[git] GnuPG - branch, master, updated. gnupg-2.1.0-17-g9d897f8
by Werner Koch
cvs at cvs.gnupg.org
Thu Nov 13 17:51:26 CET 2014
This is an automated email from the git hooks/post-receive script. It was
generated because a ref change was pushed to the repository containing
the project "The GNU Privacy Guard".
The branch, master has been updated
via 9d897f8178610b4ce24f57d625dac71c679ce651 (commit)
via 69384568f66a48eff3968bb1714aa13925580e9f (commit)
via 22748338da9a78d20aefe3656ba40b0f9d34a681 (commit)
via 63c651441579e63b7f846d2adebe8983a352f1d6 (commit)
from e30cb8f61792e3808f7c8f343fc8545e6c81fe74 (commit)
Those revisions listed above that are new to this repository have
not appeared on any other notification email; so we list those
revisions in full, below.
- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 9d897f8178610b4ce24f57d625dac71c679ce651
Author: Werner Koch <wk at gnupg.org>
Date: Thu Nov 13 17:51:09 2014 +0100
po: Auto-update.
--
diff --git a/po/de.po b/po/de.po
index 5f00126..ab5796e 100644
--- a/po/de.po
+++ b/po/de.po
@@ -2295,6 +2295,11 @@ msgstr "Importiere Signaturen, die als nicht exportfähig markiert sind"
msgid "repair damage from the pks keyserver during import"
msgstr "Beseitige Beschädigung durch den Schlüsselserver während des Imports"
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "do not update the trustdb after import"
+msgid "do not clear the ownertrust values during import"
+msgstr "ändern Sie die \"Trust\"-Datenbank nach dem Import nicht"
+
msgid "do not update the trustdb after import"
msgstr "ändern Sie die \"Trust\"-Datenbank nach dem Import nicht"
@@ -4271,6 +4276,10 @@ msgid ", key algorithm "
msgstr ", Schlüsselverfahren "
#, c-format
+msgid "WARNING: not a detached signature; file '%s' was NOT verified!\n"
+msgstr ""
+
+#, c-format
msgid "Can't check signature: %s\n"
msgstr "Signatur kann nicht geprüft werden: %s\n"
@@ -4289,9 +4298,6 @@ msgstr "Einzelne Signatur der Klasse 0x%02x\n"
msgid "old style (PGP 2.x) signature\n"
msgstr "Signatur nach alter (PGP 2.x) Art\n"
-msgid "invalid root packet detected in proc_tree()\n"
-msgstr "ungültiges root-Paket in proc_tree() entdeckt\n"
-
#, c-format
msgid "fstat of '%s' failed in %s: %s\n"
msgstr "fstat von `%s' schlug fehl in %s: %s\n"
@@ -8014,6 +8020,9 @@ msgstr ""
"Syntax: gpg-check-pattern [optionen] Musterdatei\n"
"Die von stdin gelesene Passphrase gegen die Musterdatei prüfen\n"
+#~ msgid "invalid root packet detected in proc_tree()\n"
+#~ msgstr "ungültiges root-Paket in proc_tree() entdeckt\n"
+
#~ msgid "no secret subkey for public subkey %s - ignoring\n"
#~ msgstr ""
#~ "Kein privater Unterschlüssel zum öffentlichen Unterschlüssel %s - "
diff --git a/po/fr.po b/po/fr.po
index abec34a..f9a23b5 100644
--- a/po/fr.po
+++ b/po/fr.po
@@ -2305,6 +2305,11 @@ msgstr "importer des signatures marquées comme locales seulement"
msgid "repair damage from the pks keyserver during import"
msgstr "réparer les données endommagées du serveur pks pendant l'importation"
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "do not update the trustdb after import"
+msgid "do not clear the ownertrust values during import"
+msgstr "ne pas mettre à jour la base de confiance après l'importation"
+
msgid "do not update the trustdb after import"
msgstr "ne pas mettre à jour la base de confiance après l'importation"
@@ -4286,6 +4291,10 @@ msgid ", key algorithm "
msgstr ", algorithme de clef "
#, c-format
+msgid "WARNING: not a detached signature; file '%s' was NOT verified!\n"
+msgstr ""
+
+#, c-format
msgid "Can't check signature: %s\n"
msgstr "Impossible de vérifier la signature : %s\n"
@@ -4305,9 +4314,6 @@ msgstr "signature autonome de classe 0x%02x\n"
msgid "old style (PGP 2.x) signature\n"
msgstr "signature d'un ancien type (PGP 2.x)\n"
-msgid "invalid root packet detected in proc_tree()\n"
-msgstr "paquet racine incorrect détecté dans proc_tree()\n"
-
#, c-format
msgid "fstat of '%s' failed in %s: %s\n"
msgstr "échec du fstat de « %s » dans %s : %s\n"
@@ -8094,6 +8100,9 @@ msgstr ""
"Vérifier une phrase secrète donnée sur l'entrée standard par rapport à "
"ficmotif\n"
+#~ msgid "invalid root packet detected in proc_tree()\n"
+#~ msgstr "paquet racine incorrect détecté dans proc_tree()\n"
+
#~ msgid "use a standard location for the socket"
#~ msgstr "utiliser un emplacement de socket standard"
diff --git a/po/ja.po b/po/ja.po
index db6258e..5382826 100644
--- a/po/ja.po
+++ b/po/ja.po
@@ -2251,6 +2251,11 @@ msgstr "ローカルだけとマークされた署名をインポートします
msgid "repair damage from the pks keyserver during import"
msgstr "インポート時にpksキーサーバからのダメージを修正します"
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "do not update the trustdb after import"
+msgid "do not clear the ownertrust values during import"
+msgstr "インポートの際、信用データベースを更新しない"
+
msgid "do not update the trustdb after import"
msgstr "インポートの際、信用データベースを更新しない"
@@ -4174,6 +4179,10 @@ msgid ", key algorithm "
msgstr "、鍵アルゴリズム "
#, c-format
+msgid "WARNING: not a detached signature; file '%s' was NOT verified!\n"
+msgstr ""
+
+#, c-format
msgid "Can't check signature: %s\n"
msgstr "署名を検査できません: %s\n"
@@ -4191,9 +4200,6 @@ msgstr "クラス0x%02xのスタンドアロン署名\n"
msgid "old style (PGP 2.x) signature\n"
msgstr "古い形式 (PGP 2.x) の署名\n"
-msgid "invalid root packet detected in proc_tree()\n"
-msgstr "proc_tree() の中に無効なルート・パケットを検出しました\n"
-
#, c-format
msgid "fstat of '%s' failed in %s: %s\n"
msgstr "'%s'のfstatが%sで失敗しました: %s\n"
@@ -7782,6 +7788,9 @@ msgstr ""
"形式: gpg-check-pattern [オプション] パターンファイル\n"
"パターンファイルに対して標準入力のパスフレーズを確認する\n"
+#~ msgid "invalid root packet detected in proc_tree()\n"
+#~ msgstr "proc_tree() の中に無効なルート・パケットを検出しました\n"
+
#~ msgid "no secret subkey for public subkey %s - ignoring\n"
#~ msgstr "公開副鍵%sにたいする秘密副鍵がありません - 無視\n"
diff --git a/po/uk.po b/po/uk.po
index 2900ef1..4a5753e 100644
--- a/po/uk.po
+++ b/po/uk.po
@@ -2328,6 +2328,11 @@ msgstr "імпортувати підписи, позначені як лише
msgid "repair damage from the pks keyserver during import"
msgstr "відновлювати пошкодження сервером ключів pks під час імпортування"
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "do not update the trustdb after import"
+msgid "do not clear the ownertrust values during import"
+msgstr "не оновлювати базу даних довіри після імпортування"
+
msgid "do not update the trustdb after import"
msgstr "не оновлювати базу даних довіри після імпортування"
@@ -4307,6 +4312,10 @@ msgid ", key algorithm "
msgstr "алгоритм: %s"
#, c-format
+msgid "WARNING: not a detached signature; file '%s' was NOT verified!\n"
+msgstr ""
+
+#, c-format
msgid "Can't check signature: %s\n"
msgstr "Не вдалося перевірити підпис: %s\n"
@@ -4324,9 +4333,6 @@ msgstr "окремий підпис класу 0x%02x\n"
msgid "old style (PGP 2.x) signature\n"
msgstr "підпис у застарілому форматі (PGP 2.x)\n"
-msgid "invalid root packet detected in proc_tree()\n"
-msgstr "виявлено некоректний кореневий пакет у proc_tree()\n"
-
#, c-format
msgid "fstat of '%s' failed in %s: %s\n"
msgstr "помилка fstat щодо «%s» у %s: %s\n"
@@ -7997,6 +8003,9 @@ msgstr ""
"Синтаксис: gpg-check-pattern [параметри] файл_шаблонів\n"
"Перевірити пароль, вказаний у stdin, за допомогою файла_шаблонів\n"
+#~ msgid "invalid root packet detected in proc_tree()\n"
+#~ msgstr "виявлено некоректний кореневий пакет у proc_tree()\n"
+
#~ msgid "no secret subkey for public subkey %s - ignoring\n"
#~ msgstr "немає закритого підключа для відкритого підключа %s — пропускаємо\n"
commit 69384568f66a48eff3968bb1714aa13925580e9f
Author: Werner Koch <wk at gnupg.org>
Date: Thu Nov 13 17:39:31 2014 +0100
gpg: Make the use of "--verify FILE" for detached sigs harder.
* g10/openfile.c (open_sigfile): Factor some code out to ...
(get_matching_datafile): new function.
* g10/plaintext.c (hash_datafiles): Do not try to find matching file
in batch mode.
* g10/mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Print a warning if a possibly
matching data file is not used by a standard signatures.
--
Allowing to use the abbreviated form for detached signatures is a long
standing bug which has only been noticed by the public with the
release of 2.1.0. :-(
What we do is to remove the ability to check detached signature in
--batch using the one file abbreviated mode. This should exhibit
problems in scripts which use this insecure practice. We also print a
warning if a matching data file exists but was not considered because
the detached signature was actually a standard signature:
gpgv: Good signature from "Werner Koch (dist sig)"
gpgv: WARNING: not a detached signature; \
file 'gnupg-2.1.0.tar.bz2' was NOT verified!
We can only print a warning because it is possible that a standard
signature is indeed to be verified but by coincidence a file with a
matching name is stored alongside the standard signature.
Reported-by: Simon Nicolussi (to gnupg-users on Nov 7)
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk at gnupg.org>
diff --git a/doc/gpg.texi b/doc/gpg.texi
index 499df87..634b4e2 100644
--- a/doc/gpg.texi
+++ b/doc/gpg.texi
@@ -214,16 +214,22 @@ files which don't begin with an encrypted message.
@item --verify
@opindex verify
-Assume that the first argument is a signed file or a detached signature
-and verify it without generating any output. With no arguments, the
-signature packet is read from STDIN. If only a sigfile is given, it may
-be a complete signature or a detached signature, in which case the
-signed stuff is expected in a file without the ".sig" or ".asc"
-extension. With more than 1 argument, the first should be a detached
-signature and the remaining files are the signed stuff. To read the
-signed stuff from STDIN, use @samp{-} as the second filename. For
-security reasons a detached signature cannot read the signed material
-from STDIN without denoting it in the above way.
+Assume that the first argument is a signed file and verify it without
+generating any output. With no arguments, the signature packet is
+read from STDIN. If only a one argument is given, it is expected to
+be a complete signature.
+
+With more than 1 argument, the first should be a detached signature
+and the remaining files ake up the the signed data. To read the signed
+data from STDIN, use @samp{-} as the second filename. For security
+reasons a detached signature cannot read the signed material from
+STDIN without denoting it in the above way.
+
+Note: If the option @option{--batch} is not used, @command{@gpgname}
+may assume that a single argument is a file with a detached signature
+and it will try to find a matching data file by stripping certain
+suffixes. Using this historical feature to verify a detached
+signature is strongly discouraged; always specify the data file too.
Note: When verifying a cleartext signature, @command{gpg} verifies
only what makes up the cleartext signed data and not any extra data
diff --git a/g10/main.h b/g10/main.h
index 76541c7..d313afb 100644
--- a/g10/main.h
+++ b/g10/main.h
@@ -286,7 +286,8 @@ char *make_outfile_name( const char *iname );
char *ask_outfile_name( const char *name, size_t namelen );
int open_outfile (int inp_fd, const char *iname, int mode,
int restrictedperm, iobuf_t *a);
-iobuf_t open_sigfile( const char *iname, progress_filter_context_t *pfx );
+char *get_matching_datafile (const char *sigfilename);
+iobuf_t open_sigfile (const char *sigfilename, progress_filter_context_t *pfx);
void try_make_homedir( const char *fname );
char *get_openpgp_revocdir (const char *home);
@@ -374,7 +375,7 @@ void decrypt_messages (ctrl_t ctrl, int nfiles, char *files[]);
/*-- plaintext.c --*/
int hash_datafiles( gcry_md_hd_t md, gcry_md_hd_t md2,
- strlist_t files, const char *sigfilename, int textmode );
+ strlist_t files, const char *sigfilename, int textmode);
int hash_datafile_by_fd ( gcry_md_hd_t md, gcry_md_hd_t md2, int data_fd,
int textmode );
PKT_plaintext *setup_plaintext_name(const char *filename,IOBUF iobuf);
diff --git a/g10/mainproc.c b/g10/mainproc.c
index bc186d3..b84607a 100644
--- a/g10/mainproc.c
+++ b/g10/mainproc.c
@@ -2008,6 +2008,44 @@ check_sig_and_print (CTX c, kbnode_t node)
*pkstrbuf?_(", key algorithm "):"",
pkstrbuf);
+ if (!rc && !c->signed_data.used)
+ {
+ /* Signature is basically good but we test whether the
+ deprecated command
+ gpg --verify FILE.sig
+ was used instead of
+ gpg --verify FILE.sig FILE
+ to verify a detached signature. If we figure out that a
+ data file with a matching name exists, we print a warning.
+
+ The problem is that the first form would also verify a
+ standard signature. This behavior could be used to
+ create a made up .sig file for a tarball by creating a
+ standard signature from a valid detached signature packet
+ (for example from a signed git tag). Then replace the
+ sig file on the FTP server along with a changed tarball.
+ Using the first form the verify command would correctly
+ verify the signature but don't even consider the tarball. */
+ kbnode_t n;
+ char *dfile;
+
+ dfile = get_matching_datafile (c->sigfilename);
+ if (dfile)
+ {
+ for (n = c->list; n; n = n->next)
+ if (n->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE)
+ break;
+ if (n)
+ {
+ /* Not only signature packets in the tree thus this
+ is not a detached signature. */
+ log_info (_("WARNING: not a detached signature; "
+ "file '%s' was NOT verified!\n"), dfile);
+ }
+ xfree (dfile);
+ }
+ }
+
if (rc)
g10_errors_seen = 1;
if (opt.batch && rc)
diff --git a/g10/openfile.c b/g10/openfile.c
index ab27f44..76961e5 100644
--- a/g10/openfile.c
+++ b/g10/openfile.c
@@ -310,40 +310,64 @@ open_outfile (int inp_fd, const char *iname, int mode, int restrictedperm,
}
+/* Find a matching data file for the signature file SIGFILENAME and
+ return it as a malloced string. If no matching data file is found,
+ return NULL. */
+char *
+get_matching_datafile (const char *sigfilename)
+{
+ char *fname = NULL;
+ size_t len;
+
+ if (iobuf_is_pipe_filename (sigfilename))
+ return NULL;
+
+ len = strlen (sigfilename);
+ if (len > 4
+ && (!strcmp (sigfilename + len - 4, EXTSEP_S "sig")
+ || (len > 5 && !strcmp(sigfilename + len - 5, EXTSEP_S "sign"))
+ || !strcmp(sigfilename + len - 4, EXTSEP_S "asc")))
+ {
+
+ fname = xstrdup (sigfilename);
+ fname[len-(fname[len-1]=='n'?5:4)] = 0 ;
+ if (access (fname, R_OK ))
+ {
+ /* Not found or other error. */
+ xfree (fname);
+ fname = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return fname;
+}
+
+
/*
* Try to open a file without the extension ".sig" or ".asc"
* Return NULL if such a file is not available.
*/
-IOBUF
-open_sigfile( const char *iname, progress_filter_context_t *pfx )
+iobuf_t
+open_sigfile (const char *sigfilename, progress_filter_context_t *pfx)
{
- IOBUF a = NULL;
- size_t len;
+ iobuf_t a = NULL;
+ char *buf;
- if (!iobuf_is_pipe_filename (iname))
+ buf = get_matching_datafile (sigfilename);
+ if (buf)
{
- len = strlen(iname);
- if( len > 4 && (!strcmp(iname + len - 4, EXTSEP_S "sig")
- || (len > 5 && !strcmp(iname + len - 5, EXTSEP_S "sign"))
- || !strcmp(iname + len - 4, EXTSEP_S "asc")))
+ a = iobuf_open (buf);
+ if (a && is_secured_file (iobuf_get_fd (a)))
{
- char *buf;
-
- buf = xstrdup(iname);
- buf[len-(buf[len-1]=='n'?5:4)] = 0 ;
- a = iobuf_open( buf );
- if (a && is_secured_file (iobuf_get_fd (a)))
- {
- iobuf_close (a);
- a = NULL;
- gpg_err_set_errno (EPERM);
- }
- if (a && opt.verbose)
- log_info (_("assuming signed data in '%s'\n"), buf);
- if (a && pfx)
- handle_progress (pfx, a, buf);
- xfree (buf);
- }
+ iobuf_close (a);
+ a = NULL;
+ gpg_err_set_errno (EPERM);
+ }
+ if (a)
+ log_info (_("assuming signed data in '%s'\n"), buf);
+ if (a && pfx)
+ handle_progress (pfx, a, buf);
+ xfree (buf);
}
return a;
diff --git a/g10/plaintext.c b/g10/plaintext.c
index 5454198..5d343c6 100644
--- a/g10/plaintext.c
+++ b/g10/plaintext.c
@@ -607,10 +607,8 @@ leave:
-/****************
- * Hash the given files and append the hash to hash context md.
- * If FILES is NULL, hash stdin.
- */
+/* Hash the given files and append the hash to hash contexts MD and
+ * MD2. If FILES is NULL, stdin is hashed. */
int
hash_datafiles (gcry_md_hd_t md, gcry_md_hd_t md2, strlist_t files,
const char *sigfilename, int textmode)
@@ -623,15 +621,22 @@ hash_datafiles (gcry_md_hd_t md, gcry_md_hd_t md2, strlist_t files,
if (!files)
{
- /* check whether we can open the signed material */
- fp = open_sigfile (sigfilename, pfx);
- if (fp)
- {
- do_hash (md, md2, fp, textmode);
- iobuf_close (fp);
- release_progress_context (pfx);
- return 0;
- }
+ /* Check whether we can open the signed material. We avoid
+ trying to open a file if run in batch mode. This assumed
+ data file for a sig file feature is just a convenience thing
+ for the command line and the user needs to read possible
+ warning messages. */
+ if (!opt.batch)
+ {
+ fp = open_sigfile (sigfilename, pfx);
+ if (fp)
+ {
+ do_hash (md, md2, fp, textmode);
+ iobuf_close (fp);
+ release_progress_context (pfx);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
log_error (_("no signed data\n"));
release_progress_context (pfx);
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_DATA);
commit 22748338da9a78d20aefe3656ba40b0f9d34a681
Author: Werner Koch <wk at gnupg.org>
Date: Thu Nov 13 17:01:17 2014 +0100
gpg: Fix a missing LF in debug output.
* g10/kbnode.c (dump_kbnode): Print a LF.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk at gnupg.org>
diff --git a/g10/kbnode.c b/g10/kbnode.c
index ad66f8a..3337e01 100644
--- a/g10/kbnode.c
+++ b/g10/kbnode.c
@@ -424,6 +424,8 @@ dump_kbnode (KBNODE node)
pk->flags.valid? 'v':'.',
pk->flags.mdc? 'm':'.');
}
+ else
+ log_printf ("\n");
log_flush ();
}
commit 63c651441579e63b7f846d2adebe8983a352f1d6
Author: Werner Koch <wk at gnupg.org>
Date: Thu Nov 13 13:00:46 2014 +0100
gpg: Re-indent two files.
--
diff --git a/g10/mainproc.c b/g10/mainproc.c
index 19f1aac..bc186d3 100644
--- a/g10/mainproc.c
+++ b/g10/mainproc.c
@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
/* mainproc.c - handle packets
- * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007,
- * 2008, 2009 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
- * Copyright (C) 2013, 2014 Werner Koch
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2009 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 2013-2014 Werner Koch
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
@@ -47,16 +46,18 @@
#define MAX_NESTING_DEPTH 32
-struct kidlist_item {
- struct kidlist_item *next;
- u32 kid[2];
- int pubkey_algo;
- int reason;
+/* An object to build a list of keyid related info. */
+struct kidlist_item
+{
+ struct kidlist_item *next;
+ u32 kid[2];
+ int pubkey_algo;
+ int reason;
};
-/****************
- * Structure to hold the context
+/*
+ * Object to hold the processing context.
*/
typedef struct mainproc_context *CTX;
struct mainproc_context
@@ -90,8 +91,8 @@ struct mainproc_context
DEK *dek;
int last_was_session_key;
- KBNODE list; /* The current list of packets. */
- IOBUF iobuf; /* Used to get the filename etc. */
+ kbnode_t list; /* The current list of packets. */
+ iobuf_t iobuf; /* Used to get the filename etc. */
int trustletter; /* Temporary usage in list_node. */
ulong symkeys;
struct kidlist_item *pkenc_list; /* List of encryption packets. */
@@ -104,135 +105,150 @@ struct mainproc_context
};
-static int do_proc_packets( CTX c, IOBUF a );
-static void list_node( CTX c, KBNODE node );
-static void proc_tree( CTX c, KBNODE node );
+/*** Local prototypes. ***/
+static int do_proc_packets (CTX c, iobuf_t a);
+static void list_node (CTX c, kbnode_t node);
+static void proc_tree (CTX c, kbnode_t node);
static int literals_seen;
+
+/*** Functions. ***/
+
+
void
reset_literals_seen(void)
{
- literals_seen=0;
+ literals_seen = 0;
}
+
static void
release_list( CTX c )
{
- if( !c->list )
- return;
- proc_tree(c, c->list );
- release_kbnode( c->list );
- while( c->pkenc_list ) {
- struct kidlist_item *tmp = c->pkenc_list->next;
- xfree( c->pkenc_list );
- c->pkenc_list = tmp;
+ if (!c->list)
+ return;
+ proc_tree (c, c->list);
+ release_kbnode (c->list);
+ while (c->pkenc_list)
+ {
+ struct kidlist_item *tmp = c->pkenc_list->next;
+ xfree (c->pkenc_list);
+ c->pkenc_list = tmp;
}
- c->pkenc_list = NULL;
- c->list = NULL;
- c->any.data = 0;
- c->any.uncompress_failed = 0;
- c->last_was_session_key = 0;
- xfree(c->dek); c->dek = NULL;
+ c->pkenc_list = NULL;
+ c->list = NULL;
+ c->any.data = 0;
+ c->any.uncompress_failed = 0;
+ c->last_was_session_key = 0;
+ xfree (c->dek);
+ c->dek = NULL;
}
static int
-add_onepass_sig( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
+add_onepass_sig (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
{
- KBNODE node;
+ kbnode_t node;
- if ( c->list ) /* add another packet */
- add_kbnode( c->list, new_kbnode( pkt ));
- else /* insert the first one */
- c->list = node = new_kbnode( pkt );
+ if (c->list) /* Add another packet. */
+ add_kbnode (c->list, new_kbnode (pkt));
+ else /* Insert the first one. */
+ c->list = node = new_kbnode (pkt);
return 1;
}
static int
-add_gpg_control( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
+add_gpg_control (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
{
- if ( pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START ) {
- /* New clear text signature.
- * Process the last one and reset everything */
- release_list(c);
+ if ( pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START )
+ {
+ /* New clear text signature.
+ * Process the last one and reset everything */
+ release_list(c);
}
- if( c->list ) /* add another packet */
- add_kbnode( c->list, new_kbnode( pkt ));
- else /* insert the first one */
- c->list = new_kbnode( pkt );
+ if (c->list) /* Add another packet. */
+ add_kbnode (c->list, new_kbnode (pkt));
+ else /* Insert the first one. */
+ c->list = new_kbnode (pkt);
- return 1;
+ return 1;
}
-
static int
-add_user_id( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
+add_user_id (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
{
- if( !c->list ) {
- log_error("orphaned user ID\n" );
- return 0;
+ if (!c->list)
+ {
+ log_error ("orphaned user ID\n");
+ return 0;
}
- add_kbnode( c->list, new_kbnode( pkt ) );
- return 1;
+ add_kbnode (c->list, new_kbnode (pkt));
+ return 1;
}
+
static int
-add_subkey( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
+add_subkey (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
{
- if( !c->list ) {
- log_error("subkey w/o mainkey\n" );
- return 0;
+ if (!c->list)
+ {
+ log_error ("subkey w/o mainkey\n");
+ return 0;
}
- add_kbnode( c->list, new_kbnode( pkt ) );
- return 1;
+ add_kbnode (c->list, new_kbnode (pkt));
+ return 1;
}
+
static int
-add_ring_trust( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
+add_ring_trust (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
{
- if( !c->list ) {
- log_error("ring trust w/o key\n" );
- return 0;
+ if (!c->list)
+ {
+ log_error ("ring trust w/o key\n");
+ return 0;
}
- add_kbnode( c->list, new_kbnode( pkt ) );
- return 1;
+ add_kbnode (c->list, new_kbnode (pkt));
+ return 1;
}
static int
-add_signature( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
+add_signature (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
{
- KBNODE node;
-
- c->any.sig_seen = 1;
- if( pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE && !c->list ) {
- /* This is the first signature for the following datafile.
- * GPG does not write such packets; instead it always uses
- * onepass-sig packets. The drawback of PGP's method
- * of prepending the signature to the data is
- * that it is not possible to make a signature from data read
- * from stdin. (GPG is able to read PGP stuff anyway.) */
- node = new_kbnode( pkt );
- c->list = node;
- return 1;
+ kbnode_t node;
+
+ c->any.sig_seen = 1;
+ if (pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE && !c->list)
+ {
+ /* This is the first signature for the following datafile.
+ * GPG does not write such packets; instead it always uses
+ * onepass-sig packets. The drawback of PGP's method
+ * of prepending the signature to the data is
+ * that it is not possible to make a signature from data read
+ * from stdin. (GPG is able to read PGP stuff anyway.) */
+ node = new_kbnode (pkt);
+ c->list = node;
+ return 1;
}
- else if( !c->list )
- return 0; /* oops (invalid packet sequence)*/
- else if( !c->list->pkt )
- BUG(); /* so nicht */
-
- /* add a new signature node id at the end */
- node = new_kbnode( pkt );
- add_kbnode( c->list, node );
- return 1;
+ else if (!c->list)
+ return 0; /* oops (invalid packet sequence)*/
+ else if (!c->list->pkt)
+ BUG(); /* so nicht */
+
+ /* Add a new signature node item at the end. */
+ node = new_kbnode (pkt);
+ add_kbnode (c->list, node);
+
+ return 1;
}
static int
-symkey_decrypt_seskey( DEK *dek, byte *seskey, size_t slen )
+symkey_decrypt_seskey (DEK *dek, byte *seskey, size_t slen)
{
gcry_cipher_hd_t hd;
@@ -267,132 +283,137 @@ symkey_decrypt_seskey( DEK *dek, byte *seskey, size_t slen )
return 0;
}
+
static void
-proc_symkey_enc( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
+proc_symkey_enc (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
{
- PKT_symkey_enc *enc;
+ PKT_symkey_enc *enc;
- enc = pkt->pkt.symkey_enc;
- if (!enc)
- log_error ("invalid symkey encrypted packet\n");
- else if(!c->dek)
- {
- int algo = enc->cipher_algo;
- const char *s = openpgp_cipher_algo_name (algo);
-
- if (!openpgp_cipher_test_algo (algo))
- {
- if(!opt.quiet)
- {
- if(enc->seskeylen)
- log_info(_("%s encrypted session key\n"), s );
- else
- log_info(_("%s encrypted data\n"), s );
- }
- }
- else
- log_error(_("encrypted with unknown algorithm %d\n"), algo );
-
- if(openpgp_md_test_algo (enc->s2k.hash_algo))
- {
- log_error(_("passphrase generated with unknown digest"
- " algorithm %d\n"),enc->s2k.hash_algo);
- s=NULL;
- }
-
- c->last_was_session_key = 2;
- if(!s || opt.list_only)
- goto leave;
-
- if(opt.override_session_key)
- {
- c->dek = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *c->dek );
- if(get_override_session_key(c->dek, opt.override_session_key))
- {
- xfree(c->dek);
- c->dek = NULL;
- }
- }
- else
- {
- c->dek = passphrase_to_dek (NULL, 0, algo, &enc->s2k, 3,
- NULL, NULL);
- if(c->dek)
- {
- c->dek->symmetric=1;
-
- /* FIXME: This doesn't work perfectly if a symmetric
- key comes before a public key in the message - if
- the user doesn't know the passphrase, then there is
- a chance that the "decrypted" algorithm will happen
- to be a valid one, which will make the returned dek
- appear valid, so we won't try any public keys that
- come later. */
- if(enc->seskeylen)
- {
- if(symkey_decrypt_seskey(c->dek, enc->seskey,
- enc->seskeylen))
- {
- xfree(c->dek);
- c->dek=NULL;
- }
- }
- else
- c->dek->algo_info_printed = 1;
- }
- }
- }
+ enc = pkt->pkt.symkey_enc;
+ if (!enc)
+ log_error ("invalid symkey encrypted packet\n");
+ else if(!c->dek)
+ {
+ int algo = enc->cipher_algo;
+ const char *s = openpgp_cipher_algo_name (algo);
+
+ if (!openpgp_cipher_test_algo (algo))
+ {
+ if (!opt.quiet)
+ {
+ if (enc->seskeylen)
+ log_info (_("%s encrypted session key\n"), s );
+ else
+ log_info (_("%s encrypted data\n"), s );
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ log_error (_("encrypted with unknown algorithm %d\n"), algo);
+
+ if (openpgp_md_test_algo (enc->s2k.hash_algo))
+ {
+ log_error(_("passphrase generated with unknown digest"
+ " algorithm %d\n"),enc->s2k.hash_algo);
+ s = NULL;
+ }
+
+ c->last_was_session_key = 2;
+ if (!s || opt.list_only)
+ goto leave;
+
+ if (opt.override_session_key)
+ {
+ c->dek = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *c->dek);
+ if (get_override_session_key (c->dek, opt.override_session_key))
+ {
+ xfree (c->dek);
+ c->dek = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ c->dek = passphrase_to_dek (NULL, 0, algo, &enc->s2k, 3, NULL, NULL);
+ if (c->dek)
+ {
+ c->dek->symmetric = 1;
+
+ /* FIXME: This doesn't work perfectly if a symmetric key
+ comes before a public key in the message - if the
+ user doesn't know the passphrase, then there is a
+ chance that the "decrypted" algorithm will happen to
+ be a valid one, which will make the returned dek
+ appear valid, so we won't try any public keys that
+ come later. */
+ if (enc->seskeylen)
+ {
+ if (symkey_decrypt_seskey (c->dek,
+ enc->seskey, enc->seskeylen))
+ {
+ xfree (c->dek);
+ c->dek = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ c->dek->algo_info_printed = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
leave:
- c->symkeys++;
- free_packet(pkt);
+ c->symkeys++;
+ free_packet (pkt);
}
+
static void
-proc_pubkey_enc( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
+proc_pubkey_enc (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
{
- PKT_pubkey_enc *enc;
- int result = 0;
-
- /* check whether the secret key is available and store in this case */
- c->last_was_session_key = 1;
- enc = pkt->pkt.pubkey_enc;
- /*printf("enc: encrypted by a pubkey with keyid %08lX\n", enc->keyid[1] );*/
- /* Hmmm: why do I have this algo check here - anyway there is
- * function to check it. */
- if( opt.verbose )
- log_info(_("public key is %s\n"), keystr(enc->keyid) );
-
- if( is_status_enabled() ) {
- char buf[50];
- /* FIXME: For ECC support we need to map the OpenPGP algo
- number to the Libgcrypt definef one. This is due a
- chicken-egg problem: We need to have code in libgcrypt for
- a new algorithm so to implement a proposed new algorithm
- before the IANA will finally assign an OpenPGP
- indentifier. */
- snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%08lX%08lX %d 0",
- (ulong)enc->keyid[0], (ulong)enc->keyid[1], enc->pubkey_algo );
- write_status_text( STATUS_ENC_TO, buf );
+ PKT_pubkey_enc *enc;
+ int result = 0;
+
+ /* Check whether the secret key is available and store in this case. */
+ c->last_was_session_key = 1;
+ enc = pkt->pkt.pubkey_enc;
+ /*printf("enc: encrypted by a pubkey with keyid %08lX\n", enc->keyid[1] );*/
+ /* Hmmm: why do I have this algo check here - anyway there is
+ * function to check it. */
+ if (opt.verbose)
+ log_info (_("public key is %s\n"), keystr (enc->keyid));
+
+ if (is_status_enabled())
+ {
+ char buf[50];
+ /* FIXME: For ECC support we need to map the OpenPGP algo number
+ to the Libgcrypt defined one. This is due a chicken-egg
+ problem: We need to have code in Libgcrypt for a new
+ algorithm so to implement a proposed new algorithm before the
+ IANA will finally assign an OpenPGP indentifier. */
+ snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%08lX%08lX %d 0",
+ (ulong)enc->keyid[0], (ulong)enc->keyid[1], enc->pubkey_algo);
+ write_status_text (STATUS_ENC_TO, buf);
}
- if( !opt.list_only && opt.override_session_key ) {
- /* It does not make much sense to store the session key in
- * secure memory because it has already been passed on the
- * command line and the GCHQ knows about it. */
- c->dek = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *c->dek );
- result = get_override_session_key ( c->dek, opt.override_session_key );
- if ( result ) {
- xfree(c->dek); c->dek = NULL;
+ if (!opt.list_only && opt.override_session_key)
+ {
+ /* It does not make much sense to store the session key in
+ * secure memory because it has already been passed on the
+ * command line and the GCHQ knows about it. */
+ c->dek = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *c->dek);
+ result = get_override_session_key (c->dek, opt.override_session_key);
+ if (result)
+ {
+ xfree (c->dek);
+ c->dek = NULL;
}
}
- else if( is_ELGAMAL(enc->pubkey_algo)
- || enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA
- || enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA
- || enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA
- || enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH
- || is_RSA(enc->pubkey_algo)
- || enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL) {
+ else if (is_ELGAMAL(enc->pubkey_algo)
+ || enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA
+ || enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA
+ || enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA
+ || enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH
+ || is_RSA (enc->pubkey_algo)
+ || enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL)
+ {
/* Note that we also allow type 20 Elgamal keys for decryption.
There are still a couple of those keys in active use as a
subkey. */
@@ -400,341 +421,352 @@ proc_pubkey_enc( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
/* FIXME: Store this all in a list and process it later so that
we can prioritize what key to use. This gives a better user
experience if wildcard keyids are used. */
- if ( !c->dek && ((!enc->keyid[0] && !enc->keyid[1])
- || opt.try_all_secrets
- || have_secret_key_with_kid (enc->keyid)) ) {
- if( opt.list_only )
- result = -1;
- else {
- c->dek = xmalloc_secure_clear( sizeof *c->dek );
- if( (result = get_session_key( enc, c->dek )) ) {
- /* error: delete the DEK */
- xfree(c->dek); c->dek = NULL;
+ if (!c->dek && ((!enc->keyid[0] && !enc->keyid[1])
+ || opt.try_all_secrets
+ || have_secret_key_with_kid (enc->keyid)))
+ {
+ if(opt.list_only)
+ result = -1;
+ else
+ {
+ c->dek = xmalloc_secure_clear (sizeof *c->dek);
+ if ((result = get_session_key (enc, c->dek)))
+ {
+ /* Error: Delete the DEK. */
+ xfree (c->dek);
+ c->dek = NULL;
}
}
}
- else
- result = G10ERR_NO_SECKEY;
+ else
+ result = G10ERR_NO_SECKEY;
}
- else
- result = G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
+ else
+ result = G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
- if( result == -1 )
- ;
- else
- {
- /* store it for later display */
- struct kidlist_item *x = xmalloc( sizeof *x );
- x->kid[0] = enc->keyid[0];
- x->kid[1] = enc->keyid[1];
- x->pubkey_algo = enc->pubkey_algo;
- x->reason = result;
- x->next = c->pkenc_list;
- c->pkenc_list = x;
-
- if( !result && opt.verbose > 1 )
- log_info( _("public key encrypted data: good DEK\n") );
- }
+ if (result == -1)
+ ;
+ else
+ {
+ /* Store it for later display. */
+ struct kidlist_item *x = xmalloc (sizeof *x);
+ x->kid[0] = enc->keyid[0];
+ x->kid[1] = enc->keyid[1];
+ x->pubkey_algo = enc->pubkey_algo;
+ x->reason = result;
+ x->next = c->pkenc_list;
+ c->pkenc_list = x;
+
+ if (!result && opt.verbose > 1)
+ log_info (_("public key encrypted data: good DEK\n"));
+ }
- free_packet(pkt);
+ free_packet(pkt);
}
-
-/****************
+/*
* Print the list of public key encrypted packets which we could
* not decrypt.
*/
static void
-print_pkenc_list( struct kidlist_item *list, int failed )
+print_pkenc_list (struct kidlist_item *list, int failed)
{
- for( ; list; list = list->next ) {
- PKT_public_key *pk;
- const char *algstr;
+ for (; list; list = list->next)
+ {
+ PKT_public_key *pk;
+ const char *algstr;
- if ( failed && !list->reason )
- continue;
- if ( !failed && list->reason )
- continue;
+ if (failed && !list->reason)
+ continue;
+ if (!failed && list->reason)
+ continue;
+
+ algstr = openpgp_pk_algo_name (list->pubkey_algo);
+ pk = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pk);
+
+ if (!algstr)
+ algstr = "[?]";
+ pk->pubkey_algo = list->pubkey_algo;
+ if (!get_pubkey (pk, list->kid))
+ {
+ char *p;
+ log_info (_("encrypted with %u-bit %s key, ID %s, created %s\n"),
+ nbits_from_pk (pk), algstr, keystr_from_pk(pk),
+ strtimestamp (pk->timestamp));
+ p = get_user_id_native (list->kid);
+ log_printf (_(" \"%s\"\n"), p);
+ xfree (p);
+ }
+ else
+ log_info (_("encrypted with %s key, ID %s\n"),
+ algstr, keystr(list->kid));
- algstr = openpgp_pk_algo_name ( list->pubkey_algo );
- pk = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
-
- if( !algstr )
- algstr = "[?]";
- pk->pubkey_algo = list->pubkey_algo;
- if( !get_pubkey( pk, list->kid ) )
- {
- char *p;
- log_info( _("encrypted with %u-bit %s key, ID %s, created %s\n"),
- nbits_from_pk( pk ), algstr, keystr_from_pk(pk),
- strtimestamp(pk->timestamp) );
- p=get_user_id_native(list->kid);
- log_printf (_(" \"%s\"\n"),p);
- xfree(p);
- }
- else
- log_info(_("encrypted with %s key, ID %s\n"),
- algstr,keystr(list->kid));
-
- free_public_key( pk );
-
- if( list->reason == G10ERR_NO_SECKEY ) {
- if( is_status_enabled() ) {
- char buf[20];
- snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%08lX%08lX",
- (ulong)list->kid[0], (ulong)list->kid[1]);
- write_status_text( STATUS_NO_SECKEY, buf );
+ free_public_key (pk);
+
+ if (list->reason == G10ERR_NO_SECKEY)
+ {
+ if (is_status_enabled())
+ {
+ char buf[20];
+ snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%08lX%08lX",
+ (ulong)list->kid[0], (ulong)list->kid[1]);
+ write_status_text (STATUS_NO_SECKEY, buf);
}
}
- else if (list->reason)
- {
- log_info(_("public key decryption failed: %s\n"),
- g10_errstr(list->reason));
- write_status_error ("pkdecrypt_failed", list->reason);
- }
+ else if (list->reason)
+ {
+ log_info (_("public key decryption failed: %s\n"),
+ g10_errstr(list->reason));
+ write_status_error ("pkdecrypt_failed", list->reason);
+ }
}
}
static void
-proc_encrypted( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
+proc_encrypted (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
{
- int result = 0;
+ int result = 0;
- if (!opt.quiet)
- {
- if(c->symkeys>1)
- log_info(_("encrypted with %lu passphrases\n"),c->symkeys);
- else if(c->symkeys==1)
- log_info(_("encrypted with 1 passphrase\n"));
- print_pkenc_list ( c->pkenc_list, 1 );
- print_pkenc_list ( c->pkenc_list, 0 );
- }
+ if (!opt.quiet)
+ {
+ if (c->symkeys>1)
+ log_info (_("encrypted with %lu passphrases\n"), c->symkeys);
+ else if (c->symkeys == 1)
+ log_info (_("encrypted with 1 passphrase\n"));
+ print_pkenc_list ( c->pkenc_list, 1 );
+ print_pkenc_list ( c->pkenc_list, 0 );
+ }
- /* FIXME: Figure out the session key by looking at all pkenc packets. */
-
-
- write_status( STATUS_BEGIN_DECRYPTION );
-
- /*log_debug("dat: %sencrypted data\n", c->dek?"":"conventional ");*/
- if( opt.list_only )
- result = -1;
- else if( !c->dek && !c->last_was_session_key ) {
- int algo;
- STRING2KEY s2kbuf, *s2k = NULL;
-
- if(opt.override_session_key)
- {
- c->dek = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *c->dek );
- result=get_override_session_key(c->dek, opt.override_session_key);
- if(result)
- {
- xfree(c->dek);
- c->dek = NULL;
- }
- }
- else
- {
- /* Assume this is old style conventional encrypted data. */
- algo = opt.def_cipher_algo;
- if ( algo )
- log_info (_("assuming %s encrypted data\n"),
+ /* FIXME: Figure out the session key by looking at all pkenc packets. */
+
+ write_status (STATUS_BEGIN_DECRYPTION);
+
+ /*log_debug("dat: %sencrypted data\n", c->dek?"":"conventional ");*/
+ if (opt.list_only)
+ result = -1;
+ else if (!c->dek && !c->last_was_session_key)
+ {
+ int algo;
+ STRING2KEY s2kbuf;
+ STRING2KEY *s2k = NULL;
+
+ if (opt.override_session_key)
+ {
+ c->dek = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *c->dek);
+ result = get_override_session_key (c->dek, opt.override_session_key);
+ if (result)
+ {
+ xfree (c->dek);
+ c->dek = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* Assume this is old style conventional encrypted data. */
+ algo = opt.def_cipher_algo;
+ if (algo)
+ log_info (_("assuming %s encrypted data\n"),
+ openpgp_cipher_algo_name (algo));
+ else if (openpgp_cipher_test_algo (CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA))
+ {
+ algo = opt.def_cipher_algo;
+ if (!algo)
+ algo = opt.s2k_cipher_algo;
+ log_info (_("IDEA cipher unavailable, "
+ "optimistically attempting to use %s instead\n"),
openpgp_cipher_algo_name (algo));
- else if ( openpgp_cipher_test_algo (CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA) )
- {
- algo = opt.def_cipher_algo;
- if (!algo)
- algo = opt.s2k_cipher_algo;
- log_info (_("IDEA cipher unavailable, "
- "optimistically attempting to use %s instead\n"),
- openpgp_cipher_algo_name (algo));
- }
- else
- {
- algo = CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA;
- if (!opt.s2k_digest_algo)
- {
- /* If no digest is given we assume SHA-1. */
- s2kbuf.mode = 0;
- s2kbuf.hash_algo = DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1;
- s2k = &s2kbuf;
- }
- log_info (_("assuming %s encrypted data\n"), "IDEA");
- }
-
- c->dek = passphrase_to_dek ( NULL, 0, algo, s2k, 3, NULL, NULL );
- if (c->dek)
- c->dek->algo_info_printed = 1;
- }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ algo = CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA;
+ if (!opt.s2k_digest_algo)
+ {
+ /* If no digest is given we assume SHA-1. */
+ s2kbuf.mode = 0;
+ s2kbuf.hash_algo = DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1;
+ s2k = &s2kbuf;
+ }
+ log_info (_("assuming %s encrypted data\n"), "IDEA");
+ }
+
+ c->dek = passphrase_to_dek ( NULL, 0, algo, s2k, 3, NULL, NULL );
+ if (c->dek)
+ c->dek->algo_info_printed = 1;
+ }
}
- else if( !c->dek )
- result = G10ERR_NO_SECKEY;
-
- if (!result)
- result = decrypt_data (c->ctrl, c, pkt->pkt.encrypted, c->dek );
-
- if( result == -1 )
- ;
- else if( !result || (gpg_err_code (result) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE
- && opt.ignore_mdc_error)) {
- write_status( STATUS_DECRYPTION_OKAY );
- if( opt.verbose > 1 )
- log_info(_("decryption okay\n"));
- if( pkt->pkt.encrypted->mdc_method && !result )
- write_status( STATUS_GOODMDC );
- else if(!opt.no_mdc_warn)
- log_info (_("WARNING: message was not integrity protected\n"));
+ else if( !c->dek )
+ result = G10ERR_NO_SECKEY;
+
+ if (!result)
+ result = decrypt_data (c->ctrl, c, pkt->pkt.encrypted, c->dek );
+
+ if (result == -1)
+ ;
+ else if (!result || (gpg_err_code (result) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE
+ && opt.ignore_mdc_error))
+ {
+ write_status (STATUS_DECRYPTION_OKAY);
+ if (opt.verbose > 1)
+ log_info(_("decryption okay\n"));
+ if (pkt->pkt.encrypted->mdc_method && !result)
+ write_status (STATUS_GOODMDC);
+ else if (!opt.no_mdc_warn)
+ log_info (_("WARNING: message was not integrity protected\n"));
}
- else if( result == G10ERR_BAD_SIGN ) {
- glo_ctrl.lasterr = result;
- log_error(_("WARNING: encrypted message has been manipulated!\n"));
- write_status( STATUS_BADMDC );
- write_status( STATUS_DECRYPTION_FAILED );
+ else if (result == G10ERR_BAD_SIGN)
+ {
+ glo_ctrl.lasterr = result;
+ log_error (_("WARNING: encrypted message has been manipulated!\n"));
+ write_status (STATUS_BADMDC);
+ write_status (STATUS_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
}
- else {
- if (gpg_err_code (result) == GPG_ERR_BAD_KEY
- && *c->dek->s2k_cacheid != '\0')
- {
- log_debug(_("cleared passphrase cached with ID: %s\n"),
- c->dek->s2k_cacheid);
- passphrase_clear_cache (NULL, c->dek->s2k_cacheid, 0);
- }
- glo_ctrl.lasterr = result;
- write_status( STATUS_DECRYPTION_FAILED );
- log_error(_("decryption failed: %s\n"), g10_errstr(result));
- /* Hmmm: does this work when we have encrypted using multiple
- * ways to specify the session key (symmmetric and PK)*/
+ else
+ {
+ if (gpg_err_code (result) == GPG_ERR_BAD_KEY
+ && *c->dek->s2k_cacheid != '\0')
+ {
+ log_debug (_("cleared passphrase cached with ID: %s\n"),
+ c->dek->s2k_cacheid);
+ passphrase_clear_cache (NULL, c->dek->s2k_cacheid, 0);
+ }
+ glo_ctrl.lasterr = result;
+ write_status (STATUS_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+ log_error (_("decryption failed: %s\n"), g10_errstr(result));
+ /* Hmmm: does this work when we have encrypted using multiple
+ * ways to specify the session key (symmmetric and PK). */
}
- xfree(c->dek); c->dek = NULL;
- free_packet(pkt);
- c->last_was_session_key = 0;
- write_status( STATUS_END_DECRYPTION );
+
+ xfree (c->dek);
+ c->dek = NULL;
+ free_packet (pkt);
+ c->last_was_session_key = 0;
+ write_status (STATUS_END_DECRYPTION);
}
static void
proc_plaintext( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
{
- PKT_plaintext *pt = pkt->pkt.plaintext;
- int any, clearsig, rc;
- KBNODE n;
-
- literals_seen++;
-
- if( pt->namelen == 8 && !memcmp( pt->name, "_CONSOLE", 8 ) )
- log_info(_("Note: sender requested \"for-your-eyes-only\"\n"));
- else if( opt.verbose )
- log_info(_("original file name='%.*s'\n"), pt->namelen, pt->name);
- free_md_filter_context( &c->mfx );
- if (gcry_md_open (&c->mfx.md, 0, 0))
- BUG ();
- /* fixme: we may need to push the textfilter if we have sigclass 1
- * and no armoring - Not yet tested
- * Hmmm, why don't we need it at all if we have sigclass 1
- * Should we assume that plaintext in mode 't' has always sigclass 1??
- * See: Russ Allbery's mail 1999-02-09
- */
- any = clearsig = 0;
- for(n=c->list; n; n = n->next )
- {
- if( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG )
- {
- /* For the onepass signature case */
- if( n->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->digest_algo )
- {
- gcry_md_enable (c->mfx.md,
- n->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->digest_algo);
- any = 1;
- }
- }
- else if( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
- && n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control
- == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START )
- {
- /* For the clearsigned message case */
- size_t datalen = n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->datalen;
- const byte *data = n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->data;
-
- /* check that we have at least the sigclass and one hash */
- if ( datalen < 2 )
- log_fatal("invalid control packet CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START\n");
- /* Note that we don't set the clearsig flag for not-dash-escaped
- * documents */
- clearsig = (*data == 0x01);
- for( data++, datalen--; datalen; datalen--, data++ )
- gcry_md_enable (c->mfx.md, *data);
- any = 1;
- break; /* Stop here as one-pass signature packets are not
- expected. */
- }
- else if(n->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SIGNATURE)
- {
- /* For the SIG+LITERAL case that PGP used to use. */
- gcry_md_enable ( c->mfx.md, n->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo );
- any=1;
- }
- }
+ PKT_plaintext *pt = pkt->pkt.plaintext;
+ int any, clearsig, rc;
+ kbnode_t n;
- if( !any && !opt.skip_verify )
- {
- /* This is for the old GPG LITERAL+SIG case. It's not legal
- according to 2440, so hopefully it won't come up that
- often. There is no good way to specify what algorithms to
- use in that case, so these three are the historical
- answer. */
- gcry_md_enable( c->mfx.md, DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160 );
- gcry_md_enable( c->mfx.md, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1 );
- }
- if ( DBG_HASHING ) {
- gcry_md_debug ( c->mfx.md, "verify" );
- if ( c->mfx.md2 )
- gcry_md_debug ( c->mfx.md2, "verify2" );
+ literals_seen++;
+
+ if (pt->namelen == 8 && !memcmp( pt->name, "_CONSOLE", 8))
+ log_info (_("Note: sender requested \"for-your-eyes-only\"\n"));
+ else if (opt.verbose)
+ log_info (_("original file name='%.*s'\n"), pt->namelen, pt->name);
+
+ free_md_filter_context (&c->mfx);
+ if (gcry_md_open (&c->mfx.md, 0, 0))
+ BUG ();
+ /* fixme: we may need to push the textfilter if we have sigclass 1
+ * and no armoring - Not yet tested
+ * Hmmm, why don't we need it at all if we have sigclass 1
+ * Should we assume that plaintext in mode 't' has always sigclass 1??
+ * See: Russ Allbery's mail 1999-02-09
+ */
+ any = clearsig = 0;
+ for (n=c->list; n; n = n->next )
+ {
+ if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG)
+ {
+ /* The onepass signature case. */
+ if (n->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->digest_algo)
+ {
+ gcry_md_enable (c->mfx.md, n->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->digest_algo);
+ any = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ else if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
+ && n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START)
+ {
+ /* The clearsigned message case. */
+ size_t datalen = n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->datalen;
+ const byte *data = n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->data;
+
+ /* Check that we have at least the sigclass and one hash. */
+ if (datalen < 2)
+ log_fatal ("invalid control packet CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START\n");
+ /* Note that we don't set the clearsig flag for not-dash-escaped
+ * documents. */
+ clearsig = (*data == 0x01);
+ for (data++, datalen--; datalen; datalen--, data++)
+ gcry_md_enable (c->mfx.md, *data);
+ any = 1;
+ break; /* Stop here as one-pass signature packets are not
+ expected. */
+ }
+ else if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
+ {
+ /* The SIG+LITERAL case that PGP used to use. */
+ gcry_md_enable ( c->mfx.md, n->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo );
+ any = 1;
+ }
}
- rc=0;
+ if (!any && !opt.skip_verify)
+ {
+ /* This is for the old GPG LITERAL+SIG case. It's not legal
+ according to 2440, so hopefully it won't come up that often.
+ There is no good way to specify what algorithms to use in
+ that case, so these there are the historical answer. */
+ gcry_md_enable (c->mfx.md, DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160);
+ gcry_md_enable (c->mfx.md, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1);
+ }
+ if (DBG_HASHING)
+ {
+ gcry_md_debug (c->mfx.md, "verify");
+ if (c->mfx.md2)
+ gcry_md_debug (c->mfx.md2, "verify2");
+ }
- if (literals_seen>1)
- {
- log_info (_("WARNING: multiple plaintexts seen\n"));
-
- if (!opt.flags.allow_multiple_messages)
- {
- write_status_text (STATUS_ERROR, "proc_pkt.plaintext 89_BAD_DATA");
- log_inc_errorcount ();
- rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNEXPECTED);
- }
- }
+ rc=0;
- if(!rc)
- {
- rc = handle_plaintext( pt, &c->mfx, c->sigs_only, clearsig );
- if ( gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_EACCES && !c->sigs_only )
- {
- /* Can't write output but we hash it anyway to check the
- signature. */
- rc = handle_plaintext( pt, &c->mfx, 1, clearsig );
- }
- }
+ if (literals_seen > 1)
+ {
+ log_info (_("WARNING: multiple plaintexts seen\n"));
- if( rc )
- log_error( "handle plaintext failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
- free_packet(pkt);
- c->last_was_session_key = 0;
-
- /* We add a marker control packet instead of the plaintext packet.
- * This is so that we can later detect invalid packet sequences.
- */
- n = new_kbnode (create_gpg_control (CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK, NULL, 0));
- if (c->list)
- add_kbnode (c->list, n);
- else
- c->list = n;
+ if (!opt.flags.allow_multiple_messages)
+ {
+ write_status_text (STATUS_ERROR, "proc_pkt.plaintext 89_BAD_DATA");
+ log_inc_errorcount ();
+ rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNEXPECTED);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!rc)
+ {
+ rc = handle_plaintext (pt, &c->mfx, c->sigs_only, clearsig);
+ if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_EACCES && !c->sigs_only)
+ {
+ /* Can't write output but we hash it anyway to check the
+ signature. */
+ rc = handle_plaintext( pt, &c->mfx, 1, clearsig );
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (rc)
+ log_error ("handle plaintext failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
+
+ free_packet(pkt);
+ c->last_was_session_key = 0;
+
+ /* We add a marker control packet instead of the plaintext packet.
+ * This is so that we can later detect invalid packet sequences. */
+ n = new_kbnode (create_gpg_control (CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK, NULL, 0));
+ if (c->list)
+ add_kbnode (c->list, n);
+ else
+ c->list = n;
}
static int
-proc_compressed_cb( IOBUF a, void *info )
+proc_compressed_cb (iobuf_t a, void *info)
{
if ( ((CTX)info)->signed_data.used
&& ((CTX)info)->signed_data.data_fd != -1)
@@ -746,15 +778,17 @@ proc_compressed_cb( IOBUF a, void *info )
((CTX)info)->sigfilename );
}
+
static int
-proc_encrypt_cb (IOBUF a, void *info )
+proc_encrypt_cb (iobuf_t a, void *info )
{
CTX c = info;
return proc_encryption_packets (c->ctrl, info, a );
}
+
static int
-proc_compressed( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
+proc_compressed (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
{
PKT_compressed *zd = pkt->pkt.compressed;
int rc;
@@ -786,123 +820,135 @@ proc_compressed( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
return rc;
}
-/****************
+
+/*
* check the signature
* Returns: 0 = valid signature or an error code
*/
static int
-do_check_sig( CTX c, KBNODE node, int *is_selfsig,
- int *is_expkey, int *is_revkey )
+do_check_sig (CTX c, kbnode_t node, int *is_selfsig,
+ int *is_expkey, int *is_revkey)
{
- PKT_signature *sig;
- gcry_md_hd_t md = NULL, md2 = NULL;
- int algo, rc;
-
- assert( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE );
- if( is_selfsig )
- *is_selfsig = 0;
- sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
-
- algo = sig->digest_algo;
- rc = openpgp_md_test_algo(algo);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
-
- if( sig->sig_class == 0x00 ) {
- if( c->mfx.md )
- {
- if (gcry_md_copy (&md, c->mfx.md ))
- BUG ();
- }
- else /* detached signature */
- {
- /* signature_check() will enable the md*/
- if (gcry_md_open (&md, 0, 0 ))
- BUG ();
- }
+ PKT_signature *sig;
+ gcry_md_hd_t md = NULL;
+ gcry_md_hd_t md2 = NULL;
+ int algo, rc;
+
+ assert (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE);
+ if (is_selfsig)
+ *is_selfsig = 0;
+ sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
+
+ algo = sig->digest_algo;
+ rc = openpgp_md_test_algo (algo);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ if (sig->sig_class == 0x00)
+ {
+ if (c->mfx.md)
+ {
+ if (gcry_md_copy (&md, c->mfx.md ))
+ BUG ();
+ }
+ else /* detached signature */
+ {
+ /* signature_check() will enable the md. */
+ if (gcry_md_open (&md, 0, 0 ))
+ BUG ();
+ }
}
- else if( sig->sig_class == 0x01 ) {
- /* how do we know that we have to hash the (already hashed) text
- * in canonical mode ??? (calculating both modes???) */
- if( c->mfx.md ) {
- if (gcry_md_copy (&md, c->mfx.md ))
- BUG ();
- if( c->mfx.md2 && gcry_md_copy (&md2, c->mfx.md2 ))
- BUG ();
+ else if (sig->sig_class == 0x01)
+ {
+ /* How do we know that we have to hash the (already hashed) text
+ in canonical mode ??? (calculating both modes???) */
+ if (c->mfx.md)
+ {
+ if (gcry_md_copy (&md, c->mfx.md ))
+ BUG ();
+ if (c->mfx.md2 && gcry_md_copy (&md2, c->mfx.md2))
+ BUG ();
}
- else { /* detached signature */
- log_debug("Do we really need this here?");
- /* signature_check() will enable the md*/
- if (gcry_md_open (&md, 0, 0 ))
- BUG ();
- if (gcry_md_open (&md2, 0, 0 ))
- BUG ();
+ else /* detached signature */
+ {
+ log_debug ("Do we really need this here?");
+ /* signature_check() will enable the md*/
+ if (gcry_md_open (&md, 0, 0 ))
+ BUG ();
+ if (gcry_md_open (&md2, 0, 0 ))
+ BUG ();
}
}
- else if( (sig->sig_class&~3) == 0x10
- || sig->sig_class == 0x18
- || sig->sig_class == 0x1f
- || sig->sig_class == 0x20
- || sig->sig_class == 0x28
- || sig->sig_class == 0x30 ) {
- if( c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
- || c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
- return check_key_signature( c->list, node, is_selfsig );
+ else if ((sig->sig_class&~3) == 0x10
+ || sig->sig_class == 0x18
+ || sig->sig_class == 0x1f
+ || sig->sig_class == 0x20
+ || sig->sig_class == 0x28
+ || sig->sig_class == 0x30)
+ {
+ if (c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
+ || c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
+ {
+ return check_key_signature( c->list, node, is_selfsig );
}
- else if( sig->sig_class == 0x20 ) {
- log_error (_("standalone revocation - "
- "use \"gpg --import\" to apply\n"));
- return G10ERR_NOT_PROCESSED;
+ else if (sig->sig_class == 0x20)
+ {
+ log_error (_("standalone revocation - "
+ "use \"gpg --import\" to apply\n"));
+ return G10ERR_NOT_PROCESSED;
}
- else {
- log_error("invalid root packet for sigclass %02x\n",
- sig->sig_class);
- return G10ERR_SIG_CLASS;
+ else
+ {
+ log_error ("invalid root packet for sigclass %02x\n", sig->sig_class);
+ return G10ERR_SIG_CLASS;
}
}
- else
- return G10ERR_SIG_CLASS;
- rc = signature_check2( sig, md, NULL, is_expkey, is_revkey, NULL );
- if( gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE && md2 )
- rc = signature_check2( sig, md2, NULL, is_expkey, is_revkey, NULL );
- gcry_md_close(md);
- gcry_md_close(md2);
+ else
+ return G10ERR_SIG_CLASS;
- return rc;
+ rc = signature_check2 (sig, md, NULL, is_expkey, is_revkey, NULL);
+ if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE && md2)
+ rc = signature_check2 (sig, md2, NULL, is_expkey, is_revkey, NULL);
+
+ gcry_md_close (md);
+ gcry_md_close (md2);
+
+ return rc;
}
static void
-print_userid( PACKET *pkt )
+print_userid (PACKET *pkt)
{
- if( !pkt )
- BUG();
- if( pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID ) {
- printf("ERROR: unexpected packet type %d", pkt->pkttype );
- return;
+ if (!pkt)
+ BUG();
+
+ if (pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID)
+ {
+ printf ("ERROR: unexpected packet type %d", pkt->pkttype );
+ return;
}
- if( opt.with_colons )
- {
- if(pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
- printf("%u %lu",
- pkt->pkt.user_id->numattribs,
- pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_len);
- else
- es_write_sanitized (es_stdout, pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
- pkt->pkt.user_id->len, ":", NULL);
- }
- else
- print_utf8_buffer (es_stdout, pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
- pkt->pkt.user_id->len );
+ if (opt.with_colons)
+ {
+ if (pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
+ printf("%u %lu",
+ pkt->pkt.user_id->numattribs,
+ pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_len);
+ else
+ es_write_sanitized (es_stdout, pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
+ pkt->pkt.user_id->len, ":", NULL);
+ }
+ else
+ print_utf8_buffer (es_stdout, pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
+ pkt->pkt.user_id->len );
}
-/****************
- * List the certificate in a user friendly way
+/*
+ * List the keyblock in a user friendly way
*/
-
static void
-list_node( CTX c, KBNODE node )
+list_node (CTX c, kbnode_t node)
{
int mainkey;
char pkstrbuf[PUBKEY_STRING_SIZE];
@@ -1104,66 +1150,64 @@ list_node( CTX c, KBNODE node )
}
-
int
-proc_packets (ctrl_t ctrl, void *anchor, IOBUF a )
+proc_packets (ctrl_t ctrl, void *anchor, iobuf_t a )
{
- int rc;
- CTX c = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *c );
+ int rc;
+ CTX c = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *c);
- c->ctrl = ctrl;
- c->anchor = anchor;
- rc = do_proc_packets( c, a );
- xfree( c );
- return rc;
-}
+ c->ctrl = ctrl;
+ c->anchor = anchor;
+ rc = do_proc_packets (c, a);
+ xfree (c);
+ return rc;
+}
int
-proc_signature_packets (ctrl_t ctrl, void *anchor, IOBUF a,
+proc_signature_packets (ctrl_t ctrl, void *anchor, iobuf_t a,
strlist_t signedfiles, const char *sigfilename )
{
- CTX c = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *c );
- int rc;
-
- c->ctrl = ctrl;
- c->anchor = anchor;
- c->sigs_only = 1;
-
- c->signed_data.data_fd = -1;
- c->signed_data.data_names = signedfiles;
- c->signed_data.used = !!signedfiles;
-
- c->sigfilename = sigfilename;
- rc = do_proc_packets( c, a );
-
- /* If we have not encountered any signature we print an error
- messages, send a NODATA status back and return an error code.
- Using log_error is required because verify_files does not check
- error codes for each file but we want to terminate the process
- with an error. */
- if (!rc && !c->any.sig_seen)
- {
- write_status_text (STATUS_NODATA, "4");
- log_error (_("no signature found\n"));
- rc = G10ERR_NO_DATA;
- }
+ CTX c = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *c);
+ int rc;
+
+ c->ctrl = ctrl;
+ c->anchor = anchor;
+ c->sigs_only = 1;
- /* Propagate the signature seen flag upward. Do this only on
- success so that we won't issue the nodata status several
- times. */
- if (!rc && c->anchor && c->any.sig_seen)
- c->anchor->any.sig_seen = 1;
+ c->signed_data.data_fd = -1;
+ c->signed_data.data_names = signedfiles;
+ c->signed_data.used = !!signedfiles;
- xfree( c );
- return rc;
+ c->sigfilename = sigfilename;
+ rc = do_proc_packets ( c, a );
+
+ /* If we have not encountered any signature we print an error
+ messages, send a NODATA status back and return an error code.
+ Using log_error is required because verify_files does not check
+ error codes for each file but we want to terminate the process
+ with an error. */
+ if (!rc && !c->any.sig_seen)
+ {
+ write_status_text (STATUS_NODATA, "4");
+ log_error (_("no signature found\n"));
+ rc = G10ERR_NO_DATA;
+ }
+
+ /* Propagate the signature seen flag upward. Do this only on success
+ so that we won't issue the nodata status several times. */
+ if (!rc && c->anchor && c->any.sig_seen)
+ c->anchor->any.sig_seen = 1;
+
+ xfree (c);
+ return rc;
}
int
proc_signature_packets_by_fd (ctrl_t ctrl,
- void *anchor, IOBUF a, int signed_data_fd )
+ void *anchor, iobuf_t a, int signed_data_fd )
{
int rc;
CTX c;
@@ -1205,17 +1249,17 @@ proc_signature_packets_by_fd (ctrl_t ctrl,
int
-proc_encryption_packets (ctrl_t ctrl, void *anchor, IOBUF a )
+proc_encryption_packets (ctrl_t ctrl, void *anchor, iobuf_t a )
{
- CTX c = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *c );
- int rc;
-
- c->ctrl = ctrl;
- c->anchor = anchor;
- c->encrypt_only = 1;
- rc = do_proc_packets( c, a );
- xfree( c );
- return rc;
+ CTX c = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *c);
+ int rc;
+
+ c->ctrl = ctrl;
+ c->anchor = anchor;
+ c->encrypt_only = 1;
+ rc = do_proc_packets (c, a);
+ xfree (c);
+ return rc;
}
@@ -1233,152 +1277,168 @@ check_nesting (CTX c)
write_status_text (STATUS_UNEXPECTED, "1");
return GPG_ERR_BAD_DATA;
}
+
return 0;
}
static int
-do_proc_packets( CTX c, IOBUF a )
+do_proc_packets (CTX c, iobuf_t a)
{
- PACKET *pkt;
- int rc = 0;
- int any_data = 0;
- int newpkt;
-
- rc = check_nesting (c);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
-
- pkt = xmalloc( sizeof *pkt );
- c->iobuf = a;
- init_packet(pkt);
- while( (rc=parse_packet(a, pkt)) != -1 ) {
- any_data = 1;
- if( rc ) {
- free_packet(pkt);
- /* stop processing when an invalid packet has been encountered
- * but don't do so when we are doing a --list-packets. */
- if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET
- && opt.list_packets != 2 )
- break;
- continue;
+ PACKET *pkt;
+ int rc = 0;
+ int any_data = 0;
+ int newpkt;
+
+ rc = check_nesting (c);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ pkt = xmalloc( sizeof *pkt );
+ c->iobuf = a;
+ init_packet(pkt);
+ while ((rc=parse_packet(a, pkt)) != -1)
+ {
+ any_data = 1;
+ if (rc)
+ {
+ free_packet (pkt);
+ /* Stop processing when an invalid packet has been encountered
+ * but don't do so when we are doing a --list-packets. */
+ if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET
+ && opt.list_packets != 2 )
+ break;
+ continue;
}
- newpkt = -1;
- if( opt.list_packets ) {
- switch( pkt->pkttype ) {
- case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: proc_pubkey_enc( c, pkt ); break;
- case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: proc_symkey_enc( c, pkt ); break;
- case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
- case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: proc_encrypted( c, pkt ); break;
- case PKT_COMPRESSED: rc = proc_compressed( c, pkt ); break;
- default: newpkt = 0; break;
+ newpkt = -1;
+ if (opt.list_packets)
+ {
+ switch (pkt->pkttype)
+ {
+ case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: proc_pubkey_enc (c, pkt); break;
+ case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: proc_symkey_enc (c, pkt); break;
+ case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
+ case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: proc_encrypted (c, pkt); break;
+ case PKT_COMPRESSED: rc = proc_compressed (c, pkt); break;
+ default: newpkt = 0; break;
}
}
- else if( c->sigs_only ) {
- switch( pkt->pkttype ) {
- case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
- case PKT_SECRET_KEY:
- case PKT_USER_ID:
- case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC:
- case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC:
- case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
- case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC:
- write_status_text( STATUS_UNEXPECTED, "0" );
- rc = G10ERR_UNEXPECTED;
- goto leave;
- case PKT_SIGNATURE: newpkt = add_signature( c, pkt ); break;
- case PKT_PLAINTEXT: proc_plaintext( c, pkt ); break;
- case PKT_COMPRESSED: rc = proc_compressed( c, pkt ); break;
- case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig( c, pkt ); break;
- case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: newpkt = add_gpg_control(c, pkt); break;
- default: newpkt = 0; break;
+ else if (c->sigs_only)
+ {
+ switch (pkt->pkttype)
+ {
+ case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
+ case PKT_SECRET_KEY:
+ case PKT_USER_ID:
+ case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC:
+ case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC:
+ case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
+ case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC:
+ write_status_text( STATUS_UNEXPECTED, "0" );
+ rc = G10ERR_UNEXPECTED;
+ goto leave;
+
+ case PKT_SIGNATURE: newpkt = add_signature (c, pkt); break;
+ case PKT_PLAINTEXT: proc_plaintext (c, pkt); break;
+ case PKT_COMPRESSED: rc = proc_compressed (c, pkt); break;
+ case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig (c, pkt); break;
+ case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: newpkt = add_gpg_control (c, pkt); break;
+ default: newpkt = 0; break;
}
}
- else if( c->encrypt_only ) {
- switch( pkt->pkttype ) {
- case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
- case PKT_SECRET_KEY:
- case PKT_USER_ID:
- write_status_text( STATUS_UNEXPECTED, "0" );
- rc = G10ERR_UNEXPECTED;
- goto leave;
- case PKT_SIGNATURE: newpkt = add_signature( c, pkt ); break;
- case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: proc_symkey_enc( c, pkt ); break;
- case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: proc_pubkey_enc( c, pkt ); break;
- case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
- case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: proc_encrypted( c, pkt ); break;
- case PKT_PLAINTEXT: proc_plaintext( c, pkt ); break;
- case PKT_COMPRESSED: rc = proc_compressed( c, pkt ); break;
- case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig( c, pkt ); break;
- case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: newpkt = add_gpg_control(c, pkt); break;
- default: newpkt = 0; break;
+ else if (c->encrypt_only)
+ {
+ switch (pkt->pkttype)
+ {
+ case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
+ case PKT_SECRET_KEY:
+ case PKT_USER_ID:
+ write_status_text (STATUS_UNEXPECTED, "0");
+ rc = G10ERR_UNEXPECTED;
+ goto leave;
+
+ case PKT_SIGNATURE: newpkt = add_signature (c, pkt); break;
+ case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: proc_symkey_enc (c, pkt); break;
+ case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: proc_pubkey_enc (c, pkt); break;
+ case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
+ case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: proc_encrypted (c, pkt); break;
+ case PKT_PLAINTEXT: proc_plaintext (c, pkt); break;
+ case PKT_COMPRESSED: rc = proc_compressed (c, pkt); break;
+ case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig (c, pkt); break;
+ case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: newpkt = add_gpg_control (c, pkt); break;
+ default: newpkt = 0; break;
}
}
- else {
- switch( pkt->pkttype ) {
- case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
- case PKT_SECRET_KEY:
- release_list( c );
- c->list = new_kbnode( pkt );
- newpkt = 1;
- break;
- case PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY:
- case PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY:
- newpkt = add_subkey( c, pkt );
- break;
- case PKT_USER_ID: newpkt = add_user_id( c, pkt ); break;
- case PKT_SIGNATURE: newpkt = add_signature( c, pkt ); break;
- case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: proc_pubkey_enc( c, pkt ); break;
- case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: proc_symkey_enc( c, pkt ); break;
- case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
- case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: proc_encrypted( c, pkt ); break;
- case PKT_PLAINTEXT: proc_plaintext( c, pkt ); break;
- case PKT_COMPRESSED: rc = proc_compressed( c, pkt ); break;
- case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig( c, pkt ); break;
- case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: newpkt = add_gpg_control(c, pkt); break;
- case PKT_RING_TRUST: newpkt = add_ring_trust( c, pkt ); break;
- default: newpkt = 0; break;
+ else
+ {
+ switch (pkt->pkttype)
+ {
+ case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
+ case PKT_SECRET_KEY:
+ release_list (c);
+ c->list = new_kbnode (pkt);
+ newpkt = 1;
+ break;
+ case PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY:
+ case PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY:
+ newpkt = add_subkey (c, pkt);
+ break;
+ case PKT_USER_ID: newpkt = add_user_id (c, pkt); break;
+ case PKT_SIGNATURE: newpkt = add_signature (c, pkt); break;
+ case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: proc_pubkey_enc (c, pkt); break;
+ case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: proc_symkey_enc (c, pkt); break;
+ case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
+ case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: proc_encrypted (c, pkt); break;
+ case PKT_PLAINTEXT: proc_plaintext (c, pkt); break;
+ case PKT_COMPRESSED: rc = proc_compressed (c, pkt); break;
+ case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig (c, pkt); break;
+ case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: newpkt = add_gpg_control(c, pkt); break;
+ case PKT_RING_TRUST: newpkt = add_ring_trust (c, pkt); break;
+ default: newpkt = 0; break;
}
}
- if (rc)
- goto leave;
-
- /* This is a very ugly construct and frankly, I don't remember why
- * I used it. Adding the MDC check here is a hack.
- * The right solution is to initiate another context for encrypted
- * packet and not to reuse the current one ... It works right
- * when there is a compression packet inbetween which adds just
- * an extra layer.
- * Hmmm: Rewrite this whole module here??
- */
- if( pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE && pkt->pkttype != PKT_MDC )
- c->any.data = (pkt->pkttype == PKT_PLAINTEXT);
-
- if( newpkt == -1 )
- ;
- else if( newpkt ) {
- pkt = xmalloc( sizeof *pkt );
- init_packet(pkt);
+ if (rc)
+ goto leave;
+
+ /* This is a very ugly construct and frankly, I don't remember why
+ * I used it. Adding the MDC check here is a hack.
+ * The right solution is to initiate another context for encrypted
+ * packet and not to reuse the current one ... It works right
+ * when there is a compression packet inbetween which adds just
+ * an extra layer.
+ * Hmmm: Rewrite this whole module here??
+ */
+ if (pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE && pkt->pkttype != PKT_MDC)
+ c->any.data = (pkt->pkttype == PKT_PLAINTEXT);
+
+ if (newpkt == -1)
+ ;
+ else if (newpkt)
+ {
+ pkt = xmalloc (sizeof *pkt);
+ init_packet (pkt);
}
- else
- free_packet(pkt);
+ else
+ free_packet(pkt);
}
- if( rc == G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET )
- write_status_text( STATUS_NODATA, "3" );
- if( any_data )
- rc = 0;
- else if( rc == -1 )
- write_status_text( STATUS_NODATA, "2" );
-
-
- leave:
- release_list( c );
- xfree(c->dek);
- free_packet( pkt );
- xfree( pkt );
- free_md_filter_context( &c->mfx );
- return rc;
+
+ if (rc == G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET)
+ write_status_text (STATUS_NODATA, "3");
+
+ if (any_data)
+ rc = 0;
+ else if (rc == -1)
+ write_status_text (STATUS_NODATA, "2");
+
+
+ leave:
+ release_list (c);
+ xfree(c->dek);
+ free_packet (pkt);
+ xfree (pkt);
+ free_md_filter_context (&c->mfx);
+ return rc;
}
@@ -1476,7 +1536,7 @@ print_good_bad_signature (int statno, const char *keyid_str, kbnode_t un,
static int
-check_sig_and_print (CTX c, KBNODE node)
+check_sig_and_print (CTX c, kbnode_t node)
{
PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
const char *astr;
@@ -1520,7 +1580,7 @@ check_sig_and_print (CTX c, KBNODE node)
introduce a bug here.
*/
{
- KBNODE n;
+ kbnode_t n;
int n_onepass, n_sig;
/* log_debug ("checking signature packet composition\n"); */
@@ -1975,206 +2035,231 @@ check_sig_and_print (CTX c, KBNODE node)
}
-/****************
+/*
* Process the tree which starts at node
*/
static void
-proc_tree( CTX c, KBNODE node )
+proc_tree (CTX c, kbnode_t node)
{
- KBNODE n1;
- int rc;
-
- if( opt.list_packets || opt.list_only )
- return;
-
- /* we must skip our special plaintext marker packets here becuase
- they may be the root packet. These packets are only used in
- addionla checks and skipping them here doesn't matter */
- while ( node
- && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
- && node->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control
- == CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK ) {
- node = node->next;
+ kbnode_t n1;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (opt.list_packets || opt.list_only)
+ return;
+
+ /* We must skip our special plaintext marker packets here because
+ they may be the root packet. These packets are only used in
+ addional checks and skipping them here doesn't matter. */
+ while (node
+ && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
+ && node->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK)
+ {
+ node = node->next;
}
- if (!node)
- return;
+ if (!node)
+ return;
- c->trustletter = ' ';
- if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
- || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
- merge_keys_and_selfsig( node );
- list_node( c, node );
+ c->trustletter = ' ';
+ if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
+ || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
+ {
+ merge_keys_and_selfsig (node);
+ list_node (c, node);
}
- else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY ) {
- merge_keys_and_selfsig( node );
- list_node( c, node );
+ else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY)
+ {
+ merge_keys_and_selfsig (node);
+ list_node (c, node);
}
- else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG ) {
- /* check all signatures */
- if( !c->any.data ) {
- int use_textmode = 0;
-
- free_md_filter_context( &c->mfx );
- /* prepare to create all requested message digests */
- if (gcry_md_open (&c->mfx.md, 0, 0))
- BUG ();
-
- /* fixme: why looking for the signature packet and not the
- one-pass packet? */
- for ( n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE )); )
- {
- gcry_md_enable (c->mfx.md,
- n1->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo);
- }
-
- if (n1 && n1->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->sig_class == 0x01)
- use_textmode = 1;
-
- /* Ask for file and hash it. */
- if( c->sigs_only ) {
- if (c->signed_data.used && c->signed_data.data_fd != -1)
- rc = hash_datafile_by_fd (c->mfx.md, NULL,
- c->signed_data.data_fd,
- use_textmode);
- else
- rc = hash_datafiles (c->mfx.md, NULL,
- c->signed_data.data_names,
- c->sigfilename,
- use_textmode );
+ else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG)
+ {
+ /* Check all signatures. */
+ if (!c->any.data)
+ {
+ int use_textmode = 0;
+
+ free_md_filter_context (&c->mfx);
+ /* Prepare to create all requested message digests. */
+ if (gcry_md_open (&c->mfx.md, 0, 0))
+ BUG ();
+
+ /* Fixme: why looking for the signature packet and not the
+ one-pass packet? */
+ for (n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode (n1, PKT_SIGNATURE));)
+ gcry_md_enable (c->mfx.md, n1->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo);
+
+ if (n1 && n1->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->sig_class == 0x01)
+ use_textmode = 1;
+
+ /* Ask for file and hash it. */
+ if (c->sigs_only)
+ {
+ if (c->signed_data.used && c->signed_data.data_fd != -1)
+ rc = hash_datafile_by_fd (c->mfx.md, NULL,
+ c->signed_data.data_fd,
+ use_textmode);
+ else
+ rc = hash_datafiles (c->mfx.md, NULL,
+ c->signed_data.data_names,
+ c->sigfilename,
+ use_textmode);
}
- else {
- rc = ask_for_detached_datafile (c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2,
- iobuf_get_real_fname(c->iobuf),
- use_textmode );
+ else
+ {
+ rc = ask_for_detached_datafile (c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2,
+ iobuf_get_real_fname (c->iobuf),
+ use_textmode);
}
- if( rc ) {
- log_error("can't hash datafile: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
- return;
+
+ if (rc)
+ {
+ log_error ("can't hash datafile: %s\n", g10_errstr (rc));
+ return;
}
}
- else if ( c->signed_data.used ) {
- log_error (_("not a detached signature\n") );
- return;
+ else if (c->signed_data.used)
+ {
+ log_error (_("not a detached signature\n"));
+ return;
}
- for( n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE )); )
- check_sig_and_print( c, n1 );
+ for (n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode (n1, PKT_SIGNATURE));)
+ check_sig_and_print (c, n1);
+
}
- else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
- && node->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control
- == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START ) {
- /* clear text signed message */
- if( !c->any.data ) {
- log_error("cleartext signature without data\n" );
- return;
+ else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
+ && node->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START)
+ {
+ /* Clear text signed message. */
+ if (!c->any.data)
+ {
+ log_error ("cleartext signature without data\n");
+ return;
}
- else if ( c->signed_data.used ) {
- log_error (_("not a detached signature\n") );
- return;
+ else if (c->signed_data.used)
+ {
+ log_error (_("not a detached signature\n"));
+ return;
}
- for( n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE )); )
- check_sig_and_print( c, n1 );
+ for (n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode (n1, PKT_SIGNATURE));)
+ check_sig_and_print (c, n1);
+
}
- else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) {
- PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
- int multiple_ok=1;
-
- n1=find_next_kbnode(node, PKT_SIGNATURE);
- if(n1)
- {
- byte class=sig->sig_class;
- byte hash=sig->digest_algo;
-
- for(; n1; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE)))
- {
- /* We can't currently handle multiple signatures of
- different classes or digests (we'd pretty much have
- to run a different hash context for each), but if
- they are all the same, make an exception. */
- if(n1->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class!=class
- || n1->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo!=hash)
- {
- multiple_ok=0;
- log_info(_("WARNING: multiple signatures detected. "
- "Only the first will be checked.\n"));
- break;
- }
- }
- }
-
- if( sig->sig_class != 0x00 && sig->sig_class != 0x01 )
- log_info(_("standalone signature of class 0x%02x\n"),
- sig->sig_class);
- else if( !c->any.data ) {
- /* detached signature */
- free_md_filter_context( &c->mfx );
- if (gcry_md_open (&c->mfx.md, sig->digest_algo, 0))
- BUG ();
-
- if (RFC2440 || RFC4880)
- ; /* Strict RFC mode. */
- else if( sig->digest_algo == DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1
- && sig->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA
- && sig->sig_class == 0x01 ) {
- /* Enable a workaround for a pgp5 bug when the
- * detached signature has been created in textmode. */
+ else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
+ {
+ PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
+ int multiple_ok = 1;
+
+ n1 = find_next_kbnode (node, PKT_SIGNATURE);
+ if (n1)
+ {
+ byte class = sig->sig_class;
+ byte hash = sig->digest_algo;
+
+ for (; n1; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE)))
+ {
+ /* We can't currently handle multiple signatures of
+ different classes or digests (we'd pretty much have
+ to run a different hash context for each), but if
+ they are all the same, make an exception. */
+ if (n1->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class != class
+ || n1->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo != hash)
+ {
+ multiple_ok = 0;
+ log_info (_("WARNING: multiple signatures detected. "
+ "Only the first will be checked.\n"));
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (sig->sig_class != 0x00 && sig->sig_class != 0x01)
+ {
+ log_info(_("standalone signature of class 0x%02x\n"), sig->sig_class);
+ }
+ else if (!c->any.data)
+ {
+ /* Detached signature */
+ free_md_filter_context (&c->mfx);
+ if (gcry_md_open (&c->mfx.md, sig->digest_algo, 0))
+ BUG ();
+
+ if (RFC2440 || RFC4880)
+ ; /* Strict RFC mode. */
+ else if (sig->digest_algo == DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1
+ && sig->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA
+ && sig->sig_class == 0x01)
+ {
+ /* Enable a workaround for a pgp5 bug when the detached
+ * signature has been created in textmode. */
if (gcry_md_open (&c->mfx.md2, sig->digest_algo, 0 ))
BUG ();
}
- /* Here we used to have another hack to work around a pgp
- * 2 bug: It worked by not using the textmode for detached
- * signatures; this would let the first signature check
- * (on md) fail but the second one (on md2), which adds an
- * extra CR would then have produced the "correct" hash.
- * This is very, very ugly hack but it may haved help in
- * some cases (and break others).
- * c->mfx.md2? 0 :(sig->sig_class == 0x01)
- */
-
- if ( DBG_HASHING ) {
- gcry_md_debug( c->mfx.md, "verify" );
- if ( c->mfx.md2 )
- gcry_md_debug( c->mfx.md2, "verify2" );
+ /* Here we used to have another hack to work around a pgp
+ * 2 bug: It worked by not using the textmode for detached
+ * signatures; this would let the first signature check
+ * (on md) fail but the second one (on md2), which adds an
+ * extra CR would then have produced the "correct" hash.
+ * This is very, very ugly hack but it may haved help in
+ * some cases (and break others).
+ * c->mfx.md2? 0 :(sig->sig_class == 0x01)
+ */
+
+ if (DBG_HASHING)
+ {
+ gcry_md_debug (c->mfx.md, "verify");
+ if (c->mfx.md2)
+ gcry_md_debug (c->mfx.md2, "verify2");
}
- if( c->sigs_only ) {
- if (c->signed_data.used && c->signed_data.data_fd != -1)
- rc = hash_datafile_by_fd (c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2,
- c->signed_data.data_fd,
- (sig->sig_class == 0x01));
- else
- rc = hash_datafiles (c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2,
- c->signed_data.data_names,
- c->sigfilename,
- (sig->sig_class == 0x01));
+
+ if (c->sigs_only)
+ {
+ if (c->signed_data.used && c->signed_data.data_fd != -1)
+ rc = hash_datafile_by_fd (c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2,
+ c->signed_data.data_fd,
+ (sig->sig_class == 0x01));
+ else
+ rc = hash_datafiles (c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2,
+ c->signed_data.data_names,
+ c->sigfilename,
+ (sig->sig_class == 0x01));
}
- else {
- rc = ask_for_detached_datafile( c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2,
- iobuf_get_real_fname(c->iobuf),
- (sig->sig_class == 0x01) );
+ else
+ {
+ rc = ask_for_detached_datafile (c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2,
+ iobuf_get_real_fname(c->iobuf),
+ (sig->sig_class == 0x01));
}
- if( rc ) {
- log_error("can't hash datafile: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
- return;
+
+ if (rc)
+ {
+ log_error ("can't hash datafile: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
+ return;
}
}
- else if ( c->signed_data.used ) {
- log_error (_("not a detached signature\n") );
- return;
+ else if (c->signed_data.used)
+ {
+ log_error (_("not a detached signature\n"));
+ return;
+ }
+ else if (!opt.quiet)
+ log_info (_("old style (PGP 2.x) signature\n"));
+
+ if (multiple_ok)
+ {
+ for (n1 = node; n1; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE)))
+ check_sig_and_print (c, n1);
}
- else if (!opt.quiet)
- log_info(_("old style (PGP 2.x) signature\n"));
-
- if(multiple_ok)
- for( n1 = node; n1; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE )) )
- check_sig_and_print( c, n1 );
- else
- check_sig_and_print( c, node );
+ else
+ check_sig_and_print (c, node);
+
}
- else {
- dump_kbnode (c->list);
- log_error(_("invalid root packet detected in proc_tree()\n"));
- dump_kbnode (node);
+ else
+ {
+ dump_kbnode (c->list);
+ log_error ("invalid root packet detected in proc_tree()\n");
+ dump_kbnode (node);
}
}
diff --git a/g10/openfile.c b/g10/openfile.c
index 5a43648..ab27f44 100644
--- a/g10/openfile.c
+++ b/g10/openfile.c
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@
/* FIXME: Implement opt.interactive. */
-/****************
+/*
* Check whether FNAME exists and ask if it's okay to overwrite an
* existing one.
* Returns: True: it's okay to overwrite or the file does not exist
@@ -92,35 +92,37 @@ overwrite_filep( const char *fname )
}
-/****************
+/*
* Strip known extensions from iname and return a newly allocated
* filename. Return NULL if we can't do that.
*/
char *
-make_outfile_name( const char *iname )
+make_outfile_name (const char *iname)
{
- size_t n;
-
- if ( iobuf_is_pipe_filename (iname) )
- return xstrdup("-");
-
- n = strlen(iname);
- if( n > 4 && ( !CMP_FILENAME(iname+n-4, EXTSEP_S GPGEXT_GPG)
- || !CMP_FILENAME(iname+n-4, EXTSEP_S "pgp")
- || !CMP_FILENAME(iname+n-4, EXTSEP_S "sig")
- || !CMP_FILENAME(iname+n-4, EXTSEP_S "asc") ) ) {
- char *buf = xstrdup( iname );
- buf[n-4] = 0;
- return buf;
+ size_t n;
+
+ if (iobuf_is_pipe_filename (iname))
+ return xstrdup ("-");
+
+ n = strlen (iname);
+ if (n > 4 && (!CMP_FILENAME(iname+n-4, EXTSEP_S GPGEXT_GPG)
+ || !CMP_FILENAME(iname+n-4, EXTSEP_S "pgp")
+ || !CMP_FILENAME(iname+n-4, EXTSEP_S "sig")
+ || !CMP_FILENAME(iname+n-4, EXTSEP_S "asc")))
+ {
+ char *buf = xstrdup (iname);
+ buf[n-4] = 0;
+ return buf;
}
- else if( n > 5 && !CMP_FILENAME(iname+n-5, EXTSEP_S "sign") ) {
- char *buf = xstrdup( iname );
- buf[n-5] = 0;
- return buf;
+ else if (n > 5 && !CMP_FILENAME(iname+n-5, EXTSEP_S "sign"))
+ {
+ char *buf = xstrdup (iname);
+ buf[n-5] = 0;
+ return buf;
}
- log_info(_("%s: unknown suffix\n"), iname );
- return NULL;
+ log_info (_("%s: unknown suffix\n"), iname);
+ return NULL;
}
@@ -168,7 +170,7 @@ ask_outfile_name( const char *name, size_t namelen )
}
-/****************
+/*
* Make an output filename for the inputfile INAME.
* Returns an IOBUF and an errorcode
* Mode 0 = use ".gpg"
@@ -308,117 +310,132 @@ open_outfile (int inp_fd, const char *iname, int mode, int restrictedperm,
}
-/****************
+/*
* Try to open a file without the extension ".sig" or ".asc"
* Return NULL if such a file is not available.
*/
IOBUF
open_sigfile( const char *iname, progress_filter_context_t *pfx )
{
- IOBUF a = NULL;
- size_t len;
-
- if( !iobuf_is_pipe_filename (iname) ) {
- len = strlen(iname);
- if( len > 4 && ( !strcmp(iname + len - 4, EXTSEP_S "sig")
- || ( len > 5 && !strcmp(iname + len - 5, EXTSEP_S "sign") )
- || !strcmp(iname + len - 4, EXTSEP_S "asc")) ) {
- char *buf;
- buf = xstrdup(iname);
- buf[len-(buf[len-1]=='n'?5:4)] = 0 ;
- a = iobuf_open( buf );
- if (a && is_secured_file (iobuf_get_fd (a)))
- {
- iobuf_close (a);
- a = NULL;
- gpg_err_set_errno (EPERM);
- }
- if( a && opt.verbose )
- log_info(_("assuming signed data in '%s'\n"), buf );
- if (a && pfx)
- handle_progress (pfx, a, buf);
- xfree(buf);
+ IOBUF a = NULL;
+ size_t len;
+
+ if (!iobuf_is_pipe_filename (iname))
+ {
+ len = strlen(iname);
+ if( len > 4 && (!strcmp(iname + len - 4, EXTSEP_S "sig")
+ || (len > 5 && !strcmp(iname + len - 5, EXTSEP_S "sign"))
+ || !strcmp(iname + len - 4, EXTSEP_S "asc")))
+ {
+ char *buf;
+
+ buf = xstrdup(iname);
+ buf[len-(buf[len-1]=='n'?5:4)] = 0 ;
+ a = iobuf_open( buf );
+ if (a && is_secured_file (iobuf_get_fd (a)))
+ {
+ iobuf_close (a);
+ a = NULL;
+ gpg_err_set_errno (EPERM);
+ }
+ if (a && opt.verbose)
+ log_info (_("assuming signed data in '%s'\n"), buf);
+ if (a && pfx)
+ handle_progress (pfx, a, buf);
+ xfree (buf);
}
}
- return a;
+
+ return a;
}
+
/****************
* Copy the option file skeleton to the given directory.
*/
static void
-copy_options_file( const char *destdir )
+copy_options_file (const char *destdir)
{
- const char *datadir = gnupg_datadir ();
- char *fname;
- FILE *src, *dst;
- int linefeeds=0;
- int c;
- mode_t oldmask;
- int esc = 0;
- int any_option = 0;
-
- if( opt.dry_run )
- return;
-
- fname = xmalloc( strlen(datadir) + strlen(destdir) + 15 );
- strcpy(stpcpy(fname, datadir), DIRSEP_S "gpg-conf" SKELEXT );
- src = fopen( fname, "r" );
- if (src && is_secured_file (fileno (src)))
- {
- fclose (src);
- src = NULL;
- gpg_err_set_errno (EPERM);
- }
- if( !src ) {
- log_info (_("can't open '%s': %s\n"), fname, strerror(errno) );
- xfree(fname);
- return;
+ const char *datadir = gnupg_datadir ();
+ char *fname;
+ FILE *src, *dst;
+ int linefeeds=0;
+ int c;
+ mode_t oldmask;
+ int esc = 0;
+ int any_option = 0;
+
+ if (opt.dry_run)
+ return;
+
+ fname = xmalloc (strlen(datadir) + strlen(destdir) + 15);
+ strcpy (stpcpy(fname, datadir), DIRSEP_S "gpg-conf" SKELEXT);
+ src = fopen (fname, "r");
+ if (src && is_secured_file (fileno (src)))
+ {
+ fclose (src);
+ src = NULL;
+ gpg_err_set_errno (EPERM);
+ }
+ if (!src)
+ {
+ log_info (_("can't open '%s': %s\n"), fname, strerror(errno));
+ xfree(fname);
+ return;
}
- strcpy(stpcpy(fname, destdir), DIRSEP_S GPGEXT_GPG EXTSEP_S "conf" );
- oldmask=umask(077);
- if ( is_secured_filename (fname) )
- {
- dst = NULL;
- gpg_err_set_errno (EPERM);
- }
- else
- dst = fopen( fname, "w" );
- umask(oldmask);
- if( !dst ) {
- log_info (_("can't create '%s': %s\n"), fname, strerror(errno) );
- fclose( src );
- xfree(fname);
- return;
+ strcpy (stpcpy (fname, destdir), DIRSEP_S GPGEXT_GPG EXTSEP_S "conf");
+
+ oldmask = umask (077);
+ if (is_secured_filename (fname))
+ {
+ dst = NULL;
+ gpg_err_set_errno (EPERM);
+ }
+ else
+ dst = fopen( fname, "w" );
+ umask (oldmask);
+
+ if (!dst)
+ {
+ log_info (_("can't create '%s': %s\n"), fname, strerror(errno) );
+ fclose (src);
+ xfree (fname);
+ return;
}
- while( (c=getc(src)) != EOF ) {
- if( linefeeds < 3 ) {
- if( c == '\n' )
- linefeeds++;
+ while ((c = getc (src)) != EOF)
+ {
+ if (linefeeds < 3)
+ {
+ if (c == '\n')
+ linefeeds++;
}
- else {
- putc( c, dst );
- if (c== '\n')
- esc = 1;
- else if (esc == 1) {
- if (c == ' ' || c == '\t')
- ;
- else if (c == '#')
- esc = 2;
- else
- any_option = 1;
+ else
+ {
+ putc (c, dst);
+ if (c== '\n')
+ esc = 1;
+ else if (esc == 1)
+ {
+ if (c == ' ' || c == '\t')
+ ;
+ else if (c == '#')
+ esc = 2;
+ else
+ any_option = 1;
}
}
}
- fclose( dst );
- fclose( src );
- log_info(_("new configuration file '%s' created\n"), fname );
- if (any_option)
- log_info (_("WARNING: options in '%s'"
- " are not yet active during this run\n"),
- fname);
- xfree(fname);
+
+ fclose (dst);
+ fclose (src);
+
+ log_info (_("new configuration file '%s' created\n"), fname);
+ if (any_option)
+ log_info (_("WARNING: options in '%s'"
+ " are not yet active during this run\n"),
+ fname);
+ xfree (fname);
}
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of changes:
doc/gpg.texi | 26 +-
g10/kbnode.c | 2 +
g10/main.h | 5 +-
g10/mainproc.c | 2001 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------
g10/openfile.c | 271 ++++----
g10/plaintext.c | 31 +-
po/de.po | 15 +-
po/fr.po | 15 +-
po/ja.po | 15 +-
po/uk.po | 15 +-
10 files changed, 1305 insertions(+), 1091 deletions(-)
hooks/post-receive
--
The GNU Privacy Guard
http://git.gnupg.org
More information about the Gnupg-commits
mailing list