PGP 6.5.8 ckt,?just say no.

[David Shaw]

On Mon, Oct 27, 2008 at 09:48:21AM -0400, vedaal at hush.com wrote:
> >Date: Fri, 24 Oct 2008 20:42:14 -0400
> >From: David Shaw <dshaw at jabberwocky.com>
> >Subject: PGP 6.5.8 ckt,	just say no.  (was: Re: set type digest 
> >mode?
> 
> >On Oct 24, 2008, at 10:41 AM, vedaal at hush.com wrote:
> >
> >> [1] any ckt V4 rsa keys generated,
> >> have the rsa subkey as both sign and encrypt,
> >> and there is (as yet, afaik,) no way
> >> that gnupg can be used to get such a key to cross-certify the
> >> primary key,
> >> and since the subkey will be used by default by gnupg to sign,
> >> gnupg will give error messages about the verification
> >
> >gpg --edit-key (thekey)
> >cross-certify
> >save
> >
> >Please don't anyone take that to mean that I think people should 
> >use  
> >6.5.8ckt.  I really don't.
> 
> 
> OK, i won't
> 
> but it *still* doesn't cross certify :-)
> 
> (at least in 1.4.9 on windows)
> (if you can get it to work on linux, 
> or gnupg 2.x, please let me know)
> 
> here is an rsa v4 keypair generated in ckt 
> to try to cross certify:

Now that is an... interesting key.  It's a V4 (OpenPGP) key with V3
(PGP 2.x) binding signature).  GPG won't cross-certify such a key
because it is a one-way change.  Once cross-certified, the binding
signature will be V4 (OpenPGP).  Note that you can't change the
expiration date of the subkey on that key either (for the same
reason).

David