HKP keyservers over SSL

[Phil Pennock]

On 2009-04-03 at 15:09 +0200, Werner Koch wrote:
> Me too.  We have to live with HKP.  Look only on how hard it is to
> convince people nut to use the old broken pgp keyservers.  We are trying
> for years to abolish the sue of them but without much success.

Meh.  Most people I deal with don't even know of the problems with
things like pgp.mit.edu.  What has actually been tried?

Suggestion for gpg:

WARNING: you are using keyserver "pgp.mit.edu" which is broken
WARNING: reason: does not accept subkey updates
WARNING: result: keys appear invalid because correct updates not received

Default list of keyservers to whine about, gpg.conf option to hush up
the warning for a particular keyserver -- the goal being to persuade,
not coerce.  And besides, pgp.mit.edu might someday be updated and stop
being a blight and this would let people use it.

-Phil
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