Fwd: crypto flaw in secure mail standards

[Don Davis]

On Sat, 23 Jun 2001, Ingo Kloecker wrote:
[excerpt of a paper by Don Davis]
>> Suppose Alice and Bob are business partners, and are setting
>> up a deal together.  Suppose Alice decides to call off the
>> deal, so she sends Bob a secure-mail message: "The deal is off."
>> Then Bob can get even with Alice:
>>
>>  * Bob waits until Alice has a new deal in the works
>>    with Charlle;
>>  * Bob can abuse the secure e-mail protocol to re-encrypt
>>    and resend Alice's message to Charlie;
>>  * When Charlie receives Alice's message, he'll believe
>>    that the mail-security features guarantee that Alice
>>    sent the message to Charlie.
>>  * Charlie abandons his deal with Alice.

> Wrong.
> Charlie sees that the message was not signed by Alice and
> contacts her to verify the status of their deal. Unsigned
> messages are worthless in this context, encrypted or not.
> Either the posted summary leaves out some important details,
> or this paper is seriously flawed.

mr. greene --

the point is that charlie decrypts alice's _signed_ message,
then re-encrypts it, without removing the signature.  i'm
sorry my summary was unclear about this point.  i wrote the
summary to serve as a press-release, more-or-less, and as a
teaser to get people to read the paper.

please do read the paper.  the links are live now:

				- don davis, boston

http://world.std.com/~dtd/sign_encrypt/sign_encrypt7.ps
http://world.std.com/~dtd/sign_encrypt/sign_encrypt7.html







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