How to verify the file was successfully encrypted...

Janusz A. Urbanowicz alex at
Fri Jul 14 15:07:16 CEST 2006

On Wed, Jul 12, 2006 at 10:59:52AM -0600, Benny Helms wrote:
> On Wed, 2006-07-12 at 12:25 +0200, Janusz A. Urbanowicz wrote:
> > On Tue, Jul 11, 2006 at 01:38:23PM -0600, Benny Helms wrote:
> <snip>
> > What is your actual threat model here?
> > 
> > The simplest answer is to check gpg's rc after the encryption run.
> Before deleting original file, I must make certain encrypted version is
> in good shape so I can open it at a later date and obtain data.  If it
> is broken, I'm in deep monkey muffins.  That's the threat model.
> Can you please explain what you mean by "check the gpg's rc after the
> encryption run?"  I'm unfamilar with the meaning of "rc" in this case.

return code

every unix code returns an numerical code which by convention means
the state of operation just done, 0 - success.

I find your explanation of the threat model not very consistent. You
don't trust gpg, but you trust the filesystem code, network transfers
or storage media. It is possible to any element of the chain fail and
corrupt your precious files.

If they're so important as you state, you should invest in some decent
hardware like RAID-s and backups and disaster recovery planning, and
site physical security policy and procedures. And irreliability of gpg
is your least problem.


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