Passphrase and swapfile (David Picón Álvarez)

Adrian 'Dagurashibanipal' von Bidder
Fri Jun 7 09:03:02 2002

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On Thu, 2002-06-06 at 17:18, Steve Butler wrote:
> In a recent article I read the authors showed that even overwriting does
> not prevent a well financed and determined group from picking off the
> last 4-5 layers.  It has to do with the stray magnetic fields and the
> heads not being exactly (down to the atom) positioned the same for each
> write.  In fact, that technology is used by some data recovery
> companies to pick off data one layer back.  So, even if it has been
> "properly" erased, somebody, with the right set of tools, can read it.


When you begin to worry about such things, you'd better
 - destroy the discs physically
 - use only non-battery backed solid state disks

(at least I've never heard of anybody recovering data from a unplugged
DRAM, so I'd assume this would be really safe: install your system to
this disk, as soon as the attacker comes, pull the plug...)

-- vbi

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