OpenPGP data in the CERT RR

[Werner Koch]

On Wed, 07 Aug 2002 02:09:10 +0200, Simon Josefsson said:

> Actually, wouldn't it make more sense to include a "preferred
> keyserver" option in the OpenPGP message instead?  That would solve
> the same problem, and even work in non-email situations.

Both are required.  The preferred keyserver field is required to get
updates of a key and a mail header to get the key in the first
instance, say you know someone from a ML but at some point you want to
send a an encrypted mail.

OTOH, using the preferred keyserver for revocation checking has a
security risk: If Alice believes her secret key has been compromised,
she creates a recocation certificate and puts it on her DNS server.
Meanwhile Mallory has changed the preferred keyserver of Alice's key
and distributed the modified key to a lot of sites; there is now a
risk that someone verifiying a message or sending one to Alice uses
the modified key and checks the bogus preferred keyserver where he
does not find a revocation.

We need a distributed and replicated network of keyservers to look up
revocations. Something like:

01.rvc.pgp.net.  NS  rvc-a.pgp.net.
02.rvc.pgp.net.  NS  rvc-b.pgp.net.
..
ff.rvc.pgp.net.  NS  rvc-d.pgp.net.

where the 2 digits are the last digits of the fingerprint and the
rvc-?.pgp.net servers then serve the query.  Have several of these
networks and replicate them so a user can choose the most trustworthy
network.



Salam-Shalom,

   Werner