v3 subkeys and signatures

[Daniel Kahn Gillmor]

On 06/23/2012 04:41 PM, David Shaw wrote:
> Yes, this makes sense.  GPG won't generate a subkey on a V3 key (or a V3 subkey at all), but might accept them if generated elsewhere.  So you had to patch things to make the key, but no patch is needed to use the key.

Of course, the opportunity for compromise comes when a victim *uses* of
the key, not from its creation.  So while i appreciate the refusal of
GPG to generate these keys (which means one less tool available to an
attacker for the creation of the colliding key), it doesn't really
address the fact that users of GPG are at risk if they deal with keys
generated elsewhere.

	--dkg

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