[PATCH 2/3] dirmngr: add system CAs if no hkp-cacert is given
Kristian Fiskerstrand
kristian.fiskerstrand at sumptuouscapital.com
Fri Oct 28 00:59:03 CEST 2016
On 10/28/2016 12:30 AM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> * dirmngr/dirmngr.c (http_session_new): if the user isn't talking to
> the HKPS pool, and they have not specified any hkp-cacert, then we
> should default to the system CAs, rather than nothing.
> * doc/dirmngr.texi: document choice of CAs.
I'm a bit ambiguous about this change. In Gentoo we currently have the
use of a system CA behind a user-selectable use flag for hkps but even
so the set of provided CAs is originating mostly from Mozilla.
As seen with the latest WoSign / StartCom issues, mozilla is not overly
concerned about third-party usage of the provided CA certificates, and
have more complex restrictions in place for NSS (e.g specific
notBeforeDate and OneCRL checking).
As such I question the security of the root stores and actually like
that it defaults to not using system CAs so users needs to make an
informed decision.
--
----------------------------
Kristian Fiskerstrand
Blog: https://blog.sumptuouscapital.com
Twitter: @krifisk
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