sign and encrypt

[mkontakt at gmail.com]

Yes, I meant this. I can thing of other solutions as s-e-s or
signing the header of email messages in separate mime part, but it would
consume cpu, as you would not be able to sign a message and simply
encrypt it n-times  with recipients keys. So the best way around this
problem is to educate users. 

Thanks for your comment 
Martin     

On Mon, Jun 05, 2006 at 02:58:32PM -0700, Chris De Young wrote:
> mkontakt at gmail.com wrote:
> > I have seen in the spec rfc3156 that a message should be signed and
> > then encrypted, but hypothetically if send a message to someone I do
> > not like and sign it and then encrypt it he/she can forward it to
> > someone else pretending that the message was originally from my self.
> 
> I assume you mean forward the decrypted version, with the signature
> intact, since the encrypted version would only be readable by the
> intended recipient.
> 
> Yes, this could happen, but it doesn't seem like a very big problem.
> The deception doesn't work if anything in the message itself indicates
> who the intended recipient is ("Hey Mike, [...]").
> 
> Signing after encryption exposes more information about the message,
> which I think is the main reason it's discouraged.  The encrypted
> version is already tamper-proof, since any alteration will break the
> decryption.
> 
> -C
> 



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