Migrating keys
Atom 'Smasher'
atom at suspicious.org
Thu Nov 27 12:29:04 CET 2003
> > another observation, is that a signed email [claiming to be] from bob
> > saying:
> > my old key isn't good any more, here's my new key...
> >
> > (even though many of us would not trust it, at face value) really has just
> > as much validity as a new sub-key (which most of us would trust, at face
> > value) because both are signed by bob's signing key, which we trust (and
> > may have certified to trust) belongs to bob.... social aspects aside, is
> > there really a technical difference between trusting a new sub-key and
> > trusting a signed email, like above? (i propose there is no difference)
>
> There might be not a big difference between trusting a new subkey and trusting
> a new key on the grounds of the above email. BUT (and it's the same argument
> that came up in this thread already), it's a big difference between trusting
> a new subkey for encrypting messages and *signing* a new key, which means
> that other people then are going to trust that new key based on your belief.
>
> All signatures on a key have a date - I think it is entierly plausible to
> implement a trust model where older signatures have less impact on key trust.
> Independently of the expiration date which is set by the signer, this would
> be influenced only by the user of a public key.
=====================================================
but, if i sign your key, and you add a sub-key, that carries my signature,
just the same as your original key that i signed... my understanding of
PGP/GPG is that it's easy to "go back in time" and add a sub-key, so it
would appear that the sub-key was also signed.
in one case (based on a signed email) one might (or might not) explicitly
sign a new key... in the other case (a new sub-key is generated) one has
implicitly (and unknowingly) signed the new sub-key.
anyway, it does kinda make sense that a trust model should devalue
signatures as they get older....
...atom
_______________________________________________
PGP key - http://smasher.suspicious.org/pgp.txt
3EBE 2810 30AE 601D 54B2 4A90 9C28 0BBF 3D7D 41E3
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