Keyserver rejection filter and signing subkeys

[Daniel Kahn Gillmor]

On 07/30/2014 08:43 AM, Werner Koch wrote:
> On Wed, 30 Jul 2014 11:00, kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com
> said:
> 
>>> verify the key binding you would import a foreign key while
>>> verifying a signature done with the faked subkey.
>>
>> Indeed, and the purpose of the filter is partly to protect against
>> mallicious keyservers, so even if the "good" keyservers implements
>> this[1]  it can't be trusted.
> 
> Actually this is not a problem because gpg won't import that subkey due
> to the missing key binding.

hm, maybe i'm not understanding the scenario here, but if i request key
0xdeadbeef, and that is only available as a subkey, and that subkey is
bound to multiple primary keys on the keyservers, won't gpg import them all?

let's set aside the concern about treating that subkey as a signing- or
certification-capable subkey, which should require cross-certification
in normal configurations.  That constraint can be avoided by attaching
the key with other usage flags, right?

	--dkg

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