[git] GnuPG - branch, STABLE-BRANCH-2-0, updated. gnupg-2.0.22-21-g684b0bd
by Werner Koch
cvs at cvs.gnupg.org
Mon Jun 2 16:22:38 CEST 2014
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- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 684b0bd4bfb846d03a531385e2d1251391dee1f5
Author: Werner Koch <wk at gnupg.org>
Date: Mon Jun 2 16:02:30 2014 +0200
gpgsm: Handle re-issued CA certificates in a better way.
* sm/certchain.c (find_up_search_by_keyid): Consider all matching
certificates.
(find_up): Add some debug messages.
--
The DFN-Verein recently re-issued its CA certificates without
generating new keys. Thus looking up the chain using the authority
keyids works but may use still existing old certificates. This may
break the CRL lookup in the Dirmngr. The hack to fix this is by using
the latest issued certificate with the same subject key identifier.
As usual Peter Gutman's X.509 style guide has some comments on that
re-issuing.
GnuPG-bug-id: 1644
Resolved conflicts:
sm/certchain.c - whitespace fixes.
diff --git a/sm/certchain.c b/sm/certchain.c
index 0023a98..1fbe9ca 100644
--- a/sm/certchain.c
+++ b/sm/certchain.c
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <assert.h>
@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ has_validation_model_chain (ksba_cert_t cert, int listmode, estream_t listfp)
if (opt.verbose)
do_list (0, listmode, listfp,
- _("validation model requested by certificate: %s"),
+ _("validation model requested by certificate: %s"),
!strcmp (oidbuf, "1.3.6.1.4.1.8301.3.5.1")? _("chain") :
!strcmp (oidbuf, "1.3.6.1.4.1.8301.3.5.2")? _("shell") :
/* */ oidbuf);
@@ -274,9 +274,9 @@ unknown_criticals (ksba_cert_t cert, int listmode, estream_t fp)
/* Check whether CERT is an allowed certificate. This requires that
CERT matches all requirements for such a CA, i.e. the
BasicConstraints extension. The function returns 0 on success and
- the awlloed length of the chain at CHAINLEN. */
+ the allowed length of the chain at CHAINLEN. */
static int
-allowed_ca (ctrl_t ctrl,
+allowed_ca (ctrl_t ctrl,
ksba_cert_t cert, int *chainlen, int listmode, estream_t fp)
{
gpg_error_t err;
@@ -327,7 +327,7 @@ check_cert_policy (ksba_cert_t cert, int listmode, estream_t fplist)
any_critical = !!strstr (policies, ":C");
if (!opt.policy_file)
- {
+ {
xfree (policies);
if (any_critical)
{
@@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ check_cert_policy (ksba_cert_t cert, int listmode, estream_t fplist)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_POLICY_MATCH);
}
- for (;;)
+ for (;;)
{
int c;
char *p, line[256];
@@ -389,7 +389,7 @@ check_cert_policy (ksba_cert_t cert, int listmode, estream_t fplist)
fclose (fp);
return tmperr;
}
-
+
if (!*line || line[strlen(line)-1] != '\n')
{
/* eat until end of line */
@@ -400,13 +400,13 @@ check_cert_policy (ksba_cert_t cert, int listmode, estream_t fplist)
return gpg_error (*line? GPG_ERR_LINE_TOO_LONG
: GPG_ERR_INCOMPLETE_LINE);
}
-
+
/* Allow for empty lines and spaces */
for (p=line; spacep (p); p++)
;
}
while (!*p || *p == '\n' || *p == '#');
-
+
/* parse line */
for (allowed=line; spacep (allowed); allowed++)
;
@@ -444,6 +444,8 @@ find_up_search_by_keyid (KEYDB_HANDLE kh,
int rc;
ksba_cert_t cert = NULL;
ksba_sexp_t subj = NULL;
+ int anyfound = 0;
+ ksba_isotime_t not_before, last_not_before;
keydb_search_reset (kh);
while (!(rc = keydb_search_subject (kh, issuer)))
@@ -460,10 +462,37 @@ find_up_search_by_keyid (KEYDB_HANDLE kh,
if (!ksba_cert_get_subj_key_id (cert, NULL, &subj))
{
if (!cmp_simple_canon_sexp (keyid, subj))
- break; /* Found matching cert. */
+ {
+ /* Found matching cert. */
+ rc = ksba_cert_get_validity (cert, 0, not_before);
+ if (rc)
+ {
+ log_error ("keydb_get_validity() failed: rc=%d\n", rc);
+ rc = -1;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (!anyfound || strcmp (last_not_before, not_before) < 0)
+ {
+ /* This certificate is the first one found or newer
+ than the previous one. This copes with
+ re-issuing CA certificates while keeping the same
+ key information. */
+ anyfound = 1;
+ gnupg_copy_time (last_not_before, not_before);
+ keydb_push_found_state (kh);
+ }
+ }
}
}
-
+
+ if (anyfound)
+ {
+ /* Take the last saved one. */
+ keydb_pop_found_state (kh);
+ rc = 0; /* Ignore EOF or other error after the first cert. */
+ }
+
ksba_cert_release (cert);
xfree (subj);
return rc? -1:0;
@@ -493,7 +522,7 @@ find_up_external (ctrl_t ctrl, KEYDB_HANDLE kh,
int count = 0;
char *pattern;
const char *s;
-
+
if (opt.verbose)
log_info (_("looking up issuer at external location\n"));
/* The Dirmngr process is confused about unknown attributes. As a
@@ -515,7 +544,7 @@ find_up_external (ctrl_t ctrl, KEYDB_HANDLE kh,
if (opt.verbose)
log_info (_("number of issuers matching: %d\n"), count);
- if (rc)
+ if (rc)
{
log_error ("external key lookup failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
rc = -1;
@@ -556,7 +585,7 @@ find_up_dirmngr (ctrl_t ctrl, KEYDB_HANDLE kh,
char *pattern;
(void)kh;
-
+
if (opt.verbose)
log_info (_("looking up issuer from the Dirmngr cache\n"));
if (subject_mode)
@@ -583,7 +612,7 @@ find_up_dirmngr (ctrl_t ctrl, KEYDB_HANDLE kh,
if (opt.verbose)
log_info (_("number of matching certificates: %d\n"), count);
- if (rc && !opt.quiet)
+ if (rc && !opt.quiet)
log_info (_("dirmngr cache-only key lookup failed: %s\n"),
gpg_strerror (rc));
return (!rc && count)? 0 : -1;
@@ -598,7 +627,7 @@ find_up_dirmngr (ctrl_t ctrl, KEYDB_HANDLE kh,
keydb_get_cert on the keyDb context KH will return it. Returns 0
on success, -1 if not found or an error code. */
static int
-find_up (ctrl_t ctrl, KEYDB_HANDLE kh,
+find_up (ctrl_t ctrl, KEYDB_HANDLE kh,
ksba_cert_t cert, const char *issuer, int find_next)
{
ksba_name_t authid;
@@ -606,6 +635,8 @@ find_up (ctrl_t ctrl, KEYDB_HANDLE kh,
ksba_sexp_t keyid;
int rc = -1;
+ if (DBG_X509)
+ log_debug ("looking for parent certificate\n");
if (!ksba_cert_get_auth_key_id (cert, &keyid, &authid, &authidno))
{
const char *s = ksba_name_enum (authid, 0);
@@ -614,7 +645,10 @@ find_up (ctrl_t ctrl, KEYDB_HANDLE kh,
rc = keydb_search_issuer_sn (kh, s, authidno);
if (rc)
keydb_search_reset (kh);
-
+
+ if (!rc && DBG_X509)
+ log_debug (" found via authid and sn+issuer\n");
+
/* In case of an error, try to get the certificate from the
dirmngr. That is done by trying to put that certifcate
into the ephemeral DB and let the code below do the
@@ -627,17 +661,20 @@ find_up (ctrl_t ctrl, KEYDB_HANDLE kh,
that in find_next mode because we can't keep the search
state then. */
if (rc == -1 && !find_next)
- {
+ {
int old = keydb_set_ephemeral (kh, 1);
if (!old)
{
rc = keydb_search_issuer_sn (kh, s, authidno);
if (rc)
keydb_search_reset (kh);
+
+ if (!rc && DBG_X509)
+ log_debug (" found via authid and sn+issuer (ephem)\n");
}
keydb_set_ephemeral (kh, old);
}
- if (rc)
+ if (rc)
rc = -1; /* Need to make sure to have this error code. */
}
@@ -649,14 +686,18 @@ find_up (ctrl_t ctrl, KEYDB_HANDLE kh,
subjectKeyIdentifier. */
/* Fixme: Should we also search in the dirmngr? */
rc = find_up_search_by_keyid (kh, issuer, keyid);
+ if (!rc && DBG_X509)
+ log_debug (" found via authid and keyid\n");
if (rc)
{
int old = keydb_set_ephemeral (kh, 1);
if (!old)
rc = find_up_search_by_keyid (kh, issuer, keyid);
+ if (!rc && DBG_X509)
+ log_debug (" found via authid and keyid (ephem)\n");
keydb_set_ephemeral (kh, old);
}
- if (rc)
+ if (rc)
rc = -1; /* Need to make sure to have this error code. */
}
@@ -676,13 +717,21 @@ find_up (ctrl_t ctrl, KEYDB_HANDLE kh,
}
keydb_set_ephemeral (kh, old);
}
- if (rc)
+ if (rc)
rc = -1; /* Need to make sure to have this error code. */
+
+ if (!rc && DBG_X509)
+ log_debug (" found via authid and issuer from dirmngr cache\n");
}
/* If we still didn't found it, try an external lookup. */
if (rc == -1 && opt.auto_issuer_key_retrieve && !find_next)
- rc = find_up_external (ctrl, kh, issuer, keyid);
+ {
+ rc = find_up_external (ctrl, kh, issuer, keyid);
+ if (!rc && DBG_X509)
+ log_debug (" found via authid and external lookup\n");
+ }
+
/* Print a note so that the user does not feel too helpless when
an issuer certificate was found and gpgsm prints BAD
@@ -714,7 +763,7 @@ find_up (ctrl_t ctrl, KEYDB_HANDLE kh,
ksba_name_release (authid);
xfree (authidno);
}
-
+
if (rc) /* Not found via authorithyKeyIdentifier, try regular issuer name. */
rc = keydb_search_subject (kh, issuer);
if (rc == -1 && !find_next)
@@ -733,11 +782,18 @@ find_up (ctrl_t ctrl, KEYDB_HANDLE kh,
rc = keydb_search_subject (kh, issuer);
}
keydb_set_ephemeral (kh, old);
+
+ if (!rc && DBG_X509)
+ log_debug (" found via issuer\n");
}
/* Still not found. If enabled, try an external lookup. */
if (rc == -1 && opt.auto_issuer_key_retrieve && !find_next)
- rc = find_up_external (ctrl, kh, issuer, NULL);
+ {
+ rc = find_up_external (ctrl, kh, issuer, NULL);
+ if (!rc && DBG_X509)
+ log_debug (" found via issuer and external lookup\n");
+ }
return rc;
}
@@ -748,7 +804,7 @@ find_up (ctrl_t ctrl, KEYDB_HANDLE kh,
int
gpgsm_walk_cert_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t start, ksba_cert_t *r_next)
{
- int rc = 0;
+ int rc = 0;
char *issuer = NULL;
char *subject = NULL;
KEYDB_HANDLE kh = keydb_new (0);
@@ -779,7 +835,7 @@ gpgsm_walk_cert_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t start, ksba_cert_t *r_next)
if (is_root_cert (start, issuer, subject))
{
rc = -1; /* we are at the root */
- goto leave;
+ goto leave;
}
rc = find_up (ctrl, kh, start, issuer, 0);
@@ -803,7 +859,7 @@ gpgsm_walk_cert_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t start, ksba_cert_t *r_next)
leave:
xfree (issuer);
xfree (subject);
- keydb_release (kh);
+ keydb_release (kh);
return rc;
}
@@ -850,20 +906,20 @@ is_root_cert (ksba_cert_t cert, const char *issuerdn, const char *subjectdn)
that is the case this is a root certificate. */
ak_name_str = ksba_name_enum (ak_name, 0);
if (ak_name_str
- && !strcmp (ak_name_str, issuerdn)
+ && !strcmp (ak_name_str, issuerdn)
&& !cmp_simple_canon_sexp (ak_sn, serialno))
{
result = 1; /* Right, CERT is self-signed. */
goto leave;
- }
-
+ }
+
/* Similar for the ak_keyid. */
if (ak_keyid && !ksba_cert_get_subj_key_id (cert, NULL, &subj_keyid)
&& !cmp_simple_canon_sexp (ak_keyid, subj_keyid))
{
result = 1; /* Right, CERT is self-signed. */
goto leave;
- }
+ }
leave:
@@ -872,7 +928,7 @@ is_root_cert (ksba_cert_t cert, const char *issuerdn, const char *subjectdn)
ksba_name_release (ak_name);
ksba_free (ak_sn);
ksba_free (serialno);
- return result;
+ return result;
}
@@ -896,7 +952,7 @@ gpgsm_is_root_cert (ksba_cert_t cert)
/* This is a helper for gpgsm_validate_chain. */
-static gpg_error_t
+static gpg_error_t
is_cert_still_valid (ctrl_t ctrl, int force_ocsp, int lm, estream_t fp,
ksba_cert_t subject_cert, ksba_cert_t issuer_cert,
int *any_revoked, int *any_no_crl, int *any_crl_too_old)
@@ -905,13 +961,13 @@ is_cert_still_valid (ctrl_t ctrl, int force_ocsp, int lm, estream_t fp,
if (opt.no_crl_check && !ctrl->use_ocsp)
{
- audit_log_ok (ctrl->audit, AUDIT_CRL_CHECK,
+ audit_log_ok (ctrl->audit, AUDIT_CRL_CHECK,
gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_ENABLED));
return 0;
}
err = gpgsm_dirmngr_isvalid (ctrl,
- subject_cert, issuer_cert,
+ subject_cert, issuer_cert,
force_ocsp? 2 : !!ctrl->use_ocsp);
audit_log_ok (ctrl->audit, AUDIT_CRL_CHECK, err);
@@ -948,7 +1004,7 @@ is_cert_still_valid (ctrl_t ctrl, int force_ocsp, int lm, estream_t fp,
"\"dirmngr\" is properly installed\n"));
*any_crl_too_old = 1;
break;
-
+
default:
do_list (1, lm, fp, _("checking the CRL failed: %s"),
gpg_strerror (err));
@@ -963,7 +1019,7 @@ is_cert_still_valid (ctrl_t ctrl, int force_ocsp, int lm, estream_t fp,
SUBJECT_CERT. The caller needs to pass EXPTIME which will be
updated to the nearest expiration time seen. A DEPTH of 0 indicates
the target certifciate, -1 the final root certificate and other
- values intermediate certificates. */
+ values intermediate certificates. */
static gpg_error_t
check_validity_period (ksba_isotime_t current_time,
ksba_cert_t subject_cert,
@@ -993,7 +1049,7 @@ check_validity_period (ksba_isotime_t current_time,
if (*not_before && strcmp (current_time, not_before) < 0 )
{
- do_list (1, listmode, listfp,
+ do_list (1, listmode, listfp,
depth == 0 ? _("certificate not yet valid") :
depth == -1 ? _("root certificate not yet valid") :
/* other */ _("intermediate certificate not yet valid"));
@@ -1004,8 +1060,8 @@ check_validity_period (ksba_isotime_t current_time,
log_printf (")\n");
}
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CERT_TOO_YOUNG);
- }
-
+ }
+
if (*not_after && strcmp (current_time, not_after) > 0 )
{
do_list (opt.ignore_expiration?0:1, listmode, listfp,
@@ -1022,8 +1078,8 @@ check_validity_period (ksba_isotime_t current_time,
log_info ("WARNING: ignoring expiration\n");
else
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CERT_EXPIRED);
- }
-
+ }
+
return 0;
}
@@ -1070,7 +1126,7 @@ check_validity_period_cm (ksba_isotime_t current_time,
log_printf (")\n");
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_CERT);
}
-
+
if (!*exptime)
gnupg_copy_time (exptime, not_after);
else if (strcmp (not_after, exptime) < 0 )
@@ -1078,7 +1134,7 @@ check_validity_period_cm (ksba_isotime_t current_time,
if (strcmp (current_time, not_before) < 0 )
{
- do_list (1, listmode, listfp,
+ do_list (1, listmode, listfp,
depth == 0 ? _("certificate not yet valid") :
depth == -1 ? _("root certificate not yet valid") :
/* other */ _("intermediate certificate not yet valid"));
@@ -1089,16 +1145,16 @@ check_validity_period_cm (ksba_isotime_t current_time,
log_printf (")\n");
}
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CERT_TOO_YOUNG);
- }
+ }
if (*check_time
- && (strcmp (check_time, not_before) < 0
+ && (strcmp (check_time, not_before) < 0
|| strcmp (check_time, not_after) > 0))
{
/* Note that we don't need a case for the root certificate
because its own consitency has already been checked. */
do_list(opt.ignore_expiration?0:1, listmode, listfp,
- depth == 0 ?
+ depth == 0 ?
_("signature not created during lifetime of certificate") :
depth == 1 ?
_("certificate not created during lifetime of issuer") :
@@ -1135,7 +1191,7 @@ check_validity_period_cm (ksba_isotime_t current_time,
static int
ask_marktrusted (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, int listmode)
{
- static int no_more_questions;
+ static int no_more_questions;
int rc;
char *fpr;
int success = 0;
@@ -1143,7 +1199,7 @@ ask_marktrusted (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, int listmode)
fpr = gpgsm_get_fingerprint_string (cert, GCRY_MD_SHA1);
log_info (_("fingerprint=%s\n"), fpr? fpr : "?");
xfree (fpr);
-
+
if (no_more_questions)
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED);
else
@@ -1225,7 +1281,7 @@ do_validate_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_isotime_t checktime_arg,
{
if (!strcmp (checktime_arg, "19700101T000000"))
{
- do_list (1, listmode, listfp,
+ do_list (1, listmode, listfp,
_("WARNING: creation time of signature not known - "
"assuming current time"));
gnupg_copy_time (check_time, current_time);
@@ -1314,7 +1370,7 @@ do_validate_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_isotime_t checktime_arg,
if (has_validation_model_chain (subject_cert, listmode, listfp))
rootca_flags->chain_model = 1;
}
-
+
/* Check the validity period. */
if ( (flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_CHAIN_MODEL) )
@@ -1332,7 +1388,7 @@ do_validate_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_isotime_t checktime_arg,
}
else if (rc)
goto leave;
-
+
/* Assert that we understand all critical extensions. */
rc = unknown_criticals (subject_cert, listmode, listfp);
@@ -1355,7 +1411,7 @@ do_validate_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_isotime_t checktime_arg,
/* If this is the root certificate we are at the end of the chain. */
if (is_root)
- {
+ {
if (!istrusted_rc)
; /* No need to check the certificate for a trusted one. */
else if (gpgsm_check_cert_sig (subject_cert, subject_cert) )
@@ -1378,8 +1434,8 @@ do_validate_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_isotime_t checktime_arg,
if (rc)
goto leave;
}
-
-
+
+
/* Set the flag for qualified signatures. This flag is
deduced from a list of root certificates allowed for
qualified signatures. */
@@ -1388,15 +1444,15 @@ do_validate_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_isotime_t checktime_arg,
gpg_error_t err;
size_t buflen;
char buf[1];
-
- if (!ksba_cert_get_user_data (cert, "is_qualified",
+
+ if (!ksba_cert_get_user_data (cert, "is_qualified",
&buf, sizeof (buf),
&buflen) && buflen)
{
/* We already checked this for this certificate,
thus we simply take it from the user data. */
is_qualified = !!*buf;
- }
+ }
else
{
/* Need to consult the list of root certificates for
@@ -1419,7 +1475,7 @@ do_validate_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_isotime_t checktime_arg,
"is_qualified", buf, 1);
if (err)
log_error ("set_user_data(is_qualified) failed: %s\n",
- gpg_strerror (err));
+ gpg_strerror (err));
}
}
}
@@ -1431,7 +1487,7 @@ do_validate_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_isotime_t checktime_arg,
;
else if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NOT_TRUSTED)
{
- do_list (0, listmode, listfp,
+ do_list (0, listmode, listfp,
_("root certificate is not marked trusted"));
/* If we already figured out that the certificate is
expired it does not make much sense to ask the user
@@ -1443,12 +1499,12 @@ do_validate_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_isotime_t checktime_arg,
&& ask_marktrusted (ctrl, subject_cert, listmode) )
rc = 0;
}
- else
+ else
{
log_error (_("checking the trust list failed: %s\n"),
gpg_strerror (rc));
}
-
+
if (rc)
goto leave;
@@ -1456,9 +1512,9 @@ do_validate_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_isotime_t checktime_arg,
if ((flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_NO_DIRMNGR))
;
else if (opt.no_trusted_cert_crl_check || rootca_flags->relax)
- ;
+ ;
else
- rc = is_cert_still_valid (ctrl,
+ rc = is_cert_still_valid (ctrl,
(flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_CHAIN_MODEL),
listmode, listfp,
subject_cert, subject_cert,
@@ -1470,7 +1526,7 @@ do_validate_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_isotime_t checktime_arg,
break; /* Okay: a self-signed certicate is an end-point. */
} /* End is_root. */
-
+
/* Take care that the chain does not get too long. */
if ((depth+1) > maxdepth)
{
@@ -1552,7 +1608,7 @@ do_validate_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_isotime_t checktime_arg,
do_list (0, listmode, listfp,
_("found another possible matching "
"CA certificate - trying again"));
- ksba_cert_release (issuer_cert);
+ ksba_cert_release (issuer_cert);
issuer_cert = tmp_cert;
goto try_another_cert;
}
@@ -1629,9 +1685,9 @@ do_validate_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_isotime_t checktime_arg,
rc = 0;
else if (is_root && (opt.no_trusted_cert_crl_check
|| (!istrusted_rc && rootca_flags->relax)))
- rc = 0;
+ rc = 0;
else
- rc = is_cert_still_valid (ctrl,
+ rc = is_cert_still_valid (ctrl,
(flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_CHAIN_MODEL),
listmode, listfp,
subject_cert, issuer_cert,
@@ -1690,7 +1746,7 @@ do_validate_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_isotime_t checktime_arg,
else if (any_no_policy_match)
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_POLICY_MATCH);
}
-
+
leave:
/* If we have traversed a complete chain up to the root we will
reset the ephemeral flag for all these certificates. This is done
@@ -1700,7 +1756,7 @@ do_validate_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_isotime_t checktime_arg,
{
gpg_error_t err;
chain_item_t ci;
-
+
for (ci = chain; ci; ci = ci->next)
{
/* Note that it is possible for the last certificate in the
@@ -1714,7 +1770,7 @@ do_validate_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_isotime_t checktime_arg,
;
else if (err)
log_error ("clearing ephemeral flag failed: %s\n",
- gpg_strerror (err));
+ gpg_strerror (err));
}
}
@@ -1729,14 +1785,14 @@ do_validate_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_isotime_t checktime_arg,
char buf[1];
buf[0] = !!is_qualified;
-
+
for (ci = chain; ci; ci = ci->next)
{
err = ksba_cert_set_user_data (ci->cert, "is_qualified", buf, 1);
if (err)
{
log_error ("set_user_data(is_qualified) failed: %s\n",
- gpg_strerror (err));
+ gpg_strerror (err));
if (!rc)
rc = err;
}
@@ -1762,7 +1818,7 @@ do_validate_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_isotime_t checktime_arg,
gnupg_copy_time (r_exptime, exptime);
xfree (issuer);
xfree (subject);
- keydb_release (kh);
+ keydb_release (kh);
while (chain)
{
chain_item_t ci_next = chain->next;
@@ -1807,7 +1863,7 @@ gpgsm_validate_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_isotime_t checktime,
*retflags = (flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_CHAIN_MODEL);
memset (&rootca_flags, 0, sizeof rootca_flags);
- rc = do_validate_chain (ctrl, cert, checktime,
+ rc = do_validate_chain (ctrl, cert, checktime,
r_exptime, listmode, listfp, flags,
&rootca_flags);
if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_CERT_EXPIRED
@@ -1816,17 +1872,17 @@ gpgsm_validate_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_isotime_t checktime,
{
do_list (0, listmode, listfp, _("switching to chain model"));
rc = do_validate_chain (ctrl, cert, checktime,
- r_exptime, listmode, listfp,
+ r_exptime, listmode, listfp,
(flags |= VALIDATE_FLAG_CHAIN_MODEL),
&rootca_flags);
*retflags |= VALIDATE_FLAG_CHAIN_MODEL;
}
if (opt.verbose)
- do_list (0, listmode, listfp, _("validation model used: %s"),
+ do_list (0, listmode, listfp, _("validation model used: %s"),
(*retflags & VALIDATE_FLAG_CHAIN_MODEL)?
_("chain"):_("shell"));
-
+
return rc;
}
@@ -1843,7 +1899,7 @@ gpgsm_basic_cert_check (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert)
char *subject = NULL;
KEYDB_HANDLE kh;
ksba_cert_t issuer_cert = NULL;
-
+
if (opt.no_chain_validation)
{
log_info ("WARNING: bypassing basic certificate checks\n");
@@ -1900,7 +1956,7 @@ gpgsm_basic_cert_check (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert)
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_MISSING_ISSUER_CERT);
goto leave;
}
-
+
ksba_cert_release (issuer_cert); issuer_cert = NULL;
rc = keydb_get_cert (kh, &issuer_cert);
if (rc)
@@ -1930,7 +1986,7 @@ gpgsm_basic_cert_check (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert)
leave:
xfree (issuer);
xfree (subject);
- keydb_release (kh);
+ keydb_release (kh);
ksba_cert_release (issuer_cert);
return rc;
}
@@ -1941,7 +1997,7 @@ gpgsm_basic_cert_check (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert)
authority for qualified signature. They do not set the
basicConstraints and thus we need this workaround. It works by
looking up the root certificate and checking whether that one is
- listed as a qualified certificate for Germany.
+ listed as a qualified certificate for Germany.
We also try to cache this data but as long as don't keep a
reference to the certificate this won't be used.
@@ -1967,7 +2023,7 @@ get_regtp_ca_info (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, int *chainlen)
chainlen = &dummy_chainlen;
*chainlen = 0;
- err = ksba_cert_get_user_data (cert, "regtp_ca_chainlen",
+ err = ksba_cert_get_user_data (cert, "regtp_ca_chainlen",
&buf, sizeof (buf), &buflen);
if (!err)
{
@@ -2024,7 +2080,7 @@ get_regtp_ca_info (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, int *chainlen)
"\x01\x00", 2);
if (err)
log_error ("ksba_set_user_data(%s) failed: %s\n",
- "regtp_ca_chainlen", gpg_strerror (err));
+ "regtp_ca_chainlen", gpg_strerror (err));
for (i=0; i < depth; i++)
ksba_cert_release (array[i]);
*chainlen = (depth>1? 0:1);
@@ -2033,11 +2089,11 @@ get_regtp_ca_info (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, int *chainlen)
leave:
/* Nothing special with this certificate. Mark the target
- certificate anyway to avoid duplicate lookups. */
+ certificate anyway to avoid duplicate lookups. */
err = ksba_cert_set_user_data (cert, "regtp_ca_chainlen", "", 1);
if (err)
log_error ("ksba_set_user_data(%s) failed: %s\n",
- "regtp_ca_chainlen", gpg_strerror (err));
+ "regtp_ca_chainlen", gpg_strerror (err));
for (i=0; i < depth; i++)
ksba_cert_release (array[i]);
return 0;
commit 3121c4b6c17b19cbf2119d2658d69ce4cca908c6
Author: Werner Koch <wk at gnupg.org>
Date: Mon Jun 2 15:55:00 2014 +0200
gpgsm: Add a way to save a found state.
* kbx/keybox-defs.h (keybox_found_s): New.
(keybox_handle): Factor FOUND out to above. Add saved_found.
* kbx/keybox-init.c (keybox_release): Release saved_found.
(keybox_push_found_state, keybox_pop_found_state): New.
* sm/keydb.c (keydb_handle): Add field saved_found.
(keydb_new): Init it.
(keydb_push_found_state, keydb_pop_found_state): New.
--
Resolved conflicts:
kbx/keybox-defs.h - whitespace fixes.
diff --git a/kbx/keybox-defs.h b/kbx/keybox-defs.h
index 626f3e5..728168d 100644
--- a/kbx/keybox-defs.h
+++ b/kbx/keybox-defs.h
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ typedef struct keyboxblob *KEYBOXBLOB;
typedef struct keybox_name *KB_NAME;
typedef struct keybox_name const *CONST_KB_NAME;
-struct keybox_name
+struct keybox_name
{
/* Link to the next resources, so that we can walk all
resources. */
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ struct keybox_name
entrues are set to NULL. HANDLE_TABLE may be NULL. */
KEYBOX_HANDLE *handle_table;
size_t handle_table_size;
-
+
/* Not yet used. */
int is_locked;
@@ -82,6 +82,14 @@ struct keybox_name
};
+struct keybox_found_s
+{
+ KEYBOXBLOB blob;
+ off_t offset;
+ size_t pk_no;
+ size_t uid_no;
+ unsigned int n_packets; /*used for delete and update*/
+};
struct keybox_handle {
CONST_KB_NAME kb;
@@ -89,14 +97,9 @@ struct keybox_handle {
FILE *fp;
int eof;
int error;
- int ephemeral;
- struct {
- KEYBOXBLOB blob;
- off_t offset;
- size_t pk_no;
- size_t uid_no;
- unsigned int n_packets; /*used for delete and update*/
- } found;
+ int ephemeral;
+ struct keybox_found_s found;
+ struct keybox_found_s saved_found;
struct {
char *name;
char *pattern;
@@ -215,7 +218,7 @@ void _keybox_free (void *p);
#define STR2(v) STR(v)
/*
- a couple of handy macros
+ a couple of handy macros
*/
#define return_if_fail(expr) do { \
diff --git a/kbx/keybox-init.c b/kbx/keybox-init.c
index e413864..53c1c50 100644
--- a/kbx/keybox-init.c
+++ b/kbx/keybox-init.c
@@ -148,6 +148,7 @@ keybox_release (KEYBOX_HANDLE hd)
hd->kb->handle_table[idx] = NULL;
}
_keybox_release_blob (hd->found.blob);
+ _keybox_release_blob (hd->saved_found.blob);
if (hd->fp)
{
fclose (hd->fp);
@@ -159,6 +160,35 @@ keybox_release (KEYBOX_HANDLE hd)
}
+/* Save the current found state in HD for later retrieval by
+ keybox_restore_found_state. Only one state may be saved. */
+void
+keybox_push_found_state (KEYBOX_HANDLE hd)
+{
+ if (hd->saved_found.blob)
+ {
+ _keybox_release_blob (hd->saved_found.blob);
+ hd->saved_found.blob = NULL;
+ }
+ hd->saved_found = hd->found;
+ hd->found.blob = NULL;
+}
+
+
+/* Restore the saved found state in HD. */
+void
+keybox_pop_found_state (KEYBOX_HANDLE hd)
+{
+ if (hd->found.blob)
+ {
+ _keybox_release_blob (hd->found.blob);
+ hd->found.blob = NULL;
+ }
+ hd->found = hd->saved_found;
+ hd->saved_found.blob = NULL;
+}
+
+
const char *
keybox_get_resource_name (KEYBOX_HANDLE hd)
{
diff --git a/kbx/keybox.h b/kbx/keybox.h
index 4330694..e0d8c53 100644
--- a/kbx/keybox.h
+++ b/kbx/keybox.h
@@ -68,6 +68,8 @@ int keybox_is_writable (void *token);
KEYBOX_HANDLE keybox_new (void *token, int secret);
void keybox_release (KEYBOX_HANDLE hd);
+void keybox_push_found_state (KEYBOX_HANDLE hd);
+void keybox_pop_found_state (KEYBOX_HANDLE hd);
const char *keybox_get_resource_name (KEYBOX_HANDLE hd);
int keybox_set_ephemeral (KEYBOX_HANDLE hd, int yes);
diff --git a/sm/keydb.c b/sm/keydb.c
index 37f791e..5547405 100644
--- a/sm/keydb.c
+++ b/sm/keydb.c
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ static int used_resources;
struct keydb_handle {
int locked;
int found;
+ int saved_found;
int current;
int is_ephemeral;
int used; /* items in active */
@@ -265,6 +266,7 @@ keydb_new (int secret)
hd = xcalloc (1, sizeof *hd);
hd->found = -1;
+ hd->saved_found = -1;
assert (used_resources <= MAX_KEYDB_RESOURCES);
for (i=j=0; i < used_resources; i++)
@@ -476,6 +478,58 @@ unlock_all (KEYDB_HANDLE hd)
hd->locked = 0;
}
+
+
+/* Push the last found state if any. */
+void
+keydb_push_found_state (KEYDB_HANDLE hd)
+{
+ if (!hd)
+ return;
+
+ if (hd->found < 0 || hd->found >= hd->used)
+ {
+ hd->saved_found = -1;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ switch (hd->active[hd->found].type)
+ {
+ case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_NONE:
+ break;
+ case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_KEYBOX:
+ keybox_push_found_state (hd->active[hd->found].u.kr);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ hd->saved_found = hd->found;
+ hd->found = -1;
+}
+
+
+/* Pop the last found state. */
+void
+keydb_pop_found_state (KEYDB_HANDLE hd)
+{
+ if (!hd)
+ return;
+
+ hd->found = hd->saved_found;
+ hd->saved_found = -1;
+ if (hd->found < 0 || hd->found >= hd->used)
+ return;
+
+ switch (hd->active[hd->found].type)
+ {
+ case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_NONE:
+ break;
+ case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_KEYBOX:
+ keybox_pop_found_state (hd->active[hd->found].u.kr);
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+
#if 0
/*
diff --git a/sm/keydb.h b/sm/keydb.h
index a440c50..f51d79d 100644
--- a/sm/keydb.h
+++ b/sm/keydb.h
@@ -49,6 +49,8 @@ gpg_error_t keydb_get_flags (KEYDB_HANDLE hd, int which, int idx,
unsigned int *value);
gpg_error_t keydb_set_flags (KEYDB_HANDLE hd, int which, int idx,
unsigned int value);
+void keydb_push_found_state (KEYDB_HANDLE hd);
+void keydb_pop_found_state (KEYDB_HANDLE hd);
int keydb_get_cert (KEYDB_HANDLE hd, ksba_cert_t *r_cert);
int keydb_insert_cert (KEYDB_HANDLE hd, ksba_cert_t cert);
int keydb_update_cert (KEYDB_HANDLE hd, ksba_cert_t cert);
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of changes:
kbx/keybox-defs.h | 25 +++---
kbx/keybox-init.c | 30 +++++++
kbx/keybox.h | 2 +
sm/certchain.c | 228 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
sm/keydb.c | 54 +++++++++++++
sm/keydb.h | 2 +
6 files changed, 244 insertions(+), 97 deletions(-)
hooks/post-receive
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