integrating GPG with deniable steganography

Matthias Urlichs smurf at noris.de
Tue Mar 20 16:00:14 CET 2001


Hi,

Florian Weimer:
> "Marlow, Andrew (London)" <MarloAnd at exchange.uk.ml.com> writes:
> > 	[Marlow, Andrew (London)]
> > For steg to work we must assume that Wendy has
> > 	knowledge of all steg algorithms. Otherwise its just security
> > through obscurity.
> 
Umm, Andrew: could you tell your mailer not to prefix every paragraph
with this [your name] thing? Thank you.

> I think no steganography algorithms with this property are a publicly
> known today.  Steganography is about at the level cryptography was
> several hundred years ago.

Hmm. Don't most crypto algorithms just look like random bits when you
don't have the key?

Therefore, a stego algorithm which replaces the lower bit of a noisy
audio or video file should be perfectly safe, assuming (a) that lower
bit is truly random, and (b) nobody can get at the original image.

(b) is not always easy, but essentially a solved problem. (a) isn't
quite that simple, but IMHO still much further along than early crypto.

-- 
Matthias Urlichs     |     noris network AG     |     http://smurf.noris.de/



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