[svn] GnuPG - r5478 - branches/STABLE-BRANCH-2-0/g10
svn author dshaw
cvs at cvs.gnupg.org
Fri Oct 29 21:54:57 CEST 2010
Author: dshaw
Date: 2010-10-29 21:54:56 +0200 (Fri, 29 Oct 2010)
New Revision: 5478
Modified:
branches/STABLE-BRANCH-2-0/g10/ChangeLog
branches/STABLE-BRANCH-2-0/g10/pkclist.c
Log:
* pkclist.c (select_algo_from_prefs): Make sure the scores can't
overflow when picking an algorithm (not a security issue since we
can't pick something not present in all preference lists, but we might
pick something that isn't scored first choice).
* pkclist.c (select_algo_from_prefs): Slightly improve the handling of
MD5 in preference lists. Instead of replacing MD5 with SHA-1, just
remove MD5 from the list altogether, and let the next-highest ranked
algorithm be chosen.
Modified: branches/STABLE-BRANCH-2-0/g10/ChangeLog
===================================================================
--- branches/STABLE-BRANCH-2-0/g10/ChangeLog 2010-10-29 19:49:54 UTC (rev 5477)
+++ branches/STABLE-BRANCH-2-0/g10/ChangeLog 2010-10-29 19:54:56 UTC (rev 5478)
@@ -1,3 +1,15 @@
+2010-10-29 David Shaw <dshaw at jabberwocky.com>
+
+ * pkclist.c (select_algo_from_prefs): Make sure the scores can't
+ overflow when picking an algorithm (not a security issue since we
+ can't pick something not present in all preference lists, but we
+ might pick something that isn't scored first choice).
+
+ * pkclist.c (select_algo_from_prefs): Slightly improve the
+ handling of MD5 in preference lists. Instead of replacing MD5
+ with SHA-1, just remove MD5 from the list altogether, and let the
+ next-highest ranked algorithm be chosen.
+
2010-09-29 Werner Koch <wk at g10code.com>
* keygen.c (key_from_sexp): Fix memory leak in the error case.
@@ -10973,7 +10985,7 @@
Copyright 1998,1999,2000,2001,2002,2003,2004,2005,
- 2006,2007,2008,2009 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ 2006,2007,2008,2009,2010 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This file is free software; as a special exception the author gives
unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, with or without
Modified: branches/STABLE-BRANCH-2-0/g10/pkclist.c
===================================================================
--- branches/STABLE-BRANCH-2-0/g10/pkclist.c 2010-10-29 19:49:54 UTC (rev 5477)
+++ branches/STABLE-BRANCH-2-0/g10/pkclist.c 2010-10-29 19:54:56 UTC (rev 5478)
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/* pkclist.c - create a list of public keys
* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007,
- * 2008 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ * 2008, 2009, 2010 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
@@ -1275,9 +1275,8 @@
u32 bits[8];
const prefitem_t *prefs;
int result=-1,i;
- unsigned int best=-1;
- byte scores[256];
-
+ u16 scores[256];
+
if( !pk_list )
return -1;
@@ -1339,7 +1338,13 @@
{
if( prefs[i].type == preftype )
{
- scores[prefs[i].value]+=rank;
+ /* Make sure all scores don't add up past 0xFFFF
+ (and roll around) */
+ if(rank+scores[prefs[i].value]<=0xFFFF)
+ scores[prefs[i].value]+=rank;
+ else
+ scores[prefs[i].value]=0xFFFF;
+
mask[prefs[i].value/32] |= 1<<(prefs[i].value%32);
rank++;
@@ -1406,10 +1411,31 @@
if(result==-1)
{
+ unsigned int best=-1;
+
/* At this point, we have not selected an algorithm due to a
special request or via personal prefs. Pick the highest
ranked algorithm (i.e. the one with the lowest score). */
+ if(preftype==PREFTYPE_HASH && scores[DIGEST_ALGO_MD5])
+ {
+ /* "If you are building an authentication system, the recipient
+ may specify a preferred signing algorithm. However, the
+ signer would be foolish to use a weak algorithm simply
+ because the recipient requests it." (RFC4880:14). If any
+ other hash algorithm is available, pretend that MD5 isn't.
+ Note that if the user intentionally chose MD5 by putting it
+ in their personal prefs, then we do what the user said (as we
+ never reach this code). */
+
+ for(i=DIGEST_ALGO_MD5+1;i<256;i++)
+ if(scores[i])
+ {
+ scores[DIGEST_ALGO_MD5]=0;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
for(i=0;i<256;i++)
{
/* Note the '<' here. This means in case of a tie, we will
@@ -1427,18 +1453,6 @@
result=i;
}
}
-
- /* "If you are building an authentication system, the recipient
- may specify a preferred signing algorithm. However, the
- signer would be foolish to use a weak algorithm simply
- because the recipient requests it." (RFC4880:14). If we
- settle on MD5, and SHA1 is also available, use SHA1 instead.
- Note that if the user intentionally chose MD5 by putting it
- in their personal prefs, then we do what the user said (as we
- never reach this code). */
- if(preftype==PREFTYPE_HASH && result==DIGEST_ALGO_MD5
- && (bits[0] & (1<<DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1)))
- result=DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1;
}
return result;
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