-connect-agent --dirmngr 'KEYSERVER --help' /bye
S # Known schemata:
S #   hkp
S #   hkps
S #   http
S #   finger
S #   kdns

or ldd /usr/bin/dirmngr|grep gnutls
> 
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________ Gnupg-users mailing
> list Gnupg-users at gnupg.org 
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
> 


- -- 
- ----------------------------
Kristian Fiskerstrand
Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com
Twitter: @krifisk
- ----------------------------
Public OpenPGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net
fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3
- ----------------------------
"Statistics are like a bikini. What they reveal is suggestive, but
what they conceal is vital."
(Aaron Levenstein)
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

iQEcBAEBCgAGBQJVCerJAAoJEP7VAChXwav6QawH/iYRspyutKC0pdqH9XmGF9gL
U2k7au0hFbXFP9BwTa2k80uAQCtNve6AaZVtEaCwbr/+rSw8tlTdv8/8qfuvZmFG
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From samir at samirnassar.com  Wed Mar 18 22:33:47 2015
From: samir at samirnassar.com (Samir Nassar)
Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2015 22:33:47 +0100
Subject: SKS Keyserver, HKPS, and GnuPG 2.1
In-Reply-To: <5509EACD.3040509@sumptuouscapital.com>
References: <9234986.JL3FiFvT8u@lathe> <2469357.e4KVUOf5oW@lathe>
 <5509EACD.3040509@sumptuouscapital.com>
Message-ID: <3021547.ccKtnh10l0@lathe>

On Wednesday, March 18, 2015 10:14:53 PM Kristian Fiskerstrand wrote:
> gpg-connect-agent --dirmngr 'KEYSERVER --help' /bye
> S # Known schemata:
> S #   hkp
> S #   hkps
> S #   http
> S #   finger
> S #   kdns

Same.
 
When I set the keyserver to: hkp://keyserver.myriapolis.net everything works.

When I set the keyserver to: hkps://keyserver.myriapolis.net it stops working.

To test whether it is a general hkps problem or now, I tried: 
hkps://keys.niif.hu with the same issue.

Is it possible that dirmngr isn't reading the cert I have for myriapolis.net 
properly?

Samir
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From kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com  Wed Mar 18 22:40:57 2015
From: kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com (Kristian Fiskerstrand)
Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2015 22:40:57 +0100
Subject: SKS Keyserver, HKPS, and GnuPG 2.1
In-Reply-To: <3021547.ccKtnh10l0@lathe>
References: <9234986.JL3FiFvT8u@lathe> <2469357.e4KVUOf5oW@lathe>
 <5509EACD.3040509@sumptuouscapital.com> <3021547.ccKtnh10l0@lathe>
Message-ID: <5509F0E9.8040905@sumptuouscapital.com>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

On 03/18/2015 10:33 PM, Samir Nassar wrote:
> On Wednesday, March 18, 2015 10:14:53 PM Kristian Fiskerstrand
> wrote:
>> gpg-connect-agent --dirmngr 'KEYSERVER --help' /bye S # Known
>> schemata: S #   hkp S #   hkps S #   http S #   finger S #
>> kdns
> 
> Same.
> 
> When I set the keyserver to: hkp://keyserver.myriapolis.net
> everything works.
> 
> When I set the keyserver to: hkps://keyserver.myriapolis.net it
> stops working.
> 
> To test whether it is a general hkps problem or now, I tried: 
> hkps://keys.niif.hu with the same issue.
> 
> Is it possible that dirmngr isn't reading the cert I have for
> myriapolis.net properly?

try renaming  /home/snassar/.gnupg/myriapolis.net.crt to
/home/snassar/.gnupg/myriapolis.net.pem

if that doesn't help , can you increase debug verbosity in
dirmngr.conf and set the logfile?
$ cat dirmngr.conf
verbose
debug 4096
debug-level 4096
debug-all
log-file /tmp/dirmngr.log

- -- 
- ----------------------------
Kristian Fiskerstrand
Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com
Twitter: @krifisk
- ----------------------------
Public OpenPGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net
fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3
- ----------------------------
"A committee is a group that keeps minutes and loses hours."
(Milton Berle)
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

iQEcBAEBCgAGBQJVCfDfAAoJEP7VAChXwav6rr8H/jl2Vlly7ivDNnT/BmhhYRUq
qoX3AFDbW8z7p7V9RZ07oxFI0GL5qim1VoMgJQZjb0Ygv2F9f7oOfeu1KOBAxxok
CKEBGQinxj/PRQi8uIT5ZrTVJIsDTyTG6QnmbMBpABoqOMDOrVXwhfGlec5YqxuA
h5ReotqLH8LzrQj9EA/MBPKv4XHFW/tAfvXzLj4oyPqeUAGdOyT/RF6VPswwk4ce
0RlQ5MbNNAuYqvgJ1KRujgg9I/2M9jTvx88n//N+XI1yc07iXsSVBig+zi9WF06W
kSeATYbxk19ssKSK3sVHpnIuceLThRC0Xw4Mh/2bVJeDFGM0QDYaYtLMuhI8rmE=
=XC4g
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


From samir at samirnassar.com  Wed Mar 18 23:03:11 2015
From: samir at samirnassar.com (Samir Nassar)
Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2015 23:03:11 +0100
Subject: SKS Keyserver, HKPS, and GnuPG 2.1
In-Reply-To: <5509F0E9.8040905@sumptuouscapital.com>
References: <9234986.JL3FiFvT8u@lathe> <3021547.ccKtnh10l0@lathe>
 <5509F0E9.8040905@sumptuouscapital.com>
Message-ID: <1603537.oTnZ3ufBTN@lathe>

On Wednesday, March 18, 2015 10:40:57 PM Kristian Fiskerstrand wrote:
> try renaming  /home/snassar/.gnupg/myriapolis.net.crt to
> /home/snassar/.gnupg/myriapolis.net.pem

Done.

> if that doesn't help , can you increase debug verbosity in
> dirmngr.conf and set the logfile?
> $ cat dirmngr.conf
> verbose
> debug 4096
> debug-level 4096
> debug-all
> log-file /tmp/dirmngr.log

Results:

2015-03-18 22:57:20 dirmngr[23026.0] listening on socket 
'/home/snassar/.gnupg/S.dirmngr'
2015-03-18 22:57:20 dirmngr[23027.0] permanently loaded certificates: 0
2015-03-18 22:57:20 dirmngr[23027.0]     runtime cached certificates: 0
2015-03-18 22:57:21 dirmngr[23027.0] handler for fd 0 started
2015-03-18 22:57:21 dirmngr[23027.0] DBG: chan_0 -> # Home: 
/home/snassar/.gnupg
2015-03-18 22:57:21 dirmngr[23027.0] DBG: chan_0 -> # Config: 
/home/snassar/.gnupg/dirmngr.conf
2015-03-18 22:57:21 dirmngr[23027.0] DBG: chan_0 -> OK Dirmngr 2.1.2 at your 
service
2015-03-18 22:57:21 dirmngr[23027.0] connection from process 23024 (1000:1000)
2015-03-18 22:57:21 dirmngr[23027.0] DBG: chan_0 <- KEYSERVER --clear 
hkps://keyserver.myriapolis.net
2015-03-18 22:57:21 dirmngr[23027.0] DBG: chan_0 -> OK
2015-03-18 22:57:21 dirmngr[23027.0] DBG: chan_0 <- KS_SEARCH -- 
samir at samirnassar.com
2015-03-18 22:57:21 dirmngr[23027.0] getnameinfo returned for 
'keyserver.myriapolis.net': 'keyserver.myriapolis.net' [already known]
2015-03-18 22:57:22 dirmngr[23027.0] TLS verification of peer failed: 
status=0x0042
2015-03-18 22:57:22 dirmngr[23027.0] TLS verification of peer failed: The 
certificate is NOT trusted. The certificate issuer is unknown. 
2015-03-18 22:57:22 dirmngr[23027.0] DBG: expected hostname: 
keyserver.myriapolis.net
2015-03-18 22:57:22 dirmngr[23027.0] DBG: BEGIN Certificate 'server[0]':
2015-03-18 22:57:22 dirmngr[23027.0] DBG:      serial: 
4BC6878D433B6F5CA74E0142C8C2CA6B
2015-03-18 22:57:22 dirmngr[23027.0] DBG:   notBefore: 2013-12-11 00:00:00
2015-03-18 22:57:22 dirmngr[23027.0] DBG:    notAfter: 2015-12-11 23:59:59
2015-03-18 22:57:22 dirmngr[23027.0] DBG:      issuer: CN=COMODO RSA Domain 
Validation Secure Server CA,O=COMODO CA Limited,L=Salford,ST=Greater 
Manchester,C=GB
2015-03-18 22:57:22 dirmngr[23027.0] DBG:     subject: 
CN=*.myriapolis.net,OU=EssentialSSL Wildcard,OU=Domain Control Validated
2015-03-18 22:57:22 dirmngr[23027.0] DBG:   hash algo: 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11
2015-03-18 22:57:22 dirmngr[23027.0] DBG:   SHA1 fingerprint: 
47D0B4CAA99B5D3F9EA9C2E2F26B380CD60129C7
2015-03-18 22:57:22 dirmngr[23027.0] DBG: END Certificate
2015-03-18 22:57:22 dirmngr[23027.0] DBG: BEGIN Certificate 'server[1]':
2015-03-18 22:57:22 dirmngr[23027.0] DBG:      serial: 
2B2E6EEAD975366C148A6EDBA37C8C07
2015-03-18 22:57:22 dirmngr[23027.0] DBG:   notBefore: 2014-02-12 00:00:00
2015-03-18 22:57:22 dirmngr[23027.0] DBG:    notAfter: 2029-02-11 23:59:59
2015-03-18 22:57:22 dirmngr[23027.0] DBG:      issuer: CN=COMODO RSA 
Certification Authority,O=COMODO CA Limited,L=Salford,ST=Greater 
Manchester,C=GB
2015-03-18 22:57:22 dirmngr[23027.0] DBG:     subject: CN=COMODO RSA Domain 
Validation Secure Server CA,O=COMODO CA Limited,L=Salford,ST=Greater 
Manchester,C=GB
2015-03-18 22:57:22 dirmngr[23027.0] DBG:   hash algo: 1.2.840.113549.1.1.12
2015-03-18 22:57:22 dirmngr[23027.0] DBG:   SHA1 fingerprint: 
339CDD57CFD5B141169B615FF31428782D1DA639
2015-03-18 22:57:22 dirmngr[23027.0] DBG: END Certificate
2015-03-18 22:57:22 dirmngr[23027.0] DBG: BEGIN Certificate 'server[2]':
2015-03-18 22:57:22 dirmngr[23027.0] DBG:      serial: 
2766EE56EB49F38EABD770A2FC84DE22
2015-03-18 22:57:22 dirmngr[23027.0] DBG:   notBefore: 2000-05-30 10:48:38
2015-03-18 22:57:22 dirmngr[23027.0] DBG:    notAfter: 2020-05-30 10:48:38
2015-03-18 22:57:22 dirmngr[23027.0] DBG:      issuer: CN=AddTrust External CA 
Root,OU=AddTrust External TTP Network,O=AddTrust AB,C=SE
2015-03-18 22:57:22 dirmngr[23027.0] DBG:     subject: CN=COMODO RSA 
Certification Authority,O=COMODO CA Limited,L=Salford,ST=Greater 
Manchester,C=GB
2015-03-18 22:57:22 dirmngr[23027.0] DBG:   hash algo: 1.2.840.113549.1.1.12
2015-03-18 22:57:22 dirmngr[23027.0] DBG:   SHA1 fingerprint: 
F5AD0BCC1AD56CD150725B1C866C30AD92EF21B0
2015-03-18 22:57:22 dirmngr[23027.0] DBG: END Certificate
2015-03-18 22:57:22 dirmngr[23027.0] DBG: BEGIN Certificate 'server[3]':
2015-03-18 22:57:22 dirmngr[23027.0] DBG:      serial: 01
2015-03-18 22:57:22 dirmngr[23027.0] DBG:   notBefore: 2000-05-30 10:48:38
2015-03-18 22:57:22 dirmngr[23027.0] DBG:    notAfter: 2020-05-30 10:48:38
2015-03-18 22:57:22 dirmngr[23027.0] DBG:      issuer: CN=AddTrust External CA 
Root,OU=AddTrust External TTP Network,O=AddTrust AB,C=SE
2015-03-18 22:57:22 dirmngr[23027.0] DBG:     subject: CN=AddTrust External CA 
Root,OU=AddTrust External TTP Network,O=AddTrust AB,C=SE
2015-03-18 22:57:22 dirmngr[23027.0] DBG:   hash algo: 1.2.840.113549.1.1.5
2015-03-18 22:57:22 dirmngr[23027.0] DBG:   SHA1 fingerprint: 
02FAF3E291435468607857694DF5E45B68851868
2015-03-18 22:57:22 dirmngr[23027.0] DBG: END Certificate
2015-03-18 22:57:22 dirmngr[23027.0] TLS connection authentication failed: 
General error
2015-03-18 22:57:22 dirmngr[23027.0] error connecting to 
'https://keyserver.myriapolis.net:443': General error
2015-03-18 22:57:22 dirmngr[23027.0] command 'KS_SEARCH' failed: General error 
<Unspecified source>
2015-03-18 22:57:22 dirmngr[23027.0] command 'KS_SEARCH' failed: General error 
<Unspecified source>
2015-03-18 22:57:22 dirmngr[23027.0] DBG: chan_0 -> ERR 1 General error 
<Unspecified source>
2015-03-18 22:57:22 dirmngr[23027.0] DBG: chan_0 <- BYE
2015-03-18 22:57:22 dirmngr[23027.0] DBG: chan_0 -> OK closing connection
2015-03-18 22:57:22 dirmngr[23027.0] handler for fd 0 terminated

Samir
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From dkg at fifthhorseman.net  Wed Mar 18 23:18:53 2015
From: dkg at fifthhorseman.net (Daniel Kahn Gillmor)
Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2015 18:18:53 -0400
Subject: SKS Keyserver, HKPS, and GnuPG 2.1
In-Reply-To: <1603537.oTnZ3ufBTN@lathe>
References: <9234986.JL3FiFvT8u@lathe> <3021547.ccKtnh10l0@lathe>
 <5509F0E9.8040905@sumptuouscapital.com> <1603537.oTnZ3ufBTN@lathe>
Message-ID: <87vbhygd9u.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>

On Wed 2015-03-18 18:03:11 -0400, Samir Nassar wrote:
> On Wednesday, March 18, 2015 10:40:57 PM Kristian Fiskerstrand wrote:
>> try renaming  /home/snassar/.gnupg/myriapolis.net.crt to
>> /home/snassar/.gnupg/myriapolis.net.pem
>
> Done.

It looks to me like you're using the server's certificate as the CA
certificate.  I don't think that's going to work.  Maybe you want to use
the Addtrust root cert (attached here)

and then point hkp-cacert to that?

    --dkg

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From samir at samirnassar.com  Thu Mar 19 00:03:00 2015
From: samir at samirnassar.com (Samir Nassar)
Date: Thu, 19 Mar 2015 00:03 +0100
Subject: SKS Keyserver, HKPS, and GnuPG 2.1
In-Reply-To: <87vbhygd9u.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
References: <9234986.JL3FiFvT8u@lathe> <1603537.oTnZ3ufBTN@lathe>
 <87vbhygd9u.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
Message-ID: <11444290.gasUsWNnp7@lathe>

On Wednesday, March 18, 2015 06:18:53 PM Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> It looks to me like you're using the server's certificate as the CA
> certificate.  I don't think that's going to work.  Maybe you want to use
> the Addtrust root cert (attached here)

Ahem. You are so very right. Somehow it escaped me that what I want for the 
setup is the CA cert, this despite dirmngr.conf having the line: hkp-cacert

> and then point hkp-cacert to that?

Now things work. I feel a bit foolish, but it's just wounded ego.

David Wood wrote me off-list and pointed out 
https://bugs.g10code.com/gnupg/issue1792 fixes access to my keyserver so I am 
writing for clarification.

Thank you Kristian and Daniel and David for your help.

Samir
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From david.j.wood.2 at gmail.com  Wed Mar 18 22:52:03 2015
From: david.j.wood.2 at gmail.com (David Wood)
Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2015 21:52:03 +0000
Subject: SKS Keyserver, HKPS and GnuPG 2.1
Message-ID: <CAPajYNnAvw6b-KUwuZRF2Yc8J-fgvd__=embZjbguzFvPy7eTw@mail.gmail.com>

Dear all,

Apologies for the thread break - I was reading via the archives and have
only just subscribed.

I debugged this issue a few days ago. I've posted a patch for testing and
hopefully incorporation into a future GnuPG 2.1 build at
https://bugs.g10code.com/gnupg/issue1792

With this patch, hkps://hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net works correctly for me.


David
-- 
David Wood
david.j.wood.2 at gmail.com
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From thomas at thomasruddy.org  Thu Mar 19 09:18:03 2015
From: thomas at thomasruddy.org (Thomas F. Ruddy)
Date: Thu, 19 Mar 2015 09:18:03 +0100
Subject: New "Everyman's software" from CeBIT in Germany
Message-ID: <550A863B.9060600@thomasruddy.org>

Dear all,

I'd be interested in hearing Werner Koch's take on this recent
innovation. Werner, you speak German:

A new "Everyman's software" featuring certification, key servers,
currently Windows only (Linux planned),

https://www.sit.fraunhofer.de/de/volksverschluesselung/

Said to be Open Source in this news-story,

http://www.nzz.ch/mehr/digital/cebit-2015-fraunhofer-volksverschluesselung-1.18505017

-- 

Thomas Ruddy, Germany




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From wk at gnupg.org  Thu Mar 19 10:39:19 2015
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Thu, 19 Mar 2015 10:39:19 +0100
Subject: SKS Keyserver, HKPS and GnuPG 2.1
In-Reply-To: <CAPajYNnAvw6b-KUwuZRF2Yc8J-fgvd__=embZjbguzFvPy7eTw@mail.gmail.com>
 (David Wood's message of "Wed, 18 Mar 2015 21:52:03 +0000")
References: <CAPajYNnAvw6b-KUwuZRF2Yc8J-fgvd__=embZjbguzFvPy7eTw@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <87oanpxr5k.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Wed, 18 Mar 2015 22:52, david.j.wood.2 at gmail.com said:

> I debugged this issue a few days ago. I've posted a patch for testing and
> hopefully incorporation into a future GnuPG 2.1 build at

It is on my shortlist.

Thanks,

  Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From sam.kuper at uclmail.net  Thu Mar 19 12:35:36 2015
From: sam.kuper at uclmail.net (Sam Kuper)
Date: Thu, 19 Mar 2015 11:35:36 +0000
Subject: USB key form-factor smart-card readers with pinpads?
In-Reply-To: <52D3B3FC.2090306@digitalbrains.com>
References: <CAD-JurJD5fOJUhunrVQNF=CNkxHBatAw1NH9AZY1Uz-+vzDWmg@mail.gmail.com>
 <87mwjak401.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <CAD-JurK85MQLiXNbA0q76=u_bPp1w8WP7OGmKhR+j66+SJ7yPg@mail.gmail.com>
 <874n5hihdd.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <CAD-Jur+i+OybTUGYjfySQGMsZfAqeNjmAfKhqO=Vv1BomRdm2g@mail.gmail.com>
 <CAD-Jur+cYWzgLWsOdOwoicqY+mUdADqmrDM0cCzc3H23Ho-BhA@mail.gmail.com>
 <CAOy4VzcKu3xHBCiErd39ONMjypJrnc_BOTXfhuX5KoYJNdZQ_w@mail.gmail.com>
 <CAD-JurJTD_mXNJ3uO1TqsRD5BxN3mWsngx5C+exvbvvqTaw7ig@mail.gmail.com>
 <CAOy4VzeSHuXuQj9GQfC+jwQ2=UR95mLyEF+QRa19hcjBoWdf_w@mail.gmail.com>
 <CAD-JurKqFowP=2HCKGjM8kwVG3Tus9b54ufGA1_VwX7VvEV80w@mail.gmail.com>
 <52D3B3FC.2090306@digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <CAD-Jur+LU4O8ppbxRf6GhW6DDKneKz7RqGJH8+ETjmpkLHMAWw@mail.gmail.com>

On 13/01/2014, Peter Lebbing <peter at digitalbrains.com> wrote:
> On 12/01/14 00:18, Sam Kuper wrote:
>> Again, perhaps I am wrong. But if I am not, then the use of OpenPGP
>> cards with non-pinpad readers still makes no sense (at least, not to
>> me).
>
> Since most readers don't filter VERIFY commands

Yes, I'm getting to realise this. Ideally, it ought ought to be
possible to easily tell before buying a reader whether it does this or
not.

Apologies for my delay in replying, btw.

> and additionally you can't
> force
> the OpenPGP smartcard to require a VERIFY before each decryption anyway,
> the
> pinpad really doesn't add much at all for decryption.
>
> With regard to the PIN not being known to the attacker when using a pinpad:
> Werner disagrees that a pinpad can reliably accomplish that. I did a
> feature
> request about a year ago, you should read this thread: [1]. And especially
> Werners answer in [2]. So according to him, it doesn't add much for
> signatures
> either.

Thank you for the links.

> A bugged reader firmware (certainly a possibility) would even still work in
> the
> face of a reader filtering VERIFY commands. I think most readers have
> upgradeable firmware. If an attacker has your PC and knows a vulnerability
> in
> the firmware upgrade method, they can just flash their own firmware in your
> smartcard reader. This is a really difficult to solve scenario. I do think
> it
> requires a rather capable attacker.

Again, I know of no easy way to discover the "flashability" of a
reader in advance of a purchase. No-one has collated this information
for popular readers, as far as I'm aware.

Readers really ought to require physical access (e.g. by means of a
jumper pin that would switch between normal functionality with
flashing disabled in order to be re-flashed.

Best regards,

Sam


From hans at guardianproject.info  Thu Mar 19 15:27:21 2015
From: hans at guardianproject.info (Hans-Christoph Steiner)
Date: Thu, 19 Mar 2015 10:27:21 -0400
Subject: Article in Forbes.
In-Reply-To: <550879B5.5010108@openmailbox.org>
References: <550879B5.5010108@openmailbox.org>
Message-ID: <550ADCC9.50301@guardianproject.info>


Sounds like you should report it directly to GPGTools.org.  I'm sure they have
a bug tracker or mailing address somewhere.

Have you seen any technical details on this attack?  Its hard to tell exactly
what's happening from that article.

.hc

Eric F:
> Perhaps not directly gnupg related, more OS X related. But, with both
> GPGtools an GnuPG for OS X I'll post it here... (and there was this OS X
> sec. discussion the other week) :)
> 
> It's seem like ?Gatekeeper? is only using http if I read it correctly.
> 
> Ex-NSA Researcher Finds Sneaky Way Past Apple Mac's Gatekeeper
> http://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2015/03/17/apple-mac-gatekeeper-bypass-exacerbated-by-unencrypted-av-downloads/
> 
> ?He found around 150 on his own machine, including hugely popular
> software like Microsoft Word and Excel, Apple?s own iCloud Photos and
> Dropbox. The list also included Apple?s developer tool *XCODE and email
> encryption key management software GPG Keychain, both of which he abused
> in his proof of concept attacks*.?
> 
> 
> I have no idea how this works, but one question that came in mind was if
> a hijacked ?GPG Keychain? on a Mac computer could form a threat to gpg
> on other platforms?
> 
> Anyway, interesting reading. Just wanted to share.
> 
> /Eric
> 
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
> 

-- 
PGP fingerprint: 5E61 C878 0F86 295C E17D  8677 9F0F E587 374B BE81
https://pgp.mit.edu/pks/lookup?op=vindex&search=0x9F0FE587374BBE81


From patrick-mailinglists at whonix.org  Thu Mar 19 18:39:07 2015
From: patrick-mailinglists at whonix.org (Patrick Schleizer)
Date: Thu, 19 Mar 2015 17:39:07 +0000
Subject: --verify --status-fd separator for multiple signatures?
Message-ID: <550B09BB.8090903@whonix.org>

Hi,

when using --verify combined with --status-fd [or --status-file], how
can one notice in scripts, that processing the one signature is done and
that further status-fd messages belong to the next message?

I mean, sometimes it shows SIG_ID, but not in case of ERRSIG.

So is there some line / separator that can be reliably used?

Cheers,
Patrick


From wk at gnupg.org  Thu Mar 19 20:27:38 2015
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Thu, 19 Mar 2015 20:27:38 +0100
Subject: --verify --status-fd separator for multiple signatures?
In-Reply-To: <550B09BB.8090903@whonix.org> (Patrick Schleizer's message of
 "Thu, 19 Mar 2015 17:39:07 +0000")
References: <550B09BB.8090903@whonix.org>
Message-ID: <87twxgvlcl.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Thu, 19 Mar 2015 18:39, patrick-mailinglists at whonix.org said:

> when using --verify combined with --status-fd [or --status-file], how
> can one notice in scripts, that processing the one signature is done and
> that further status-fd messages belong to the next message?

That is unfortunately a bit complicated due to different behaviour in
gpgsm and gpg.  I suggest to do what we do in gpgme/src/verify.c .  Of
course if would be useful to make sure that NEWSIG is also emitted by
gpg but you also need to take care of older gpg versions.

I assume adding NEWSIG to gpg has simply be forgotten.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner


-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From dougb at dougbarton.email  Thu Mar 19 20:32:00 2015
From: dougb at dougbarton.email (Doug Barton)
Date: Thu, 19 Mar 2015 12:32:00 -0700
Subject: --verify --status-fd separator for multiple signatures?
In-Reply-To: <550B09BB.8090903@whonix.org>
References: <550B09BB.8090903@whonix.org>
Message-ID: <550B2430.2020505@dougbarton.email>

On 3/19/15 10:39 AM, Patrick Schleizer wrote:
> Hi,
>
> when using --verify combined with --status-fd [or --status-file], how
> can one notice in scripts, that processing the one signature is done and
> that further status-fd messages belong to the next message?

You are using --with-colons, right?


-- 
I am conducting an experiment in the efficacy of PGP/MIME signatures. 
This message should be signed. If it is not, or the signature does not 
validate, please let me know how you received this message (direct, or 
to a list) and the mail software you use. Thanks!

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From kloecker at kde.org  Thu Mar 19 23:32:22 2015
From: kloecker at kde.org (Ingo =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Kl=F6cker?=)
Date: Thu, 19 Mar 2015 23:32:22 +0100
Subject: New "Everyman's software" from CeBIT in Germany
In-Reply-To: <550A863B.9060600@thomasruddy.org>
References: <550A863B.9060600@thomasruddy.org>
Message-ID: <2372514.US1guNcxe2@collossus.ingo-kloecker.de>

On Thursday 19 March 2015 09:18:03 Thomas F. Ruddy wrote:
> Dear all,
> 
> I'd be interested in hearing Werner Koch's take on this recent
> innovation. Werner, you speak German:
> 
> A new "Everyman's software" featuring certification, key servers,
> currently Windows only (Linux planned),
> 
> https://www.sit.fraunhofer.de/de/volksverschluesselung/
> 
> Said to be Open Source in this news-story,
> 
> http://www.nzz.ch/mehr/digital/cebit-2015-fraunhofer-volksverschluesselung-1
> .18505017

Both links do not provide technical details. They talk about two things 
provided by their solution: A central PKI and some end-user-friendly software 
for certificate creation which automagically adds the certificate to the 
user's software (email client, browser, other software).

I don't see any indication for a new crypto-standard. So their solution will 
either uses S/MIME or OpenPGP. I suspect it will be S/MIME because more 
software supports S/MIME out-of-the-box. ... I guessed correctly. It's based 
on S/MIME: http://www.golem.de/news/projekt-volksverschluesselung-fraunhofer-institut-vereinfacht-s-mime-einrichtung-1503-113011.html

Moreover, at first one will have to use the eID feature of the new German 
personal identification card for requesting the certification of one's 
certificate.

https://www.sit.fraunhofer.de/de/news/aktuelles/presse/details/news-article/verschluesselung-fuer-alle/ (also in German)


Another crypto project is shown at CeBIT. It's also based on the eID feature.

Governikus (developed for the German BSI) offers web application for 
certifying one's OpenPGP key with one's personal identification card. So it's 
basically key certification by the German government (for German citizen's 
only).
https://www.governikus.com/de/pressemitteilungen#entry_6938266


Both services appear to be restricted to Germany.


Regards,
Ingo
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From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net  Thu Mar 19 23:42:31 2015
From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA)
Date: Thu, 19 Mar 2015 22:42:31 +0000
Subject: Making the case for smart cards for the average user
In-Reply-To: <CANyOob084py4p7corVNONTQO=WHhTBViUoFc8teRTHSHX+MHHw@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAAocvpvEqs-tQ-rEki8AX3spdSt8P5TG0+KoXVtufW0Azy9wDQ@mail.gmail.com>
 <277590791.20150317005551@my_localhost>
 <87lhivpls4.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
 <137410941.20150317193149@my_localhost>
 <CANyOob084py4p7corVNONTQO=WHhTBViUoFc8teRTHSHX+MHHw@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <67233080.20150319224231@my_localhost>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512



On Wednesday 18 March 2015 at 1:35:46 AM, in
<mid:CANyOob084py4p7corVNONTQO=WHhTBViUoFc8teRTHSHX+MHHw at mail.gmail.com>,
Brian Minton wrote:


> I thought keyservers strip all punctuation. So
> <foo at example.com> becomes foo example com.

Keyservers seem to do that.

GnuPG locating keys on the local keyring does not.

A user with GnuPG configured to automatically fetch keys from a
keyserver when not found locally might end up needlessly
re-downloading a correspondent's key each time they encrypted to (or
verified a signature from) <foo at example.com>. But they would be
stuffed when the email client was trying to match their own key to
sign a message.


- --
Best regards

MFPA                  <mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net>

During an eruption - move away from the volcano - not towards it
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From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net  Fri Mar 20 01:58:25 2015
From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA)
Date: Fri, 20 Mar 2015 00:58:25 +0000
Subject: Email-only UIDs and verification (was: Making the case for smart
 cards for the average user)
In-Reply-To: <16C07A2D-8B6D-48E5-9BC3-B6AE5D0935D9@gmail.com>
References: <CAAocvpvEqs-tQ-rEki8AX3spdSt8P5TG0+KoXVtufW0Azy9wDQ@mail.gmail.com>
 <277590791.20150317005551@my_localhost>
 <16C07A2D-8B6D-48E5-9BC3-B6AE5D0935D9@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <842480936.20150320005825@my_localhost>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512



On Wednesday 18 March 2015 at 6:18:57 PM, in
<mid:16C07A2D-8B6D-48E5-9BC3-B6AE5D0935D9 at gmail.com>, Jose Castillo
wrote:


> On Mar 16, 2015, at 8:55 PM, MFPA
> <2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net> wrote:

MFPA>> No angle brackets around the email address means no key found.

JC> Good point, I?ll make that change.

Appreciated.

As you probably read in Daniel Kahn Gilmore's message, he has lodged a
bug report/feature request for GnuPG.


JC> As a sidenote, I
> notice that when I?m generating a key interactively, I
> get an error message of 'Name must be at least 5
> characters long? when I try to make an email-only UID.
> It works in batch mode, and obviously with the
> allow-freeform-uid option, but just thought it was
> interesting to point out. Someone attempting to make
> such a UID in the interactive mode might be forgiven
> for putting their email address in the ?name? field as
> a workaround.

They would be scolded at the next prompt, then probably either give
up, or go back and enter a name, or enter their email address a second
time.

I would imagine the "average user" you are aiming at would use your
GUI to create keys. A more advanced user might read your
documentation, so you could tell them which options to use if they
wanted to create a key matching your bespoke user-id standard through
the normal GnuPG text interface.




MFPA>> Thinking about it, you don't need the user to click a
>> link or to reply to an email at all.

> This is a very good point, and I can see making this
> change.

I would think it would make it easier to code: you don't have to
bother tracking the verication link/email.



> This was in reference to the PGP global directory?s
> verification check. Having never used it I?m curious
> why the validity period is only two weeks.

Lots of activation or verification links sent out by email have a
short validity period. People are used to that.

PGP Global Directory's FAQ
<https://keyserver.pgp.com/vkd/VKDHelpPGPCom.html> says:-

    What if I don't respond to the renewal message?

    The PGP Global Directory will give you two weeks to respond. If
    you don't respond, your key will be removed from the directory, as
    it is assumed you no longer have the key or are no longer using
    the email address in the user ID of the key.




> Does the
> user have to re-verify their email address every two
> weeks? That seems excessive.

It would be.(-;

The user has two weeks to react to the verification email. Once the
user has verified the email address, the verification is good for six
months. Then they get a renewal verification email, and so on.

I have no idea why the PGP GD verification signatures last only two
weeks instead of six months. Their FAQ is silent on the matter.



MFPA>> Finally, if the person at the other end is able to
>> decrypt my message and reply to me, then the key and
>> the email address are controlled by the same person.
>> What assurance does the verification service add?

> In the case of establishing communication with someone
> you haven?t yet met, it gives you an assurance that a
> third party has verified that they were in control of
> the address on a given date within the last year.

The person at the other end decrypting my message and replying to me
shows that the key and the corresponding email address are both
controlled by the same person today (Person A), verified by me.

Additional information: the verification service verified that the key
and the email address were both controlled by the same person (Person
B)on a given verification date within the last year.

I am opening communication with the Person A at that address today. I
neither know nor care if Person B, who was there within the last year,
is the same person as person A. So I cannot think of a use for the
additional information. (I'm not saying there is no use, merely that I
can't see one.)



> If I
> query your email address and find four keys, I don?t
> know what to do;

Good question.

1. You could ask me, in an email encrypted to all four keys.

2. You could ask me, in up to four individually-encrypted emails. May
not need all four if I answer before you sent them all.

3. Out-of-bound communication, such as phone.

4. Look for clues in my email signature block or headers.



> but if one of them is trusted by the
> email verification service, which I trust, then there?s
> only one valid key.

The email verification service's signature, which warrants that the
key and email address were under common control on a specific date in
the past year. That is a reasonable first guess out of the four keys,
and makes that one key "valid" in accordance with your bespoke Signet
simplified validity scheme.




- --
Best regards

MFPA                  <mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net>

Don't anthropomorphize computers - they hate it
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From david at gbenet.com  Fri Mar 20 08:58:42 2015
From: david at gbenet.com (david at gbenet.com)
Date: Fri, 20 Mar 2015 07:58:42 +0000
Subject: New "Everyman's software" from CeBIT in Germany
In-Reply-To: <2372514.US1guNcxe2@collossus.ingo-kloecker.de>
References: <550A863B.9060600@thomasruddy.org>
 <2372514.US1guNcxe2@collossus.ingo-kloecker.de>
Message-ID: <550BD332.5030604@gbenet.com>

On 19/03/15 22:32, Ingo Kl?cker wrote:
> On Thursday 19 March 2015 09:18:03 Thomas F. Ruddy wrote:
>> Dear all,
>>
>> I'd be interested in hearing Werner Koch's take on this recent
>> innovation. Werner, you speak German:
>>
>> A new "Everyman's software" featuring certification, key servers,
>> currently Windows only (Linux planned),
>>
>> https://www.sit.fraunhofer.de/de/volksverschluesselung/
>>
>> Said to be Open Source in this news-story,
>>
>> http://www.nzz.ch/mehr/digital/cebit-2015-fraunhofer-volksverschluesselung-1
>> .18505017
> 
> Both links do not provide technical details. They talk about two things 
> provided by their solution: A central PKI and some end-user-friendly software 
> for certificate creation which automagically adds the certificate to the 
> user's software (email client, browser, other software).
> 
> I don't see any indication for a new crypto-standard. So their solution will 
> either uses S/MIME or OpenPGP. I suspect it will be S/MIME because more 
> software supports S/MIME out-of-the-box. ... I guessed correctly. It's based 
> on S/MIME: http://www.golem.de/news/projekt-volksverschluesselung-fraunhofer-institut-vereinfacht-s-mime-einrichtung-1503-113011.html
> 
> Moreover, at first one will have to use the eID feature of the new German 
> personal identification card for requesting the certification of one's 
> certificate.
> 
> https://www.sit.fraunhofer.de/de/news/aktuelles/presse/details/news-article/verschluesselung-fuer-alle/ (also in German)
> 
> 
> Another crypto project is shown at CeBIT. It's also based on the eID feature.
> 
> Governikus (developed for the German BSI) offers web application for 
> certifying one's OpenPGP key with one's personal identification card. So it's 
> basically key certification by the German government (for German citizen's 
> only).
> https://www.governikus.com/de/pressemitteilungen#entry_6938266
> 
> 
> Both services appear to be restricted to Germany.
> 
> 
> Regards,
> Ingo
> 
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
> 
Well if it's Windoz - then Microsoft are lurking in the woodwork - and that smells like very
bad news. Microsoft are never into free as in a free beer - Microsoft are into tying people
in to their software. End-user friendly software? Yeah right - whatever Microsoft does -
it's primary objective is to make more money - and does not give a shit about end-user
security. It's just another ploy to get users to give up Linux - or move to a Linux that
they control - and we have all seen how they play tricks over the years.

We have the whole house for free - that may still erk those that do not support free
software - and free encryption.

David


-- 
?See the sanity of the man! No gods, no angels, no demons, no body. Nothing of the
kind.Stern, sane,every brain-cell perfect and complete even at the moment of death. No
delusion.? https://linuxcounter.net/user/512854.html - http://gbenet.com

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From patrick-mailinglists at whonix.org  Fri Mar 20 10:20:15 2015
From: patrick-mailinglists at whonix.org (Patrick Schleizer)
Date: Fri, 20 Mar 2015 09:20:15 +0000
Subject: --verify --status-fd separator for multiple signatures?
In-Reply-To: <550B2430.2020505@dougbarton.email>
References: <550B09BB.8090903@whonix.org> <550B2430.2020505@dougbarton.email>
Message-ID: <550BE64F.9060509@whonix.org>

Doug Barton:
> On 3/19/15 10:39 AM, Patrick Schleizer wrote:
>> Hi,
>>
>> when using --verify combined with --status-fd [or --status-file], how
>> can one notice in scripts, that processing the one signature is done and
>> that further status-fd messages belong to the next message?
> 
> You are using --with-colons, right?

No. Using --status-file. --with-colons does not seem to affect that.

Cheers,
Patrick



From robertc at broadcom.com  Fri Mar 20 18:43:27 2015
From: robertc at broadcom.com (Bob (Robert) Cavanaugh)
Date: Fri, 20 Mar 2015 17:43:27 +0000
Subject: Email-only UIDs and verification (was: Making the case for
 smart cards for the average user)
In-Reply-To: <842480936.20150320005825@my_localhost>
References: <CAAocvpvEqs-tQ-rEki8AX3spdSt8P5TG0+KoXVtufW0Azy9wDQ@mail.gmail.com>
 <277590791.20150317005551@my_localhost>
 <16C07A2D-8B6D-48E5-9BC3-B6AE5D0935D9@gmail.com>
 <842480936.20150320005825@my_localhost>
Message-ID: <8F0B09FC6339FA439524099BFCABC11F2D3CD3D6@IRVEXCHMB11.corp.ad.broadcom.com>

Hi,
One thought to add to the mix: Phishng attacks by having unknowledgable users "click on this link" are pretty successful. Doesn't this proposal open a  new threat vector?

Thanks,
 
Bob Cavanaugh


> -----Original Message-----
> From: Gnupg-users [mailto:gnupg-users-
> bounces+robertc=broadcom.com at gnupg.org] On Behalf Of MFPA
> Sent: Thursday, March 19, 2015 5:58 PM
> To: Jose Castillo on GnuPG-Users
> Subject: Re: Email-only UIDs and verification (was: Making the case for smart
> cards for the average user)
> 
> * PGP Signed by an unknown key
> 
> 
> 
> On Wednesday 18 March 2015 at 6:18:57 PM, in <mid:16C07A2D-8B6D-48E5-
> 9BC3-B6AE5D0935D9 at gmail.com>, Jose Castillo
> wrote:
> 
> 
> > On Mar 16, 2015, at 8:55 PM, MFPA
> > <2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net> wrote:
> 
> MFPA>> No angle brackets around the email address means no key found.
> 
> JC> Good point, I?ll make that change.
> 
> Appreciated.
> 
> As you probably read in Daniel Kahn Gilmore's message, he has lodged a bug
> report/feature request for GnuPG.
> 
> 
> JC> As a sidenote, I
> > notice that when I?m generating a key interactively, I get an error
> > message of 'Name must be at least 5 characters long? when I try to
> > make an email-only UID.
> > It works in batch mode, and obviously with the allow-freeform-uid
> > option, but just thought it was interesting to point out. Someone
> > attempting to make such a UID in the interactive mode might be
> > forgiven for putting their email address in the ?name? field as a
> > workaround.
> 
> They would be scolded at the next prompt, then probably either give up, or
> go back and enter a name, or enter their email address a second time.
> 
> I would imagine the "average user" you are aiming at would use your GUI to
> create keys. A more advanced user might read your documentation, so you
> could tell them which options to use if they wanted to create a key matching
> your bespoke user-id standard through the normal GnuPG text interface.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> MFPA>> Thinking about it, you don't need the user to click a
> >> link or to reply to an email at all.
> 
> > This is a very good point, and I can see making this change.
> 
> I would think it would make it easier to code: you don't have to bother
> tracking the verication link/email.
> 
> 
> 
> > This was in reference to the PGP global directory?s verification
> > check. Having never used it I?m curious why the validity period is
> > only two weeks.
> 
> Lots of activation or verification links sent out by email have a short validity
> period. People are used to that.
> 
> PGP Global Directory's FAQ
> <https://keyserver.pgp.com/vkd/VKDHelpPGPCom.html> says:-
> 
>     What if I don't respond to the renewal message?
> 
>     The PGP Global Directory will give you two weeks to respond. If
>     you don't respond, your key will be removed from the directory, as
>     it is assumed you no longer have the key or are no longer using
>     the email address in the user ID of the key.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> > Does the
> > user have to re-verify their email address every two weeks? That seems
> > excessive.
> 
> It would be.(-;
> 
> The user has two weeks to react to the verification email. Once the user has
> verified the email address, the verification is good for six months. Then they
> get a renewal verification email, and so on.
> 
> I have no idea why the PGP GD verification signatures last only two weeks
> instead of six months. Their FAQ is silent on the matter.
> 
> 
> 
> MFPA>> Finally, if the person at the other end is able to
> >> decrypt my message and reply to me, then the key and the email
> >> address are controlled by the same person.
> >> What assurance does the verification service add?
> 
> > In the case of establishing communication with someone you haven?t yet
> > met, it gives you an assurance that a third party has verified that
> > they were in control of the address on a given date within the last
> > year.
> 
> The person at the other end decrypting my message and replying to me
> shows that the key and the corresponding email address are both controlled
> by the same person today (Person A), verified by me.
> 
> Additional information: the verification service verified that the key and the
> email address were both controlled by the same person (Person B)on a given
> verification date within the last year.
> 
> I am opening communication with the Person A at that address today. I
> neither know nor care if Person B, who was there within the last year, is the
> same person as person A. So I cannot think of a use for the additional
> information. (I'm not saying there is no use, merely that I can't see one.)
> 
> 
> 
> > If I
> > query your email address and find four keys, I don?t know what to do;
> 
> Good question.
> 
> 1. You could ask me, in an email encrypted to all four keys.
> 
> 2. You could ask me, in up to four individually-encrypted emails. May not
> need all four if I answer before you sent them all.
> 
> 3. Out-of-bound communication, such as phone.
> 
> 4. Look for clues in my email signature block or headers.
> 
> 
> 
> > but if one of them is trusted by the
> > email verification service, which I trust, then there?s only one valid
> > key.
> 
> The email verification service's signature, which warrants that the key and
> email address were under common control on a specific date in the past
> year. That is a reasonable first guess out of the four keys, and makes that
> one key "valid" in accordance with your bespoke Signet simplified validity
> scheme.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> --
> Best regards
> 
> MFPA                  <mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net>
> 
> Don't anthropomorphize computers - they hate it
> 
> * Unknown Key
> * 0x1AF778E4(L)
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

From patrick-mailinglists at whonix.org  Fri Mar 20 19:41:10 2015
From: patrick-mailinglists at whonix.org (Patrick Schleizer)
Date: Fri, 20 Mar 2015 18:41:10 +0000
Subject: --verify --status-fd separator for multiple signatures?
In-Reply-To: <87twxgvlcl.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <550B09BB.8090903@whonix.org> <87twxgvlcl.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <550C69C6.1020004@whonix.org>

Werner Koch:
> On Thu, 19 Mar 2015 18:39, patrick-mailinglists at whonix.org said:
> 
>> when using --verify combined with --status-fd [or --status-file], how
>> can one notice in scripts, that processing the one signature is done and
>> that further status-fd messages belong to the next message?
> 
> That is unfortunately a bit complicated due to different behaviour in
> gpgsm and gpg.  I suggest to do what we do in gpgme/src/verify.c .  Of
> course if would be useful to make sure that NEWSIG is also emitted by
> gpg but you also need to take care of older gpg versions.
> 
> I assume adding NEWSIG to gpg has simply be forgotten.

Well, I don't speak C, so I can't make head or tail of "what we do in
gpgme/src/verify.c".

Maybe let's put it this way. If there is no guarantee to get a NEWSIG or
other separator... Is there a limited combination of start and end keywords?

What I mean... Here is an example...

start: [GNUPG:] ERRSIG [...]
end__: [GNUPG:] NODATA [...]

start: [GNUPG:] SIG_ID [...]
end__: [GNUPG:] TRUST_[...]

start: [GNUPG:] ERRSIG [...]
end__: [GNUPG:] NO_PUBKEY [...]

Is there a complete list of all possible start/end keyword combinations?

Cheers,
Patrick



From lists at theflorys.org  Fri Mar 20 22:29:57 2015
From: lists at theflorys.org (David)
Date: Fri, 20 Mar 2015 17:29:57 -0400
Subject: Unsupported certificate error
Message-ID: <550C9155.8060701@theflorys.org>

I just installed GnuPG 2.0.27 on my Ubuntu 14.10 laptop.  I am getting
this error from gpa:

The GPGME library returned an unexpected
error at keytable.c:150. The error was:

    Unsupported certificate

This is either an installation problem or a bug in GPA.
GPA will now try to recover from this error.

I have researched it a bit and it seems to either be due to a MD5
certificate or a conflict between gnome-agent and the gpa-agent.

Has anyone seen this and solved it?


From muelli at cryptobitch.de  Thu Mar 19 11:19:45 2015
From: muelli at cryptobitch.de (Tobias Mueller)
Date: Thu, 19 Mar 2015 11:19:45 +0100
Subject: Defaults
In-Reply-To: <87k2ye20cl.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <5508842F.1010101@sixdemonbag.org>
 <87k2ye20cl.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <20150319101944.GS8014@cryptobitch.de>

On Wed, Mar 18, 2015 at 09:09:30AM +0100, Werner Koch wrote:
> Create a new key:
> 
>   $ gpg --no-options --quick-gen-key 'test key <foo at example.org>'
>   About to create a key for:
>       "test key <foo at example.org>"
>   
>   Continue? (Y/n) y
>   public and secret key created and signed.
>   
>   pub   rsa2048/50C4476F 2015-03-18
>         Key fingerprint = 11E9 91C2 36E0 21A6 1E35  A682 68CC E4C2 50C4 476F
>   uid       [ultimate] test key <foo at example.org>
>   sub   rsa2048/807D0FF4 2015-03-18
Is there anything in this listing that would allow me to quickly copy and paste
(e.g. double click and middle click) in order to further work with the key,
e.g. edit or encrypt to?
The short key id would probably do, but the "rsa2048/" prefix prevents me from simply double clicking it.
The fingerprint would probably be better to identify the key, but, similarly,
the spaces prevent me from selecting it easily.

>   
> What are the preferences:  
>   
>   $ gpg --no-options --edit-key 50C4476F
                                  ^^^^^^^^
>   gpg (GnuPG) 2.1.3-beta26; Copyright (C) 2015 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
>   Secret key is available.
>   
>   pub  rsa2048/50C4476F
                 ^^^^^^^^

I thought short keyids are dangerous and should not be used,
cf. <https://evil32.com/>.  If that's the case then it might be a good
idea to fade them out as much as possible.

Cheers,
  Tobi


From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net  Sat Mar 21 12:49:13 2015
From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA)
Date: Sat, 21 Mar 2015 11:49:13 +0000
Subject: Defaults
In-Reply-To: <20150319101944.GS8014@cryptobitch.de>
References: <5508842F.1010101@sixdemonbag.org>
 <87k2ye20cl.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <20150319101944.GS8014@cryptobitch.de>
Message-ID: <447371844.20150321114913@my_localhost>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512



On Thursday 19 March 2015 at 10:19:45 AM, in
<mid:20150319101944.GS8014 at cryptobitch.de>, Tobias Mueller wrote:


> I thought short keyids are dangerous and should not be
> used, cf. <https://evil32.com/>.  If that's the case
> then it might be a good idea to fade them out as much
> as possible.

You mean make "LONG" (or "0xLONG") the default for --keyid-format?




- --
Best regards

MFPA                  <mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net>

Ballerinas are always on their toes.  We need taller ballerinas!
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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=
=6j/y
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----



From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net  Sat Mar 21 13:06:20 2015
From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA)
Date: Sat, 21 Mar 2015 12:06:20 +0000
Subject: Defaults
In-Reply-To: <5508C822.20103@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <5508842F.1010101@sixdemonbag.org> <5508B076.5060607@incenp.org>
 <5508C822.20103@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <946086348.20150321120620@my_localhost>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512



On Wednesday 18 March 2015 at 12:34:42 AM, in
<mid:5508C822.20103 at sixdemonbag.org>, Robert J. Hansen wrote:



> Yes.  My list was comprehensive ("what the new set
> should be"), not differential ("what needs changing").
> :)

Whilst I realise you were specifically concentrating on defaults for
new key generation, perhaps a fully comprehensive discussion of GnuPG
defaults would be useful. This could be partly informed by people
looking through their GnuPG.conf files at the options they have chosen
to to change.



- --
Best regards

MFPA                  <mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net>

Dreams come true on this side of the Rainbow too!
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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=
=G7jc
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----



From wk at gnupg.org  Sat Mar 21 14:03:48 2015
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Sat, 21 Mar 2015 14:03:48 +0100
Subject: Defaults
In-Reply-To: <20150319101944.GS8014@cryptobitch.de> (Tobias Mueller's message
 of "Thu, 19 Mar 2015 11:19:45 +0100")
References: <5508842F.1010101@sixdemonbag.org>
 <87k2ye20cl.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <20150319101944.GS8014@cryptobitch.de>
Message-ID: <878ueqsdsb.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Thu, 19 Mar 2015 11:19, muelli at cryptobitch.de said:

> Is there anything in this listing that would allow me to quickly copy and paste
> (e.g. double click and middle click) in order to further work with the key,
> e.g. edit or encrypt to?

Sorry, I do not understand you.  This is a command line interface and
not a point an click thingie

> The fingerprint would probably be better to identify the key, but, similarly,
> the spaces prevent me from selecting it easily.

Use a GUI tool.

> I thought short keyids are dangerous and should not be used,

They are not more dangerous than long fingerprints.  It depends on what
you want to do.  In my test setting using the short key id is perfectly
okay.  For checking the validity of the key you need to use the
fingerprint and not some keyid or mail address.


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From wk at gnupg.org  Sat Mar 21 14:18:17 2015
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Sat, 21 Mar 2015 14:18:17 +0100
Subject: --verify --status-fd separator for multiple signatures?
In-Reply-To: <550C69C6.1020004@whonix.org> (Patrick Schleizer's message of
 "Fri, 20 Mar 2015 18:41:10 +0000")
References: <550B09BB.8090903@whonix.org> <87twxgvlcl.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <550C69C6.1020004@whonix.org>
Message-ID: <874mpesd46.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Fri, 20 Mar 2015 19:41, patrick-mailinglists at whonix.org said:

> Well, I don't speak C, so I can't make head or tail of "what we do in
> gpgme/src/verify.c".

You should still be able to follow the control flow.  That is not
different from any pseudo code.

> Is there a complete list of all possible start/end keyword combinations?

As, I said, checkout gpgme: 

  switch (code)
    {
    case GPGME_STATUS_NEWSIG:
      if (sig)
        calc_sig_summary (sig);

NEWSIG has been seen: Finalize the output for the current signature if any.

      err = prepare_new_sig (opd);

      opd->only_newsig_seen = 1;

Get ready for a new signature.  That is the helpful feature of NEWSIG.
Note that there is no guarantee that a signature will follow: I maybe
garbled or remove and gpg won't get to the actual verification.

    case GPGME_STATUS_GOODSIG:
    case GPGME_STATUS_EXPSIG:
    case GPGME_STATUS_EXPKEYSIG:
    case GPGME_STATUS_BADSIG:
    case GPGME_STATUS_ERRSIG:
    case GPGME_STATUS_REVKEYSIG:
      if (sig && !opd->did_prepare_new_sig)
	calc_sig_summary (sig);

If we have a signature and we are not yet preparing for a new signature
(i.e. have not called prepare_new-sig): Finalize the output for the
current signature

      opd->only_newsig_seen = 0;

Clear flag for NEWSIG seen.

      return parse_new_sig (opd, code, args, ctx->protocol);

Do something with the signature.  This fucntion calls prepare_new_sig if
not yet done.

    case GPGME_STATUS_VALIDSIG:
      opd->only_newsig_seen = 0;
      return sig ? parse_valid_sig (sig, args, ctx->protocol)
	: trace_gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ENGINE);

VALIDSIG is the modern version of GOODSIG.  Take care of it.


    case GPGME_STATUS_NODATA:
      opd->only_newsig_seen = 0;

Forget about NEWSIG.  The code in GPGME requires this here and for
several other status messages.

    case GPGME_STATUS_EOF:
      if (sig && !opd->did_prepare_new_sig)
	calc_sig_summary (sig);
      if (opd->only_newsig_seen && sig)
        {
          gpgme_signature_t sig2;
          /* The last signature has no valid information - remove it
             from the list. */

On EOF finalize the last signature.  If a NEWSIG has neen seen remove
the prepared information.

Proper verification is a bit complicate if you need to do this in the
most general way.  You can get away much easier in many cases.  For
example VALIDSIG gives you all the information about correctly verified
signatures.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From dkg at fifthhorseman.net  Fri Mar 20 19:47:49 2015
From: dkg at fifthhorseman.net (Daniel Kahn Gillmor)
Date: Fri, 20 Mar 2015 14:47:49 -0400
Subject: Email-only UIDs and verification (was: Making the case for smart
 cards for the average user)
In-Reply-To: <8F0B09FC6339FA439524099BFCABC11F2D3CD3D6@IRVEXCHMB11.corp.ad.broadcom.com>
References: <CAAocvpvEqs-tQ-rEki8AX3spdSt8P5TG0+KoXVtufW0Azy9wDQ@mail.gmail.com>
 <277590791.20150317005551@my_localhost>
 <16C07A2D-8B6D-48E5-9BC3-B6AE5D0935D9@gmail.com>
 <842480936.20150320005825@my_localhost>
 <8F0B09FC6339FA439524099BFCABC11F2D3CD3D6@IRVEXCHMB11.corp.ad.broadcom.com>
Message-ID: <87pp83eca2.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>

On Fri 2015-03-20 13:43:27 -0400, Bob (Robert) Cavanaugh wrote:
> One thought to add to the mix: Phishng attacks by having
> unknowledgable users "click on this link" are pretty
> successful. Doesn't this proposal open a new threat vector?

There are a lot of proposals in this thread, and you didn't trim the
quoted text to isolate just one of them; can you be specific about which
one you're talking about?

I think you're talking about the proposal to have a verification service
send regular e-mails asking users to follow up on them.

If the followup is just "click this link" then i agree it's probably
encouraging bad habits.  What if the suggested followup was an e-mail
reply?  What if we require the verifier to sign its outbound messages,
and tell users "don't do this unless the message is signed by the
verifier"?

I'm still not sure how useful this is in the big picture -- is such a
verifier only for first-contact, or is it supposed to be useful
longer-term as well?

        --dkg


From mailing-lists at asatiifm.net  Sat Mar 21 16:23:33 2015
From: mailing-lists at asatiifm.net (=?windows-1252?Q?Ville_M=E4=E4tt=E4?=)
Date: Sat, 21 Mar 2015 17:23:33 +0200
Subject: Email-only UIDs and verification
In-Reply-To: <87pp83eca2.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
References: <CAAocvpvEqs-tQ-rEki8AX3spdSt8P5TG0+KoXVtufW0Azy9wDQ@mail.gmail.com>
 <277590791.20150317005551@my_localhost>
 <16C07A2D-8B6D-48E5-9BC3-B6AE5D0935D9@gmail.com>
 <842480936.20150320005825@my_localhost>
 <8F0B09FC6339FA439524099BFCABC11F2D3CD3D6@IRVEXCHMB11.corp.ad.broadcom.com>
 <87pp83eca2.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
Message-ID: <550D8CF5.6030800@asatiifm.net>

On 20.03.15 20:47, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> On Fri 2015-03-20 13:43:27 -0400, Bob (Robert) Cavanaugh wrote:
>> > One thought to add to the mix: Phishng attacks by having
>> > unknowledgable users "click on this link" are pretty
>> > successful. Doesn't this proposal open a new threat vector?

Yeah? I don't really see much of a problem as proposed by Bob. Any
verification emails for any purpose should always be related to an
action the user did very recently. I.e. they visited a site or used an
application, whatever the route and method but they should already /be
expecting an email verification/.

> If the followup is just "click this link" then i agree it's probably
> encouraging bad habits.

Any verification should certainly be worded better, yes :).

> What if the suggested followup was an e-mail
> reply?  What if we require the verifier to sign its outbound messages,
> and tell users "don't do this unless the message is signed by the
> verifier"?

Good ideas.

-- 
Ville

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From jose.castillo at gmail.com  Sat Mar 21 17:55:40 2015
From: jose.castillo at gmail.com (Jose Castillo)
Date: Sat, 21 Mar 2015 12:55:40 -0400
Subject: Email-only UIDs and verification (was: Making the case for smart
 cards for the average user)
In-Reply-To: <87pp83eca2.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
References: <CAAocvpvEqs-tQ-rEki8AX3spdSt8P5TG0+KoXVtufW0Azy9wDQ@mail.gmail.com>
 <277590791.20150317005551@my_localhost>
 <16C07A2D-8B6D-48E5-9BC3-B6AE5D0935D9@gmail.com>
 <842480936.20150320005825@my_localhost>
 <8F0B09FC6339FA439524099BFCABC11F2D3CD3D6@IRVEXCHMB11.corp.ad.broadcom.com>
 <87pp83eca2.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
Message-ID: <B0EBA88F-207A-49CB-B18D-E857CAF38021@gmail.com>

On Mar 20, 2015, at 2:47 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg at fifthhorseman.net> wrote:
> If the followup is just "click this link" then i agree it's probably
> encouraging bad habits.  What if the suggested followup was an e-mail
> reply?  What if we require the verifier to sign its outbound messages,
> and tell users "don't do this unless the message is signed by the
> verifier??

I think MFPA had a good idea earlier in the thread: the first message, the request for a signature on the UID, is signed; whether the from address is spoofed or not, the automated service can?t be sure. What if the automated service went ahead and made the certification anyway, but encrypted it before sending it? At that point only the recipient in the UID field will receive the email, and they?ll only have access to the certification if they?re also in control of the key to decrypt it. There?s no followup required. 

> I'm still not sure how useful this is in the big picture -- is such a
> verifier only for first-contact, or is it supposed to be useful
> longer-term as well?

The thought process here is that when someone generates their identity, it?s not trusted by anyone, and they don?t trust anyone by default. It?s up to them to build the trust landscape themselves, which isn?t a great user experience for the layperson. This proposal is about establishing a minimal viable trust scheme based around persona-level certification of verified email addresses. The user can augment that with their own web of trust as needed. 

Ideally, I?d like to be able to present UI that shows a signature from an untrusted key as an error condition, in much the same way your browser warns you about an untrusted SSL certificate. That?s difficult if you have to establish yourself in a web of trust first. 

-- 

Joey Castillo
www.joeycastillo.com



From mail at angelparrales.com  Sat Mar 21 18:16:08 2015
From: mail at angelparrales.com (Angel Parrales)
Date: Sat, 21 Mar 2015 12:46:08 -0430
Subject: Error Installing gnupg-2.0.27 on Debian Squeeze
Message-ID: <550DA758.1040604@angelparrales.com>

Following instructions included in documentation, is not possible to
complete installation,
Last lines pasted below:

make[3]: Entering directory
`/home/adolfo/Downloads/gnupg-2.0.27/tests/openpgp'
echo '#!/bin/sh' >./gpg_dearmor
echo "../../g10/gpg2 --homedir . --no-options --no-greeting \
             --no-secmem-warning --batch --dearmor" >>./gpg_dearmor
chmod 755 ./gpg_dearmor
./gpg_dearmor > ./pubring.gpg < ./pubring.asc
../../g10/gpg2: error while loading shared libraries: libgcrypt.so.20:
cannot open shared object file: No such file or directory
make[3]: *** [pubring.gpg] Error 127
make[3]: Leaving directory
`/home/adolfo/Downloads/gnupg-2.0.27/tests/openpgp'
make[2]: *** [all-recursive] Error 1
make[2]: Leaving directory `/home/adolfo/Downloads/gnupg-2.0.27/tests'
make[1]: *** [all-recursive] Error 1
make[1]: Leaving directory `/home/adolfo/Downloads/gnupg-2.0.27'
make: *** [all] Error 2

Your help is highly appreciated.

Thanks and Regards,
-- Angel Parrales


From stebe at mailbox.org  Sun Mar 22 16:06:17 2015
From: stebe at mailbox.org (Stephan Beck)
Date: Sun, 22 Mar 2015 16:06:17 +0100
Subject: Error Installing gnupg-2.0.27 on Debian Squeeze
In-Reply-To: <550DA758.1040604@angelparrales.com>
References: <550DA758.1040604@angelparrales.com>
Message-ID: <550EDA69.9050404@mailbox.org>

Hi Angel,

I cannot reproduce the error and I don't know which documentation you exactly
refer to, but using Debian Squeeze (oldstable) you need the gnupg and libgcrypt
oldstable versions that are adequate for you.
I'd use the package manager (apt) for installing it.

Here's what I found (1):
gnupg 2.0.14-2+squeeze2
libgcrypt 1.4.5-2+squeeze1

(1) https://packages.debian.org

Hope that helps

Stephan



Am 21.03.2015 um 18:16 schrieb Angel Parrales:
> Following instructions included in documentation, is not possible to
> complete installation,
> Last lines pasted below:
> 
> make[3]: Entering directory
> `/home/adolfo/Downloads/gnupg-2.0.27/tests/openpgp'
> echo '#!/bin/sh' >./gpg_dearmor
> echo "../../g10/gpg2 --homedir . --no-options --no-greeting \
>              --no-secmem-warning --batch --dearmor" >>./gpg_dearmor
> chmod 755 ./gpg_dearmor
> ./gpg_dearmor > ./pubring.gpg < ./pubring.asc
> ../../g10/gpg2: error while loading shared libraries: libgcrypt.so.20:
> cannot open shared object file: No such file or directory
> make[3]: *** [pubring.gpg] Error 127
> make[3]: Leaving directory
> `/home/adolfo/Downloads/gnupg-2.0.27/tests/openpgp'
> make[2]: *** [all-recursive] Error 1
> make[2]: Leaving directory `/home/adolfo/Downloads/gnupg-2.0.27/tests'
> make[1]: *** [all-recursive] Error 1
> make[1]: Leaving directory `/home/adolfo/Downloads/gnupg-2.0.27'
> make: *** [all] Error 2
> 
> Your help is highly appreciated.
> 
> Thanks and Regards,
> -- Angel Parrales
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
> 




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From dkg at fifthhorseman.net  Sun Mar 22 22:27:51 2015
From: dkg at fifthhorseman.net (Daniel Kahn Gillmor)
Date: Sun, 22 Mar 2015 16:27:51 -0500
Subject: Error Installing gnupg-2.0.27 on Debian Squeeze
In-Reply-To: <550DA758.1040604@angelparrales.com>
References: <550DA758.1040604@angelparrales.com>
Message-ID: <87lhiod8o8.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>

Hi Angel--

On Sat 2015-03-21 12:16:08 -0500, Angel Parrales wrote:
> Following instructions included in documentation, is not possible to
> complete installation,
> Last lines pasted below:
>
> make[3]: Entering directory
> `/home/adolfo/Downloads/gnupg-2.0.27/tests/openpgp'
> echo '#!/bin/sh' >./gpg_dearmor
> echo "../../g10/gpg2 --homedir . --no-options --no-greeting \
>              --no-secmem-warning --batch --dearmor" >>./gpg_dearmor
> chmod 755 ./gpg_dearmor
> ./gpg_dearmor > ./pubring.gpg < ./pubring.asc
> ../../g10/gpg2: error while loading shared libraries: libgcrypt.so.20:
> cannot open shared object file: No such file or directory
> make[3]: *** [pubring.gpg] Error 127
> make[3]: Leaving directory
> `/home/adolfo/Downloads/gnupg-2.0.27/tests/openpgp'
> make[2]: *** [all-recursive] Error 1
> make[2]: Leaving directory `/home/adolfo/Downloads/gnupg-2.0.27/tests'
> make[1]: *** [all-recursive] Error 1
> make[1]: Leaving directory `/home/adolfo/Downloads/gnupg-2.0.27'
> make: *** [all] Error 2

it's looking for libgcrypt20, which is not available in squeeze.  Maybe
you've tried to build it pointing at the wrong libgcrypt?  squeeze
only has libgcrypt11, version 1.4.5.

what is the output of:

  dpkg -l 'libgcrypt*

It should show you a -dev package and a regular non-dev package as well,
most likely of libgcrypt11.

You'll either need to backport a new libgcrypt, or to point the compiler
(during ./configure time?)  toward the right libgcrypt-dev variant.

        --dkg


From venture37 at gmail.com  Mon Mar 23 06:31:00 2015
From: venture37 at gmail.com (Sevan / Venture37)
Date: Mon, 23 Mar 2015 05:31:00 +0000
Subject: Clarification on advisories
Message-ID: <CA+U3Mf7h9hPw0ZjnHCkHU-fbeixicKaH7u2CkX8Z_r6QWRUZqQ@mail.gmail.com>

Hi,
In the 1.4.19 announcement, the entry: "Fixed bugs related to bogus
keyrings." is the fix for CVE-2015-1606?
https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-announce/2015q1/000363.html

The following commit appears to be present in 1.4.19
http://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=gnupg.git;a=commitdiff;h=f0f71a721ccd7ab9e40b8b6b028b59632c0cc648

Am I right in thinking the issues found through fuzzing which led to
the release of 2.1.2 still have not be back ported to previous
releases? certainly most of the changes in the commits highlighted are
applicable accounting for the change of line numbers.

Regards


Sevan / Venture37


From wk at gnupg.org  Mon Mar 23 10:48:12 2015
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Mon, 23 Mar 2015 10:48:12 +0100
Subject: Clarification on advisories
In-Reply-To: <CA+U3Mf7h9hPw0ZjnHCkHU-fbeixicKaH7u2CkX8Z_r6QWRUZqQ@mail.gmail.com>
 (Sevan's message of "Mon, 23 Mar 2015 05:31:00 +0000")
References: <CA+U3Mf7h9hPw0ZjnHCkHU-fbeixicKaH7u2CkX8Z_r6QWRUZqQ@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <87iodsqc2r.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Mon, 23 Mar 2015 06:31, venture37 at gmail.com said:

> In the 1.4.19 announcement, the entry: "Fixed bugs related to bogus
> keyrings." is the fix for CVE-2015-1606?

The Debian announcement describes this as

    The keyring parsing code did not properly reject certain packet types
    not belonging in a keyring, which caused an access to memory already
    freed. This could allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service
    (crash) via crafted keyring files.

This seems to be about this fix:

  commit 81d3e541326e94d26a953aa70afc3cb149d11ebe

    gpg: Prevent an invalid memory read using a garbled keyring.
    
    * g10/keyring.c (keyring_get_keyblock): Whitelist allowed packet
    types.
    --
    
    The keyring DB code did not reject packets which don't belong into a
    keyring.  If for example the keyblock contains a literal data packet
    it is expected that the processing code stops at the data packet and
    reads from the input stream which is referenced from the data packets.
    Obviously the keyring processing code does not and cannot do that.
    However, when exporting this messes up the IOBUF and leads to an
    invalid read of sizeof (int).
    
    We now skip all packets which are not allowed in a keyring.
        
    Reported-by: Hanno B?ck <hanno at hboeck.de>
    
    (back ported from commit f0f71a721ccd7ab9e40b8b6b028b59632c0cc648)
    
    [dkg: rebased to STABLE-BRANCH-1-4]
    Signed-off-by: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg at fifthhorseman.net>


(I don't think that "access to memory already freed" is the right
description.)

> Am I right in thinking the issues found through fuzzing which led to
> the release of 2.1.2 still have not be back ported to previous
> releases? certainly most of the changes in the commits highlighted are
> applicable accounting for the change of line numbers.

I may not understand what your qyestion here.  The commit you are
referring to is against 2.1 (current master) and not against 1.4.  The
parts relevant to 1.4 and 2.0 have been ported back (see above for 1.4).


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner


-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From venture37 at gmail.com  Mon Mar 23 11:05:28 2015
From: venture37 at gmail.com (Sevan / Venture37)
Date: Mon, 23 Mar 2015 10:05:28 +0000
Subject: Clarification on advisories
In-Reply-To: <87iodsqc2r.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <CA+U3Mf7h9hPw0ZjnHCkHU-fbeixicKaH7u2CkX8Z_r6QWRUZqQ@mail.gmail.com>
 <87iodsqc2r.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <CA+U3Mf6RiXczDuDuykeieqSUB92hp=Ym+=EPxt2HKftLsPp_pA@mail.gmail.com>

Hi Werner,

On 23 March 2015 at 09:48, Werner Koch <wk at gnupg.org> wrote:
>> Am I right in thinking the issues found through fuzzing which led to
>> the release of 2.1.2 still have not be back ported to previous
>> releases? certainly most of the changes in the commits highlighted are
>> applicable accounting for the change of line numbers.
>
> I may not understand what your qyestion here.  The commit you are
> referring to is against 2.1 (current master) and not against 1.4.  The
> parts relevant to 1.4 and 2.0 have been ported back (see above for 1.4).

Apologies, I bundled 2 enquiries about completely separate issues in one email.
Are the applicable parts of the issues highlighted here:
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2015/02/13/14
Backported to 2.0.27?


Sevan / Venture37


From wk at gnupg.org  Mon Mar 23 13:20:24 2015
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Mon, 23 Mar 2015 13:20:24 +0100
Subject: Clarification on advisories
In-Reply-To: <CA+U3Mf6RiXczDuDuykeieqSUB92hp=Ym+=EPxt2HKftLsPp_pA@mail.gmail.com>
 (Sevan's message of "Mon, 23 Mar 2015 10:05:28 +0000")
References: <CA+U3Mf7h9hPw0ZjnHCkHU-fbeixicKaH7u2CkX8Z_r6QWRUZqQ@mail.gmail.com>
 <87iodsqc2r.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <CA+U3Mf6RiXczDuDuykeieqSUB92hp=Ym+=EPxt2HKftLsPp_pA@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <878uenrjlj.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Mon, 23 Mar 2015 11:05, venture37 at gmail.com said:

> Are the applicable parts of the issues highlighted here:
> http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2015/02/13/14
> Backported to 2.0.27?

Yes, all four:

1. 39978487863066e59bb657f5fe4e8baab510da7e

  commit 7e12ec4c7d6df29a7d7935399fccd2594ebb4a7e
  Author: Werner Koch <wk at gnupg.org>
  Date:   Thu Feb 12 18:52:07 2015 +0100

    gpg: Fix a NULL-deref due to empty ring trust packets.
    
    * g10/parse-packet.c (parse_trust): Always allocate a packet.
    --
    
    Reported-by: Hanno B?ck <hanno at hboeck.de>
    Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk at gnupg.org>
    
    (back ported from commit 39978487863066e59bb657f5fe4e8baab510da7e)


2. 0835d2f44ef62eab51fce6a927908f544e01cf8f

  commit 8da836e76f1349f4587d1bb74864b11dde7b8a39
  Author: Werner Koch <wk at gnupg.org>
  Date:   Thu Feb 12 18:54:17 2015 +0100

    gpg: Fix a NULL-deref in export due to invalid packet lengths.
    
    * g10/build-packet.c (write_fake_data): Take care of a NULL stored as
    opaque MPI.
    --
    
    Reported-by: Hanno B?ck <hanno at hboeck.de>
    
    (back ported from commit 0835d2f44ef62eab51fce6a927908f544e01cf8f)


3. 0f71a721ccd7ab9e40b8b6b028b59632c0cc648

  commit 824d88ac51b4d680f06e68f0879a7c1ec03cb2ba
  Author: Werner Koch <wk at gnupg.org>
  Date:   Thu Feb 12 18:58:36 2015 +0100

    gpg: Prevent an invalid memory read using a garbled keyring.
    
    * g10/keyring.c (keyring_get_keyblock): Whitelist allowed packet
    types.
    --
    
    The keyring DB code did not reject packets which don't belong into a
    keyring.  If for example the keyblock contains a literal data packet
    it is expected that the processing code stops at the data packet and
    reads from the input stream which is referenced from the data packets.
    Obviously the keyring processing code does not and cannot do that.
    However, when exporting this messes up the IOBUF and leads to an
    invalid read of sizeof (int).
    
    We now skip all packets which are not allowed in a keyring.
    
    Reported-by: Hanno B?ck <hanno at hboeck.de>
    
    (back ported from commit f0f71a721ccd7ab9e40b8b6b028b59632c0cc648)


4. 2183683bd633818dd031b090b5530951de76f392

  commit 3627123dc8fdc551caca1c7944713fbf01feccf6
  Author: Werner Koch <wk at gnupg.org>
  Date:   Thu Feb 12 20:34:44 2015 +0100

    Use inline functions to convert buffer data to scalars.
    
    * include/host2net.h (buf16_to_ulong, buf16_to_uint): New.
    (buf16_to_ushort, buf16_to_u16): New.
    (buf32_to_size_t, buf32_to_ulong, buf32_to_uint, buf32_to_u32): New.
    --
    
    This fixes sign extension on shift problems.  Hanno B?ck found a case
    with an invalid read due to this problem.  To fix that almost all uses
    of "<< 24" and "<< 8" are changed by this patch to use an inline
    function from host2net.h.
    
    (back ported from commit 2183683bd633818dd031b090b5530951de76f392)


and releases with 2.0.27

  commit 8d47e6e5235b6ecb41baf52865c5837c1de962b5
  Author: Werner Koch <wk at gnupg.org>
  Date:   Wed Feb 18 14:10:57 2015 +0100

    Release 2.0.27


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From CRivard at merkleinc.com  Mon Mar 23 15:34:14 2015
From: CRivard at merkleinc.com (Clark Rivard)
Date: Mon, 23 Mar 2015 14:34:14 +0000
Subject: GnuPG 1.4.19 - Encryption Questions 
Message-ID: <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A04920@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>

Hi



I installed GnuPG 1.4.19 - Command Line Only (ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/binary/gnupg-w32cli-1.4.19.exe 1586k)



I had existing keyrings and trustdb that I copied over to a new location.



I am now trying to encrypt a file using the "homedir" option to point to the copied keyrings but am getting this error message:



        gpg: keyblock resource '\secring.pgp' : file open error

        gpg: keyblock resource '\pubring.pgp' : file open error



I have done several Internet searches in attempt to resolve but have been unsuccessful.  Any ideas and help would be appreciated.





Also - I cannot locate the config file (gpg.conf)?  I search the server but no hits.  Is there not a config file with this version?











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From wk at gnupg.org  Mon Mar 23 16:49:28 2015
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Mon, 23 Mar 2015 16:49:28 +0100
Subject: GnuPG 1.4.19 - Encryption Questions
In-Reply-To: <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A04920@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 (Clark Rivard's message of "Mon, 23 Mar 2015 14:34:14 +0000")
References: <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A04920@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
Message-ID: <87oanjpvcn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Mon, 23 Mar 2015 15:34, CRivard at merkleinc.com said:

> I am now trying to encrypt a file using the "homedir" option to point
> to the copied keyrings but am getting this error message:

You better run

  gpg --version 

to see which directory is the default homedir of GnuPG.  You your files
to that directory.  If you need a gpg.conf put it into the same directory.

>         gpg: keyblock resource '\secring.pgp' : file open error

Transcript error?  It should be ".gpg" and not ".pgp"

Please consider to use the installer from Gpg4win.org instead.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From CRivard at merkleinc.com  Mon Mar 23 17:29:38 2015
From: CRivard at merkleinc.com (Clark Rivard)
Date: Mon, 23 Mar 2015 16:29:38 +0000
Subject: GnuPG 1.4.19 - Encryption Questions
In-Reply-To: <87oanjpvcn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A04920@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <87oanjpvcn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A04A1B@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>

Thanks, Werner. 

I got it to work.  I had syntax errors in the gpg commands.  

Question though - the gpg.conf file is optional?   If I want one I must create it?  
  

-----Original Message-----
From: Werner Koch [mailto:wk at gnupg.org] 
Sent: Monday, March 23, 2015 10:49 AM
To: Clark Rivard
Cc: gnupg-users at gnupg.org
Subject: Re: GnuPG 1.4.19 - Encryption Questions

On Mon, 23 Mar 2015 15:34, CRivard at merkleinc.com said:

> I am now trying to encrypt a file using the "homedir" option to point 
> to the copied keyrings but am getting this error message:

You better run

  gpg --version 

to see which directory is the default homedir of GnuPG.  You your files to that directory.  If you need a gpg.conf put it into the same directory.

>         gpg: keyblock resource '\secring.pgp' : file open error

Transcript error?  It should be ".gpg" and not ".pgp"

Please consider to use the installer from Gpg4win.org instead.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

--
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From robertc at broadcom.com  Mon Mar 23 18:35:45 2015
From: robertc at broadcom.com (Bob (Robert) Cavanaugh)
Date: Mon, 23 Mar 2015 17:35:45 +0000
Subject: Email-only UIDs and verification (was: Making the case for
 smart cards for the average user)
In-Reply-To: <87pp83eca2.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
References: <CAAocvpvEqs-tQ-rEki8AX3spdSt8P5TG0+KoXVtufW0Azy9wDQ@mail.gmail.com>
 <277590791.20150317005551@my_localhost>
 <16C07A2D-8B6D-48E5-9BC3-B6AE5D0935D9@gmail.com>
 <842480936.20150320005825@my_localhost>
 <8F0B09FC6339FA439524099BFCABC11F2D3CD3D6@IRVEXCHMB11.corp.ad.broadcom.com>
 <87pp83eca2.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
Message-ID: <8F0B09FC6339FA439524099BFCABC11F2D3CE5B0@IRVEXCHMB11.corp.ad.broadcom.com>

Daniel,
Checking my e-mail service. Did my response clip OK?

Thanks,
 
Bob Cavanaugh

> There are a lot of proposals in this thread, and you didn't trim the quoted
> text to isolate just one of them; can you be specific about which one you're
> talking about?
> 
______________________________________________
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users


From wk at gnupg.org  Mon Mar 23 18:46:53 2015
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Mon, 23 Mar 2015 18:46:53 +0100
Subject: GnuPG 1.4.19 - Encryption Questions
In-Reply-To: <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A04A1B@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 (Clark Rivard's message of "Mon, 23 Mar 2015 16:29:38 +0000")
References: <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A04920@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <87oanjpvcn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A04A1B@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
Message-ID: <87h9tbppwy.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Mon, 23 Mar 2015 17:29, CRivard at merkleinc.com said:

> Question though - the gpg.conf file is optional?   If I want one I must create it?  

Yes, it is optional.  If you have more than one key it is advisable to
create one and add 

--8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8---
default-key 1234567812345678
encrypt-to  1234567812345678
keyid-format long
keyserver hkp://keys.gnupg.net
--8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8---

So that gpg knows which is your default key (in this example the one
with key id 1234567812345678), to which key all messages shall be
encrypted in addition to the recipients (so that you can decrypt your
own mails), that a keyserver shall be used, and finally to use the long
keyid format.

Depending on the mail program, you need to add an encrypt-to in any
case.


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From petar at smokva.net  Mon Mar 23 18:43:53 2015
From: petar at smokva.net (Petar Bogdanovic)
Date: Mon, 23 Mar 2015 18:43:53 +0100
Subject: DBG: armor-keys-failed
Message-ID: <20150323174353.GA2927@pintail.smokva.net>

Hi,

when refreshing keys, I get the following messages:

	gpg: DBG: armor-keys-failed (KEY 0xB076... BEGIN
	) ->0
	gpg: DBG: armor-keys-failed (KEY 0xB076... END
	) ->0

the comments suggest that the issue is not fatal:

	http://lists.gnutls.org/pipermail/gnupg-devel/2015-February/029524.html

Or is it?

		Petar
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From CRivard at merkleinc.com  Mon Mar 23 19:59:03 2015
From: CRivard at merkleinc.com (Clark Rivard)
Date: Mon, 23 Mar 2015 18:59:03 +0000
Subject: GnuPG 1.4.19 - Encryption Questions
In-Reply-To: <87h9tbppwy.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A04920@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <87oanjpvcn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A04A1B@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <87h9tbppwy.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A04CD9@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>

I am migrating PGP processing to a new server - going from GnuPG 1.4.8 to GnuPG 1.4.19.

I have a file that was encrypted using 1.4.8 and the same file encrypted from 1.4.19.  I used the FC file compare program to verify the encrypted files are the same.

However, FC is telling me the files have differences.  Is this a valid way to verify the encryption results are the same - or will they not be the same?
If not why would they be different (does the Random Seed File have anything to do with this)?

What other method can I use to validate I am getting the same results?

I am using the same Keyring on both servers and the same "Recipient" Id to do the encryption.

Thanks,
Clark


-----Original Message-----
From: Werner Koch [mailto:wk at gnupg.org]
Sent: Monday, March 23, 2015 12:47 PM
To: Clark Rivard
Cc: gnupg-users at gnupg.org
Subject: Re: GnuPG 1.4.19 - Encryption Questions

On Mon, 23 Mar 2015 17:29, CRivard at merkleinc.com said:

> Question though - the gpg.conf file is optional?   If I want one I must create it?

Yes, it is optional.  If you have more than one key it is advisable to create one and add

--8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8---
default-key 1234567812345678
encrypt-to  1234567812345678
keyid-format long
keyserver hkp://keys.gnupg.net
--8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8---

So that gpg knows which is your default key (in this example the one with key id 1234567812345678), to which key all messages shall be encrypted in addition to the recipients (so that you can decrypt your own mails), that a keyserver shall be used, and finally to use the long keyid format.

Depending on the mail program, you need to add an encrypt-to in any case.


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

--
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.


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From CRivard at merkleinc.com  Mon Mar 23 20:07:18 2015
From: CRivard at merkleinc.com (Clark Rivard)
Date: Mon, 23 Mar 2015 19:07:18 +0000
Subject: PGP Encryption - Random Seed File and Keyring Questions
Message-ID: <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A04CF1@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>

Random Seed File and Keyring Questions

It is my understanding that GnuPG stores a random seed file in its working directory. This file is changed each time you use GnuPG.

I have looked for more information about this file in the manual and faq, but have not found it. (There is some information in the man page.)



How is the random seed file used in encryption / decryption processing - just to generate a Key?



Can you have multiple folders containing a "set" of keyrings, trustdb, and random seed file (each folder being used for a given recipient) and then

execute gpg using the folder specific to the recipient?



Will this cause any issues?  Does it matter if you start with the same "base" random seed file in the recipient-specific folders?



Thanks,

Clark


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From dougb at dougbarton.email  Mon Mar 23 20:25:06 2015
From: dougb at dougbarton.email (Doug Barton)
Date: Mon, 23 Mar 2015 12:25:06 -0700
Subject: GnuPG 1.4.19 - Encryption Questions
In-Reply-To: <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A04CD9@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
References: <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A04920@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <87oanjpvcn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A04A1B@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
 <87h9tbppwy.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A04CD9@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
Message-ID: <55106892.6040706@dougbarton.email>

On 3/23/15 11:59 AM, Clark Rivard wrote:
> However, FC is telling me the files have differences.  Is this a valid
> way to verify the encryption results are the same - or will they not be
> the same?

It is expected that the encrypted files will be different, for several 
"mechanical" reasons which are not terribly interesting.

The only way to confirm that the contents of the file are the same is to 
decrypt them. However it is overwhelmingly unlikely that there will be 
anything different about the contents.

hope this helps,

Doug

-- 
I am conducting an experiment in the efficacy of PGP/MIME signatures. 
This message should be signed. If it is not, or the signature does not 
validate, please let me know how you received this message (direct, or 
to a list) and the mail software you use. Thanks!

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From dougb at dougbarton.email  Mon Mar 23 20:27:17 2015
From: dougb at dougbarton.email (Doug Barton)
Date: Mon, 23 Mar 2015 12:27:17 -0700
Subject: PGP Encryption - Random Seed File and Keyring Questions
In-Reply-To: <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A04CF1@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
References: <7D23F54FC682AC47A4CDA79EF435336A25A04CF1@HQITEXCH07.pclc0.merkle.local>
Message-ID: <55106915.4050600@dougbarton.email>

On 3/23/15 12:07 PM, Clark Rivard wrote:
> _Random Seed File and Keyring Questions _
>
> It is my understanding that GnuPG stores a random seed file in its
> working directory. This file is changed each time you use GnuPG.

This is true. You can completely ignore this file, it is used internally 
by GnuPG.

> Can you have multiple folders containing a "set" of keyrings, trustdb,
> and random seed file (each folder being used for a given recipient) and then
> execute gpg using the folder specific to the recipient?

You could do that, but it is unnecessary. You can put multiple keys on 
their respective keyrings (public and private).

Doug

-- 
I am conducting an experiment in the efficacy of PGP/MIME signatures. 
This message should be signed. If it is not, or the signature does not 
validate, please let me know how you received this message (direct, or 
to a list) and the mail software you use. Thanks!

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From mike at confidantmail.org  Tue Mar 24 04:27:47 2015
From: mike at confidantmail.org (Mike Ingle)
Date: Mon, 23 Mar 2015 20:27:47 -0700
Subject: One alternative to SMTP for email: Confidant Mail
Message-ID: <5510D9B3.4090809@confidantmail.org>

There has been some discussion on gnupg-users about replacing SMTP for 
secure email, and how BitMessage does not scale.

There is an open source non-SMTP email system called Confidant Mail, 
which is based on GnuPG and hash table storage. The protocol conceals 
metadata (headers like From and Subject are inside the envelope) and 
uses TLS. The client has built-in support for Tor and I2P anonymity. The 
system supports unlimited length attachments (over 4GB) using a 
torrent-like blocking protocol. Messages are GPG encrypted and signed, 
and all messages are acknowledged. Key distribution is built into the 
protocol.
It's designed to scale using either DNS or a Kademlia DHT to look up 
keys. Servers are paired for high availability. The client can 
automatically configure itself from the server.

The client is available for Windows, Linux and MacOS. You can run your 
own server, or get an account on the test environment to try it out 
immediately. More information and downloads at: 
https://www.confidantmail.org

Mike Ingle <mike at confidantmail.org> d2b89e6f95e72e26e0c917d02d1847dfecfcd0c2


From antony at blazrsoft.com  Tue Mar 24 18:04:47 2015
From: antony at blazrsoft.com (Antony Prince)
Date: Tue, 24 Mar 2015 13:04:47 -0400
Subject: One alternative to SMTP for email: Confidant Mail
In-Reply-To: <5510D9B3.4090809@confidantmail.org>
References: <5510D9B3.4090809@confidantmail.org>
Message-ID: <5511992F.8030801@blazrsoft.com>

On 3/23/2015 11:27 PM, Mike Ingle wrote:
> There has been some discussion on gnupg-users about replacing SMTP for
> secure email, and how BitMessage does not scale.
> 
> There is an open source non-SMTP email system called Confidant Mail,
> which is based on GnuPG and hash table storage. The protocol conceals
> metadata (headers like From and Subject are inside the envelope) and
> uses TLS. The client has built-in support for Tor and I2P anonymity. The
> system supports unlimited length attachments (over 4GB) using a
> torrent-like blocking protocol. Messages are GPG encrypted and signed,
> and all messages are acknowledged. Key distribution is built into the
> protocol.
> It's designed to scale using either DNS or a Kademlia DHT to look up
> keys. Servers are paired for high availability. The client can
> automatically configure itself from the server.
> 
> The client is available for Windows, Linux and MacOS. You can run your
> own server, or get an account on the test environment to try it out
> immediately. More information and downloads at:
> https://www.confidantmail.org
> 
> Mike Ingle <mike at confidantmail.org>
> d2b89e6f95e72e26e0c917d02d1847dfecfcd0c2

Wow... this is a great concept. I'm looking forward to trying it out.

-- 

Antony Prince

Key ID: 0x4F040744
Fingerprint: FE96 5B7F A708 18D3 B74B  959F A6E1 6242 4F04 0744
URL: keyserver.blazrsoft.com

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From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net  Tue Mar 24 23:07:50 2015
From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA)
Date: Tue, 24 Mar 2015 22:07:50 +0000
Subject: One alternative to SMTP for email: Confidant Mail
In-Reply-To: <5510D9B3.4090809@confidantmail.org>
References: <5510D9B3.4090809@confidantmail.org>
Message-ID: <1666391654.20150324220750@my_localhost>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

Hi


On Tuesday 24 March 2015 at 3:27:47 AM, in
<mid:5510D9B3.4090809 at confidantmail.org>, Mike Ingle wrote:




> The client is available for Windows, Linux and MacOS.
> You can run your own server, or get an account on the
> test environment to try it out  immediately. More
> information and downloads at:
> https://www.confidantmail.org

Notwithstanding the security compromise from building SMTP gateways,
some people are pretty attached to their favourite MUA. Have you any
thoughts about accommodating them by enabling your Confidant Mail
client or server to function as a local email proxy?


- --
Best regards

MFPA                  <mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net>

Is it possible to be a closet claustrophobic?
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From mike at confidantmail.org  Tue Mar 24 23:55:04 2015
From: mike at confidantmail.org (Mike Ingle)
Date: Tue, 24 Mar 2015 15:55:04 -0700
Subject: One alternative to SMTP for email: Confidant Mail
In-Reply-To: <1666391654.20150324220750@my_localhost>
References: <5510D9B3.4090809@confidantmail.org>
 <1666391654.20150324220750@my_localhost>
Message-ID: <5511EB48.7020900@confidantmail.org>

> Notwithstanding the security compromise from building SMTP gateways,
> some people are pretty attached to their favourite MUA. Have you any
> thoughts about accommodating them by enabling your Confidant Mail
> client or server to function as a local email proxy?


The user interface has to do a lot of things differently from SMTP MUAs 
- display signatures,
check for keys, detect key collisions, display hash IDs, support 
gigabyte attachments...
so it's never going to be a layer under SMTP. The UI can definitely be 
improved to have features
people like from their existing mail clients. It needs automatic filing 
and a preview pane, for example.

At the moment it's a parallel system for when you need security and big 
files. It's as much an
alternative to file drop services as to email. File drops are not 
secure. Confidant Mail sends the
email and attachments in a GPG encrypted ZIP file, which is broken into 
blocks for transmission.

The question I am working on is mobile support. I don't really want to 
carry my GPG key on my
phone, so it might make sense to make a web UI that can run on a PC and 
present itself to a
phone or tablet over a VPN. That way the GPG key stays at home, and if 
the remote user fails
to login a few times, the web UI shuts down.

Confidant Mail can sync itself across multiple clients already, so one 
of those clients could be a
mobile web UI and the other a PC GUI.

Mike


From dougb at dougbarton.email  Wed Mar 25 08:28:19 2015
From: dougb at dougbarton.email (Doug Barton)
Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2015 00:28:19 -0700
Subject: Weird error during key refresh
Message-ID: <55126393.50108@dougbarton.email>

gpg --refresh-keys dougbarton.us
gpg: refreshing 2 keys from hkp://na.pool.sks-keyservers.net
gpg: requesting key D5B2F0FB from hkp server na.pool.sks-keyservers.net
gpg: requesting key 1A1ABC84 from hkp server na.pool.sks-keyservers.net
gpg: DBG: armor-keys-failed (KEY 
0x9DD1E44C8660ADA6580F83B6C886A42BD5B2F0FB BEGIN
) ->0
gpg: DBG: armor-keys-failed (KEY 
0x9DD1E44C8660ADA6580F83B6C886A42BD5B2F0FB END
) ->0
gpg: DBG: armor-keys-failed (KEY 
0xE3520E149D053533C33A67DB5CC686F11A1ABC84 BEGIN
) ->0
gpg: Note: signatures using the MD5 algorithm are rejected
gpg: key D5B2F0FB: "Doug Barton <DougB at DougBarton.us>" not changed
gpg: DBG: armor-keys-failed (KEY 
0xE3520E149D053533C33A67DB5CC686F11A1ABC84 END
) ->0
gpg: key 1A1ABC84: "Douglas Barton <dougb at dougbarton.us>" not changed
gpg: Total number processed: 2
gpg:              unchanged: 2

I'm using the latest on Mac from homebrew:

gpg --version
gpg (GnuPG) 2.0.27
libgcrypt 1.6.3

Any ideas?

Doug

-- 
I am conducting an experiment in the efficacy of PGP/MIME signatures. 
This message should be signed. If it is not, or the signature does not 
validate, please let me know how you received this message (direct, or 
to a list) and the mail software you use. Thanks!

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From dougb at dougbarton.email  Wed Mar 25 08:30:25 2015
From: dougb at dougbarton.email (Doug Barton)
Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2015 00:30:25 -0700
Subject: One alternative to SMTP for email: Confidant Mail
In-Reply-To: <5510D9B3.4090809@confidantmail.org>
References: <5510D9B3.4090809@confidantmail.org>
Message-ID: <55126411.1040801@dougbarton.email>

On 3/23/15 8:27 PM, Mike Ingle wrote:
> There has been some discussion on gnupg-users about replacing SMTP for
> secure email, and how BitMessage does not scale.

You can use Jabber for secure messaging. Haven't tested it with OTR, but 
I imagine if the client could do it, it would work.

Doug

-- 
I am conducting an experiment in the efficacy of PGP/MIME signatures. 
This message should be signed. If it is not, or the signature does not 
validate, please let me know how you received this message (direct, or 
to a list) and the mail software you use. Thanks!

-------------- next part --------------
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From stebe at mailbox.org  Wed Mar 25 16:10:20 2015
From: stebe at mailbox.org (Stephan Beck)
Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2015 16:10:20 +0100
Subject: Weird error during key refresh
In-Reply-To: <55126393.50108@dougbarton.email>
References: <55126393.50108@dougbarton.email>
Message-ID: <5512CFDC.9020305@mailbox.org>

Hi Doug,

it's an error very similar to the one I've got using --refresh-keys with a
specified -keyserver [name].
Did you try to specify the keyserver's name and enable both --use-temp-files and
--keep-temp-files? The output of the temp files retain the communication data of
the refreshing action and maybe it helps you identifying issues.

Hope that helps

Stephan


Am 25.03.2015 um 08:28 schrieb Doug Barton:
> gpg --refresh-keys dougbarton.us
> gpg: refreshing 2 keys from hkp://na.pool.sks-keyservers.net
> gpg: requesting key D5B2F0FB from hkp server na.pool.sks-keyservers.net
> gpg: requesting key 1A1ABC84 from hkp server na.pool.sks-keyservers.net
> gpg: DBG: armor-keys-failed (KEY 0x9DD1E44C8660ADA6580F83B6C886A42BD5B2F0FB BEGIN
> ) ->0
> gpg: DBG: armor-keys-failed (KEY 0x9DD1E44C8660ADA6580F83B6C886A42BD5B2F0FB END
> ) ->0
> gpg: DBG: armor-keys-failed (KEY 0xE3520E149D053533C33A67DB5CC686F11A1ABC84 BEGIN
> ) ->0
> gpg: Note: signatures using the MD5 algorithm are rejected
> gpg: key D5B2F0FB: "Doug Barton <DougB at DougBarton.us>" not changed
> gpg: DBG: armor-keys-failed (KEY 0xE3520E149D053533C33A67DB5CC686F11A1ABC84 END
> ) ->0
> gpg: key 1A1ABC84: "Douglas Barton <dougb at dougbarton.us>" not changed
> gpg: Total number processed: 2
> gpg:              unchanged: 2
> 
> I'm using the latest on Mac from homebrew:
> 
> gpg --version
> gpg (GnuPG) 2.0.27
> libgcrypt 1.6.3
> 
> Any ideas?
> 
> Doug
> 
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
> 






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From robertc at broadcom.com  Wed Mar 25 19:08:06 2015
From: robertc at broadcom.com (Bob (Robert) Cavanaugh)
Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2015 18:08:06 +0000
Subject: FW: One alternative to SMTP for email: Confidant Mail
In-Reply-To: <55126411.1040801@dougbarton.email>
References: <5510D9B3.4090809@confidantmail.org>
 <55126411.1040801@dougbarton.email>
Message-ID: <8F0B09FC6339FA439524099BFCABC11F2D3D03DF@IRVEXCHMB11.corp.ad.broadcom.com>

Doug,
Signature shows as an attachment "signature.asc". No evidence that PGP actions were envoked. Work forces use of Synaptic PGP, so I cannot tell if it is verified or not.

Thanks,
 
Bob Cavanaugh


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From dougb at dougbarton.email  Wed Mar 25 20:41:56 2015
From: dougb at dougbarton.email (Doug Barton)
Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2015 12:41:56 -0700
Subject: PGP/MIME (Was: One alternative to SMTP for email: Confidant Mail)
In-Reply-To: <8F0B09FC6339FA439524099BFCABC11F2D3D03DF@IRVEXCHMB11.corp.ad.broadcom.com>
References: <5510D9B3.4090809@confidantmail.org>
 <55126411.1040801@dougbarton.email>
 <8F0B09FC6339FA439524099BFCABC11F2D3D03DF@IRVEXCHMB11.corp.ad.broadcom.com>
Message-ID: <55130F84.3000603@dougbarton.email>

On 3/25/15 11:08 AM, Bob (Robert) Cavanaugh wrote:
> Doug,
> Signature shows as an attachment "signature.asc". No evidence that PGP actions were envoked. Work forces use of Synaptic PGP, so I cannot tell if it is verified or not.

Thanks Bob, that is interesting feedback.

FWIW, I have received various other messages privately from people who 
have said the same thing ... They can see the attachment, but either 
message verification fails, or there is no indication on their side that 
it is a PGP-signed message at all.

While this is strictly anecdotal evidence I would argue that it's a good 
indication that we may not be ready for PGP/MIME as the default.

Doug

-- 
I am conducting an experiment in the efficacy of PGP/MIME signatures. 
This message should be signed. If it is not, or the signature does not 
validate, please let me know how you received this message (direct, or 
to a list) and the mail software you use. Thanks!

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From dougb at dougbarton.email  Wed Mar 25 20:42:35 2015
From: dougb at dougbarton.email (Doug Barton)
Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2015 12:42:35 -0700
Subject: Weird error during key refresh
In-Reply-To: <5512FA71.1070106@sumptuouscapital.com>
References: <55126393.50108@dougbarton.email>
 <5512FA71.1070106@sumptuouscapital.com>
Message-ID: <55130FAB.9010902@dougbarton.email>

On 3/25/15 11:12 AM, Kristian Fiskerstrand wrote:
> On 03/25/2015 08:28 AM, Doug Barton wrote:
>> gpg --refresh-keys dougbarton.us
>
> ...
>
>> gpg: DBG: armor-keys-failed (KEY
>> 0x9DD1E44C8660ADA6580F83B6C886A42BD5B2F0FB BEGIN ) ->0 gpg: DBG:
>> armor-keys-failed (KEY 0x9DD1E44C8660ADA6580F83B6C886A42BD5B2F0FB
>> END ) ->0 gpg: DBG: armor-keys-failed (KEY
>> 0xE3520E149D053533C33A67DB5CC686F11A1ABC84 BEGIN
> ...
>
>
>> I'm using the latest on Mac from homebrew:
>
>> gpg --version gpg (GnuPG) 2.0.27
>
> See http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-devel/2015-February/029546.html

Thanks Kristian.

Doug

-- 
I am conducting an experiment in the efficacy of PGP/MIME signatures.
This message should be signed. If it is not, or the signature does not
validate, please let me know how you received this message (direct, or
to a list) and the mail software you use. Thanks!

-------------- next part --------------
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From kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com  Wed Mar 25 19:12:01 2015
From: kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com (Kristian Fiskerstrand)
Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2015 19:12:01 +0100
Subject: Weird error during key refresh
In-Reply-To: <55126393.50108@dougbarton.email>
References: <55126393.50108@dougbarton.email>
Message-ID: <5512FA71.1070106@sumptuouscapital.com>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

On 03/25/2015 08:28 AM, Doug Barton wrote:
> gpg --refresh-keys dougbarton.us

...

> gpg: DBG: armor-keys-failed (KEY 
> 0x9DD1E44C8660ADA6580F83B6C886A42BD5B2F0FB BEGIN ) ->0 gpg: DBG:
> armor-keys-failed (KEY 0x9DD1E44C8660ADA6580F83B6C886A42BD5B2F0FB
> END ) ->0 gpg: DBG: armor-keys-failed (KEY 
> 0xE3520E149D053533C33A67DB5CC686F11A1ABC84 BEGIN
...

> 
> I'm using the latest on Mac from homebrew:
> 
> gpg --version gpg (GnuPG) 2.0.27

See http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-devel/2015-February/029546.html

- -- 
- ----------------------------
Kristian Fiskerstrand
Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com
Twitter: @krifisk
- ----------------------------
Public OpenPGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net
fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3
- ----------------------------
"Great things are not accomplished by those who yield to trends and
fads and popular opinion."
(Jack Kerouac)
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

iQEcBAEBCgAGBQJVEvpsAAoJEP7VAChXwav661AH/RbOE8PtVYgh0AD3wqzDLD45
pOUna/JNvucv81aWVDalzhfIenW9J8vcxxNkgmoDF6jKo0EHQbG7hfPaihVHM5wH
zEazgbMcYFXSStYUeN3jLbye9Rjgo2sqwa5RBucjpyV7RIU+KBWxONNPxAW/lxoh
DsVE0Ng807OA5BiIS3BUbZPkDwAZpd0PsY+4zraZRSpYFMyCeahokh4cJFAsrDfk
KUihB8yBsLoOCZkQZZ2c5Av2TUdjl0lY54Ag7CG2BTMOyNEQUmUMP9uKSReB9xah
q45ctMzyq2BkFvOs7gTrTjWeau0/OhXHx9cf6K4P8nH2P2aZBJIoTGfejdrZf4Q=
=uqgt
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


From mailing-lists at asatiifm.net  Wed Mar 25 21:20:40 2015
From: mailing-lists at asatiifm.net (=?windows-1252?Q?Ville_M=E4=E4tt=E4?=)
Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2015 22:20:40 +0200
Subject: PGP/MIME (Was: One alternative to SMTP for email: Confidant Mail)
In-Reply-To: <55130F84.3000603@dougbarton.email>
References: <5510D9B3.4090809@confidantmail.org>
 <55126411.1040801@dougbarton.email>
 <8F0B09FC6339FA439524099BFCABC11F2D3D03DF@IRVEXCHMB11.corp.ad.broadcom.com>
 <55130F84.3000603@dougbarton.email>
Message-ID: <55131898.7000208@asatiifm.net>

On 25.03.15 21:41, Doug Barton wrote:
> While this is strictly anecdotal evidence I would argue that it's a good
> indication that we may not be ready for PGP/MIME as the default.

I think that fail, a signature.asc attachment, is still a "cleaner fail"
than a non-PGP receiver getting a breakdown from inline PGP. And that is
for every single email.

I have not received a single question from anyone regarding my PGP/MIME
signed emails. Not one. And I'm talking about the ones that don't use
PGP / have no clue what PGP is.

> FWIW, I have received various other messages privately from people who have said the same thing ... They can see the attachment, but either message verification fails, or there is no indication on their side that it is a PGP-signed message at all.

In this one I can see your email with the attachment, but also marked
with a "good signature".

-- 
Ville

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From mailing-lists at asatiifm.net  Wed Mar 25 21:26:49 2015
From: mailing-lists at asatiifm.net (=?windows-1252?Q?Ville_M=E4=E4tt=E4?=)
Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2015 22:26:49 +0200
Subject: PGP/MIME efficacy (Was: Weird error during key refresh)
In-Reply-To: <55130FAB.9010902@dougbarton.email>
References: <55126393.50108@dougbarton.email>
 <5512FA71.1070106@sumptuouscapital.com> <55130FAB.9010902@dougbarton.email>
Message-ID: <55131A09.4030501@asatiifm.net>

On 25.03.15 21:42, Doug Barton wrote:
> 
> Doug
> 
> -- 
> I am conducting an experiment in the efficacy of PGP/MIME signatures.
> This message should be signed. If it is not, or the signature does not
> validate, please let me know how you received this message (direct, or
> to a list) and the mail software you use. Thanks!

It seems I'm getting all (ok, sample size 2) your emails as "good
signature" and with signature.asc attachment.

-- 
Ville

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From dougb at dougbarton.email  Wed Mar 25 21:32:45 2015
From: dougb at dougbarton.email (Doug Barton)
Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2015 13:32:45 -0700
Subject: PGP/MIME (Was: One alternative to SMTP for email: Confidant Mail)
In-Reply-To: <55131898.7000208@asatiifm.net>
References: <5510D9B3.4090809@confidantmail.org>
 <55126411.1040801@dougbarton.email>
 <8F0B09FC6339FA439524099BFCABC11F2D3D03DF@IRVEXCHMB11.corp.ad.broadcom.com>
 <55130F84.3000603@dougbarton.email> <55131898.7000208@asatiifm.net>
Message-ID: <55131B6D.6010002@dougbarton.email>

On 3/25/15 1:20 PM, Ville M??tt? wrote:
> On 25.03.15 21:41, Doug Barton wrote:
>> While this is strictly anecdotal evidence I would argue that it's a good
>> indication that we may not be ready for PGP/MIME as the default.
>
> I think that fail, a signature.asc attachment, is still a "cleaner fail"
> than a non-PGP receiver getting a breakdown from inline PGP. And that is
> for every single email.

How are you using the term "breakdown" here? If their client isn't doing 
PGP they see some extraneous text, and a signature block. While I agree 
that for those not using PGP that is clutter, I am not sure what you 
mean by "breakdown."

> I have not received a single question from anyone regarding my PGP/MIME
> signed emails. Not one. And I'm talking about the ones that don't use
> PGP / have no clue what PGP is.

We've already established that PGP/MIME is a "cleaner" solution for 
those that don't use PGP. I'm not debating that point, and I don't think 
anyone else is either.

The question at hand is for those that *do* use PGP, which is more 
effective? TMK there are no mail clients that fail to process a valid 
in-line signature, but obviously there are still clients that cannot 
correctly handle PGP/MIME.

>> FWIW, I have received various other messages privately from people who have said the same thing ... They can see the attachment, but either message verification fails, or there is no indication on their side that it is a PGP-signed message at all.
>
> In this one I can see your email with the attachment, but also marked
> with a "good signature".

Thank you for confirming, but we're both using Enigmail so I would 
suspect that would be the case. :)  Also, I can see the valid signatures 
on the message that I receive from the list. I'm glad to see that the 
old Mailman bug has been fixed in that regard.

Doug

-- 
I am conducting an experiment in the efficacy of PGP/MIME signatures. 
This message should be signed. If it is not, or the signature does not 
validate, please let me know how you received this message (direct, or 
to a list) and the mail software you use. Thanks!

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From samir at samirnassar.com  Wed Mar 25 21:56:56 2015
From: samir at samirnassar.com (Samir Nassar)
Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2015 21:56:56 +0100
Subject: PGP/MIME (Was: One alternative to SMTP for email: Confidant Mail)
In-Reply-To: <55130F84.3000603@dougbarton.email>
References: <5510D9B3.4090809@confidantmail.org>
 <8F0B09FC6339FA439524099BFCABC11F2D3D03DF@IRVEXCHMB11.corp.ad.broadcom.com>
 <55130F84.3000603@dougbarton.email>
Message-ID: <118949745.UfHx5V2qD8@lathe>

On Wednesday, March 25, 2015 12:41:56 PM Doug Barton wrote:
> On 3/25/15 11:08 AM, Bob (Robert) Cavanaugh wrote:
> > Doug,
> > Signature shows as an attachment "signature.asc". No evidence that PGP
> > actions were envoked. Work forces use of Synaptic PGP, so I cannot tell
> > if it is verified or not.

Most likely Bob is talking about Symantec PGP which works with MS Outlook.

> Thanks Bob, that is interesting feedback.

This is not new information. If "Synaptic PGP" is indeed Symantec PGP and 
we're talking about Outlook then indeed MS Outlook does not understand 
PGP/MIME.

So yes, we have an extremely outdated mail client manufacturer that is 
unwilling to accomodate PGP/MIME. Users of that mail client have a problem 
with PGP/MIME. Almost no-one else; Thunderbird, KMail2, mutt, even Roundcube, 
the web-based IMAP client, gives a useful message on facing PGP/MIME saying 
something like: This message is encrypted and can't be viewed.

Samir
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From martijn.list at gmail.com  Wed Mar 25 21:06:53 2015
From: martijn.list at gmail.com (martijn.list)
Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2015 21:06:53 +0100
Subject: PGP/MIME (Was: One alternative to SMTP for email: Confidant Mail)
In-Reply-To: <55130F84.3000603@dougbarton.email>
References: <5510D9B3.4090809@confidantmail.org>
 <55126411.1040801@dougbarton.email>
 <8F0B09FC6339FA439524099BFCABC11F2D3D03DF@IRVEXCHMB11.corp.ad.broadcom.com>
 <55130F84.3000603@dougbarton.email>
Message-ID: <5513155D.3090005@gmail.com>

On 03/25/2015 08:41 PM, Doug Barton wrote:
> On 3/25/15 11:08 AM, Bob (Robert) Cavanaugh wrote:
>> Doug,
>> Signature shows as an attachment "signature.asc". No evidence that PGP
>> actions were envoked. Work forces use of Synaptic PGP, so I cannot
>> tell if it is verified or not.
> 
> Thanks Bob, that is interesting feedback.
> 
> FWIW, I have received various other messages privately from people who
> have said the same thing ... They can see the attachment, but either
> message verification fails, or there is no indication on their side that
> it is a PGP-signed message at all.
> 
> While this is strictly anecdotal evidence I would argue that it's a good
> indication that we may not be ready for PGP/MIME as the default.

It looks like this is caused by the mailing list software (mailman).
Mailman adds a banner to the mail and therefore the mail is no longer a
valid PGP/MIME mail. I think mailman should be smart enough not to mess
with digitally signed mail (same thing happens with S/MIME signed email).

Kind regards,

Martijn Brinkers


-- 
CipherMail email encryption

Open source email encryption gateway with support for S/MIME, OpenPGP
and PDF messaging.

http://www.ciphermail.com

Twitter: http://twitter.com/CipherMail


From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net  Wed Mar 25 22:06:40 2015
From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA)
Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2015 21:06:40 +0000
Subject: PGP/MIME (Was: One alternative to SMTP for email: Confidant Mail)
In-Reply-To: <55130F84.3000603@dougbarton.email>
References: <5510D9B3.4090809@confidantmail.org>
 <55126411.1040801@dougbarton.email>
 <8F0B09FC6339FA439524099BFCABC11F2D3D03DF@IRVEXCHMB11.corp.ad.broadcom.com>
 <55130F84.3000603@dougbarton.email>
Message-ID: <135981617.20150325210640@my_localhost>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

Hi


On Wednesday 25 March 2015 at 7:41:56 PM, in
<mid:55130F84.3000603 at dougbarton.email>, Doug Barton wrote:



> While this is strictly anecdotal evidence I would argue
> that it's a good indication that we may not be ready
> for PGP/MIME as the default.


FWIW, my MUA (The Bat!) shows your photo, then displays:-

  OpenPGP Signature verified OK

  # off=0 ctb=ff tag=63 hlen=2 plen=11 new-ctb
:packet 63: length 11 # off=13 ctb=cb tag=11 hlen=2 plen=0 partial new-ctb
:literal data packet:
        mode t (74), created 0, name="",
        raw data: unknown length
# off=1118 ctb=89 tag=2 hlen=3 plen=284
:signature packet: algo 1, keyid 5CC686F11A1ABC84
        version 4, created 1427312516, md5len 0, sigclass 0x01
        digest algo 8, begin of digest fd d6
        hashed subpkt 2 len 4 (sig created 2015-03-25)
        subpkt 16 len 8 (issuer key ID 5CC686F11A1ABC84)
        data: [2046 bits]


I also tried to verify the signature from the message source, just for
shits and giggles. This sometimes works if a PGP/MIME signature won't
verify for me when I click the button. On this occasion it didn't.



- --
Best regards

MFPA                  <mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net>

Don't cry because it is over - smile because it happened
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

iQF8BAEBCgBmBQJVEyNyXxSAAAAAAC4AKGlzc3Vlci1mcHJAbm90YXRpb25zLm9w
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QjdDNzRDRUIzMUYyNUYwAAoJEGt8dM6zHyXweVYIALlTpzYpwzhbKXOsKPfCLTpz
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jWeA6SHSOW+2zSCO0TFQPYj15ZOfjmrZYuJ5Jvu9tEnLueQylazYZVs3jbNFHCz4
jjoI0lQ8+crrn8qdjuF2sVOoJjy9Z6s8RspG/LTgV1ltvNihrOXaVbmPcdOg+ys2
SJrT3pyIk2YuVH7TCLGJ+AslJa1Qym2DGW6Z2CMapN7N66EJ4aDyDCHm5iidL/yI
vgQBFgoAZgUCVRMjeF8UgAAAAAAuAChpc3N1ZXItZnByQG5vdGF0aW9ucy5vcGVu
cGdwLmZpZnRoaG9yc2VtYW4ubmV0MzNBQ0VENEVFOTEzNEVFQkRFNkE4NTA2MTcx
MkJDNDYxQUY3NzhFNAAKCRAXErxGGvd45PvMAQC8yP53WL5+7UmeGurK8MjxJ8MS
EjsZ+TREVndPgavlkwEAKOQu0jrgjVUtSrhJJMO3S45cB9bzKIfjEmBH02oA4gI=
=lR1/
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----



From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net  Wed Mar 25 22:25:57 2015
From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA)
Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2015 21:25:57 +0000
Subject: One alternative to SMTP for email: Confidant Mail
In-Reply-To: <5511EB48.7020900@confidantmail.org>
References: <5510D9B3.4090809@confidantmail.org>
 <1666391654.20150324220750@my_localhost> <5511EB48.7020900@confidantmail.org>
Message-ID: <1434537311.20150325212557@my_localhost>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

Hi


On Tuesday 24 March 2015 at 10:55:04 PM, in
<mid:5511EB48.7020900 at confidantmail.org>, Mike Ingle wrote:



> The user interface has to do a lot of things
> differently from SMTP MUAs - display signatures, check for keys,

SMTP MUAs that interface with PGP or GnuPG (or use S/MIME) display
signature verification results (and actual signatures in the message
body if signed PGP-inline). And they invoke GnuPG etc. to find keys.



> detect key collisions,

If more than one key on my GnuPG keyring matches on an email address,
the MUA I use displays a dialog box allowing me to choose. An older
version used to just pick the first match it came to.



> display hash IDs,

OK, that sounds like something extra it has to accommodate. But maybe
an SMTP proxy could treat the hash as part of the display name:-

"Mike Ingle d2b89e6f95e72e26e0c917d0...cd0c2" <mike at confidantmail.org>


> support  gigabyte attachments...

- From an MUA UI perspective, does size matter when handling
attachments? All the user tends to see is an icon, a filename, and a
file size.


- --
Best regards

MFPA                  <mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net>

Dogs look up to us. Cats look down on us. Pigs treat us as equals.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

iQF8BAEBCgBmBQJVEyfmXxSAAAAAAC4AKGlzc3Vlci1mcHJAbm90YXRpb25zLm9w
ZW5wZ3AuZmlmdGhob3JzZW1hbi5uZXRCM0FFN0VDQTlBOEM4QjMwMjZBNUEwRjU2
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=ymC0
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----



From kloecker at kde.org  Wed Mar 25 23:14:57 2015
From: kloecker at kde.org (Ingo =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Kl=F6cker?=)
Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2015 23:14:57 +0100
Subject: PGP/MIME (Was: One alternative to SMTP for email: Confidant Mail)
In-Reply-To: <5513155D.3090005@gmail.com>
References: <5510D9B3.4090809@confidantmail.org>
 <55130F84.3000603@dougbarton.email> <5513155D.3090005@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <2886004.karhszMXGj@collossus.ingo-kloecker.de>

On Wednesday 25 March 2015 21:06:53 martijn. list wrote:
> On 03/25/2015 08:41 PM, Doug Barton wrote:
> > On 3/25/15 11:08 AM, Bob (Robert) Cavanaugh wrote:
> >> Doug,
> >> Signature shows as an attachment "signature.asc". No evidence that PGP
> >> actions were envoked. Work forces use of Synaptic PGP, so I cannot
> >> tell if it is verified or not.
> > 
> > Thanks Bob, that is interesting feedback.
> > 
> > FWIW, I have received various other messages privately from people who
> > have said the same thing ... They can see the attachment, but either
> > message verification fails, or there is no indication on their side that
> > it is a PGP-signed message at all.
> > 
> > While this is strictly anecdotal evidence I would argue that it's a good
> > indication that we may not be ready for PGP/MIME as the default.
> 
> It looks like this is caused by the mailing list software (mailman).
> Mailman adds a banner to the mail and therefore the mail is no longer a
> valid PGP/MIME mail. I think mailman should be smart enough not to mess
> with digitally signed mail (same thing happens with S/MIME signed email).

Actually, mailman is that smart. mailman has put the body of the signed 
message together with the corresponding Content-type header as message part 
into a multipart/mixed container and has added the banner as second message 
part to the multipart/mixed container. My mail client (KMail) properly parses 
this "complex" message and shows the signed part and below the unsigned 
mailing list banner.

So it's not mailman that's not smart enough, but the mail clients the other 
recipients are using. Mail clients showing a "signature.asc" attachment 
probably do not understand PGP/MIME (which isn't that unusual because only a 
handful mail clients support PGP/MIME out-of-the-box without additional 
plugins).


Regards,
Ingo
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From mailing-lists at asatiifm.net  Wed Mar 25 23:56:03 2015
From: mailing-lists at asatiifm.net (=?windows-1252?Q?Ville_M=E4=E4tt=E4?=)
Date: Thu, 26 Mar 2015 00:56:03 +0200
Subject: PGP/MIME (Was: One alternative to SMTP for email: Confidant Mail)
In-Reply-To: <2886004.karhszMXGj@collossus.ingo-kloecker.de>
References: <5510D9B3.4090809@confidantmail.org>
 <55130F84.3000603@dougbarton.email> <5513155D.3090005@gmail.com>
 <2886004.karhszMXGj@collossus.ingo-kloecker.de>
Message-ID: <55133D03.7070708@asatiifm.net>

On 26.03.15 00:14, Ingo Kl?cker wrote:
> So it's not mailman that's not smart enough, but the mail clients the other 
> recipients are using. Mail clients showing a "signature.asc" attachment 
> probably do not understand PGP/MIME (which isn't that unusual because only a 
> handful mail clients support PGP/MIME out-of-the-box without additional 
> plugins).

It seems to me that emails sent and signed by Thunderbird + Enigmail are
displayed just fine by it. No signature.asc quirks. But emails sent by
others are displaying the attachment in addition to the normal Enigmail
added UI signature information. Ingo, Doug, Samir and Bob; I see the
attached file for each of you but not my own PGP/MIME mails routed back
to me from the list :).

-- 
Ville

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From samir at samirnassar.com  Thu Mar 26 00:26:48 2015
From: samir at samirnassar.com (Samir Nassar)
Date: Thu, 26 Mar 2015 00:26:48 +0100
Subject: PGP/MIME (Was: One alternative to SMTP for email: Confidant Mail)
In-Reply-To: <55133D03.7070708@asatiifm.net>
References: <5510D9B3.4090809@confidantmail.org>
 <2886004.karhszMXGj@collossus.ingo-kloecker.de>
 <55133D03.7070708@asatiifm.net>
Message-ID: <2105669.fdIHN9BOR4@lathe>

On Thursday, March 26, 2015 12:56:03 AM Ville M??tt? wrote:
> It seems to me that emails sent and signed by Thunderbird + Enigmail are
> displayed just fine by it. No signature.asc quirks. But emails sent by
> others are displaying the attachment in addition to the normal Enigmail
> added UI signature information. Ingo, Doug, Samir and Bob; I see the
> attached file for each of you but not my own PGP/MIME mails routed back
> to me from the list :).

I am using KMail2 4.14.6 and I see your, Doug's, and Ingo's emails clearly 
even after mailman's modifications and all three are using PGP/MIME from 
different clients (I presume).

Samir
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From daniele at grinta.net  Thu Mar 26 00:38:25 2015
From: daniele at grinta.net (Daniele Nicolodi)
Date: Thu, 26 Mar 2015 00:38:25 +0100
Subject: PGP/MIME (Was: One alternative to SMTP for email: Confidant Mail)
In-Reply-To: <55133D03.7070708@asatiifm.net>
References: <5510D9B3.4090809@confidantmail.org>
 <55130F84.3000603@dougbarton.email> <5513155D.3090005@gmail.com>
 <2886004.karhszMXGj@collossus.ingo-kloecker.de>
 <55133D03.7070708@asatiifm.net>
Message-ID: <551346F1.10907@grinta.net>

On 25/03/15 23:56, Ville M??tt? wrote:
> On 26.03.15 00:14, Ingo Kl?cker wrote:
>> So it's not mailman that's not smart enough, but the mail clients
>> the other recipients are using. Mail clients showing a
>> "signature.asc" attachment probably do not understand PGP/MIME
>> (which isn't that unusual because only a handful mail clients
>> support PGP/MIME out-of-the-box without additional plugins).
> 
> It seems to me that emails sent and signed by Thunderbird +
> Enigmail are displayed just fine by it. No signature.asc quirks.
> But emails sent by others are displaying the attachment in addition
> to the normal Enigmail added UI signature information. Ingo, Doug,
> Samir and Bob; I see the attached file for each of you but not my
> own PGP/MIME mails routed back to me from the list :).

The difference must be somewhere else: I use Thunderbird 31.5.0 and
Enigmail 1.8 (20150316-1815) and, while it recognizes the signatures,
I see the attachment "signature.asc" for all the PGP/MIME signed
emails I've checked.

Cheers,
Daniele




From dave.kimble at riseup.net  Thu Mar 26 04:45:14 2015
From: dave.kimble at riseup.net (Dave Kimble)
Date: Thu, 26 Mar 2015 13:45:14 +1000
Subject: upgrading v1 to v2
Message-ID: <551380CA.5040103@riseup.net>

Ubuntu 14.04 with gnupg 1.4.16 installed from Ubuntu repository.
Enigmail says it is about time I upgraded to gnupg v2.
Ubuntu Software Centre says I have the latest version.

I have git cloned gnupg ?v2.0.26? and attempted to configure.
It says I need libgpg-error, libgcrypt, libassuan, libksba, npth

I have installed libgpg-error-1.9 , apparently OK.
I can see /usr/lib/bin/libgpg-error and /libgpg-error-config

When I try to configure libgcrypt-1.6.3 it says:
checking for gpg-error-config... /usr/local/bin/gpg-error-config
checking for GPG Error - version >= 1.11... no
configure: error: libgpg-error is needed.

Obviously I am doing something wrong, so its my fault, but this is
ABSOLUTELY HOPELESS if you want people to adopt gnupg.  I work with
clients who don't know what an email client is, let alone what theirs is
called, on a wide variety of OSs.  They cannot possibly do this all
this.  Is it too much to ask that you produce an Ubuntu-friendly
repository that takes care of all the dependencies and compiling?

Rant over, please help.

Dave



From dave.kimble at riseup.net  Thu Mar 26 03:39:44 2015
From: dave.kimble at riseup.net (Dave Kimble)
Date: Thu, 26 Mar 2015 12:39:44 +1000
Subject: upgrading v1 to v2
Message-ID: <55137170.1030708@riseup.net>

Ubuntu 14.04 with gnupg 1.4.16 installed from Ubuntu repository.
Enigmail says it is about time I upgraded to gnupg v2.
Ubuntu Software Centre says I have the latest version.

I have git cloned gnupg ?v2.0.26? and attempted to configure.
It says I need libgpg-error, libgcrypt, libassuan, libksba, npth

I have installed libgpg-error-1.9 , apparently OK.
I can see /usr/lib/bin/libgpg-error and /libgpg-error-config

When I try to configure libgcrypt-1.6.3 it says:
checking for gpg-error-config... /usr/local/bin/gpg-error-config
checking for GPG Error - version >= 1.11... no
configure: error: libgpg-error is needed.

Obviously I am doing something wrong, so its my fault, but this is
ABSOLUTELY HOPELESS if you want people to adopt gnupg.  I work with
clients who don't know what an email client is, let alone what theirs is
called, on a wide variety of OSs.  They cannot possibly do this all
this.  Is it too much to ask that you produce an Ubuntu-friendly
repository that takes care of all the dependencies and compiling?

Rant over, please help.

Dave



From antony at blazrsoft.com  Thu Mar 26 05:12:09 2015
From: antony at blazrsoft.com (Antony Prince)
Date: Thu, 26 Mar 2015 00:12:09 -0400
Subject: upgrading v1 to v2
In-Reply-To: <55137170.1030708@riseup.net>
References: <55137170.1030708@riseup.net>
Message-ID: <55138719.4090802@blazrsoft.com>

On 3/25/2015 10:39 PM, Dave Kimble wrote:
> I have installed libgpg-error-1.9 , apparently OK.
> checking for GPG Error - version >= 1.11... no

It is looking for version >= 1.11, which you do not have.

> I can see /usr/lib/bin/libgpg-error and /libgpg-error-config
> checking for gpg-error-config... /usr/local/bin/gpg-error-config

It also appears to be looking in the default directory for self compiled
software (/usr/local/bin). I would recommend compiling the necessary
libraries/binaries of the correct version from source as well since it
looks like the repository does not provide them, which would make sense
since the repository version does not require a newer version. If you're
going to compile software from source, be prepared for headaches like
this. This isn't really a GPG issue, but just the fact that Ubuntu has
not brought the newer versions into their repositories yet.

> this.  Is it too much to ask that you produce an Ubuntu-friendly
> repository that takes care of all the dependencies and compiling?

I've never looked into maintaining a repository myself, but it does seem
like it would be a quite a bit of work (maintaining the server,
compiling and packaging the software, etc.) especially for software that
has a one man development team.

-- 

Antony Prince

Key ID: 0x4F040744
Fingerprint: FE96 5B7F A708 18D3 B74B  959F A6E1 6242 4F04 0744
URL: keyserver.blazrsoft.com

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From mirimir at riseup.net  Thu Mar 26 05:19:11 2015
From: mirimir at riseup.net (Mirimir)
Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2015 22:19:11 -0600
Subject: upgrading v1 to v2
In-Reply-To: <55137170.1030708@riseup.net>
References: <55137170.1030708@riseup.net>
Message-ID: <551388BF.5030802@riseup.net>

On 03/25/2015 08:39 PM, Dave Kimble wrote:
> Ubuntu 14.04 with gnupg 1.4.16 installed from Ubuntu repository.
> Enigmail says it is about time I upgraded to gnupg v2.
> Ubuntu Software Centre says I have the latest version.

In Ubuntu 12.04 x64, I just did:

$ sudo apt-get install gnupg2

That gave me "gpg (GnuPG) 2.0.17".

Then I went to "Enigmail Preferences | Basic", and made sure that GnuPG
was pointed at "/usr/bin/gpg2".

> I have git cloned gnupg ?v2.0.26? and attempted to configure.
> It says I need libgpg-error, libgcrypt, libassuan, libksba, npth
> 
> I have installed libgpg-error-1.9 , apparently OK.
> I can see /usr/lib/bin/libgpg-error and /libgpg-error-config
> 
> When I try to configure libgcrypt-1.6.3 it says:
> checking for gpg-error-config... /usr/local/bin/gpg-error-config
> checking for GPG Error - version >= 1.11... no
> configure: error: libgpg-error is needed.
> 
> Obviously I am doing something wrong, so its my fault, but this is
> ABSOLUTELY HOPELESS if you want people to adopt gnupg.  I work with
> clients who don't know what an email client is, let alone what theirs is
> called, on a wide variety of OSs.  They cannot possibly do this all
> this.  Is it too much to ask that you produce an Ubuntu-friendly
> repository that takes care of all the dependencies and compiling?
> 
> Rant over, please help.
> 
> Dave
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
> 


From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Thu Mar 26 05:22:38 2015
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Thu, 26 Mar 2015 00:22:38 -0400
Subject: upgrading v1 to v2
In-Reply-To: <551380CA.5040103@riseup.net>
References: <551380CA.5040103@riseup.net>
Message-ID: <5513898E.3030702@sixdemonbag.org>

> Ubuntu 14.04 with gnupg 1.4.16 installed from Ubuntu repository.
> Enigmail says it is about time I upgraded to gnupg v2.
> Ubuntu Software Centre says I have the latest version.

Open up a terminal window.

"sudo apt-get install gnupg2"

Bang, done.  Ubuntu isn't lying to you -- you have the most recent
version of GnuPG *1*.  GnuPG version *2* is a separate package.


From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Thu Mar 26 05:26:48 2015
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Thu, 26 Mar 2015 00:26:48 -0400
Subject: upgrading v1 to v2
In-Reply-To: <55138719.4090802@blazrsoft.com>
References: <55137170.1030708@riseup.net> <55138719.4090802@blazrsoft.com>
Message-ID: <55138A88.2060508@sixdemonbag.org>

> I would recommend compiling the necessary libraries/binaries of the
> correct version from source as well since it looks like the
> repository does not provide them

Ubuntu does provide them, and has for several years.



From antony at blazrsoft.com  Thu Mar 26 05:27:36 2015
From: antony at blazrsoft.com (Antony Prince)
Date: Thu, 26 Mar 2015 00:27:36 -0400
Subject: upgrading v1 to v2
In-Reply-To: <551388BF.5030802@riseup.net>
References: <55137170.1030708@riseup.net> <551388BF.5030802@riseup.net>
Message-ID: <55138AB8.7030604@blazrsoft.com>

On 3/26/2015 12:19 AM, Mirimir wrote:
> In Ubuntu 12.04 x64, I just did:
> 
> $ sudo apt-get install gnupg2

Been a while since I used Ubuntu. That would make sense though since
some applications still require v1.x and some require 2.x which would
explain the naming discrepancy (gnupg vs. gnupg2), but its easy to see
how that could be confusing. Easier than compiling it and all its
dependencies from source, that's for darn sure.

-- 

Antony Prince

Key ID: 0x4F040744
Fingerprint: FE96 5B7F A708 18D3 B74B  959F A6E1 6242 4F04 0744
URL: keyserver.blazrsoft.com

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From antony at blazrsoft.com  Thu Mar 26 05:43:40 2015
From: antony at blazrsoft.com (Antony Prince)
Date: Thu, 26 Mar 2015 00:43:40 -0400
Subject: upgrading v1 to v2
In-Reply-To: <55138A88.2060508@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <55137170.1030708@riseup.net> <55138719.4090802@blazrsoft.com>
 <55138A88.2060508@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <55138E7C.8020401@blazrsoft.com>

On 3/26/2015 12:26 AM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
>> I would recommend compiling the necessary libraries/binaries of the
>> correct version from source as well since it looks like the
>> repository does not provide them
> 
> Ubuntu does provide them, and has for several years.

I admit I didn't check. Seemed odd that they wouldn't since Ubuntu is
known for keeping its repositories pretty up-to-date.

-- 

Antony Prince

Key ID: 0x4F040744
Fingerprint: FE96 5B7F A708 18D3 B74B  959F A6E1 6242 4F04 0744
URL: keyserver.blazrsoft.com

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From xavier at maillard.im  Thu Mar 26 06:44:09 2015
From: xavier at maillard.im (Xavier Maillard)
Date: Thu, 26 Mar 2015 06:44:09 +0100
Subject: PGP/MIME (Was: One alternative to SMTP for email: Confidant Mail)
In-Reply-To: <55130F84.3000603@dougbarton.email>
References: <5510D9B3.4090809@confidantmail.org>
 <55126411.1040801@dougbarton.email>
 <8F0B09FC6339FA439524099BFCABC11F2D3D03DF@IRVEXCHMB11.corp.ad.broadcom.com>
 <55130F84.3000603@dougbarton.email>
Message-ID: <864mp8ia8m.fsf@kcals2.maillard.im>


Doug Barton <dougb at dougbarton.email> writes:

> On 3/25/15 11:08 AM, Bob (Robert) Cavanaugh wrote:
>> Doug,
>> Signature shows as an attachment "signature.asc". No evidence that PGP actions were envoked. Work forces use of Synaptic PGP, so I cannot tell if it is verified or not.
>
> Thanks Bob, that is interesting feedback.
>
> FWIW, I have received various other messages privately from people who
> have said the same thing ... They can see the attachment, but either
> message verification fails, or there is no indication on their side that
> it is a PGP-signed message at all.

I thought your signature was a joke :)

-- Xavier.


From mike at confidantmail.org  Thu Mar 26 09:59:53 2015
From: mike at confidantmail.org (Mike Ingle)
Date: Thu, 26 Mar 2015 01:59:53 -0700
Subject: Enabling and using ECC keys (any reason not to?)
Message-ID: <5513CA89.20301@confidantmail.org>

The current version of Confidant Mail for Windows includes GPG 1.4.19. 
However, the code is written to support version 2.1 and ECC keys. If you 
point it to GPG 2.1, it will let GPG handle passphrases, and will let 
you create and rotate ECC keys.

Is there any reason not to start using them? I have been reluctant to 
bundle version 2.1, because once people start using ECC keys, using 
version 2.1 becomes mandatory. GPG makes you ask very nicely 
(--full-gen-key --expert) to get an ECC key. Is this just a backward 
compatibility thing, or is the security of ECC keys not fully trusted yet?

I want to enable them, but not until it's safe.

Thanks,
Mike


From wk at gnupg.org  Thu Mar 26 11:05:11 2015
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Thu, 26 Mar 2015 11:05:11 +0100
Subject: Enabling and using ECC keys (any reason not to?)
In-Reply-To: <5513CA89.20301@confidantmail.org> (Mike Ingle's message of "Thu, 
 26 Mar 2015 01:59:53 -0700")
References: <5513CA89.20301@confidantmail.org>
Message-ID: <87mw30gjl4.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Thu, 26 Mar 2015 09:59, mike at confidantmail.org said:

> Is there any reason not to start using them? I have been reluctant to
> bundle version 2.1, because once people start using ECC keys, using

There is no deployed base of ECC capable OpenPGP implementation yet.
Thus ECC is not enabled by default becuase it does not make much sense
to ask people to create ECC keys if there is virtually nobody else who
is able to use it.

A second reason is that the plan is to use Ed25519/Curve25519 as the
default ECC curves instead of the NIST curves.  ECDH for Curve25519 is
not yet implemented  

> compatibility thing, or is the security of ECC keys not fully trusted
> yet?

Our ECC implementation might still be subject to side channel attacks
thus if that is part of your threat model you may want to wait a bit
longer.  However mitigating SCA is a never ending cops and gendarme game.

If you do not need to migrate an old inbstallation I would always
suggest to go with 2.1.


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From pete at heypete.com  Thu Mar 26 10:29:09 2015
From: pete at heypete.com (Pete Stephenson)
Date: Thu, 26 Mar 2015 10:29:09 +0100
Subject: upgrading v1 to v2
In-Reply-To: <551380CA.5040103@riseup.net>
References: <551380CA.5040103@riseup.net>
Message-ID: <CA+4dSw4-oDqg+6Kf4RhzSd2asRg1znLmYUeFy0Ad31s0uuxMjg@mail.gmail.com>

On Mar 26, 2015 4:47 AM, "Dave Kimble" <dave.kimble at riseup.net> wrote:
>
> Ubuntu 14.04 with gnupg 1.4.16 installed from Ubuntu repository.
> Enigmail says it is about time I upgraded to gnupg v2.
> Ubuntu Software Centre says I have the latest version.
>
> I have git cloned gnupg ?v2.0.26? and attempted to configure.

Any particular reason you want GnuPG 2.0.x instead of 2.1? There's very
little difference for most users between 1.x and 2.0.x.

2.1.x adds ECC support, which is nice, but there aren't any packages yet
for it in Ubuntu.

Since you're on Ubuntu you could just run "sudo apt-get install gnupg2" and
GnuPG 2.0.x would be installed alongside 1.x. Although it wouldn't show the
latest version number it'd still have all the security updates backported.

> Obviously I am doing something wrong, so its my fault, but this is
> ABSOLUTELY HOPELESS if you want people to adopt gnupg.  I work with
> clients who don't know what an email client is, let alone what theirs is
> called, on a wide variety of OSs.  They cannot possibly do this all
> this.  Is it too much to ask that you produce an Ubuntu-friendly
> repository that takes care of all the dependencies and compiling?

Compiling from source is not for the faint of heart. Fortunately, the
gnupg2 package exists on Ubuntu and makes the installation easy.

Cheers!
-Pete
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From philip.jackson at nordnet.fr  Thu Mar 26 15:20:24 2015
From: philip.jackson at nordnet.fr (Philip Jackson)
Date: Thu, 26 Mar 2015 15:20:24 +0100
Subject: upgrading v1 to v2
In-Reply-To: <55137170.1030708@riseup.net>
References: <55137170.1030708@riseup.net>
Message-ID: <551415A8.5000606@nordnet.fr>

On 26/03/15 03:39, Dave Kimble wrote:
> Ubuntu 14.04 with gnupg 1.4.16 installed from Ubuntu repository.
> Enigmail says it is about time I upgraded to gnupg v2.
> Ubuntu Software Centre says I have the latest version.
> 
I have a ubuntu flavour 14.04 and gnupg2 is certainly available in its
repository as well as gnupg1.1.16

You should easily be able to find 2.0.22 in 14.04.

In a few weeks, you'll be able to get 15.04 (I suppose) and this could have
something later than 2.0.22.

Philip


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From brian at minton.name  Thu Mar 26 17:17:46 2015
From: brian at minton.name (Brian Minton)
Date: Thu, 26 Mar 2015 12:17:46 -0400
Subject: PGP/MIME (Was: One alternative to SMTP for email: Confidant Mail)
In-Reply-To: <2886004.karhszMXGj@collossus.ingo-kloecker.de>
References: <5510D9B3.4090809@confidantmail.org>
 <55130F84.3000603@dougbarton.email>
 <5513155D.3090005@gmail.com> <2886004.karhszMXGj@collossus.ingo-kloecker.de>
Message-ID: <CANyOob3TFr0OYrmD6SZWEobDm-+fDJrmkB3SNk5oTt_rgvucqg@mail.gmail.com>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Hash: SHA256


I think gmail is the single most popular email client, with 500 million

users.  I think that until there is a way to verify pgp signatures from

within gmail, pgp/mime will continue to show up as an attachment.

There are ways to use pgp/mime or inline pgp with gmail, but nothing

great.  I'm hopeful for google's end to end, and I currently use

mailvelope, but as far as I know, neither of those options supports

PGP/MIME.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

Version: GnuPG v1


iF4EAREIAAYFAlUUMNoACgkQa46zoGXPuqnDTwD/QapSkfkZDsUfXf1rVw7O3Bbk

VuxnKzl/+sk8EuyD9dcA/RSd31z6jC1u1EFGptqQw3DWpEQqcU1G6LS/GPfclBWN

=hHOn

-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
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From johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl  Thu Mar 26 17:55:21 2015
From: johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl (Johan Wevers)
Date: Thu, 26 Mar 2015 17:55:21 +0100
Subject: Enabling and using ECC keys (any reason not to?)
In-Reply-To: <5513CA89.20301@confidantmail.org>
References: <5513CA89.20301@confidantmail.org>
Message-ID: <551439F9.2010202@vulcan.xs4all.nl>

On 26-03-2015 9:59, Mike Ingle wrote:

> Is this just a backward
> compatibility thing, or is the security of ECC keys not fully trusted yet?

The buzz about Dual_EC_DRBG made it clear that it is possible to design
curves where the designers have access to data that allows them to
compromise the system. Wether the curves used in a given implementation
are suspected to possibly have such a weakness is a matter of debate. I
didn't check the status of this for the curves used in GnuPG 2.1.

-- 
ir. J.C.A. Wevers
PGP/GPG public keys at http://www.xs4all.nl/~johanw/pgpkeys.html



From mailing-lists at asatiifm.net  Thu Mar 26 18:20:58 2015
From: mailing-lists at asatiifm.net (=?windows-1252?Q?Ville_M=E4=E4tt=E4?=)
Date: Thu, 26 Mar 2015 19:20:58 +0200
Subject: PGP/MIME (Was: One alternative to SMTP for email: Confidant Mail)
In-Reply-To: <CANyOob3TFr0OYrmD6SZWEobDm-+fDJrmkB3SNk5oTt_rgvucqg@mail.gmail.com>
References: <5510D9B3.4090809@confidantmail.org>
 <55130F84.3000603@dougbarton.email> <5513155D.3090005@gmail.com>
 <2886004.karhszMXGj@collossus.ingo-kloecker.de>
 <CANyOob3TFr0OYrmD6SZWEobDm-+fDJrmkB3SNk5oTt_rgvucqg@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <55143FFA.6040203@asatiifm.net>

On 26.03.15 18:17, Brian Minton wrote:
> I think gmail is the single most popular email client, with 500 million
> 
> users.

There are about 7,3 billion people out there that don't have a clue what
OpenPGP is.

> I think that until there is a way to verify pgp signatures from
> 
> within gmail, pgp/mime will continue to show up as an attachment.

Why should it? At least for non-Gmail users as well as Gmail users not
using *webmail*.

> There are ways to use pgp/mime or inline pgp with gmail, but nothing
> 
> great.  I'm hopeful for google's end to end, and I currently use
> 
> mailvelope, but as far as I know, neither of those options supports
> 
> PGP/MIME.

Yeah? so? Not all email users are GMail users. Not all GMail users use
the /webmail/ interface. There are a lot of GMail and other /webmail/
users out there but *we really need to stop letting that drag us down*.
Those /webmail/ operators need to get their shit together and start
playing by the rules. It's not our job to do theirs for them.

And until OpenPGP breaks out even of the single digits coverage I really
don't think we should worry about every single use case. Those who care
for OpenPGP can very easily just use something other than webmail.

I just did a test across accounts sending from Thunderbird + Enigmail.
Sure, GMail /webmail/ shows the attachment. In Thunderbird over IMAP the
emails are just fine; "Good signature" and no attachments. Now Google
just needs to go and get their platform up to speed on PGP/MIME.

-- 
Ville

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From pete at heypete.com  Thu Mar 26 18:40:15 2015
From: pete at heypete.com (Pete Stephenson)
Date: Thu, 26 Mar 2015 18:40:15 +0100
Subject: Enabling and using ECC keys (any reason not to?)
In-Reply-To: <551439F9.2010202@vulcan.xs4all.nl>
References: <5513CA89.20301@confidantmail.org>
 <551439F9.2010202@vulcan.xs4all.nl>
Message-ID: <CA+4dSw4GBBa0Nom8x+-c8QTw7TKVCmBaey=d-mtT7oqPk8UYkw@mail.gmail.com>

On Thu, Mar 26, 2015 at 5:55 PM, Johan Wevers <johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl> wrote:
> On 26-03-2015 9:59, Mike Ingle wrote:
>
>> Is this just a backward
>> compatibility thing, or is the security of ECC keys not fully trusted yet?
>
> The buzz about Dual_EC_DRBG made it clear that it is possible to design
> curves where the designers have access to data that allows them to
> compromise the system. Wether the curves used in a given implementation
> are suspected to possibly have such a weakness is a matter of debate. I
> didn't check the status of this for the curves used in GnuPG 2.1.

Although Dual_EC_DRBG uses elliptic curves, the weakness in that
algorithm lies with the alleged backdoor in Dual_EC_DRBG itself and
not in the mathematics behind elliptic curve crypto in general.

GnuPG 2.1 implements the following curves:
   (1) Curve 25519
   (2) NIST P-256
   (3) NIST P-384
   (4) NIST P-521
   (5) Brainpool P-256
   (6) Brainpool P-384
   (7) Brainpool P-512

People have raised concerns about the NIST curves, but they are part
of the RFC 6637 standard so compliant programs must implement P-256,
may implement P-384, and should implement P-521.

To address potential concerns with the NIST curves, GnuPG also
supports the Brainpool curves which are similar in structure to the
NIST curves but use parameters chosen from nothing-up-my-sleeve
numbers and so should be reasonably trustworthy. Still, the structure
of such curves leaves a bit to be desired (see
http://safecurves.cr.yp.to/ for details, I'm hardly an expert).

Additionally, GnuPG implements the non-standard Curve25519 (but only
for signing at the moment -- encryption will come later after things
have been standardized) which should be safe.

Cheers!
-Pete

-- 
Pete Stephenson


From mailing-lists at asatiifm.net  Thu Mar 26 18:57:25 2015
From: mailing-lists at asatiifm.net (=?windows-1252?Q?Ville_M=E4=E4tt=E4?=)
Date: Thu, 26 Mar 2015 19:57:25 +0200
Subject: PGP/MIME (Was: One alternative to SMTP for email: Confidant Mail)
In-Reply-To: <551346F1.10907@grinta.net>
References: <5510D9B3.4090809@confidantmail.org>
 <55130F84.3000603@dougbarton.email> <5513155D.3090005@gmail.com>
 <2886004.karhszMXGj@collossus.ingo-kloecker.de>
 <55133D03.7070708@asatiifm.net> <551346F1.10907@grinta.net>
Message-ID: <55144885.7050007@asatiifm.net>

On 26.03.15 01:38, Daniele Nicolodi wrote:
> On 25/03/15 23:56, Ville M??tt? wrote:
>> > On 26.03.15 00:14, Ingo Kl?cker wrote:
>>> >> So it's not mailman that's not smart enough, but the mail clients
>>> >> the other recipients are using. Mail clients showing a
>>> >> "signature.asc" attachment probably do not understand PGP/MIME
>>> >> (which isn't that unusual because only a handful mail clients
>>> >> support PGP/MIME out-of-the-box without additional plugins).
>> > 
>> > It seems to me that emails sent and signed by Thunderbird +
>> > Enigmail are displayed just fine by it. No signature.asc quirks.
>> > But emails sent by others are displaying the attachment in addition
>> > to the normal Enigmail added UI signature information. Ingo, Doug,
>> > Samir and Bob; I see the attached file for each of you but not my
>> > own PGP/MIME mails routed back to me from the list :).
> The difference must be somewhere else: I use Thunderbird 31.5.0 and
> Enigmail 1.8 (20150316-1815) and, while it recognizes the signatures,
> I see the attachment "signature.asc" for all the PGP/MIME signed
> emails I've checked.

I sent a signed message to Daniele off list. Signature recognized fine
and no attachment. So a bug, i.e. the extra attachment, in Enigmail's
reading of mails that have gone through Mailman even though Mailman
produced MIME should be valid?

-- 
Ville

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From antony at blazrsoft.com  Thu Mar 26 19:21:06 2015
From: antony at blazrsoft.com (Antony Prince)
Date: Thu, 26 Mar 2015 14:21:06 -0400
Subject: PGP/MIME (Was: One alternative to SMTP for email: Confidant Mail)
In-Reply-To: <55144885.7050007@asatiifm.net>
References: <5510D9B3.4090809@confidantmail.org>
 <55130F84.3000603@dougbarton.email> <5513155D.3090005@gmail.com>
 <2886004.karhszMXGj@collossus.ingo-kloecker.de>
 <55133D03.7070708@asatiifm.net> <551346F1.10907@grinta.net>
 <55144885.7050007@asatiifm.net>
Message-ID: <55144E12.6030604@blazrsoft.com>

On 3/26/2015 1:57 PM, Ville M??tt? wrote:
> On 26.03.15 01:38, Daniele Nicolodi wrote:
>> On 25/03/15 23:56, Ville M??tt? wrote:
>>>> On 26.03.15 00:14, Ingo Kl?cker wrote:
>>>>>> So it's not mailman that's not smart enough, but the mail clients
>>>>>> the other recipients are using. Mail clients showing a
>>>>>> "signature.asc" attachment probably do not understand PGP/MIME
>>>>>> (which isn't that unusual because only a handful mail clients
>>>>>> support PGP/MIME out-of-the-box without additional plugins).
>>>>
>>>> It seems to me that emails sent and signed by Thunderbird +
>>>> Enigmail are displayed just fine by it. No signature.asc quirks.
>>>> But emails sent by others are displaying the attachment in addition
>>>> to the normal Enigmail added UI signature information. Ingo, Doug,
>>>> Samir and Bob; I see the attached file for each of you but not my
>>>> own PGP/MIME mails routed back to me from the list :).
>> The difference must be somewhere else: I use Thunderbird 31.5.0 and
>> Enigmail 1.8 (20150316-1815) and, while it recognizes the signatures,
>> I see the attachment "signature.asc" for all the PGP/MIME signed
>> emails I've checked.
> 
> I sent a signed message to Daniele off list. Signature recognized fine
> and no attachment. So a bug, i.e. the extra attachment, in Enigmail's
> reading of mails that have gone through Mailman even though Mailman
> produced MIME should be valid?
> 

FWIW, I use Thunderbird 31.5.0 and Enigmail 1.8.1 (2015-03-23) and the
signatures verify just fine, but it does show the signature.asc as an
attachment. Viewing my own PGP/MIME mails in the Sent folder does not
show any attachments, but the signature verifies.

-- 

Antony Prince

Key ID: 0x4F040744
Fingerprint: FE96 5B7F A708 18D3 B74B  959F A6E1 6242 4F04 0744
URL: keyserver.blazrsoft.com

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From hugo at barrera.io  Thu Mar 26 18:40:30 2015
From: hugo at barrera.io (Hugo Osvaldo Barrera)
Date: Thu, 26 Mar 2015 14:40:30 -0300
Subject: upgrading v1 to v2
In-Reply-To: <551380CA.5040103@riseup.net>
References: <551380CA.5040103@riseup.net>
Message-ID: <20150326174030.GA13480@hyperion.barrera.io>

On 2015-03-26 13:45, Dave Kimble wrote:
> Ubuntu 14.04 with gnupg 1.4.16 installed from Ubuntu repository.
> Enigmail says it is about time I upgraded to gnupg v2.
> Ubuntu Software Centre says I have the latest version.
> 
> I have git cloned gnupg ?v2.0.26? and attempted to configure.
> It says I need libgpg-error, libgcrypt, libassuan, libksba, npth
> 
> I have installed libgpg-error-1.9 , apparently OK.
> I can see /usr/lib/bin/libgpg-error and /libgpg-error-config
> 
> When I try to configure libgcrypt-1.6.3 it says:
> checking for gpg-error-config... /usr/local/bin/gpg-error-config
> checking for GPG Error - version >= 1.11... no
> configure: error: libgpg-error is needed.
> 

IIRC, Ubuntu splits most packages in two, with the binaries in one, and the
headers (needed for building) in another.

I can't recall what the name was exactly, but I do recall it was pretty
non-obvious and confusing.

Anyway, as noted, unless you want 2.1, just get 2.0 from the Ubuntu repos via
apt-get.

> Obviously I am doing something wrong, so its my fault, but this is
> ABSOLUTELY HOPELESS if you want people to adopt gnupg.  I work with
> clients who don't know what an email client is, let alone what theirs is
> called, on a wide variety of OSs.  They cannot possibly do this all
> this.  Is it too much to ask that you produce an Ubuntu-friendly
> repository that takes care of all the dependencies and compiling?
> 
> Rant over, please help.
> 
> Dave
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

-- 
Hugo Osvaldo Barrera
A: Because we read from top to bottom, left to right.
Q: Why should I start my reply below the quoted text?
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From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net  Thu Mar 26 20:49:09 2015
From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA)
Date: Thu, 26 Mar 2015 19:49:09 +0000
Subject: PGP/MIME (Was: One alternative to SMTP for email: Confidant Mail)
In-Reply-To: <CANyOob3TFr0OYrmD6SZWEobDm-+fDJrmkB3SNk5oTt_rgvucqg@mail.gmail.com>
References: <5510D9B3.4090809@confidantmail.org>
 <55130F84.3000603@dougbarton.email> <5513155D.3090005@gmail.com>
 <2886004.karhszMXGj@collossus.ingo-kloecker.de>
 <CANyOob3TFr0OYrmD6SZWEobDm-+fDJrmkB3SNk5oTt_rgvucqg@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <66989839.20150326194909@my_localhost>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

Hi


On Thursday 26 March 2015 at 4:17:46 PM, in
<mid:CANyOob3TFr0OYrmD6SZWEobDm-+fDJrmkB3SNk5oTt_rgvucqg at mail.gmail.com>,
Brian Minton wrote:



> I think gmail is the single most popular email client,


Gmail is an email service provider, not an email client. They provide
access via a webmail site for those who wish to process their email
using a web browser, as well as by both POP and IMAP, for those who
wish to process their email using an email client.


- --
Best regards

MFPA                  <mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net>

A bird in the hand makes it awfully hard to blow your nose
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-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----



From brian at minton.name  Thu Mar 26 21:10:08 2015
From: brian at minton.name (Brian Minton)
Date: Thu, 26 Mar 2015 16:10:08 -0400
Subject: PGP/MIME (Was: One alternative to SMTP for email: Confidant Mail)
In-Reply-To: <66989839.20150326194909@my_localhost>
References: <5510D9B3.4090809@confidantmail.org>
 <55130F84.3000603@dougbarton.email>
 <5513155D.3090005@gmail.com> <2886004.karhszMXGj@collossus.ingo-kloecker.de>
 <CANyOob3TFr0OYrmD6SZWEobDm-+fDJrmkB3SNk5oTt_rgvucqg@mail.gmail.com>
 <66989839.20150326194909@my_localhost>
Message-ID: <CANyOob2J-Kg_xaoPj9g7SRMsWrQPBZOGA=v9yG5nOXLMsLk0iA@mail.gmail.com>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256

On Thu, Mar 26, 2015 at 3:49 PM, MFPA
<2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net> wrote:
>
> Gmail is an email service provider, not an email client. They provide
> access via a webmail site for those who wish to process their email
> using a web browser, as well as by both POP and IMAP, for those who
> wish to process their email using an email client.
>

I meant what I said about them gmail being a client.  I agree that they
are also an email service, and it's true that you can access the gmail
mail service with imap, but I don't think it's as popular as their web
interface.  To be fair, I don't have any verifiable sources for that
claim.  But, doing so loses some of the best features of gmail (google
search on your inbox, google chat, conversation view, etc.)  Yes, I
know that lots of email clients have conversation view and search, but
for comparison, searching my ~12GB of mail on Thunderbird takes a lot
longer and is a lot clunkier of an interface than the nearly instant
search using gmail's web interface.
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-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net  Thu Mar 26 21:27:54 2015
From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA)
Date: Thu, 26 Mar 2015 20:27:54 +0000
Subject: One alternative to SMTP for email: Confidant Mail
In-Reply-To: <5510D9B3.4090809@confidantmail.org>
References: <5510D9B3.4090809@confidantmail.org>
Message-ID: <91509341.20150326202754@my_localhost>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

Hi


On Tuesday 24 March 2015 at 3:27:47 AM, in
<mid:5510D9B3.4090809 at confidantmail.org>, Mike Ingle wrote:

> More
> information and downloads at:
> https://www.confidantmail.org

The intro page on your website says "SMTP-compatible address format:
keep your existing email address". Have you checked whether google (or
any other email provider) might have something to say about using
addresses at their email domain name on a completely unrelated
service?

And does the Confidant Mail setup do any sort of challenge/response
over SMTP to check the user controls the email address they are
duplicating as a Confidant Mail address?


- --
Best regards

MFPA                  <mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net>

Versifiers write poems for it.
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From antony at blazrsoft.com  Thu Mar 26 21:43:40 2015
From: antony at blazrsoft.com (Antony Prince)
Date: Thu, 26 Mar 2015 16:43:40 -0400
Subject: One alternative to SMTP for email: Confidant Mail
In-Reply-To: <91509341.20150326202754@my_localhost>
References: <5510D9B3.4090809@confidantmail.org>
 <91509341.20150326202754@my_localhost>
Message-ID: <55146F7C.4080701@blazrsoft.com>

On 3/26/2015 4:27 PM, MFPA wrote:
> Hi
> 
> 
> On Tuesday 24 March 2015 at 3:27:47 AM, in
> <mid:5510D9B3.4090809 at confidantmail.org>, Mike Ingle wrote:
> 
>> More
>> information and downloads at:
>> https://www.confidantmail.org
> 
> The intro page on your website says "SMTP-compatible address format:
> keep your existing email address". Have you checked whether google (or
> any other email provider) might have something to say about using
> addresses at their email domain name on a completely unrelated
> service?
> 

From the bit of testing I did with it, it seems the "email address" is
merely used as a user identifier. The domain is irrelevant. You could
use nobody at nonexistent-domain.com and it would still work. The email
address doesn't actually have to exist.

> And does the Confidant Mail setup do any sort of challenge/response
> over SMTP to check the user controls the email address they are
> duplicating as a Confidant Mail address?
> 

I don't think it does since the email address you use is in no way tied
to the actual address. It is linked to the AUTH code generated by the
server during user setup and that's about all. I used this e-mail
address during the server/client setup test and I never received
anything from the Confidant server I set up. From what I gathered
reading through the docs, the Confidant protocol doesn't use domain
names as identifiers, but each user has a specific identifier. The email
address is just a more human readable way of referring to their
identifier on the server. I could be wrong though and I'm sure Mike can
explain it better.

-- 

Antony Prince

Key ID: 0x4F040744
Fingerprint: FE96 5B7F A708 18D3 B74B  959F A6E1 6242 4F04 0744
URL: keyserver.blazrsoft.com

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From peter at digitalbrains.com  Thu Mar 26 21:54:58 2015
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Thu, 26 Mar 2015 21:54:58 +0100
Subject: PGP/MIME
In-Reply-To: <CANyOob2J-Kg_xaoPj9g7SRMsWrQPBZOGA=v9yG5nOXLMsLk0iA@mail.gmail.com>
References: <5510D9B3.4090809@confidantmail.org>
 <55130F84.3000603@dougbarton.email> <5513155D.3090005@gmail.com>
 <2886004.karhszMXGj@collossus.ingo-kloecker.de>
 <CANyOob3TFr0OYrmD6SZWEobDm-+fDJrmkB3SNk5oTt_rgvucqg@mail.gmail.com>
 <66989839.20150326194909@my_localhost>
 <CANyOob2J-Kg_xaoPj9g7SRMsWrQPBZOGA=v9yG5nOXLMsLk0iA@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <fce66fd66756bc7cb355b0f40c650ebd@butters.digitalbrains.com>

On 2015-03-26 21:10, Brian Minton wrote:
> but
> for comparison, searching my ~12GB of mail on Thunderbird takes a lot
> longer and is a lot clunkier of an interface than the nearly instant
> search using gmail's web interface.

With IMAP, you can run searches on the server as well (I'm assuming 
you're talking about a local search because you mention your client, not 
your server software). A good IMAP server could get you the search 
results quickly. And it can probably avoid searching the attachments; I 
think a lot of that 12 GB is attachments?

HTH,

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at 
<http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>


From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net  Thu Mar 26 22:03:43 2015
From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA)
Date: Thu, 26 Mar 2015 21:03:43 +0000
Subject: PGP/MIME (Was: One alternative to SMTP for email: Confidant Mail)
In-Reply-To: <CANyOob2J-Kg_xaoPj9g7SRMsWrQPBZOGA=v9yG5nOXLMsLk0iA@mail.gmail.com>
References: <5510D9B3.4090809@confidantmail.org>
 <55130F84.3000603@dougbarton.email> <5513155D.3090005@gmail.com>
 <2886004.karhszMXGj@collossus.ingo-kloecker.de>
 <CANyOob3TFr0OYrmD6SZWEobDm-+fDJrmkB3SNk5oTt_rgvucqg@mail.gmail.com>
 <66989839.20150326194909@my_localhost>
 <CANyOob2J-Kg_xaoPj9g7SRMsWrQPBZOGA=v9yG5nOXLMsLk0iA@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <181784881.20150326210343@my_localhost>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

Hi


On Thursday 26 March 2015 at 8:10:08 PM, in
<mid:CANyOob2J-Kg_xaoPj9g7SRMsWrQPBZOGA=v9yG5nOXLMsLk0iA at mail.gmail.com>,
Brian Minton wrote:


> I meant what I said about them gmail being a client.

This is only true in the limited sense that they provide a webmail
interface that performs a function equivalent to an email client. (And
yes, I'm being a bit pedantic.)



> But, doing so loses some of
> the best features of gmail (google search on your
> inbox,

I find the search function in my favourite MUA far superior to that in
gmail's web interface.



> google chat,

As far as I'm concerned, the only useful thing in any "Chat" function
is the ability to turn it off. (-:



> conversation view

Which is a pale imitation of the real threading found in decent mail
clients. Unless it has massively improved in the few months since I
last needed to go to the gmail webmail interface because something
they changed had broken the POP access for my gmail account




- --
Best regards

MFPA                  <mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net>

Only dead fish go with the flow
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From mike at confidantmail.org  Thu Mar 26 22:26:35 2015
From: mike at confidantmail.org (Mike Ingle)
Date: Thu, 26 Mar 2015 14:26:35 -0700
Subject: One alternative to SMTP for email: Confidant Mail
In-Reply-To: <55146F7C.4080701@blazrsoft.com>
References: <5510D9B3.4090809@confidantmail.org>
 <91509341.20150326202754@my_localhost> <55146F7C.4080701@blazrsoft.com>
Message-ID: <5514798B.7020402@confidantmail.org>

 > From the bit of testing I did with it, it seems the "email address" is
 > merely used as a user identifier. The domain is irrelevant. You could
 > use nobody at nonexistent-domain.com and it would still work. The email
 > address doesn't actually have to exist.
 >
 > I don't think it does since the email address you use is in no way tied
 > to the actual address. It is linked to the AUTH code generated by the
 > server during user setup and that's about all. I used this e-mail
 > address during the server/client setup test and I never received
 > anything from the Confidant server I set up. From what I gathered
 > reading through the docs, the Confidant protocol doesn't use domain
 > names as identifiers, but each user has a specific identifier. The email
 > address is just a more human readable way of referring to their
 > identifier on the server. I could be wrong though and I'm sure Mike can
 > explain it better.

Yes, the email address is just an identifier. The address is used in two
ways. One, it is hashed with SHA1 and used to look up the user's key id.
Two, you can search for a key using DNS, which means take the part of
the email address after @, prepend "cmsvr.", look up the corresponding
TXT record, and use that to find the CM server with the key.

At present, there is no key verification built in and you have to check
the key fingerprint (which is always shown to the right of the address)
or check a signature chain on your key using a GPG key manager.

If you get two keys with the same address, messages will show a key
collision and the automatic lookup will refuse to match. This reduces
the problem of someone making a key matching someone you know and
sending you an email that would otherwise look correct.

In the future, what I want to do is have some basic level of trust
assigned when (a) the key is fetched from a server which is listed in
the TXT record for the domain in the email address of that key and (b)
the server has a commercial SSL certificate for cmsvr.DOMAIN. That would
give some small amount of trust, roughly equivalent to SSL website
trust, to strangers using the system. It should provide
better-than-nothing security to careless people (at least stop passive
monitoring, but not active attacks), and good security to people who
exercise some caution.

 >The intro page on your website says "SMTP-compatible address format:
 >keep your existing email address". Have you checked whether google (or
 >any other email provider) might have something to say about using
 >addresses at their email domain name on a completely unrelated
 >service?

They very well might, if I was the one making such claims. The claim is
made by whoever created the key, and it is just a claim. It's much like
using a gmail address as your username on a website - purely a shortcut
identifier. Not to be trusted.

 >And does the Confidant Mail setup do any sort of challenge/response
 >over SMTP to check the user controls the email address they are
 >duplicating as a Confidant Mail address?

No. There is no authority in a position to do that. CM can run in a
purely peer-to-peer mode, and bogus keys are currently the biggest
threat to CM security (and to any encrypted email system that does not
have a central authority.) Check the fingerprint. Hopefully CM users
will put their address plus fingerprint on social media profiles,
email sig block, etc. Any hacking would therefore be public.

Mike


From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net  Fri Mar 27 00:24:09 2015
From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA)
Date: Thu, 26 Mar 2015 23:24:09 +0000
Subject: One alternative to SMTP for email: Confidant Mail
In-Reply-To: <5514798B.7020402@confidantmail.org>
References: <5510D9B3.4090809@confidantmail.org>
 <91509341.20150326202754@my_localhost> <55146F7C.4080701@blazrsoft.com>
 <5514798B.7020402@confidantmail.org>
Message-ID: <425213999.20150326232409@my_localhost>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

Hi


On Thursday 26 March 2015 at 9:26:35 PM, in
<mid:5514798B.7020402 at confidantmail.org>, Mike Ingle wrote:



> Yes, the email address is just an identifier. The
> address is used in two ways. One, it is hashed with
> SHA1 and used to look up the user's key id.

I'm in favour of hashing email addresses in key UIDs.



> At present, there is no key verification built in and
> you have to check the key fingerprint (which is always
> shown to the right of the address) or check a signature
> chain on your key using a GPG key manager.

Or you can Trust On First Use, if it suits your threat model.


 MFPA>>The intro page on your website says "SMTP-compatible
 >>address format: keep your existing email address".
 >>Have you checked whether google (or any other email
 >>provider) might have something to say about using
 >>addresses at their email domain name on a completely
 >>unrelated service?

> They very well might, if I was the one making such
> claims. The claim is made by whoever created the key,
> and it is just a claim.

You are the one stating that the user can keep their existing SMTP
email address to use on CM. Given that you do not have a process in
place to verify the user's SMTP email address, I think that is a
pretty bold statement.

Any thoughts on the possible outcomes when a high-profile
politician/celebrity/company with deep pockets finds they are unable
to effectively use their SMTP email address on CM due to messages
showing a key collision and the automatic lookup refusing to match
because somebody got the address first? Maybe nothing, but worthy of
consideration.



> It's much like using a gmail
> address as your username on a website - purely a
> shortcut identifier. Not to be trusted.

I have used websites and services where usernames are email addresses,
but not without some form of challenge/response. (Click the link in
the email, reply to the email, enter the code that was in the
encrypted email, etc.)


- --
Best regards

MFPA                  <mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net>

Change is inevitable except from a vending machine
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From mike at confidantmail.org  Fri Mar 27 00:57:43 2015
From: mike at confidantmail.org (Mike Ingle)
Date: Thu, 26 Mar 2015 16:57:43 -0700
Subject: One alternative to SMTP for email: Confidant Mail
In-Reply-To: <425213999.20150326232409@my_localhost>
References: <5510D9B3.4090809@confidantmail.org>
 <91509341.20150326202754@my_localhost> <55146F7C.4080701@blazrsoft.com>
 <5514798B.7020402@confidantmail.org> <425213999.20150326232409@my_localhost>
Message-ID: <55149CF7.2070400@confidantmail.org>


>> At present, there is no key verification built in and
>> you have to check the key fingerprint (which is always
>> shown to the right of the address) or check a signature
>> chain on your key using a GPG key manager.
>>     
>
> Or you can Trust On First Use, if it suits your threat model.
>
>   
That's more or less what it does. When you get an email from 
joe at somewhere.com, it fetches that key id and adds it to your keyring. 
If you get an email from a different key claiming joe at somewhere.com, it 
also fetches that key id and adds it, but now messages from both users 
show a key collision until you go delete one of those keys. Likewise, 
while you have a key collision, you cannot email that user by typing his 
email address. You have to type or click the key id. In that way it 
forces you to deal with it when and if you get a collision.

>  MFPA>>The intro page on your website says "SMTP-compatible
>  >>address format: keep your existing email address".
>  >>Have you checked whether google (or any other email
>  >>provider) might have something to say about using
>  >>addresses at their email domain name on a completely
>  >>unrelated service?
>
>   
>> They very well might, if I was the one making such
>> claims. The claim is made by whoever created the key,
>> and it is just a claim.
>>     
>
> You are the one stating that the user can keep their existing SMTP
> email address to use on CM. Given that you do not have a process in
> place to verify the user's SMTP email address, I think that is a
> pretty bold statement.
>   
Think I should rephrase that like, "SMTP-style addresses can be used to 
look up keys"?
It is true that people can always keep and use their existing address, 
but others can potentially
generate fake keys for that address.
> Any thoughts on the possible outcomes when a high-profile
> politician/celebrity/company with deep pockets finds they are unable
> to effectively use their SMTP email address on CM due to messages
> showing a key collision and the automatic lookup refusing to match
> because somebody got the address first? Maybe nothing, but worthy of
> consideration.
>
>   
The celebrity will not be blocked because there is no central key 
directory. It's possible some impostor will start using a celebrity's 
email address on CM. Then when the real celebrity wants to use it, he 
will tweet "My real CM key id is (some hash), please ignore those 
impostors" and hopefully that will resolve it. It's similar to regular 
PGP keyservers in that it will accept any key someone wants to post. The 
main difference is keys expire after a month or so if they are not 
re-posted.

The only person who will see a key collision is one who previously 
received a message from the impostor.

Yes I am worried about the bogus keys problem. Just not sure how to 
handle it in a peer to peer system. For business use I like the SSL 
approach.
>
>   
>> It's much like using a gmail
>> address as your username on a website - purely a
>> shortcut identifier. Not to be trusted.
>>     
>
> I have used websites and services where usernames are email addresses,
> but not without some form of challenge/response. (Click the link in
> the email, reply to the email, enter the code that was in the
> encrypted email, etc.)
>   
That is a good idea and if I build a commercial provider I will probably 
implement that. Anyone can run a provider and I expect them to range 
from strictly business to the dodgy darknet variety.

Mike


From dave.kimble at riseup.net  Fri Mar 27 01:49:26 2015
From: dave.kimble at riseup.net (Dave Kimble)
Date: Fri, 27 Mar 2015 10:49:26 +1000
Subject: upgrading v1 to v2
Message-ID: <5514A916.4060309@riseup.net>

It seems I've been replying to individuals rather than the list, sorry.

Thanks to all who helped sort me out.

I have been back over the website, trying to find the point where I got on the wrong track.
I think it is down to https://gnupg.org/download which has the GnuPG Binary Releases section AFTER the Source Code Releases.

Since I know how to build from sources (notwithstanding my stuff ups), I just clicked on stable source download and never got to see the bit at the bottom.
Perhaps those sections could be reversed, to save you from idiots wasting your time.

The link for Debian isn't very helpful. Linking to Debian GnuPG Maintainers would be better:
https://qa.debian.org/developer.php/login=pkg-gnupg-maint at lists.alioth.debian.org
that's where you get to see "gnupg" and "gnupg2", without which you are going to be baffled.

Dave




From martin-gnupg-users at dkyb.de  Fri Mar 27 14:21:00 2015
From: martin-gnupg-users at dkyb.de (Martin Behrendt)
Date: Fri, 27 Mar 2015 14:21:00 +0100
Subject: Enabling and using ECC keys (any reason not to?)
In-Reply-To: <CA+4dSw4GBBa0Nom8x+-c8QTw7TKVCmBaey=d-mtT7oqPk8UYkw@mail.gmail.com>
References: <5513CA89.20301@confidantmail.org>
 <551439F9.2010202@vulcan.xs4all.nl>
 <CA+4dSw4GBBa0Nom8x+-c8QTw7TKVCmBaey=d-mtT7oqPk8UYkw@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <5515593C.8080008@dkyb.de>

On 26.03.2015 18:40, Pete Stephenson wrote:
> 
> People have raised concerns about the NIST curves, but they are part
> of the RFC 6637 standard so compliant programs must implement P-256,
> may implement P-384, and should implement P-521.
> 
> To address potential concerns with the NIST curves, GnuPG also
> supports the Brainpool curves which are similar in structure to the
> NIST curves but use parameters chosen from nothing-up-my-sleeve
> numbers and so should be reasonably trustworthy. Still, the structure
> of such curves leaves a bit to be desired (see
> http://safecurves.cr.yp.to/ for details, I'm hardly an expert).
> 

I just did a quick search but didn't find anything. But as a general
question, why is it not possible to use two different encryptions keys
and use a cascade two layer encryption? E.g. truecrypt offered something
similar for up to 3 different encryption methods.

So especially when introducing new algorithms which might be tampered
with, using e.g. an old style RSA Key as one layer and ECC as a second
should help against this. Or am I missing something here?

Greetings
Martin


From boleslaw.tokarski at gmail.com  Fri Mar 27 13:36:45 2015
From: boleslaw.tokarski at gmail.com (=?UTF-8?Q?Boles=C5=82aw_Tokarski?=)
Date: Fri, 27 Mar 2015 13:36:45 +0100
Subject: SSH CA and OpenPGP card
Message-ID: <CAHZKDEBYCO_V_pSOgh_Wh6fA+JU2YG0iVK+Ayu3kBacLn=g_eg@mail.gmail.com>

Hello,

I am trying to use the OpenPGP card as a SSH CA (see ssh-keygen and i.e.
https://blog.habets.se/2011/07/OpenSSH-certificates).

ssh-keygen by default uses an ssh (private) key to sign a public key of a
server or of an individual.

I managed to successfully use the OpenPGP card for SSH authentication, and
so it can perfectly be used as an SSH key encryption engine.

ssh-keygen *can* sign a public key with a smartcard. Using a PKCS#11 token.
However, I see that the OpenPGP card does not natively talk PKCS#11, but
there's some wrapper library. Am I really forced to use that? Would it work
correctly or would it break the keys currently on the card?

Is the PKCS#11 library for OpenPGP card usable?

Best regards,
Boles?aw Tokarski
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From jcea at jcea.es  Fri Mar 27 17:07:44 2015
From: jcea at jcea.es (Jesus Cea)
Date: Fri, 27 Mar 2015 17:07:44 +0100
Subject: gpg 2.0.27 is updating the trustdb constantly, and taking minutes
 to do it
Message-ID: <55158050.4040606@jcea.es>

I upgraded my GNUPG form 1.4.x to 2.0.27. I kept the configuration,
public and private keyrings. I have recreated the trustdb from scratch,
trying to solve this, with no success (using "--export-ownertrust").

My pubring.gpg is 34MB in size and I usually create local signatures via
--lsign".

My problem is that any change to the pubring, like downloading a new
key, refreshing, adding a new local signature with "--lsign", etc., will
force a trustdb update (in the next execution. For instance, decrypting
a private message). And that operation is VERY slow.

An example execution retrieving a new key from the keyservers:

"""
jcea at ubuntu:/tmp$ time gpg2 --recv-keys 010D6F3A
gpg: requesting key 010D6F3A from hkp server pgp.rediris.es
gpg: DBG: armor-keys-failed (KEY 0x010D6F3A BEGIN
) ->0
gpg: DBG: armor-keys-failed (KEY 0x010D6F3A END
) ->0
gpg: key 010D6F3A: public key "dirk astrath (mobile key)
<dirk.astrath at inovio.de>" imported
gpg: Note: signatures using the MD5 algorithm are rejected
gpg: 3 marginal(s) needed, 1 complete(s) needed, PGP trust model
gpg: depth: 0  valid:  21  signed:  96  trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 21u
gpg: depth: 1  valid:  96  signed: 106  trust: 3-, 93q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 0u
gpg: next trustdb check due at 2015-04-08
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg:               imported: 1  (RSA: 1)

real	12m52.782s
user	9m27.720s
sys	1m43.040s
"""

13 minutes!!.

As I said, my pubring.gpg is 34MB long. With gnupg 1.4.x it would take a
few seconds only.

Doing a "strace" I can confirm gnupg reprocessing the entire pubring file.

Forcing a "trustdb" update takes ages too:

"""
jcea at ubuntu:/tmp$ time gpg2 --check-trustdb
gpg: Note: signatures using the MD5 algorithm are rejected
gpg: 3 marginal(s) needed, 1 complete(s) needed, PGP trust model
gpg: depth: 0  valid:  21  signed:  96  trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 21u
gpg: depth: 1  valid:  96  signed: 106  trust: 3-, 93q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 0u
gpg: next trustdb check due at 2015-04-08

real	2m39.769s
user	1m9.620s
sys	0m14.200s
"""

PS: Bonus: how to get rid of

"""
gpg: DBG: armor-keys-failed (KEY 0x010D6F3A BEGIN
) ->0
gpg: DBG: armor-keys-failed (KEY 0x010D6F3A END
) ->0
"""

-- 
Jes?s Cea Avi?n                         _/_/      _/_/_/        _/_/_/
jcea at jcea.es - http://www.jcea.es/     _/_/    _/_/  _/_/    _/_/  _/_/
Twitter: @jcea                        _/_/    _/_/          _/_/_/_/_/
jabber / xmpp:jcea at jabber.org  _/_/  _/_/    _/_/          _/_/  _/_/
"Things are not so easy"      _/_/  _/_/    _/_/  _/_/    _/_/  _/_/
"My name is Dump, Core Dump"   _/_/_/        _/_/_/      _/_/  _/_/
"El amor es poner tu felicidad en la felicidad de otro" - Leibniz

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From wk at gnupg.org  Sat Mar 28 11:48:22 2015
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Sat, 28 Mar 2015 11:48:22 +0100
Subject: gpg 2.0.27 is updating the trustdb constantly,
 and taking minutes to do it
In-Reply-To: <55158050.4040606@jcea.es> (Jesus Cea's message of "Fri, 27 Mar
 2015 17:07:44 +0100")
References: <55158050.4040606@jcea.es>
Message-ID: <87bnjdfle1.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Fri, 27 Mar 2015 17:07, jcea at jcea.es said:

> My problem is that any change to the pubring, like downloading a new
> key, refreshing, adding a new local signature with "--lsign", etc., will
> force a trustdb update (in the next execution. For instance, decrypting

A new key signature may chnage rthe entire WoT thus it needs to be
re-computed.  I have

  no-auto-check-trustdb

in my gpg.conf and 

  30   1 * * *   /usr/local/bin/gpg --batch --check-trustdb 2>/dev/null

in my crontab.  Thus tehre will be only one re-computation a day.

> As I said, my pubring.gpg is 34MB long. With gnupg 1.4.x it would take a
> few seconds only.

Which 1.4 version is this?


> PS: Bonus: how to get rid of
>
> """
> gpg: DBG: armor-keys-failed (KEY 0x010D6F3A BEGIN

Sorry for this.  It has already been fixed in the repo, see below.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner


--8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8---
commit 936416690e6c889505d84fe96983a66983beae5e
Author: Werner Koch <wk at gnupg.org>
Date:   Thu Feb 26 09:38:58 2015 +0100

    gpg: Remove left-over debug message.
    
    * g10/armor.c (check_input): Remove log_debug.

	Modified   g10/armor.c
diff --git a/g10/armor.c b/g10/armor.c
index 6c0013d..de1726d 100644
--- a/g10/armor.c
+++ b/g10/armor.c
@@ -534,9 +534,6 @@ check_input( armor_filter_context_t *afx, IOBUF a )
             /* This is probably input from a keyserver helper and we
                have not yet seen an error line.  */
             afx->key_failed_code = parse_key_failed_line (line+4, len-4);
-            log_debug ("armor-keys-failed (%.*s) ->%d\n",
-                       (int)len, line,
-                       afx->key_failed_code);
           }
 	if( i >= 0 && !(afx->only_keyblocks && i != 1 && i != 5 && i != 6 )) {
 	    hdr_line = i;
--8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8---


-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl  Sat Mar 28 12:38:29 2015
From: johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl (Johan Wevers)
Date: Sat, 28 Mar 2015 12:38:29 +0100
Subject: Enabling and using ECC keys (any reason not to?)
In-Reply-To: <5515593C.8080008@dkyb.de>
References: <5513CA89.20301@confidantmail.org>
 <551439F9.2010202@vulcan.xs4all.nl>
 <CA+4dSw4GBBa0Nom8x+-c8QTw7TKVCmBaey=d-mtT7oqPk8UYkw@mail.gmail.com>
 <5515593C.8080008@dkyb.de>
Message-ID: <551692B5.70403@vulcan.xs4all.nl>

On 27-03-2015 14:21, Martin Behrendt wrote:

> So especially when introducing new algorithms which might be tampered
> with, using e.g. an old style RSA Key as one layer and ECC as a second
> should help against this. Or am I missing something here?

Why would you want to use a suspect algorithm if the RSA alone is secure
enough?

-- 
ir. J.C.A. Wevers
PGP/GPG public keys at http://www.xs4all.nl/~johanw/pgpkeys.html



From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net  Sat Mar 28 15:59:22 2015
From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA)
Date: Sat, 28 Mar 2015 14:59:22 +0000
Subject: One alternative to SMTP for email: Confidant Mail
In-Reply-To: <55149CF7.2070400@confidantmail.org>
References: <5510D9B3.4090809@confidantmail.org>
 <91509341.20150326202754@my_localhost> <55146F7C.4080701@blazrsoft.com>
 <5514798B.7020402@confidantmail.org> <425213999.20150326232409@my_localhost>
 <55149CF7.2070400@confidantmail.org>
Message-ID: <834239320.20150328145922@my_localhost>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

Hi


On Thursday 26 March 2015 at 11:57:43 PM, in
<mid:55149CF7.2070400 at confidantmail.org>, Mike Ingle wrote:



> That's more or less what it does. When you get an email
> from  joe at somewhere.com, it fetches that key id and
> adds it to your keyring. If you get an email from a
> different key claiming joe at somewhere.com, it also
> fetches that key id and adds it, but now messages from
> both users show a key collision until you go delete one
> of those keys.


Why should the user need to delete one, rather than just be told there
were two and the one with such-and-such a fingerprint (or the one
highlighted) signed this message? If it is just a string in a key UID
rather than a functional email address, it will not necessarily be
unique.



> Likewise,  while you have a key
> collision, you cannot email that user by typing his
> email address. You have to type or click the key id. In
> that way it  forces you to deal with it when and if you
> get a collision.

I guess a future UI enhancement might be the ability to specify a key
id in a contact list entry. Or something akin to Enigmail's
Per-recipient rules.



> Think I should rephrase that like, "SMTP-style
> addresses can be used to look up keys"?

I think it is a good idea to re-phrase it so that you are not stating
the user can keep their existing SMTP email address, and also to make
it clear this identifier is used only for key look-up and not for
message delivery.


> It is true that
> people can always keep and use their existing address,
> but others can potentially generate fake keys for that
> address.

It is also true that some email providers recycle email addresses that
have fallen out of use. Out of seven yahoo addresses I used for
consecutive periods between 2004 and 2009, six are currently available
to be registered. (The odd-one-out is from 2006.) I have left each one
active with an auto-forward to the next.



> The celebrity will not be blocked because there is no
> central key  directory. It's possible some impostor
> will start using a celebrity's  email address on CM.
> Then when the real celebrity wants to use it, he  will
> tweet "My real CM key id is (some hash), please ignore
> those  impostors" and hopefully that will resolve it.

That is re-assuring to hear. See also my first comment, above.



> It's similar to regular PGP keyservers in that it will
> accept any key someone wants to post. The main
> difference is keys expire after a month or so if they
> are not  re-posted.

In a similar way to a file that has not been requested for a
relatively long time dropping off a peer-to-peer filesharing network?



> The only person who will see a key collision is one who
> previously  received a message from the impostor.

Or subsequently received a message from the imposter, then goes back
to look at the message that was not from the imposter, presumably.



> Yes I am worried about the bogus keys problem. Just not
> sure how to  handle it in a peer to peer system.

Is there a way to incorporate some sort of challenge/response at key
creation time before the key is uploaded to the peer-to-peer system?
Or could the challenge/response be handled by a number of
"verification agents" incorporated into the peer-to-peer network?



> Anyone can run
> a provider and I expect them to range  from strictly
> business to the dodgy darknet variety.

Using "darknet" services to enhance privacy does not equate to
"dodgy". A person's communications are none of anybody else's
business, apart from whoever they choose to communicate with.


- --
Best regards

MFPA                  <mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net>

Oven mitt: A partially charred grease stain that fits over the hand.
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vgQBFgoAZgUCVRbB318UgAAAAAAuAChpc3N1ZXItZnByQG5vdGF0aW9ucy5vcGVu
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=ugkT
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----



From peter at digitalbrains.com  Sat Mar 28 18:05:05 2015
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Sat, 28 Mar 2015 18:05:05 +0100
Subject: One alternative to SMTP for email: Confidant Mail
In-Reply-To: <834239320.20150328145922@my_localhost>
References: <5510D9B3.4090809@confidantmail.org>
 <91509341.20150326202754@my_localhost> <55146F7C.4080701@blazrsoft.com>
 <5514798B.7020402@confidantmail.org> <425213999.20150326232409@my_localhost>
 <55149CF7.2070400@confidantmail.org> <834239320.20150328145922@my_localhost>
Message-ID: <5516DF41.4090805@digitalbrains.com>

On 28/03/15 15:59, MFPA wrote:
> Using "darknet" services to enhance privacy does not equate to
> "dodgy".

No, but nobody said the adjective was used tautological.

It's like someone says "they're doing shady business in a dark alley"
and you protest "Hey, I know plenty proper businesses that are just
upstanding people making sales! In fact, I also know plenty alleys that
let in a lot of sunlight..."

:)

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at <http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>


From dougb at dougbarton.email  Sat Mar 28 19:58:57 2015
From: dougb at dougbarton.email (Doug Barton)
Date: Sat, 28 Mar 2015 11:58:57 -0700
Subject: gpg 2.0.27 is updating the trustdb constantly, and taking minutes
 to do it
In-Reply-To: <87bnjdfle1.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <55158050.4040606@jcea.es> <87bnjdfle1.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <5516F9F1.2060205@dougbarton.email>

On 3/28/15 3:48 AM, Werner Koch wrote:
> Sorry for this.  It has already been fixed in the repo,

Just out of curiosity, do you have an ETA on a new release?

-- 
I am conducting an experiment in the efficacy of PGP/MIME signatures. 
This message should be signed. If it is not, or the signature does not 
validate, please let me know how you received this message (direct, or 
to a list) and the mail software you use. Thanks!

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From ljbp1csyfud6ixyyflzyq9hrg0 at openmailbox.org  Fri Mar 27 21:46:03 2015
From: ljbp1csyfud6ixyyflzyq9hrg0 at openmailbox.org (ljbp1csyfud6ixyyflzyq9hrg0 at openmailbox.org)
Date: Fri, 27 Mar 2015 20:46:03 +0000
Subject: Iceland mirror not working
Message-ID: <fd3cd152da58bc838b5844732e86a07e@openmailbox.org>

Hi,
Notice that Iceland mirror are not working:
ftp://ftp.hi.is/pub/mirrors/gnupg/


From stebe at mailbox.org  Sat Mar 28 21:57:59 2015
From: stebe at mailbox.org (Stephan Beck)
Date: Sat, 28 Mar 2015 21:57:59 +0100
Subject: Enabling and using ECC keys (any reason not to?)
In-Reply-To: <5515593C.8080008@dkyb.de>
References: <5513CA89.20301@confidantmail.org>
 <551439F9.2010202@vulcan.xs4all.nl>
 <CA+4dSw4GBBa0Nom8x+-c8QTw7TKVCmBaey=d-mtT7oqPk8UYkw@mail.gmail.com>
 <5515593C.8080008@dkyb.de>
Message-ID: <551715D7.1070904@mailbox.org>

Am 27.03.2015 um 14:21 schrieb Martin Behrendt:
> On 26.03.2015 18:40, Pete Stephenson wrote:
>>
>> People have raised concerns about the NIST curves, but they are part
>> of the RFC 6637 standard so compliant programs must implement P-256,
>> may implement P-384, and should implement P-521.
>>
>> To address potential concerns with the NIST curves, GnuPG also
>> supports the Brainpool curves which are similar in structure to the
>> NIST curves but use parameters chosen from nothing-up-my-sleeve
>> numbers and so should be reasonably trustworthy. Still, the structure
>> of such curves leaves a bit to be desired (see
>> http://safecurves.cr.yp.to/ for details, I'm hardly an expert).
>>
> 
> I just did a quick search but didn't find anything.
[...]

A very recent (Feb 2015) "historical" analysis of the surreptitious weakening of
cryptographic systems, incl. a description of the NIST (or Dual EC-DRBG) curves'
pecularities "detected" in 2005 can be found at (1):

(1) https://www.schneier.com/paper-weakening.html (p. 2,7).

Cheers,
Stephan




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From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net  Sun Mar 29 13:53:51 2015
From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA)
Date: Sun, 29 Mar 2015 12:53:51 +0100
Subject: One alternative to SMTP for email: Confidant Mail
In-Reply-To: <5516DF41.4090805@digitalbrains.com>
References: <5510D9B3.4090809@confidantmail.org>
 <91509341.20150326202754@my_localhost> <55146F7C.4080701@blazrsoft.com>
 <5514798B.7020402@confidantmail.org> <425213999.20150326232409@my_localhost>
 <55149CF7.2070400@confidantmail.org> <834239320.20150328145922@my_localhost>
 <5516DF41.4090805@digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <1209077951.20150329125351@my_localhost>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512



On Saturday 28 March 2015 at 6:05:05 PM, in
<mid:5516DF41.4090805 at digitalbrains.com>, Peter Lebbing wrote:


> No, but nobody said the adjective was used
> tautological.

Maybe it doesn't imply or hint that to everybody, but it is definitely
what I infer when I read "from strictly business to the dodgy darknet
variety".


> It's like someone says "they're doing shady business in
> a dark alley" and you protest "Hey, I know plenty
> proper businesses that are just upstanding people
> making sales! In fact, I also know plenty alleys that
> let in a lot of sunlight..."

I think that's rather over-egging it. Wouldn't the equivalent protest
be about the possible insinuation (and cliche) that all business that
takes place in a dark alley is shady?

(-;


- --
Best regards

MFPA                  <mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net>

Don't learn safety rules by accident...
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From wk at gnupg.org  Sun Mar 29 15:56:19 2015
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Sun, 29 Mar 2015 15:56:19 +0200
Subject: gpg 2.0.27 is updating the trustdb constantly,
 and taking minutes to do it
In-Reply-To: <5516F9F1.2060205@dougbarton.email> (Doug Barton's message of
 "Sat, 28 Mar 2015 11:58:57 -0700")
References: <55158050.4040606@jcea.es> <87bnjdfle1.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
 <5516F9F1.2060205@dougbarton.email>
Message-ID: <87d23rdi0s.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Sat, 28 Mar 2015 19:58, dougb at dougbarton.email said:

> Just out of curiosity, do you have an ETA on a new release?

Nothing really important has changed since mid February except for a fix
in gpgtar - does anyone really use it on non-Windows?  (it has been
fixed in gpg4win).


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From nickeconopouly at gmail.com  Sun Mar 29 14:25:51 2015
From: nickeconopouly at gmail.com (Nick Econopouly)
Date: Sun, 29 Mar 2015 08:25:51 -0400
Subject: One alternative to SMTP for email: Confidant Mail
In-Reply-To: <1209077951.20150329125351@my_localhost>
References: <5510D9B3.4090809@confidantmail.org>
 <91509341.20150326202754@my_localhost>
 <55146F7C.4080701@blazrsoft.com>
 <5514798B.7020402@confidantmail.org>
 <425213999.20150326232409@my_localhost>
 <55149CF7.2070400@confidantmail.org>
 <834239320.20150328145922@my_localhost>
 <5516DF41.4090805@digitalbrains.com>
 <1209077951.20150329125351@my_localhost>
Message-ID: <CA+EYPeE7LAyPdA47dZEoSCkzxrEwVowzKg1=X1Esbr7a1JQp_w@mail.gmail.com>

Any word on whether confidant mail will support the openpgp smart cards (or
yubikey, similar)?
-Nick
On Mar 29, 2015 7:55 AM, "MFPA" <2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net>
wrote:

> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA512
>
>
>
> On Saturday 28 March 2015 at 6:05:05 PM, in
> <mid:5516DF41.4090805 at digitalbrains.com>, Peter Lebbing wrote:
>
>
> > No, but nobody said the adjective was used
> > tautological.
>
> Maybe it doesn't imply or hint that to everybody, but it is definitely
> what I infer when I read "from strictly business to the dodgy darknet
> variety".
>
>
> > It's like someone says "they're doing shady business in
> > a dark alley" and you protest "Hey, I know plenty
> > proper businesses that are just upstanding people
> > making sales! In fact, I also know plenty alleys that
> > let in a lot of sunlight..."
>
> I think that's rather over-egging it. Wouldn't the equivalent protest
> be about the possible insinuation (and cliche) that all business that
> takes place in a dark alley is shady?
>
> (-;
>
>
> - --
> Best regards
>
> MFPA                  <mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net>
>
> Don't learn safety rules by accident...
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> cGdwLmZpZnRoaG9yc2VtYW4ubmV0MzNBQ0VENEVFOTEzNEVFQkRFNkE4NTA2MTcx
> MkJDNDYxQUY3NzhFNAAKCRAXErxGGvd45L80AQAHEDUcF6JJ7keNR3xhXo3jvavb
> m/V3oDUsTHHotmPbjgEAq/6BWQ2cw1NtdA2OPdpISJo0A0sQD2GvKjng7ZGCbAE=
> =RUbH
> -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
>
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From peter at digitalbrains.com  Sun Mar 29 19:36:02 2015
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Sun, 29 Mar 2015 19:36:02 +0200
Subject: Instructions for converting keyring for 2.1
Message-ID: <55183802.8010306@digitalbrains.com>

I just followed the instructions on [1] for converting your pubring.gpg to the
new keybox format. I discovered I needed --import-options import-local-sigs on
the import command to also import my local signatures, which obviously is very
desirable when converting your public keyring... it's a bit lossy otherwise :S.

Here's a diff for the gnupg-doc git:

diff --git a/web/faq/whats-new-in-2.1.org b/web/faq/whats-new-in-2.1.org
index bc312da..1056dd0 100644
--- a/web/faq/whats-new-in-2.1.org
+++ b/web/faq/whats-new-in-2.1.org
@@ -561,7 +561,7 @@ then run import, and finally restore the ownertrust values:
 $ cd ~/.gnupg
 $ gpg --export-ownertrust >otrust.lst
 $ mv pubring.gpg publickeys
-$ gpg2 --import publickeys
+$ gpg2 --import-options import-local-sigs --import publickeys
 $ gpg2 --import-ownertrust otrust.lst
 #+end_example

HTH,

Peter.

[1] https://www.gnupg.org/faq/whats-new-in-2.1.html#keybox

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at <http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>


From jcea at jcea.es  Sun Mar 29 19:41:15 2015
From: jcea at jcea.es (Jesus Cea)
Date: Sun, 29 Mar 2015 19:41:15 +0200
Subject: gpg 2.0.27 is updating the trustdb constantly, and taking minutes
 to do it
In-Reply-To: <87bnjdfle1.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <55158050.4040606@jcea.es> <87bnjdfle1.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <5518393B.4090704@jcea.es>

On 28/03/15 11:48, Werner Koch wrote:
> On Fri, 27 Mar 2015 17:07, jcea at jcea.es said:
> 
>> My problem is that any change to the pubring, like downloading a new
>> key, refreshing, adding a new local signature with "--lsign", etc., will
>> force a trustdb update (in the next execution. For instance, decrypting
> 
> A new key signature may chnage rthe entire WoT thus it needs to be
> re-computed.  I have
> 
>   no-auto-check-trustdb
> 
> in my gpg.conf and 
> 
>   30   1 * * *   /usr/local/bin/gpg --batch --check-trustdb 2>/dev/null
> 
> in my crontab.  Thus tehre will be only one re-computation a day.

I understand that, nice hack, but I used 1.4.19 until a week ago and
this recalculation was taking a few seconds. Now it is taking minutes.

Same configuration, same keyring files:

With 1.4 GPG:

"""
jcea at ubuntu:~/video$ time gpg.OLD --update-trustdb
gpg: public key FBBB8AB1 is 58138 seconds newer than the signature
gpg: public key D3A42C61 is 2009 seconds newer than the signature
gpg: 3 marginal(s) needed, 1 complete(s) needed, PGP trust model
gpg: depth: 0  valid:  21  signed:  96  trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 21u
gpg: depth: 1  valid:  96  signed: 116  trust: 0-, 96q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 0u
gpg: next trustdb check due at 2015-04-08

real	0m7.570s
user	0m6.800s
sys	0m0.440s
"""

With 2.0.27 GPG:

"""
jcea at ubuntu:~/video$ time gpg2 --update-trustdb
gpg: Note: signatures using the MD5 algorithm are rejected
gpg: 3 marginal(s) needed, 1 complete(s) needed, PGP trust model
gpg: depth: 0  valid:  21  signed:  96  trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 21u
gpg: depth: 1  valid:  96  signed: 106  trust: 0-, 96q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 0u
gpg: next trustdb check due at 2015-04-08

real	1m27.370s
user	1m10.240s
sys	0m13.950s
"""

Trustdb rebuild time has skyrocketed. Unless GPG 1.4 has a serious bug,
2.0.17 is doing something wrong. The sys time is interesting, looks like
GPG 2.0.27 is doing a lot of syscalls. I wonder if it is doing the
calculations several times, or what.

>> As I said, my pubring.gpg is 34MB long. With gnupg 1.4.x it would take a
>> few seconds only.
> 
> Which 1.4 version is this?

"""
jcea at ubuntu:~/video$ gpg.OLD --version
gpg (GnuPG) 1.4.19
Copyright (C) 2015 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
License GPLv3+: GNU GPL version 3 or later
<http://gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html>
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.

Home: ~/.gnupg
Supported algorithms:
Pubkey: RSA, RSA-E, RSA-S, ELG-E, DSA
Cipher: IDEA, 3DES, CAST5, BLOWFISH, AES, AES192, AES256, TWOFISH,
        CAMELLIA128, CAMELLIA192, CAMELLIA256
Hash: MD5, SHA1, RIPEMD160, SHA256, SHA384, SHA512, SHA224
Compression: Uncompressed, ZIP, ZLIB, BZIP2
"""

>> PS: Bonus: how to get rid of
>>
>> """
>> gpg: DBG: armor-keys-failed (KEY 0x010D6F3A BEGIN
> 
> Sorry for this.  It has already been fixed in the repo, see below.

Great. Thanks.

PS: Thanks for GNUPG!.

-- 
Jes?s Cea Avi?n                         _/_/      _/_/_/        _/_/_/
jcea at jcea.es - http://www.jcea.es/     _/_/    _/_/  _/_/    _/_/  _/_/
Twitter: @jcea                        _/_/    _/_/          _/_/_/_/_/
jabber / xmpp:jcea at jabber.org  _/_/  _/_/    _/_/          _/_/  _/_/
"Things are not so easy"      _/_/  _/_/    _/_/  _/_/    _/_/  _/_/
"My name is Dump, Core Dump"   _/_/_/        _/_/_/      _/_/  _/_/
"El amor es poner tu felicidad en la felicidad de otro" - Leibniz

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From stebe at mailbox.org  Sun Mar 29 20:08:11 2015
From: stebe at mailbox.org (Stephan Beck)
Date: Sun, 29 Mar 2015 20:08:11 +0200
Subject: SSH CA and OpenPGP card
In-Reply-To: <CAHZKDEBYCO_V_pSOgh_Wh6fA+JU2YG0iVK+Ayu3kBacLn=g_eg@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAHZKDEBYCO_V_pSOgh_Wh6fA+JU2YG0iVK+Ayu3kBacLn=g_eg@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <55183F8B.9000502@mailbox.org>

Am 27.03.2015 um 13:36 schrieb Boles?aw Tokarski:
> Hello,
[...]
> Is the PKCS#11 library for OpenPGP card usable?


I guess you may install and use gnupg-pkcs11-scd for that purpose, provided that
you only use RSA keys.

See /usr/share/man/man1/gnupg-pkcs11-scd.1 for more info.


Hope that helps

Stephan



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From mike at confidantmail.org  Sun Mar 29 23:28:13 2015
From: mike at confidantmail.org (Mike Ingle)
Date: Sun, 29 Mar 2015 14:28:13 -0700
Subject: One alternative to SMTP for email: Confidant Mail
In-Reply-To: <CA+EYPeE7LAyPdA47dZEoSCkzxrEwVowzKg1=X1Esbr7a1JQp_w@mail.gmail.com>
References: <5510D9B3.4090809@confidantmail.org>
 <91509341.20150326202754@my_localhost> <55146F7C.4080701@blazrsoft.com>
 <5514798B.7020402@confidantmail.org> <425213999.20150326232409@my_localhost>
 <55149CF7.2070400@confidantmail.org> <834239320.20150328145922@my_localhost>
 <5516DF41.4090805@digitalbrains.com> <1209077951.20150329125351@my_localhost>
 <CA+EYPeE7LAyPdA47dZEoSCkzxrEwVowzKg1=X1Esbr7a1JQp_w@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <55186E6D.20604@confidantmail.org>

 > Any word on whether confidant mail will support the openpgp smart 
cards (or
 > yubikey, similar)?  -Nick

With GPG 2.1, the gpg-agent handles all the passphrase prompting. I 
don't see
why it would not work with a smartcard. Which one do you think I should 
get to
test with? I have not played with them.

 > > That's more or less what it does. When you get an email
 > > from  joe at somewhere.com, it fetches that key id and
 > > adds it to your keyring. If you get an email from a
 > > different key claiming joe at somewhere.com, it also
 > > fetches that key id and adds it, but now messages from
 > > both users show a key collision until you go delete one
 > > of those keys.

 > Why should the user need to delete one, rather than just be told there
 > were two and the one with such-and-such a fingerprint (or the one
 > highlighted) signed this message? If it is just a string in a key UID 
rather
 > than a functional email address, it will not necessarily be unique.

There should not be two or more keys advertised for one email address. That
creates confusion, requires the recipient to have two CM accounts, and
increases the risk of bogus keys being used. Since CM keys disappear 
from the
key search results about a month after the key owner stops advertising them,
people should delete old or bogus keys from their keyrings.

 > > It's similar to regular PGP keyservers in that it will
 > > accept any key someone wants to post. The main
 > > difference is keys expire after a month or so if they
 > > are not  re-posted.

 > In a similar way to a file that has not been requested for a
 > relatively long time dropping off a peer-to-peer filesharing network?

Once the owner stops advertising the key (by using it in a CM account), 
after
a month or so the STORUTIL will remove it from the servers. That depends on
how often server operators run STORUTIL to prune their server directories.

 > Is there a way to incorporate some sort of challenge/response at key
 > creation time before the key is uploaded to the peer-to-peer system?
 > Or could the challenge/response be handled by a number of
 > "verification agents" incorporated into the peer-to-peer network?

Not at the moment. There is no place to put a gatekeeper in this system. 
It is
a Kademlia peer to peer network with signature and integrity checking done
before the key is accepted. Any gatekeeping will have to be done by the 
clients.
In general it's a server dumb/client smart system.

 > > Anyone can run a provider and I expect them to range from strictly
 > > business to the dodgy darknet variety.

 > Using "darknet" services to enhance privacy does not equate to
 > "dodgy". A person's communications are none of anybody else's
 > business, apart from whoever they choose to communicate with.

No offense to the darknet intended. I'm in favor of more widespread Tor 
and I2P
usage, that's why I built in support for it. Using CM over hidden 
services is a good
way to avoid social graph building.

An example of a "dodgy darknet provider" would be if one of the darknet 
markets
decided to run a couple of covert CM servers (having only Tor hidden service
addresses) to facilitate vendor to customer communication. That would solve
the problem of some users not encrypting their messages, and would allow 
people
to communicate even if the hidden website server is down.

Suppose a reporter on a "strictly business" CM provider wanted to interview
vendors of that darknet market. She could do so using CM without needing a
technical expert to handle the encryption, and without either party being
exposed to any risks. In the past that has been difficult.

It is also possible to run mailing lists and file servers over CM. I am
currently running a CM users' mailing list.

Mike


From gniibe at fsij.org  Mon Mar 30 03:17:30 2015
From: gniibe at fsij.org (NIIBE Yutaka)
Date: Mon, 30 Mar 2015 10:17:30 +0900
Subject: SSH CA and OpenPGP card
In-Reply-To: <CAHZKDEBYCO_V_pSOgh_Wh6fA+JU2YG0iVK+Ayu3kBacLn=g_eg@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAHZKDEBYCO_V_pSOgh_Wh6fA+JU2YG0iVK+Ayu3kBacLn=g_eg@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <5518A42A.2000906@fsij.org>

On 03/27/2015 09:36 PM, Boles?aw Tokarski wrote:
> ssh-keygen *can* sign a public key with a smartcard. Using a PKCS#11 token.
> However, I see that the OpenPGP card does not natively talk PKCS#11, but
> there's some wrapper library. Am I really forced to use that? Would it work
> correctly or would it break the keys currently on the card?
> 
> Is the PKCS#11 library for OpenPGP card usable?

Scute is a shared library for NSS (Network Security Services) with
scdaemon (of GnuPG) which provides PKCS#11 interface.

But, I'm afraid it doesn't work for OpenSSH.  I mean, the library
interface of NSS doesn't match to the one of OpenSSH.

Well, I think that it's possible for us to write a script using
gpg-connect-agent which asks generating signature by authentication
key of GnuPG.  Then, the script can be used for certificate generation
of OpenSSH (instead of ssh-keygen).

I generated *-cert.pub by ssh-keygen, and examined its content.  It
seems that it's simple concatenation of:

	Header
	Public key to be signed
	Key Id
	Options (in ASCII)
	Signing public key of CA
	Signature

We can use SIGKEY, SETHASH, and PKSIGN commands of gpg-agent to
generate signature and other part can be written by, say Python, or
something.

Ideally, ssh-keygen would have better to talk ssh-agent to ask
signing, though.
-- 


From gniibe at fsij.org  Mon Mar 30 10:21:17 2015
From: gniibe at fsij.org (NIIBE Yutaka)
Date: Mon, 30 Mar 2015 17:21:17 +0900
Subject: Unsupported certificate error
In-Reply-To: <550C9155.8060701@theflorys.org>
References: <550C9155.8060701@theflorys.org>
Message-ID: <5519077D.4050506@fsij.org>

Hello,

On 03/21/2015 06:29 AM, David wrote:
> I just installed GnuPG 2.0.27 on my Ubuntu 14.10 laptop.  I am getting
> this error from gpa:
> 
> The GPGME library returned an unexpected
> error at keytable.c:150. The error was:
> 
>     Unsupported certificate
[...]
> Has anyone seen this and solved it?

If I understand correctly, your gpg-agent is not the real one, but
gnome-keyring.  "Unsupported certificate" is the typical error message
when gnome-keyring takes over.

How to fix this issue depends on the specific version of gnome-keyring.

Please see:

    http://www.gniibe.org/memo/notebook/gnome3-gpg-settings.html

I think that nobody asked gnome-keyring to do that, and nobody expects
gnome-keyring to do that.
-- 


From boleslaw.tokarski at gmail.com  Mon Mar 30 14:46:22 2015
From: boleslaw.tokarski at gmail.com (=?UTF-8?Q?Boles=C5=82aw_Tokarski?=)
Date: Mon, 30 Mar 2015 14:46:22 +0200
Subject: SSH CA and OpenPGP card
In-Reply-To: <5518A42A.2000906@fsij.org>
References: <CAHZKDEBYCO_V_pSOgh_Wh6fA+JU2YG0iVK+Ayu3kBacLn=g_eg@mail.gmail.com>
 <5518A42A.2000906@fsij.org>
Message-ID: <CAHZKDEAkKdGxSwsfnV9NhjovPHtYY1k_bHFOT1r1ti6V41WQvA@mail.gmail.com>

Hello,

Thanks for taking the time to examine that. I guess that I'd need to dig
deeper. Or ask the OpenSSH guys.

Best regards,
Boles?aw Tokarski

2015-03-30 3:17 GMT+02:00 NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe at fsij.org>:

> On 03/27/2015 09:36 PM, Boles?aw Tokarski wrote:
> > ssh-keygen *can* sign a public key with a smartcard. Using a PKCS#11
> token.
> > However, I see that the OpenPGP card does not natively talk PKCS#11, but
> > there's some wrapper library. Am I really forced to use that? Would it
> work
> > correctly or would it break the keys currently on the card?
> >
> > Is the PKCS#11 library for OpenPGP card usable?
>
> Scute is a shared library for NSS (Network Security Services) with
> scdaemon (of GnuPG) which provides PKCS#11 interface.
>
> But, I'm afraid it doesn't work for OpenSSH.  I mean, the library
> interface of NSS doesn't match to the one of OpenSSH.
>
> Well, I think that it's possible for us to write a script using
> gpg-connect-agent which asks generating signature by authentication
> key of GnuPG.  Then, the script can be used for certificate generation
> of OpenSSH (instead of ssh-keygen).
>
> I generated *-cert.pub by ssh-keygen, and examined its content.  It
> seems that it's simple concatenation of:
>
>         Header
>         Public key to be signed
>         Key Id
>         Options (in ASCII)
>         Signing public key of CA
>         Signature
>
> We can use SIGKEY, SETHASH, and PKSIGN commands of gpg-agent to
> generate signature and other part can be written by, say Python, or
> something.
>
> Ideally, ssh-keygen would have better to talk ssh-agent to ask
> signing, though.
> --
>
> _______________________________________________
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
>
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From mailing-lists at asatiifm.net  Mon Mar 30 20:21:35 2015
From: mailing-lists at asatiifm.net (=?windows-1252?Q?Ville_M=E4=E4tt=E4?=)
Date: Mon, 30 Mar 2015 21:21:35 +0300
Subject: PGP/MIME (Was: One alternative to SMTP for email: Confidant Mail)
In-Reply-To: <55131B6D.6010002@dougbarton.email>
References: <5510D9B3.4090809@confidantmail.org>
 <55126411.1040801@dougbarton.email>
 <8F0B09FC6339FA439524099BFCABC11F2D3D03DF@IRVEXCHMB11.corp.ad.broadcom.com>
 <55130F84.3000603@dougbarton.email> <55131898.7000208@asatiifm.net>
 <55131B6D.6010002@dougbarton.email>
Message-ID: <5519942F.90100@asatiifm.net>

On 25.03.15 22:32, Doug Barton wrote:
> On 3/25/15 1:20 PM, Ville M??tt? wrote:
>> On 25.03.15 21:41, Doug Barton wrote:
>>> While this is strictly anecdotal evidence I would argue that it's a good
>>> indication that we may not be ready for PGP/MIME as the default.
>>
>> I think that fail, a signature.asc attachment, is still a "cleaner fail"
>> than a non-PGP receiver getting a breakdown from inline PGP. And that is
>> for every single email.
> 
> How are you using the term "breakdown" here? If their client isn't doing
> PGP they see some extraneous text, and a signature block. While I agree
> that for those not using PGP that is clutter, I am not sure what you
> mean by "breakdown."

That's a "mental breakdown" of the user :). Sorry about the ambiguity.

> 
>> I have not received a single question from anyone regarding my PGP/MIME
>> signed emails. Not one. And I'm talking about the ones that don't use
>> PGP / have no clue what PGP is.
> 
> We've already established that PGP/MIME is a "cleaner" solution for those that don't use PGP. I'm not debating that point, and I don't think anyone else is either. 

I suppose I must've missed that we had established that?

> The question at hand is for those that *do* use PGP, which is more effective? TMK there are no mail clients that fail to process a valid in-line signature, but obviously there are still clients that cannot correctly handle PGP/MIME. 

True.

I consider both inline and PGP/MIME equally to be something of a MUST
support for any client / plugin that claims to support PGP. Whether
support is done by the client itself or a plugin is not that important
to me as long as someone is maintaining support.

-- 
Ville

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From 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net  Mon Mar 30 21:54:27 2015
From: 2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net (MFPA)
Date: Mon, 30 Mar 2015 20:54:27 +0100
Subject: PGP/MIME (Was: One alternative to SMTP for email: Confidant Mail)
In-Reply-To: <5519942F.90100@asatiifm.net>
References: <5510D9B3.4090809@confidantmail.org>
 <55126411.1040801@dougbarton.email>
 <8F0B09FC6339FA439524099BFCABC11F2D3D03DF@IRVEXCHMB11.corp.ad.broadcom.com>
 <55130F84.3000603@dougbarton.email> <55131898.7000208@asatiifm.net>
 <55131B6D.6010002@dougbarton.email> <5519942F.90100@asatiifm.net>
Message-ID: <1086178539.20150330205427@my_localhost>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512



On Monday 30 March 2015 at 7:21:35 PM, in
<mid:5519942F.90100 at asatiifm.net>, Ville M??tt? wrote:



> That's a "mental breakdown" of the user :). Sorry about
> the ambiguity.


I find malformed emails full of HTML tags and almost totally
unreadable throughout to be a greater risk to mental health than a few
lines of PGP signature. (-;



- --
Best regards

MFPA                  <mailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-groups at riseup.net>

What's another word for synonym?
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

iQF8BAEBCgBmBQJVGanzXxSAAAAAAC4AKGlzc3Vlci1mcHJAbm90YXRpb25zLm9w
ZW5wZ3AuZmlmdGhob3JzZW1hbi5uZXRCM0FFN0VDQTlBOEM4QjMwMjZBNUEwRjU2
QjdDNzRDRUIzMUYyNUYwAAoJEGt8dM6zHyXwJyYH/0qgA4id0rmNA5zXnFCevzjW
rxDPeXPNjaUd/mB/bWmwUhMLYYCo+a1q8iqEhB3QW5HC5asHSV+sVjVmTMDLerVW
lZP5pKiFn21hQY65s4kZtYrTsNMm148+6AU7U6n7M2SJaX4xwkCB5zwkWOCRcFY6
yyxpJv4sTGIxvjdsY8hERwRi5tU6MnbMyiIQg15qvi9CHPO1KkaLkKKY4Z12tMZ9
kjM38YDiI7bYKZQzc/PLWX7CLjCs+PTslg5yAmWuC2fUooig+NCvgI4bD2SpUMx2
js0LgccMVjK+LPeB92iP6Jd9+XU5c4mtfY7qP0qRgBlw5t1zsf7+1vQc+pHn8n2I
vgQBFgoAZgUCVRmp9F8UgAAAAAAuAChpc3N1ZXItZnByQG5vdGF0aW9ucy5vcGVu
cGdwLmZpZnRoaG9yc2VtYW4ubmV0MzNBQ0VENEVFOTEzNEVFQkRFNkE4NTA2MTcx
MkJDNDYxQUY3NzhFNAAKCRAXErxGGvd45NdeAQDmIrbG18G/CHo7OwaSiXyugzPf
WR2muUZiIolQSEF3tgEAbrl2bNOW/tR7OulJ/cb+q/pt7cFD0+H0kZh5Vil9QQs=
=JUYZ
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----



From jankow at datenkollektiv.net  Tue Mar 31 13:25:22 2015
From: jankow at datenkollektiv.net (Jan Kowalsky)
Date: Tue, 31 Mar 2015 13:25:22 +0200
Subject: decrypt luks with gnupg Card: determine if cardreader has pinpad
Message-ID: <mailman.0.1427809801.9338.gnupg-users@gnupg.org>

Hi all,

I'm new on the list ...

while experimenting with scripts for using gnupgCard for unlocking a
luks-encrypted device I'm searching a possibility for determining if a
attached cardreader has a pinpad or not.

I used the script of Peter Lebbing
http://www.digitalbrains.com/2014/gpgcryptroot and changed it a bit for
cardreaders with pinpads.

I'd like to use the same script also for cardreaders without pinpad -
but then I have to determine, if a cardreader has one or not. Is their
any possibility for getting this information?

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
/lib/cryptsetup/scripts/decrypt_gnupg_sc:

    #!/bin/sh

    # quick hack for starting pcscd
    pcscd &

    decrypt_gpg () {
            # we check for attachted cardreader
            # cardreaders with pinpad: they have to be attached before
booting
            # for cardreaders without pinpad: just attach them later, if
the script already
            # asks for Passphrase or PIN
            if gpg2 --card-status > /dev/null 2>&1 && sleep 2; then
                    echo "Please use the pinpad of your cardreader for
PIN entry." >&2
                    if ! /usr/bin/gpg2 --homedir "$(dirname $1)" \
                            --trustdb-name /dev/null --decrypt $1; then
                            return 1
                    fi
                    return 0
            else
                    echo "Performing GPG key decryption ..." >&2
                    if ! /lib/cryptsetup/askpass \
                            "Enter passphrase for key $1, or PIN for
your cardreader: " | \
                            /usr/bin/gpg -q --batch --homedir "$(dirname
$1)" \
                            --trustdb-name /dev/null --passphrase-fd 0
--decrypt $1; then
                            return 1
                    fi
                    return 0
            fi
    }

    if [ ! -x /usr/bin/gpg2 ]; then
            echo "$0: /usr/bin/gpg2 is not available" >&2
            exit 1
    fi

    if [ -z "$1" ]; then
            echo "$0: missing key as argument" >&2
            exit 1
    fi

    decrypt_gpg "$1"
    exit $?
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

I wrote a howto (in german) in addition to the one from Peter Lebbing
(thanks a lot!):
https://wiki.datenkollektiv.net/public/gnupg/luks_gnupg_card

For getting cardreaders with pinpad working we need gnupg2 inside the
initramdisk. But it works.

Best Regards
Jan


From errol at askerrol.org  Tue Mar 31 16:19:56 2015
From: errol at askerrol.org (Errol Casey)
Date: Tue, 31 Mar 2015 10:19:56 -0400
Subject: tty permission issues
Message-ID: <CABnbCSEcDRNUirD58h8EPwFrPqOX-avVexq4bBeTUv+Y-j1mMQ@mail.gmail.com>

I've run into an issue with tty permissions when using GNUpg.

We have accounts that users cannot login to directly for security reasons.

They must use sudo su - <account> to access the account, after logging in
from
their own personal account.

This leaves the pseudo tty owned by the login users. The permission issue
causes pinentry to fail, and not prompt for passphrases.

I'm looking into possible changes to sudo config, setuid binaries, and
individual script to change permission before and after sudo as possible
workarounds.

Wanted to see if other gnupg users had worked around this issue.
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From mailinglist at krebs.uno  Tue Mar 31 18:50:58 2015
From: mailinglist at krebs.uno (Daniel Krebs)
Date: Tue, 31 Mar 2015 18:50:58 +0200
Subject: What is 'CA fingerprint 1' on Smartcard
Message-ID: <551AD072.6030808@krebs.uno>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

Hi,
Hope this question is OK on this list.
What is the CA fingerprint on FSFE-Smartcard?

A gpg2 --car-status gave the information:
CA fingerprint 1 .: C485 A6CD 7EC6 6E9E EC33  65F2 70F2 75E4 C32F 6CA5

This is a smartcard issued by the FSFE. After reseting the card this
information is gone, so it must be applied by FSFE. I read the
openpgp-card-2.0 specification but I'm still not sure what this CA
data object is used for and what specific CA it points to. Maybe you
can help...

DK
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (GNU/Linux)
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=Orxq
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


From dkg at fifthhorseman.net  Tue Mar 31 23:33:55 2015
From: dkg at fifthhorseman.net (Daniel Kahn Gillmor)
Date: Tue, 31 Mar 2015 17:33:55 -0400
Subject: Instructions for converting keyring for 2.1
In-Reply-To: <55183802.8010306@digitalbrains.com>
References: <55183802.8010306@digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <87lhichmws.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>

On Sun 2015-03-29 13:36:02 -0400, Peter Lebbing wrote:
> I just followed the instructions on [1] for converting your pubring.gpg to the
> new keybox format. I discovered I needed --import-options import-local-sigs on
> the import command to also import my local signatures, which obviously is very
> desirable when converting your public keyring... it's a bit lossy otherwise :S.
>
> Here's a diff for the gnupg-doc git:
>
> diff --git a/web/faq/whats-new-in-2.1.org b/web/faq/whats-new-in-2.1.org
> index bc312da..1056dd0 100644
> --- a/web/faq/whats-new-in-2.1.org
> +++ b/web/faq/whats-new-in-2.1.org
> @@ -561,7 +561,7 @@ then run import, and finally restore the ownertrust values:
>  $ cd ~/.gnupg
>  $ gpg --export-ownertrust >otrust.lst
>  $ mv pubring.gpg publickeys
> -$ gpg2 --import publickeys
> +$ gpg2 --import-options import-local-sigs --import publickeys
>  $ gpg2 --import-ownertrust otrust.lst
>  #+end_example

This doesn't appear to have been updated upstream yet, but i agree with
Peter Lebbing's suggestion here.  Would presenting the patch in some
other way (e.g in git format-patch style?) be helpful?

        --dkg