atom at suspicious.org
Mon Jul 26 19:20:26 CEST 2004
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is this considered an attack:
mallory generates a few thousand (or more) keys and signs bob's
key with all of them (maybe spoofing different dates). mallory posts bob's
signed key to a keyserver, where these signatures will spread and become a
burden, not an asset, to bob's key.
mallory could also create keys with UIDs of infamous persons, and post
those public keys to the keyservers, giving the *impression* that bob's
key was signed by mass murderers, rapists, war criminals, etc.
of course the way to avoid this (and similar nuisances) is to require that
certification signatures (0x10 - 0x13) must be accepted by bob's primary
key before they are accepted by OpenPGP implementations (especially
keyservers). however, bob must be able to import such a key signature
before it's accepted, or he will have no way to accept it.
and, of course, if bob accepts a certification signature from alice, alice
must be able to revoke that signature without requiring acceptance from
is it feasible (or desired) to add such a mechanism to the OpenPGP
PGP key - http://atom.smasher.org/pgp.txt
762A 3B98 A3C3 96C9 C6B7 582A B88D 52E4 D9F5 7808
"I am committed to helping Ohio deliver its electoral
votes to the president [Bush] next year"
-- Walden O'Dell, CEO of Diebold
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Version: GnuPG v1.3.6 (FreeBSD)
Comment: What is this gibberish?
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