From johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl Sat Jul 1 23:31:19 2006 From: johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl (Johan Wevers) Date: Sat Jul 1 23:28:55 2006 Subject: WinPT homedir Message-ID: <200607012131.k61LVJp0006398@vulcan.xs4all.nl> Hello, Does anyone know how to set the homedir that WinPT assumes for gpg to another place as Application Data? I want it to be somewhere in My Documents on my PC at work. Changing the registry entry for gpg didn't work for WinPT. -- ir. J.C.A. Wevers // Physics and science fiction site: johanw@vulcan.xs4all.nl // http://www.xs4all.nl/~johanw/index.html PGP/GPG public keys at http://www.xs4all.nl/~johanw/pgpkeys.html From Axel.Thimm at ATrpms.net Sat Jul 1 23:13:28 2006 From: Axel.Thimm at ATrpms.net (Axel Thimm) Date: Sun Jul 2 02:25:58 2006 Subject: gpg: WARNING: standard input reopened Message-ID: <20060701211328.GK24584@neu.nirvana> Hi, after upgrading to gnupg 1.4.4 my rpm signing spits out these warnings. Is this OK, and if so, how can I turn this warning off? Thanks. -- Axel.Thimm at ATrpms.net -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 189 bytes Desc: not available Url : /pipermail/attachments/20060701/85c111b3/attachment.pgp From twoaday at gmx.net Sun Jul 2 11:58:18 2006 From: twoaday at gmx.net (Timo Schulz) Date: Sun Jul 2 12:06:09 2006 Subject: WinPT homedir In-Reply-To: <200607012131.k61LVJp0006398@vulcan.xs4all.nl> References: <200607012131.k61LVJp0006398@vulcan.xs4all.nl> Message-ID: <44A798BA.8000102@gmx.net> Johan Wevers schrieb: > Does anyone know how to set the homedir that WinPT assumes for gpg > to another place as Application Data? I want it to be somewhere in > My Documents on my PC at work. Changing the registry entry for gpg > didn't work for WinPT. There is a bug in the current code. I fixed this in the CVS and will do a new release next week. Actually it is just a display problem. The 'HomeDir' registry values will be successfully changed but the preference dialog still display the $APPDATA\gnupg path. Timo From jharris at widomaker.com Sun Jul 2 22:38:17 2006 From: jharris at widomaker.com (Jason Harris) Date: Sun Jul 2 22:37:31 2006 Subject: new (2006-06-25) keyanalyze results (+sigcheck) Message-ID: <20060702203816.GA1715@wilma.widomaker.com> New keyanalyze results are available at: http://keyserver.kjsl.com/~jharris/ka/2006-06-25/ Signatures are now being checked using keyanalyze+sigcheck: http://dtype.org/~aaronl/ Earlier reports are also available, for comparison: http://keyserver.kjsl.com/~jharris/ka/ Even earlier monthly reports are at: http://dtype.org/keyanalyze/ SHA-1 hashes and sizes for all the "permanent" files: 35cb8b395338d1c5feb471e6dc659108e28136f4 13883562 preprocess.keys 10b4152d8d2d0e07f5970d66a400dc2bd0c9e913 8237421 othersets.txt 652878f8f5e1223a413c86cddc435758d498e82a 3358044 msd-sorted.txt a751f9d5477744a4f5e5ce6ebad6a60908e317ee 1372 index.html a5b29179aa73b5daf991df1c2c0f408a70048656 2291 keyring_stats bc5240e66333a15c662a51018a6f812be30eef86 1319045 msd-sorted.txt.bz2 aa8fb7336126762039aa440e97ddcbe0e7d0ff91 26 other.txt df50134c41c95cf0913a48bc35b19844ff6a9696 1784061 othersets.txt.bz2 a7e58804cf14e4d6e2a1dafd5390a2b01c96bce0 5630986 preprocess.keys.bz2 d8660fe429c89771a3d7349b061dd41f8b1796af 14243 status.txt 743d824442287a6975abb2c4b9769cdab103a13a 209827 top1000table.html 8f6a49a77df3a85eccab3269c0b12aa603a83b47 30035 top1000table.html.gz 1012650fa78cd185cd28cc8e1ae8eba72f6603c4 10804 top50table.html 969d04994a0940c6b0f407d04642822a18a83dab 2529 D3/D39DA0E3 -- Jason Harris | NIC: JH329, PGP: This _is_ PGP-signed, isn't it? jharris@widomaker.com _|_ web: http://keyserver.kjsl.com/~jharris/ Got photons? (TM), (C) 2004 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 313 bytes Desc: not available Url : /pipermail/attachments/20060702/c80b621d/attachment.pgp From thomas-strobel at web.de Mon Jul 3 15:00:43 2006 From: thomas-strobel at web.de (Thomas Strobel) Date: Mon Jul 3 16:56:00 2006 Subject: OpenPGP-Card: ccid_transceive failed Message-ID: <44A914FB.20905@web.de> Hello, I've recently bought a cardreader Cardman 4040 and an OpenPGP-Card. But unfortunately I can't create all keys on it. If I'm executing "gpg --card-edit" the following error messages show up (in German, sorry): ... Admin-PIN gpg: Bitte warten, der Schl?ssel wird erzeugt ... gpg: Schl?sselerzeugung abgeschlossen (26 Sekunden) gpg: signatures created so far: 0 gpg: Existierender Schl?ssel wird ersetzt werden gpg: Bitte warten, der Schl?ssel wird erzeugt ... gpg: ccid_transceive failed: (0x10009) gpg: apdu_send_simple(0) failed: card inactive gpg: Schl?sselerzeugung fehlgeschlagen gpg: key generation failed: Allgemeiner Fehler Schl?sselerzeugung fehlgeschlagen: Allgemeiner Fehler After that only my signing key is available on the card. But I'm able to load some external created signing and authentification keys onto the card. I've tried it with several versions of gnupg (1.4.2, 1.4.3, 1.4.5-svn4186, 1.9.20), each time with pcsc-lite 1.3.1 and with ccid from kernel 2.6.17.1. My internet research didn't point me to any new ideas how I could solve the problem. So maybe someone of you had similar problems and can give me a hint what I could try. Thanks Thomas From schiessle at fsfe.org Thu Jul 6 07:37:07 2006 From: schiessle at fsfe.org (Bjoern Schiessle) Date: Thu Jul 6 08:55:47 2006 Subject: poldi and cardman4040 Message-ID: <20060706053707.GA4895@ubuntu.local.netz> Hello, i have tried to use libpam-poldi to login with my GnuPG smartcard. On my PC everything works. I'm using Ubuntu Dapper, libpam-poldi (version 0.3.0-4) from Debian Sid and the SPR532 card reader. On my notebook I'm using Ubuntu Dapper too, but with a cardman4040. GnuPG with the smartcard works: sign mails, encrypt/decrypt mails, etc.. But if i try to set up poldi with: poldi-ctrl --set-key i get this error messages: poldi-ctrl: pcsc_establish_context failed: no service (0x8010001d) poldi-ctrl: Error: failed to open card: Card Error. The only difference between PC and notebook should be the card reader. Any idea what's going wrong? Maybe poldi doesn't work with the cardman4040? Thanks! Bjoern From irwanj at gmail.com Thu Jul 6 12:40:10 2006 From: irwanj at gmail.com (Mohd Irwansteiger) Date: Thu Jul 6 14:25:39 2006 Subject: No Public Key Problem Message-ID: <948541e00607060340o2434200cjce78569ebaf8f500@mail.gmail.com> Good day, I'm quite new to GnuPG; my problem started when I want to send my email thru Evolution. I've got this error: ##### start ##### Because "gpg: [don't know]: invalid packet (ctb=01) gpg: keydb_search failed: invalid packet gpg: key ACAD66DB: secret key without public key - skipped gpg: skipped `ACAD66DB': secret key not available gpg: signing failed: secret key not available ", you may need to select different mail options. ##### end ##### When I try to revoke, I've got this error: ##### begin ##### [irwan@kuli .gnupg]$ gpg --import ~/revoke.asc gpg: [don't know]: invalid packet (ctb=01) gpg: keydb_search failed: invalid packet gpg: key ACAD66DB: no public key - can't apply revocation certificate gpg: Total number processed: 1 ##### end ##### I'm using RHEL 4 Update 3 & gnupg version 1.2.6-1 (RHEL package). Appreciate if anyone explain me the problem and how to solve it. Thanks in advanced. My public key is here: http://pgp.mit.edu:11371/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0xACAD66DB -- ## (o_ //\ V_/_ The past belongs to Uruguay, The present belongs to Brasil, But the future belongs to Deutschland. From tmz at pobox.com Thu Jul 6 20:45:06 2006 From: tmz at pobox.com (Todd Zullinger) Date: Thu Jul 6 20:44:51 2006 Subject: Keysigning challenge policies/procedures Message-ID: <20060706184506.GB12539@psilocybe.teonanacatl.org> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Hi, I'm putting together a short talk for my local LUG as we're planning to have a keysigning party in the near future and some folks want to hear more details so they'll understand better. I was wondering if some folks here have detailed their challenge policies and procedures and if you'd mind sharing them if you have? Even handier would be some scripts to help in the automation of this task. ;) In particular, I like how David Shaw has explained the pitfalls with various approaches to doing the email challenge several times on the list. David, is your challenge policy something you've posted anywhere? Thanks in advance for any tips and pointers, - -- Todd OpenPGP -> KeyID: 0xD654075A | URL: www.pobox.com/~tmz/pgp ====================================================================== Politics: A strife of interests masquerading as a contest of principles. The conduct of public affairs for private advantage. -- Ambrose Bierce -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.4 (GNU/Linux) Comment: When crypto is outlawed bayl bhgynjf jvyy unir cevinpl. iG0EARECAC0FAkStWjImGGh0dHA6Ly93d3cucG9ib3guY29tL350bXovcGdwL3Rt ei5hc2MACgkQuv+09NZUB1rfhgCgppgUCneHGIDbicUjD6D2CObVB1wAoO4mITD/ rzoIwYVh4mlSML5fMhdx =PKSA -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From iam-est-hora-surgere at despammed.com Fri Jul 7 01:08:49 2006 From: iam-est-hora-surgere at despammed.com (Marcus Frings) Date: Fri Jul 7 01:07:52 2006 Subject: Keysigning challenge policies/procedures References: <20060706184506.GB12539__31031.8979471505$1152211719$gmane$org@psilocybe.teonanacatl.org> Message-ID: * Todd Zullinger wrote: > I was wondering if some folks here have detailed their challenge > policies and procedures and if you'd mind sharing them if you have? > Even handier would be some scripts to help in the automation of this > task. ;) http://www.sc-delphin-eschweiler.de/pgp/ http://sion.quickie.net/keysigning.txt http://pgp-tools.alioth.debian.org/ Regards, Marcus -- "Was ist f?r einen Mann das sch?nste in seinem Leben?" - "Eine weite Steppe, ein schnelles Pferd, der Falke auf seiner Faust und der Wind in seinem Haar." - "Falsch! Conan, sag Du es mir!" - "Zu k?mpfen mit dem Feind, ihn zu verfolgen und zu vernichten und sich zu erfreuen an dem Geschrei der Weiber." From tmz at pobox.com Fri Jul 7 06:31:04 2006 From: tmz at pobox.com (Todd Zullinger) Date: Fri Jul 7 06:31:04 2006 Subject: Keysigning challenge policies/procedures In-Reply-To: References: <20060706184506.GB12539__31031.8979471505$1152211719$gmane$org@psilocybe.teonanacatl.org> Message-ID: <20060707043104.GK12539@psilocybe.teonanacatl.org> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Marcus Frings wrote: > * Todd Zullinger wrote: > >> I was wondering if some folks here have detailed their challenge >> policies and procedures and if you'd mind sharing them if you have? >> Even handier would be some scripts to help in the automation of this >> task. ;) > > http://www.sc-delphin-eschweiler.de/pgp/ > http://sion.quickie.net/keysigning.txt > http://pgp-tools.alioth.debian.org/ Thank you Marcus. I had actually found your page while doing some research and read it. Very nicely outlined. Thank you for sharing it with the world. I believe that we will be using the method outlined in Len Sassaman's and Phil Zimmermann's paper from above. This too I had read while researching this earlier. (It's good to know I've run across some of the same info you recommend. :) What I don't see in any of the links is more information about sending an email challenge before signing a key. (My apologies if I'm overlooking it on your page or any of the others.) It's been discussed here before but I've not found any scripts or good details that I could point my fellow LUG members toward. Isn't it a good thing to send some random data to each UID on the key someone wishes you to sign and require that they send back that data signed by the key to prove they control both the key and the email address in the UID? Many thanks for the helpful information, - -- Todd OpenPGP -> KeyID: 0xD654075A | URL: www.pobox.com/~tmz/pgp ====================================================================== Money can't buy happiness, but it sure makes living in misery easier. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.4 (GNU/Linux) Comment: When crypto is outlawed bayl bhgynjf jvyy unir cevinpl. iG0EARECAC0FAkSt44gmGGh0dHA6Ly93d3cucG9ib3guY29tL350bXovcGdwL3Rt ei5hc2MACgkQuv+09NZUB1qEygCbBVGaCdjOa7MJ9gjkdRphpmz/Rx8AoO7Fh4Zd /pIdv/NHTQTTvue9nY2r =O8C/ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From kloecker at kde.org Fri Jul 7 10:36:07 2006 From: kloecker at kde.org (Ingo =?iso-8859-1?q?Kl=F6cker?=) Date: Fri Jul 7 10:35:36 2006 Subject: Keysigning challenge policies/procedures In-Reply-To: <20060707043104.GK12539@psilocybe.teonanacatl.org> References: <20060706184506.GB12539__31031.8979471505$1152211719$gmane$org@psilocybe.teonanacatl.org> <20060707043104.GK12539@psilocybe.teonanacatl.org> Message-ID: <200607071036.08284@helena.mathA.rwth-aachen.de> Am Freitag, 7. Juli 2006 06:31 schrieb Todd Zullinger: > What I don't see in any of the links is more information about > sending an email challenge before signing a key. (My apologies if > I'm overlooking it on your page or any of the others.) > > It's been discussed here before but I've not found any scripts or > good details that I could point my fellow LUG members toward. Try CA-Bot (http://cabot.alioth.debian.org/). I haven't used it myself because I'm using a self-written script for creating challenges with KMail. But I've been sent a few challenges generated by CA-Bot. Last time I received such a message, it said (at least IIRC) that CA-Bot couldn't handle signed and/or encrypted replies. So using CA-Bot you can only check whether the person you send the challenge to can decrypt the challenge, but you can't check whether he also controls the signing key. > Isn't > it a good thing to send some random data to each UID on the key > someone wishes you to sign and require that they send back that data > signed by the key to prove they control both the key and the email > address in the UID? Where "control the email address" is different from "is the owner of the email address". Anybody between you and the owner of the email address can intercept the challenge, sign it and send it back to you. This is especially a problem with email addresses which don't contain the name, but just some random alias, nickname or whatever. tmz@pobox.com could be anyone's email address. Regards, Ingo -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 189 bytes Desc: not available Url : /pipermail/attachments/20060707/86827b95/attachment.pgp From iam-est-hora-surgere at despammed.com Fri Jul 7 11:19:47 2006 From: iam-est-hora-surgere at despammed.com (Marcus Frings) Date: Fri Jul 7 11:18:45 2006 Subject: Keysigning challenge policies/procedures References: <20060706184506.GB12539__31031.8979471505$1152211719$gmane$org@psilocybe.teonanacatl.org> <20060707043104.GK12539__44517.2066022225$1152247059$gmane$org@psilocybe.teonanacatl.org> Message-ID: * Todd Zullinger wrote: > What I don't see in any of the links is more information about sending > an email challenge before signing a key. (My apologies if I'm > overlooking it on your page or any of the others.) Before I used a protocol to signing keys where I sent out random strings as challenge response but it's not worth. There is no enhanced security and only more work for "signer" and "signee". If you send the signed UIDs encrypted to each mail address separately it has the same effect in security because if the mail address bounces or the person behind the address doesn't have the private key your signed UIDs won't become publicly available. > It's been discussed here before but I've not found any scripts or good > details that I could point my fellow LUG members toward. Isn't it a > good thing to send some random data to each UID on the key someone > wishes you to sign and require that they send back that data signed by > the key to prove they control both the key and the email address in > the UID? There are some scripts around but don't use CA-Bot as Ingo suggested. As he has already said it has problems with so-called sign-only-keys and it sends out broken mails. caff, from the same author, handles these keys much better. It can be downloaded from the third link I mentioned. Besides it is already available in Debian and FreeBSD. Regards, Marcus -- "This elevator serves me alone. I have complete control over this entire level. With cameras as my eyes and nodes as my hands, I rule here, insect." (Shodan in System Shock) From tmz at pobox.com Fri Jul 7 16:56:10 2006 From: tmz at pobox.com (Todd Zullinger) Date: Fri Jul 7 16:55:34 2006 Subject: Keysigning challenge policies/procedures In-Reply-To: <200607071036.08284@helena.mathA.rwth-aachen.de> References: <20060706184506.GB12539__31031.8979471505$1152211719$gmane$org@psilocybe.teonanacatl.org> <20060707043104.GK12539@psilocybe.teonanacatl.org> <200607071036.08284@helena.mathA.rwth-aachen.de> Message-ID: <20060707145610.GT12539@psilocybe.teonanacatl.org> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Ingo Kl?cker wrote: > Try CA-Bot (http://cabot.alioth.debian.org/). Thanks Ingo. > I haven't used it myself because I'm using a self-written script for > creating challenges with KMail. Could you elaborate a little on the procedure you use to generate the challenges? I'd love to have some examples of how other folks do things to present to my fellow LUG members. > But I've been sent a few challenges generated by CA-Bot. Last time I > received such a message, it said (at least IIRC) that CA-Bot > couldn't handle signed and/or encrypted replies. So using CA-Bot you > can only check whether the person you send the challenge to can > decrypt the challenge, but you can't check whether he also controls > the signing key. That's unfortunate, since the signature is more important than the decryption, AFAIAC. I'll take a look and see if CA-bot can't be useful as a starting point for some scripts of my own. >> Isn't it a good thing to send some random data to each UID on the >> key someone wishes you to sign and require that they send back that >> data signed by the key to prove they control both the key and the >> email address in the UID? > > Where "control the email address" is different from "is the owner of > the email address". Anybody between you and the owner of the email > address can intercept the challenge, sign it and send it back to > you. Of course, but they can't sign it with the key I've been asked to sign and which I verified from the key fingerprint and other owner details, unless they are the proper owner of that key. > This is especially a problem with email addresses which don't > contain the name, but just some random alias, nickname or whatever. > tmz@pobox.com could be anyone's email address. Right. But if we met in person and I showed you acceptable ID, provided you with the key fingerprint and other key data, then returned a challenge from you signed using the key matching the fingerprint that you verified in our meeting, you know that I am in control of the key and that I can get mail at tmz@pobox.com. Obviously, others can read mail there too and that's why I'm using GPG to ensure that I'm the only one that will be able to decipher mail sent to that address and generate verifiable email from that address. Thanks, - -- Todd OpenPGP -> KeyID: 0xD654075A | URL: www.pobox.com/~tmz/pgp ====================================================================== You will never find time for anything. If you want time you must make it. -- Charles Buxton -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.4 (GNU/Linux) Comment: When crypto is outlawed bayl bhgynjf jvyy unir cevinpl. iG0EARECAC0FAkSudgomGGh0dHA6Ly93d3cucG9ib3guY29tL350bXovcGdwL3Rt ei5hc2MACgkQuv+09NZUB1qhDQCg113UiRsz5aUYeNGvRWOQdOHRzT0AnAnXloPp xhBU91pupwwlzXFTFOjm =xk6i -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From tmz at pobox.com Fri Jul 7 17:09:55 2006 From: tmz at pobox.com (Todd Zullinger) Date: Fri Jul 7 17:15:12 2006 Subject: Keysigning challenge policies/procedures In-Reply-To: References: <20060706184506.GB12539__31031.8979471505$1152211719$gmane$org@psilocybe.teonanacatl.org> <20060707043104.GK12539__44517.2066022225$1152247059$gmane$org@psilocybe.teonanacatl.org> Message-ID: <20060707150955.GU12539@psilocybe.teonanacatl.org> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Marcus Frings wrote: > * Todd Zullinger wrote: > >> What I don't see in any of the links is more information about >> sending an email challenge before signing a key. (My apologies if >> I'm overlooking it on your page or any of the others.) > > Before I used a protocol to signing keys where I sent out random > strings as challenge response but it's not worth. There is no > enhanced security and only more work for "signer" and "signee". If > you send the signed UIDs encrypted to each mail address separately > it has the same effect in security because if the mail address > bounces or the person behind the address doesn't have the private > key your signed UIDs won't become publicly available. But that does mean that you can't get a signed key to someone if the key you've signed doesn't have any encryption capabilities, correct? Unless, of course, you have told the signee that they must provide you with a key which they wish to have the signed keys encrypted to. Have you found in practice that you don't run into many sign-only keys that you are asked to certify? > There are some scripts around but don't use CA-Bot as Ingo > suggested. As he has already said it has problems with so-called > sign-only-keys and it sends out broken mails. caff, from the same > author, handles these keys much better. It can be downloaded from > the third link I mentioned. Besides it is already available in > Debian and FreeBSD. Thanks, I'll look closer at caff. I didn't pull down the package and play with it yet. - -- Todd OpenPGP -> KeyID: 0xD654075A | URL: www.pobox.com/~tmz/pgp ====================================================================== You're not drunk if you can lie on the floor without holding on. -- Dean Martin -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.4 (GNU/Linux) Comment: When crypto is outlawed bayl bhgynjf jvyy unir cevinpl. iG0EARECAC0FAkSueUMmGGh0dHA6Ly93d3cucG9ib3guY29tL350bXovcGdwL3Rt ei5hc2MACgkQuv+09NZUB1pmfwCg+sxhZadaXGAJYLU/7yBAT/1XIq0An2UnRecE 3bNFigiZqvEXMotWpR5z =09Wl -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From ken at latitudetech.net Fri Jul 7 19:23:09 2006 From: ken at latitudetech.net (Ken Ferguson) Date: Fri Jul 7 20:26:04 2006 Subject: Key Import Error Message-ID: <44AE987D.2040802@latitudetech.net> I'm trying to import a pgp key and getting an error I know nothing about. gpg --import D:\keyfile.key.pgp gpg: mpi too large for this implementation (40843 bits) gpg: mpi too large for this implementation (43184 bits) gpg: read_block: read error: invalid packet gpg: import from `D:\keyfile.key.pgp' failed: invalid keyring gpg: Total number processed: 0 Does anyone have any idea what this means??? I have another key in a .txt file and it imports perfectly fine. I'm a total nube and any help will be greatly appreciated. TIA, Ferg From mail at mark-kirchner.de Fri Jul 7 19:22:40 2006 From: mail at mark-kirchner.de (Mark Kirchner) Date: Fri Jul 7 20:55:43 2006 Subject: Keysigning challenge policies/procedures In-Reply-To: References: <20060706184506.GB12539__31031.8979471505$1152211719$gmane$org@psilocybe.teonanacatl.org> <20060707043104.GK12539__44517.2066022225$1152247059$gmane$org@psilocybe.teonanacatl.org> Message-ID: <879802070.20060707192240@mark-kirchner.de> On Friday, July 7, 2006, 11:19:47 AM, Marcus wrote: > * Todd Zullinger wrote: > >> What I don't see in any of the links is more information about sending >> an email challenge before signing a key. (My apologies if I'm >> overlooking it on your page or any of the others.) > > Before I used a protocol to signing keys where I sent out random strings > as challenge response but it's not worth. There is no enhanced security > and only more work for "signer" and "signee". If you send the signed UIDs > encrypted to each mail address separately it has the same effect in > security I don't think that's true: Decryption is (usually) handled by the encryption subkey and there's absolutely no guarantee that this subkey is controlled by the same person as the primary/signing key. There may even be valid reasons to split the two "roles". Since UIDs are attached to the primary key and the primary key is the only one that can modify UIDs (and signing a key is all about UIDs) this system can't prove what it's supposed to prove: The link between the UID (better: the e-mail-address in it) and the person in control of it. Regards, Mark Kirchner -- _____________________________________________________________ Key (0x172C073C): http://www.mark-kirchner.de/keys/key-mk.asc -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 183 bytes Desc: not available Url : /pipermail/attachments/20060707/b501c07e/attachment.pgp From kloecker at kde.org Fri Jul 7 20:39:37 2006 From: kloecker at kde.org (Ingo =?iso-8859-1?q?Kl=F6cker?=) Date: Fri Jul 7 21:55:47 2006 Subject: Keysigning challenge policies/procedures In-Reply-To: <20060707150955.GU12539@psilocybe.teonanacatl.org> References: <20060706184506.GB12539__31031.8979471505$1152211719$gmane$org@psilocybe.teonanacatl.org> <20060707150955.GU12539@psilocybe.teonanacatl.org> Message-ID: <200607072039.38874@erwin.ingo-kloecker.de> On Friday 07 July 2006 17:09, Todd Zullinger wrote: > Marcus Frings wrote: > > * Todd Zullinger wrote: > >> What I don't see in any of the links is more information about > >> sending an email challenge before signing a key. (My apologies if > >> I'm overlooking it on your page or any of the others.) > > > > Before I used a protocol to signing keys where I sent out random > > strings as challenge response but it's not worth. There is no > > enhanced security and only more work for "signer" and "signee". If > > you send the signed UIDs encrypted to each mail address separately > > it has the same effect in security because if the mail address > > bounces or the person behind the address doesn't have the private > > key your signed UIDs won't become publicly available. > > But that does mean that you can't get a signed key to someone if the > key you've signed doesn't have any encryption capabilities, correct? That's obviously correct. In this case you could give the key owner a piece of paper with a random string and ask him to send it in a signed message to your email address. Then you know that he can use this key for signing messages. Obviously, you can't check the validity of the email addresses belonging to this key (unless he's got an encryption key you can use for checking the addresses). But in case of a certification-only key even that won't work. > Unless, of course, you have told the signee that they must provide > you with a key which they wish to have the signed keys encrypted to. > > Have you found in practice that you don't run into many sign-only > keys that you are asked to certify? Among a few hundreds keys I've signed so far only a handful were sign-only or certification-only keys. I did simply sign them with a lower verification level. Regards, Ingo -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 189 bytes Desc: not available Url : /pipermail/attachments/20060707/24bb7b4e/attachment.pgp From kloecker at kde.org Fri Jul 7 20:24:03 2006 From: kloecker at kde.org (Ingo =?utf-8?q?Kl=C3=B6cker?=) Date: Fri Jul 7 21:56:10 2006 Subject: Keysigning challenge policies/procedures In-Reply-To: <20060707145610.GT12539@psilocybe.teonanacatl.org> References: <20060706184506.GB12539__31031.8979471505$1152211719$gmane$org@psilocybe.teonanacatl.org> <200607071036.08284@helena.mathA.rwth-aachen.de> <20060707145610.GT12539@psilocybe.teonanacatl.org> Message-ID: <200607072024.14608@erwin.ingo-kloecker.de> Skipped content of type multipart/mixed-------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 189 bytes Desc: not available Url : /pipermail/attachments/20060707/1e3bad23/attachment-0001.pgp From tmz at pobox.com Fri Jul 7 22:15:03 2006 From: tmz at pobox.com (Todd Zullinger) Date: Fri Jul 7 22:31:09 2006 Subject: Keysigning challenge policies/procedures In-Reply-To: <200607072039.38874@erwin.ingo-kloecker.de> References: <20060706184506.GB12539__31031.8979471505$1152211719$gmane$org@psilocybe.teonanacatl.org> <20060707150955.GU12539@psilocybe.teonanacatl.org> <200607072039.38874@erwin.ingo-kloecker.de> Message-ID: <20060707201503.GK12539@psilocybe.teonanacatl.org> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Ingo Kl?cker wrote: > On Friday 07 July 2006 17:09, Todd Zullinger wrote: [...] >> But that does mean that you can't get a signed key to someone if >> the key you've signed doesn't have any encryption capabilities, >> correct? > > That's obviously correct. In this case you could give the key owner > a piece of paper with a random string and ask him to send it in a > signed message to your email address. Then you know that he can use > this key for signing messages. Obviously, you can't check the > validity of the email addresses belonging to this key (unless he's > got an encryption key you can use for checking the addresses). Is it really necessary to encrypt the challenge? If the key has encryption capabilities, I would do so, but if it was a sign only key and I could not do so, just what sort of attacks or weaknesses are there in sending the challenge in the clear? I've seen David Shaw point out that it didn't gain you much. I'm just trying to work through the possible scenarios so I have them clear in my mind before trying to present this to a larger group, who may well end up with questions on this that I'd like to have better answers for than I do now. >> Have you found in practice that you don't run into many sign-only >> keys that you are asked to certify? > > Among a few hundreds keys I've signed so far only a handful were > sign-only or certification-only keys. I did simply sign them with a > lower verification level. Okay. I would have guessed that you probably wouldn't run into terribly many keys like this, but thank you for giving some practical experience to support this. - -- Todd OpenPGP -> KeyID: 0xD654075A | URL: www.pobox.com/~tmz/pgp ====================================================================== ...unfortunately, we can't control the actions of everyone. -- Bill Clinton, April 20, 1993 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.4 (GNU/Linux) Comment: When crypto is outlawed bayl bhgynjf jvyy unir cevinpl. iG0EARECAC0FAkSuwMcmGGh0dHA6Ly93d3cucG9ib3guY29tL350bXovcGdwL3Rt ei5hc2MACgkQuv+09NZUB1ogLQCfdgI3cZPmG30R7Ho9S6wERT1Bf0MAoJnW40cG UqfQ+iNwqQUwaDyhHVFH =gsl0 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From tmz at pobox.com Fri Jul 7 22:34:20 2006 From: tmz at pobox.com (Todd Zullinger) Date: Fri Jul 7 22:33:39 2006 Subject: Keysigning challenge policies/procedures In-Reply-To: <200607072024.14608@erwin.ingo-kloecker.de> References: <20060706184506.GB12539__31031.8979471505$1152211719$gmane$org@psilocybe.teonanacatl.org> <200607071036.08284@helena.mathA.rwth-aachen.de> <20060707145610.GT12539@psilocybe.teonanacatl.org> <200607072024.14608@erwin.ingo-kloecker.de> Message-ID: <20060707203420.GL12539@psilocybe.teonanacatl.org> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Ingo Kl?cker wrote: > On Friday 07 July 2006 16:56, Todd Zullinger wrote: [...] >> Could you elaborate a little on the procedure you use to generate the >> challenges? I'd love to have some examples of how other folks do >> things to present to my fellow LUG members. > > My script does the following: > For each key id that's given on the command line it first determines all > UIDs which are neither revoked nor expired nor have already been signed > by me. Then for each UID a random string is generated. I use the > command > head -c 18 /dev/urandom | mimencode > for this. (mimencode is part of metamail.) This challenge and the key id > and the UID are then inserted into a text explaining what the receiver > of the challenge has to do. This text is then encrypted with the key > corresponding to the key id. The encrypted text is then prepended with > another text explaining what the encrypted text is about. Finally the > resulting text is given to KMail together with the email address > (==UID). Now I only have to click on the Send button in KMail to send > the message. Thank you much for this. > (I could make KMail automatically send the messages, but I prefer to > have a last look at them before I send them in order to check that > everything worked correctly.) Yeah, I understand that perfectly. Too much automation can bite you when you least expect it. :) > I've attached the script. And thank you very much for this! It'll be very handy to have something concrete to point others to for an example. Between that and the caff script in pgp-tools I've now got two nice perl examples my fellow LUG members can check out and use or adapt. >> Of course, but they can't sign it with the key I've been asked to >> sign and which I verified from the key fingerprint and other owner >> details, unless they are the proper owner of that key. > > Yes, they can if it was them who asked you to sign their key. For > example, I could create a key with my name and your email address, > go to a key signing party and make everybody sign the fake user id. > And if I can intercept your mail then I can even reply to > challenges. But if you do this, then even encrypting the challenge wouldn't help, as I'd be encrypting it to the key you presented to me. It seems that this is a problem outside the scope of what the challenge will solve. Or am I missing something? (I've been busy all morning fixing some plumbing, so my mind isn't as sharp as usual -- not that I'm the sharpest tool in the shed on a good day. ;) Many thanks to you for indulging my questions and posting your procedures and script! - -- Todd OpenPGP -> KeyID: 0xD654075A | URL: www.pobox.com/~tmz/pgp ====================================================================== Going to hell when I die would just be redundant. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.4 (GNU/Linux) Comment: When crypto is outlawed bayl bhgynjf jvyy unir cevinpl. iG0EARECAC0FAkSuxUwmGGh0dHA6Ly93d3cucG9ib3guY29tL350bXovcGdwL3Rt ei5hc2MACgkQuv+09NZUB1qNPgCgs7ZSgz8W6nxwl3MdwL1N5WVKwckAnig/ITip qc3hM02PxYoEwJxQzPa+ =aKEB -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Fri Jul 7 23:11:12 2006 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Fri Jul 7 23:09:55 2006 Subject: Keysigning challenge policies/procedures In-Reply-To: References: <20060706184506.GB12539__31031.8979471505$1152211719$gmane$org@psilocybe.teonanacatl.org> <20060707043104.GK12539__44517.2066022225$1152247059$gmane$org@psilocybe.teonanacatl.org> Message-ID: <20060707211112.GC29516@jabberwocky.com> On Fri, Jul 07, 2006 at 11:19:47AM +0200, Marcus Frings wrote: > * Todd Zullinger wrote: > > > What I don't see in any of the links is more information about sending > > an email challenge before signing a key. (My apologies if I'm > > overlooking it on your page or any of the others.) > > Before I used a protocol to signing keys where I sent out random strings > as challenge response but it's not worth. There is no enhanced security > and only more work for "signer" and "signee". If you send the signed UIDs > encrypted to each mail address separately it has the same effect in > security because if the mail address bounces or the person behind the > address doesn't have the private key your signed UIDs won't become > publicly available. I've been away on vacation and only picked up this thread now. This statement is not correct. Back in the PGP 2.x days, this might have been true, but with OpenPGP, there is no particular requirement that the ability to sign and the ability to decrypt are connected. You can have a shared key with separate capabilities. Sending an signed key via encrypted mail does not ensure anything about the key owner. David From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Fri Jul 7 23:19:16 2006 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Fri Jul 7 23:17:59 2006 Subject: Keysigning challenge policies/procedures In-Reply-To: <200607072039.38874@erwin.ingo-kloecker.de> References: <20060706184506.GB12539__31031.8979471505$1152211719$gmane$org@psilocybe.teonanacatl.org> <20060707150955.GU12539@psilocybe.teonanacatl.org> <200607072039.38874@erwin.ingo-kloecker.de> Message-ID: <20060707211916.GD29516@jabberwocky.com> On Fri, Jul 07, 2006 at 08:39:37PM +0200, Ingo Kl?cker wrote: > On Friday 07 July 2006 17:09, Todd Zullinger wrote: > > Marcus Frings wrote: > > > * Todd Zullinger wrote: > > >> What I don't see in any of the links is more information about > > >> sending an email challenge before signing a key. (My apologies if > > >> I'm overlooking it on your page or any of the others.) > > > > > > Before I used a protocol to signing keys where I sent out random > > > strings as challenge response but it's not worth. There is no > > > enhanced security and only more work for "signer" and "signee". If > > > you send the signed UIDs encrypted to each mail address separately > > > it has the same effect in security because if the mail address > > > bounces or the person behind the address doesn't have the private > > > key your signed UIDs won't become publicly available. > > > > But that does mean that you can't get a signed key to someone if the > > key you've signed doesn't have any encryption capabilities, correct? > > That's obviously correct. In this case you could give the key owner a > piece of paper with a random string and ask him to send it in a signed > message to your email address. Then you know that he can use this key > for signing messages. Obviously, you can't check the validity of the > email addresses belonging to this key (unless he's got an encryption > key you can use for checking the addresses). Sure you can: just send the random string to the email address. If the person can return the string back to you, signed, then you know that there is access to both the signing key and the email address. David From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Fri Jul 7 23:21:42 2006 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Fri Jul 7 23:20:24 2006 Subject: Keysigning challenge policies/procedures In-Reply-To: <20060707201503.GK12539@psilocybe.teonanacatl.org> References: <20060706184506.GB12539__31031.8979471505$1152211719$gmane$org@psilocybe.teonanacatl.org> <20060707150955.GU12539@psilocybe.teonanacatl.org> <200607072039.38874@erwin.ingo-kloecker.de> <20060707201503.GK12539@psilocybe.teonanacatl.org> Message-ID: <20060707212142.GE29516@jabberwocky.com> On Fri, Jul 07, 2006 at 04:15:03PM -0400, Todd Zullinger wrote: > Ingo Kl?cker wrote: > > On Friday 07 July 2006 17:09, Todd Zullinger wrote: > [...] > >> But that does mean that you can't get a signed key to someone if > >> the key you've signed doesn't have any encryption capabilities, > >> correct? > > > > That's obviously correct. In this case you could give the key owner > > a piece of paper with a random string and ask him to send it in a > > signed message to your email address. Then you know that he can use > > this key for signing messages. Obviously, you can't check the > > validity of the email addresses belonging to this key (unless he's > > got an encryption key you can use for checking the addresses). > > Is it really necessary to encrypt the challenge? If the key has > encryption capabilities, I would do so, but if it was a sign only key > and I could not do so, just what sort of attacks or weaknesses are > there in sending the challenge in the clear? I've seen David Shaw > point out that it didn't gain you much. I'm just trying to work > through the possible scenarios so I have them clear in my mind before > trying to present this to a larger group, who may well end up with > questions on this that I'd like to have better answers for than I do > now. There is no harm (and no real benefit either) in sending the challenge NOT in the clear. Either way, you're proving the same thing: whether the email address goes anywhere and whether someone who has access to the email also has access to the key. David From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Fri Jul 7 23:23:37 2006 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Fri Jul 7 23:22:18 2006 Subject: Keysigning challenge policies/procedures In-Reply-To: <879802070.20060707192240@mark-kirchner.de> References: <20060706184506.GB12539__31031.8979471505$1152211719$gmane$org@psilocybe.teonanacatl.org> <20060707043104.GK12539__44517.2066022225$1152247059$gmane$org@psilocybe.teonanacatl.org> <879802070.20060707192240@mark-kirchner.de> Message-ID: <20060707212337.GF29516@jabberwocky.com> On Fri, Jul 07, 2006 at 07:22:40PM +0200, Mark Kirchner wrote: > On Friday, July 7, 2006, 11:19:47 AM, Marcus wrote: > > * Todd Zullinger wrote: > > > >> What I don't see in any of the links is more information about sending > >> an email challenge before signing a key. (My apologies if I'm > >> overlooking it on your page or any of the others.) > > > > Before I used a protocol to signing keys where I sent out random strings > > as challenge response but it's not worth. There is no enhanced security > > and only more work for "signer" and "signee". If you send the signed UIDs > > encrypted to each mail address separately it has the same effect in > > security > > I don't think that's true: Decryption is (usually) handled by the > encryption subkey and there's absolutely no guarantee that this subkey > is controlled by the same person as the primary/signing key. There may > even be valid reasons to split the two "roles". > > Since UIDs are attached to the primary key and the primary key is the > only one that can modify UIDs (and signing a key is all about UIDs) > this system can't prove what it's supposed to prove: The link between > the UID (better: the e-mail-address in it) and the person in control > of it. This is exactly correct. The "identity" (for lack of a better word) is the primary+UID. Since that is what you are signing when you sign someone's key, that is what you should be verifying before you make the signature. David From iam-est-hora-surgere at despammed.com Fri Jul 7 23:39:03 2006 From: iam-est-hora-surgere at despammed.com (Marcus Frings) Date: Fri Jul 7 23:37:54 2006 Subject: Keysigning challenge policies/procedures References: <20060706184506.GB12539__31031.8979471505$1152211719$gmane$org@psilocybe.teonanacatl.org> <20060707150955.GU12539@psilocybe.teonanacatl.org> <200607072039.38874__36161.6808026612$1152302436$gmane$org@erwin.ingo-kloecker.de> Message-ID: * Ingo Kl?cker wrote: > On Friday 07 July 2006 17:09, Todd Zullinger wrote: >> Have you found in practice that you don't run into many sign-only >> keys that you are asked to certify? > Among a few hundreds keys I've signed so far only a handful were > sign-only or certification-only keys. I did simply sign them with a > lower verification level. Me, too. I just give these sign-only keys a level of 2 as explained in my policy. I have been at several (large) keysigning parties and luckily there are not so many sign-only keys around. I don't like them very much but that's life ... Regards, Marcus -- "Paranoia - das hei?t doch nur, die Wirklichkeit realistischer zu sehen als andere." From tmz at pobox.com Sat Jul 8 07:40:14 2006 From: tmz at pobox.com (Todd Zullinger) Date: Sat Jul 8 07:39:51 2006 Subject: Keysigning challenge policies/procedures In-Reply-To: <20060707211112.GC29516@jabberwocky.com> References: <20060706184506.GB12539__31031.8979471505$1152211719$gmane$org@psilocybe.teonanacatl.org> <20060707043104.GK12539__44517.2066022225$1152247059$gmane$org@psilocybe.teonanacatl.org> <20060707211112.GC29516@jabberwocky.com> Message-ID: <20060708054013.GO12539@psilocybe.teonanacatl.org> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Hi David, David Shaw wrote: > I've been away on vacation and only picked up this thread now. Hope it was relaxing. Welcome back seems like a negative thing to say. ;) > This statement is not correct. Back in the PGP 2.x days, this might > have been true, but with OpenPGP, there is no particular requirement > that the ability to sign and the ability to decrypt are connected. > You can have a shared key with separate capabilities. > > Sending an signed key via encrypted mail does not ensure anything > about the key owner. Marcus and Ingo have very been helpful in providing pretty specific procedures that they've used (and documented) for key signing. I've read with interest the comments that you've made over the years as the topic of keysigning has come up and I'd be very appreciative if you could share a basic outline of the procedure you take or recommend. As I alluded to at the start of this thread, I've been volunteered to give a talk on the process and reason behind key signing at an upcoming meeting of my local LUG. I've been trying to find as many different peoples policies and procedures as I can prior to my presentation to a) refresh my memory and b) prepare for potential questions on why one might use a particular method. I highly respect the methods you've outlined on this list and I think the members of my local LUG could benefit greatly from being exposed to the policy/procedure for handling keys the come across at a key signing party. Thanks much for your efforts on GnuPG. Like OpenSSH, it's one of the applications that I use every single day and would have a hard time living without. - -- Todd OpenPGP -> KeyID: 0xD654075A | URL: www.pobox.com/~tmz/pgp ====================================================================== Life is the art of drawing without an eraser. -- John Gardner -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.4 (GNU/Linux) Comment: When crypto is outlawed bayl bhgynjf jvyy unir cevinpl. iG0EARECAC0FAkSvRTwmGGh0dHA6Ly93d3cucG9ib3guY29tL350bXovcGdwL3Rt ei5hc2MACgkQuv+09NZUB1oIFACg1o1VlJkJc3qnus5D24wxs1+c+nMAnif/DXQB GM8hQmMqt6RFQ6AxQObg =yZQj -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From michael.kallas at web.de Sat Jul 8 18:01:54 2006 From: michael.kallas at web.de (Michael Kallas) Date: Sat Jul 8 19:56:11 2006 Subject: Keysigning challenge policies/procedures In-Reply-To: <20060707211112.GC29516@jabberwocky.com> References: <20060706184506.GB12539__31031.8979471505$1152211719$gmane$org@psilocybe.teonanacatl.org> <20060707043104.GK12539__44517.2066022225$1152247059$gmane$org@psilocybe.teonanacatl.org> <20060707211112.GC29516@jabberwocky.com> Message-ID: <44AFD6F2.9060709@web.de> David Shaw schrieb: > I've been away on vacation and only picked up this thread now. This > statement is not correct. Back in the PGP 2.x days, this might have > been true, but with OpenPGP, there is no particular requirement that > the ability to sign and the ability to decrypt are connected. You can > have a shared key with separate capabilities. > > Sending an signed key via encrypted mail does not ensure anything > about the key owner. Why not? Sorry, this conclusion was too fast for me, could you please explain a little bit? Best wishes Michael -- Nobody can save your freedom but YOU - become a fellow of the FSF Europe! http://www.fsfe.org/en -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 256 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature Url : /pipermail/attachments/20060708/6d271fed/signature.pgp From alphasigmax at gmail.com Sun Jul 9 06:27:56 2006 From: alphasigmax at gmail.com (Alphax) Date: Sun Jul 9 06:29:47 2006 Subject: Keysigning challenge policies/procedures In-Reply-To: <44AFD6F2.9060709@web.de> References: <20060706184506.GB12539__31031.8979471505$1152211719$gmane$org@psilocybe.teonanacatl.org> <20060707043104.GK12539__44517.2066022225$1152247059$gmane$org@psilocybe.teonanacatl.org> <20060707211112.GC29516@jabberwocky.com> <44AFD6F2.9060709@web.de> Message-ID: <44B085CC.8090304@gmail.com> Michael Kallas wrote: > David Shaw schrieb: >> I've been away on vacation and only picked up this thread now. This >> statement is not correct. Back in the PGP 2.x days, this might have >> been true, but with OpenPGP, there is no particular requirement that >> the ability to sign and the ability to decrypt are connected. You can >> have a shared key with separate capabilities. >> >> Sending an signed key via encrypted mail does not ensure anything >> about the key owner. > Why not? > Sorry, this conclusion was too fast for me, could you please explain a > little bit? > Suppose you send an email to Address W and encrypt an "authentication token" to Key X. You recieve a reply from Address Y, containing the authentication token, which has been signed with Key Z. This tells you that /someone/ with access to W has recieved a message; /someone/ with access to X has decrypted it; /someone/ with access to Z has signed a reply; and /someone/ with access to Y has sent a reply. Keys X and Z may or may not be the same key or subkeys of the same primary key, addresses W and Y may or may not be the same, and Y may or may not have been faked (which is trivial). The "owners" of W, X, Y and Z could be four different people, or they might not be people at all; all you can really say about the "key owner" is that X is in contact with W and Z, and Z is in contact with X and Y. -- Alphax Death to all fanatics! Down with categorical imperative! OpenPGP key: http://tinyurl.com/lvq4g -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 564 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature Url : /pipermail/attachments/20060709/c8b64b0d/signature.pgp From michael.kallas at web.de Sun Jul 9 15:09:56 2006 From: michael.kallas at web.de (Michael Kallas) Date: Sun Jul 9 15:09:14 2006 Subject: Keysigning challenge policies/procedures In-Reply-To: <44B085CC.8090304@gmail.com> References: <20060706184506.GB12539__31031.8979471505$1152211719$gmane$org@psilocybe.teonanacatl.org> <20060707043104.GK12539__44517.2066022225$1152247059$gmane$org@psilocybe.teonanacatl.org> <20060707211112.GC29516@jabberwocky.com> <44AFD6F2.9060709@web.de> <44B085CC.8090304@gmail.com> Message-ID: <44B10024.9090807@web.de> Hi, Alphax schrieb: > Suppose you send an email to Address W and encrypt an "authentication > token" to Key X. You recieve a reply from Address Y, containing the > authentication token, which has been signed with Key Z. > > This tells you that /someone/ with access to W has recieved a message; > /someone/ with access to X has decrypted it; /someone/ with access to Z > has signed a reply; and /someone/ with access to Y has sent a reply. > > Keys X and Z may or may not be the same key or subkeys of the same > primary key, addresses W and Y may or may not be the same, and Y may or > may not have been faked (which is trivial). Couldn't I check this by looking at the public keys they published at key servers? Best wishes Michael -- Nobody can save your freedom but YOU - become a fellow of the FSF Europe! http://www.fsfe.org/en -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 256 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature Url : /pipermail/attachments/20060709/7ec64bb0/signature.pgp From kloecker at kde.org Sun Jul 9 14:20:50 2006 From: kloecker at kde.org (Ingo =?iso-8859-15?q?Kl=F6cker?=) Date: Sun Jul 9 15:55:44 2006 Subject: Keysigning challenge policies/procedures In-Reply-To: <44B085CC.8090304@gmail.com> References: <20060706184506.GB12539__31031.8979471505$1152211719$gmane$org@psilocybe.teonanacatl.org> <44AFD6F2.9060709@web.de> <44B085CC.8090304@gmail.com> Message-ID: <200607091420.50763@erwin.ingo-kloecker.de> On Sunday 09 July 2006 06:27, Alphax wrote: > Michael Kallas wrote: > > David Shaw schrieb: > >> I've been away on vacation and only picked up this thread now. > >> This statement is not correct. Back in the PGP 2.x days, this > >> might have been true, but with OpenPGP, there is no particular > >> requirement that the ability to sign and the ability to decrypt > >> are connected. You can have a shared key with separate > >> capabilities. > >> > >> Sending an signed key via encrypted mail does not ensure anything > >> about the key owner. > > > > Why not? > > Sorry, this conclusion was too fast for me, could you please > > explain a little bit? The key (i.e. the primary key) could belong to a group, but only one person of the group might be the key owner (i.e. have full access to the key) or even no member of the group might be the key owner, but only a superior entity like the company's CA. Moreover, each member of the group could have a separate encryption subkey. This example should explain why sending a signed key via encrypted mail doesn't ensure anything about the key owner. Of course, with respect to keys belonging to real persons rather than to entities/companies/etc. this example is probably not that convincing. > Suppose you send an email to Address W and encrypt an "authentication > token" to Key X. You recieve a reply from Address Y, containing the > authentication token, which has been signed with Key Z. > > This tells you that /someone/ with access to W has recieved a > message; /someone/ with access to X has decrypted it; /someone/ with > access to Z has signed a reply; and /someone/ with access to Y has > sent a reply. Except for the Y part this is correct. But the contents of the From address, i.e. Y, means absolutely nothing. > Keys X and Z may or may not be the same key or subkeys of the same > primary key, addresses W and Y may or may not be the same, and Y may > or may not have been faked (which is trivial). Exactly. And therefore you shouldn't have written above "and /someone/ with access to Y has sent a reply" because anyone could have sent the reply. Regards, Ingo -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 189 bytes Desc: not available Url : /pipermail/attachments/20060709/dc83d645/attachment.pgp From atom at smasher.org Tue Jul 11 06:58:01 2006 From: atom at smasher.org (Atom Smasher) Date: Tue Jul 11 06:56:58 2006 Subject: Keysigning challenge policies/procedures In-Reply-To: <20060706184506.GB12539@psilocybe.teonanacatl.org> References: <20060706184506.GB12539@psilocybe.teonanacatl.org> Message-ID: <20060711045806.19224.qmail@smasher.org> On Thu, 6 Jul 2006, Todd Zullinger wrote: > I was wondering if some folks here have detailed their challenge > policies and procedures and if you'd mind sharing them if you have? Even > handier would be some scripts to help in the automation of this task. > ;) ====================== pgp Key Signing Observations: Overlooked Social and Technical Considerations there's a few sections in that article that might be of interest. -- ...atom ________________________ http://atom.smasher.org/ 762A 3B98 A3C3 96C9 C6B7 582A B88D 52E4 D9F5 7808 ------------------------------------------------- "We in the West must bear in mind that the poor countries are poor primarily because we have exploited them through political or economic colonialism." -- Martin Luther King, Jr From j.lysdal at gmail.com Tue Jul 11 13:09:15 2006 From: j.lysdal at gmail.com (=?ISO-8859-1?Q?J=F8rgen_Lysdal?=) Date: Tue Jul 11 13:07:58 2006 Subject: show-photos off by defaulf, causes problem? Message-ID: <44B386DB.5030802@gmail.com> Recently, a friend had a problem with a key in his keyring that appeared to be valid. However he could not find any link between that key and his only ultimately trusted key. He removed all signatures from that key, but it still appeared to be valid. After importing the key into PGP i noticed that there was a photo uid that had the link between the keys that he could not find. Okay, maybe i missed something here, but could the problem be that show-photos was turned off? are there any good reasons this is turned off by default? --- show-photos Causes --list-keys, --list-sigs, --list-public- keys, and --list-secret-keys to display any photo IDs attached to the key. Defaults to no. See also --photo-viewer. - Jorgen Christiansen Lysdal j.lysdal(at)gmail.com 0x01331B97 / 0x972BF22A From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Tue Jul 11 13:53:00 2006 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Tue Jul 11 13:51:50 2006 Subject: show-photos off by defaulf, causes problem? In-Reply-To: <44B386DB.5030802@gmail.com> References: <44B386DB.5030802@gmail.com> Message-ID: <20060711115300.GB4513@jabberwocky.com> On Tue, Jul 11, 2006 at 01:09:15PM +0200, J?rgen Lysdal wrote: > Recently, a friend had a problem with a key in his keyring that appeared > to be valid. However he could not find any link between that key and his > only ultimately trusted key. He removed all signatures from that key, > but it still appeared to be valid. After importing the key into PGP i > noticed that there was a photo uid that had the link between the > keys that he could not find. > > Okay, maybe i missed something here, but could the problem be that > show-photos was turned off? I'm not sure. What was the problem here? David From j.lysdal at gmail.com Tue Jul 11 16:10:05 2006 From: j.lysdal at gmail.com (=?ISO-8859-1?Q?J=F8rgen_Lysdal?=) Date: Tue Jul 11 16:08:47 2006 Subject: show-photos off by defaulf, causes problem? In-Reply-To: <20060711115300.GB4513@jabberwocky.com> References: <44B386DB.5030802@gmail.com> <20060711115300.GB4513@jabberwocky.com> Message-ID: <44B3B13D.7030605@gmail.com> David Shaw wrote: > > I'm not sure. What was the problem here? > > David okay, made a mistake here... There is no problem. sry for wasting your time... (im hitting myself with the stupidity stick) From tmz at pobox.com Tue Jul 11 17:30:44 2006 From: tmz at pobox.com (Todd Zullinger) Date: Tue Jul 11 17:29:58 2006 Subject: Keysigning challenge policies/procedures In-Reply-To: <20060711045806.19224.qmail@smasher.org> References: <20060706184506.GB12539@psilocybe.teonanacatl.org> <20060711045806.19224.qmail@smasher.org> Message-ID: <20060711153044.GA25336@psilocybe.teonanacatl.org> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Atom Smasher wrote: > pgp Key Signing Observations: Overlooked Social and Technical > Considerations > > > there's a few sections in that article that might be of interest. Indeed, thank you Atom! I'll pass this link along for more information after my short talk. - -- Todd OpenPGP -> KeyID: 0xD654075A | URL: www.pobox.com/~tmz/pgp ====================================================================== Politicians are the same all over. They promise to build bridges even when there are no rivers. -- Nikita Khrushchev -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.4 (GNU/Linux) Comment: When crypto is outlawed bayl bhgynjf jvyy unir cevinpl. iG0EARECAC0FAkSzxCQmGGh0dHA6Ly93d3cucG9ib3guY29tL350bXovcGdwL3Rt ei5hc2MACgkQuv+09NZUB1ritwCeL/ePib2q8dHR4C97Y123fmAHj7cAn2O5jfDf eOZHarR6d6HWF8qYfYp6 =X0Vq -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From tony at tonywhitmore.co.uk Tue Jul 11 20:16:02 2006 From: tony at tonywhitmore.co.uk (Tony Whitmore) Date: Tue Jul 11 21:25:52 2006 Subject: Card readers supported by GPG's internal drivers Message-ID: <44B3EAE2.4040401@tonywhitmore.co.uk> Hi all, I've been playing around with an OpenGPG smartcard and card reader for the last few days, and have a few questions. Is there a compatibility list of drivers supported by GPG's internal card reader driver, other than the relevant part of the HOWTO? Do readers have to support a certain standard to be supported by GPG directly, or is support for each reader implemented individually? I have an ACS ACR30U reader[1] and have followed the HOWTOs instructions on setting up with udev. However, it doesn't seem to work with GPG directly: $ gpg --card-status gpg: pcsc_establish_context failed: no service (0x8010001d) gpg: card reader not available gpg: OpenPGP card not available: general error The reader does support PC/SC though, so I plan to try using PC/SC to access the card. BTW, the link to the gnupg-ccid file (NOT gnupg-ccid.rules) on the HOWTO links back to the HOWTO, not the file: http://www.gnupg.org/(en)/howtos/card-howto/en/smartcard-howto-single.html#id2501406 Thanks in advance for any help, Tony Whitmore [1] http://www.acs.com.hk/Product_Readers.asp?productID=53&PCate=Products_PC_Linked_SmartCard_Readers -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 254 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature Url : /pipermail/attachments/20060711/2092f751/signature.pgp From tony at tonywhitmore.co.uk Tue Jul 11 23:03:20 2006 From: tony at tonywhitmore.co.uk (Tony Whitmore) Date: Tue Jul 11 23:02:53 2006 Subject: Card readers supported by GPG's internal drivers In-Reply-To: <20060711201221.GU4206@mbwg.de> References: <44B3EAE2.4040401@tonywhitmore.co.uk> <20060711201221.GU4206@mbwg.de> Message-ID: <44B41218.5080305@tonywhitmore.co.uk> Matthias Kirschner wrote: > * Tony Whitmore [2006-07-11 19:16:02 +0100]: > >> $ gpg --card-status >> gpg: pcsc_establish_context failed: no service (0x8010001d) >> gpg: card reader not available >> gpg: OpenPGP card not available: general error > > Sorry, wrong link in my last e-mail. Please try this: > http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-devel/2006-July/023000.html Thanks Matze. I've removed the udev rules/script I had previously setup as per the HOWTO and substituted the rules you gave. I've symlinked them into /etc/udev/rules.d too and restarted udev, but get the same result. I'm running Ubuntu Dapper. Am I right in thinking the entries in /proc/bus/usb/XXX/XXX should be modified to match the rules (i.e. group scard, mode 644)? Because they don't seem to be: # ls -l /proc/bus/usb/002/021 -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 43 2006-07-11 21:58 /proc/bus/usb/002/021 I get the same failure as reported before even if I manually change the group and permissions on the device node. And yes, my user is in the scard group. :) FWIW, lsusb for the device reports: Bus 002 Device 021: ID 072f:0001 Advanced Card Systems, Ltd AC1030-based SmartCard Reader What can I try next? Thanks, Tony -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 254 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature Url : /pipermail/attachments/20060711/61663119/signature.pgp From Todd.Patrick at dtn.com Tue Jul 11 23:26:45 2006 From: Todd.Patrick at dtn.com (Todd Patrick) Date: Wed Jul 12 04:25:46 2006 Subject: How do I check if a file is a valid encrypted file before I decrypt it? Message-ID: <52C333133934CA4585938535BE63885C02389FD9@EX02.dtn.com> Version: gpg (GnuPG) 1.2.6 Copyright (C) 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc. This program comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY. This is free software, and you are welcome to redistribute it under certain conditions. See the file COPYING for details. Home: ~/.gnupg Supported algorithms: Pubkey: RSA, RSA-E, RSA-S, ELG-E, DSA, ELG Cipher: 3DES, CAST5, BLOWFISH, AES, AES192, AES256, TWOFISH Hash: MD5, SHA1, RIPEMD160, SHA256 Compression: Uncompressed, ZIP, ZLIB Summary: How do I check if a file is a valid encrypted file before I decrypt it? Issue: Before I decrypt a file, this file does have a .pgp extension, how do I know if it is a valid encrypted file before I decrypt it? Looking at the man pages, there is a --verify argument, but that deals with the sigfile and not an encrypted file. Basically, I'd like to check the file to make sure it was encrypted properly before I attempt to decrypt it. Suggestions, examples or thoughts are greatly appreciated. Thanks, --Todd From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Wed Jul 12 05:19:25 2006 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Wed Jul 12 05:55:58 2006 Subject: How do I check if a file is a valid encrypted file before I decrypt it? In-Reply-To: <52C333133934CA4585938535BE63885C02389FD9@EX02.dtn.com> References: <52C333133934CA4585938535BE63885C02389FD9@EX02.dtn.com> Message-ID: <44B46A3D.6080703@sixdemonbag.org> > Before I decrypt a file, this file does have a .pgp extension, how do I > know if it is a valid encrypted file before I decrypt it? I'm not sure what you're asking here, to be honest. What's an invalid encrypted file? If I send you an encrypted file containing nothing but random data, the successful decryption of the valid file will be statistically indistinguishable from trying to decrypt it with an incorrect session key. And in some other respects, the OpenPGP standard makes it very easy for an implementation to detect bad or corrupted data and to bail out early. So without knowing precisely what you mean by 'validity', I don't know what to tell you, I'm sorry. From wk at gnupg.org Wed Jul 12 09:05:58 2006 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Wed Jul 12 09:08:08 2006 Subject: Card readers supported by GPG's internal drivers In-Reply-To: <44B3EAE2.4040401@tonywhitmore.co.uk> (Tony Whitmore's message of "Tue, 11 Jul 2006 19:16:02 +0100") References: <44B3EAE2.4040401@tonywhitmore.co.uk> Message-ID: <87irm3fgkp.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> On Tue, 11 Jul 2006 20:16, Tony Whitmore said: > Is there a compatibility list of drivers supported by GPG's internal > card reader driver, other than the relevant part of the HOWTO? Do No there is no such list. This is becuase the driver implements the CCID specification with a few limitations (only T-1, auto-negoations required). It only a matter of the reader. > $ gpg --card-status > gpg: pcsc_establish_context failed: no service (0x8010001d) > gpg: card reader not available > gpg: OpenPGP card not available: general error Using --debug-ccid-driver will give more information. Shalom-Salam, Werner From benny at egovmt.com Tue Jul 11 21:38:23 2006 From: benny at egovmt.com (Benny Helms) Date: Wed Jul 12 11:05:36 2006 Subject: How to verify the file was successfully encrypted... Message-ID: <1152646703.5441.18.camel@localhost.localdomain> Hi folks. I've read the man page. I've read the FAQ's. I'm not seeing what I'm looking for. Using something like "zip", you can use a -T to test the integrity of the file. Note: this is not testing that nobody has altered it, or that it came from a specific user; it is only testing whether it is a good gpg file and whether it can be decrypted. All I can find in gpg is a way to verify the integrity vs. a signature file. I'm looking for a way to gpg encrypt a file, test that the encryption was good and that the file can be extracted, and then to delete the original file. Even better would be a way to automatically remove the original when the encrypted version has been successfully created, if such a parameter exists. At the very least, though, a way of testing that the file encryption was successful without having to sit at my desk at 3AM running 'gpg --decrypt filename' to test it would be very helpful. Is this something I'm just not seeing on the man page and in the FAQ's? Thanks! Benny Helms From tony at tonywhitmore.co.uk Wed Jul 12 09:28:38 2006 From: tony at tonywhitmore.co.uk (Tony Whitmore) Date: Wed Jul 12 11:55:50 2006 Subject: Card readers supported by GPG's internal drivers In-Reply-To: <87irm3fgkp.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> References: <44B3EAE2.4040401@tonywhitmore.co.uk> <87irm3fgkp.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> Message-ID: <20060712072838.GA23044@streetend.force9.co.uk> On Wed, Jul 12, 2006 at 09:05:58AM +0200, Werner Koch wrote: > On Tue, 11 Jul 2006 20:16, Tony Whitmore said: > > > Is there a compatibility list of drivers supported by GPG's internal > > card reader driver, other than the relevant part of the HOWTO? Do > > No there is no such list. This is becuase the driver implements the > CCID specification with a few limitations (only T-1, auto-negoations > required). It only a matter of the reader. Ah OK. It's not entirely clear from the spec of my reader whether it supports the CCID specification, although it does say it supports the T=1 protocol. > > $ gpg --card-status > > gpg: pcsc_establish_context failed: no service (0x8010001d) > > gpg: card reader not available > > gpg: OpenPGP card not available: general error > > Using --debug-ccid-driver will give more information. Not all that much more, I'm afraid. :) $ gpg --debug-ccid-driver --card-status gpg: DBG: ccid-driver: no CCID reader with number 0 gpg: pcsc_establish_context failed: no service (0x8010001d) gpg: card reader not available gpg: OpenPGP card not available: general error Running the command through an strace shows gpg trying to access device nodes directly (e.g. /dev/bus/usb/002/022) rather than entries in /proc/bus/usb as the HOWTO talks about. The device nodes are, by default, writeable only by root. But even with tweaked permissions and group ownership on the device node, the same error occurs. The difference is that instead of reporting "Permission denied" on the device node, strace shows: open("/dev/bus/usb/002/022", O_RDWR) = 3 ioctl(3, USBDEVFS_IOCTL, 0xbfe8ad20) = -1 ENOTTY (Inappropriate ioctl for device) If there are any more suggestions of what I can try, I'm all ears. :) Thanks, Tony -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 189 bytes Desc: Digital signature Url : /pipermail/attachments/20060712/16ab9117/attachment.pgp From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Wed Jul 12 12:14:03 2006 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Wed Jul 12 12:13:30 2006 Subject: How to verify the file was successfully encrypted... In-Reply-To: <1152646703.5441.18.camel@localhost.localdomain> References: <1152646703.5441.18.camel@localhost.localdomain> Message-ID: <44B4CB6B.4000107@sixdemonbag.org> Benny Helms wrote: > I'm looking for a way to gpg encrypt a file, test that the encryption > was good and that the file can be extracted, and then to delete the > original file. Forgive a silly question, but what's wrong with decrypting the file as a way of verifying the encryption worked? > At the very least, though, a way of testing that the file encryption was > successful without having to sit at my desk at 3AM running 'gpg > --decrypt filename' to test it would be very helpful. If you're already sitting at your desk at 3AM doing encryptions, then doing a decryption shouldn't be a terrible additional step. If you've got a Perl script that's doing the encryptions, then have your Perl script do the verification step, too. From alex at bofh.net.pl Wed Jul 12 12:25:09 2006 From: alex at bofh.net.pl (Janusz A. Urbanowicz) Date: Wed Jul 12 12:24:06 2006 Subject: How to verify the file was successfully encrypted... In-Reply-To: <1152646703.5441.18.camel@localhost.localdomain> References: <1152646703.5441.18.camel@localhost.localdomain> Message-ID: <20060712102509.GM3704@hell.pl> On Tue, Jul 11, 2006 at 01:38:23PM -0600, Benny Helms wrote: > Hi folks. > > I've read the man page. I've read the FAQ's. I'm not seeing what I'm > looking for. > > Using something like "zip", you can use a -T to test the integrity of > the file. Note: this is not testing that nobody has altered it, or that > it came from a specific user; it is only testing whether it is a good > gpg file and whether it can be decrypted. All I can find in gpg is a > way to verify the integrity vs. a signature file. > > I'm looking for a way to gpg encrypt a file, test that the encryption > was good and that the file can be extracted, and then to delete the > original file. What is your actual threat model here? The simplest answer is to check gpg's rc after the encryption run. From broonie at sirena.org.uk Wed Jul 12 13:02:12 2006 From: broonie at sirena.org.uk (Mark Brown) Date: Wed Jul 12 13:03:17 2006 Subject: Card readers supported by GPG's internal drivers In-Reply-To: <44B41218.5080305@tonywhitmore.co.uk> References: <44B3EAE2.4040401@tonywhitmore.co.uk> <20060711201221.GU4206@mbwg.de> <44B41218.5080305@tonywhitmore.co.uk> Message-ID: <20060712110212.GA1808@sirena.org.uk> On Tue, Jul 11, 2006 at 10:03:20PM +0100, Tony Whitmore wrote: > I'm running Ubuntu Dapper. Am I right in thinking the entries in > /proc/bus/usb/XXX/XXX should be modified to match the rules (i.e. group > scard, mode 644)? Because they don't seem to be: Current systems with udev should use somewhere obviously named in /dev by default, with libusb preferring them. It's those that get their permissions changed. There are unresolvable races with using /proc. -- "You grabbed my hand and we fell into it, like a daydream - or a fever." From tony at tonywhitmore.co.uk Wed Jul 12 13:22:28 2006 From: tony at tonywhitmore.co.uk (Tony Whitmore) Date: Wed Jul 12 13:21:37 2006 Subject: Card readers supported by GPG's internal drivers In-Reply-To: <20060712110212.GA1808@sirena.org.uk> References: <44B3EAE2.4040401@tonywhitmore.co.uk> <20060711201221.GU4206@mbwg.de> <44B41218.5080305@tonywhitmore.co.uk> <20060712110212.GA1808@sirena.org.uk> Message-ID: <20060712112228.GB23422@streetend.force9.co.uk> On Wed, Jul 12, 2006 at 12:02:12PM +0100, Mark Brown wrote: > On Tue, Jul 11, 2006 at 10:03:20PM +0100, Tony Whitmore wrote: > > > I'm running Ubuntu Dapper. Am I right in thinking the entries in > > /proc/bus/usb/XXX/XXX should be modified to match the rules (i.e. group > > scard, mode 644)? Because they don't seem to be: > > Current systems with udev should use somewhere obviously named in /dev > by default, with libusb preferring them. It's those that get their > permissions changed. There are unresolvable races with using /proc. Thanks for confirming this Mark. It's what I had suspected from the strace output [1]. gpg is certainly looking at entires in /dev/bus/usb when it runs, and doesn't seem to reference /proc at all. Having changed the permissions on the relevant device node, it hasn't changed the situation. Thanks, Tony [1] http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/2006-July/028983.html -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 189 bytes Desc: Digital signature Url : /pipermail/attachments/20060712/335a09c8/attachment.pgp From benny at egovmt.com Wed Jul 12 18:57:45 2006 From: benny at egovmt.com (Benny Helms) Date: Wed Jul 12 18:56:38 2006 Subject: How to verify the file was successfully encrypted... In-Reply-To: <44B4CB6B.4000107@sixdemonbag.org> References: <1152646703.5441.18.camel@localhost.localdomain> <44B4CB6B.4000107@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <1152723465.5417.92.camel@localhost.localdomain> On Wed, 2006-07-12 at 05:14 -0500, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > Benny Helms wrote: > > I'm looking for a way to gpg encrypt a file, test that the encryption > > was good and that the file can be extracted, and then to delete the > > original file. > > Forgive a silly question, but what's wrong with decrypting the file as a > way of verifying the encryption worked? Sorry. I guess I should have given more details. I was just hoping the bare minimum info would be enough because somebody would say, "Oh, that's easy! All you do is..." I have a server with files that are created on a daily basis. Many files. I've reached a point where I want to have those files encrypted each night to prevent security breaches. My intent is to encrypt the file and delete the original. However, if I do that, and then go back a week later to obtain some data from that file, and it says, "Whoa, dude! This gpg file seems to be hosed. I can't open it!", I'm absolutely screwed because our contract requires eternal data retention on some if this stuff. Losing data is unacceptable. But at the same time, having an encrypted version and an unencryted version is equally unacceptable. Basically, I'm looking for a *scripted* way to verify that the newly created gpg file is in good condition and I'll be able to open it at a later date if needed, BEFORE I delete the original file. Frankly, I'm surprised that's not a standard built-in function in gpg. Bzip2 will bzip a file, and only after successfully completing the task, it will automatically delete the original and leave only the bz2 version in place. That's the basic functionality I'm looking for. And I definitely want it to be able to do the job in a script because I don't have a life as it is, let alone sitting here manually decrypting file after file to test their usability in the wee hours of the morning when I should be home with my family. Make sense? > If you've got a Perl script that's doing the encryptions, then have your > Perl script do the verification step, too. I'm doing this with a plain old bash script. Basically... for file in "list of files" do gpg -r username -z 9 --encrypt $file done Benny From benny at egovmt.com Wed Jul 12 18:59:52 2006 From: benny at egovmt.com (Benny Helms) Date: Wed Jul 12 18:58:36 2006 Subject: How to verify the file was successfully encrypted... In-Reply-To: <20060712102509.GM3704@hell.pl> References: <1152646703.5441.18.camel@localhost.localdomain> <20060712102509.GM3704@hell.pl> Message-ID: <1152723593.5417.96.camel@localhost.localdomain> On Wed, 2006-07-12 at 12:25 +0200, Janusz A. Urbanowicz wrote: > On Tue, Jul 11, 2006 at 01:38:23PM -0600, Benny Helms wrote: > What is your actual threat model here? > > The simplest answer is to check gpg's rc after the encryption run. Before deleting original file, I must make certain encrypted version is in good shape so I can open it at a later date and obtain data. If it is broken, I'm in deep monkey muffins. That's the threat model. Can you please explain what you mean by "check the gpg's rc after the encryption run?" I'm unfamilar with the meaning of "rc" in this case. Thanks! Benny From benny at egovmt.com Wed Jul 12 19:57:21 2006 From: benny at egovmt.com (Benny Helms) Date: Wed Jul 12 19:56:06 2006 Subject: How to verify the file was successfully encrypted... In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <1152727042.5417.103.camel@localhost.localdomain> On Wed, 2006-07-12 at 13:23 -0400, Mark Hardman wrote: > If you're using bash, can't you just script it like this... > > 1. encrypt to gpg > 2. decrypt to text (or whatever it was originally) with altered file > name (filename.test_decrypt) > 3. do a diff between the original file and the newly decrypted file > (versions of diff I've used work on binary files, too, but you might > want to test this) > 4. if there are no differences, delete original file and test decrypt > file, leaving only the encrypted gpg file > > Would that get what you're looking for? > > Take care. > mark Thank you for the reply, Mark. Yes, that would definitely do the trick. I guess I need to go to the FAQ to discover how to safely put a password into a scripted activity since each decryption requires a password. Check me on this, though. Is there any error checking in gnupg when creating a file? Is it safe to assume that if the job completes, the file is usable? This method you've described will definitely work, but it seems like a lot more CPU cycles and a lot more time involved in the script than should be necessary. Should I be submitting a "wish" to the developer list? Benny From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Wed Jul 12 20:06:41 2006 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Wed Jul 12 20:05:22 2006 Subject: How to verify the file was successfully encrypted... In-Reply-To: <1152727042.5417.103.camel@localhost.localdomain> References: <1152727042.5417.103.camel@localhost.localdomain> Message-ID: <20060712180641.GC18687@jabberwocky.com> On Wed, Jul 12, 2006 at 11:57:21AM -0600, Benny Helms wrote: > On Wed, 2006-07-12 at 13:23 -0400, Mark Hardman wrote: > > If you're using bash, can't you just script it like this... > > > > 1. encrypt to gpg > > 2. decrypt to text (or whatever it was originally) with altered file > > name (filename.test_decrypt) > > 3. do a diff between the original file and the newly decrypted file > > (versions of diff I've used work on binary files, too, but you might > > want to test this) > > 4. if there are no differences, delete original file and test decrypt > > file, leaving only the encrypted gpg file > > > > Would that get what you're looking for? > > > > Take care. > > mark > > Thank you for the reply, Mark. Yes, that would definitely do the trick. > I guess I need to go to the FAQ to discover how to safely put a password > into a scripted activity since each decryption requires a password. > > Check me on this, though. Is there any error checking in gnupg when > creating a file? Is it safe to assume that if the job completes, the > file is usable? This method you've described will definitely work, but > it seems like a lot more CPU cycles and a lot more time involved in the > script than should be necessary. Should I be submitting a "wish" to the > developer list? There is no way to design such a self-check. This isn't a lack in GnuPG, but a design impossibility for any program. Think about it: a "check mode" would try and account for a bug in GnuPG and warn you that the file was not encrypted properly. However, if you're presuming a bug, then who says you should trust the check mode? If GnuPG completes successfully, that means it succeeded. If you want more assurance than that, the only way to do it is to decrypt the file and compare. David From jon at jrock.us Wed Jul 12 20:11:20 2006 From: jon at jrock.us (Jonathan Rockway) Date: Wed Jul 12 20:47:34 2006 Subject: How to verify the file was successfully encrypted... In-Reply-To: <20060712180641.GC18687@jabberwocky.com> References: <1152727042.5417.103.camel@localhost.localdomain> <20060712180641.GC18687@jabberwocky.com> Message-ID: <44B53B48.8010909@jrock.us> > There is no way to design such a self-check. This isn't a lack in > GnuPG, but a design impossibility for any program. Think about it: a > "check mode" would try and account for a bug in GnuPG and warn you > that the file was not encrypted properly. However, if you're > presuming a bug, then who says you should trust the check mode? > > If GnuPG completes successfully, that means it succeeded. If you want > more assurance than that, the only way to do it is to decrypt the file > and compare. > If you wanted to be really sure that GPG didn't mess something else, try decrypting it with some other OpenPGP implementation. If you're using perl, use Crypt::OpenPGP. (And Text::Diff to do your diff, and File::Slurp to read in the files for Text::Diff :) BTW, why are you encrypting these files anyway? If someone broke into your computer they could just steal the crypto key too. Regards, Jonathan Rockway From jbloss at tampabay.rr.com Wed Jul 12 21:13:58 2006 From: jbloss at tampabay.rr.com (Jeffrey F. Bloss) Date: Wed Jul 12 21:12:59 2006 Subject: How to verify the file was successfully encrypted... In-Reply-To: <1152727042.5417.103.camel@localhost.localdomain> References: <1152727042.5417.103.camel@localhost.localdomain> Message-ID: <20060712151358.5b5593c9@localhost.localdomain> Benny Helms wrote: First off, I hope you've considered that gpg is doing what it's suppose to do and you're really trying to break it. If your encrypted files are "corrupt" at a later date, maybe you have another problem and don't *want* to make it just go away. IOW, be cautious that a solution doesn't weaken your security. ;) > Thank you for the reply, Mark. Yes, that would definitely do the > trick. I guess I need to go to the FAQ to discover how to safely put > a password into a scripted activity since each decryption requires a > password. Don't know if this will help or not, but I just did a quick test with GnuPG 1.4.4 and the --dry-run command line switch seem to work fine. Outputs to stdout rather than writing a file to disk. I changed a single bit in an encrypted (armored) file and tried it, and got a "CRC error" without entering any pass phrase at all. That's with -vv set in my options file, FWIW. And bleeding edge hash/cypher algorithms. Additionally, you can enter a pass phrase on the command line with the --passphrase switch. I tested it with both known good and known bad encrypted files, and if you enter a bogus/incorrect pass phrase for a known good file you get a "bad passphrase" error. With a known bad encrypted file you get the same "CRC error". Neither one requires any user input, which is what you want. IOW, if you... gpg -d --dry-run --passphrase boguspassphrase bad-file.asc You get the "CRC error", but if you... gpg -d --dry-run --passphrase boguspassphrase good-file.asc You get the "bad passphrase". The down side is, both are exit code '2', so you'd have to grep for the "verbal" response to tell the difference. But that's not a major hurdle and it should be trivial to "if $?" grep return codes into something useful. The other down side is this doesn't explicitly tell you if you have a *good* encrypted file, it only picks out a couple errors. To do that you'd have to either be sitting there entering pass phrases, or include them in your script. Probably not where you'd want to go with this. :( -- Hand crafted on 12 July, 2006 at 14:36:55 EDT Outside of a dog, a book is a man's best friend. Inside of a dog, it's too dark to read. -Groucho Marx -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 892 bytes Desc: not available Url : /pipermail/attachments/20060712/fc8b31e5/signature-0001.pgp From tmz at pobox.com Wed Jul 12 21:09:56 2006 From: tmz at pobox.com (Todd Zullinger) Date: Wed Jul 12 21:42:36 2006 Subject: How to verify the file was successfully encrypted... In-Reply-To: <44B53B48.8010909@jrock.us> References: <1152727042.5417.103.camel@localhost.localdomain> <20060712180641.GC18687@jabberwocky.com> <44B53B48.8010909@jrock.us> Message-ID: <20060712190956.GH24448@psilocybe.teonanacatl.org> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Jonathan Rockway wrote: > BTW, why are you encrypting these files anyway? If someone broke into > your computer they could just steal the crypto key too. True, unless the private key isn't kept on the same machine. Which also would negate the ability to decrypt the file on the server to verify that the encryption was successful. :) - -- Todd OpenPGP -> KeyID: 0xD654075A | URL: www.pobox.com/~tmz/pgp ====================================================================== Those who have been intoxicated with power... can never willingly abandon it. -- Edmund Burke -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.4 (GNU/Linux) Comment: When crypto is outlawed bayl bhgynjf jvyy unir cevinpl. iG0EARECAC0FAkS1SQQmGGh0dHA6Ly93d3cucG9ib3guY29tL350bXovcGdwL3Rt ei5hc2MACgkQuv+09NZUB1otkgCgnP7KTsByYiIOddJmAG7HNyB+JA4AniX2DvJw d0uPX2K0oA+DO8iZ5K4x =YnXM -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From benny at egovmt.com Wed Jul 12 22:59:38 2006 From: benny at egovmt.com (Benny Helms) Date: Wed Jul 12 22:58:45 2006 Subject: How to verify the file was successfully encrypted... In-Reply-To: <44B53B48.8010909@jrock.us> References: <1152727042.5417.103.camel@localhost.localdomain> <20060712180641.GC18687@jabberwocky.com> <44B53B48.8010909@jrock.us> Message-ID: <1152737978.5417.153.camel@localhost.localdomain> On Wed, 2006-07-12 at 13:11 -0500, Jonathan Rockway wrote: > > BTW, why are you encrypting these files anyway? If someone broke into > your computer they could just steal the crypto key too. Excellent question! Truth be told, as soon as they are encrypted, they're being moved to another server in another location, and then are being burned to CD and moved to a safety deposit box. Benny From benny at egovmt.com Thu Jul 13 00:23:45 2006 From: benny at egovmt.com (Benny Helms) Date: Thu Jul 13 00:22:51 2006 Subject: How to verify the file was successfully encrypted... In-Reply-To: <20060712151358.5b5593c9@localhost.localdomain> References: <1152727042.5417.103.camel@localhost.localdomain> <20060712151358.5b5593c9@localhost.localdomain> Message-ID: <1152743025.5417.169.camel@localhost.localdomain> On Wed, 2006-07-12 at 15:13 -0400, Jeffrey F. Bloss wrote: > Benny Helms wrote: > > > Don't know if this will help or not, but I just did a quick test with > GnuPG 1.4.4 and the --dry-run command line switch seem to work fine. > Outputs to stdout rather than writing a file to disk. I changed a > single bit in an encrypted (armored) file and tried it, and got a "CRC > error" without entering any pass phrase at all. > > That's with -vv set in my options file, FWIW. And bleeding edge > hash/cypher algorithms. > > Additionally, you can enter a pass phrase on the command line with the > --passphrase switch. I tested it with both known good and known bad > encrypted files, and if you enter a bogus/incorrect pass phrase for a > known good file you get a "bad passphrase" error. With a known bad > encrypted file you get the same "CRC error". Neither one requires any > user input, which is what you want. > > IOW, if you... > > gpg -d --dry-run --passphrase boguspassphrase bad-file.asc > > You get the "CRC error", but if you... > > gpg -d --dry-run --passphrase boguspassphrase good-file.asc > > You get the "bad passphrase". > > The down side is, both are exit code '2', so you'd have to grep for the > "verbal" response to tell the difference. But that's not a major hurdle > and it should be trivial to "if $?" grep return codes into something > useful. > > The other down side is this doesn't explicitly tell you if you have a > *good* encrypted file, it only picks out a couple errors. To do that > you'd have to either be sitting there entering pass phrases, or include > them in your script. Probably not where you'd want to go with this. :( Thanks Jeffrey. Excellent suggestion. This worked well with a .asc file, but not with a .gpg file. Does anyone on the list have a preference for .asc vs .gpg output? Pros? Cons? The size is almost twice as big as a .gpg at this time, which is a definite con. But there are probably some serious pros as well. Input? Benny From j.lysdal at gmail.com Thu Jul 13 00:36:49 2006 From: j.lysdal at gmail.com (=?ISO-8859-1?Q?J=F8rgen_Lysdal?=) Date: Thu Jul 13 00:36:24 2006 Subject: How to verify the file was successfully encrypted... In-Reply-To: <1152723465.5417.92.camel@localhost.localdomain> References: <1152646703.5441.18.camel@localhost.localdomain> <44B4CB6B.4000107@sixdemonbag.org> <1152723465.5417.92.camel@localhost.localdomain> Message-ID: <44B57981.8070503@gmail.com> This might be a hard one. When you encrypt to a public key, there is no way gpg can decrypt it, to verify that it can be decrypted, unless it can unlock the private key with your password. The only way i see, is that gpg would have to encrypt 2 times and compare the results. But then again, the same error might happen twice. Does this make any sense? i don't know, this was just what im thinking. From alphasigmax at gmail.com Thu Jul 13 07:31:31 2006 From: alphasigmax at gmail.com (Alphax) Date: Thu Jul 13 07:53:13 2006 Subject: How to verify the file was successfully encrypted... In-Reply-To: <1152743025.5417.169.camel@localhost.localdomain> References: <1152727042.5417.103.camel@localhost.localdomain> <20060712151358.5b5593c9@localhost.localdomain> <1152743025.5417.169.camel@localhost.localdomain> Message-ID: <44B5DAB3.2030103@gmail.com> Benny Helms wrote: > On Wed, 2006-07-12 at 15:13 -0400, Jeffrey F. Bloss wrote: >> Benny Helms wrote: >> >> > >> Don't know if this will help or not, but I just did a quick test with >> GnuPG 1.4.4 and the --dry-run command line switch seem to work fine. >> Outputs to stdout rather than writing a file to disk. I changed a >> single bit in an encrypted (armored) file and tried it, and got a "CRC >> error" without entering any pass phrase at all. >> >> That's with -vv set in my options file, FWIW. And bleeding edge >> hash/cypher algorithms. >> >> Additionally, you can enter a pass phrase on the command line with the >> --passphrase switch. I tested it with both known good and known bad >> encrypted files, and if you enter a bogus/incorrect pass phrase for a >> known good file you get a "bad passphrase" error. With a known bad >> encrypted file you get the same "CRC error". Neither one requires any >> user input, which is what you want. >> >> IOW, if you... >> >> gpg -d --dry-run --passphrase boguspassphrase bad-file.asc >> >> You get the "CRC error", but if you... >> >> gpg -d --dry-run --passphrase boguspassphrase good-file.asc >> >> You get the "bad passphrase". >> >> The down side is, both are exit code '2', so you'd have to grep for the >> "verbal" response to tell the difference. But that's not a major hurdle >> and it should be trivial to "if $?" grep return codes into something >> useful. >> >> The other down side is this doesn't explicitly tell you if you have a >> *good* encrypted file, it only picks out a couple errors. To do that >> you'd have to either be sitting there entering pass phrases, or include >> them in your script. Probably not where you'd want to go with this. :( > > Thanks Jeffrey. Excellent suggestion. This worked well with a .asc > file, but not with a .gpg file. Does anyone on the list have a > preference for .asc vs .gpg output? Pros? Cons? The size is almost > twice as big as a .gpg at this time, which is a definite con. But there > are probably some serious pros as well. Input? > .asc files are immune to mangling of CR/LF characters which may be present in binary data, which often happens when you transfer via email or FTP. -- Alphax Death to all fanatics! Down with categorical imperative! OpenPGP key: http://tinyurl.com/lvq4g -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 564 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature Url : /pipermail/attachments/20060713/95e9c8cc/signature.pgp From laurent.jumet at skynet.be Thu Jul 13 11:15:14 2006 From: laurent.jumet at skynet.be (Laurent Jumet) Date: Thu Jul 13 11:17:20 2006 Subject: Manual for GnuPG 1.4.4 Message-ID: Hello ! Here, you can download the manual for GnuPG 1.4.4 formated in a printable way, in 12 pages: http://users.skynet.be/laurent.jumet/MyMan_GnuPG-144.pdf -- Laurent Jumet KeyID: 0xCFAF704C From samuel at Update.UU.SE Thu Jul 13 23:15:42 2006 From: samuel at Update.UU.SE (Samuel ]slund) Date: Thu Jul 13 23:14:34 2006 Subject: How to verify the file was successfully encrypted... In-Reply-To: <1152723593.5417.96.camel@localhost.localdomain> References: <1152646703.5441.18.camel@localhost.localdomain> <20060712102509.GM3704@hell.pl> <1152723593.5417.96.camel@localhost.localdomain> Message-ID: <20060713211542.GB20017@Update.UU.SE> On Wed, Jul 12, 2006 at 10:59:52AM -0600, Benny Helms wrote: > On Wed, 2006-07-12 at 12:25 +0200, Janusz A. Urbanowicz wrote: > > On Tue, Jul 11, 2006 at 01:38:23PM -0600, Benny Helms wrote: > > > What is your actual threat model here? > > > > The simplest answer is to check gpg's rc after the encryption run. > > Before deleting original file, I must make certain encrypted version is > in good shape so I can open it at a later date and obtain data. If it > is broken, I'm in deep monkey muffins. That's the threat model. If I read this thread right you actually wnt to make a decryption and compare the results and you do _not_ want to keep the private key on that machine. Could you do something creative with --show-session-key to be able to decrypt each file once w.o. risking your private key? HTH //Samuel From tony at tonywhitmore.co.uk Thu Jul 13 23:44:21 2006 From: tony at tonywhitmore.co.uk (Tony Whitmore) Date: Thu Jul 13 23:43:45 2006 Subject: Card readers supported by GPG's internal drivers In-Reply-To: <44B4CBC6.6090501@jrock.us> References: <44B3EAE2.4040401@tonywhitmore.co.uk> <87irm3fgkp.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> <20060712072838.GA23044@streetend.force9.co.uk> <44B4CBC6.6090501@jrock.us> Message-ID: <44B6BEB5.7000007@tonywhitmore.co.uk> On Wed, Jul 12, 2006 at 05:15:34AM -0500, Jonathan Rockway wrote: >> Two possible options: >> First, if you're using CCID, does your user have proper write permission >> to the /dev/usb node? (Maybe try sudo gpg --card-status?) Yes, I've been manually changing the permissions on the device nodes to give the scard group (of which my user account is a member) read-write access. But this hasn't changed anything. (Running using sudo has the same output with the addition of a line warning about ownership of ~/.gnupg/gpg.conf. >> Secondly, have you tried pcscd? Install that, start the daemon, then >> run a tool like pcsc_scan (comes with debian's pcscd package, IIRC). >> Between pcsc_scan's output and pcscd's logfile, you might have much >> better luck debugging. For my card reader (built-in to my Dell laptop), >> I had to configure pcscd to "use buggy drivers" since apparently my card >> reader was untested. It works fine, and now I use my OpenPGP card for >> signing mail and logging into machines via ssh. Yes, I've tried pcscd. Sadly the licence of the driver for my smartcard reader is unclear (the LICENCE file is missing from the download .zip file). The card was certainly detected by pcscd but I had problems completing very basic steps - pcscd segfaulted when I tried to set my name on the card. So I wanted to see if I could get the gpg internal system working as (potentially) the easiest route! Thanks, Tony -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 254 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature Url : /pipermail/attachments/20060713/d0661ed2/signature.pgp From peter at palfrader.org Fri Jul 14 00:32:39 2006 From: peter at palfrader.org (Peter Palfrader) Date: Fri Jul 14 00:31:17 2006 Subject: [Sks-devel] key too large? In-Reply-To: <20060713222843.GA3910@asteria.noreply.org> References: <20060713222843.GA3910@asteria.noreply.org> Message-ID: <20060713223239.GB3910@asteria.noreply.org> On Fri, 14 Jul 2006, Peter Palfrader wrote: > I wonder if my key is too large for SKS to like: > > weasel@galaxy:~$ gpg --send 94c09c7f > gpg: sending key 94C09C7F to hkp server keyserver.noreply.org > gpgkeys: HTTP post error 22: url returned error 500 > gpgkeys: no KEY 94c09c7f END found > gpg: keyserver internal error > gpg: keyserver send failed: keyserver error > > If so, maybe we could patch SKS to allow larger keys? *sigh* Actually this appears to be a GnuPG problem? ./keyserver/gpgkeys_hkp.c: fprintf(console,"gpgkeys: no KEY %s END found\n",keyid); -- | .''`. ** Debian GNU/Linux ** Peter Palfrader | : :' : The universal http://www.palfrader.org/ | `. `' Operating System | `- http://www.debian.org/ From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Fri Jul 14 00:45:07 2006 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Fri Jul 14 00:43:49 2006 Subject: [Sks-devel] key too large? In-Reply-To: <20060713223239.GB3910@asteria.noreply.org> References: <20060713222843.GA3910@asteria.noreply.org> <20060713223239.GB3910@asteria.noreply.org> Message-ID: <20060713224507.GC22711@jabberwocky.com> On Fri, Jul 14, 2006 at 12:32:39AM +0200, Peter Palfrader wrote: > On Fri, 14 Jul 2006, Peter Palfrader wrote: > > > I wonder if my key is too large for SKS to like: > > > > weasel@galaxy:~$ gpg --send 94c09c7f > > gpg: sending key 94C09C7F to hkp server keyserver.noreply.org > > gpgkeys: HTTP post error 22: url returned error 500 > > gpgkeys: no KEY 94c09c7f END found > > gpg: keyserver internal error > > gpg: keyserver send failed: keyserver error > > > > If so, maybe we could patch SKS to allow larger keys? > > *sigh* > > Actually this appears to be a GnuPG problem? Version? At least for the recent code, It's very hard to see how you got that error. The code just doesn't flow that way. David From peter at palfrader.org Fri Jul 14 01:12:10 2006 From: peter at palfrader.org (Peter Palfrader) Date: Fri Jul 14 01:10:45 2006 Subject: [Sks-devel] key too large? In-Reply-To: <20060713224507.GC22711@jabberwocky.com> References: <20060713222843.GA3910@asteria.noreply.org> <20060713223239.GB3910@asteria.noreply.org> <20060713224507.GC22711@jabberwocky.com> Message-ID: <20060713231210.GD3910@asteria.noreply.org> On Thu, 13 Jul 2006, David Shaw wrote: > On Fri, Jul 14, 2006 at 12:32:39AM +0200, Peter Palfrader wrote: > > On Fri, 14 Jul 2006, Peter Palfrader wrote: > > > > > I wonder if my key is too large for SKS to like: > > > > > > weasel@galaxy:~$ gpg --send 94c09c7f > > > gpg: sending key 94C09C7F to hkp server keyserver.noreply.org > > > gpgkeys: HTTP post error 22: url returned error 500 > > > gpgkeys: no KEY 94c09c7f END found > > > gpg: keyserver internal error > > > gpg: keyserver send failed: keyserver error > > > > > > If so, maybe we could patch SKS to allow larger keys? > > > > *sigh* > > > > Actually this appears to be a GnuPG problem? > > Version? At least for the recent code, It's very hard to see how you > got that error. The code just doesn't flow that way. gpg (GnuPG) 1.4.4-cvs, looks like a snapshot built around April 5th, probably r4114. I don't see the problem on a different host with what is quite likely r4189. -- | .''`. ** Debian GNU/Linux ** Peter Palfrader | : :' : The universal http://www.palfrader.org/ | `. `' Operating System | `- http://www.debian.org/ From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Fri Jul 14 02:08:38 2006 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Fri Jul 14 02:07:28 2006 Subject: [Sks-devel] key too large? In-Reply-To: <20060713231210.GD3910@asteria.noreply.org> References: <20060713222843.GA3910@asteria.noreply.org> <20060713223239.GB3910@asteria.noreply.org> <20060713224507.GC22711@jabberwocky.com> <20060713231210.GD3910@asteria.noreply.org> Message-ID: <20060714000838.GA22848@jabberwocky.com> On Fri, Jul 14, 2006 at 01:12:10AM +0200, Peter Palfrader wrote: > On Thu, 13 Jul 2006, David Shaw wrote: > > > On Fri, Jul 14, 2006 at 12:32:39AM +0200, Peter Palfrader wrote: > > > On Fri, 14 Jul 2006, Peter Palfrader wrote: > > > > > > > I wonder if my key is too large for SKS to like: > > > > > > > > weasel@galaxy:~$ gpg --send 94c09c7f > > > > gpg: sending key 94C09C7F to hkp server keyserver.noreply.org > > > > gpgkeys: HTTP post error 22: url returned error 500 > > > > gpgkeys: no KEY 94c09c7f END found > > > > gpg: keyserver internal error > > > > gpg: keyserver send failed: keyserver error > > > > > > > > If so, maybe we could patch SKS to allow larger keys? > > > > > > *sigh* > > > > > > Actually this appears to be a GnuPG problem? > > > > Version? At least for the recent code, It's very hard to see how you > > got that error. The code just doesn't flow that way. > > gpg (GnuPG) 1.4.4-cvs, looks like a snapshot built around April 5th, > probably r4114. > > I don't see the problem on a different host with what is quite likely > r4189. There are no meaningful changes in gpgkeys_hkp between those two revisions. Can you reproduce this with --keyserver-options "use-temp-files keep-temp-files" and send me the temp file? David From vladimir at doisan.com Fri Jul 14 02:31:39 2006 From: vladimir at doisan.com (Vladimir Doisan) Date: Fri Jul 14 03:49:08 2006 Subject: How to verify the file was successfully encrypted... In-Reply-To: <44B57981.8070503@gmail.com> References: <1152646703.5441.18.camel@localhost.localdomain> <44B4CB6B.4000107@sixdemonbag.org> <1152723465.5417.92.camel@localhost.localdomain> <44B57981.8070503@gmail.com> Message-ID: <44B6E5EB.9010203@doisan.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 You will have to just trust GPG as I do not think that such checking is possible to do in a secure manner. At my org, I am using GPG to encrypt all backups. To ensure that the code does not contain bugs, I wait for ~ a month before upgrading the GPG release. After an upgrade, I perform several backup+encrypt+decrypt+restore+check to make sure nothing is borked. I lock in the version and use that for a while. I do not worry about daily backups, but each quarterly backup, I encrypt it, decrypt it and verify it manually. The user base of GnuPG is huge, and any serious bugs in the code will be weeded out very quickly by the beta testers and early adopters. Invalid encryptions is a VERY serious bug. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.3 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iD8DBQFEtuXrNR4PQ6HVpW0RAkGuAKDflrwOXTRc521Mhj0StDSriiaDdgCg1JMD kkmh4QPGGJ45njeUsC4Cry8= =R6vH -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From home at tristanwilliams.com Fri Jul 14 08:51:52 2006 From: home at tristanwilliams.com (Tristan Williams) Date: Fri Jul 14 08:53:06 2006 Subject: Moving computers with an OpenPGP card Message-ID: <20060714065152.GA3266@g3.spring.org> Hello, Is it possible to arrive at a new computer which has a known working card reader and installation of gpg with only your OpenPGP card and be able to sign/encrypt? i.e arrive at computer, download and import your public key, insert smart card and then be able to sign/encrypt? I have not been able to do this (though by copying my secring.gpg which has the key stub I can) and wondered whether it was possible? Kind regards Tristan Williams From sadam at CLEMSON.EDU Wed Jul 12 22:19:36 2006 From: sadam at CLEMSON.EDU (Adam Schreiber) Date: Fri Jul 14 13:56:00 2006 Subject: Calculating Buffer Size Message-ID: <44B55958.8020707@clemson.edu> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Is there a way to calculate the unencrypted or unsigned size of an ASCII armored encrypted message given the size of the message and the length of the key? Cheers, Adam Schreiber - -- Why isn't all of your email protected? http://gnupg.org http://enigmail.mozdev.org http://seahorse.sourceforge.net http://live.gnome.org/Seahorse -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.4 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iD8DBQFEtVlYjU1oaHEI4wgRAlPQAKCMlTMv7QgvMvq+7jFroHHQTFC4ZACgmgnN H/sADn5mYebQ92ZdUySDNR4= =aKI2 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From gdmr at inf.ed.ac.uk Thu Jul 13 09:24:33 2006 From: gdmr at inf.ed.ac.uk (George Ross) Date: Fri Jul 14 13:56:04 2006 Subject: How to verify the file was successfully encrypted... In-Reply-To: Your message of "Wed, 12 Jul 2006 14:59:38 MDT." <1152737978.5417.153.camel@localhost.localdomain> Message-ID: <200607130724.k6D7OXX5009711@glendy.inf.ed.ac.uk> > > BTW, why are you encrypting these files anyway? If someone broke into > > your computer they could just steal the crypto key too. > > Excellent question! Truth be told, as soon as they are encrypted, > they're being moved to another server in another location, and then are > being burned to CD and moved to a safety deposit box. How about if you append a hash of the file to the file, and encrypt that too? Then have the remote machine do the trial decrypt-and-check-hash. If all is OK the remote machine can then tell the local one to delete the original; and if it's not OK, it can scream at you. -- Dr George D M Ross, School of Informatics, University of Edinburgh Kings Buildings, Mayfield Road, Edinburgh, Scotland, EH9 3JZ Mail: gdmr@inf.ed.ac.uk Voice: +44 131 650 5147 Fax: +44 131 667 7209 PGP: 1024D/AD758CC5 B91E D430 1E0D 5883 EF6A 426C B676 5C2B AD75 8CC5 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 238 bytes Desc: not available Url : /pipermail/attachments/20060713/fefbe97a/attachment.pgp From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Fri Jul 14 14:40:39 2006 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Fri Jul 14 14:39:19 2006 Subject: Calculating Buffer Size In-Reply-To: <44B55958.8020707@clemson.edu> References: <44B55958.8020707@clemson.edu> Message-ID: <20060714124039.GC6856@jabberwocky.com> On Wed, Jul 12, 2006 at 04:19:36PM -0400, Adam Schreiber wrote: > Is there a way to calculate the unencrypted or unsigned size of an ASCII > armored encrypted message given the size of the message and the length > of the key? Yes, but not if compression is turned on (as it is by default). Factors are key size, key algorithm, and number of recipients to the message. David From alex at bofh.net.pl Fri Jul 14 15:07:16 2006 From: alex at bofh.net.pl (Janusz A. Urbanowicz) Date: Fri Jul 14 15:06:00 2006 Subject: How to verify the file was successfully encrypted... In-Reply-To: <1152723593.5417.96.camel@localhost.localdomain> References: <1152646703.5441.18.camel@localhost.localdomain> <20060712102509.GM3704@hell.pl> <1152723593.5417.96.camel@localhost.localdomain> Message-ID: <20060714130716.GX3704@hell.pl> On Wed, Jul 12, 2006 at 10:59:52AM -0600, Benny Helms wrote: > On Wed, 2006-07-12 at 12:25 +0200, Janusz A. Urbanowicz wrote: > > On Tue, Jul 11, 2006 at 01:38:23PM -0600, Benny Helms wrote: > > > What is your actual threat model here? > > > > The simplest answer is to check gpg's rc after the encryption run. > > Before deleting original file, I must make certain encrypted version is > in good shape so I can open it at a later date and obtain data. If it > is broken, I'm in deep monkey muffins. That's the threat model. > > Can you please explain what you mean by "check the gpg's rc after the > encryption run?" I'm unfamilar with the meaning of "rc" in this case. return code every unix code returns an numerical code which by convention means the state of operation just done, 0 - success. I find your explanation of the threat model not very consistent. You don't trust gpg, but you trust the filesystem code, network transfers or storage media. It is possible to any element of the chain fail and corrupt your precious files. If they're so important as you state, you should invest in some decent hardware like RAID-s and backups and disaster recovery planning, and site physical security policy and procedures. And irreliability of gpg is your least problem. Alex From peter at palfrader.org Fri Jul 14 16:14:43 2006 From: peter at palfrader.org (Peter Palfrader) Date: Fri Jul 14 16:13:28 2006 Subject: [Sks-devel] key too large? In-Reply-To: <20060714000838.GA22848@jabberwocky.com> References: <20060713222843.GA3910@asteria.noreply.org> <20060713223239.GB3910@asteria.noreply.org> <20060713224507.GC22711@jabberwocky.com> <20060713231210.GD3910@asteria.noreply.org> <20060714000838.GA22848@jabberwocky.com> Message-ID: <20060714141443.GG3910@asteria.noreply.org> On Thu, 13 Jul 2006, David Shaw wrote: > > gpg (GnuPG) 1.4.4-cvs, looks like a snapshot built around April 5th, > > probably r4114. > > > > I don't see the problem on a different host with what is quite likely > > r4189. > > There are no meaningful changes in gpgkeys_hkp between those two > revisions. Can you reproduce this with --keyserver-options > "use-temp-files keep-temp-files" and send me the temp file? http://asteria.noreply.org/~weasel/gpg-20061714/tempin.txt http://asteria.noreply.org/~weasel/gpg-20061714/tempout.txt | weasel@galaxy:~/public_html/gpg-20061714$ cat tempin.txt | VERSION 1 | PROGRAM 1.4.4-cvs | SCHEME hkp | HOST keyserver.noreply.org | PORT 80 | PATH / | COMMAND SEND | | | INFO DE7AAF6E94C09C7F BEGIN | pub:DE7AAF6E94C09C7F:17:1024:942264711:0: | uid:Peter Palfrader:951840856:0: | sig:DBD245FCB3B2A12C:10:976528694:0 | sig:21AB0663B1AE9060:10:1042281434:0 [...] | sub:7284C301B86DCE5F:16:2048:942264776:0:r | sub:5AF2C377E8F4A328:16:2048:1057717115:1154458341: | INFO DE7AAF6E94C09C7F END | KEY 94c09c7f BEGIN | -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- | Version: GnuPG v1.4.4-cvs (GNU/Linux) | | mQGiBDgp0YcRBACN9s8EycXRsu9ym3Sjou1NlPc+xz4ExlWtDOBoSlTzEJs0P/px | xyPaZ+ampr//fT+6EZXsgl4EmbQzW+boPsJ9tXkD9owm36djlsgfMcSUBf7PS7Eu [...] | xCdqABIHZUdQRwABAQkQ3nqvbpTAnH9CPQCg2MeKjGOkR1974Y2FKcn2mk9bguMA | oNI5EZKAzGXwZ+Hzpty0cfNDLk+I | =Tbd+ | -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- | KEY 94c09c7f END | weasel@galaxy:~/public_html/gpg-20061714$ cat tempout.txt | VERSION 1 | PROGRAM 1.4.4-cvs | | KEY 94c09c7f FAILED 8 HTH -- | .''`. ** Debian GNU/Linux ** Peter Palfrader | : :' : The universal http://www.palfrader.org/ | `. `' Operating System | `- http://www.debian.org/ From alphasigmax at gmail.com Fri Jul 14 16:35:56 2006 From: alphasigmax at gmail.com (Alphax) Date: Fri Jul 14 16:36:55 2006 Subject: How to verify the file was successfully encrypted... In-Reply-To: <200607130724.k6D7OXX5009711@glendy.inf.ed.ac.uk> References: <200607130724.k6D7OXX5009711@glendy.inf.ed.ac.uk> Message-ID: <44B7ABCC.5030407@gmail.com> George Ross wrote: >>> BTW, why are you encrypting these files anyway? If someone broke into >>> your computer they could just steal the crypto key too. >> Excellent question! Truth be told, as soon as they are encrypted, >> they're being moved to another server in another location, and then are >> being burned to CD and moved to a safety deposit box. > > How about if you append a hash of the file to the file, and encrypt that > too? Then have the remote machine do the trial decrypt-and-check-hash. If > all is OK the remote machine can then tell the local one to delete the > original; and if it's not OK, it can scream at you. > Better than that, if you get GPG to sign the file when it encrypts it (using a passwordless key/subkey) and/or use the MDC option, you'll be able to do this more reliably... -- Alphax Death to all fanatics! Down with categorical imperative! OpenPGP key: http://tinyurl.com/lvq4g -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 564 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature Url : /pipermail/attachments/20060715/38368e02/signature.pgp From eleuteri at myrealbox.com Fri Jul 14 15:03:33 2006 From: eleuteri at myrealbox.com (David Picon Alvarez) Date: Fri Jul 14 17:25:48 2006 Subject: Use of OpenPGP smartcard on MS Windows Message-ID: <000501c6a745$e958a2c0$0302a8c0@enterprise> Hi, Is it possible to use the OpenPGP smartcard on a GnuPG version compiled for MS Windows such as the ones available at gnupg.org? What should I know about smart card reders, drivers, et al, before trying to do this? Pointers appreciated. --David. From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Fri Jul 14 17:30:51 2006 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Fri Jul 14 17:29:35 2006 Subject: [Sks-devel] key too large? In-Reply-To: <20060714141443.GG3910@asteria.noreply.org> References: <20060713222843.GA3910@asteria.noreply.org> <20060713223239.GB3910@asteria.noreply.org> <20060713224507.GC22711@jabberwocky.com> <20060713231210.GD3910@asteria.noreply.org> <20060714000838.GA22848@jabberwocky.com> <20060714141443.GG3910@asteria.noreply.org> Message-ID: <20060714153051.GA26611@jabberwocky.com> On Fri, Jul 14, 2006 at 04:14:43PM +0200, Peter Palfrader wrote: > On Thu, 13 Jul 2006, David Shaw wrote: > > > > gpg (GnuPG) 1.4.4-cvs, looks like a snapshot built around April 5th, > > > probably r4114. > > > > > > I don't see the problem on a different host with what is quite likely > > > r4189. > > > > There are no meaningful changes in gpgkeys_hkp between those two > > revisions. Can you reproduce this with --keyserver-options > > "use-temp-files keep-temp-files" and send me the temp file? > > http://asteria.noreply.org/~weasel/gpg-20061714/tempin.txt > http://asteria.noreply.org/~weasel/gpg-20061714/tempout.txt Aha, fixed, thanks. Your armored key just happened to have text in it that looked like the "KEY xxxx"... delimiter. David From JPClizbe at comcast.net Fri Jul 14 21:11:25 2006 From: JPClizbe at comcast.net (John Clizbe) Date: Fri Jul 14 21:48:03 2006 Subject: Use of OpenPGP smartcard on MS Windows In-Reply-To: <000501c6a745$e958a2c0$0302a8c0@enterprise> References: <000501c6a745$e958a2c0$0302a8c0@enterprise> Message-ID: <44B7EC5D.5030406@comcast.net> David Picon Alvarez wrote: > Hi, > > Is it possible to use the OpenPGP smartcard on a GnuPG version compiled for > MS Windows such as the ones available at gnupg.org? What should I know about > smart card readers, drivers, et al, before trying to do this? Pointers > appreciated. OpenPGP Smart card support has been in GnuPG on Windows for sometime now. Prebuilt binaries from gnupg.org should work fine. Cygwin binaries for 1.4.2.1 or greater should also work. The only thing you might need in the way of drivers is the reader manufacturer's drivers to allow it to talk to the Smart Card service, scardsvr.exe. I'm using an SCM SCR335 USB reader that came with the card. No problems. -- John P. Clizbe Inet: JPClizbe(a)comcast DOT nyet Golden Bear Networks PGP/GPG KeyID: 0x608D2A10 "Be who you are and say what you feel because those who mind don't matter and those who matter don't mind." - Dr Seuss, "Oh the Places You'll Go" -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 646 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature Url : /pipermail/attachments/20060714/6bd7fc15/signature.pgp From yochanon at localnet.com Fri Jul 14 19:58:32 2006 From: yochanon at localnet.com (John B) Date: Fri Jul 14 21:55:53 2006 Subject: Manual for GnuPG 1.4.4 In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <200607141258.32786.yochanon@localnet.com> On Thursday 13 July 2006 04:15, Laurent Jumet wrote: > Hello ! > > Here, you can download the manual for GnuPG 1.4.4 formated in a > printable way, in 12 pages: > > http://users.skynet.be/laurent.jumet/MyMan_GnuPG-144.pdf Thanks, Laurent! From peter at palfrader.org Fri Jul 14 23:03:26 2006 From: peter at palfrader.org (Peter Palfrader) Date: Fri Jul 14 23:02:03 2006 Subject: [Sks-devel] key too large? In-Reply-To: <20060714153051.GA26611@jabberwocky.com> References: <20060713222843.GA3910@asteria.noreply.org> <20060713223239.GB3910@asteria.noreply.org> <20060713224507.GC22711@jabberwocky.com> <20060713231210.GD3910@asteria.noreply.org> <20060714000838.GA22848@jabberwocky.com> <20060714141443.GG3910@asteria.noreply.org> <20060714153051.GA26611@jabberwocky.com> Message-ID: <20060714210326.GG1241@asteria.noreply.org> On Fri, 14 Jul 2006, David Shaw wrote: > On Fri, Jul 14, 2006 at 04:14:43PM +0200, Peter Palfrader wrote: > > On Thu, 13 Jul 2006, David Shaw wrote: > > > > > > gpg (GnuPG) 1.4.4-cvs, looks like a snapshot built around April 5th, > > > > probably r4114. > > > > > > > > I don't see the problem on a different host with what is quite likely > > > > r4189. > > > > > > There are no meaningful changes in gpgkeys_hkp between those two > > > revisions. Can you reproduce this with --keyserver-options > > > "use-temp-files keep-temp-files" and send me the temp file? > > > > http://asteria.noreply.org/~weasel/gpg-20061714/tempin.txt > > http://asteria.noreply.org/~weasel/gpg-20061714/tempout.txt > > Aha, fixed, thanks. > > Your armored key just happened to have text in it that looked like the > "KEY xxxx"... delimiter. Thanks -- | .''`. ** Debian GNU/Linux ** Peter Palfrader | : :' : The universal http://www.palfrader.org/ | `. `' Operating System | `- http://www.debian.org/ From benny at egovmt.com Fri Jul 14 23:25:42 2006 From: benny at egovmt.com (Benny Helms) Date: Fri Jul 14 23:24:25 2006 Subject: How to verify the file was successfully encrypted... In-Reply-To: <20060714130716.GX3704@hell.pl> References: <1152646703.5441.18.camel@localhost.localdomain> <20060712102509.GM3704@hell.pl> <1152723593.5417.96.camel@localhost.localdomain> <20060714130716.GX3704@hell.pl> Message-ID: <1152912342.5442.95.camel@localhost.localdomain> On Fri, 2006-07-14 at 15:07 +0200, Janusz A. Urbanowicz wrote: > > Can you please explain what you mean by "check the gpg's rc after the > > encryption run?" I'm unfamilar with the meaning of "rc" in this case. > > return code > > every unix code returns an numerical code which by convention means > the state of operation just done, 0 - success. Understood. I call that return status. Too many acronyms in our industry. :-) > I find your explanation of the threat model not very consistent. You > don't trust gpg, but you trust the filesystem code, network transfers > or storage media. It is possible to any element of the chain fail and > corrupt your precious files. > > If they're so important as you state, you should invest in some decent > hardware like RAID-s and backups and disaster recovery planning, and > site physical security policy and procedures. And irreliability of gpg > is your least problem. Interesting. Perhaps I'm not clear. That happens. An encrypted file is absolutely useless if it cannot be decrypted. In fact, it's flat out dangerous! It's like carrying a gun around for protection, and when you suddenly need it, discovering it has no ammo and the barrel has been blocked. All the backups in the world, all the RAID, DR policies, etc., will not help if the encrypted data is corrupt and you do not have the original. To me, that sounds very "consistent". And the fact that I'm trying to certify that the file is a solid, working encrypted file before deleting the original should have told you that I wasn't being frivolous with my procedures and security measures. As a Unix SysAdmin with many years on the job, I do my backups faithfully, I'm running RAID, we have a DR policy in place and test it on a regular basis. Firewalls are many, strong and in place. What these items have to do with whether I can trust that an encrypted file can be decrypted to return my "precious data" when I need it is beyond me. And yes, I also take into account the data transfer, the storage media, etc. I already have procedures in place for all of that. What I don't have, and what makes everything you offered irrelevant, is the certainty that the encrypted file is decryptable so I can safely remove the original that I wanted to protect in the first place. That was the only question I put on the table because I've already handled the rest, and don't need assistance in those areas. I only asked for assistance with gpg because I haven't used it in this way in the past. Thanks for your input, though. Benny From sjlopezb at hackindex.com Fri Jul 14 22:04:27 2006 From: sjlopezb at hackindex.com (=?ISO-8859-15?Q?Santiago_Jos=E9_L=F3pez_Borraz=E1s?=) Date: Fri Jul 14 23:25:40 2006 Subject: Manual for GnuPG 1.4.4 In-Reply-To: <200607141258.32786.yochanon@localnet.com> References: <200607141258.32786.yochanon@localnet.com> Message-ID: <44B7F8CB.90902@foo.hackindex.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 El 14/07/06 19:58, John B escribi?: > Thanks, Laurent! Idem... The manual is very compression ;-) - -- Slds de Santiago Jos? L?pez Borraz?s. Admin de hackindex.com/.es Conocimientos avanzados en seguridad inform?tica. Conocimientos avanzados en redes peque?as y grandes. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.4 (GNU/Linux) iQIVAwUBRLf4yruF9/q6J55WAQpcnw//WULKKqz4zevTPrG+eh5d5dMyxKRApH/4 HKS8O/xcscMLAUlnl/tNk6QrVkoegJNK1B0xkvhOOHS15klEMZ0XVVUXPdHnCzCy 6YayzfEYtu7e7MiMMPr08NVrQ1dIQJAAgmBHIhHmJM3x0E23C2HWWQVKS8vDZH1v 1VzyXxcKZCH9bmrMRa3k8SDJvQxDALbyDceDpOzNWGpn17MiyHAFbHBRnJnkk/nl +y9fDlipyO6VLGpGTJwCgO3OINuVmhYRj1obJQQfFLV7HCaltypzk2H6FAy+Ew6D zCysQtFbKUw8uYRtOWg8I3W7pib9LECeaeOTaiD/leQtYm21/fquRyxHQoubUg2V kKjNWwnikgWIJwGdxJ2J8Z6I2UYOKZlW2CkDSmz8mUJk2ok1hAdLTsqlMdNYY0K3 ps5gJdj7yoityv6LjXMX6OHySvBTBXUC5xrWKYdaYtxwRntcG/h4G5pcsXDIg2CT T5yuEAaOxvt+r5vvT0lmmIcNEWGAcj1K/F7QfUWzRp2Be2qGK9P34qp/sNBKZIN3 4Y00EHs5TlJTd8++Y8nRySdPaoWr7NnZJ8MCGumMnmCRxpThtIfnyX0h1uG3XjnN I5aDh0a9JVoPriw13Qo9gaE5V/w5DSt1rkOJNcp99amyHo0D4h5jP4MCej/EL4KI R7AInsu30jE= =+ELn -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From benny at egovmt.com Sat Jul 15 00:01:34 2006 From: benny at egovmt.com (Benny Helms) Date: Sat Jul 15 00:00:16 2006 Subject: How to verify the file was successfully encrypted... In-Reply-To: <44B7ABCC.5030407@gmail.com> References: <200607130724.k6D7OXX5009711@glendy.inf.ed.ac.uk> <44B7ABCC.5030407@gmail.com> Message-ID: <1152914494.5442.98.camel@localhost.localdomain> On Sat, 2006-07-15 at 00:05 +0930, Alphax wrote: > Better than that, if you get GPG to sign the file when it encrypts it > (using a passwordless key/subkey) and/or use the MDC option, you'll be > able to do this more reliably... Thank you, Alphax! I'll look into that. Benny From benny at egovmt.com Sat Jul 15 00:05:08 2006 From: benny at egovmt.com (Benny Helms) Date: Sat Jul 15 00:03:44 2006 Subject: How to verify the file was successfully encrypted... In-Reply-To: <20060713211542.GB20017@Update.UU.SE> References: <1152646703.5441.18.camel@localhost.localdomain> <20060712102509.GM3704@hell.pl> <1152723593.5417.96.camel@localhost.localdomain> <20060713211542.GB20017@Update.UU.SE> Message-ID: <1152914708.5442.101.camel@localhost.localdomain> On Thu, 2006-07-13 at 23:15 +0200, Samuel ]slund wrote: > If I read this thread right you actually wnt to make a decryption and > compare the results and you do _not_ want to keep the private key on > that machine. > > Could you do something creative with --show-session-key to be able to > decrypt each file once w.o. risking your private key? > > HTH > //Samuel Interesting idea, Samuel. Thank you! I'll give it a whirl. Benny From samuel at Update.UU.SE Sat Jul 15 01:49:46 2006 From: samuel at Update.UU.SE (Samuel ]slund) Date: Sat Jul 15 01:49:08 2006 Subject: How to verify the file was successfully encrypted... In-Reply-To: <44B6E5EB.9010203@doisan.com> References: <1152646703.5441.18.camel@localhost.localdomain> <44B4CB6B.4000107@sixdemonbag.org> <1152723465.5417.92.camel@localhost.localdomain> <44B57981.8070503@gmail.com> <44B6E5EB.9010203@doisan.com> Message-ID: <20060714234946.GE20017@Update.UU.SE> On Thu, Jul 13, 2006 at 08:31:39PM -0400, Vladimir Doisan wrote: > The user base of GnuPG is huge, and any serious bugs in the code will > be weeded out very quickly by the beta testers and early adopters. > Invalid encryptions is a VERY serious bug. Sadly this is not true enough, as has been illustrated recently by some people asking about corrupted large encrypted files generated on windows with (if I remember correctly) the "-e file" option some time before. I think it was possible to restore the data by doing some manual bit fideling in the encrypted binary... (But I do not remember.) HTH, //Samuel From benjamin at py-soft.co.uk Sat Jul 15 00:32:30 2006 From: benjamin at py-soft.co.uk (Benjamin Donnachie) Date: Sat Jul 15 03:55:43 2006 Subject: macgpg2 update! gpg2 working under Mac OS X with smartcard support! Message-ID: <44B81B7E.9060506@py-soft.co.uk> Binary install packages are now available for Mac OS X; PowerPC only at this stage with Universal binaries to follow. Please follow the instructions at http://www.py-soft.co.uk/~benjamin/download/mac-gpg/MacOS%20gpg-agent%20and%20pinentry%20HOWTO.txt This package brings the power of gnupg v1.9.20 and OpenPGP Smartcards to the Mac! Authenticate under SSH using your card from any SSH application including Fugu! See http://www.py-soft.co.uk/~benjamin/download/mac-gpg/fugu%20plus%20macgpg2.jpg for a screen shot. Use my native pinentry-mac program to cache your passphrase with gpg-agent under, for example, enigmail! Fully compatible with mac-gpg and gpg v1.4.*. No more compiling from source! No more darwin ports! No more QT libraries! Just click and install! This package is an alpha release and will be fully integrated into the mac-gpg project once fully tested. Feedback welcome. Ben Donnachie. Pythagoras Software (UK) From laurent.jumet at skynet.be Sat Jul 15 08:42:19 2006 From: laurent.jumet at skynet.be (Laurent Jumet) Date: Sat Jul 15 09:20:42 2006 Subject: Good and bad signature... Message-ID: -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: RIPEMD160 Hello ! Does somebody has an explanation about this fact: Checking a ClearSign signature inside my mailer answers "Bad". Copying that message inside the clipboard and checking it, answers "Good". May be this could happen with this message. - -- Laurent Jumet KeyID: 0xCFAF704C -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.4 (MingW32) iD8DBQFEuI8T9R1toM+vcEwRA4w5AKCEihMD+f/tWZkUoEUwOSbb/brFOACeLFeb nRAv9o6hrP3ZfJwgIe4iTN8= =e1UK -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From kloecker at kde.org Sat Jul 15 10:34:32 2006 From: kloecker at kde.org (Ingo =?iso-8859-15?q?Kl=F6cker?=) Date: Sat Jul 15 11:55:43 2006 Subject: Good and bad signature... In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <200607151034.39852@erwin.ingo-kloecker.de> On Saturday 15 July 2006 08:42, Laurent Jumet wrote: > Hello ! > > Does somebody has an explanation about this fact: > > Checking a ClearSign signature inside my mailer answers "Bad". > Copying that message inside the clipboard and checking it, > answers "Good". > > May be this could happen with this message. The signature of your message is valid (according to KMail). Which mail application are you using? And which mail application was used to create the clearsigned messages? If you can show us an example message (it's best to zip it in order to protect it from being changed during transport) then it would be much easier to answer. One possible explanation is a problem with the interpretation of 8bit character, e.g. french accented characters. Another possible explanation could be different treatment of trailing white space. Regards, Ingo -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 189 bytes Desc: not available Url : /pipermail/attachments/20060715/e13b9e17/attachment.pgp From henkdebruijn at wanadoo.nl Sat Jul 15 12:07:37 2006 From: henkdebruijn at wanadoo.nl (Henk M. de Bruijn) Date: Sat Jul 15 12:06:15 2006 Subject: Good and bad signature... In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <3110640382.20060715120737@wanadoo.nl> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 On Sat, 15 Jul 2006 08:42:19 +0200GMT (15-7-2006, 8:42 +0200, where I live), Laurent Jumet wrote: > Does somebody has an explanation about this fact: > Checking a ClearSign signature inside my mailer answers "Bad". > Copying that message inside the clipboard and checking it, answers "Good". > May be this could happen with this message. The message verified "good". - -- Henk M. de Bruijn ______________________________________________________________________ The Bat! Natural E-Mail System? version 3.81.08 Beta Pro on Windows XP SP2 Request-PGP: http://www.biglumber.com/x/web?qs=0x6C9F6CE78C32408B Gossamer Spider Web of Trust http://www.gswot.org A progressive and innovative Web of Trust -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.5-svn4194-HdB-Dynamic-Build (Cygwin/MingW32) iQEVAwUBRLi+QhHuy+60ZN0PAQrx+Af/amK+UjnTEMFkszkYAZf7dzx0kf8KKLCG nDr8RgnIPS3j6NMn90FVDiNUxipPyD1yQjTvERZM6R+atTP/ApmzEDvlRgRlAzH0 Ucgni6y1oeaImmmTpeDWlzxNhUkxJSJgjcXhhqC7sFUKUPnirGzAyhYpMdq3EOo8 jJXvIxnhcW3dj61r2+p/l0yBuoExv0CoRxHu7RFl9xEw79D3J82tqsuh956p3uUl doLlf75deT4eQfRQ9YuxHYyuS3/+fnKJFrFQ8XkJ/TExObE+DFsjcoyfG+gdOnqq iiiul15FqIEKH3XTokyFLE3vhz0rso05KOsBnXP8IZ37HY/6m1kcqw== =5mX3 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From benjamin at py-soft.co.uk Sat Jul 15 14:41:12 2006 From: benjamin at py-soft.co.uk (Benjamin Donnachie) Date: Sat Jul 15 14:40:30 2006 Subject: macgpg2 update! gpg2 working under Mac OS X with smartcard support! Message-ID: <44B8E268.3080704@py-soft.co.uk> ... Not sure whether my first attempt made it ... Binary install packages are now available for Mac OS X; PowerPC only at this stage with Universal binaries to follow. Please follow the instructions at http://www.py-soft.co.uk/~benjamin/download/mac-gpg/MacOS%20gpg-agent%20and%20pinentry%20HOWTO.txt This package brings the power of gnupg v1.9.20 and OpenPGP Smartcards to the Mac! Authenticate under SSH using your card from any SSH application including Fugu! See http://www.py-soft.co.uk/~benjamin/download/mac-gpg/fugu%20plus%20macgpg2.jpg for a screen shot. Use my native pinentry-mac program to cache your passphrase with gpg-agent under, for example, enigmail! Fully compatible with mac-gpg and gpg v1.4.*. No more compiling from source! No more darwin ports! No more QT libraries! Just click and install! This package is an alpha release and will be fully integrated into the mac-gpg project once fully tested. Feedback welcome. Ben Donnachie. Pythagoras Software (UK) From jbloss at tampabay.rr.com Sat Jul 15 18:51:39 2006 From: jbloss at tampabay.rr.com (Jeffrey F. Bloss) Date: Sat Jul 15 18:50:49 2006 Subject: Good and bad signature... In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20060715125139.4a57f98d@localhost.localdomain> Laurent Jumet wrote: > Hello ! > > Does somebody has an explanation about this fact: > > Checking a ClearSign signature inside my mailer answers "Bad". > Copying that message inside the clipboard and checking it, answers "Good". > > May be this could happen with this message. Your signature verified fine here. I had this exact same trouble with the Pan news reader. Never really explored the causes in any detail, but I did notice the same article displayed in Pan and another news client were word wrapped differently. I assumed that GnuPG/PGP operations were performed on a temporary copy of the original, either generated from the display or using some "clipboard" facility, and discarded Pan as a client that messes around with message text the same way it messes around with the display of message headers. :-( -- Hand crafted on 15 July, 2006 at 12:39:42 EDT Outside of a dog, a book is a man's best friend. Inside of a dog, it's too dark to read. -Groucho Marx -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 892 bytes Desc: not available Url : /pipermail/attachments/20060715/72c63e75/signature.pgp From gpg-news at dmgjvncg.privatecubicle.com Sat Jul 15 19:45:49 2006 From: gpg-news at dmgjvncg.privatecubicle.com (Bob) Date: Sat Jul 15 21:25:42 2006 Subject: How to verify the file was successfully encrypted... Message-ID: <20060715104549.089950.59e2215b@dmgjvncg.privatecubicle.com> Benny Helms wrote: > I'm looking for a way to gpg encrypt a file, test that the encryption > was good and that the file can be extracted, and then to delete the > original file. > > Even better would be a way to automatically remove the original when the > encrypted version has been successfully created, if such a parameter > exists. > > At the very least, though, a way of testing that the file encryption was > successful without having to sit at my desk at 3AM running 'gpg > --decrypt filename' to test it would be very helpful. My suggestion: On your server, calculate a hash for the unencrypted data file. Encrypt the data file & transfer the encrypted file to a secure box which has your secret key. Decrypt the file on that secure box & compare the hash to the hash created on the server. If the hashes are the same then all is well & you can delete the files on the server. This can all be scripted & it keeps your private key off the server. I hope this helps, Bob {My apologize if this doesn't thread correctly] From bob.henson at galen.org.uk Sat Jul 15 21:43:39 2006 From: bob.henson at galen.org.uk (Bob Henson) Date: Sat Jul 15 23:01:15 2006 Subject: New Windows Binary? Message-ID: <44B9456B.1040004@galen.org.uk> I read some days ago on the GPGee forum that a new Windows binary would be released to correct the change in GPG 1.4.4 that broke GPGee. Is it around/about to appear? I have some files encrypted using GPGee and can't get at them until the problem is fixed - for some reason I can't decrypt them using GnuPG alone - probably my ineptitude, but either way round it would be good to have the fix. Regards, Bob -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 546 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature Url : /pipermail/attachments/20060715/2d5ce4dd/signature-0001.pgp From mkontakt at gmail.com Sun Jul 16 22:03:30 2006 From: mkontakt at gmail.com (mkontakt@gmail.com) Date: Sun Jul 16 22:01:47 2006 Subject: How to verify the file was successfully encrypted... In-Reply-To: <20060715104549.089950.59e2215b@dmgjvncg.privatecubicle.com> References: <20060715104549.089950.59e2215b@dmgjvncg.privatecubicle.com> Message-ID: <20060716200330.GA16587@debian.mydomain.com> Why do you need to use gpg for this task when you only need a symmetric cipher. You would be better off going to CPAN (perl) and download AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) module and use all of the features coming with it or use libcrypt (used by gnupg) and use this. The other solution, I can think off (if you use linux), is making encrypted pseudo file system (file) of requested size (size of CD/DVD or other backup medium) and copy the data on this file system (it is transparent). When you finis this move the pseudo file system (file) to your backup medium. Regards Martin Poz From karl.kashofer at gmx.at Mon Jul 17 10:07:32 2006 From: karl.kashofer at gmx.at (Karl Kashofer) Date: Mon Jul 17 10:06:58 2006 Subject: German "umlauts" in passphrase Message-ID: <200607171007.33535.karl.kashofer@gmx.at> Hi all ! This should be a simple question, but I have failed to find an answer to it. Is it possible to use german umlauts in the gnupg passphrase? The reason I ask is that I imported a keypair from my windows keyring when I switched my laptop to linux, and now I cant use it as it has umlauts in the passphrase. I cant even change the passphrase as I can not enter it.... Do I really have to export my key to windows and remove the umlaut, or is there another solution ? Cheers, Karl Ubuntu 6.06, gnupg 1.4.2.2 From eleuteri at myrealbox.com Mon Jul 17 11:24:13 2006 From: eleuteri at myrealbox.com (David Picon Alvarez) Date: Mon Jul 17 11:22:51 2006 Subject: German "umlauts" in passphrase References: <200607171007.33535.karl.kashofer@gmx.at> Message-ID: <001101c6a982$c4e5b970$0302a8c0@enterprise> It's possible to use non-7-bit-ascii characters for the passphrase, but there can be issues with character sets when changing from machine to machine, OS to OS, or on different revs of an OS depending on locale settings. Personally I'd advice using oe instead of ? just in case, although if you're careful of character sets and such you should be able to get it working right. --David. From karl.kashofer at gmx.at Mon Jul 17 12:27:50 2006 From: karl.kashofer at gmx.at (Karl Kashofer) Date: Mon Jul 17 12:27:00 2006 Subject: German "umlauts" in passphrase In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <200607171227.50844.karl.kashofer@gmx.at> Hi ! > This is a Charset problem. Yes, thats what I guessed. > Two solutions may work: > -examining the Charset tables, you can find what character should be > entered and accepted. Example, with my Charsets, this is what I see for a > user: R?gis D?camps (+?l?ve ing?nieur IIE) > and this is what it should be: > R?gis D?camps (+?l?ve ing?nieur IIE) > > So, if my PassPhrase was the latter, I would have to input the first, > to be accepted. I will most probably change my passphrase, but as this problem has cropped up in other apps as well I would really like to find out how to solve it. So, how would I examine the charset talbles ? The UserID and other information printed by GnuPG is correctly displayed with all the umlauts. How do I find out what character I have to type to get the umlaut in my passphrase? I presume i could find out by comparing the german windows charset to the german linux charset ? Any leads ? Thanks for your help, Cheers, Karl From sk at intertivity.com Mon Jul 17 14:37:18 2006 From: sk at intertivity.com (sk@intertivity.com) Date: Mon Jul 17 15:55:34 2006 Subject: AW: German "umlauts" in passphrase Message-ID: <11600039.740291153139838477.JavaMail.servlet@kundenserver> just convert everything to utf-8! Regards, --sk >Hi all ! > >This should be a simple question, but I have failed to find an answer to it. > >Is it possible to use german umlauts in the gnupg passphrase? > >The reason I ask is that I imported a keypair from my windows keyring when I >switched my laptop to linux, and now I cant use it as it has umlauts in the >passphrase. I cant even change the passphrase as I can not enter it.... > >Do I really have to export my key to windows and remove the umlaut, or is >there another solution ? > >Cheers, >Karl >Ubuntu 6.06, gnupg 1.4.2.2 > >_______________________________________________ >Gnupg-users mailing list >Gnupg-users@gnupg.org >http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users From wk at gnupg.org Tue Jul 18 12:08:05 2006 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Tue Jul 18 12:11:22 2006 Subject: Moving computers with an OpenPGP card In-Reply-To: <20060714065152.GA3266@g3.spring.org> (Tristan Williams's message of "Fri, 14 Jul 2006 07:51:52 +0100") References: <20060714065152.GA3266@g3.spring.org> Message-ID: <87r70j9qey.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> On Fri, 14 Jul 2006 08:51, Tristan Williams said: > i.e arrive at computer, download and import your public key, insert > smart card and then be able to sign/encrypt? I have not been able to > do this (though by copying my secring.gpg which has the key stub I > can) and wondered whether it was possible? Sure, it is possible. Actually there is no need to copy the secring.pgp because a gpg --card-edit or --card-status should create a fresh key stub. Along with the fetch command in --card-edit this should make it all pretty easy. However, I just tested it and there seems to be a problem. A debugger needs to be thrown on import.c:auto_create_card_key_stub to see what is going on. Shalom-Salam, Werner From wk at gnupg.org Tue Jul 18 12:18:45 2006 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Tue Jul 18 12:21:12 2006 Subject: German "umlauts" in passphrase In-Reply-To: <200607171227.50844.karl.kashofer@gmx.at> (Karl Kashofer's message of "Mon, 17 Jul 2006 12:27:50 +0200") References: <200607171227.50844.karl.kashofer@gmx.at> Message-ID: <87lkqr9px6.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> On Mon, 17 Jul 2006 12:27, Karl Kashofer said: > So, how would I examine the charset talbles ? The UserID and other information > printed by GnuPG is correctly displayed with all the umlauts. How do I find > out what character I have to type to get the umlaut in my passphrase? You need to try. There is no conversion inside gpg and gpg uses whatever you type/feed. I see that this is a problem between different platforms. However there is no real solution for this problem because it would break all non-ASCII pasphrases currently in use. Salam-Shalom, Werner From benjamin at py-soft.co.uk Tue Jul 18 14:24:52 2006 From: benjamin at py-soft.co.uk (Benjamin Donnachie) Date: Tue Jul 18 14:24:07 2006 Subject: German "umlauts" in passphrase In-Reply-To: <87lkqr9px6.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> References: <200607171227.50844.karl.kashofer@gmx.at> <87lkqr9px6.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> Message-ID: <44BCD314.1070901@py-soft.co.uk> Werner Koch wrote: > You need to try. There is no conversion inside gpg and gpg uses > whatever you type/feed. I see that this is a problem between > different platforms. However there is no real solution for this > problem because it would break all non-ASCII pasphrases currently in > use. Perhaps some sort of configuration option for the people that need it? (Or even the people that don't need it!) Take care, Ben From dave at davehope.co.uk Tue Jul 18 14:01:04 2006 From: dave at davehope.co.uk (dave@davehope.co.uk) Date: Tue Jul 18 15:55:37 2006 Subject: Supported Cards Message-ID: <20060718080104.45bkia652xsg8ccc@davehope.co.uk> Hello all, Firstly, I'd like to apologize for my lack of understanding in all things related to SmartCards. Just recently (having finally managed to keep my key for a year - I usually forget to back them up when rebuilding my PC) I've decided it's time to invest in a SmartCard system. I've come across the OpenPGP [0] card which is supported in gnupg 1.4.0 and above, however when trying to contact them didn't hear back. SmartcardFoucus seems to be a fairly comprehensive site [1], so I was wondering if someone on the list would be kind enough to point me at which cards I'll be able to use to store my key ? Thanks, Dave *[0] http://www.g10code.com/p-card.html *[1] http://www.smartcardfocus.com/shop/ilp/se~5/ssn~3465476863229912103618072006/p/index.shtml From benjamin at py-soft.co.uk Tue Jul 18 16:08:52 2006 From: benjamin at py-soft.co.uk (Benjamin Donnachie) Date: Tue Jul 18 16:07:55 2006 Subject: Supported Cards In-Reply-To: <20060718080104.45bkia652xsg8ccc@davehope.co.uk> References: <20060718080104.45bkia652xsg8ccc@davehope.co.uk> Message-ID: <44BCEB74.6040500@py-soft.co.uk> dave@davehope.co.uk wrote: > I've come across the OpenPGP [0] card which is supported in gnupg 1.4.0 > and above, however when trying to contact them didn't hear back. > SmartcardFoucus seems to be a fairly comprehensive site [1], so I was > wondering if someone on the list would be kind enough to point me at > which cards I'll be able to use to store my key ? You'll need a card that conforms to the OpenPGP standard. The only distributor I know of is Kernel Concepts [1]. However, you also get a free OpenPGP card when you join the Fellowship of the Free Software Foundation [2]. At this stage, you can only store 1kb RSA keys on OpenPGP cards. I am currently working on an implementation using BasicCards that will support 4kb RSA keys, but it's not a priority for me. Ben [1] http://www.kernelconcepts.de/products/security-en.shtml [2] https://fsfe.org/en/card From patrick at mozilla-enigmail.org Tue Jul 18 17:47:17 2006 From: patrick at mozilla-enigmail.org (Patrick Brunschwig) Date: Tue Jul 18 17:46:42 2006 Subject: German "umlauts" in passphrase In-Reply-To: <87lkqr9px6.fsf__35665.1623188101$1153218371$gmane$org@wheatstone.g10code.de> References: <200607171227.50844.karl.kashofer@gmx.at> <87lkqr9px6.fsf__35665.1623188101$1153218371$gmane$org@wheatstone.g10code.de> Message-ID: -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Werner Koch wrote: > On Mon, 17 Jul 2006 12:27, Karl Kashofer said: > >> So, how would I examine the charset talbles ? The UserID and other information >> printed by GnuPG is correctly displayed with all the umlauts. How do I find >> out what character I have to type to get the umlaut in my passphrase? > > You need to try. There is no conversion inside gpg and gpg uses > whatever you type/feed. I see that this is a problem between > different platforms. However there is no real solution for this > problem because it would break all non-ASCII pasphrases currently in > use. How about some new command line parameters that specify the charset of the passphrase provided and/or the charset in which the passphrase is stored on the keyring? - -Patrick -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.4 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iQEVAwUBRL0Cg3cOpHodsOiwAQKrGQgAl3poBbNFZyRzJB7tzMaOidOOJzND5+u9 lqs4fMX2BJpe5k7HDw5n42WXr1/ue/CfDPfxftOagThx/qVVnp/kwDEIvca0Vvbv nFJHnJvl+K9y4jLvW/Xo4TELvx6NV2UucPzAgKamhybuD4jydiUPdpjNHJhYwCu4 5f3oSqzhUeL97XGUFJm/lDCfvSqd4AYNvNvJD50Lkf5S1S5AoxcJIA9ZBVKsJQ5e HMSAFo9n1fhlxIa5HaMTtsXvehfq6B4jUVIeowmGY7HJlS1mS9E7EQyazXYesHNk 9ZoDPPbfxhaj8SlnAeKIydo3nFCEFmOa05Amc/eZ31mwwR6iEzXBNg== =cei8 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From vedaal at hush.com Tue Jul 18 21:36:54 2006 From: vedaal at hush.com (vedaal@hush.com) Date: Tue Jul 18 21:35:58 2006 Subject: German "umlauts" in passphrase Message-ID: <20060718193656.99CDBDA81F@mailserver7.hushmail.com> Werner Koch wk at gnupg.org wrote on Tue Jul 18 12:18:45 CEST 2006 >On Mon, 17 Jul 2006 12:27, Karl Kashofer said: > So, how would I examine the charset talbles ? The UserID and other >information printed by GnuPG is correctly displayed with all the >umlauts. How do I find out what character I have to type to get the >umlaut in my passphrase? here is a table of the extended ASCII chart including umlauted letters: The extended ASCII chart http://www.cdrummond.qc.ca/cegep/informat/Professeurs/Alain/files/as cii.htm and here is an online javascript converter, where you type whatever key you have on whatever platform, and it will give you the ascii number of the character that is typed: http://www.vortex.prodigynet.co.uk/misc/ascii_conv.html ] You need to try. There is no conversion inside gpg and gpg uses ]whatever you type/feed. I see that this is a problem between ]different platforms. However there is no real solution for this ]problem because it would break all non-ASCII pasphrases currently in ]use. is there a way to link the character to the underlying ASCII representation, so that the same character is identified cross- platform (for the latin alphabet at least) ? example: u-umlaut == ascii 129 if gnupg identified it as ascii 129, and all platforms expect to see ascii 129 as the correct character, then all that remains is to enter it as the same character on each platform a possible way to do this, might be to have an option for gnupg to enter the ascii number for each character of the passphrase, and type the number ( 0 - 256 )instead of typing the character not 'easier', but at least a 'backup' way to decrypt when one cannot enter the exact character with certainty directly from the keyboard vedaal Concerned about your privacy? Instantly send FREE secure email, no account required http://www.hushmail.com/send?l=480 Get the best prices on SSL certificates from Hushmail https://www.hushssl.com?l=485 From benjamin at py-soft.co.uk Tue Jul 18 21:46:22 2006 From: benjamin at py-soft.co.uk (Benjamin Donnachie) Date: Tue Jul 18 21:45:38 2006 Subject: gnupg v1.4.4 binary install for Mac OS X Message-ID: <44BD3A8E.1030701@py-soft.co.uk> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 As macgpg hasn't been updated yet, I've put together a quick install package for gnupg v1.4.4. Due to the security bug found in v1.4.3 upgrading to this version is recommended. http://www.py-soft.co.uk/~benjamin/download/mac-gpg/GnuPG%201.4.4%20for%20PPC%20OSX%2010.4.zip This file is for the Power PC ONLY. It has been compiled under Mac OS v10.4 but /may/ work with earlier versions. Ben -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.3 (Darwin) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iQIVAwUBRL06h+gNmph0Y1E2AQIYRA/+IN4CUJv8D0T1jJC1VuVY/3BGHjDbDm1b uiKaEfxcPBdY167mnALiOUDZb5mGWjdtBdtxeoYGkwxkaEDwyw/QYEAgdarO9dvV CRdA5XXHAaLAb9DgYsjs9cMT9czZbpJTPm6aB9DTYVOcBR3rRJ+YT3IDjxYSK6UY ehwHMUFfXdAiYQBC+D2TNgz2CJxjm73gpkUPR5/Dlyyd7xiWG7RX2FmGMfKKPFVr 6VEw78mbXyF5CwguacAEcAyHd91JYdErv2xROpPk9R3t2lx+Vh9Z5U8YUeeXjiwA xBDfUMETdnhURT9/n9ZHuEbHN5s9pLhFcwg+X7OUzO4kpGc/OdyVq4WfQBa0rnCV LXXGjQUqUHTdbewHPbWsM0Bh5+eQ9reyIbydSvcJN8jrq/HFAMDzgTsZCdvLB+j0 mfd58Xs0FaiPWyrpm4Dsshci7IOUc2lkwMShfjrUvvTiYWe/sVFhHESc0e0p242o qqksomXqUQ94WaLOjp7kIV9v1STO606BypsTXl5ua3XEyd7yI+kWTOGRvLp5vJqA 4TyCcORsBUmt8YpEwaAHJBDpe5FtSb0xuwkG5dLT5F5qUjKj0SZvO8xh7HVQWGKb bmF1KN26C56O2vf7yQIAO4SVmqpr4mdjwds941uJjfcpp+LeZGkIob+GqZvgmwsZ c1U8t0Xk0OQ= =felK -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From shavital at mac.com Tue Jul 18 23:43:18 2006 From: shavital at mac.com (Charly Avital) Date: Tue Jul 18 23:42:04 2006 Subject: [Macgpg-users] gnupg v1.4.4 binary install for Mac OS X In-Reply-To: <44BD3A8E.1030701@py-soft.co.uk> References: <44BD3A8E.1030701@py-soft.co.uk> Message-ID: <44BD55F6.2080804@mac.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Ben, although I had already compiled 1.4.4 from src, I thank you for your contribution to MacGPG users. As well as for your gpg2 package. Charly Benjamin Donnachie wrote the following on 7/18/06 3:46 PM: > > As macgpg hasn't been updated yet, I've put together a quick install > package for gnupg v1.4.4. Due to the security bug found in v1.4.3 > upgrading to this version is recommended. > > http://www.py-soft.co.uk/~benjamin/download/mac-gpg/GnuPG%201.4.4%20for%20PPC%20OSX%2010.4.zip > > This file is for the Power PC ONLY. It has been compiled under Mac OS > v10.4 but /may/ work with earlier versions. > > Ben - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Take Surveys. Earn Cash. Influence the Future of IT Join SourceForge.net's Techsay panel and you'll get the chance to share your opinions on IT & business topics through brief surveys -- and earn cash http://www.techsay.com/default.php?page=join.php&p=sourceforge&CID=DEVDEV _______________________________________________ Macgpg-users mailing list Macgpg-users@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/macgpg-users -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.4 (Darwin) Comment: GnuPG for Privacy Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iQEVAwUBRL1V883GMi2FW4PvAQhGzgf/cJKX+16BVB9EduKWsYyMXae4/zlNBRO3 1Z1xVMOYTywdjKlrhfoEkDPi6cKqbuTVqSgkwSfu4w3B1XATLONcYCmABiztu5IY Ruug+iFIKDaU6MMGFJc5H/BY/XvRsM8OU6JwO9dZK2UgHxfkw0VLABdIRM4MyVc6 eiLTXbhYr21l0UMVSEZaKt5A8utqCuymrUSczmh3nX3seR9qjj3wjd+zYCz5/TOH alheNS6C7DWHT8K8482n/H8xzQk7QkOBVbqACHEs8jh5U6Cd9vEBUhjEU5Siqey/ 96uCZChXhIj1qx+AzskAX+A2RIpZVgTYVpeb4kmCJ+AYz//FFtMOGw== =2ofJ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From wk at gnupg.org Wed Jul 19 11:48:53 2006 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Wed Jul 19 11:51:17 2006 Subject: German "umlauts" in passphrase In-Reply-To: (Patrick Brunschwig's message of "Tue, 18 Jul 2006 17:47:17 +0200") References: <200607171227.50844.karl.kashofer@gmx.at> <87lkqr9px6.fsf__35665.1623188101$1153218371$gmane$org@wheatstone.g10code.de> Message-ID: <87odvlylfe.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> On Tue, 18 Jul 2006 17:47, Patrick Brunschwig said: > How about some new command line parameters that specify the charset of > the passphrase provided and/or the charset in which the passphrase is > stored on the keyring? We don't know the charset used. In fact, gpg considers the passphrase as binary data with the only exception that a null byte or a LF termintate that data. printf "strange passp\xf3rase\n" | gpg --passphrase-fd 0 .... Might come handy if it is not possible to enter the passphrase directly due to a changed locale. Shalom-Salam, Werner From benjamin at py-soft.co.uk Wed Jul 19 13:52:28 2006 From: benjamin at py-soft.co.uk (Benjamin Donnachie) Date: Wed Jul 19 13:51:19 2006 Subject: German "umlauts" in passphrase In-Reply-To: <87odvlylfe.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> References: <200607171227.50844.karl.kashofer@gmx.at> <87lkqr9px6.fsf__35665.1623188101$1153218371$gmane$org@wheatstone.g10code.de> <87odvlylfe.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> Message-ID: <44BE1CFC.1060501@py-soft.co.uk> Werner Koch wrote: > We don't know the charset used. In fact, gpg considers the passphrase > as binary data with the only exception that a null byte or a LF > termintate that data. Is this a problem which gpg-agent could be modified to solve, perhaps? Ben From mlisten at hammernoch.net Wed Jul 19 14:39:02 2006 From: mlisten at hammernoch.net (=?ISO-8859-15?Q?Ludwig_H=FCgelsch=E4fer?=) Date: Wed Jul 19 14:40:27 2006 Subject: gpg 1.4.4 build error on Ubuntu Message-ID: <44BE27E6.3030109@hammernoch.net> Hi together, I'm trying to compile gpg 1.4.4 on ubuntu-Linux 5.1 running ./configure produces: > checking for C compiler default output file name... configure: error: C compiler cannot create executables > See `config.log' for more details. and checking config.log yields: > configure:2881: gcc -v &5 > Reading specs from /usr/lib/gcc/i486-linux-gnu/3.4.5/specs > Configured with: ../src/configure -v --enable-languages=c,c++,f77,pascal,objc,ada --prefix=/usr --libexecdir=/usr/lib --with-gxx-include-dir=/usr/include/c++/3.4 --enable-shared --with-system-zlib --enable-nls --without-included-gettext --program-suffix=-3.4 --enable-__cxa_atexit --enable-libstdcxx-allocator=mt --enable-clocale=gnu --enable-libstdcxx-debug i486-linux-gnu > Thread model: posix > gcc version 3.4.5 20050809 (prerelease) (Ubuntu 3.4.4-6ubuntu8.1) > configure:2884: $? = 0 > configure:2886: gcc -V &5 > gcc: `-V' option must have argument > configure:2889: $? = 1 > configure:2912: checking for C compiler default output file name > configure:2915: gcc conftest.c >&5 > /usr/bin/ld: crt1.o: No such file: No such file or directory > collect2: ld returned 1 exit status > configure:2918: $? = 1 What's running wrong there? Wrong gcc-Version installed? TIA Ludwig From gct3 at blueyonder.co.uk Wed Jul 19 18:26:14 2006 From: gct3 at blueyonder.co.uk (Graham) Date: Wed Jul 19 18:25:29 2006 Subject: [lists] gpg 1.4.4 build error on Ubuntu In-Reply-To: <44BE27E6.3030109@hammernoch.net> References: <44BE27E6.3030109@hammernoch.net> Message-ID: <200607191726.37555.gct3@blueyonder.co.uk> On Wednesday 19 July 2006 1:39 pm, Ludwig H?gelsch?fer wrote: > Hi together, > > I'm trying to compile gpg 1.4.4 on ubuntu-Linux 5.1 Just a thought. Have you installed build-essential? Ubuntu doesn't install many tools to compile from source code with the base install, so you have to do that yourself. You might trying to change your sources.list to the dapper repositories, and then doing: sudo apt-get update sudo apt-get dist-upgrade Which will upgrade your distro to Ubuntu 6.06 and then other tools will be available to you. The version I believe that is in the dapper repositories is gnupg 1.4.2, which may be sufficient for your needs. But if you want to compile from scratch you will still have to install build-essential.... This is one of the reasons I am using MEPIS 6.0. It uses the dapper repositories but it installs much more easily and has facilities to compile source from the base install. Its default desktop is KDE, but you can easily change that if you're a Gnome user -- Graham -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 245 bytes Desc: not available Url : /pipermail/attachments/20060719/26f2f131/attachment.pgp From mlisten at hammernoch.net Wed Jul 19 22:14:34 2006 From: mlisten at hammernoch.net (=?ISO-8859-15?Q?Ludwig_H=FCgelsch=E4fer?=) Date: Wed Jul 19 22:13:17 2006 Subject: [lists] gpg 1.4.4 build error on Ubuntu In-Reply-To: <200607191726.37555.gct3@blueyonder.co.uk> References: <44BE27E6.3030109@hammernoch.net> <200607191726.37555.gct3@blueyonder.co.uk> Message-ID: <44BE92AA.2050503@hammernoch.net> Hi, Graham schrieb: > Just a thought. Have you installed build-essential? (...) > But if you want to compile from scratch you will still have to install > build-essential.... Well, that did the job for now, at least make is running right now. Thanksalot! Ludwig, going to look into the other hints later... From wk at gnupg.org Thu Jul 20 13:05:15 2006 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Thu Jul 20 13:11:22 2006 Subject: German "umlauts" in passphrase In-Reply-To: <44BE1CFC.1060501@py-soft.co.uk> (Benjamin Donnachie's message of "Wed, 19 Jul 2006 12:52:28 +0100") References: <200607171227.50844.karl.kashofer@gmx.at> <87lkqr9px6.fsf__35665.1623188101$1153218371$gmane$org@wheatstone.g10code.de> <87odvlylfe.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> <44BE1CFC.1060501@py-soft.co.uk> Message-ID: <874pxcwn84.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> On Wed, 19 Jul 2006 13:52, Benjamin Donnachie said: > Is this a problem which gpg-agent could be modified to solve, perhaps? Not with old passphrases. However the APIs between the GnuPG 1.9 modules do all use utf-8, so in some future this problem should vanish. Salam-Shalom, Werner From gdmr at inf.ed.ac.uk Fri Jul 14 16:56:51 2006 From: gdmr at inf.ed.ac.uk (George Ross) Date: Fri Jul 21 16:22:15 2006 Subject: How to verify the file was successfully encrypted... In-Reply-To: Your message of "Sat, 15 Jul 2006 00:05:56 +0930." <44B7ABCC.5030407@gmail.com> Message-ID: <200607141456.k6EEuptR020044@glendy.inf.ed.ac.uk> > > How about if you append a hash of the file to the file, and encrypt that > > too? Then have the remote machine do the trial decrypt-and-check-hash. If > > all is OK the remote machine can then tell the local one to delete the > > original; and if it's not OK, it can scream at you. > > Better than that, if you get GPG to sign the file when it encrypts it > (using a passwordless key/subkey) and/or use the MDC option, you'll be > able to do this more reliably... Wasn't the original poster looking for something which didn't require trusting one particular piece of software? If they're happy to go with gpg, or to use two different PGP implementations at the two ends, then sign+encrypt would indeed appear to cover it. (Of course, it's not quite true signing, in the sense that it's only there as a check against corruption, and the signing key will be visible on the source machine.) -- Dr George D M Ross, School of Informatics, University of Edinburgh Kings Buildings, Mayfield Road, Edinburgh, Scotland, EH9 3JZ Mail: gdmr@inf.ed.ac.uk Voice: +44 131 650 5147 Fax: +44 131 667 7209 PGP: 1024D/AD758CC5 B91E D430 1E0D 5883 EF6A 426C B676 5C2B AD75 8CC5 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 238 bytes Desc: not available Url : /pipermail/attachments/20060714/c61502c4/attachment-0001.pgp From pg at futureware.at Wed Jul 19 16:45:51 2006 From: pg at futureware.at (Philipp =?iso-8859-1?q?G=FChring?=) Date: Fri Jul 21 16:22:20 2006 Subject: Version of signatures Message-ID: <200607191645.51652.pg@futureware.at> Hi, Which version of OpenPGP signature format is being used by GnuPG 1.4.1? Is it always version 4 signatures? Does it depend on the key? Best regards, Philipp G?hring From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Fri Jul 21 16:30:38 2006 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Fri Jul 21 16:29:17 2006 Subject: Version of signatures In-Reply-To: <200607191645.51652.pg@futureware.at> References: <200607191645.51652.pg@futureware.at> Message-ID: <20060721143038.GA19817@jabberwocky.com> On Wed, Jul 19, 2006 at 04:45:51PM +0200, Philipp G?hring wrote: > Hi, > > Which version of OpenPGP signature format is being used by GnuPG 1.4.1? > Is it always version 4 signatures? > Does it depend on the key? Yes, it depends on the key and a number of other details (is it a data signature or a signature on a key? Does the signature expire? Does the signature have a notation on it? etc, etc.) David From luis at riseup.net Fri Jul 21 20:00:34 2006 From: luis at riseup.net (Luis) Date: Fri Jul 21 22:56:04 2006 Subject: bad signature on encrypted and signed block? Message-ID: <61327.luis.1153504834.squirrel@mail.riseup.net> Can a GPG encrypted AND signed block (as in $gpg -a -e -s -r email@address msg.txt) end up showing a "BAD signature" warning? Or is it impossible because changes to the block would make it invalid, giving a CRC error before the signature could be checked? Thanks for any info or pointers on this. -- Luis From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Fri Jul 21 23:54:46 2006 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Fri Jul 21 23:53:33 2006 Subject: bad signature on encrypted and signed block? In-Reply-To: <61327.luis.1153504834.squirrel@mail.riseup.net> References: <61327.luis.1153504834.squirrel@mail.riseup.net> Message-ID: <20060721215446.GB20354@jabberwocky.com> On Fri, Jul 21, 2006 at 03:00:34PM -0300, Luis wrote: > Can a GPG encrypted AND signed block (as in $gpg -a -e -s -r email@address > msg.txt) end up showing a "BAD signature" warning? Or is it impossible > because changes to the block would make it invalid, giving a CRC error > before the signature could be checked? No, it is definitely possible. The CRC is not nearly as strong as the signature for validation. David From michael.kallas at web.de Sat Jul 22 10:53:59 2006 From: michael.kallas at web.de (Michael Kallas) Date: Sat Jul 22 10:53:11 2006 Subject: Fetching keys via http/https? Message-ID: <372110042@web.de> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Hi, Is there any way to properly fetch keys automatically if you are on a machine where only HTTP to port 80 and HTTPS to port 443 are allowed? (I.e. you are behind a firewall/proxy that checks not only ports but protocols also). Best wishes Michael - -- Nobody can save your freedom but YOU - Become a fellow of the FSF Europe! http://www.fsfe.org/en -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.4 (MingW32) - WinPT 0.12.3 iQCVAwUBRMHnhYy7vAEofQELAQIsowP8DzioMVwkf8KSScXo2YukALQ87178qC7h t18nPyVf7jeKwr13reIJQYt9FScAzvgMgyYUUs0LU//l7vJ1u9jpFigNwPrGeMlS wQEAPmB/Wmkyg1h+8haXqV5OlP6KeIv44QkaHNsi8HB92P1rXMoIdMwk+JlnVmVG 5VSpbc3P5Wo= =FWnz -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From h_hucke at aeon.icebear.org Sat Jul 22 11:38:57 2006 From: h_hucke at aeon.icebear.org (Henning Hucke) Date: Sat Jul 22 13:25:43 2006 Subject: Fetching keys via http/https? In-Reply-To: <372110042@web.de> References: <372110042@web.de> Message-ID: On Sat, 22 Jul 2006, Michael Kallas wrote: > Is there any way to properly fetch keys automatically if you are on a > machine where only HTTP to port 80 and HTTPS to port 443 are allowed? > (I.e. you are behind a firewall/proxy that checks not only ports but > protocols also). "keyserver x-hkp://" ? Regards Henning Hucke -- The SAME WAVE keeps coming in and COLLAPSING like a rayon MUU-MUU ... From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Sat Jul 22 15:01:37 2006 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Sat Jul 22 15:00:22 2006 Subject: Fetching keys via http/https? In-Reply-To: <372110042@web.de> References: <372110042@web.de> Message-ID: <20060722130137.GA5061@jabberwocky.com> On Sat, Jul 22, 2006 at 10:53:59AM +0200, Michael Kallas wrote: > Hi, > > Is there any way to properly fetch keys automatically if you are on a > machine where only HTTP to port 80 and HTTPS to port 443 are allowed? > (I.e. you are behind a firewall/proxy that checks not only ports but > protocols also). Some keyservers operate on port 80 as well as the usual 11371. Try hkp://keyserver.pramberger.at:80 David From qed at tiscali.it Sat Jul 22 14:31:27 2006 From: qed at tiscali.it (Qed) Date: Sat Jul 22 16:19:03 2006 Subject: Fetching keys via http/https? In-Reply-To: <372110042@web.de> References: <372110042@web.de> Message-ID: <44C21A9F.1070505@tiscali.it> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: RIPEMD160 On 07/22/2006 10:53 AM, Michael Kallas wrote: > Is there any way to properly fetch keys automatically if you are on a > machine where only HTTP to port 80 and HTTPS to port 443 are allowed? > (I.e. you are behind a firewall/proxy that checks not only ports but > protocols also). keyserver hkp://subkeys.pgp.net keyserver-options http-proxy=http://yourproxy:8080,honor-http-proxy - -- Q.E.D. War is Peace Freedom is Slavery Ignorance is Strenght ICQ UIN: 301825501 OpenPGP key ID: 0x58D14EB3 Key fingerprint: 00B9 3E17 630F F2A7 FF96 DA6B AEE0 EC27 58D1 4EB3 Check fingerprints before trusting a key! -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.4 (GNU/Linux) iD8DBQFEwhqfH+Dh0Dl5XacRA0MZAKCJEcVPDVWdR2cSCHJM2xPQdIcTmwCfRbtm Zvsc799Amn+mjCJur0KZrug= =pMar -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From michael.kallas at web.de Mon Jul 24 14:05:35 2006 From: michael.kallas at web.de (Michael Kallas) Date: Mon Jul 24 14:04:45 2006 Subject: Fetching keys via http/https? Message-ID: <373071850@web.de> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Hi, > On 07/22/2006 10:53 AM, Michael Kallas wrote: > > Is there any way to properly fetch keys automatically if you are on a > > machine where only HTTP to port 80 and HTTPS to port 443 are allowed? > > (I.e. you are behind a firewall/proxy that checks not only ports but > > protocols also). > > keyserver hkp://subkeys.pgp.net > keyserver-options http-proxy=http://yourproxy:8080,honor-http-proxy No luck although I even tried broken-http-proxy. It's always: gpg: requesting key 89074FAD from http server keyserver.pramberger.at [or whatever keyserver I try] gpgkeys: http fetch error 7: couldn't connect: No error gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found. gpg: Total number processed: 0 Normal http requests (wget etc.) work through this proxy. Best wishes Michael -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.4 (MingW32) - WinPT 0.12.3 iQCVAwUBRMS3eoy7vAEofQELAQIWSAQAtT2FRhHB5KYXsOW5+n8Pl2/a0xB73BA3 h+DmgdzuWss0rG0XsOuegF060GmOe9+xayhfTGNMSHmcBG//KIjzKdOj+K8of/eo U9++gLYVMQ3h27LFQIt+58+h5afoiFqTeWQhnMK8E0i1IyT/jn+MQ35yvPIFHdCL WW9l/Kz47iE= =sQbu -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From tony at tonywhitmore.co.uk Mon Jul 24 22:50:22 2006 From: tony at tonywhitmore.co.uk (Tony Whitmore) Date: Mon Jul 24 22:49:39 2006 Subject: Driving licence as identification and accepting signed keys without exchanging encrypted data Message-ID: <44C5328E.5060400@tonywhitmore.co.uk> I'm still working on getting my card reader to work, but in the meantime, I have a couple of questions regarding key-signing ettiquette following a session at LUG Radio Live last weekend. I hope the questions are not OT, I've checked the HOWTOs & FAQs, but there's some ambiguity in them. First: Is a photo driving licence considered adequate identification? I'm in the UK so we have UK / EU photo driving licences. I have previously only used passports as ID, but some people were presenting driving licences instead. Second: I've already had back some e-mails, encrypted with my public key, with signatures attached ready for me to upload to a keyserver. I usually use the procedure described at [1], which requires the additional verification of the encryption, exchange and decryption of a random amount of text before signatures are sent. Obviously I have to be able to decrypt the e-mail successfully to access the signature they have sent me, but is this considered a safe and appropriate way to sign keys? The e-mails I received were identical apart from the sender's name, so I suspect they are using a script. I wasn't able to find anything definitive on Google so can't be sure which script they are using, but the text ran like: ---quote--- Hi, please find attached the user id Antony Paul Whitmore of your key 7920DB2171B98B64 signed by me. If you have multiple user ids, I sent the signature for each user id separately to that user id's associated email address. You can import the signatures by running each through `gpg --import`. Note that I did not upload your key to any keyservers. If you want this new signature to be available to others, please upload it yourself. With GnuPG this can be done using gpg --keyserver subkeys.pgp.net --send-key 7920DB2171B98B64 If you have any questions, don't hesitate to ask. ---end quote--- I'd value the opinions of the list, as I want to ensure correct procedure is followed to ensure the integrity of the web of trust. Tony [1] http://www.hantslug.org.uk/cgi-bin/wiki.pl?LinuxHints/KeySigning -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 254 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature Url : /pipermail/attachments/20060724/6eb9d731/signature.pgp From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Mon Jul 24 23:23:23 2006 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Mon Jul 24 23:22:04 2006 Subject: Driving licence as identification and accepting signed keys without exchanging encrypted data In-Reply-To: <44C5328E.5060400@tonywhitmore.co.uk> References: <44C5328E.5060400@tonywhitmore.co.uk> Message-ID: <20060724212323.GA1888@jabberwocky.com> On Mon, Jul 24, 2006 at 09:50:22PM +0100, Tony Whitmore wrote: > I'm still working on getting my card reader to work, but in the > meantime, I have a couple of questions regarding key-signing ettiquette > following a session at LUG Radio Live last weekend. I hope the questions > are not OT, I've checked the HOWTOs & FAQs, but there's some ambiguity > in them. > > First: Is a photo driving licence considered adequate identification? > I'm in the UK so we have UK / EU photo driving licences. I have > previously only used passports as ID, but some people were presenting > driving licences instead. It depends on what *you* think. Some people do accept driver licences as adequate identification. Some don't. I do, for what it's worth. > Second: I've already had back some e-mails, encrypted with my public > key, with signatures attached ready for me to upload to a keyserver. I > usually use the procedure described at [1], which requires the > additional verification of the encryption, exchange and decryption of a > random amount of text before signatures are sent. Obviously I have to be > able to decrypt the e-mail successfully to access the signature they > have sent me, but is this considered a safe and appropriate way to sign > keys? No, it's not. Some people do it, though. Note that there is a difference between what page at http://www.hantslug.org.uk/cgi-bin/wiki.pl?LinuxHints/KeySigning says and what you say above. The page (correctly) notes that all that is necessary is that the person *sign* the challenge before sending it back to you. The page makes clear ("encrypted, if you like") that encryption is optional here, and adds little to what you are trying to prove. It doesn't matter if other people can read the signed challenge or not. Of course, it doesn't hurt to encrypt, so long as it is understood that it doesn't really help either. Take a look at the thread starting at http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/2006-July/028949.html It has a pretty good discussions of various issues around keysigning. David From tony at tonywhitmore.co.uk Mon Jul 24 23:40:55 2006 From: tony at tonywhitmore.co.uk (Tony Whitmore) Date: Mon Jul 24 23:40:08 2006 Subject: Driving licence as identification and accepting signed keys without exchanging encrypted data In-Reply-To: <20060724212323.GA1888@jabberwocky.com> References: <44C5328E.5060400@tonywhitmore.co.uk> <20060724212323.GA1888@jabberwocky.com> Message-ID: <44C53E67.8030506@tonywhitmore.co.uk> David Shaw wrote: > On Mon, Jul 24, 2006 at 09:50:22PM +0100, Tony Whitmore wrote: >> First: Is a photo driving licence considered adequate identification? >> I'm in the UK so we have UK / EU photo driving licences. I have >> previously only used passports as ID, but some people were presenting >> driving licences instead. > > It depends on what *you* think. Some people do accept driver licences > as adequate identification. Some don't. I do, for what it's worth. I understand there is a personal decision to be made here, and that I have responsibility to be satisfied with the ID, but I don't know whether there are good arguments for/against accepting photo driving licences. >> Second: I've already had back some e-mails, encrypted with my public >> key, with signatures attached ready for me to upload to a keyserver. I >> usually use the procedure described at [1], which requires the >> additional verification of the encryption, exchange and decryption of a >> random amount of text before signatures are sent. Obviously I have to be >> able to decrypt the e-mail successfully to access the signature they >> have sent me, but is this considered a safe and appropriate way to sign >> keys? > > No, it's not. Some people do it, though. :( I suppose I have the option of not uploading their signature to a public keyserver, but presumably these people are damaging the web of trust in signing keys in this way? > Note that there is a difference between what page at > http://www.hantslug.org.uk/cgi-bin/wiki.pl?LinuxHints/KeySigning says > and what you say above. The page (correctly) notes that all that is > necessary is that the person *sign* the challenge before sending it > back to you. The page makes clear ("encrypted, if you like") that > encryption is optional here, and adds little to what you are trying to > prove. It doesn't matter if other people can read the signed > challenge or not. Of course, it doesn't hurt to encrypt, so long as > it is understood that it doesn't really help either. Yes, I realise I didn't phrase my explanation very well. The procedure I use is as described on the referenced web page. What should have been a separate comment was in regard to the encrypted e-mails *I* have been sent with signatures attached. In order to access the attached signature file, I have to be able to decrypt the e-mail, meaning I have to have access to my private key. If I don't have the private key, I can't decrypt the e-mail and can't access the signature to upload it. This seems to provide some sort of checking that the e-mail address ties up with the public and private keys, but again I'd like to hear what other people think. > Take a look at the thread starting at > http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/2006-July/028949.html Thank you, I will do so. Tony -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 254 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature Url : /pipermail/attachments/20060724/af149f5d/signature.pgp From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Mon Jul 24 23:50:36 2006 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Mon Jul 24 23:49:12 2006 Subject: Driving licence as identification and accepting signed keys without exchanging encrypted data In-Reply-To: <44C53E67.8030506@tonywhitmore.co.uk> References: <44C5328E.5060400@tonywhitmore.co.uk> <20060724212323.GA1888@jabberwocky.com> <44C53E67.8030506@tonywhitmore.co.uk> Message-ID: <20060724215036.GA1946@jabberwocky.com> On Mon, Jul 24, 2006 at 10:40:55PM +0100, Tony Whitmore wrote: > David Shaw wrote: > > On Mon, Jul 24, 2006 at 09:50:22PM +0100, Tony Whitmore wrote: > >> First: Is a photo driving licence considered adequate identification? > >> I'm in the UK so we have UK / EU photo driving licences. I have > >> previously only used passports as ID, but some people were presenting > >> driving licences instead. > > > > It depends on what *you* think. Some people do accept driver licences > > as adequate identification. Some don't. I do, for what it's worth. > > I understand there is a personal decision to be made here, and that I > have responsibility to be satisfied with the ID, but I don't know > whether there are good arguments for/against accepting photo driving > licences. It comes down to whether you believe it is hard or easy to get a false drivers license. That is something that is going to be very different in different places. You also need to factor in whether you'd recognize a fake drivers license anyway (I'm not sure I would - here in the US there are over 50 types of drivers licenses).. > > Note that there is a difference between what page at > > http://www.hantslug.org.uk/cgi-bin/wiki.pl?LinuxHints/KeySigning says > > and what you say above. The page (correctly) notes that all that is > > necessary is that the person *sign* the challenge before sending it > > back to you. The page makes clear ("encrypted, if you like") that > > encryption is optional here, and adds little to what you are trying to > > prove. It doesn't matter if other people can read the signed > > challenge or not. Of course, it doesn't hurt to encrypt, so long as > > it is understood that it doesn't really help either. > > Yes, I realise I didn't phrase my explanation very well. The procedure I > use is as described on the referenced web page. What should have been a > separate comment was in regard to the encrypted e-mails *I* have been > sent with signatures attached. In order to access the attached signature > file, I have to be able to decrypt the e-mail, meaning I have to have > access to my private key. If I don't have the private key, I can't > decrypt the e-mail and can't access the signature to upload it. This > seems to provide some sort of checking that the e-mail address ties up > with the public and private keys, but again I'd like to hear what other > people think. The error here was made by the signer. As you are the signee, presumably you have good assurance that you are who you say you are. I'd go ahead and upload the keys :) David From atom at smasher.org Tue Jul 25 08:29:23 2006 From: atom at smasher.org (Atom Smasher) Date: Tue Jul 25 08:28:18 2006 Subject: Driving licence as identification and accepting signed keys without exchanging encrypted data In-Reply-To: <44C5328E.5060400@tonywhitmore.co.uk> References: <44C5328E.5060400@tonywhitmore.co.uk> Message-ID: <20060725062927.4471.qmail@smasher.org> On Mon, 24 Jul 2006, Tony Whitmore wrote: > I'm still working on getting my card reader to work, but in the > meantime, I have a couple of questions regarding key-signing ettiquette > following a session at LUG Radio Live last weekend. I hope the questions > are not OT, I've checked the HOWTOs & FAQs, but there's some ambiguity > in them. > > First: Is a photo driving licence considered adequate identification? > I'm in the UK so we have UK / EU photo driving licences. I have > previously only used passports as ID, but some people were presenting > driving licences instead. ================ no matter what anyone tells you is or isn't adequate, you have to decide for yourself. this may help you figure it out - http://www.linuxsecurity.com/content/view/121645/49/ -- ...atom ________________________ http://atom.smasher.org/ 762A 3B98 A3C3 96C9 C6B7 582A B88D 52E4 D9F5 7808 ------------------------------------------------- "If the world were merely seductive, that would be easy. If it were merely challenging, that would be no problem. But I arise in the morning torn between a desire to improve the world, and a desire to enjoy the world. This makes it hard to plan the day." -- E.B. White From atom at smasher.org Tue Jul 25 08:43:50 2006 From: atom at smasher.org (Atom Smasher) Date: Tue Jul 25 08:42:41 2006 Subject: Driving licence as identification and accepting signed keys without exchanging encrypted data In-Reply-To: <20060724212323.GA1888@jabberwocky.com> References: <44C5328E.5060400@tonywhitmore.co.uk> <20060724212323.GA1888@jabberwocky.com> Message-ID: <20060725064355.15342.qmail@smasher.org> On Mon, 24 Jul 2006, David Shaw wrote: > Note that there is a difference between what page at > http://www.hantslug.org.uk/cgi-bin/wiki.pl?LinuxHints/KeySigning says > and what you say above. The page (correctly) notes that all that is > necessary is that the person *sign* the challenge before sending it back > to you. The page makes clear ("encrypted, if you like") that encryption > is optional here, and adds little to what you are trying to prove. It > doesn't matter if other people can read the signed challenge or not. > Of course, it doesn't hurt to encrypt, so long as it is understood that > it doesn't really help either. ====================== other than adding an extra step to the process, what is gained by signing a challenge instead of encrypting a key certification (key signature) to the recipient's public key? assuming that the primary key is the signing key, the protocol outlined in the link, above, does NOT demonstrate that the recipient controls the private half of the encryption subkey. if, instead, the signed key is encrypted to the recipient, the key signature is only useful AFTER the recipient has proven their control of the private encryption key... this protocol simultaneously demonstrates their control of the primary key (used to self-sign the UID and encryption subkey) and email address. -- ...atom ________________________ http://atom.smasher.org/ 762A 3B98 A3C3 96C9 C6B7 582A B88D 52E4 D9F5 7808 ------------------------------------------------- "Nationalism is the childness sickness of Man. It is the whooping cough of adults" -- Albert Einstein From kloecker at kde.org Tue Jul 25 10:05:16 2006 From: kloecker at kde.org (Ingo =?iso-8859-1?q?Kl=F6cker?=) Date: Tue Jul 25 10:04:10 2006 Subject: Driving licence as identification and accepting signed keys without exchanging encrypted data In-Reply-To: <20060725064355.15342.qmail@smasher.org> References: <44C5328E.5060400@tonywhitmore.co.uk> <20060724212323.GA1888@jabberwocky.com> <20060725064355.15342.qmail@smasher.org> Message-ID: <200607251005.16890@helena.mathA.rwth-aachen.de> Am Dienstag, 25. Juli 2006 08:43 schrieb Atom Smasher: > On Mon, 24 Jul 2006, David Shaw wrote: > > Note that there is a difference between what page at > > http://www.hantslug.org.uk/cgi-bin/wiki.pl?LinuxHints/KeySigning > > says and what you say above. The page (correctly) notes that all > > that is necessary is that the person *sign* the challenge before > > sending it back to you. The page makes clear ("encrypted, if you > > like") that encryption is optional here, and adds little to what > > you are trying to prove. It doesn't matter if other people can > > read the signed challenge or not. Of course, it doesn't hurt to > > encrypt, so long as it is understood that it doesn't really help > > either. > > ====================== > > other than adding an extra step to the process, what is gained by > signing a challenge instead of encrypting a key certification (key > signature) to the recipient's public key? Please (re-)read the recent thread (mentioned by David) where we discussed this. Regards, Ingo -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 189 bytes Desc: not available Url : /pipermail/attachments/20060725/f3665bff/attachment.pgp From tony at tonywhitmore.co.uk Tue Jul 25 11:30:33 2006 From: tony at tonywhitmore.co.uk (Tony Whitmore) Date: Tue Jul 25 11:29:47 2006 Subject: Driving licence as identification and accepting signed keys without exchanging encrypted data In-Reply-To: <20060725062927.4471.qmail@smasher.org> References: <44C5328E.5060400@tonywhitmore.co.uk> <20060725062927.4471.qmail@smasher.org> Message-ID: <20060725093033.GA11484@streetend.force9.co.uk> On Tue, Jul 25, 2006 at 02:29:23AM -0400, Atom Smasher wrote: > no matter what anyone tells you is or isn't adequate, you have to decide > for yourself. this may help you figure it out - > http://www.linuxsecurity.com/content/view/121645/49/ Thanks Atom, that article was linked to from the thread suggested yesterday. It covers some interesting etiquette points, and certainly doesn't mention using a encrypted block of random data to further verify identity: "If required, they may take this opportunity to present each other with formal identification. After enjoying each others' company, they each return home, verify each others' key information to be correct (between the papers they exchanged and the keys they are about to sign), and sign each others' keys. They may then exchange signed keys." Yet it's already been suggested in this thread that this represents insufficient verification. As I mentioned yesterday, I understand that it's my decision whether to trust any particular piece of identification. I thought it would be worth finding out whether there are any actual arguments for or against accepting such ID which would help inform my decision. Cheers, Tony -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 189 bytes Desc: Digital signature Url : /pipermail/attachments/20060725/ad727027/attachment.pgp From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Tue Jul 25 12:35:23 2006 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Tue Jul 25 12:34:12 2006 Subject: Driving licence as identification and accepting signed keys without exchanging encrypted data In-Reply-To: <20060725093033.GA11484@streetend.force9.co.uk> References: <44C5328E.5060400@tonywhitmore.co.uk> <20060725062927.4471.qmail@smasher.org> <20060725093033.GA11484@streetend.force9.co.uk> Message-ID: <44C5F3EB.40706@sixdemonbag.org> Tony Whitmore wrote: > Yet it's already been suggested in this thread that this represents > insufficient verification. Simple answers like "sufficient" or "insufficient" are tempting, but they utterly lack context. When it comes to these questions, you need to carefully assess your needs and then establish a security policy that meets those needs. So: start from the beginning. What's your threat model? What do you need an OpenPGP key signature to represent? How paranoid do you need to be? Once you know that, then start looking for other people with similar policies and ask them for arguments for or against to help you decide. But asking strangers with completely unknown policies is unlikely to do much but confuse you. From og at pre-secure.de Tue Jul 25 12:38:51 2006 From: og at pre-secure.de (Olaf Gellert) Date: Tue Jul 25 12:41:41 2006 Subject: Driving licence as identification and accepting signed keys without exchanging encrypted data In-Reply-To: <20060725093033.GA11484@streetend.force9.co.uk> References: <44C5328E.5060400@tonywhitmore.co.uk> <20060725062927.4471.qmail@smasher.org> <20060725093033.GA11484@streetend.force9.co.uk> Message-ID: <44C5F4BB.1040308@pre-secure.de> Hi all, Tony Whitmore wrote: > As I mentioned yesterday, I understand that it's my decision whether to trust > any particular piece of identification. I thought it would be worth finding > out whether there are any actual arguments for or against accepting such ID > which would help inform my decision. You might take a look on the presented dokument itself. Ask yourself a few questions: - do I believe or even know that this is an official document (and not a fake)? - is this something which could be faked easily? I guess there is a difference for example between the US drivers licenses and the new European ones (regarding the possibility of faking these), I feel that at least where I live (Germany) the drivers license would be fairly equal to a passport. But that's for sure not true for all kinds of documents (eg. very old driving licenses here). Another (more paranoid) question would be: - do I believe that it is difficult in the country where the document was issued, to get it issued to a wrong name (by giving the officer a nice little present)? ;-) And you might ask yourself for what purposes you would use a validation according to the web of trust. If my life would depend on it: No ways. For sending some usual business information: No problem. ;-) So I do accept passports / official IDs only for my private key. With my company key I have to be more relaxed (cause sometimes a good bit of security is much more already than having none at all). So my identification policy depends on the key that's used. Schizophrenia! Regards, Olaf -- Dipl.Inform. Olaf Gellert PRESECURE (R) Senior Researcher, Consulting GmbH Phone: (+49) 0700 / PRESECURE og@pre-secure.de A daily view on Internet Attacks https://www.ecsirt.net/sensornet From wk at gnupg.org Tue Jul 25 14:10:23 2006 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Tue Jul 25 14:33:21 2006 Subject: [Announce] Gpg4win 1.0.4 released Message-ID: <87u055opg0.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> Skipped content of type multipart/signed-------------- next part -------------- _______________________________________________ Gnupg-announce mailing list Gnupg-announce@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-announce From atom at smasher.org Tue Jul 25 17:37:46 2006 From: atom at smasher.org (Atom Smasher) Date: Tue Jul 25 17:36:40 2006 Subject: Driving licence as identification and accepting signed keys without exchanging encrypted data In-Reply-To: <20060725093033.GA11484@streetend.force9.co.uk> References: <44C5328E.5060400@tonywhitmore.co.uk> <20060725062927.4471.qmail@smasher.org> <20060725093033.GA11484@streetend.force9.co.uk> Message-ID: <20060725153752.27490.qmail@smasher.org> On Tue, 25 Jul 2006, Tony Whitmore wrote: > Thanks Atom, that article was linked to from the thread suggested > yesterday. It covers some interesting etiquette points, and certainly > doesn't mention using a encrypted block of random data to further verify > identity: > > "If required, they may take this opportunity to present each other with > formal identification. After enjoying each others' company, they each > return home, verify each others' key information to be correct (between > the papers they exchanged and the keys they are about to sign), and sign > each others' keys. They may then exchange signed keys." > > Yet it's already been suggested in this thread that this represents > insufficient verification. > > As I mentioned yesterday, I understand that it's my decision whether to > trust any particular piece of identification. I thought it would be > worth finding out whether there are any actual arguments for or against > accepting such ID which would help inform my decision. ==================== what form of ID cannot be forged, stolen or otherwise compromised? if everyone had govt issued tattoos, or RFID implants, would that be 100% trustworthy? what about biometrics? to make things worse, we can't even trust multiple forms of ID (passport + DL + credit cards + library card + employee ID, etc) because fake IDs are often obtained/established using other fake IDs. there are even cases where people have spent years being married to someone and the spouse wasn't who they claimed to be. other than my immediate family, is there anyone whose identity i can *really* be 100% certain of? can i even trust my immediate family? given this, it's really somewhat hopeless to think that you can absolutely verify the identity of someone you just met... but even if you can't absolutely verify (earning a level 3 signature) someone's identity, you can still issue a level one or two signature based on your level of confidence that the person is who they claim to be. if you follow the protocol outlined in the article you can at least demonstrate that the person controls the private key and email address. since legal names are not designed to be 100% unique (i know of several people named "george bush") we can, to a certain extent, blur the line between real names and pseudonyms... in sci-fi we can often think of identification as an absolute, but in the real world it's blurry. my own current [informal] policy is that only people i have personally known for extended periods of time can get a level 3 signature from me (and i recognize that even this is not 100% accurate). if i just meet someone at a key signing party and they show me some ID that earns a level 2 signature. in no way am i implying that this policy is right and everything else is wrong... that's just the way i'm currently doing it. everyone needs to figure it out for themselves, and do what makes the most sense to them. -- ...atom ________________________ http://atom.smasher.org/ 762A 3B98 A3C3 96C9 C6B7 582A B88D 52E4 D9F5 7808 ------------------------------------------------- "Reality is that which, when you stop believing in it, doesn't go away." -- Philip K. Dick From wk at gnupg.org Tue Jul 25 19:47:39 2006 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Tue Jul 25 19:51:29 2006 Subject: New Windows Binary? In-Reply-To: <44B9456B.1040004@galen.org.uk> (Bob Henson's message of "Sat, 15 Jul 2006 20:43:39 +0100") References: <44B9456B.1040004@galen.org.uk> Message-ID: <87ejw9o9tw.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> On Sat, 15 Jul 2006 21:43, Bob Henson said: > I read some days ago on the GPGee forum that a new Windows binary would > be released to correct the change in GPG 1.4.4 that broke GPGee. Is it > around/about to appear? I have some files encrypted using GPGee and No. However, I released gpg4win 1.0.4 today with a patched version of gpg. You might want to take the gpg binary from that package (use the light installer). Shalom-Salam, Werner From sam at robots.org.uk Tue Jul 25 20:13:45 2006 From: sam at robots.org.uk (Sam Morris) Date: Tue Jul 25 20:18:49 2006 Subject: Driving licence as identification and accepting signed keys without exchanging encrypted data References: <44C5328E.5060400@tonywhitmore.co.uk> Message-ID: -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On Mon, 24 Jul 2006 21:50:22 +0100, Tony Whitmore wrote: > The e-mails I received were identical apart from the sender's name, so I > suspect they are using a script. I wasn't able to find anything > definitive on Google so can't be sure which script they are using, but > the text ran like: > ---quote--- > Hi, > > please find attached the user id > Antony Paul Whitmore > of your key 7920DB2171B98B64 signed by me. > > If you have multiple user ids, I sent the signature for each user id > separately to that user id's associated email address. You can import > the signatures by running each through `gpg --import`. > > Note that I did not upload your key to any keyservers. If you want this > new signature to be available to others, please upload it yourself. > With GnuPG this can be done using > gpg --keyserver subkeys.pgp.net --send-key 7920DB2171B98B64 > > If you have any questions, don't hesitate to ask. > ---end quote--- I can at least help clear this one up, as I was one of the ones who used the script. :) It is called CA Fire and Forget (caff). Its home page, containing a brief description and a link to the source code is . A copy of the man page can be found online at . - -- Sam Morris http://robots.org.uk/ PGP key id 5EA01078 3412 EA18 1277 354B 991B C869 B219 7FDB 5EA0 1078 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.3 (GNU/Linux) iD8DBQFExl5kshl/216gEHgRAtZWAJ9yQbwBaFzxHouEegKG+fGDS30yaACfesg/ csn+6FKs2kn2igOfq8A8YqY= =76iK -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From bob.henson at galen.org.uk Tue Jul 25 20:31:08 2006 From: bob.henson at galen.org.uk (Bob Henson) Date: Tue Jul 25 20:29:52 2006 Subject: New Windows Binary? In-Reply-To: <87ejw9o9tw.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> References: <44B9456B.1040004@galen.org.uk> <87ejw9o9tw.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> Message-ID: <44C6636C.5080004@galen.org.uk> Werner Koch wrote > On Sat, 15 Jul 2006 21:43, Bob Henson said: > >> I read some days ago on the GPGee forum that a new Windows binary would >> be released to correct the change in GPG 1.4.4 that broke GPGee. Is it >> around/about to appear? I have some files encrypted using GPGee and > > No. However, I released gpg4win 1.0.4 today with a patched version of > gpg. You might want to take the gpg binary from that package (use the > light installer). Thanks, Werner. I'll get that a.s.a.p Regards, Bob -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 546 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature Url : /pipermail/attachments/20060725/32c219aa/signature.pgp From z.himsel at gmail.com Tue Jul 25 21:21:30 2006 From: z.himsel at gmail.com (Zach Himsel) Date: Tue Jul 25 22:25:27 2006 Subject: gpg-agent in Enigmail/Thunderbird Message-ID: <44C66F3A.6090500@gmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 I recall some time ago I had a question as to how I can use gpg-agent in Windows for Thunderbird/Enigmail. Since there is no release of gpg-agent for Windows (without building it yourself), I had to enter in my passphrase every time TB started up (I had the pass cache for 9999 minutes). I figured out that in the Enigmail options, you can have it add string of options before the command. If you add --passphrase "#####" it will bypass the --passphrase-fd 0 that it puts there by default. The only downside is that the pass is not stored securely. - -- Zach Himsel (aka DJ Zeru ) ====================== () ASCII Ribbon - Against HTML mail /\ Campaign - & vCard Signatures ====================== OpenPGP Public Key ID: 0xD1093592 http://zach-himsel.is.dreaming.org -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.4 (MingW32) Comment: ================================================= Comment: Key ID: 0xD1093592 (zach-himsel.is.dreaming.org) Comment: ------------------------------------------------- Comment: () ASCII Ribbon - against HTML email Comment: /\ Campaign - & vCard signatures Comment: ================================================= iQEVAwUBRMZvOpHoJdzRCTWSAQrK8QgAiJQPEcTK/V1KtbM/TzaQV4U72+LlOJk3 3pP+ihrdonb/3/44BvAj+S4GE9CsYxSvNY9i+Z6vue9rIuLAvo5vFaRUWZtFyvY3 zdkfmiPQsI7DeO3qNd2xSxWogt3urDqKICot5TssJI1mrNn9mKrqp0f760fya2mY V83Wf+zdbDbB0Ub7A1eGZ7aaQxS59z3Q0r4FXvtsfhvGYsD0+PoDoBZnfAcr12/U 05YAjCx+6UL7yUPdEgJtAWmQfujbnXW+J4s+L7jx1EEKvYu/WFNJ3/2e9VWPbr37 XVUflhvy5CvJe+O+YamQ4A3rg7arf3Rti/wcMLMkA9JMURWEK4oTxw== =kGx/ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Wed Jul 26 22:34:44 2006 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Wed Jul 26 22:33:47 2006 Subject: GnuPG 1.4.4 does not compile on NetBSD is curl library is installed from pkgsrc In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20060726203444.GA7787@jabberwocky.com> On Tue, Jul 25, 2006 at 01:55:34PM +0200, Gilbert Fernandes wrote: > Hello everyone, > > when GnuPG 1.4.4 is compiled on NetBSD 3.0 it works fine. The configure > does its job, as the make and make install. > > But if the curl library has been installed on the system (on one of my > computers, > it has been installed as dependency of clamav) then the make fails because > a file does not find the proper include file at the right place. Should be fixed now, thanks. Index: Makefile.am =================================================================== --- Makefile.am (revision 4198) +++ Makefile.am (working copy) @@ -50,4 +50,5 @@ gpgkeys_curl_LDADD = @LIBCURL@ @GETOPT@ gpgkeys_hkp_CPPFLAGS = @LIBCURL_CPPFLAGS@ gpgkeys_hkp_LDADD = @LIBCURL@ @GETOPT@ +gpgkeys_finger_CPPFLAGS = @LIBCURL_CPPFLAGS@ endif David From wk at gnupg.org Thu Jul 27 17:25:34 2006 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Thu Jul 27 17:31:20 2006 Subject: GnuPG 1.9.222 released Message-ID: <87psfrjci9.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> Hi! This is just a short note to announce that GnuPG 1.9.22 is avaiable at the usual place (ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/alpha/gnupg/). Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.22 (2006-07-27) ------------------------------------------------- * Enhanced pkcs#12 support to allow import from simple keyBags. * Exporting to pkcs#12 now create bag attributes so that Mozilla is able to import the files. * Fixed uploading of certain keys to the smart card. It is currently to hot in my office to write a real announcement. And well, I need to leave for the monthly meeting of the www.dlug.de . Salam-Shalom, Werner From gilboooo at gmail.com Tue Jul 25 13:55:34 2006 From: gilboooo at gmail.com (Gilbert Fernandes) Date: Thu Jul 27 18:40:39 2006 Subject: GnuPG 1.4.4 does not compile on NetBSD is curl library is installed from pkgsrc Message-ID: Hello everyone, when GnuPG 1.4.4 is compiled on NetBSD 3.0 it works fine. The configure does its job, as the make and make install. But if the curl library has been installed on the system (on one of my computers, it has been installed as dependency of clamav) then the make fails because a file does not find the proper include file at the right place. Here is the error message : -*- In file included from gpgkeys_finger.c:48: ksutil.h:26:23: curl/curl.h: No such file or directory In file included from gpgkeys_finger.c:48: ksutil.h:108: error: parse error before "error" *** Error code 1 Stop. make: stopped in /root/g/gnupg-1.4.4/keyserver *** Error code 1 Stop. make: stopped in /root/g/gnupg-1.4.4 *** Error code 1 Stop. make: stopped in /root/g/gnupg-1.4.4 soekris{/root/g/gnupg-1.4.4} -*- As soon as I remove the curl library (compiled from /usr/pkgsrc/www/curl) the make of GnuPG 1.4.4 works fine. When the curl library is installed, the curl.h file is located there : /usr/pkg/include/curl/curl.h To make a test, I have tried to compile the previous GnuPG version (1.4.3) with and without that curl library installed : -*- keyserver.c:30:23: curl/curl.h: No such file or directory In file included from keyserver.c:40: ../include/ttyio.h:32: warning: `libintl_printf' is an unrecognized format function type ../include/ttyio.h:34: warning: `libintl_printf' is an unrecognized format function type In file included from keyserver.c:45: ../include/util.h:81: warning: `libintl_printf' is an unrecognized format function type ../include/util.h:84: warning: `libintl_printf' is an unrecognized format function type ../include/util.h:85: warning: `libintl_printf' is an unrecognized format function type ../include/util.h:86: warning: `libintl_printf' is an unrecognized format function type ../include/util.h:87: warning: `libintl_printf' is an unrecognized format function type ../include/util.h:88: warning: `libintl_printf' is an unrecognized format function type keyserver.c: In function `parse_keyserver_uri': keyserver.c:367: warning: subscript has type `char' *** Error code 1 Stop. make: stopped in /root/g/gnupg-1.4.3/g10 *** Error code 1 Stop. make: stopped in /root/g/gnupg-1.4.3 *** Error code 1 Stop. make: stopped in /root/g/gnupg-1.4.3 -*- Result is the same. Here is my system uname -a : NetBSD soekris 3.0 NetBSD 3.0 (SOEKRIS) #4: Fri May 5 19:19:40 UTC 2006 root@soekris:/usr/src/sys/arch/i386/compile/SOEKRIS i386 Installed software versions : curl-7.15.4 gmake-3.81 (I always compiled GnuPG using make, not gmake) libtool-base-1.5.22nb3 m4-1.4.4 When I tried to compile without curl, both 1.4.3 and 1.4.4 compile fine. After having installed curl, I did a new ./configure && make in both GnuPG 1.4.3 folder and 1.4.4 folder after a make clean. Two solutions : 1. GnuPG make file is adapted to NetBSD 2. The curl package maintener does a change that allows GnuPG make file to find curl where it should be. 3. #ifdef __NETBSD__ include the curl file located in /usr/pkg/include/curl/ The curl library maintainer is Cc of this email. Best regards, -- unzip ; strip ; touch ; grep ; find ; finger ; mount ; fsck ; more ; yes ; fsck ; umount ; sleep From sweeney276 at gmail.com Wed Jul 26 02:13:01 2006 From: sweeney276 at gmail.com (Graham) Date: Thu Jul 27 18:40:45 2006 Subject: Driving licence as identification and accepting signed keys without exchanging encrypted data In-Reply-To: References: <44C5328E.5060400@tonywhitmore.co.uk> Message-ID: <200607260113.02125.gct3@blueyonder.co.uk> On Tuesday 25 July 2006 19:13, Sam Morris wrote: > Message was signed by Sam Morris (Key ID: > 0x5EA01078). Warning: The signature is bad. I get this message when viewing through KMail. Anyone else confirm the sig is bad? -- Graham From gilboooo at gmail.com Wed Jul 26 23:10:24 2006 From: gilboooo at gmail.com (Gilbert Fernandes) Date: Thu Jul 27 18:40:48 2006 Subject: GnuPG 1.4.4 does not compile on NetBSD is curl library is installed from pkgsrc In-Reply-To: <20060726203444.GA7787@jabberwocky.com> References: <20060726203444.GA7787@jabberwocky.com> Message-ID: > Should be fixed now, thanks. Name your beer and address and I will handle the shipping :) (er.. try to choose a beer I can find in France though ha ha) -- unzip ; strip ; touch ; grep ; find ; finger ; mount ; fsck ; more ; yes ; fsck ; umount ; sleep From sam at robots.org.uk Thu Jul 27 18:50:12 2006 From: sam at robots.org.uk (Sam Morris) Date: Thu Jul 27 18:49:19 2006 Subject: Driving licence as identification and accepting signed keys without exchanging encrypted data References: <44C5328E.5060400@tonywhitmore.co.uk> <200607260113.02125.gct3@blueyonder.co.uk> Message-ID: On Wed, 26 Jul 2006 01:13:01 +0100, Graham wrote: > On Tuesday 25 July 2006 19:13, Sam Morris wrote: > >> Message was signed by Sam Morris (Key ID: >> 0x5EA01078). Warning: The signature is bad. > > I get this message when viewing through KMail. Anyone else confirm the > sig is bad? Yes. That'll teach me to try to sign something in Pan, by copying out of an xterm... :( -- Sam Morris http://robots.org.uk/ PGP key id 5EA01078 3412 EA18 1277 354B 991B C869 B219 7FDB 5EA0 1078 From wk at gnupg.org Fri Jul 28 11:32:18 2006 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Fri Jul 28 11:33:58 2006 Subject: Release candidate for 1.4.5 Message-ID: <87fygmjcrh.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> Hi! I just did a release candidate for 1.4.5. I'd kindly ask you to try building it in the next days and report any build problems to this mailing list. The tarballs are available at: ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/alpha/gnupg/gnupg-1.4.5.tar.bz2 (3018k) ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/alpha/gnupg/gnupg-1.4.5.tar.bz2.sig Or as a diff against 1.4.4: ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/alpha/gnupg/gnupg-1.4.4-1.4.5rc1.diff.bz2 (107k) There is no binary for windows available. If you are in need for a fixed gpg binary, please get the the latest Gpg4win installer from http://www.gpg4win.org which includes a patches gpg version. Noteworthy changes in version 1.4.5 ------------------------------------------------ * Reverted check for valid standard handles under Windows. * More DSA2 tweaks. * Fixed a problem uploading certain keys to the smart card. * Fixed 2 more possible memory allocation attacks. * Added Norwegian translation. Happy hacking, Werner -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 196 bytes Desc: not available Url : /pipermail/attachments/20060728/dbb21429/attachment.pgp From shavital at mac.com Fri Jul 28 12:52:35 2006 From: shavital at mac.com (Charly Avital) Date: Fri Jul 28 12:51:21 2006 Subject: Release candidate for 1.4.5 In-Reply-To: <87fygmjcrh.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> References: <87fygmjcrh.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> Message-ID: <44C9EC73.4030308@mac.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Hi, 1. Compiled on PPC with 'cp idea.c cipher'. Running fine. 2. Compiled on PPC without 'cp idea.c cipher', on a gnupg system where $ gcc -Wall -O2 -fPIC -dynamiclib -o idea idea.c which requires to have 'load-extension idea' enabled in gpg.conf. Running fine. Thank you Werner, David and all at gnupg. Thank you Ben Donnachie Charly Werner Koch wrote the following on 7/28/06 5:32 AM: > Hi! > > I just did a release candidate for 1.4.5. I'd kindly ask you to try > building it in the next days and report any build problems to this > mailing list. > > The tarballs are available at: > > ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/alpha/gnupg/gnupg-1.4.5.tar.bz2 (3018k) > ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/alpha/gnupg/gnupg-1.4.5.tar.bz2.sig > > Or as a diff against 1.4.4: > > ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/alpha/gnupg/gnupg-1.4.4-1.4.5rc1.diff.bz2 (107k) > > There is no binary for windows available. If you are in need for a > fixed gpg binary, please get the the latest Gpg4win installer from > http://www.gpg4win.org which includes a patches gpg version. > > > Noteworthy changes in version 1.4.5 > ------------------------------------------------ > > * Reverted check for valid standard handles under Windows. > > * More DSA2 tweaks. > > * Fixed a problem uploading certain keys to the smart card. > > * Fixed 2 more possible memory allocation attacks. > > * Added Norwegian translation. > > > > Happy hacking, > > Werner > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users@gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.5rc1 (Darwin) Comment: GnuPG for Privacy Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iQEVAwUBRMnsas3GMi2FW4PvAQjudgf+JI3R0+lsyKK4C/bxhxUH6W09utesKx3o HsFaVzgS7TUredD20U5Db/XFe1E+s1RHrdV+oXNU4RvhpQ7GDXhOZcuT29HYFBL4 etOPPviBx7NGqoVqMqGzFqHqdFXq4wNz/cyTAp33JXlLoJxF6SOnhaDengZtGMff /h8DzujLyZvZVBApjUIfXTvyHHjG5j3eNd3+tM/404DqjEAzigTXAzcpQu0Yek+i tZXSRq2rhkvqBHMl0lWXM5Y2vlHSGJiT/58tVcANg+NN50yTMzYfxiXOGRQ0T91/ 0H9XKQc2Di5pSQZS12RHo6yM2WO/sIz2NrMBpzE4QRu7OlhrxWEAMg== =qruE -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From henkdebruijn at wanadoo.nl Fri Jul 28 14:18:50 2006 From: henkdebruijn at wanadoo.nl (Henk M. de Bruijn) Date: Fri Jul 28 14:17:20 2006 Subject: Release candidate for 1.4.5 In-Reply-To: <87fygmjcrh.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> References: <87fygmjcrh.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> Message-ID: <126434667.20060728141850@wanadoo.nl> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 On Fri, 28 Jul 2006 11:32:18 +0200GMT (28-7-2006, 11:32 +0200, where I live), Werner Koch wrote: > I just did a release candidate for 1.4.5. I'd kindly ask you to try > building it in the next days and report any build problems to this > mailing list. > The tarballs are available at: > ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/alpha/gnupg/gnupg-1.4.5.tar.bz2 (3018k) > ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/alpha/gnupg/gnupg-1.4.5.tar.bz2.sig > Or as a diff against 1.4.4: > ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/alpha/gnupg/gnupg-1.4.4-1.4.5rc1.diff.bz2 (107k) > There is no binary for windows available. No problem ;-) - -- Henk M. de Bruijn ______________________________________________________________________ The Bat! Natural E-Mail System? version 3.81.12 Beta Pro on Windows XP SP2 Request-PGP: http://www.biglumber.com/x/web?qs=0x6C9F6CE78C32408B Gossamer Spider Web of Trust http://www.gswot.org A progressive and innovative Web of Trust -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.5rc1 (Cygwin/MingW32) iQEVAwUBRMoApRHuy+60ZN0PAQo1UQgApU0CIVtkd13xgaFipA4Xku/VG1jM3OEi l8I6bHU0yOsS271d6+whc6YMrrqFb3nV+bk9vU0w8Aa4XhpwelLAmSO0ypcEAmz5 HUcckaVnall+tjPJYxOAcRvAkUk7WFUMBx9GD8FqhZS1+DS+F9GjHvg2PO6nrEg/ U4o46YsCm/gRSjs/q852UYyPVfCF83RYMIWnF7rg3Oi8RmIyU28EimA2AJbJNICs cxlq2xZIvHxxhPmZw5dTONma7Ky4dwIbDIHjHgBljU77O4VJGNuwAGhBriJcuwfO zB2OQwIoz7AXD/8T9Vjm3U6Z2DkCU49wwDcAp/Mdx6gCvWLkX1jESQ== =trkx -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From qed at tiscali.it Fri Jul 28 21:03:52 2006 From: qed at tiscali.it (Qed) Date: Fri Jul 28 22:12:40 2006 Subject: Fetching keys via http/https? In-Reply-To: <373071850@web.de> References: <373071850@web.de> Message-ID: <44CA5F98.3010500@tiscali.it> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: RIPEMD160 On 07/24/2006 02:05 PM, Michael Kallas wrote: >> keyserver hkp://subkeys.pgp.net >> keyserver-options http-proxy=http://yourproxy:8080,honor-http-proxy > No luck although I even tried broken-http-proxy. > It's always: > gpg: requesting key 89074FAD from http server keyserver.pramberger.at > [or whatever keyserver I try] > gpgkeys: http fetch error 7: couldn't connect: No error > gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found. > gpg: Total number processed: 0 > > Normal http requests (wget etc.) work through this proxy. Here I use Squid and I don't have any problem with hkp and x-hkp keyservers. - -- Q.E.D. War is Peace Freedom is Slavery Ignorance is Strenght ICQ UIN: 301825501 OpenPGP key ID: 0x58D14EB3 Key fingerprint: 00B9 3E17 630F F2A7 FF96 DA6B AEE0 EC27 58D1 4EB3 Check fingerprints before trusting a key! -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.4 (GNU/Linux) iD8DBQFEyl+YH+Dh0Dl5XacRA8ZXAJ0T9lEJsp3jt2jI3NzhfQ5GNPjv+gCffObA 5Po6qcdd9c3H8k4NypYn7Dw= =pGad -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From qed at tiscali.it Sat Jul 29 11:25:44 2006 From: qed at tiscali.it (Qed) Date: Sat Jul 29 11:23:52 2006 Subject: Security of truncated hash functions Message-ID: <44CB2998.9000704@tiscali.it> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: RIPEMD160 Suppose you need a 160 bit digest. You can choose RIPEMD160/SHA1 or a truncated version of a bigger one (e.g.: SHA2 family). Which solution would be safer? Is a digest algo designed for a given length stronger than a truncated longer one? I googled, but I found only http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/10/nist_hash_works_3.html I know that sci.crypt would be a better place to ask this question, but I don't like it. - -- Q.E.D. War is Peace Freedom is Slavery Ignorance is Strength ICQ UIN: 301825501 OpenPGP key ID: 0x58D14EB3 Key fingerprint: 00B9 3E17 630F F2A7 FF96 DA6B AEE0 EC27 58D1 4EB3 Check fingerprints before trusting a key! -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.4 (GNU/Linux) iD8DBQFEyymYH+Dh0Dl5XacRA/VHAJ4kT/TuLjcgREwV8ysi0/rc+Jd7PgCfeUHk yLz05vW8h3udm7WvtQ8o+mo= =XcHw -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From qed at tiscali.it Sat Jul 29 11:00:59 2006 From: qed at tiscali.it (Qed) Date: Sat Jul 29 11:24:05 2006 Subject: Release candidate for 1.4.5 In-Reply-To: <87fygmjcrh.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> References: <87fygmjcrh.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> Message-ID: <44CB23CB.107@tiscali.it> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: RIPEMD160 On 07/28/2006 11:32 AM, Werner Koch wrote: > I just did a release candidate for 1.4.5. I'd kindly ask you to try > building it in the next days and report any build problems to this > mailing list. > Or as a diff against 1.4.4: > > ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/alpha/gnupg/gnupg-1.4.4-1.4.5rc1.diff.bz2 (107k) Patched and successfully compiled(gcc 4.1.0, GNU/Linux i386). - -- Q.E.D. War is Peace Freedom is Slavery Ignorance is Strength ICQ UIN: 301825501 OpenPGP key ID: 0x58D14EB3 Key fingerprint: 00B9 3E17 630F F2A7 FF96 DA6B AEE0 EC27 58D1 4EB3 Check fingerprints before trusting a key! -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.4 (GNU/Linux) iD4DBQFEyyPLH+Dh0Dl5XacRA9v/AKCXaxa6AI9OCiMQvxf9+GBEz0XgvQCYjw8D qezPK5acrFvnyPUwQZrPlQ== =oJ6e -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Sat Jul 29 11:35:50 2006 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Sat Jul 29 11:34:31 2006 Subject: Security of truncated hash functions In-Reply-To: <44CB2998.9000704@tiscali.it> References: <44CB2998.9000704@tiscali.it> Message-ID: <44CB2BF6.2010705@sixdemonbag.org> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Qed wrote: > Which solution would be safer? Assuming an idealized hash function, they're of equal strength. If each bit of the hash algorithm is effectively random with a 50/50 distribution, then a truncated hash is just as good as a full-size hash. In the real world, hashes aren't idealized and this may not be good advice. Just another instance where theory and practice are subtly different from each other... -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.4 (Darwin) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iQEcBAEBCgAGBQJEyyv1AAoJELcA9IL+r4EJb1kH/iQ3F668BwcDhpWtByx9yyPP loR+1FuZaC7P4F+yP/Gk4gk3t2kA56sEWXOlrNQ4exwRdg7/pO0mquERgiiPvZ/B cjzOkeMWKc5yc0w9YBNdbB9xgnioZ7QfTVvUzgi+IYWfLyTbkTygN6+aH2tOL71R /YsKYcsYqoX2/bbizpcAHt9V86VBrPHOw7l0K8e2UofLP8xzyUhI72l3rZgonjbh uKGnPr/7zuL5EHawe3FcOjyWo2aaQ6VsXgWsPm+4I6PKPko7NSE9keGIuzs7Cy2A aUrDOVgE0++TkA7DkDSakM2CbeS4iXIMx7veSRaKYOwp5ldeo0xlBz1zPCBZdt0= =zJvR -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From sjlopezb at hackindex.com Sat Jul 29 11:43:26 2006 From: sjlopezb at hackindex.com (=?ISO-8859-15?Q?Santiago_Jos=E9_L=F3pez_Borraz=E1s?=) Date: Sat Jul 29 11:41:58 2006 Subject: Release candidate for 1.4.5 In-Reply-To: <44CB23CB.107@tiscali.it> References: <87fygmjcrh.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> <44CB23CB.107@tiscali.it> Message-ID: <44CB2DBE.2070500@foo.hackindex.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 El 29/07/06 11:00, Qed escribi?: > Patched and successfully compiled(gcc 4.1.0, GNU/Linux i386). No problem. In my sistem, is a Debian, no problem compilation this version of GnuPG 1.4.5rc1 ;-) - -- Slds de Santiago Jos? L?pez Borraz?s. Admin de hackindex.com/.es Conocimientos avanzados en seguridad inform?tica. Conocimientos avanzados en redes peque?as y grandes. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.4 (GNU/Linux) iQIVAwUBRMstvruF9/q6J55WAQpD9A/7BKxHeFZGNhQGQfH8wpjbHqBkogdd95gn 10NlZaVkgXTC0Qkpo5L+u64lTSCXKb1tDAAGZ78Mt95i/BXuWi4gJerlkX33Sakw eAbwGKhzWfjVYpruUt+KF+6Mov0O7JQvgw9ggbPqrSJvQR9e3xL7PvEvSQ8RHafd y8x04uaPj1V59aDak6ED8FKtXDB6E3ctNxJ5i9ucYe9genaiwq93HB6ckY+Oq0xO yN3sFji2YjzyawWaBY7COdQ9w531zbJUlR37o4rwTqg6OGVaTHMuGt/2R4z1X6yx EYEVm/VGvfQ7WWm+43KZjRickTowNkBwY6xQ+aS0eyEPjJhnkczATR5wTMz9vryw pU9zJKCPQt2EMfOOZczN+Per/7JUcNzfoB2cVvT30e5bQV1G5xZjZQ6IwHsk3S44 Id5CLpt964lGgHaC0aQg5rkX4L29TzpL94WxiKamZQEaKXk3qWry96kAFmxt6sDJ eDiOQ9C5aUcdMgO5P/4OtZTCldf5H386hXYJLqOf3ByTG26S1ffvJFC6V9JqFlzY oYnMERXbk4GqMRS78mntAGljPpeQJv456EqzsN2dxuONk6lFJ3kGGxnAIKCMKgzk PcdzUVjSQJKKjARKm1DaP0E/QDUzlNWQmfyDQxj0bXqCFMXAthPlHXAXlVUwuu+J cHfYhc2Ka74= =ueRQ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From alphasigmax at gmail.com Sat Jul 29 11:56:18 2006 From: alphasigmax at gmail.com (Alphax) Date: Sat Jul 29 11:57:26 2006 Subject: Security of truncated hash functions In-Reply-To: <44CB2998.9000704@tiscali.it> References: <44CB2998.9000704@tiscali.it> Message-ID: <44CB30C2.6000607@gmail.com> Qed wrote: > Suppose you need a 160 bit digest. > You can choose RIPEMD160/SHA1 or a truncated version of a bigger one > (e.g.: SHA2 family). > Which solution would be safer? > Is a digest algo designed for a given length stronger than a truncated > longer one? > Since you're asking about 160-bit hashes on the GnuPG mailing list, I'll assume that you're asking about using the "DSA2" option to use truncated hashes with DSA keys that have q=160. Now, I could be completely wrong, but "common sense" seems to suggest that there's no reason why it's any safer; in fact, you may be worse off. The reasoning for this answer is as follows: since DSA OpenPGP keys don't have a hash function firewall, it just gives an attacker more oppurtunities to find a hash collision; instead of having to pick from SHA1 and RIPEMD160 as the hash algorithms to pick a colliding message digest from, they can now add the SHA2 family of algorithms to their choices; plus, instead of having to collide 160/160 bits, they now only have to collide 160/{224,256,384,512} bits. Again, I could be completely wrong, but that's what "common sense" seems to suggest. > I googled, but I found only > http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/10/nist_hash_works_3.html > I know that sci.crypt would be a better place to ask this question, but > I don't like it. You could also ask at PGP-Basics :) -- Alphax Death to all fanatics! Down with categorical imperative! OpenPGP key: http://tinyurl.com/lvq4g -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 564 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature Url : /pipermail/attachments/20060729/77bcf27e/signature.pgp From Werner.Dittmann at t-online.de Sat Jul 29 14:46:47 2006 From: Werner.Dittmann at t-online.de (Werner Dittmann) Date: Sat Jul 29 14:45:24 2006 Subject: Smartcard reader and SUSE 10.1 Message-ID: <44CB58B7.6030301@t-online.de> All, after having tried all howTos now I'm sort of stuck. I have read the e-mail thread of Tony Whitmore and Werner Koch - bur this also does not contains a solution. My errors are the same as Tony describes. Just to get some more information I put a error printout in the gnupg-ccid script to get the info which parameters are given to that script. I see the following input: add, /proc/bus/usb/001/010 this is an add operation to the device in /proc/.... The I tried to lookup the device doing a ls /proc/bus/usb/001/010 gives me a "file or directory not found" err message. Doing a ls /dev/bus/usb/001/010 shows a file there. I can even read from that device (under root doing a "cat /dev/bus/usb/001/010" gives some binary data. My conclusion is that something is very wrong here :-) Regards, Werner From Werner.Dittmann at t-online.de Sat Jul 29 11:46:42 2006 From: Werner.Dittmann at t-online.de (Werner Dittmann) Date: Sun Jul 30 00:58:15 2006 Subject: Smartcard reader and SUSE 10.1 Message-ID: <44CB2E82.9010606@t-online.de> All, after having tried all howTos now I'm sort of stuck. I have read the e-mail thread of Tony Whitmore and Werner Koch - bur this also does not contains a solution. My errors are the same as Tony describes. Just to get some more information I put a error printout in the gnupg-ccid script to get the info which parameters are given to that script. I see the following input: add, /proc/bus/usb/001/010 this is an add operation to the device in /proc/.... The I tried to lookup the device doing a ls /proc/bus/usb/001/010 gives me a "file or directory not found" err message. Doing a ls /dev/bus/usb/001/010 shows a file there. I can even read from that device (under root doing a "cat /dev/bus/usb/001/010" gives some binary data. My conclusion is that something is very wrong here :-) Regards, Werner From tony at tonywhitmore.co.uk Sun Jul 30 19:31:39 2006 From: tony at tonywhitmore.co.uk (Tony Whitmore) Date: Sun Jul 30 19:31:10 2006 Subject: GPG, OpenPGP card, ACS ACR30U card reader Message-ID: <44CCECFB.9050400@tonywhitmore.co.uk> Further to my mails earlier this month, I've been trying to get GPG working with my card reader and PC/SC. pcscd recognises my card reader and the card that is inserted into it. GnuPG returns the expected output from the --card-status command. I have been able to set the language on the card, following the instructions on the HOWTO. However, whenever I try to set my name on the card, GnuPG exits with an error and pcscd segfaults. $ gpg --disable-ccid --debug-all -vv --card-edit Command> admin Admin commands are allowed Command> name Cardholder's surname: Whitmore Cardholder's given name: Antony gpg: DBG: send apdu: c=00 i=CA p0=00 p1=C4 lc=-1 le=256 gpg: DBG: PCSC_data: 00 CA 00 C4 00 gpg: DBG: response: sw=9000 datalen=7 gpg: DBG: dump: 00 FE FE FE 03 03 03 gpg: 3 Admin PIN attempts remaining before card is permanently locked Admin PIN gpg: DBG: send apdu: c=00 i=20 p0=00 p1=83 lc=8 le=-1 gpg: DBG: PCSC_data: 00 20 00 83 08 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 gpg: DBG: response: sw=9000 datalen=0 gpg: DBG: dump: gpg: DBG: send apdu: c=00 i=DA p0=00 p1=5B lc=16 le=-1 gpg: DBG: PCSC_data: 00 DA 00 5B 10 57 68 69 74 6D 6F 72 65 3C 3C 41 6E 74 6F 6E 79 gpg: pcsc_transmit failed: comm error (0x80100013) gpg: apdu_send_simple(0) failed: card I/O error gpg: failed to set `DISP-NAME': general error gpg: error setting Name: general error pcscd produces this (output from after enter is hit after entering the admin PIN): APDU: 00 20 00 83 08 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 T=1 -> 0 20 0 83 8 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 T=1 <- 90 0 SW: 90 00 APDU: 00 DA 00 5B 10 57 68 69 74 6D 6F 72 65 3C 3C 41 6E 74 6F 6E 79 T=1 -> 0 da 0 5b 10 57 68 69 74 6d 6f 72 65 3c 3c 41 6e 74 6f 6e 79 Segmentation fault I'd appreciate any advice as to where to look next. As I see it, this could either be a bug in GnuPG, a bug in pcscd or a bug in the driver for my card reader. But I'm not experienced enough to know where to look to find out more. Thanks in advance, Tony P.S. As per Jonathan Rockway's e-mail, the output of pcsc_scan on my system (with pcscd running and the card inserted) is: $ pcsc_scan PC/SC device scanner V 1.4.1 (c) 2001-2004, Ludovic Rousseau Compiled with PC/SC lite version: 1.2.9-beta7 Scanning present readers 0: ACS ACR 30u 00 00 Sun Jul 30 18:22:15 2006 Reader 0 (ACS ACR 30u 00 00) Card state: Card inserted, ATR: 3B FA 13 00 FF 81 31 80 45 00 31 C1 73 C0 01 00 00 90 00 B1 ATR: 3B FA 13 00 FF 81 31 80 45 00 31 C1 73 C0 01 00 00 90 00 B1 + TS = 3B --> Direct Convention + T0 = FA, Y(1): 1111, K: 10 (historical bytes) TA(1) = 13 --> Fi=372, Di=4, 93.000 cycles/ETU TB(1) = 00 --> Programming Param P: 0 Volts, I: 0 milli-Ampres TC(1) = FF --> Extra guard time: 255 TD(1) = 81 --> Y(i+1) = 1000, Protocol T = 1 ----- TD(2) = 31 --> Y(i+1) = 0011, Protocol T = 1 ----- TA(3) = 80 --> IFSC: 128 TB(3) = 45 --> Block Waiting Integer: 4 - Character Waiting Integer: 5 + Historical bytes: 00 31 C1 73 C0 01 00 00 90 00 B1 Possibly identified card (using /usr/lib/pcsc/smartcard_list.txt): 3B FA 13 00 FF 81 31 80 45 00 31 C1 73 C0 01 00 00 90 00 B1 OpenPGP -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 254 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature Url : /pipermail/attachments/20060730/1e91901f/signature.pgp From mchastain at ipowerweb.com Mon Jul 31 22:20:27 2006 From: mchastain at ipowerweb.com (Marcel Chastain - Security Administration) Date: Mon Jul 31 23:55:42 2006 Subject: [Fwd: perl EUID change causing failure] Message-ID: <44CE660B.7080206@ipowerweb.com> I have a perl wrapper around gpg for use within a web app. It changes its 'EUID' (Effective UserID) early in the script. From there, it attempts to run /usr/local/bin/gpg --list-public-keys My test script: #!/usr/bin/perl $ENV{'GNUPGHOME'} = '/home/username/.gnupg'; my $uid = getpwnam("username"); $> = $uid; print `/usr/local/bin/gpg --list-public-keys`; The output: gpg: Ohhhh jeeee: ... this is a bug (gpg.c:1880:main) secmem usage: 0/0 bytes in 0/0 blocks of pool 0/32768 (replace the word 'username' with a user on your system for testing purposes) Now, this *only* happens when setting the EUID. I can set the RealUID($<) and things work perfectly. Does this have something to do with the code updates mentioned in the "What's New" section..? ( http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-announce/2006q2/000226.html ) User IDs are now capped at 2048 bytes. This avoids a memory allocation attack (see CVE-2006-3082). Running gnupg 1.4.4 compiled from ports, freebsd 4.11-STABLE . -- ####################### Marcel C. Security Administration iPower, Inc. -------------- next part -------------- An embedded message was scrubbed... From: Marcel Chastain - Security Administration Subject: perl EUID change causing failure Date: Wed, 26 Jul 2006 16:26:48 -0700 Size: 1252 Url: /pipermail/attachments/20060731/90c22ed5/perlEUIDchangecausingfailure-0001.mht