key server security

[Kyle Hasselbacher]

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On Thu, Jun 19, 2003 at 03:09:44PM -0400, David Shaw wrote:

>No.  The keyservers are add-only for various reasons. [...]

Sorry if this is a FAQ, but:  why?

After a thread about a faked key on a key server (which doesn't check
signatures), I started thinking about a key server which DOES check
signatures, and strips those it finds lacking.  How do I attack such a
system?  How do I attack if it if it throws away expired data?  Is there a
good reason NOT to use a DB backend (like Postgres) to do the storage?

What's the impact of a black hat owning a key server?

If all this is answered somewhere else, I'd love a pointer.
- -- 
Kyle Hasselbacher
kyle@toehold.com
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