Key length for integer- and finite-field cryptography
David Leon Gil
coruus at gmail.com
Thu Aug 7 20:30:57 CEST 2014
On Thursday, August 7, 2014, Robert J. Hansen <rjh at sixdemonbag.org> wrote:
> Good grief, *no*, *no*, *no*.
> *If you require 256 bits of entropy throughout, you need to use something
> other than GnuPG.*
Generally agreed. (I'm assuming you mean 'security strength' when you write
'entropy'; hopefully GnuPG can use arbitrary amounts of entropy if the
system RNG can provide it.)
> The take-home is the same as it's always been. "If you need X bits of
> entropy, check to make sure each step in the link provides at least X bits.
> If some provide more, that's fine."
Completely in agreement; do you disagree with the RSA bit-lengths I
Using AES-256 is *not* a good reason to start using RSA-16k.
But wanting a 256-bit security strength is, right?
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