From wk at gnupg.org Thu Oct 7 07:50:37 2021 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Thu, 07 Oct 2021 07:50:37 +0200 Subject: [Announce] GnuPG 2.2.32 (LTS) fixes a problem with Let's Encrypt Message-ID: <87czohxu1e.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> Hello! We are pleased to announce the availability of a new GnuPG LTS release: version 2.2.32. This release fixes a problem in GnuPG with the new Let's Encrypt root certificate and is thus required to restore access to many web resources (e.g. Web Key Directory and keyservers). The LTS (long term support) series of GnuPG is guaranteed to be maintained at least until the end of 2024. See https://gnupg.org/download/index.html#end-of-life What is GnuPG ============= The GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG, GPG) is a complete and free implementation of the OpenPGP and S/MIME standards. GnuPG allows to encrypt and sign data and communication, features a versatile key management system as well as access modules for public key directories. GnuPG itself is a command line tool with features for easy integration with other applications. The separate library GPGME provides a uniform API to use the GnuPG engine by software written in common programming languages. A wealth of frontend applications and libraries making use of GnuPG are available. As an universal crypto engine GnuPG provides support for S/MIME and Secure Shell in addition to OpenPGP. GnuPG can be freely used, modified and distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License. Noteworthy changes in version 2.2.32 (2021-10-06) ================================================= * dirmngr: Fix Let's Encrypt certificate chain validation. [T5639] (See https://dev/gnupg.org/T5639) * dirmngr: New option --ignore-cert. [323a20399d] * gpg: Fix --list-packets for AEAD packets with unknown key. [T5584] Release-info: https://dev.gnupg.org/T5601 Getting the Software ==================== Please follow the instructions found at or read on: GnuPG 2.2.32 may be downloaded from one of the GnuPG mirror sites or direct from its primary FTP server. The list of mirrors can be found at . Note that GnuPG is not available at ftp.gnu.org. The GnuPG source code compressed using BZIP2 and its OpenPGP signature are available here: https://gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt/gnupg/gnupg-2.2.32.tar.bz2 (7043k) https://gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt/gnupg/gnupg-2.2.32.tar.bz2.sig An installer for Windows without any graphical frontend except for a very minimal Pinentry tool is available here: https://gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt/binary/gnupg-w32-2.2.32_20211006.exe (4395k) https://gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt/binary/gnupg-w32-2.2.32_20211006.exe.sig The source used to build the Windows installer can be found in the same directory with a ".tar.xz" suffix. A new version of Gpg4win will not be published. Users of Gpg4win should instead install this version on top of Gpg4win 3.1.16. Checking the Integrity ====================== In order to check that the version of GnuPG which you are going to install is an original and unmodified one, you can do it in one of the following ways: * If you already have a version of GnuPG installed, you can simply verify the supplied signature. For example to verify the signature of the file gnupg-2.2.32.tar.bz2 you would use this command: gpg --verify gnupg-2.2.32.tar.bz2.sig gnupg-2.2.32.tar.bz2 This checks whether the signature file matches the source file. You should see a message indicating that the signature is good and made by one or more of the release signing keys. Make sure that this is a valid key, either by matching the shown fingerprint against a trustworthy list of valid release signing keys or by checking that the key has been signed by trustworthy other keys. See the end of this mail for information on the signing keys. * If you are not able to use an existing version of GnuPG, you have to verify the SHA-1 checksum. On Unix systems the command to do this is either "sha1sum" or "shasum". Assuming you downloaded the file gnupg-2.2.32.tar.bz2, you run the command like this: sha1sum gnupg-2.2.32.tar.bz2 and check that the output matches the next line: 81684626720c91060ae9920936c768df9fc8b2f6 gnupg-2.2.32.tar.bz2 0e24879a809c3a6de89dc41bad1dd4c2430b38a2 gnupg-w32-2.2.32_20211006.tar.xz 4705ed62b21cda6b8314d9e48ad8d9de1801ee8d gnupg-w32-2.2.32_20211006.exe Internationalization ==================== This version of GnuPG has support for 26 languages with Chinese (traditional and simplified), Czech, French, German, Italian, Japanese, Norwegian, Polish, Russian, and Ukrainian being almost completely translated. Documentation and Support ========================= The file gnupg.info has the complete reference manual of the system. Separate man pages are included as well but they miss some of the details available only in thee manual. The manual is also available online at https://gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gnupg/ or can be downloaded as PDF at https://gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gnupg.pdf . You may also want to search the GnuPG mailing list archives or ask on the gnupg-users mailing list for advise on how to solve problems. Most of the new features are around for several years and thus enough public experience is available. https://wiki.gnupg.org has user contributed information around GnuPG and relate software. In case of build problems specific to this release please first check https://dev.gnupg.org/T5601 for updated information. Please consult the archive of the gnupg-users mailing list before reporting a bug: https://gnupg.org/documentation/mailing-lists.html. We suggest to send bug reports for a new release to this list in favor of filing a bug at https://bugs.gnupg.org. If you need commercial support go to https://gnupg.com or https://gnupg.org/service.html. If you are a developer and you need a certain feature for your project, please do not hesitate to bring it to the gnupg-devel mailing list for discussion. Thanks ====== Since 2001 maintenance and development of GnuPG is done by g10 Code GmbH and still mostly financed by donations. Three full-time employed developers as well as two contractors exclusively work on GnuPG and closely related software like Libgcrypt, GPGME and Gpg4win. We like to thank all the nice people who are helping the GnuPG project, be it testing, coding, translating, suggesting, auditing, administering the servers, spreading the word, or answering questions on the mailing lists. Many thanks to our numerous financial supporters, both corporate and individuals. Without you it would not be possible to keep GnuPG in a good and secure shape and to address all the small and larger requests made by our users. Thanks. Happy hacking, Your GnuPG hackers p.s. This is an announcement only mailing list. Please send replies only to the gnupg-users'at'gnupg.org mailing list. List of Release Signing Keys: To guarantee that a downloaded GnuPG version has not been tampered by malicious entities we provide signature files for all tarballs and binary versions. The keys are also signed by the long term keys of their respective owners. Current releases are signed by one or more of these keys: rsa3072 2017-03-17 [expires: 2027-03-15] 5B80 C575 4298 F0CB 55D8 ED6A BCEF 7E29 4B09 2E28 Andre Heinecke (Release Signing Key) ed25519 2020-08-24 [expires: 2030-06-30] 6DAA 6E64 A76D 2840 571B 4902 5288 97B8 2640 3ADA Werner Koch (dist signing 2020) ed25519 2021-05-19 [expires: 2027-04-04] AC8E 115B F73E 2D8D 47FA 9908 E98E 9B2D 19C6 C8BD Niibe Yutaka (GnuPG Release Key) The keys are available at https://gnupg.org/signature_key.html and in any recently released GnuPG tarball in the file g10/distsigkey.gpg . Note that this mail has been signed by a different key. -- Please read Nils Melzer: Der Fall Julian Assange It is really important to know the background of the Assange case to understand the massive perils to free journalism. The book is right now only available in German: https://dev.gnupg.org/u/melzerassang -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 227 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- _______________________________________________ Gnupg-announce mailing list Gnupg-announce at gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-announce From andrewg at andrewg.com Tue Oct 12 15:51:07 2021 From: andrewg at andrewg.com (Andrew Gallagher) Date: Tue, 12 Oct 2021 14:51:07 +0100 Subject: Keyserver: List of available ones (dynamic) In-Reply-To: <07af606d-9eda-83b1-db56-5b29feda34c1@andrewg.com> References: <87tulaaxu5.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> <333721ea-fd8f-b5a3-f271-c276784c0647@andrewg.com> <202109241227.54884.bernhard@intevation.de> <07af606d-9eda-83b1-db56-5b29feda34c1@andrewg.com> Message-ID: On 24/09/2021 12:49, Andrew Gallagher wrote: > On 24/09/2021 11:27, Bernhard Reiter wrote: > >> In the graphs I can see keyserver.ubuntu.com, but in the list >> I cannot. Why is that? > > Well spotted. :-) > > The graph code (written in Ruby) polls both port 80 and port 11371, > while the list code (written in Go) only polls 11371. Furthermore, > keyserver.ubuntu.com is not referenced directly by any peer, but > keyserver.syseleven.de is -- it runs a proxy on port 80 (only) that > forwards requests to keyserver.ubuntu.com. This means that the Ruby > spider can find keyserver.ubuntu.com by traversing syseleven port 80, > but the Go spider can't. After investigating the above further, I have now removed the port 80 check entirely from the Ruby graphing code - the only "keyservers" that listen on port 80 and not 11371 are either proxies/redirectors like syseleven and pgp.pm, or DNS registrar holding pages. In any case, a keyserver that does not listen on port 11371 will almost certainly not sync, so should not be listed as functional. This change has allowed me to quickly detect some broken mutuals, exposing some hidden fragilities in the graph (I did/will follow these up by private mail). Andrew. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: OpenPGP_0xFB73E21AF1163937.asc Type: application/pgp-keys Size: 34134 bytes Desc: OpenPGP public key URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: OpenPGP_signature Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 833 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From wk at gnupg.org Tue Oct 12 19:41:15 2021 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Tue, 12 Oct 2021 19:41:15 +0200 Subject: [Announce] GnuPG 2.3.3 released Message-ID: <874k9mqgxw.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> Hello! We are pleased to announce the availability of a new GnuPG release: version 2.3.3. This is the fourth release in the new 2.3 series which fixes a couple of bugs we introduced in 2.3.2 as well as a fix for keyservers. See below for details. What is GnuPG ============= The GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG, GPG) is a complete and free implementation of the OpenPGP and S/MIME standards. GnuPG allows to encrypt and sign data and communication, features a versatile key management system as well as access modules for public key directories. GnuPG itself is a command line tool with features for easy integration with other applications. The separate library GPGME provides a uniform API to use the GnuPG engine by software written in common programming languages. A wealth of frontend applications and libraries making use of GnuPG are available. As an universal crypto engine GnuPG provides support for S/MIME and Secure Shell in addition to OpenPGP. GnuPG is Free Software (meaning that it respects your freedom). It can be freely used, modified and distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License. Three different series of GnuPG are actively maintained: - Version 2.3 is the current stable version with a lot of new features compared to 2.2. This announcement is about the latest release of this series. - Version 2.2 is our LTS (long term support) version and guaranteed to be maintained at least until the end of 2024. See https://gnupg.org/download/index.html#end-of-life - Version 1.4 is only maintained to allow decryption of very old data which is, for security reasons, not anymore possible with other GnuPG versions. Noteworthy changes in version 2.3.3 (2021-10-12) =============================================== * agent: Fix segv in GET_PASSPHRASE (regression). [#5577] * dirmngr: Fix Let's Encrypt certificate chain validation. [#5639] * gpg: Change default and maximum AEAD chunk size to 4 MiB. [ad3dabc9fb] * gpg: Print a warning when importing a bad cv25519 secret key. [#5464] * gpg: Fix --list-packets for undecryptable AEAD packets. [#5584] * gpg: Verify backsigs for v5 keys correctly. [#5628] * keyboxd: Fix checksum computation for no UBID entry on disk. [#5573] * keyboxd: Fix "invalid object" error with cv448 keys. [#5609] * dirmngr: New option --ignore-cert. [4b3e9a44b5] * agent: Fix calibrate_get_time use of clock_gettime. [#5623] * Silence process spawning diagnostics on Windows. [f2b01025c3] * Support a gpgconf.ctl file under Unix and use this for the regression tests. [#5999] * The Windows installer now also installs the new keyboxd. (Put "use-keyboxd" into common.conf to use a fast SQLite database instead of the pubring.kbx file.) Release-info: https://dev.gnupg.org/T5565 Getting the Software ==================== Please follow the instructions found at or read on: GnuPG may be downloaded from one of the GnuPG mirror sites or direct from its primary FTP server. The list of mirrors can be found at . Note that GnuPG is not available at ftp.gnu.org. The GnuPG source code compressed using BZIP2 and its OpenPGP signature are available here: https://gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt/gnupg/gnupg-2.3.3.tar.bz2 (7412k) https://gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt/gnupg/gnupg-2.3.3.tar.bz2.sig An installer for Windows without any graphical frontend except for a very minimal Pinentry tool is available here: https://gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt/binary/gnupg-w32-2.3.3_20211012.exe (4701k) https://gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt/binary/gnupg-w32-2.3.3_20211012.exe.sig The source used to build the Windows installer can be found in the same directory with a ".tar.xz" suffix. If you want to use this GnuPG versions with Gpg4win simply install it on on top of Gpg4win 3.1.16. Checking the Integrity ====================== In order to check that the version of GnuPG which you are going to install is an original and unmodified one, you can do it in one of the following ways: * If you already have a version of GnuPG installed, you can simply verify the supplied signature. For example to verify the signature of the file gnupg-2.3.3.tar.bz2 you would use this command: gpg --verify gnupg-2.3.3.tar.bz2.sig gnupg-2.3.3.tar.bz2 This checks whether the signature file matches the source file. You should see a message indicating that the signature is good and made by one or more of the release signing keys. Make sure that this is a valid key, either by matching the shown fingerprint against a trustworthy list of valid release signing keys or by checking that the key has been signed by trustworthy other keys. See the end of this mail for information on the signing keys. * If you are not able to use an existing version of GnuPG, you have to verify the SHA-1 checksum. On Unix systems the command to do this is either "sha1sum" or "shasum". Assuming you downloaded the file gnupg-2.3.3.tar.bz2, you run the command like this: sha1sum gnupg-2.3.3.tar.bz2 and check that the output matches the next line: b19a407076424704f1b00e8265254de1b3061659 gnupg-2.3.3.tar.bz2 bfb4e9fe2a69c763f15f6a7dd980c7ef6807277f gnupg-w32-2.3.3_20211012.tar.xz f95dec36a3905c1a928e7b8b83d4eee8a8200364 gnupg-w32-2.3.3_20211012.exe Internationalization ==================== This version of GnuPG has support for 26 languages with Chinese (traditional and simplified), Czech, French, German, Italian, Japanese, Norwegian, Polish, Russian, and Ukrainian being almost completely translated. Documentation and Support ========================= The file gnupg.info has the complete reference manual of the system. Separate man pages are included as well but they miss some of the details available only in the manual. The manual is also available online at https://gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gnupg/ or can be downloaded as PDF at https://gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gnupg.pdf You may also want to search the GnuPG mailing list archives or ask on the gnupg-users mailing list for advise on how to solve problems. Most of the new features are around for several years and thus enough public experience is available. https://wiki.gnupg.org has user contributed information around GnuPG and relate software. In case of build problems specific to this release please first check https://dev.gnupg.org/T5565 for updated information. Please consult the archive of the gnupg-users mailing list before reporting a bug: https://gnupg.org/documentation/mailing-lists.html. We suggest to send bug reports for a new release to this list in favor of filing a bug at https://bugs.gnupg.org. If you need commercial support go to https://gnupg.com or https://gnupg.org/service.html. If you are a developer and you need a certain feature for your project, please do not hesitate to bring it to the gnupg-devel mailing list for discussion. Thanks ====== Since 2001 maintenance and development of GnuPG is done by g10 Code GmbH and still mostly financed by donations. Three full-time employed developers as well as two contractors exclusively work on GnuPG and closely related software like Libgcrypt, GPGME and Gpg4win. We like to thank all the nice people who are helping the GnuPG project, be it testing, coding, translating, suggesting, auditing, administering the servers, spreading the word, or answering questions on the mailing lists. The financial support of the governmental CERT of Luxembourg (GOVCERT.LU) allowed us to develop new and improved features for smartcards (Yubikey, PIV and Scute) as well as various usability features. Thanks. Many thanks also to all other financial supporters, both corporate and individuals. Without you it would not be possible to keep GnuPG in a good and secure shape and to address all the small and larger requests made by our users. Happy hacking, Your GnuPG hackers p.s. This is an announcement only mailing list. Please send replies only to the gnupg-users at gnupg.org mailing list. p.p.s List of Release Signing Keys: To guarantee that a downloaded GnuPG version has not been tampered by malicious entities we provide signature files for all tarballs and binary versions. The keys are also signed by the long term keys of their respective owners. Current releases are signed by one or more of these four keys: ed25519 2020-08-24 [expires: 2030-06-30] Key fingerprint = 6DAA 6E64 A76D 2840 571B 4902 5288 97B8 2640 3ADA Werner Koch (dist signing 2020) rsa3072 2017-03-17 [expires: 2027-03-15] Key fingerprint = 5B80 C575 4298 F0CB 55D8 ED6A BCEF 7E29 4B09 2E28 Andre Heinecke (Release Signing Key) ed25519 2021-05-19 [expires: 2027-04-04] AC8E 115B F73E 2D8D 47FA 9908 E98E 9B2D 19C6 C8BD Niibe Yutaka (GnuPG Release Key) The keys are available at https://gnupg.org/signature_key.html and in any recently released GnuPG tarball in the file g10/distsigkey.gpg . Note that this mail has been signed by a different key. -- Please read Nils Melzer: Der Fall Julian Assange It is really important to know the background of the Assange case to understand the massive perils to free journalism. The book is right now only available in German: https://dev.gnupg.org/u/melzerassang -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 227 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- _______________________________________________ Gnupg-announce mailing list Gnupg-announce at gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-announce From bernhard at intevation.de Fri Oct 22 16:35:37 2021 From: bernhard at intevation.de (Bernhard Reiter) Date: Fri, 22 Oct 2021 16:35:37 +0200 Subject: WKD Research: Measuring use. An mailinglist maintainers that would help? Message-ID: <202110221635.44294.bernhard@intevation.de> Hello friends of OpenPGP, as part of his Bachelor thesis [1], Christoph wants so to find out, which actions could increase the overall usage of WKD. Ideally we should be able to observe some changes in the usage of WKD over time and hopefully can credit something to some changes like measures tried during the research. So how do we observe WKD usage over time? Obviously this is hard to do, as we are in a decentral system, this is designed to keep things private. Thus our measurement could only be indirectly. One idea is: If we have a public email address where a lot of emails are send to, e.g. the submission address of a mailinglist we could set up an OpenPGP key for it via WKD and use a small tool to pipe each incoming mail through on the server to decrypt and count the mail. We can also count the number of request for the WKD address on the webserver serving the WKD. In both counts, no personal data is saved. So it is just about the safety of the decryption tool, which can be provided. Do you know email addresses, e.g. of mailinglists, where you know the server administrators would be potentially willing to help this academic research? An other ideas? Best Regards, Bernhard [1] https://wiki.gnupg.org/WKD/Misc -- www.intevation.de/~bernhard ? +49 541 33 508 3-3 Intevation GmbH, Osnabr?ck, DE; Amtsgericht Osnabr?ck, HRB 18998 Gesch?ftsf?hrer Frank Koormann, Bernhard Reiter, Dr. Jan-Oliver Wagner -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 659 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From gnupg at eckner.net Fri Oct 22 19:17:07 2021 From: gnupg at eckner.net (Erich Eckner) Date: Fri, 22 Oct 2021 19:17:07 +0200 (CEST) Subject: WKD Research: Measuring use. An mailinglist maintainers that would help? In-Reply-To: <202110221635.44294.bernhard@intevation.de> References: <202110221635.44294.bernhard@intevation.de> Message-ID: -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 On Fri, 22 Oct 2021, Bernhard Reiter wrote: > Hello friends of OpenPGP, Hi! > as part of his Bachelor thesis [1], Christoph wants so to find out, which > actions could increase the overall usage of WKD. There are two parts of the usage: The publishing part and the search-for-and-use-if-available part. Both need separate measurements, I think. > > Ideally we should be able to observe some changes in the usage of WKD over > time and hopefully can credit something to some changes like measures tried > during the research. > > So how do we observe WKD usage over time? Obviously this is hard to do, > as we are in a decentral system, this is designed to keep things private. > > Thus our measurement could only be indirectly. > > One idea is: If we have a public email address where a lot of emails are send > to, e.g. the submission address of a mailinglist > we could set up an OpenPGP key for it via WKD > and use a small tool to pipe each incoming mail through on the server > to decrypt and count the mail. Wouldn't this break DKIM signatures on the mail? Just to be clear: You intend to send the encrypted mail through the mailing list as usual, right? Also: This would only cover mailing lists and thus skew the results. What about organizations, that use WKD in-house, but whose members rarely write to mailing lists? > > We can also count the number of request for the WKD address on the webserver > serving the WKD. In both counts, no personal data is saved. > So it is just about the safety of the decryption tool, which can be provided. > > Do you know email addresses, e.g. of mailinglists, where you know the server > administrators would be potentially willing to help this academic research? > > An other ideas? If you want to fiddle around with mailservers, I would prefer your second approach: You measure the requests to the webserver, but actually don't offer a key via WKD - thus, the email flow is undisturbed, but you still get your metrics. For measuring the publishing part, one could actively query for WKD on known MX domains. For measuring the usage part, I think, it's more valuable to have a look at available software and their features: How many people use mail client X, and does X have WKD enabled by default or can it use WKD at all / as a fallback / ... > > Best Regards, > Bernhard regards, Erich -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAEBCAAdFiEE3p92iMrPBP64GmxZCu7JB1Xae1oFAmFy8hUACgkQCu7JB1Xa e1pl1g/9F7mEkQhHS6nT9lFOJb6qj+lbuRU33wAtqcUdY4VsuEZOiG0rjTQWwrkJ MkeC8Q09zNZu7xNEy4R86R9nhjyZjgohjqbxxntdSL5YCsJCVGVLLz6dvmzUIXTc xtEgIZp8Qi2ftOLZQaCc9qkp6RduuBoqJPbLIgan+XWvRIQE2X4/xaDljVuJUkqz m3I7tQzsdm6QFK+0w6WiWp4qigNpkxWe8j/LlOWzQROXymkymDOmnDVX+qPakoh0 P1q5rD9tlFvDSAEURHw3b9KpFgD0F9hvzquzl7T2t58zgXph/LXu5cHJqYJNdqgq t4J7ZM4bK6pRjwz1vlKyoqvK+7NS9HWr8f3b+9mr4nNpJtC8bgUmIBDnMPWkl490 OedA6I+mczhtCidJMEfU1QxE/CR3f8YlFbu7zkXZ++VAedm3uY5dyWltZSr7u+fw Swbuw3gYPIPUi0pN+LnXvDFDZCEkn7fzSrkwkMUa0nlMXMGzX3pAUooVVktZjnN1 JCf5Mg6hSr8giHhHzNcBN3FmFC6wTeXgUk/HLcgi/OrUClDHsCS2zB372ZhtxXWo EI++nbYBDGFMjt6CLl6bSqTPTQH4r9YHQvlOmA2D2VGhejskcZObbbM/C15JErKr fZf7sre8x7wvgALmRoDG2MK6Pk9j8VA0VCqn7sLIcA80gPbNk9k= =xoNe -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----