Safe decryption with GnuPG?
Krzysztof Żelechowski
program.spe at home.pl
Wed Feb 6 09:14:58 CET 2008
Thanks a lot for the keywords, the hints and the missing parts.
Indeed, I hoped that such an application
did not need a custom implementation
because IMHO encrypting information is useless
if you cannot view the information
without exposure to eavesdropping or tracing.
I have to review what is available and what is needed
before I can come up with a budget.
Specific comments below.
Thx, Chris
Dnia 06-02-2008, Śr o godzinie 02:22 +0100, Philipp Gühring pisze:
> Hi,
>
> > 1.
> > The decrypted information must not make it to any persistent medium
> > (I understand gpg '-d' already guarantees it
> > as long as it manages the decrypted text,
> > but what happens after it leaves gpg?)
>
> Use a full-disc encryption system for all your persistent media.
That is overkill if it only can be avoided.
>
> > 2.
> > The decrypted text must not be stored in volatile memory
> > any longer than it is needed.
>
> You can use TaintedBochs or TaintedQemu to investigate that.
>
> > In particular, it should be converted to a human-viewable bitmap
> > and the computer-readable representation must be immediately erased.
>
> Doesn´t help much to try that, I would say. But feel free to try ...
>
> > 3. Only the information I need should be displayed.
>
> You need a Do-What-I-Mean system for that.
In this particular case, Do-What-I-Mean
means displaying only matching information à la fgrep.
The keywords are not secret.
> > 7.
> > If more information is requested,
> > it should be displayed in small chunks.
> > The program should be fully unaware
> > of the content of the chunks that are not being displayed.
>
> > (That probably means a garbage-collected language cannot be used).
>
> I don´t understand why you need that.
> I would suggest that you seperate the small chunks into seperated encrypted
> files, to ensure that the reader only gets those chunks that you actually
> decrypted.
I shall consider that but I do not like this idea at the first glance;
I am afraid there would be some maintenance overhead.
>
> > 8.
> > The application should be as lightweight as possible
> > (for source code audit).
>
> Agreed.
>
> > Can you direct me to some implementation meeting these requirements?
>
> I think your specification isn´t complete yet. You forgot about half of the
> requirements.
>
> I guess that:
>
> * You want a machine that seperates code from data (to be secure against
> trojans, virii and other malware)
>
> * You want secure documents, that can´t change dynamically, or otherwise
> contain invisible contents
I thought GnuPG-encrypted files are immutable, aren't they?
>
> * You want a secure path to the user
>
> (and some more requirements that I forgot at the moment)
>
> What´s your budget for this small project?
>
> Best regards,
> Philipp Gühring
>
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