self-sigs with weaker hashes

Werner Koch wk at
Wed Jan 11 08:19:59 CET 2017

On Wed, 11 Jan 2017 00:58, dkg at said:

> Should gpg just ignore or filter out the "bad" self-sigs that it doesn't
> think are valid, rather than leaking warnings every time the key is
> encountered?

I general I would say yes.  I use --check-sigs to look for such bogus
signatures and thus we would need to add a new --verify-option to allow
printing them.

Or we could try to suppress the 

  gpg: DSA key 308B0A7BD8DEC2EC requires a 256 bit or larger hash (hash is SHA1)

line and output

  sig%3        308B0A7BD8DEC2EC 2015-08-22  [Key requires a 256 bit or
  larger hash (hash is SHA1)] 

However, that  might be larger chage and too late for 2.2.



Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.
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