Certs by a revoked key
Tue Feb 25 18:21:01 2003
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On Tue, Feb 25, 2003 at 10:46:54AM +0100, Adrian 'Dagurashibanipal' von Bidder wrote:
> I imagined the situation where the victim already has a soft-revoked
> key, which is then compromised. For an attacker, it could be easier to
> just not let the victim get at the additional 'compromised' revocation
> cert than to modify her local key ring and remove the soft revocation -
> and it does the job, which is to lead the victim into trusting too many
> signatures. (Yes, I didn't spell this out too clearly in my original
Ah, I understand now. Yes, this is true, but is it different from the
current problem where an attacker can prevent the victim from getting
at any revocation? That is, use the same example as you gave, but
just remove the soft revocation from the equation.
> Interesting debate you and Richard have going!
Indeed. For me, discussions are half the fun in working on GnuPG.
The fact that Richard and I mostly agree doesn't hurt either..
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