[git] GnuPG - branch, master, updated. gnupg-2.1.10-107-g4619ea8
by Werner Koch
cvs at cvs.gnupg.org
Tue Jan 12 10:50:35 CET 2016
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- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 4619ea8e519215b4ae0685cd3881937ec26c32d3
Author: Werner Koch <wk at gnupg.org>
Date: Tue Jan 12 10:41:07 2016 +0100
gpg: Re-indent check_key_signature2.
--
I am considering some changes and thus better start off by switching
to standard GNU indentation. This patch also changes comment lines
like
if (foo)
/* Comment on foo. */
{
to
if (foo)
{ /* Comment on foo. */
or
if (foo) /* Comment on foo. */
{
to make the brace of the opening block stand out immediately.
Further stars on the left are added to longer comments because that
makes the code easier to read by disabled hackers, when reading
without font locking, and for reading black-white printouts.
diff --git a/g10/sig-check.c b/g10/sig-check.c
index 75b06e8..bcf46f8 100644
--- a/g10/sig-check.c
+++ b/g10/sig-check.c
@@ -48,42 +48,43 @@ check_signature (PKT_signature *sig, gcry_md_hd_t digest)
return check_signature2 (sig, digest, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
}
-/* Check a signature.
-
- Looks up the public key that created the signature (SIG->KEYID)
- from the key db. Makes sure that the signature is valid (it was
- not created prior to the key, the public key was created in the
- past, and the signature does not include any unsupported critical
- features), finishes computing the hash of the signature data, and
- checks that the signature verifies the digest. If the key that
- generated the signature is a subkey, this function also verifies
- that there is a valid backsig from the subkey to the primary key.
- Finally, if status fd is enabled and the signature class is 0x00 or
- 0x01, then a STATUS_SIG_ID is emitted on the status fd.
-
- SIG is the signature to check.
-
- DIGEST contains a valid hash context that already includes the
- signed data. This function adds the relevant meta-data from the
- signature packet to compute the final hash. (See Section 5.2 of
- RFC 4880: "The concatenation of the data being signed and the
- signature data from the version number through the hashed subpacket
- data (inclusive) is hashed.")
-
- If R_EXPIREDATE is not NULL, R_EXPIREDATE is set to the key's
- expiry.
-
- If R_EXPIRED is not NULL, *R_EXPIRED is set to 1 if PK has expired
- (0 otherwise). Note: PK being expired does not cause this function
- to fail.
-
- If R_REVOKED is not NULL, *R_REVOKED is set to 1 if PK has been
- revoked (0 otherwise). Note: PK being revoked does not cause this
- function to fail.
-
- If PK is not NULL, the public key is saved in *PK on success.
- Returns 0 on success. An error code otherwise. */
+/* Check a signature.
+ *
+ * Looks up the public key that created the signature (SIG->KEYID)
+ * from the key db. Makes sure that the signature is valid (it was
+ * not created prior to the key, the public key was created in the
+ * past, and the signature does not include any unsupported critical
+ * features), finishes computing the hash of the signature data, and
+ * checks that the signature verifies the digest. If the key that
+ * generated the signature is a subkey, this function also verifies
+ * that there is a valid backsig from the subkey to the primary key.
+ * Finally, if status fd is enabled and the signature class is 0x00 or
+ * 0x01, then a STATUS_SIG_ID is emitted on the status fd.
+ *
+ * SIG is the signature to check.
+ *
+ * DIGEST contains a valid hash context that already includes the
+ * signed data. This function adds the relevant meta-data from the
+ * signature packet to compute the final hash. (See Section 5.2 of
+ * RFC 4880: "The concatenation of the data being signed and the
+ * signature data from the version number through the hashed subpacket
+ * data (inclusive) is hashed.")
+ *
+ * If R_EXPIREDATE is not NULL, R_EXPIREDATE is set to the key's
+ * expiry.
+ *
+ * If R_EXPIRED is not NULL, *R_EXPIRED is set to 1 if PK has expired
+ * (0 otherwise). Note: PK being expired does not cause this function
+ * to fail.
+ *
+ * If R_REVOKED is not NULL, *R_REVOKED is set to 1 if PK has been
+ * revoked (0 otherwise). Note: PK being revoked does not cause this
+ * function to fail.
+ *
+ * If PK is not NULL, the public key is saved in *PK on success.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success. An error code otherwise. */
int
check_signature2 (PKT_signature *sig, gcry_md_hd_t digest, u32 *r_expiredate,
int *r_expired, int *r_revoked, PKT_public_key *pk )
@@ -237,22 +238,22 @@ check_signature2 (PKT_signature *sig, gcry_md_hd_t digest, u32 *r_expiredate,
/* The signature SIG was generated with the public key PK. Check
- whether the signature is valid in the following sense:
-
- - Make sure the public key was created before the signature was
- generated.
-
- - Make sure the public key was created in the past
-
- - Check whether PK has expired (set *R_EXPIRED to 1 if so and 0
- otherwise)
-
- - Check whether PK has been revoked (set *R_REVOKED to 1 if so
- and 0 otherwise).
-
- If either of the first two tests fail, returns an error code.
- Otherwise returns 0. (Thus, this function doesn't fail if the
- public key is expired or revoked.) */
+ * whether the signature is valid in the following sense:
+ *
+ * - Make sure the public key was created before the signature was
+ * generated.
+ *
+ * - Make sure the public key was created in the past
+ *
+ * - Check whether PK has expired (set *R_EXPIRED to 1 if so and 0
+ * otherwise)
+ *
+ * - Check whether PK has been revoked (set *R_REVOKED to 1 if so
+ * and 0 otherwise).
+ *
+ * If either of the first two tests fail, returns an error code.
+ * Otherwise returns 0. (Thus, this function doesn't fail if the
+ * public key is expired or revoked.) */
static int
check_signature_metadata_validity (PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_signature *sig,
int *r_expired, int *r_revoked)
@@ -318,34 +319,34 @@ check_signature_metadata_validity (PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_signature *sig,
/* Finish generating a signature and check it. Concretely: make sure
- that the signature is valid (it was not created prior to the key,
- the public key was created in the past, and the signature does not
- include any unsupported critical features), finish computing the
- digest by adding the relevant data from the signature packet, and
- check that the signature verifies the digest.
-
- DIGEST contains a hash context, which has already hashed the signed
- data. This function adds the relevant meta-data from the signature
- packet to compute the final hash. (See Section 5.2 of RFC 4880:
- "The concatenation of the data being signed and the signature data
- from the version number through the hashed subpacket data
- (inclusive) is hashed.")
-
- SIG is the signature to check.
-
- PK is the public key used to generate the signature.
-
- If R_EXPIRED is not NULL, *R_EXPIRED is set to 1 if PK has expired
- (0 otherwise). Note: PK being expired does not cause this function
- to fail.
-
- If R_REVOKED is not NULL, *R_REVOKED is set to 1 if PK has been
- revoked (0 otherwise). Note: PK being revoked does not cause this
- function to fail.
-
- If RET_PK is not NULL, PK is copied into RET_PK on success.
-
- Returns 0 on success. An error code other. */
+ * that the signature is valid (it was not created prior to the key,
+ * the public key was created in the past, and the signature does not
+ * include any unsupported critical features), finish computing the
+ * digest by adding the relevant data from the signature packet, and
+ * check that the signature verifies the digest.
+ *
+ * DIGEST contains a hash context, which has already hashed the signed
+ * data. This function adds the relevant meta-data from the signature
+ * packet to compute the final hash. (See Section 5.2 of RFC 4880:
+ * "The concatenation of the data being signed and the signature data
+ * from the version number through the hashed subpacket data
+ * (inclusive) is hashed.")
+ *
+ * SIG is the signature to check.
+ *
+ * PK is the public key used to generate the signature.
+ *
+ * If R_EXPIRED is not NULL, *R_EXPIRED is set to 1 if PK has expired
+ * (0 otherwise). Note: PK being expired does not cause this function
+ * to fail.
+ *
+ * If R_REVOKED is not NULL, *R_REVOKED is set to 1 if PK has been
+ * revoked (0 otherwise). Note: PK being revoked does not cause this
+ * function to fail.
+ *
+ * If RET_PK is not NULL, PK is copied into RET_PK on success.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success. An error code other. */
static int
check_signature_end (PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_signature *sig,
gcry_md_hd_t digest,
@@ -486,35 +487,36 @@ cache_sig_result ( PKT_signature *sig, int result )
}
}
+
/* SIG is a key revocation signature. Check if this signature was
- generated by any of the public key PK's designated revokers.
-
- PK is the public key that SIG allegedly revokes.
-
- SIG is the revocation signature to check.
-
- This function avoids infinite recursion, which can happen if two
- keys are designed revokers for each other and they revoke each
- other. This is done by observing that if a key A is revoked by key
- B we still consider the revocation to be valid even if B is
- revoked. Thus, we don't need to determine whether B is revoked to
- determine whether A has been revoked by B, we just need to check
- the signature.
-
- Returns 0 if sig is valid (i.e. pk is revoked), non-0 if not
- revoked. We are careful to make sure that GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY is
- only returned when a revocation signature is from a valid
- revocation key designated in a revkey subpacket, but the revocation
- key itself isn't present. */
-
-/* XXX: This code will need to be modified if gpg ever becomes
- multi-threaded. Note that this guarantees that a designated
- revocation sig will never be considered valid unless it is actually
- valid, as well as being issued by a revocation key in a valid
- direct signature. Note also that this is written so that a revoked
- revoker can still issue revocations: i.e. If A revokes B, but A is
- revoked, B is still revoked. I'm not completely convinced this is
- the proper behavior, but it matches how PGP does it. -dms */
+ * generated by any of the public key PK's designated revokers.
+ *
+ * PK is the public key that SIG allegedly revokes.
+ *
+ * SIG is the revocation signature to check.
+ *
+ * This function avoids infinite recursion, which can happen if two
+ * keys are designed revokers for each other and they revoke each
+ * other. This is done by observing that if a key A is revoked by key
+ * B we still consider the revocation to be valid even if B is
+ * revoked. Thus, we don't need to determine whether B is revoked to
+ * determine whether A has been revoked by B, we just need to check
+ * the signature.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if sig is valid (i.e. pk is revoked), non-0 if not
+ * revoked. We are careful to make sure that GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY is
+ * only returned when a revocation signature is from a valid
+ * revocation key designated in a revkey subpacket, but the revocation
+ * key itself isn't present.
+ *
+ * XXX: This code will need to be modified if gpg ever becomes
+ * multi-threaded. Note that this guarantees that a designated
+ * revocation sig will never be considered valid unless it is actually
+ * valid, as well as being issued by a revocation key in a valid
+ * direct signature. Note also that this is written so that a revoked
+ * revoker can still issue revocations: i.e. If A revokes B, but A is
+ * revoked, B is still revoked. I'm not completely convinced this is
+ * the proper behavior, but it matches how PGP does it. -dms */
int
check_revocation_keys (PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_signature *sig)
{
@@ -526,29 +528,29 @@ check_revocation_keys (PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_signature *sig)
assert((sig->keyid[0]!=pk->keyid[0]) || (sig->keyid[0]!=pk->keyid[1]));
/* Avoid infinite recursion. Consider the following:
-
- - We want to check if A is revoked.
-
- - C is a designated revoker for B and has revoked B.
-
- - B is a designated revoker for A and has revoked A.
-
- When checking if A is revoked (in merge_selfsigs_main), we
- observe that A has a designed revoker. As such, we call this
- function. This function sees that there is a valid revocation
- signature, which is signed by B. It then calls check_signature()
- to verify that the signature is good. To check the sig, we need
- to lookup B. Looking up B means calling merge_selfsigs_main,
- which checks whether B is revoked, which calls this function to
- see if B was revoked by some key.
-
- In this case, the added level of indirection doesn't hurt. It
- just means a bit more work. However, if C == A, then we'd end up
- in a loop. But, it doesn't make sense to look up C anyways: even
- if B is revoked, we conservatively consider a valid revocation
- signed by B to revoke A. Since this is the only place where this
- type of recursion can occur, we simply cause this function to
- fail if it is entered recursively. */
+ *
+ * - We want to check if A is revoked.
+ *
+ * - C is a designated revoker for B and has revoked B.
+ *
+ * - B is a designated revoker for A and has revoked A.
+ *
+ * When checking if A is revoked (in merge_selfsigs_main), we
+ * observe that A has a designed revoker. As such, we call this
+ * function. This function sees that there is a valid revocation
+ * signature, which is signed by B. It then calls check_signature()
+ * to verify that the signature is good. To check the sig, we need
+ * to lookup B. Looking up B means calling merge_selfsigs_main,
+ * which checks whether B is revoked, which calls this function to
+ * see if B was revoked by some key.
+ *
+ * In this case, the added level of indirection doesn't hurt. It
+ * just means a bit more work. However, if C == A, then we'd end up
+ * in a loop. But, it doesn't make sense to look up C anyways: even
+ * if B is revoked, we conservatively consider a valid revocation
+ * signed by B to revoke A. Since this is the only place where this
+ * type of recursion can occur, we simply cause this function to
+ * fail if it is entered recursively. */
if (busy)
{
/* Return an error (i.e. not revoked), but mark the pk as
@@ -637,202 +639,225 @@ check_backsig (PKT_public_key *main_pk,PKT_public_key *sub_pk,
/* Check that a signature over a key is valid. This is a
- specialization of check_key_signature2 with the unnamed parameters
- passed as NULL. See the documentation for that function for more
- details. */
+ * specialization of check_key_signature2 with the unnamed parameters
+ * passed as NULL. See the documentation for that function for more
+ * details. */
int
check_key_signature (KBNODE root, KBNODE node, int *is_selfsig)
{
return check_key_signature2 (root, node, NULL, NULL, is_selfsig, NULL, NULL);
}
-/* Check that a signature over a key (e.g., a key revocation, key
- binding, user id certification, etc.) is valid. If the function
- detects a self-signature, it uses the public key from the specified
- key block and does not bother looking up the key specified in the
- signature packet.
-
- ROOT is a keyblock.
-
- NODE references a signature packet that appears in the keyblock
- that should be verified.
-
- If CHECK_PK is set, the specified key is sometimes preferred for
- verifying signatures. See the implementation for details.
-
- If RET_PK is not NULL, the public key that successfully verified
- the signature is copied into *RET_PK.
-
- If IS_SELFSIG is not NULL, *IS_SELFSIG is set to 1 if NODE is a
- self-signature.
-
- If R_EXPIREDATE is not NULL, *R_EXPIREDATE is set to the expiry
- date.
-
- If R_EXPIRED is not NULL, *R_EXPIRED is set to 1 if PK has been
- expired (0 otherwise). Note: PK being revoked does not cause this
- function to fail.
-
- If OPT.NO_SIG_CACHE is not set, this function will first check if
- the result of a previous verification is already cached in the
- signature packet's data structure. */
-/* TODO: add r_revoked here as well. It has the same problems as
- r_expiredate and r_expired and the cache. */
+/* Check that a signature over a key (e.g., a key revocation, key
+ * binding, user id certification, etc.) is valid. If the function
+ * detects a self-signature, it uses the public key from the specified
+ * key block and does not bother looking up the key specified in the
+ * signature packet.
+ *
+ * ROOT is a keyblock.
+ *
+ * NODE references a signature packet that appears in the keyblock
+ * that should be verified.
+ *
+ * If CHECK_PK is set, the specified key is sometimes preferred for
+ * verifying signatures. See the implementation for details.
+ *
+ * If RET_PK is not NULL, the public key that successfully verified
+ * the signature is copied into *RET_PK.
+ *
+ * If IS_SELFSIG is not NULL, *IS_SELFSIG is set to 1 if NODE is a
+ * self-signature.
+ *
+ * If R_EXPIREDATE is not NULL, *R_EXPIREDATE is set to the expiry
+ * date.
+ *
+ * If R_EXPIRED is not NULL, *R_EXPIRED is set to 1 if PK has been
+ * expired (0 otherwise). Note: PK being revoked does not cause this
+ * function to fail.
+ *
+ *
+ * If OPT.NO_SIG_CACHE is not set, this function will first check if
+ * the result of a previous verification is already cached in the
+ * signature packet's data structure.
+ *
+ * TODO: add r_revoked here as well. It has the same problems as
+ * r_expiredate and r_expired and the cache. */
int
-check_key_signature2(KBNODE root, KBNODE node, PKT_public_key *check_pk,
- PKT_public_key *ret_pk, int *is_selfsig,
- u32 *r_expiredate, int *r_expired )
+check_key_signature2 (kbnode_t root, kbnode_t node, PKT_public_key *check_pk,
+ PKT_public_key *ret_pk, int *is_selfsig,
+ u32 *r_expiredate, int *r_expired )
{
- gcry_md_hd_t md;
- PKT_public_key *pk;
- PKT_signature *sig;
- int algo;
- int rc;
-
- if( is_selfsig )
- *is_selfsig = 0;
- if( r_expiredate )
- *r_expiredate = 0;
- if( r_expired )
- *r_expired = 0;
- assert( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE );
- assert( root->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY );
-
- pk = root->pkt->pkt.public_key;
- sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
- algo = sig->digest_algo;
-
- /* Check whether we have cached the result of a previous signature
- check. Note that we may no longer have the pubkey or hash
- needed to verify a sig, but can still use the cached value. A
- cache refresh detects and clears these cases. */
- if ( !opt.no_sig_cache ) {
- if (sig->flags.checked) { /*cached status available*/
- if( is_selfsig ) {
- u32 keyid[2];
+ gcry_md_hd_t md;
+ PKT_public_key *pk;
+ PKT_signature *sig;
+ int algo;
+ int rc;
- keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid );
- if( keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1] )
- *is_selfsig = 1;
+ if (is_selfsig)
+ *is_selfsig = 0;
+ if (r_expiredate)
+ *r_expiredate = 0;
+ if (r_expired)
+ *r_expired = 0;
+ assert (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE);
+ assert (root->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY);
+
+ pk = root->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+ sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
+ algo = sig->digest_algo;
+
+ /* Check whether we have cached the result of a previous signature
+ check. Note that we may no longer have the pubkey or hash
+ needed to verify a sig, but can still use the cached value. A
+ cache refresh detects and clears these cases. */
+ if ( !opt.no_sig_cache )
+ {
+ if (sig->flags.checked) /* Cached status available. */
+ {
+ if (is_selfsig)
+ {
+ u32 keyid[2];
+
+ keyid_from_pk (pk, keyid);
+ if (keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1])
+ *is_selfsig = 1;
}
- /* BUG: This is wrong for non-self-sigs.. needs to be the
- actual pk */
- if((rc = check_signature_metadata_validity (pk, sig,
- r_expired, NULL)))
- return rc;
- return sig->flags.valid? 0 : gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ /* BUG: This is wrong for non-self-sigs... needs to be the
+ actual pk. */
+ rc = check_signature_metadata_validity (pk, sig, r_expired, NULL);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ return sig->flags.valid? 0 : gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
}
}
- if( (rc=openpgp_pk_test_algo(sig->pubkey_algo)) )
- return rc;
- if( (rc=openpgp_md_test_algo(algo)) )
- return rc;
-
- if( sig->sig_class == 0x20 ) { /* key revocation */
- u32 keyid[2];
- keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid );
+ rc = openpgp_pk_test_algo(sig->pubkey_algo);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = openpgp_md_test_algo(algo);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
- /* is it a designated revoker? */
- if(keyid[0]!=sig->keyid[0] || keyid[1]!=sig->keyid[1])
- rc=check_revocation_keys(pk,sig);
- else
- {
- if (gcry_md_open (&md, algo, 0 ))
- BUG ();
- hash_public_key( md, pk );
- rc = check_signature_end (pk, sig, md, r_expired, NULL, ret_pk);
- cache_sig_result ( sig, rc );
- gcry_md_close(md);
- }
+ if (sig->sig_class == 0x20) /* key revocation */
+ {
+ u32 keyid[2];
+ keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid );
+
+ /* Is it a designated revoker? */
+ if (keyid[0] != sig->keyid[0] || keyid[1] != sig->keyid[1])
+ rc = check_revocation_keys (pk, sig);
+ else
+ {
+ if (gcry_md_open (&md, algo, 0))
+ BUG ();
+ hash_public_key (md, pk);
+ rc = check_signature_end (pk, sig, md, r_expired, NULL, ret_pk);
+ cache_sig_result (sig, rc);
+ gcry_md_close (md);
+ }
}
- else if( sig->sig_class == 0x28 ) { /* subkey revocation */
- KBNODE snode = find_prev_kbnode( root, node, PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY );
-
- if( snode ) {
- if (gcry_md_open (&md, algo, 0))
- BUG ();
- hash_public_key( md, pk );
- hash_public_key( md, snode->pkt->pkt.public_key );
- rc = check_signature_end (pk, sig, md, r_expired, NULL, ret_pk);
- cache_sig_result ( sig, rc );
- gcry_md_close(md);
+ else if (sig->sig_class == 0x28) /* subkey revocation */
+ {
+ kbnode_t snode = find_prev_kbnode (root, node, PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY);
+
+ if (snode)
+ {
+ if (gcry_md_open (&md, algo, 0))
+ BUG ();
+ hash_public_key (md, pk);
+ hash_public_key (md, snode->pkt->pkt.public_key);
+ rc = check_signature_end (pk, sig, md, r_expired, NULL, ret_pk);
+ cache_sig_result (sig, rc);
+ gcry_md_close (md);
}
- else
- {
- if (opt.verbose)
- log_info (_("key %s: no subkey for subkey"
- " revocation signature\n"),keystr_from_pk(pk));
- rc = GPG_ERR_SIG_CLASS;
- }
+ else
+ {
+ if (opt.verbose)
+ log_info (_("key %s: no subkey for subkey"
+ " revocation signature\n"), keystr_from_pk(pk));
+ rc = GPG_ERR_SIG_CLASS;
+ }
}
- else if( sig->sig_class == 0x18 ) { /* key binding */
- KBNODE snode = find_prev_kbnode( root, node, PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY );
+ else if (sig->sig_class == 0x18) /* key binding */
+ {
+ kbnode_t snode = find_prev_kbnode (root, node, PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY);
- if( snode ) {
- if( is_selfsig ) { /* does this make sense????? */
- u32 keyid[2]; /* it should always be a selfsig */
+ if (snode)
+ {
+ if (is_selfsig)
+ {
+ /* Does this make sense? It should always be a
+ selfsig. Yes: We can't be sure about this and we
+ need to be able to indicate that it is a selfsig.
+ FIXME: The question is whether we should reject
+ such a signature if it is not a selfsig. */
+ u32 keyid[2];
- keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid );
- if( keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1] )
- *is_selfsig = 1;
- }
+ keyid_from_pk (pk, keyid);
+ if (keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1])
+ *is_selfsig = 1;
+ }
if (gcry_md_open (&md, algo, 0))
BUG ();
- hash_public_key( md, pk );
- hash_public_key( md, snode->pkt->pkt.public_key );
+ hash_public_key (md, pk);
+ hash_public_key (md, snode->pkt->pkt.public_key);
rc = check_signature_end (pk, sig, md, r_expired, NULL, ret_pk);
cache_sig_result ( sig, rc );
- gcry_md_close(md);
- }
+ gcry_md_close (md);
+ }
else
{
if (opt.verbose)
log_info(_("key %s: no subkey for subkey"
- " binding signature\n"),keystr_from_pk(pk));
+ " binding signature\n"), keystr_from_pk(pk));
rc = GPG_ERR_SIG_CLASS;
}
- }
- else if( sig->sig_class == 0x1f ) { /* direct key signature */
+ }
+ else if (sig->sig_class == 0x1f) /* direct key signature */
+ {
if (gcry_md_open (&md, algo, 0 ))
BUG ();
hash_public_key( md, pk );
rc = check_signature_end (pk, sig, md, r_expired, NULL, ret_pk);
- cache_sig_result ( sig, rc );
- gcry_md_close(md);
- }
- else { /* all other classes */
- KBNODE unode = find_prev_kbnode( root, node, PKT_USER_ID );
+ cache_sig_result (sig, rc);
+ gcry_md_close (md);
+ }
+ else /* all other classes */
+ {
+ kbnode_t unode = find_prev_kbnode (root, node, PKT_USER_ID);
- if( unode ) {
+ if (unode)
+ {
u32 keyid[2];
- keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid );
- if (gcry_md_open (&md, algo, 0 ))
+ keyid_from_pk (pk, keyid);
+ if (gcry_md_open (&md, algo, 0))
BUG ();
- hash_public_key( md, pk );
- hash_uid_node( unode, md, sig );
- if( keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1] )
- /* The primary key is the signing key. */
- {
- if( is_selfsig )
+ hash_public_key (md, pk);
+ hash_uid_node (unode, md, sig);
+ if (keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1])
+ { /* The primary key is the signing key. */
+
+ if (is_selfsig)
*is_selfsig = 1;
rc = check_signature_end (pk, sig, md, r_expired, NULL, ret_pk);
}
else if (check_pk)
- /* The caller specified a key. Try that. */
- rc = check_signature_end (check_pk, sig, md,
- r_expired, NULL, ret_pk);
+ { /* The caller specified a key. Try that. */
+
+ rc = check_signature_end (check_pk, sig, md,
+ r_expired, NULL, ret_pk);
+ }
else
- /* Look up the key. XXX: Could it be that the key is
- not is not in this keyblock? */
- rc = check_signature2 (sig, md, r_expiredate, r_expired,
- NULL, ret_pk);
+ { /* Look up the key. */
+ rc = check_signature2 (sig, md, r_expiredate, r_expired,
+ NULL, ret_pk);
+ }
- cache_sig_result ( sig, rc );
- gcry_md_close(md);
- }
+ cache_sig_result (sig, rc);
+ gcry_md_close (md);
+ }
else
{
if (!opt.quiet)
@@ -840,7 +865,7 @@ check_key_signature2(KBNODE root, KBNODE node, PKT_public_key *check_pk,
" of class %02x\n",keystr_from_pk(pk),sig->sig_class);
rc = GPG_ERR_SIG_CLASS;
}
- }
+ }
- return rc;
+ return rc;
}
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of changes:
g10/sig-check.c | 593 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------------
1 file changed, 309 insertions(+), 284 deletions(-)
hooks/post-receive
--
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