'sensitive' designated revoker -- are the keyservers still aware?

[Atom Smasher]

On Thu, 1 Feb 2007, vedaal at hush.com wrote:

> why must the identity be revealed at all, if the key-owner who 
> designated the revoker doesn't want it to be?
>
> it doesn't add to the security to know who revoked it, (whoever it as, 
> it was someone the 'key-owner' decided it should be) it only compromises 
> the revoker and/or key owner, as the revoker may become a target to 
> revoke the original key-owner's replacement key
============================

if that's a concern... bob wants to designate alice as a revoker, but bob 
[or alice] doesn't want to reveal that alice is the desiganted revoker, 
even if his key is revoked. the solution is for bob to generate a 
revocation certificate, encrypt it to alice, and send it to alice with 
instructions about if/when to publish it. this basically serves the same 
purpose, but doesn't necessarily reveal that alice was the designated 
revoker.

a variation could break the revocation certificate into shares, requiring 
any number of "secret revokers" to assemble the revocation certificate.


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