[git] GCRYPT - branch, master, updated. libgcrypt-1.5.0-171-g37d0a1e
by Werner Koch
cvs at cvs.gnupg.org
Fri Jul 19 18:44:28 CEST 2013
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commit 37d0a1ebdc2dc74df4fb6bf0621045018122a68f
Author: Werner Koch <wk at gnupg.org>
Date: Fri Jul 19 18:14:38 2013 +0200
pk: Allow the use of a hash element for DSA sign and verify.
* cipher/pubkey.c (pubkey_sign): Add arg ctx and pass it to the sign
module.
(gcry_pk_sign): Pass CTX to pubkey_sign.
(sexp_data_to_mpi): Add flag rfc6979 and code to alls hash with *DSA
* cipher/rsa.c (rsa_sign, rsa_verify): Return an error if an opaque
MPI is given for DATA/HASH.
* cipher/elgamal.c (elg_sign, elg_verify): Ditto.
* cipher/dsa.c (dsa_sign, dsa_verify): Convert a given opaque MPI.
* cipher/ecc.c (ecc_sign, ecc_verify): Ditto.
* tests/basic.c (check_pubkey_sign_ecdsa): Add a test for using a hash
element with DSA.
--
This patch allows the use of
(data (flags raw)
(hash sha256 #80112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF
000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F#))
in addition to the old but more efficient
(data (flags raw)
(value #80112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF
000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F#))
for DSA and ECDSA. With the hash element the flag "raw" must be
explicitly given because existing regression test code expects that
conflict error is return if no flags but a hash element is given.
Note that the hash algorithm name is currently not checked. It may
eventually be used to cross-check the length of the provided hash
value. It is suggested that the correct hash name is given - even if
a truncated hash value is used.
Finally this patch adds a way to pass the hash algorithm and flag
values to the signing module. "rfc6979" as been implemented as a new
but not yet used flag.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk at gnupg.org>
diff --git a/cipher/dsa.c b/cipher/dsa.c
index 55805e2..7652c19 100644
--- a/cipher/dsa.c
+++ b/cipher/dsa.c
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
/* dsa.c - DSA signature algorithm
* Copyright (C) 1998, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003,
* 2006, 2008 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 2013 g10 Code GmbH.
*
* This file is part of Libgcrypt.
*
@@ -539,7 +540,7 @@ check_secret_key( DSA_secret_key *sk )
Make a DSA signature from HASH and put it into r and s.
*/
static void
-sign(gcry_mpi_t r, gcry_mpi_t s, gcry_mpi_t hash, DSA_secret_key *skey )
+sign (gcry_mpi_t r, gcry_mpi_t s, gcry_mpi_t hash, DSA_secret_key *skey )
{
gcry_mpi_t k;
gcry_mpi_t kinv;
@@ -929,7 +930,22 @@ dsa_sign (int algo, gcry_mpi_t *resarr, gcry_mpi_t data, gcry_mpi_t *skey,
sk.x = skey[4];
resarr[0] = mpi_alloc (mpi_get_nlimbs (sk.p));
resarr[1] = mpi_alloc (mpi_get_nlimbs (sk.p));
- sign (resarr[0], resarr[1], data, &sk);
+ if (mpi_is_opaque (data))
+ {
+ const void *abuf;
+ unsigned int abits;
+ gcry_mpi_t a;
+
+ abuf = gcry_mpi_get_opaque (data, &abits);
+ err = gcry_mpi_scan (&a, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, abuf, abits/8, NULL);
+ if (!err)
+ {
+ sign (resarr[0], resarr[1], a, &sk);
+ gcry_mpi_release (a);
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ sign (resarr[0], resarr[1], data, &sk);
}
return err;
}
@@ -954,8 +970,26 @@ dsa_verify (int algo, gcry_mpi_t hash, gcry_mpi_t *data, gcry_mpi_t *pkey,
pk.q = pkey[1];
pk.g = pkey[2];
pk.y = pkey[3];
- if (! verify (data[0], data[1], hash, &pk))
- err = GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE;
+ if (mpi_is_opaque (hash))
+ {
+ const void *abuf;
+ unsigned int abits;
+ gcry_mpi_t a;
+
+ abuf = gcry_mpi_get_opaque (hash, &abits);
+ err = gcry_mpi_scan (&a, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, abuf, abits/8, NULL);
+ if (!err)
+ {
+ if (!verify (data[0], data[1], a, &pk))
+ err = GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE;
+ gcry_mpi_release (a);
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (!verify (data[0], data[1], hash, &pk))
+ err = GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE;
+ }
}
return err;
}
diff --git a/cipher/ecc.c b/cipher/ecc.c
index e4b1799..725dfbe 100644
--- a/cipher/ecc.c
+++ b/cipher/ecc.c
@@ -1347,7 +1347,24 @@ ecc_sign (int algo, gcry_mpi_t *resarr, gcry_mpi_t data, gcry_mpi_t *skey,
resarr[0] = mpi_alloc (mpi_get_nlimbs (sk.E.p));
resarr[1] = mpi_alloc (mpi_get_nlimbs (sk.E.p));
- err = sign (data, &sk, resarr[0], resarr[1]);
+
+ if (mpi_is_opaque (data))
+ {
+ const void *abuf;
+ unsigned int abits;
+ gcry_mpi_t a;
+
+ abuf = gcry_mpi_get_opaque (data, &abits);
+ err = gcry_mpi_scan (&a, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, abuf, abits/8, NULL);
+ if (!err)
+ {
+ err = sign (a, &sk, resarr[0], resarr[1]);
+ gcry_mpi_release (a);
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ err = sign (data, &sk, resarr[0], resarr[1]);
+
if (err)
{
mpi_free (resarr[0]);
@@ -1394,7 +1411,22 @@ ecc_verify (int algo, gcry_mpi_t hash, gcry_mpi_t *data, gcry_mpi_t *pkey,
return err;
}
- err = verify (hash, &pk, data[0], data[1]);
+ if (mpi_is_opaque (hash))
+ {
+ const void *abuf;
+ unsigned int abits;
+ gcry_mpi_t a;
+
+ abuf = gcry_mpi_get_opaque (hash, &abits);
+ err = gcry_mpi_scan (&a, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, abuf, abits/8, NULL);
+ if (!err)
+ {
+ err = verify (a, &pk, data[0], data[1]);
+ gcry_mpi_release (a);
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ err = verify (hash, &pk, data[0], data[1]);
point_free (&pk.E.G);
point_free (&pk.Q);
diff --git a/cipher/elgamal.c b/cipher/elgamal.c
index 128dd99..b40d132 100644
--- a/cipher/elgamal.c
+++ b/cipher/elgamal.c
@@ -763,6 +763,9 @@ elg_sign (int algo, gcry_mpi_t *resarr, gcry_mpi_t data, gcry_mpi_t *skey,
(void)flags;
(void)hashalgo;
+ if (mpi_is_opaque (data))
+ return GPG_ERR_INV_DATA;
+
if ((! data)
|| (! skey[0]) || (! skey[1]) || (! skey[2]) || (! skey[3]))
err = GPG_ERR_BAD_MPI;
@@ -792,6 +795,9 @@ elg_verify (int algo, gcry_mpi_t hash, gcry_mpi_t *data, gcry_mpi_t *pkey,
(void)cmp;
(void)opaquev;
+ if (mpi_is_opaque (hash))
+ return GPG_ERR_INV_DATA;
+
if ((! data[0]) || (! data[1]) || (! hash)
|| (! pkey[0]) || (! pkey[1]) || (! pkey[2]))
err = GPG_ERR_BAD_MPI;
diff --git a/cipher/pubkey.c b/cipher/pubkey.c
index 23a4358..606cedf 100644
--- a/cipher/pubkey.c
+++ b/cipher/pubkey.c
@@ -37,7 +37,8 @@ static gcry_err_code_t pubkey_decrypt (int algo, gcry_mpi_t *result,
gcry_mpi_t *data, gcry_mpi_t *skey,
int flags);
static gcry_err_code_t pubkey_sign (int algo, gcry_mpi_t *resarr,
- gcry_mpi_t hash, gcry_mpi_t *skey);
+ gcry_mpi_t hash, gcry_mpi_t *skey,
+ struct pk_encoding_ctx *ctx);
static gcry_err_code_t pubkey_verify (int algo, gcry_mpi_t hash,
gcry_mpi_t *data, gcry_mpi_t *pkey,
int (*cmp) (void *, gcry_mpi_t),
@@ -712,7 +713,7 @@ pubkey_decrypt (int algorithm, gcry_mpi_t *result, gcry_mpi_t *data,
*/
static gcry_err_code_t
pubkey_sign (int algorithm, gcry_mpi_t *resarr, gcry_mpi_t data,
- gcry_mpi_t *skey)
+ gcry_mpi_t *skey, struct pk_encoding_ctx *ctx)
{
gcry_pk_spec_t *pubkey;
gcry_module_t module;
@@ -732,7 +733,8 @@ pubkey_sign (int algorithm, gcry_mpi_t *resarr, gcry_mpi_t data,
if (module)
{
pubkey = (gcry_pk_spec_t *) module->spec;
- rc = pubkey->sign (algorithm, resarr, data, skey, 0, 0);
+ rc = pubkey->sign (algorithm, resarr, data, skey,
+ ctx->flags, ctx->hash_algo);
_gcry_module_release (module);
goto ready;
}
@@ -2477,7 +2479,7 @@ sexp_to_enc (gcry_sexp_t sexp, gcry_mpi_t **retarray, gcry_module_t *retalgo,
(<mpi>)
or
(data
- [(flags [raw, pkcs1, oaep, pss, no-blinding])]
+ [(flags [raw, direct, pkcs1, oaep, pss, no-blinding, rfc6979])]
[(hash <algo> <value>)]
[(value <text>)]
[(hash-algo <algo>)]
@@ -2504,8 +2506,9 @@ sexp_data_to_mpi (gcry_sexp_t input, gcry_mpi_t *ret_mpi,
int i;
size_t n;
const char *s;
- int unknown_flag=0;
+ int unknown_flag = 0;
int parsed_flags = 0;
+ int explicit_raw = 0;
*ret_mpi = NULL;
ldata = gcry_sexp_find_token (input, "data", 0);
@@ -2525,9 +2528,14 @@ sexp_data_to_mpi (gcry_sexp_t input, gcry_mpi_t *ret_mpi,
s = gcry_sexp_nth_data (lflags, i, &n);
if (!s)
; /* not a data element*/
+ else if (n == 7 && ! memcmp (s, "rfc6979", 7))
+ parsed_flags |= PUBKEY_FLAG_RFC6979;
else if ( n == 3 && !memcmp (s, "raw", 3)
&& ctx->encoding == PUBKEY_ENC_UNKNOWN)
- ctx->encoding = PUBKEY_ENC_RAW;
+ {
+ ctx->encoding = PUBKEY_ENC_RAW;
+ explicit_raw = 1;
+ }
else if ( n == 5 && !memcmp (s, "pkcs1", 5)
&& ctx->encoding == PUBKEY_ENC_UNKNOWN)
ctx->encoding = PUBKEY_ENC_PKCS1;
@@ -2557,8 +2565,47 @@ sexp_data_to_mpi (gcry_sexp_t input, gcry_mpi_t *ret_mpi,
rc = GPG_ERR_INV_OBJ; /* none or both given */
else if (unknown_flag)
rc = GPG_ERR_INV_FLAG;
+ else if (ctx->encoding == PUBKEY_ENC_RAW && lhash
+ && (explicit_raw || (parsed_flags & PUBKEY_FLAG_RFC6979)))
+ {
+ /* Raw encoding along with a hash element. This is commonly
+ used for DSA. For better backward error compatibility we
+ allow this only if either the rfc6979 flag has been given or
+ the raw flags was explicitly given. */
+ if (gcry_sexp_length (lhash) != 3)
+ rc = GPG_ERR_INV_OBJ;
+ else if ( !(s=gcry_sexp_nth_data (lhash, 1, &n)) || !n )
+ rc = GPG_ERR_INV_OBJ;
+ else
+ {
+ void *value;
+ size_t valuelen;
+
+ ctx->hash_algo = get_hash_algo (s, n);
+ if (!ctx->hash_algo)
+ rc = GPG_ERR_DIGEST_ALGO;
+ else if (!(value=gcry_sexp_nth_buffer (lhash, 2, &valuelen)))
+ rc = GPG_ERR_INV_OBJ;
+ else if ((valuelen * 8) < valuelen)
+ {
+ gcry_free (value);
+ rc = GPG_ERR_TOO_LARGE;
+ }
+ else
+ *ret_mpi = gcry_mpi_set_opaque (NULL, value, valuelen*8);
+ }
+ }
else if (ctx->encoding == PUBKEY_ENC_RAW && lvalue)
{
+ /* RFC6969 may only be used with the a hash value and not the
+ MPI based value. */
+ if (parsed_flags & PUBKEY_FLAG_RFC6979)
+ {
+ rc = GPG_ERR_CONFLICT;
+ goto leave;
+ }
+
+ /* Get the value */
*ret_mpi = gcry_sexp_nth_mpi (lvalue, 1, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG);
if (!*ret_mpi)
rc = GPG_ERR_INV_OBJ;
@@ -3214,7 +3261,7 @@ gcry_pk_sign (gcry_sexp_t *r_sig, gcry_sexp_t s_hash, gcry_sexp_t s_skey)
rc = gpg_err_code_from_syserror ();
goto leave;
}
- rc = pubkey_sign (module->mod_id, result, hash, skey);
+ rc = pubkey_sign (module->mod_id, result, hash, skey, &ctx);
if (rc)
goto leave;
diff --git a/cipher/rsa.c b/cipher/rsa.c
index 4787f81..c9fcebf 100644
--- a/cipher/rsa.c
+++ b/cipher/rsa.c
@@ -700,7 +700,7 @@ stronger_key_check ( RSA_secret_key *skey )
* Where m is OUTPUT, c is INPUT and d,n,p,q,u are elements of SKEY.
*/
static void
-secret(gcry_mpi_t output, gcry_mpi_t input, RSA_secret_key *skey )
+secret (gcry_mpi_t output, gcry_mpi_t input, RSA_secret_key *skey )
{
if (!skey->p || !skey->q || !skey->u)
{
@@ -1002,6 +1002,9 @@ rsa_sign (int algo, gcry_mpi_t *resarr, gcry_mpi_t data, gcry_mpi_t *skey,
(void)flags;
(void)hashalgo;
+ if (mpi_is_opaque (data))
+ return GPG_ERR_INV_DATA;
+
sk.n = skey[0];
sk.e = skey[1];
sk.d = skey[2];
@@ -1028,6 +1031,9 @@ rsa_verify (int algo, gcry_mpi_t hash, gcry_mpi_t *data, gcry_mpi_t *pkey,
(void)cmp;
(void)opaquev;
+ if (mpi_is_opaque (hash))
+ return GPG_ERR_INV_DATA;
+
pk.n = pkey[0];
pk.e = pkey[1];
result = gcry_mpi_new ( 160 );
diff --git a/tests/basic.c b/tests/basic.c
index 88ae131..46e213c 100644
--- a/tests/basic.c
+++ b/tests/basic.c
@@ -3073,6 +3073,14 @@ check_pubkey_sign_ecdsa (int n, gcry_sexp_t skey, gcry_sexp_t pkey)
int dummy;
} datas[] =
{
+ { 192,
+ "(data (flags raw)\n"
+ " (value #00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF0001020304050607#))",
+ 0,
+ "(data (flags raw)\n"
+ " (value #80112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF0001020304050607#))",
+ 0
+ },
{ 256,
"(data (flags raw)\n"
" (value #00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF"
@@ -3083,12 +3091,14 @@ check_pubkey_sign_ecdsa (int n, gcry_sexp_t skey, gcry_sexp_t pkey)
/* */ "000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F#))",
0
},
- { 192,
+ { 256,
"(data (flags raw)\n"
- " (value #00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF0001020304050607#))",
+ " (hash sha256 #00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF"
+ /* */ "000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F#))",
0,
"(data (flags raw)\n"
- " (value #80112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF0001020304050607#))",
+ " (hash sha256 #80112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF"
+ /* */ "000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F#))",
0
},
{ 0, NULL }
commit 2d3e8d4d9562d666420aadd9ffa8ac0456a1cd91
Author: Werner Koch <wk at gnupg.org>
Date: Fri Jul 19 15:54:03 2013 +0200
sexp: Add function gcry_sexp_nth_buffer.
* src/sexp.c (gcry_sexp_nth_buffer): New.
* src/visibility.c, src/visibility.h: Add function wrapper.
* src/libgcrypt.vers, src/libgcrypt.def: Add to API.
* src/gcrypt.h.in: Add prototype.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk at gnupg.org>
diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS
index b1ad7ac..508b943 100644
--- a/NEWS
+++ b/NEWS
@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ Noteworthy changes in version 1.6.0 (unreleased)
GCRYCTL_DISABLE_LOCKED_SECMEM NEW.
GCRYCTL_DISABLE_PRIV_DROP NEW.
GCRY_CIPHER_SALSA20 NEW.
+ gcry_sexp_nth_buffer NEW.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.5.0 (2011-06-29)
diff --git a/doc/gcrypt.texi b/doc/gcrypt.texi
index cfc0174..770a245 100644
--- a/doc/gcrypt.texi
+++ b/doc/gcrypt.texi
@@ -3596,6 +3596,30 @@ printf ("my name is %.*s\n", (int)len, name);
@end example
@end deftypefun
+ at deftypefun {void *} gcry_sexp_nth_buffer (@w{const gcry_sexp_t @var{list}}, @w{int @var{number}}, @w{size_t *@var{rlength}})
+
+This function is used to get data from a @var{list}. A malloced
+buffer with the actual data at list index @var{number} is returned and
+the length of this buffer will be stored to @var{rlength}. If there
+is no data at the given index or the index represents another list,
+ at code{NULL} is returned. The caller must release the result using
+ at code{gcry_free}.
+
+ at noindent
+Here is an example on how to extract and print the CRC value from the
+S-expression @samp{(hash crc32 #23ed00d7)}:
+
+ at example
+size_t len;
+char *value;
+
+value = gcry_sexp_nth_buffer (list, 2, &len);
+if (value)
+ fwrite (value, len, 1, stdout);
+gcry_free (value);
+ at end example
+ at end deftypefun
+
@deftypefun {char *} gcry_sexp_nth_string (@w{gcry_sexp_t @var{list}}, @w{int @var{number}})
This function is used to get and convert data from a @var{list}. The
diff --git a/src/gcrypt.h.in b/src/gcrypt.h.in
index 6bd615d..06d6663 100644
--- a/src/gcrypt.h.in
+++ b/src/gcrypt.h.in
@@ -423,6 +423,13 @@ gcry_sexp_t gcry_sexp_cadr (const gcry_sexp_t list);
const char *gcry_sexp_nth_data (const gcry_sexp_t list, int number,
size_t *datalen);
+/* This function is used to get data from a LIST. A malloced buffer to the
+ data with index NUMBER is returned and the length of this
+ data will be stored to RLENGTH. If there is no data at the given
+ index or the index represents another list, `NULL' is returned. */
+void *gcry_sexp_nth_buffer (const gcry_sexp_t list, int number,
+ size_t *rlength);
+
/* This function is used to get and convert data from a LIST. The
data is assumed to be a Nul terminated string. The caller must
release the returned value using `gcry_free'. If there is no data
diff --git a/src/libgcrypt.def b/src/libgcrypt.def
index 9eaf8a7..bbc8f43 100644
--- a/src/libgcrypt.def
+++ b/src/libgcrypt.def
@@ -236,3 +236,8 @@ EXPORTS
gcry_pubkey_get_sexp @212
_gcry_mpi_get_const @213
+
+ gcry_sexp_get_buffer @214
+
+
+;; end of file with public symbols for Windows.
diff --git a/src/libgcrypt.vers b/src/libgcrypt.vers
index 6aaf0f1..473ee68 100644
--- a/src/libgcrypt.vers
+++ b/src/libgcrypt.vers
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ GCRYPT_1.6 {
gcry_sexp_build_array; gcry_sexp_cadr; gcry_sexp_canon_len;
gcry_sexp_car; gcry_sexp_cdr; gcry_sexp_cons; gcry_sexp_create;
gcry_sexp_dump; gcry_sexp_find_token; gcry_sexp_length;
- gcry_sexp_new; gcry_sexp_nth; gcry_sexp_nth_data;
+ gcry_sexp_new; gcry_sexp_nth; gcry_sexp_nth_buffer; gcry_sexp_nth_data;
gcry_sexp_nth_mpi; gcry_sexp_prepend; gcry_sexp_release;
gcry_sexp_sprint; gcry_sexp_sscan; gcry_sexp_vlist;
gcry_sexp_nth_string;
diff --git a/src/sexp.c b/src/sexp.c
index 62126d3..6dedf4e 100644
--- a/src/sexp.c
+++ b/src/sexp.c
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
/* sexp.c - S-Expression handling
* Copyright (C) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003,
* 2004, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2011 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 2013 g10 Code GmbH
*
* This file is part of Libgcrypt.
*
@@ -713,6 +714,30 @@ gcry_sexp_nth_data (const gcry_sexp_t list, int number, size_t *datalen )
}
+/* Get the nth element of a list which needs to be a simple object.
+ The returned value is a malloced buffer and needs to be freed by
+ the caller. This is basically the same as gcry_sexp_nth_data but
+ with an allocated result. */
+void *
+gcry_sexp_nth_buffer (const gcry_sexp_t list, int number, size_t *rlength)
+{
+ const char *s;
+ size_t n;
+ char *buf;
+
+ *rlength = 0;
+ s = sexp_nth_data (list, number, &n);
+ if (!s || !n)
+ return NULL;
+ buf = gcry_malloc (n);
+ if (!buf)
+ return NULL;
+ memcpy (buf, s, n);
+ *rlength = n;
+ return buf;
+}
+
+
/* Get a string from the car. The returned value is a malloced string
and needs to be freed by the caller. */
char *
@@ -733,6 +758,7 @@ gcry_sexp_nth_string (const gcry_sexp_t list, int number)
return buf;
}
+
/*
* Get a MPI from the car
*/
diff --git a/src/visibility.c b/src/visibility.c
index c86d31b..bb51d58 100644
--- a/src/visibility.c
+++ b/src/visibility.c
@@ -226,6 +226,12 @@ gcry_sexp_nth_data (const gcry_sexp_t list, int number, size_t *datalen)
return _gcry_sexp_nth_data (list, number, datalen);
}
+void *
+gcry_sexp_nth_buffer (const gcry_sexp_t list, int number, size_t *rlength)
+{
+ return _gcry_sexp_nth_buffer (list, number, rlength);
+}
+
char *
gcry_sexp_nth_string (gcry_sexp_t list, int number)
{
diff --git a/src/visibility.h b/src/visibility.h
index 4837ed6..54da016 100644
--- a/src/visibility.h
+++ b/src/visibility.h
@@ -133,14 +133,15 @@
#define gcry_sexp_length _gcry_sexp_length
#define gcry_sexp_new _gcry_sexp_new
#define gcry_sexp_nth _gcry_sexp_nth
+#define gcry_sexp_nth_buffer _gcry_sexp_nth_buffer
#define gcry_sexp_nth_data _gcry_sexp_nth_data
#define gcry_sexp_nth_mpi _gcry_sexp_nth_mpi
+#define gcry_sexp_nth_string _gcry_sexp_nth_string
#define gcry_sexp_prepend _gcry_sexp_prepend
#define gcry_sexp_release _gcry_sexp_release
#define gcry_sexp_sprint _gcry_sexp_sprint
#define gcry_sexp_sscan _gcry_sexp_sscan
#define gcry_sexp_vlist _gcry_sexp_vlist
-#define gcry_sexp_nth_string _gcry_sexp_nth_string
#define gcry_mpi_add _gcry_mpi_add
#define gcry_mpi_add_ui _gcry_mpi_add_ui
@@ -348,14 +349,15 @@ gcry_err_code_t gcry_md_get (gcry_md_hd_t hd, int algo,
#undef gcry_sexp_length
#undef gcry_sexp_new
#undef gcry_sexp_nth
+#undef gcry_sexp_nth_buffer
#undef gcry_sexp_nth_data
#undef gcry_sexp_nth_mpi
+#undef gcry_sexp_nth_string
#undef gcry_sexp_prepend
#undef gcry_sexp_release
#undef gcry_sexp_sprint
#undef gcry_sexp_sscan
#undef gcry_sexp_vlist
-#undef gcry_sexp_nth_string
#undef gcry_mpi_add
#undef gcry_mpi_add_ui
@@ -524,14 +526,15 @@ MARK_VISIBLE (gcry_sexp_find_token)
MARK_VISIBLE (gcry_sexp_length)
MARK_VISIBLE (gcry_sexp_new)
MARK_VISIBLE (gcry_sexp_nth)
+MARK_VISIBLE (gcry_sexp_nth_buffer)
MARK_VISIBLE (gcry_sexp_nth_data)
MARK_VISIBLE (gcry_sexp_nth_mpi)
+MARK_VISIBLE (gcry_sexp_nth_string)
MARK_VISIBLE (gcry_sexp_prepend)
MARK_VISIBLE (gcry_sexp_release)
MARK_VISIBLE (gcry_sexp_sprint)
MARK_VISIBLE (gcry_sexp_sscan)
MARK_VISIBLE (gcry_sexp_vlist)
-MARK_VISIBLE (gcry_sexp_nth_string)
MARK_VISIBLE (gcry_mpi_add)
MARK_VISIBLE (gcry_mpi_add_ui)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of changes:
NEWS | 1 +
cipher/dsa.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
cipher/ecc.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
cipher/elgamal.c | 6 +++++
cipher/pubkey.c | 61 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
cipher/rsa.c | 8 ++++++-
doc/gcrypt.texi | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++
src/gcrypt.h.in | 7 ++++++
src/libgcrypt.def | 5 ++++
src/libgcrypt.vers | 2 +-
src/sexp.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++
src/visibility.c | 6 +++++
src/visibility.h | 9 +++++--
tests/basic.c | 16 +++++++++++--
14 files changed, 228 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
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The GNU crypto library
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