Pinentry makes it awfully easy to snoop all passwords entered by the user

[Werner Koch]

On Wed, 28 Aug 2013 20:12, dkg at fifthhorseman.net said:

> released afaik), the agent is designed to not transmit passwords to gpg
> itself at all; instead, the agent hangs on to the keys and only
> asymmetric crypto challenges and responses are communicated between the
> agent and the gpg process.  So if you're really only concerned about

Right.  However, the pinentry is still used to ask for the passphrase or
PIN.  As a separate process it also communicates via pipes.

> but basically: if your adversary has root on your machine or has full
> control over your local account even, there isn't a way to use gpg (or

Right.  As soon as you can ptrace a process it is really easy to figure
out anything.  An adversary might also use gdb to grab interesting
things.  I do that all the time during debugging.

Protecting one from herself is not possible.


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

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