'sensitive' designated revoker -- are the keyservers still aware?

[vedaal at hush.com]

David Shaw dshaw at jabberwocky.com wrote on
Thu Feb 1 21:04:27 CET 2007

>The idea behind this is that the relationship 
>between the designated revoker and the key owner is sensitive, 
> and so we must not reveal the identity designated revoker 
>until we absolutely must 
>(i.e. when they actually revoke the key).


why must the identity be revealed at all,
if the key-owner who designated the revoker doesn't want it to be?

it doesn't add to the security to know who revoked it,
(whoever it as, it was someone the 'key-owner' decided it should be)
it only compromises the revoker and/or key owner, as the revoker
may become a target to revoke the original key-owner's replacement 
key

(n.b.
not a big deal,
just curious as to why it was done this way

there is a very simple workaround for anyone uncomfortable with it:

the designated revoker doesn't have to be a 'person',
it just has to be another 'key'
which can have a fictitious name, 
and given to the person who is trusted to do the revoking when 
necessary)

vedaal



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