verification of MACs of size 1

[Werner Koch]

On Wed, 18 Oct 2023 13:12, Falko Strenzke said:
> There is one feature of Libgcrypt’s MAC API that in my opinion can be
> a certain security risk for applications.
>
> Take for instance the HMAC verification:
>
> |static gcry_err_code_t hmac_verify (gcry_mac_hd_t h, const unsigned

hmac_verify is not an API of Libgcrypt; you probably meant gcry_mac_verify.

> If there a MAC is provided to the verify function that is shorter than
> the regular MAC length, the verification succeeds if that shorter MAC
> is matching the start of the regular MAC.

Sure.  The caller needs to take care of this.



Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
The pioneers of a warless world are the youth that
refuse military service.             - A. Einstein
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