[git] GnuPG - branch, master, updated. gnupg-2.1.9-130-g7de8376

[by Werner Koch]

This is an automated email from the git hooks/post-receive script. It was
generated because a ref change was pushed to the repository containing
the project "The GNU Privacy Guard".

The branch, master has been updated
       via  7de8376430625c1f6f3a58ae16276deca8ff6a82 (commit)
      from  7e59fb21f728b5f54468cd35b1415a2f86003d4f (commit)

Those revisions listed above that are new to this repository have
not appeared on any other notification email; so we list those
revisions in full, below.

- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 7de8376430625c1f6f3a58ae16276deca8ff6a82
Author: Werner Koch <wk at gnupg.org>
Date:   Fri Nov 13 16:09:01 2015 +0100

    gpg: Make trusted-key override for Tofu robust against swapped tofu.db.
    
    * g10/tofu.c (get_trust): For the UTK check lookup the key by
    fingerprint.
    --
    
    Extracting the keyid form the fingerprint is not a good idea because
    that only works for v4 keys.  It is also better to first read the key
    and then extract the keyid from the actual available key.
    
    The entire trusted-key stuff should be reworked to make use of
    fingerprints.
    
    Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk at gnupg.org>

diff --git a/g10/tofu.c b/g10/tofu.c
index f7dd40d..e60ee54 100644
--- a/g10/tofu.c
+++ b/g10/tofu.c
@@ -1654,30 +1654,42 @@ get_trust (struct dbs *dbs, const char *fingerprint, const char *email,
   if (policy == TOFU_POLICY_AUTO || policy == TOFU_POLICY_NONE)
     /* See if the key is ultimately trusted.  If so, we're done.  */
     {
-      const char *keyid;
-      KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc;
+      PKT_public_key *pk;
+      u32 kid[2];
+      char fpr_bin[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN+1];
+      size_t fpr_bin_len;
 
-      /* We need to convert the fingerprint as a string to a long
-         keyid.
-
-         FINGERPRINT is stored as follows:
-
-           362D3527F53AAD1971AAFDE658859975EE37CF96
-                                -------------------
-
-         The last 16 characters are the long keyid.
-      */
-      assert (strlen (fingerprint) > 4 * 4);
-      keyid = &fingerprint[strlen (fingerprint) - 16];
+      if (!hex2str (fingerprint, fpr_bin, sizeof fpr_bin, &fpr_bin_len))
+        {
+          log_error ("error converting fingerprint: %s\n",
+                     gpg_strerror (gpg_error_from_syserror ()));
+          return _tofu_GET_TRUST_ERROR;
+        }
 
-      rc = classify_user_id (keyid, &desc, 1);
-      if (rc || desc.mode != KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID)
+      /* We need to lookup the key by fingerprint again so that we can
+         properly extract the keyid.  Extracting direct from the
+         fingerprint works only for v4 keys and would assume that
+         there is no collision in the low 64 bit.  We can't guarantee
+         the latter in case the Tofu DB is used with a different
+         keyring.  In any case the UTK stuff needs to be changed to
+         use only fingerprints.  */
+      pk = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *pk);
+      if (!pk)
+         {
+           log_error (_("out of core\n"));
+           return _tofu_GET_TRUST_ERROR;
+         }
+      rc = get_pubkey_byfprint_fast (pk, fpr_bin, fpr_bin_len);
+      if (rc)
         {
-          log_error (_("'%s' is not a valid long keyID\n"), keyid);
-          goto out;
+          log_error (_("public key %s not found: %s\n"),
+                     fingerprint, gpg_strerror (rc));
+          return _tofu_GET_TRUST_ERROR;
         }
+      keyid_from_pk (pk, kid);
+      free_public_key (pk);
 
-      if (tdb_keyid_is_utk (desc.u.kid))
+      if (tdb_keyid_is_utk (kid))
         {
           if (policy == TOFU_POLICY_NONE)
             {

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 g10/tofu.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)


hooks/post-receive
-- 
The GNU Privacy Guard
http://git.gnupg.org