danger of decrypted files without integrity protection

[Bernhard Reiter]

Am Donnerstag 17 Mai 2018 11:18:40 schrieb Holger Smolinski:
> 2nd variant is attacking CFB mode by injecting CFB gadgets 

The CFB mode with MDC as GnuPG is using by default for 15 years
protects against this. (As discussed in other posts already.)

The point of my post is that the CBC mode that all known
CMS implementations use for S/MIME does not have this protection
for emails without inner signature.
So files coming out of this can leak decrypted plaintext
or otherwise use a backchannel or get "active".

Browsers offer no additional protection. So decrypting
files outside an email client may lead to dangerous files.

Bernhard

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