known plain-text attacks

[Johan Wevers]

rhkelly wrote:

>Protocols that provide an attacker with a known plain-text should
>thus be avoided whwnever possible.

That is equivalent of saying that you should keep your public key as secret
as possible too, and reveal it only to people you want to send encrypted
messages. While this might add a little security in theory, I think that
when the asymmetric algorithms in gpg are broken (it can be proven that the
discrete log problem and the prime decomposition are connected, if you crack
one you also crack the other) you have larger problems than public keys on
keyservers.

-- 
ir. J.C.A. Wevers         //  Physics and science fiction site:
johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl   //  http://www.xs4all.nl/~johanw/index.html
PGP/GPG public keys at http://www.xs4all.nl/~johanw/pgpkeys.html