Certs by a revoked key

Adrian 'Dagurashibanipal' von Bidder avbidder@fortytwo.ch
Mon Feb 24 09:33:02 2003

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On Sun, 2003-02-23 at 19:20, Richard Laager wrote:

> By my interpretation,
> the RFC is saying that if a key is revoked with a reason of 0x02 (Key
> material has been compromised), 0x00* (No reason specified), or this
> subpacket is missing* altogether, then all of the key's signatures
> are suspect and must be ignored. However, if any other reason
> (currently 0x01 (Key is superceded) or 0x03 (Key is retired and no
> longer used)) is given, then the signatures should be used in trust
> calculations.

This is the case if you can assume that all revocation packets make it
through. But I suspect that an attack where the attacker replaces a 0x02
revocation by the key holder with a 0x01 revocation might be possible,
so the victim might be led to trust too many signatures.

-- vbi

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