known plain-text attacks

Atom 'Smasher' atom-gpg at
Tue Dec 16 08:00:36 CET 2003

> >if one of those recipients wanted to crack the private key of one of the
> >other recipients, would it be helpful that the session-key is known?
> Fortunately not. Otherwise, all an atacker had to do to crack my secret key
> was creating an encrypted message to my key and his own key.

is that inherent in the [asymmetric] algorithms? or is that because of the
way the [asymmetric] algorithms are implemented?

> >does it matter which asymmetric encryption algorithm is used?
> Not if you choose one that is currently present in GnuPG (including the IDEA
> extension). They all are not vulnerable to a known-plaintext attack.

i'm wondering about the *asymmetric* algorithms. that's the part were one
would have two pieces of information to launch an attack (if such an
attack is feasible)... one would have a public-key and known plain-text
(the session-key).


 PGP key -
 3EBE 2810 30AE 601D 54B2 4A90 9C28 0BBF 3D7D 41E3

	Quidquid latine dictum sit, altum viditur.
	(Whatever is said in Latin sounds profound.)

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