From jmoore3rd at bellsouth.net Thu Jan 1 22:40:44 2009 From: jmoore3rd at bellsouth.net (John W. Moore III) Date: Thu, 01 Jan 2009 16:40:44 -0500 Subject: how-to 1) remove a key, 2) avoid spam, 3) add a principal UID when delete ? In-Reply-To: <1230249879.7702.9.camel@rafmav-laptop> References: <1230249879.7702.9.camel@rafmav-laptop> Message-ID: <495D385C.6030405@bellsouth.net> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Rapha?l Maville wrote: > 1) How to delete an unpublished GnuPG key from a computer when the > Passphrase and the Revoke file are lost ? > This key was create without revoke file. It was not published at all on > internet or to my friends. If You're certain the Key has _not_ been disseminated anywhere & there is nothing encrypted to it that You may wish to recover if/when the passphrase is 'remembered' then just delete it. > 2) How to avoid spaming to my mail boxes, is it better to do not mention > it on a gnuPG key ? This is much debated. I belong to the camp that believes having the Email Address within the Key UID makes no difference. Not having an email address associated with Your Key makes utilizing it in some situations impossible. [Key selection by Address, Creating a Big Lumber listing, etc.] > 3) How to add a "principal" uid to a key ? > I had removed the principal UID because I wanted to modify the firstname > ("trema" not well prompted). And then I can only add sub-uid. Create the UID You want on the Key and then set it as Primary. Go to the UID You're unhappy with and revoke it. If the Key has never been published to any Keyserver then You can simply delete the revoked UID. If it has then re-publish the Key with revoked UID to the Servers. HTH JOHN ;) Timestamp: Thursday 01 Jan 2009, 16:40 --500 (Eastern Standard Time) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.10-svn4907: (MingW32) Comment: Public Key at: http://tinyurl.com/8cpho Comment: Gossamer Spider Web of Trust: https://www.gswot.org Comment: Homepage: http://tinyurl.com/yzhbhx iQEcBAEBCgAGBQJJXThaAAoJEBCGy9eAtCsPY2gH/24to55ybDdBLbVIf91ADaQe kZI6vsZBmYqKZSeMsxbKaeTvF4ACXeicwRS5Xx9WFD1uW44i/wN3n7xAti9zeG2D H2JWcqsajzKgS2iPx7+Lo44Vb6EEeGxv0fOrFgmmenKWioWYQqIHaA9mAzAdIBju g1uexlKUB+rvsjdR5Ld65e5mawZ6HXF2c4xLtWLj31k2E1cTn2skDGEWywmElm2W 1jjZeoto/VS/uqrO1g2nm150R9IxbZ7l8L2HrqA1R2AUg5/+R5ZHepLhS5tD5SDF H2TVZrKnHib7H+wPTJNAQ594/YTSEf6x0nh/y0EN6EOd/y4mWG38V8se0c+hVwA= =G8td -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Fri Jan 2 00:15:34 2009 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Thu, 01 Jan 2009 18:15:34 -0500 Subject: how-to 1) remove a key, 2) avoid spam, 3) add a principal UID when delete ? In-Reply-To: <495D385C.6030405@bellsouth.net> References: <1230249879.7702.9.camel@rafmav-laptop> <495D385C.6030405@bellsouth.net> Message-ID: <495D4E96.9050502@sixdemonbag.org> John W. Moore III wrote: > If You're certain the Key has _not_ been disseminated anywhere & there > is nothing encrypted to it that You may wish to recover if/when the > passphrase is 'remembered' then just delete it. I think the OP was looking for "gpg --delete-key" and "gpg --delete-private-key". > This is much debated. I belong to the camp that believes having the > Email Address within the Key UID makes no difference. Agreed. > Create the UID You want on the Key and then set it as Primary. Go to > the UID You're unhappy with and revoke it. If the Key has never been > published to any Keyserver then You can simply delete the revoked UID. > If it has then re-publish the Key with revoked UID to the Servers. Might also be worth mentioning that the idea of "primary UID" is kind of poorly defined. No OpenPGP application (that I know of) does anything special with them. All it affects is which UID GnuPG and PGP will display first. Nothing more. From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Fri Jan 2 02:23:58 2009 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Thu, 1 Jan 2009 20:23:58 -0500 Subject: how-to 1) remove a key, 2) avoid spam, 3) add a principal UID when delete ? In-Reply-To: <1230249879.7702.9.camel@rafmav-laptop> References: <1230249879.7702.9.camel@rafmav-laptop> Message-ID: On Dec 25, 2008, at 7:04 PM, Rapha?l Maville wrote: > 1) How to delete an unpublished GnuPG key from a computer when the > Passphrase and the Revoke file are lost ? > This key was create without revoke file. It was not published at all > on > internet or to my friends. Since it was never distributed, then you're in luck. You can just delete the key and be done with it. gpg --delete-secret-and-public-keys (yourkey) > 2) How to avoid spaming to my mail boxes, is it better to do not > mention > it on a gnuPG key ? This a matter of debate. I don't think that spammers really care about OpenPGP keys in particular. In practice, the number of email addresses on the keyservers aren't that great compared to other places they pull addresses from. The spammers might vacuum up some addresses if someone links to the keyserver from a web page, but I doubt the keyservers are being targeted specifically. For most people, the benefits of having an email address on your key outweigh the minor risk of getting a few extra pieces of spam. > 3) How to add a "principal" uid to a key ? > I had removed the principal UID because I wanted to modify the > firstname > ("trema" not well prompted). And then I can only add sub-uid. If there is only one UID, then it is the primary UID and you don't need to do anything. If there are multiple UIDs, then you can pick one to tag as the primary via --edit-key. That said, "primary" doesn't really do very much - it's mainly a visual option so that the chosen UID appears first in the list. David From allen.schultz at gmail.com Fri Jan 2 18:40:28 2009 From: allen.schultz at gmail.com (Allen Schultz) Date: Fri, 2 Jan 2009 10:40:28 -0700 Subject: [linux] Which Mail Server To Use? In-Reply-To: <495E3E6A.80406@horwits.com> References: <495E3B8B.2040603@ohio.lib.in.us> <495E3E6A.80406@horwits.com> Message-ID: <3f34f8420901020940m2103f63eieae53e43a5d257e@mail.gmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On Fri, Jan 2, 2009 at 9:18 AM, Godwin Stewart wrote: > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- For some reason, FireGPG is giving me the following message about most people's PGP blocks: "The first signature of this email is not valid." There is nothing on FireGPG Forums stating the same problem, so I'm assuming at the moment, it's just my issue. There is no #firegpg on IRC anywhere and #gpg has told me to go to the forumns already on this. I have sent messages through FireGPG/Google back to myself and they come through just fine. I have copied/pasted to GPG from others and they come through fine. Does anyone have any suggestions? Yes. I'd like to stay with Firefox/Google. Allen -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.7 (MingW32) Comment: http://getfiregpg.org iD8DBQFJXlF2Bii+WJwtK7YRAuq/AKCF/i4jYp17Xh5xBfts6WRPkfPtdQCgkBbI 35k7XZ26LeyDmk6EHNpYDpU= =TaTi -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Fri Jan 2 20:41:12 2009 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Fri, 02 Jan 2009 14:41:12 -0500 Subject: [linux] Which Mail Server To Use? In-Reply-To: <3f34f8420901020940m2103f63eieae53e43a5d257e@mail.gmail.com> References: <495E3B8B.2040603@ohio.lib.in.us> <495E3E6A.80406@horwits.com> <3f34f8420901020940m2103f63eieae53e43a5d257e@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <495E6DD8.30703@sixdemonbag.org> Allen Schultz wrote: > Does anyone have any suggestions? Unfortunately, my only suggestion is to ask on FireGPG's forums and/or mailing lists. They'll be much better able to help you than this mailing list. (Much the same advice is given to people who come here looking for help with Enigmail or any of many other GnuPG-related pieces of software, so please don't think this is either a personal slight or an expression of disdain for FireGPG.) From cpollock at embarqmail.com Sat Jan 3 03:39:04 2009 From: cpollock at embarqmail.com (Chris) Date: Fri, 2 Jan 2009 20:39:04 -0600 Subject: installing gpg on Mandriva 2009 Message-ID: <200901022039.05134.cpollock@embarqmail.com> I've updated my Mandrake 10.1 box to 2009. On the 10.1 system gpg and gpg-agent were working smoothly. I installed gnupg-2.0.9 from source and copied my old .conf files over to the .gnupg folder. I also installed kgpg. When trying to add my key in Kmail to Identies > Cryptography >OpenPGP Signing key the "fetching keys" bar continues to scroll back and forth without fetching anything. My key is on the key servers. My key is entered in the OpenPGP encryption key block already. I had this working correctly in 10.1 but it won't work now. I must be missing something. I have all the required libraries installed as well as pinentry-qt. Any advice would be appreciated. Chris From cpollock at embarqmail.com Sat Jan 3 05:46:19 2009 From: cpollock at embarqmail.com (Chris) Date: Fri, 2 Jan 2009 22:46:19 -0600 Subject: installing gpg on Mandriva 2009 In-Reply-To: <200901022039.05134.cpollock@embarqmail.com> References: <200901022039.05134.cpollock@embarqmail.com> Message-ID: <200901022246.19901.cpollock@embarqmail.com> On Friday 02 January 2009 20:39:04 Chris wrote: > I've updated my Mandrake 10.1 box to 2009. On the 10.1 system gpg and > gpg-agent were working smoothly. I installed gnupg-2.0.9 from source and > copied my old .conf files over to the .gnupg folder. I also installed kgpg. > When trying to add my key in Kmail to Identies > Cryptography >OpenPGP > Signing key the "fetching keys" bar continues to scroll back and forth > without fetching anything. My key is on the key servers. My key is entered > in the OpenPGP encryption key block already. I had this working correctly > in 10.1 but it won't work now. I must be missing something. I have all the > required libraries installed as well as pinentry-qt. Any advice would be > appreciated. > > Chris One other note on the above, gpg-agent appears not to be running at least that's what Kmail says when it starts. Trying to run from the cli gives me: [root at localhost ~]# gpg-agent gpg-agent[24043]: can't connect to `/root/.gnupg/S.gpg-agent': No such file or directory gpg-agent: no gpg-agent running in this session From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Sat Jan 3 05:51:06 2009 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Fri, 02 Jan 2009 23:51:06 -0500 Subject: installing gpg on Mandriva 2009 In-Reply-To: <200901022246.19901.cpollock@embarqmail.com> References: <200901022039.05134.cpollock@embarqmail.com> <200901022246.19901.cpollock@embarqmail.com> Message-ID: <495EEEBA.80909@sixdemonbag.org> Chris wrote: > [root at localhost ~]# gpg-agent > gpg-agent[24043]: can't connect to `/root/.gnupg/S.gpg-agent': No such file or > directory > gpg-agent: no gpg-agent running in this session I have no answer for you -- I don't use GnuPG 2.0 -- but it is _very_ _very_ _important_ that you not use 'root' as your regular user. UNIX has a lot of safeguards to keep you safe from malware on the internet. However, when you run as root, many of these safeguards vanish. From cpollock at embarqmail.com Sat Jan 3 06:10:17 2009 From: cpollock at embarqmail.com (Chris) Date: Fri, 2 Jan 2009 23:10:17 -0600 Subject: installing gpg on Mandriva 2009 In-Reply-To: <495EEEBA.80909@sixdemonbag.org> References: <200901022039.05134.cpollock@embarqmail.com> <200901022246.19901.cpollock@embarqmail.com> <495EEEBA.80909@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <200901022310.17831.cpollock@embarqmail.com> On Friday 02 January 2009 22:51:06 Robert J. Hansen wrote: > Chris wrote: > > [root at localhost ~]# gpg-agent > > gpg-agent[24043]: can't connect to `/root/.gnupg/S.gpg-agent': No such > > file or directory > > gpg-agent: no gpg-agent running in this session > > I have no answer for you -- I don't use GnuPG 2.0 -- but it is _very_ > _very_ _important_ that you not use 'root' as your regular user. > > UNIX has a lot of safeguards to keep you safe from malware on the > internet. However, when you run as root, many of these safeguards vanish. I get the same run as user, I'd forgot to put that in: [chris at localhost ~]$ gpg-agent gpg-agent[27605]: can't connect to `/home/chris/.gnupg/S.gpg-agent': No such file or directory gpg-agent: no gpg-agent running in this session gpg-agent: secmem usage: 0/32768 bytes in 0 blocks From cpollock at embarqmail.com Sat Jan 3 06:12:43 2009 From: cpollock at embarqmail.com (Chris) Date: Fri, 2 Jan 2009 23:12:43 -0600 Subject: installing gpg on Mandriva 2009 In-Reply-To: <495EF255.5020601@spykes.id.au> References: <200901022039.05134.cpollock@embarqmail.com> <200901022246.19901.cpollock@embarqmail.com> <495EF255.5020601@spykes.id.au> Message-ID: <200901022312.43550.cpollock@embarqmail.com> On Friday 02 January 2009 23:06:29 Simon Dwyer wrote: > - gpg control packet > > Chris wrote: > > On Friday 02 January 2009 20:39:04 Chris wrote: > >> I've updated my Mandrake 10.1 box to 2009. On the 10.1 system gpg and > >> gpg-agent were working smoothly. I installed gnupg-2.0.9 from source > >> and copied my old .conf files over to the .gnupg folder. I also > >> installed kgpg. When trying to add my key in Kmail to Identies > > >> Cryptography >OpenPGP Signing key the "fetching keys" bar continues to > >> scroll back and forth without fetching anything. My key is on the key > >> servers. My key is entered in the OpenPGP encryption key block already. > >> I had this working correctly in 10.1 but it won't work now. I must be > >> missing something. I have all the required libraries installed as well > >> as pinentry-qt. Any advice would be appreciated. > >> > >> Chris > > > > One other note on the above, gpg-agent appears not to be running at least > > that's what Kmail says when it starts. Trying to run from the cli gives > > me: > > > > [root at localhost ~]# gpg-agent > > gpg-agent[24043]: can't connect to `/root/.gnupg/S.gpg-agent': No such > > file or directory > > gpg-agent: no gpg-agent running in this session > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Gnupg-users mailing list > > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users > > Just so you know i had the same problem on a debian box i used to make > my keys on yesterday... so there must be something out there. And it works fine in T-Bird with the Enigmail plugin, asks for passphrase just as it should. From sdwyer at spykes.id.au Sat Jan 3 06:06:29 2009 From: sdwyer at spykes.id.au (Simon Dwyer) Date: Sat, 03 Jan 2009 16:06:29 +1100 Subject: installing gpg on Mandriva 2009 In-Reply-To: <200901022246.19901.cpollock@embarqmail.com> References: <200901022039.05134.cpollock@embarqmail.com> <200901022246.19901.cpollock@embarqmail.com> Message-ID: <495EF255.5020601@spykes.id.au> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Chris wrote: > On Friday 02 January 2009 20:39:04 Chris wrote: >> I've updated my Mandrake 10.1 box to 2009. On the 10.1 system gpg and >> gpg-agent were working smoothly. I installed gnupg-2.0.9 from source and >> copied my old .conf files over to the .gnupg folder. I also installed kgpg. >> When trying to add my key in Kmail to Identies > Cryptography >OpenPGP >> Signing key the "fetching keys" bar continues to scroll back and forth >> without fetching anything. My key is on the key servers. My key is entered >> in the OpenPGP encryption key block already. I had this working correctly >> in 10.1 but it won't work now. I must be missing something. I have all the >> required libraries installed as well as pinentry-qt. Any advice would be >> appreciated. >> >> Chris > One other note on the above, gpg-agent appears not to be running at least > that's what Kmail says when it starts. Trying to run from the cli gives me: > > [root at localhost ~]# gpg-agent > gpg-agent[24043]: can't connect to `/root/.gnupg/S.gpg-agent': No such file or > directory > gpg-agent: no gpg-agent running in this session > > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users Just so you know i had the same problem on a debian box i used to make my keys on yesterday... so there must be something out there. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iEYEARECAAYFAkle8lUACgkQt54J1Z2lsy8EkwCfTVEjEXk6tiefJ0YtMmDRQdy7 amMAoJ6fIhcPzk2T0Arrr79PLUl1yQf+ =Mw1x -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From sdwyer at spykes.id.au Sat Jan 3 08:36:56 2009 From: sdwyer at spykes.id.au (Simon Dwyer) Date: Sat, 03 Jan 2009 18:36:56 +1100 Subject: installing gpg on Mandriva 2009 In-Reply-To: <200901022312.43550.cpollock@embarqmail.com> References: <200901022039.05134.cpollock@embarqmail.com> <200901022246.19901.cpollock@embarqmail.com> <495EF255.5020601@spykes.id.au> <200901022312.43550.cpollock@embarqmail.com> Message-ID: <495F1598.9060806@spykes.id.au> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Chris wrote: > On Friday 02 January 2009 23:06:29 Simon Dwyer wrote: >> - gpg control packet >> >> Chris wrote: >>> On Friday 02 January 2009 20:39:04 Chris wrote: >>>> I've updated my Mandrake 10.1 box to 2009. On the 10.1 system gpg and >>>> gpg-agent were working smoothly. I installed gnupg-2.0.9 from source >>>> and copied my old .conf files over to the .gnupg folder. I also >>>> installed kgpg. When trying to add my key in Kmail to Identies > >>>> Cryptography >OpenPGP Signing key the "fetching keys" bar continues to >>>> scroll back and forth without fetching anything. My key is on the key >>>> servers. My key is entered in the OpenPGP encryption key block already. >>>> I had this working correctly in 10.1 but it won't work now. I must be >>>> missing something. I have all the required libraries installed as well >>>> as pinentry-qt. Any advice would be appreciated. >>>> >>>> Chris >>> One other note on the above, gpg-agent appears not to be running at least >>> that's what Kmail says when it starts. Trying to run from the cli gives >>> me: >>> >>> [root at localhost ~]# gpg-agent >>> gpg-agent[24043]: can't connect to `/root/.gnupg/S.gpg-agent': No such >>> file or directory >>> gpg-agent: no gpg-agent running in this session >>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Gnupg-users mailing list >>> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org >>> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users >> Just so you know i had the same problem on a debian box i used to make >> my keys on yesterday... so there must be something out there. > > And it works fine in T-Bird with the Enigmail plugin, asks for passphrase just > as it should. > Are you talking about mine? i am using TBird and enigmail on a winblows box atm incase you were. i am sure the agent didnt work on the other box. sorry if i am confused -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iEYEARECAAYFAklfFZgACgkQt54J1Z2lsy8aHgCfWxrLBgfJf7ZvNI+CAFVG0wuB t7gAnj/uI15uW0dIbyg1Zb9b2cMoO2cN =fOCY -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From rippit at oggfrog.com Sat Jan 3 12:23:56 2009 From: rippit at oggfrog.com (Rippit the Ogg Frog) Date: Sat, 03 Jan 2009 03:23:56 -0800 Subject: Which Key ID for Business Card? Message-ID: <495F4ACC.3000903@oggfrog.com> Greetings, I just subscribed. I'm getting ready to have business cards printed, and want to include my Key ID on them so that recipients can look up my key from the keyservers. My old business card had the Key ID F7605786, UID crawford at goingware.com This is a 1024-bit key that I generated with the old Open Source PGP way back when. But I have some hazy memory of generating a 2048-bit DSA key at some point, which I think is the key one should use when sending me mail these days. Given the following: $ gpg --fingerprint rippit at oggfrog.com pub 1024D/F7605786 1999-01-11 Key fingerprint = 9B9F 2D03 9996 AF83 9A4F CB26 20E8 0D0B F760 5786 uid Michael David Crawford (aka Rippit the Ogg Frog) uid Michael David Crawford uid Michael D. Crawford sub 2048g/1EA551E9 1999-01-11 Which is the Key ID to print on my business card? F7605786 or 1EA551E9? Or should I generate a new key entirely? Following is my latest key. I just used gpg --edit-key adduid to add the first two UIDs, which seems to have rendered my key untrustworthy. Once I'm completely happy with my key I'll get some friends to sign it again. Thanks! Mike Crawford rippit at oggfrog.com http://www.oggfrog.com/ --------- My Key -------------- -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.8 (Darwin) mQGiBDaZ1nERBADtx4pmQLb0AduVW2zKxsUCqDq+91DLl83zdq4Y4bR7uCOallIH EfJw+VwkOPM0tgZsprYB/Z/ETwIcqJdteloiT/+mU89owypoCuWsIqG26vCImJdx gN/wpEZkmWdnSIO89c8XAz0h8/W3ZasE49nhbiGyBbICAbXPWcILqiFcHQCg/8tF Gji92A23c64Oim/g3VrPzCcEAIzQloP9XbFMBPY+El9NZ1QFiAF+6hQiRQPPFh7j IqgpD6njgkEuSoj+yju/OOV3mgRUqVQO48Jn5gty76mtF1/4O+T5u4Dn4iUpDBAY G7LzkBFSlQDZACkClfEgKWe8cTDSttwCMqt0Izqpcdq/XMGCcBg3PBeFzqtHay+4 cA7mA/42I0fi9yAiV/Hs8qDtYCsFmfeiS2eFRLy4XtiUJmS3GSHC0aFk9LO/dBt0 moBjQJVTgawhPD4pJ2yu4Cx2VcDXoYzxJ+ICRsFVPg4dZgtFwlEzm2tdNM8idXLD scalSm7+SLuzOBLa+cmCpA4TmzE0iahCLb85btI0sR6v6Rstu7Q1TWljaGFlbCBE YXZpZCBDcmF3Zm9yZCA8bWljaGFlbEBnZW9tZXRyaWN2aXNpb25zLmNvbT6IYAQT EQIAIAUCSV9H8gIbIwYLCQgHAwIEFQIIAwQWAgMBAh4BAheAAAoJECDoDQv3YFeG 8qoAoJ0vyOI2+jrw42600VSXSnmQOiNUAKCtASF3XxuviCP6i3VL1YA2/HY6q7Qs TWljaGFlbCBELiBDcmF3Zm9yZCA8Y3Jhd2ZvcmRAZ29pbmd3YXJlLmNvbT6IXQQQ EQIAHQUCRia4ZAYLCQgHAwIEFQIIAwQWAgMBAh4BAheAAAoJECDoDQv3YFeG21AA oLtZgnmB4eDruM9lirZItQ6BHySBAKCZ55yYhkz4KL8p1UieFEqGRQcL+4hLBBAR AgALBQI2mdZxBAsDAgEACgkQIOgNC/dgV4ZXcQCg+0vNZF0An9rU3JZQIKQWEXl/ XrgAoP4w4NfyxnAcFaGZeWK06Pzd5zh7tEVNaWNoYWVsIERhdmlkIENyYXdmb3Jk IChha2EgUmlwcGl0IHRoZSBPZ2cgRnJvZykgPHJpcHBpdEBvZ2dmcm9nLmNvbT6I YAQTEQIAIAUCSV9JOQIbIwYLCQgHAwIEFQIIAwQWAgMBAh4BAheAAAoJECDoDQv3 YFeGwIMAoKLunQ/qUul395Dyc4G6eHZWfT5TAKDgm5Ub8YpznENJ3+K+hLsxcEv8 WrkCDQQ2mdZyEAgA9kJXtwh/CBdyorrWqULzBej5UxE5T7bxbrlLOCDaAadWoxTp j0BV89AHxstDqZSt90xkhkn4DIO9ZekX1KHTUPj1WV/cdlJPPT2N286Z4VeSWc39 uK50T8X8dryDxUcwYc58yWb/Ffm7/ZFexwGq01uejaClcjrUGvC/RgBYK+X0iP1Y TknbzSC0neSRBzZrM2w4DUUdD3yIsxx8Wy2O9vPJI8BD8KVbGI2Ou1WMuF040zT9 fBdXQ6MdGGzeMyEstSr/POGxKUAYEY18hKcKctaGxAMZyAcpesqVDNmWn6vQClCb AkbTCD1mpF1Bn5x8vYlLIhkmuquiXsNV6TILOwACAgf/fw+xUkDP5Xn7RUwwKjn9 ODjrHsObmvrSV0qwdHOAS0KHcC1/FK0i8uFb+O0s2lZq0+YKANBrqQ5XtmZXoXs5 pkc/6oAi2SEpbVyaEpZaINwmOnbx1gIAUvt5RMr8ejZap8aLwKIOapwkj/76NptP yLT5tGpeS2MNKx56lezXCLQ66JS93Ai4xH2xnKOI09/a8B+0UDcKuLCtJHcLsIGP u4l0cC5D6tkmHi1z0EQNNwV4IiVa3wcQ0HLykkrQKFlayW0SKYlM3n+cLwOM78vS FzMC1jqMF41UKRno16V4qqZiUIaPOvAT1mnMg48IrHNyP8g2ERRFD7DRX8N9riPH N4hGBBgRAgAGBQI2mdZyAAoJECDoDQv3YFeGhXgAoNlq/cIY6WYuo2+2ZmHxPN2b Bm2gAJ9jaSUrS83NyLbFXFAdQyO0DxkETw== =geYt -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- From kloecker at kde.org Sat Jan 3 12:59:26 2009 From: kloecker at kde.org (Ingo =?iso-8859-1?q?Kl=F6cker?=) Date: Sat, 03 Jan 2009 12:59:26 +0100 Subject: installing gpg on Mandriva 2009 In-Reply-To: <200901022246.19901.cpollock@embarqmail.com> References: <200901022039.05134.cpollock@embarqmail.com> <200901022246.19901.cpollock@embarqmail.com> Message-ID: <200901031259.33656@thufir.ingo-kloecker.de> On Saturday 03 January 2009, Chris wrote: > On Friday 02 January 2009 20:39:04 Chris wrote: > > I've updated my Mandrake 10.1 box to 2009. On the 10.1 system gpg > > and gpg-agent were working smoothly. I installed gnupg-2.0.9 from > > source and copied my old .conf files over to the .gnupg folder. I > > also installed kgpg. When trying to add my key in Kmail to Identies > > > Cryptography >OpenPGP Signing key the "fetching keys" bar > > continues to scroll back and forth without fetching anything. My > > key is on the key servers. My key is entered in the OpenPGP > > encryption key block already. I had this working correctly in 10.1 > > but it won't work now. I must be missing something. I have all the > > required libraries installed as well as pinentry-qt. Any advice > > would be appreciated. > > > > Chris > > One other note on the above, gpg-agent appears not to be running at > least that's what Kmail says when it starts. Trying to run from the > cli gives me: > > [root at localhost ~]# gpg-agent > gpg-agent[24043]: can't connect to `/root/.gnupg/S.gpg-agent': No > such file or directory > gpg-agent: no gpg-agent running in this session Try whether you can start gpg-agent as daemon manually: # gpg-agent --daemon If this works then kill the gpg-agent process and start it with the command # eval "$(gpg-agent --daemon)" This will set the environment variable needed by all applications that want to make use of a running gpg-agent. Next start KMail from the same console, i.e. # kmail and check whether it works. If this works then put a file called start-gpg-agent.sh into ~/.kde/env (or ~/.kde4/env) containing the following two lines: ===== killall gpg-agent 2>/dev/null eval "$(gpg-agent --daemon)" ===== This will ensure that gpg-agent is started whenever KDE is started. You can add more command line arguments to gpg-agent if you like. For example I added --default-cache-ttl 36000 to increase the duration gpg-agent caches the passphrase. Regards, Ingo -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 197 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From John at Mozilla-Enigmail.org Sat Jan 3 14:17:39 2009 From: John at Mozilla-Enigmail.org (John Clizbe) Date: Sat, 03 Jan 2009 07:17:39 -0600 Subject: Which Key ID for Business Card? In-Reply-To: <495F4ACC.3000903@oggfrog.com> References: <495F4ACC.3000903@oggfrog.com> Message-ID: <495F6573.9090200@Mozilla-Enigmail.org> Rippit the Ogg Frog wrote: > > Given the following: > > $ gpg --fingerprint rippit at oggfrog.com > > > pub 1024D/F7605786 1999-01-11 > Key fingerprint = 9B9F 2D03 9996 AF83 9A4F CB26 20E8 0D0B F760 5786 > sub 2048g/1EA551E9 1999-01-11 > > > Which is the Key ID to print on my business card? F7605786 or 1EA551E9? 0xF7605786 Many print the fingerprint instead of the abbreviated short key id > Or should I generate a new key entirely? That's your call. You may wish to update preferences to include newer algorithms > Following is my latest key. > > I just used gpg --edit-key adduid to add the first two UIDs, which seems > to have rendered my key untrustworthy. Once I'm completely happy with > my key I'll get some friends to sign it again. -- John P. Clizbe Inet:John (a) Mozilla-Enigmail.org You can't spell fiasco without SCO. hkp://keyserver.gingerbear.net or mailto:pgp-public-keys at gingerbear.net?subject=HELP Q:"Just how do the residents of Haiku, Hawai'i hold conversations?" A:"An odd melody / island voices on the winds / surplus of vowels" -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 680 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From shavital at mac.com Sat Jan 3 14:35:47 2009 From: shavital at mac.com (Charly Avital) Date: Sat, 03 Jan 2009 08:35:47 -0500 Subject: Which Key ID for Business Card? In-Reply-To: <495F4ACC.3000903@oggfrog.com> References: <495F4ACC.3000903@oggfrog.com> Message-ID: <495F69B3.3000700@mac.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Rippit the Ogg Frog wrote the following on 1/3/09 6:23 AM: > Greetings, I just subscribed. Welcome, fellow Mac user :-) > > I'm getting ready to have business cards printed, and want to include my > Key ID on them so that recipients can look up my key from the keyservers. > > My old business card had the Key ID F7605786, UID crawford at goingware.com > This is a 1024-bit key that I generated with the old Open Source PGP > way back when. > > But I have some hazy memory of generating a 2048-bit DSA key at some > point, which I think is the key one should use when sending me mail > these days. > > Given the following: > > $ gpg --fingerprint rippit at oggfrog.com > > > pub 1024D/F7605786 1999-01-11 > Key fingerprint = 9B9F 2D03 9996 AF83 9A4F CB26 20E8 0D0B F760 5786 > uid Michael David Crawford (aka Rippit the Ogg Frog) > > uid Michael David Crawford > > uid Michael D. Crawford > sub 2048g/1EA551E9 1999-01-11 > > > Which is the Key ID to print on my business card? F7605786 or 1EA551E9? F7605786 is your master key, 1EA551E9 is the subkey used for encryption. Please read on. > > Or should I generate a new key entirely? > > Following is my latest key. After importing the key block you included in your message, I have: - ----- pub 1024D/F7605786 created: 1999-01-11 expires: never usage: SCA trust: unknown validity: unknown sub 2048g/1EA551E9 created: 1999-01-11 expires: never usage: E [ unknown] (1). Michael David Crawford (aka Rippit the Ogg Frog) [ unknown] (2) Michael David Crawford [ unknown] (3) Michael D. Crawford - ---- Your master key ID is F7605786, or more conservatively 0xF7605786 (Zerox........). Some key servers require the format 0XF7605786. The eight digits F7605786 are the last 8 digits of the fingerprint of that key, as you can in the fingerprint you indicated above. In my opinion 0xF7605786 is the key ID you should print on your visiting cards. It is the same you have on the old cards, except for the 0x prefix. > I just used gpg --edit-key adduid to add the first two UIDs, which seems > to have rendered my key untrustworthy. Why? You have added those UIDs because, apparently your wanted you key to include the three e-mail addresses you use, and that's perfectly OK. As a matter of fact, it is best, if not mandatory, to include in one's key the different e-mail addresses one is going to use. > Once I'm completely happy with > my key I'll get some friends to sign it again. Referring to "...have some friends sign it again". In its present state, your key, as I have downloaded and imported it into my public key ring, contains only your self-signatures, as shown below. You should have your friends sign your key, not signing it again. Command> check uid Michael David Crawford (aka Rippit the Ogg Frog) sig!3 F7605786 2009-01-03 [self-signature] uid Michael David Crawford sig!3 F7605786 2009-01-03 [self-signature] uid Michael D. Crawford sig! F7605786 2007-04-19 [self-signature] I don't know what will make you completely happy with your key, but I take the liberty of suggesting the following: - - this is not related to your key specifically, but you'd better update your gpg to 1.4.9, that is the current stable version. Source code is available at www.gnupg.org if you want to compile it, or you can download a binary installer at - - add a signing subkey to your key. When you sign, you will be using that subkey, instead of your master key. Because your master key is 1024 bits, you can use only the SHA1 message digest (which is also true in the present configuration of your key, where you use your master key to sign). The strength and security of SHA1 is debated. Many users still use it, others prefer to use SHA256, or even SHA512. If you want to use SHA256, you will have to generate a signing RSA subkey of at least 2048 bits. I believe, but I am not sure, that if you enable in your ~/.gnupg/gpg.conf file the option: enable-dsa2 you will be able to add a 2048 bits DSA subkey. You will also have to enable in your gpg.conf file the option 'digest-algo SHA256' But I *recommend* that you wait for reactions to this message from users in this forum who are *really experienced*, I am just a cobbler-empirical user. > > Thanks! > > Mike Crawford > rippit at oggfrog.com > http://www.oggfrog.com/ [...] You're welcome. Because you are a Mac user, I suggest: and especially: You are using: User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.18 (Macintosh/20081105) The current stable version is 2.0.0.19. You should be able to update automatically from 2.0.0.18. Charly MacOS 10.5.6 - MacBook Intel C2Duo "Aluminum Late 2008"- GnuPG 1.4.9 - GPG2 2.0.10rc1 - Testing TB 3.0b1+EM 0.96a - Apple's Mail+GPGMail v56 PGP key: 0xA57A8EFA -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.10rc1 (Darwin) Comment: GnuPG for Privacy Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJJX2msAAoJEM3GMi2FW4PvVTAH/RbYK0U58oq1k4l7gMkBJg1d XN1HBVU0ahTqYfs0glmX8FOwUqrj+t8rEQ+rFbmrAfMnZAk45efk+uXx/o55sNXR Hj4tuwyVU7+QjxxRSGe/eVMcTIMDycYnnXMMlQwGQpSijPDohWtE/UiaKiPgyJER CknAZcU3dxHtbn7x1/7QWUTGz394DA/OA8FD2nTnCVgZQshDpym2AxXDCxQ07mOL XkqkAwKEO8G571QrxvJGh8Yepk/vBCw8HuDN23aF3PrYGKvevIql/igage/zn6Zk oL/u6evWLhiHy0ujRih9EaTNuZX+DaXuVuB/Sr98GEq9l1l1BcdimSK/0WvSf34= =HyG6 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Sat Jan 3 15:51:46 2009 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Sat, 3 Jan 2009 09:51:46 -0500 Subject: Which Key ID for Business Card? In-Reply-To: <495F4ACC.3000903@oggfrog.com> References: <495F4ACC.3000903@oggfrog.com> Message-ID: <32FBFEC1-0348-4718-B2A2-6D0CE08FF142@jabberwocky.com> On Jan 3, 2009, at 6:23 AM, Rippit the Ogg Frog wrote: > Greetings, I just subscribed. > > I'm getting ready to have business cards printed, and want to > include my Key ID on them so that recipients can look up my key from > the keyservers. > > My old business card had the Key ID F7605786, UID crawford at goingware.com > This is a 1024-bit key that I generated with the old Open Source > PGP way back when. > > But I have some hazy memory of generating a 2048-bit DSA key at some > point, which I think is the key one should use when sending me mail > these days. > > Given the following: > > $ gpg --fingerprint rippit at oggfrog.com > > > pub 1024D/F7605786 1999-01-11 > Key fingerprint = 9B9F 2D03 9996 AF83 9A4F CB26 20E8 0D0B F760 5786 > uid Michael David Crawford (aka Rippit the Ogg Frog) > > uid Michael David Crawford > > uid Michael D. Crawford > sub 2048g/1EA551E9 1999-01-11 > > > Which is the Key ID to print on my business card? F7605786 or > 1EA551E9? Neither. You want the full fingerprint (9B9F 2D03 9996 AF83 9A4F CB26 20E8 0D0B F760 5786). Some people, myself included, include both the key ID (F7605786) as well as the full fingerprint. Some people simply boldface the last 8 digits of the fingerprint, as the key ID is the same as the last 8 digits of the fingerprint. However you choose to do it graphically, the point is that you want the large fingerprint as that is what (mostly) uniquely identifies your key. The 8 digit key ID is just a cut-down version of that which is easier to type in. > Or should I generate a new key entirely? Your call on this one. If your old key isn't widely signed by other people, you have nothing to lose in revoking it and making a new one. David From cpollock at embarqmail.com Sat Jan 3 15:53:32 2009 From: cpollock at embarqmail.com (Chris) Date: Sat, 3 Jan 2009 08:53:32 -0600 Subject: installing gpg on Mandriva 2009 In-Reply-To: <200901031259.33656@thufir.ingo-kloecker.de> References: <200901022039.05134.cpollock@embarqmail.com> <200901022246.19901.cpollock@embarqmail.com> <200901031259.33656@thufir.ingo-kloecker.de> Message-ID: <200901030853.32740.cpollock@embarqmail.com> On Saturday 03 January 2009 05:59:26 Ingo Kl?cker wrote: > On Saturday 03 January 2009, Chris wrote: > > On Friday 02 January 2009 20:39:04 Chris wrote: > > > I've updated my Mandrake 10.1 box to 2009. On the 10.1 system gpg > > > and gpg-agent were working smoothly. I installed gnupg-2.0.9 from > > > source and copied my old .conf files over to the .gnupg folder. I > > > also installed kgpg. When trying to add my key in Kmail to Identies > > > > > > > Cryptography >OpenPGP Signing key the "fetching keys" bar > > > > > > continues to scroll back and forth without fetching anything. My > > > key is on the key servers. My key is entered in the OpenPGP > > > encryption key block already. I had this working correctly in 10.1 > > > but it won't work now. I must be missing something. I have all the > > > required libraries installed as well as pinentry-qt. Any advice > > > would be appreciated. > > > > > > Chris > > > > One other note on the above, gpg-agent appears not to be running at > > least that's what Kmail says when it starts. Trying to run from the > > cli gives me: > > > > [root at localhost ~]# gpg-agent > > gpg-agent[24043]: can't connect to `/root/.gnupg/S.gpg-agent': No > > such file or directory > > gpg-agent: no gpg-agent running in this session > > Try whether you can start gpg-agent as daemon manually: > # gpg-agent --daemon > > If this works then kill the gpg-agent process and start it with the > command > # eval "$(gpg-agent --daemon)" > This will set the environment variable needed by all applications that > want to make use of a running gpg-agent. Next start KMail from the same > console, i.e. > # kmail > and check whether it works. > > If this works then put a file called start-gpg-agent.sh into ~/.kde/env > (or ~/.kde4/env) containing the following two lines: > ===== > killall gpg-agent 2>/dev/null > eval "$(gpg-agent --daemon)" > ===== > > This will ensure that gpg-agent is started whenever KDE is started. > > You can add more command line arguments to gpg-agent if you like. For > example I added --default-cache-ttl 36000 to increase the duration > gpg-agent caches the passphrase. > > > Regards, > Ingo Starting as root worked so I then entered eval "$(gpg-agent --daemon)" and it now shows as a running process. Stopped and restarted Kmail, I did not get the warning that gpg-agent wasn't running this time which is good so I tried adding my signing key to the identies configuration. The 'fetchnig keys' scroll bar still just moves back and forth as if it can't find anything. I noticed that kgpg was running as 'chris' so I stopped the root gpg-agent and started as 'chris', I saw this: [chris at localhost ~]$ eval "$(gpg-agent --daemon)" can't connect to `/home/chris/.gnupg/log-socket': No such file or directory gpg-agent shows to be running under processes though. When running kmail as root and just setting up a quick identity when trying to fetch the keys there is no acitivty at all in the scrollbar In the 'gpgagent' folder, which I copied over from my /home backup there is a 'smime.log' file which contains these entries: gpgsm[28176.0] DBG: -> # Home: ~/.gnupg gpgsm[28176.0] DBG: -> # Config: /home/chris/.gnupg/gpgsm.conf gpgsm[28176.0] DBG: -> # AgentInfo: [not set] gpgsm[28176.0] DBG: -> # DirmngrInfo: [not set] gpgsm[28176.0] DBG: -> OK GNU Privacy Guard's S/M server 2.0.9 ready gpgsm[28176.0] DBG: <- OPTION display=:0.0 gpgsm[28176.0] DBG: -> OK gpgsm[28176.0] DBG: <- OPTION enable-audit-log=1 gpgsm[28176.0] DBG: -> OK gpgsm[28176.0] DBG: <- OPTION lc-ctype=(null) gpgsm[28176.0] DBG: -> OK gpgsm[28176.0] DBG: <- OPTION lc-messages=(null) gpgsm[28176.0] DBG: -> OK gpgsm[28176.0] DBG: <- OPTION list-mode=1 gpgsm[28176.0] DBG: -> OK gpgsm[28176.0] DBG: <- OPTION with-validation=1 gpgsm[28176.0] DBG: -> OK gpgsm[28176.0] DBG: <- LISTKEYS gnupg-users at gnupg.org gpgsm[28176.0] DBG: -> OK gpgsm[28176.0] DBG: <- BYE gpgsm[28176.0] DBG: -> OK closing connection My gpg.conf file is: default-key 441D71BC727D0B1CEC1F6B39E372A7DA98E6705C default-cert-check-level 3 use-agent no-mangle-dos-filenames no-secmem-warning utf8-strings verbose verbose verbose keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net The gpg-agent.conf file is: quiet pinentry-program /usr/bin/pinentry-qt no-grab default-cache-ttl 3600 debug-level advanced log-file socket:///home/chris/.gnupg/log-socket verbose verbose verbose From kloecker at kde.org Sat Jan 3 16:21:58 2009 From: kloecker at kde.org (Ingo =?iso-8859-15?q?Kl=F6cker?=) Date: Sat, 03 Jan 2009 16:21:58 +0100 Subject: installing gpg on Mandriva 2009 In-Reply-To: <200901030853.32740.cpollock@embarqmail.com> References: <200901022039.05134.cpollock@embarqmail.com> <200901031259.33656@thufir.ingo-kloecker.de> <200901030853.32740.cpollock@embarqmail.com> Message-ID: <200901031622.07222@thufir.ingo-kloecker.de> On Saturday 03 January 2009, Chris wrote: > On Saturday 03 January 2009 05:59:26 Ingo Kl?cker wrote: > > On Saturday 03 January 2009, Chris wrote: > > > On Friday 02 January 2009 20:39:04 Chris wrote: > > > > I've updated my Mandrake 10.1 box to 2009. On the 10.1 system > > > > gpg and gpg-agent were working smoothly. I installed > > > > gnupg-2.0.9 from source and copied my old .conf files over to > > > > the .gnupg folder. I also installed kgpg. When trying to add my > > > > key in Kmail to Identies > > > > > > > > > Cryptography >OpenPGP Signing key the "fetching keys" bar > > > > > > > > continues to scroll back and forth without fetching anything. > > > > My key is on the key servers. My key is entered in the OpenPGP > > > > encryption key block already. I had this working correctly in > > > > 10.1 but it won't work now. I must be missing something. I have > > > > all the required libraries installed as well as pinentry-qt. > > > > Any advice would be appreciated. > > > > > > > > Chris > > > > > > One other note on the above, gpg-agent appears not to be running > > > at least that's what Kmail says when it starts. Trying to run > > > from the cli gives me: > > > > > > [root at localhost ~]# gpg-agent > > > gpg-agent[24043]: can't connect to `/root/.gnupg/S.gpg-agent': No > > > such file or directory > > > gpg-agent: no gpg-agent running in this session > > > > Try whether you can start gpg-agent as daemon manually: > > # gpg-agent --daemon > > > > If this works then kill the gpg-agent process and start it with the > > command > > # eval "$(gpg-agent --daemon)" > > This will set the environment variable needed by all applications > > that want to make use of a running gpg-agent. Next start KMail from > > the same console, i.e. > > # kmail > > and check whether it works. > > > > If this works then put a file called start-gpg-agent.sh into > > ~/.kde/env (or ~/.kde4/env) containing the following two lines: > > ===== > > killall gpg-agent 2>/dev/null > > eval "$(gpg-agent --daemon)" > > ===== > > > > This will ensure that gpg-agent is started whenever KDE is started. > > > > You can add more command line arguments to gpg-agent if you like. > > For example I added --default-cache-ttl 36000 to increase the > > duration gpg-agent caches the passphrase. > > > > > > Regards, > > Ingo > > Starting as root worked Please don't do anything as root. It is totally unnecessary, very dangerous and will only lead to confusion. > so I then entered eval "$(gpg-agent > --daemon)" and it now shows as a running process. Stopped and > restarted Kmail, I did not get the warning that gpg-agent wasn't > running this time which is good so I tried adding my signing key to > the identies configuration. The 'fetchnig keys' scroll bar still just > moves back and forth as if it can't find anything. I noticed that > kgpg was running as 'chris' so I stopped the root gpg-agent and > started as 'chris', I saw this: > > [chris at localhost ~]$ eval "$(gpg-agent --daemon)" > can't connect to `/home/chris/.gnupg/log-socket': No such file or > directory > > gpg-agent shows to be running under processes though. > > When running kmail as root and just setting up a quick identity when > trying to fetch the keys there is no acitivty at all in the scrollbar You started gpg-agent as chris and kmail as root? This cannot work. See what I meant above with "It [...] will only lead to confusion."? What happens if you do the following as 'chris' (e.g. in Konsole)? [chris at localhost ~]$ killall gpg-agent [chris at localhost ~]$ killall kmail [chris at localhost ~]$ eval "$(gpg-agent --daemon)" [chris at localhost ~]$ kmail Regards, Ingo -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 197 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From cpollock at embarqmail.com Sat Jan 3 18:07:47 2009 From: cpollock at embarqmail.com (Chris) Date: Sat, 3 Jan 2009 11:07:47 -0600 Subject: installing gpg on Mandriva 2009 In-Reply-To: <200901031622.07222@thufir.ingo-kloecker.de> References: <200901022039.05134.cpollock@embarqmail.com> <200901030853.32740.cpollock@embarqmail.com> <200901031622.07222@thufir.ingo-kloecker.de> Message-ID: <200901031107.47738.cpollock@embarqmail.com> On Saturday 03 January 2009 09:21:58 Ingo Kl?cker wrote: > > > > > Starting as root worked > > Please don't do anything as root. It is totally unnecessary, very > dangerous and will only lead to confusion. I only 'tried' it as root since you had entered #gpg-agent --daemon which on my box is the root login. I stopped the root process and started it as 'chris' where it is running now. > > > so I then entered eval "$(gpg-agent > > --daemon)" and it now shows as a running process. Stopped and > > restarted Kmail, I did not get the warning that gpg-agent wasn't > > running this time which is good so I tried adding my signing key to > > the identies configuration. The 'fetchnig keys' scroll bar still just > > moves back and forth as if it can't find anything. I noticed that > > kgpg was running as 'chris' so I stopped the root gpg-agent and > > started as 'chris', I saw this: > > > > [chris at localhost ~]$ eval "$(gpg-agent --daemon)" > > can't connect to `/home/chris/.gnupg/log-socket': No such file or > > directory > > > > gpg-agent shows to be running under processes though. > > > > When running kmail as root and just setting up a quick identity when > > trying to fetch the keys there is no acitivty at all in the scrollbar > > You started gpg-agent as chris and kmail as root? This cannot work. See > what I meant above with "It [...] will only lead to confusion."? Again, I just did a quick check while gpg-agent was running as root to see if kmail started as root would pickup the key. Kmail and gpg-agent are running as 'chris' and neither are running as root. > > What happens if you do the following as 'chris' (e.g. in Konsole)? > [chris at localhost ~]$ killall gpg-agent > [chris at localhost ~]$ killall kmail > [chris at localhost ~]$ eval "$(gpg-agent --daemon)" > [chris at localhost ~]$ kmail > [chris at localhost ~]$ killall gpg-agent [chris at localhost ~]$ killall kmail [chris at localhost ~]$ eval "$(gpg-agent --daemon)" can't connect to `/home/chris/.gnupg/log-socket': No such file or directory [chris at localhost ~]$ kmail Apologies for the confusion Chris From cpollock at embarqmail.com Sat Jan 3 18:46:33 2009 From: cpollock at embarqmail.com (Chris) Date: Sat, 3 Jan 2009 11:46:33 -0600 Subject: installing gpg on Mandriva 2009 In-Reply-To: <200901031107.47738.cpollock@embarqmail.com> References: <200901022039.05134.cpollock@embarqmail.com> <200901031622.07222@thufir.ingo-kloecker.de> <200901031107.47738.cpollock@embarqmail.com> Message-ID: <200901031146.33679.cpollock@embarqmail.com> On Saturday 03 January 2009 11:07:47 Chris wrote: > On Saturday 03 January 2009 09:21:58 Ingo Kl?cker wrote: > > > Starting as root worked > > > > Please don't do anything as root. It is totally unnecessary, very > > dangerous and will only lead to confusion. > > I only 'tried' it as root since you had entered #gpg-agent --daemon which > on my box is the root login. I stopped the root process and started it as > 'chris' where it is running now. > > > > so I then entered eval "$(gpg-agent > > > --daemon)" and it now shows as a running process. Stopped and > > > restarted Kmail, I did not get the warning that gpg-agent wasn't > > > running this time which is good so I tried adding my signing key to > > > the identies configuration. The 'fetchnig keys' scroll bar still just > > > moves back and forth as if it can't find anything. I noticed that > > > kgpg was running as 'chris' so I stopped the root gpg-agent and > > > started as 'chris', I saw this: > > > > > > [chris at localhost ~]$ eval "$(gpg-agent --daemon)" > > > can't connect to `/home/chris/.gnupg/log-socket': No such file or > > > directory > > > > > > gpg-agent shows to be running under processes though. > > > > > > When running kmail as root and just setting up a quick identity when > > > trying to fetch the keys there is no acitivty at all in the scrollbar > > > > You started gpg-agent as chris and kmail as root? This cannot work. See > > what I meant above with "It [...] will only lead to confusion."? > > Again, I just did a quick check while gpg-agent was running as root to see > if kmail started as root would pickup the key. Kmail and gpg-agent are > running as 'chris' and neither are running as root. > > > What happens if you do the following as 'chris' (e.g. in Konsole)? > > [chris at localhost ~]$ killall gpg-agent > > [chris at localhost ~]$ killall kmail > > [chris at localhost ~]$ eval "$(gpg-agent --daemon)" > > [chris at localhost ~]$ kmail > > [chris at localhost ~]$ killall gpg-agent > [chris at localhost ~]$ killall kmail > [chris at localhost ~]$ eval "$(gpg-agent --daemon)" > can't connect to `/home/chris/.gnupg/log-socket': No such file or directory > [chris at localhost ~]$ kmail > > Apologies for the confusion > > Chris > One other note, after logging out and back in again to the system a warning that gpg-agent is not running is displayed however looking at running processes shows that it is under 'chris'. From faramir.cl at gmail.com Sat Jan 3 19:51:52 2009 From: faramir.cl at gmail.com (Faramir) Date: Sat, 03 Jan 2009 15:51:52 -0300 Subject: Which Key ID for Business Card? In-Reply-To: <495F4ACC.3000903@oggfrog.com> References: <495F4ACC.3000903@oggfrog.com> Message-ID: <495FB3C8.3080507@gmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Rippit the Ogg Frog escribi?: > Greetings, I just subscribed. Welcome to the list! > I'm getting ready to have business cards printed, and want to include my > Key ID on them so that recipients can look up my key from the keyservers. I made the same question 1 or 2 months ago... > Or should I generate a new key entirely? It's your choice... if you want to replace your old key, and people is already using it, maybe you'd like to sign the new one with the old one. > I just used gpg --edit-key adduid to add the first two UIDs, which seems > to have rendered my key untrustworthy. Once I'm completely happy with > my key I'll get some friends to sign it again. If you want people to always be able to send emails to you, it is not a bad idea to have more than 1 UID (each one with a different email). While you don't use different names, I suppose they won't cause any trust problem... About what to print in the card, I chose to print the full fingerprint (because after being warned about collisions, I saw one with my own eyes). I also uploaded my key to biglumber.com, created a tinyurl pointing to my key, and printed that url too... Best Regards -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJJX7PIAAoJEMV4f6PvczxA4hwIAJ0AXMsvJoOXyE6pyf4sIZlK kUCah7XJjSVWKoYOeN1ziuPGaz047fe0P6khMvqVulSMYMqJujY1HKM+pkmx9Cvk 1YN7YwtEOtEobJqKWMIsqrn1pYhK6wU1kbBSgsPNbSu3VTJkQgGAgEojgFXrb6lq h0e0UsNNQJVCl9E1LCECtllXs/MkjGfN6iJ4FtkGDe5XEbkJ+VGqPGfBSmFWM+K6 8yuYzZ9/wtGPfJQcOj42fMvwFgLGVMCZtGcECspBt4EKaJCcrSMTDDUvht/VFdlE xKLgL6gr1EM8fX9u5oVHJtEIvbXx81iwzzlVvuUVlkJdhHj0J4OLf9ekUjNSBKY= =JhMC -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From kloecker at kde.org Sat Jan 3 21:08:56 2009 From: kloecker at kde.org (Ingo =?iso-8859-15?q?Kl=F6cker?=) Date: Sat, 03 Jan 2009 21:08:56 +0100 Subject: installing gpg on Mandriva 2009 In-Reply-To: <200901031146.33679.cpollock@embarqmail.com> References: <200901022039.05134.cpollock@embarqmail.com> <200901031107.47738.cpollock@embarqmail.com> <200901031146.33679.cpollock@embarqmail.com> Message-ID: <200901032109.03184@thufir.ingo-kloecker.de> On Saturday 03 January 2009, Chris wrote: > On Saturday 03 January 2009 11:07:47 Chris wrote: > > On Saturday 03 January 2009 09:21:58 Ingo Kl?cker wrote: > > > > Starting as root worked > > > > > > Please don't do anything as root. It is totally unnecessary, very > > > dangerous and will only lead to confusion. > > > > I only 'tried' it as root since you had entered #gpg-agent --daemon > > which on my box is the root login. I stopped the root process and > > started it as 'chris' where it is running now. Okay. > > > > so I then entered eval "$(gpg-agent > > > > --daemon)" and it now shows as a running process. Stopped and > > > > restarted Kmail, I did not get the warning that gpg-agent > > > > wasn't running this time which is good so I tried adding my > > > > signing key to the identies configuration. The 'fetchnig keys' > > > > scroll bar still just moves back and forth as if it can't find > > > > anything. I noticed that kgpg was running as 'chris' so I > > > > stopped the root gpg-agent and started as 'chris', I saw this: > > > > > > > > [chris at localhost ~]$ eval "$(gpg-agent --daemon)" > > > > can't connect to `/home/chris/.gnupg/log-socket': No such file > > > > or directory > > > > > > > > gpg-agent shows to be running under processes though. > > > > > > > > When running kmail as root and just setting up a quick identity > > > > when trying to fetch the keys there is no acitivty at all in > > > > the scrollbar > > > > > > You started gpg-agent as chris and kmail as root? This cannot > > > work. See what I meant above with "It [...] will only lead to > > > confusion."? > > > > Again, I just did a quick check while gpg-agent was running as root > > to see if kmail started as root would pickup the key. Kmail and > > gpg-agent are running as 'chris' and neither are running as root. > > > > > What happens if you do the following as 'chris' (e.g. in > > > Konsole)? [chris at localhost ~]$ killall gpg-agent > > > [chris at localhost ~]$ killall kmail > > > [chris at localhost ~]$ eval "$(gpg-agent --daemon)" > > > [chris at localhost ~]$ kmail > > > > [chris at localhost ~]$ killall gpg-agent > > [chris at localhost ~]$ killall kmail > > [chris at localhost ~]$ eval "$(gpg-agent --daemon)" > > can't connect to `/home/chris/.gnupg/log-socket': No such file or > > directory > > [chris at localhost ~]$ kmail > > > > Apologies for the confusion > > > > Chris > > One other note, after logging out and back in again to the system a > warning that gpg-agent is not running is displayed however looking at > running processes shows that it is under 'chris'. The warning is a bit misleading. It should read "gpg-agent cannot be connected to" or similar. In order to connect to gpg-agent the application needs to know the "channel" to use for talking to gpg-agent. This "channel" (a Unix socket) is announced with the environment variable $GPG_AGENT_INFO. Therefore only applications running in the same environment as gpg-agent can talk to gpg-agent. Did you add the file start-gpg-agent.sh to ~/.kde/env (or ~/.kde4/env or whatever folder is used for KDE 4 by Mandriva 2009)? As I wrote in my first reply this will ensure that gpg-agent is started whenever KDE is started, i.e. whenever you log in. Moreover, it ensures that all applications started from KDE are running in the same environment as gpg-agent and thus should be able to talk to gpg-agent. Regards, Ingo -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 197 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From cpollock at embarqmail.com Sat Jan 3 22:58:08 2009 From: cpollock at embarqmail.com (Chris) Date: Sat, 3 Jan 2009 15:58:08 -0600 Subject: installing gpg on Mandriva 2009 In-Reply-To: <200901032109.03184@thufir.ingo-kloecker.de> References: <200901022039.05134.cpollock@embarqmail.com> <200901031146.33679.cpollock@embarqmail.com> <200901032109.03184@thufir.ingo-kloecker.de> Message-ID: <200901031558.09078.cpollock@embarqmail.com> On Saturday 03 January 2009 14:08:56 Ingo Kl?cker wrote: > The warning is a bit misleading. It should read "gpg-agent cannot be > connected to" or similar. In order to connect to gpg-agent the > application needs to know the "channel" to use for talking to > gpg-agent. This "channel" (a Unix socket) is announced with the > environment variable $GPG_AGENT_INFO. Therefore only applications > running in the same environment as gpg-agent can talk to gpg-agent. > > Did you add the file start-gpg-agent.sh to ~/.kde/env (or ~/.kde4/env or > whatever folder is used for KDE 4 by Mandriva 2009)? As I wrote in my > first reply this will ensure that gpg-agent is started whenever KDE is > started, i.e. whenever you log in. Moreover, it ensures that all > applications started from KDE are running in the same environment as > gpg-agent and thus should be able to talk to gpg-agent. > It is now there in ~/kde4/env and there are no longer any complaints on startup and gpg-agent starts at login. Still there is the matter of setting up my signing key, apparently it still can't be found as it continues to be searched for. Your help and patience is greately appreciated Ingo. Chris From jacobbjerrum at gmail.com Sat Jan 3 19:59:40 2009 From: jacobbjerrum at gmail.com (jakse) Date: Sat, 3 Jan 2009 10:59:40 -0800 (PST) Subject: recover private key Message-ID: <21268023.post@talk.nabble.com> dear forum. I am using GnuPG on my mac. had a problem and had to reinstall everything... lost all data. from old backup i have some info on my key. The trustdb was created and so on, and i have a fingerprint for my pub key, "uid" and "sub". however i dont know what this means?! Is there any way i can recover my private key? J -- View this message in context: http://www.nabble.com/recover-private-key-tp21268023p21268023.html Sent from the GnuPG - User mailing list archive at Nabble.com. From patrick.matthaei at web.de Sun Jan 4 13:13:21 2009 From: patrick.matthaei at web.de (=?UTF-8?B?UGF0cmljayBNYXR0aMOkaQ==?=) Date: Sun, 04 Jan 2009 13:13:21 +0100 Subject: Expire of elgamal sub Message-ID: <4960A7E1.4080100@web.de> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Hello list, I have got the following problem. $ gpg --fingerprint "Patrick" pub 1024D/7A5A6CC7 2006-08-15 Key fingerprint = 1C54 FA0D 6F0F 5064 7A95 BBD3 D970 398A 7A5A 6CC7 uid Patrick Matth?i (Local Key) uid Patrick Matth?i sub 2048g/D6395C9A 2006-08-15 [expires: 2010-01-01] sub 2048g/610BB46C 2008-11-11 In the past I added an expire to my key on --gen-key, which I later changed to never expire. A much more time later I saw, that my elgamal still has got an expiration date and I can not find anything how I could change it. Then I added a new elgamal, the 2048g/610BB46C one. Is this right so? Can I edit the expire of the elgamal? What would happen *now* if the elgamal 2048g/D6395C9A has been expired? Please CC my while I am not subscribed and thanks. :-) - -- /* Mit freundlichem Gru? / With kind regards, Patrick Matth?i E-Mail: patrick.matthaei at web.de Comment: Always if we think we are right, we were maybe wrong. */ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (GNU/Linux) iEYEARECAAYFAklgp+EACgkQ2XA5inpabMcOIQCghrgaKUQ//rMQiGl97SW80Pqc LG8Aniscn1BrzV8f6WmfUHEgkdRmxjWX =+98v -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Wed Jan 7 01:22:50 2009 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Tue, 6 Jan 2009 19:22:50 -0500 Subject: recover private key In-Reply-To: <21268023.post@talk.nabble.com> References: <21268023.post@talk.nabble.com> Message-ID: <7E738D6E-41D9-4082-99B8-6FA474F05D9C@jabberwocky.com> On Jan 3, 2009, at 1:59 PM, jakse wrote: > > dear forum. > > I am using GnuPG on my mac. had a problem and had to reinstall > everything... lost all data. > > from old backup i have some info on my key. The trustdb was created > and so > on, and i have a fingerprint for my pub key, "uid" and "sub". > however i dont > know what this means?! > > Is there any way i can recover my private key? Do you have the file "secring.gpg"? If so, you have your private key. If not, you don't. David From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Wed Jan 7 01:25:37 2009 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Tue, 6 Jan 2009 19:25:37 -0500 Subject: Expire of elgamal sub In-Reply-To: <4960A7E1.4080100@web.de> References: <4960A7E1.4080100@web.de> Message-ID: <3D8000CB-559F-48F2-8717-CEB39A2176B9@jabberwocky.com> On Jan 4, 2009, at 7:13 AM, Patrick Matth?i wrote: > I have got the following problem. > > $ gpg --fingerprint "Patrick" > pub 1024D/7A5A6CC7 2006-08-15 > Key fingerprint = 1C54 FA0D 6F0F 5064 7A95 BBD3 D970 398A 7A5A > 6CC7 > uid Patrick Matth?i (Local Key) > > uid Patrick Matth?i > sub 2048g/D6395C9A 2006-08-15 [expires: 2010-01-01] > sub 2048g/610BB46C 2008-11-11 > > In the past I added an expire to my key on --gen-key, which I later > changed to never expire. > > A much more time later I saw, that my elgamal still has got an > expiration date and I can not find anything how I could change it. > > Then I added a new elgamal, the 2048g/610BB46C one. > Is this right so? Can I edit the expire of the elgamal? What would > happen *now* if the elgamal 2048g/D6395C9A has been expired? You can have different expiration dates on an OpenPGP key. The whole key can expire, and individual subkeys can expire. If the whole key expires, it takes all subkeys with it (whether they are expired or not). If a subkey expires, only that subkey is expired. In your case, you have a (whole) key without an expiration date, and two subkeys, one with an expiration date and one without. That said, what are you trying to do? What is the problem? David From faramir.cl at gmail.com Wed Jan 7 01:44:47 2009 From: faramir.cl at gmail.com (Faramir) Date: Tue, 06 Jan 2009 21:44:47 -0300 Subject: recover private key In-Reply-To: <21268023.post@talk.nabble.com> References: <21268023.post@talk.nabble.com> Message-ID: <4963FAFF.7030906@gmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 jakse escribi?: > dear forum. > > I am using GnuPG on my mac. had a problem and had to reinstall > everything... lost all data. Unless you have a backup, you can't recover the private key. However, there are chances you can recover deleted files (unfortunately, if you reinstalled everything in the same hard drive where you had your keyring, the chance is very small... and becomes smaller each time you write something in the hard drive). Now, I am talking about recovering files with the help of recovery software... I am not talking about sending the hard drive to an specialized laboratory... > from old backup i have some info on my key. The trustdb was created and so > on, and i have a fingerprint for my pub key, "uid" and "sub". however i dont > know what this means?! Well, if there is an old backup... maybe you have some luck... Did you recovered the trustdb? What files do you have in the backup? If you have a file named secring.gpg then there is a big chance you can recover the key... Tell us more about the files in your backup... look for files with 'asc' extension... like mykey_key-pair.asc or something like that... > Is there any way i can recover my private key? Only if it was backed up, or the area in the hdd where the key was stored has not been overwritten... unfortunately, I am not a mac user, so I don't know about any recovery software for macs... Best Regards -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJJY/r/AAoJEMV4f6PvczxAetoH/R8lxmS27hd1w8bSMnC26ap8 uS3Xelwb/pptr91KMf+upnfFtU7JY8Ne1ujB1rk78ttVoc59G8TMRLBG4dsCPA5s UmmTeapoJlOWO0fQur1MU2oADClGgpYvFbErc9s8nl+JLRY7La4sLiLoW7XNozGG VFq8cLqG4kX5c6PIRnc3se8mR5vKQhzbbfmwtJanDn89QamrKnQs55dFbIiCAIjy hC2XCXcb1AvIW6zxOLmzFJJQAprUMvJuJdI45QxWs8GXVyN92ZIIlZM2wFxV31v9 pmTQP9UQA/4NFn/Kp2GWmWuAWP4ZP5SEI5SEiB4uVJQ8Qa84Fni60DEM0dqSabE= =Ol5/ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From faramir.cl at gmail.com Wed Jan 7 02:46:44 2009 From: faramir.cl at gmail.com (Faramir) Date: Tue, 06 Jan 2009 22:46:44 -0300 Subject: Expire of elgamal sub In-Reply-To: <4960A7E1.4080100@web.de> References: <4960A7E1.4080100@web.de> Message-ID: <49640984.1060008@gmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Hello Patrick, > A much more time later I saw, that my elgamal still has got an > expiration date and I can not find anything how I could change it. gpg -edit--key 7A5A6CC7 (press enter) key 1 (press enter -this will select the subkey to edit) expire (press enter -this will tell gpg you want to modify the expiration date) and then, select the new expiration time. 0 means it will never expire, (n)w means it will expire in n weeks... gpg will show you the available options. Once everything is ok, use the 'save' command to save the changes, and all you need to do after that, is to send your public key to your friends (or to upload it again to keyservers) in order to let them know your subkey is not going to expire. > Then I added a new elgamal, the 2048g/610BB46C one. > Is this right so? Can I edit the expire of the elgamal? What would Well, you can always add more subkeys... but *never* delete them, even if they expire or are revoked... if you delete an encrypting subkey, you will be unable to decrypt anything encrypted to that subkey... > happen *now* if the elgamal 2048g/D6395C9A has been expired? If that elgamal subkey expires, people (including you) will be unable to use it to encrypt messages. But since you already have another elgamal subkey with encryption capability, *I think* you would not notice anything strange (unless your friends don't have the updated public key containing the new subkey... if they don't have it, they won't be able to send you encrypted things). Anyway, old messages encrypted to the expired subkey can still be decrypted, as long as you don't delete the expired subkey. > Please CC my while I am not subscribed and thanks. :-) Done... but maybe you would like to subscribe... I think the list always carries interesting stuff. Now, I will paste an example about how to edit the expiration date of your subkey. Unfortunately, the language is Spanish, but I think that won't be a big problem, since it's very few text... My comments go behind '//' signs: //this is a comment, not a command Orden> gpg -edit--key 88EB95D7 //Orden = Command pub 1024D/0x88EB95D7 creado: 2009-01-07 caduca: nunca uso: SCA confianza: absoluta validez: absoluta sub 2048g/0xDEF0DD90 creado: 2009-01-07 caduca: nunca uso: E sub 2048g/0x53AD1366 creado: 2009-01-07 caduca: 2009-01-14 uso: E [ absoluta ] (1). Tester3 (for test purposes) //since the subkey I need to edit is the second one displayed, //I need to select the subkey number 2. I think you will need to select //your subkey number 1 Orden> key 2 //this will select it pub 1024D/0x88EB95D7 creado: 2009-01-07 caduca: nunca uso: SCA confianza: absoluta validez: absoluta sub 2048g/0xDEF0DD90 creado: 2009-01-07 caduca: nunca uso: E sub* 2048g/0x53AD1366 creado: 2009-01-07 caduca: 2009-01-14 uso: E [ absoluta ] (1). Tester3 (for test purposes) //please note the '*' sign near the selected subkey. If you select the //wrong one, repeat the command to deselect it, and then select the //right one Orden> expire Cambiando fecha de caducidad de subclave. Por favor, especifique el per?odo de validez de la clave. 0 = la clave nunca caduca = la clave caduca en n d?as w = la clave caduca en n semanas m = la clave caduca en n meses y = la clave caduca en n a?os ?Validez de la clave (0)? 0 //here I had to enter how much time I want to give it before //it expires. I entered 0 to set it to never expire La clave nunca caduca ?Es correcto? (s/n) s //gpg ask me if it is right to never expire it. I told it it was right Necesita una frase contrase?a para desbloquear la clave secreta del usuario: "Tester3 (for test purposes) " clave $s de $u bits, ID $s, creada el $s pub 1024D/0x88EB95D7 creado: 2009-01-07 caduca: nunca uso: SCA confianza: absoluta validez: absoluta sub 2048g/0xDEF0DD90 creado: 2009-01-07 caduca: nunca uso: E sub* 2048g/0x53AD1366 creado: 2009-01-07 caduca: nunca uso: E [ absoluta ] (1). Tester3 (for test purposes) //gpg request the passphrasse in order to be able to make the changes Orden> save //I gave the 'save' command to save the changes, and that's all Best Regards -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJJZAmEAAoJEMV4f6PvczxARVAH+gJZ/YK7Az2z82SRst2e241W xwgX7MCUe8I/DxIT81E8MC+C01Uqd9ZhVtH27AIcuxAhNEruGpLfirkP4VKYDf2c voYyMx3qwVGkAucMbc+NIZeZAKogsF3nCjmz2sUeRQldL6c12eUti3M9wkm8KMLC 4Atl7nA4tF866dHkFjWsj6VZeAV2P4S+pENfUYi3HohILuHb28P+f2uXXA/edVYX M//Hd/S5zstIPKLvjLbN2C0f5VWFqTf9KBpitmbOpZbGO8VV8oV9yBbVVhTsxcl7 5aRSkfTuLqzB37hygZxZABXIlkhvJ7vd4xQlbTAWdqQj+0iEsnuUBWOVqpP572w= =yaNK -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From laurent.jumet at skynet.be Wed Jan 7 09:21:58 2009 From: laurent.jumet at skynet.be (Laurent Jumet) Date: Wed, 07 Jan 2009 09:21:58 +0100 Subject: Expire of elgamal sub In-Reply-To: <49640984.1060008@gmail.com> Message-ID: Hello Faramir ! Faramir wrote: >> A much more time later I saw, that my elgamal still has got an >> expiration date and I can not find anything how I could change it. > gpg -edit--key 7A5A6CC7 (press enter) > key 1 (press enter -this will select the subkey to edit) > expire (press enter -this will tell gpg you want to modify the > expiration date) > and then, select the new expiration time. 0 means it will never expire, > (n)w means it will expire in n weeks... gpg will show you the > available > options. > Once everything is ok, use the 'save' command to save the changes, and > all you need to do after that, is to send your public key to your > friends (or to upload it again to keyservers) in order to let them know > your subkey is not going to expire. Special attention should be payd to V3 and V4 sigs, that implies keys expiration. -- Laurent Jumet KeyID: 0xCFAF704C From ml at mareichelt.de Thu Jan 8 14:13:59 2009 From: ml at mareichelt.de (markus reichelt) Date: Thu, 08 Jan 2009 14:13:59 +0100 Subject: FYI: Keysigning events at FOSDEM (Feb 8th) and Chemnitzer Linux-Tage (March 14th) Message-ID: <20090108131359.GD5981@tatooine.rebelbase.local> Hi, for those interested in keysigning there are two upcoming events: PGP/GPG/CA Keysigning events on Sunday Feb 8th at FOSDEM in Brussels The exact time is yet to be announced, more info (in English) at http://fosdem.org/2009/keysigning Deadline for key submission: Thursday Jan 29th, 8:00 PM CEST PGP/GPG Keysigning event on Saturday March 14th 18:00h at Chemnitz Linux Days in ... Chemnitz. More info (in German and English) is available at http://chemnitzer.linux-tage.de/2009/service/pgp_en.html Deadline for key submission: Monday March 9th Thanks to the people organizing the events. Hope to see you there... -- left blank, right bald -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 189 bytes Desc: not available URL: From faramir.cl at gmail.com Thu Jan 8 18:05:42 2009 From: faramir.cl at gmail.com (Faramir) Date: Thu, 08 Jan 2009 14:05:42 -0300 Subject: Expire of elgamal sub In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <49663266.4010909@gmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Hello! Laurent Jumet escribi?: ... >> gpg -edit--key 7A5A6CC7 (press enter) >> key 1 (press enter -this will select the subkey to edit) >> expire (press enter -this will tell gpg you want to modify the >> expiration date) ... > Special attention should be payd to V3 and V4 sigs, that implies keys expiration. I didn't fully understand that... What do we have to look for? Best Regards -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJJZjJmAAoJEMV4f6PvczxAeZUH/26UjNPkRhhEyqvgoyPUO0zs 02nnkAxacBvGgPx+fQHr7zdowtB5wsgCWp8OXMWYSCkQXuqIXUc5i8CwEWZhfIQI RWqWbhfLJVm0d1T2zj67GNZg3idWdyI9bZWUsdYE7y4aIci/UJp6VQoJpmCxo/Tm B9qd8juQ+M71LuPS6oo+KmXbWPZMt983KPpjIEMSMH2f5TJTp0cPOny6ORK96R/t SqyB+2pb6U/eVvyzpBIdNikCQ087xnCLVZ7y28KPVGNSTbl+m9KSPZMwxYTHls1y 8GxFfX+fzAnDDEQYUMql2IkxHX4Wl4+H1WN0TFbnj9iT1ejMwxy7VIdlGdog7Bs= =+fbQ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Thu Jan 8 18:38:21 2009 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Thu, 08 Jan 2009 12:38:21 -0500 Subject: Initial pass at a BNF Message-ID: <49663A0D.3030406@sixdemonbag.org> Pursuant to a discussion on gnupg-devel, I'm looking for exotic, esoteric, and just plain broken keys. I need keys with X.509 certificates, keys with public key data packets, keys with signature subpackets, and any key that you feel is an aberration against anything from your chosen deity to the laws of physics to the guidelines of just good sense. My goal here is to provide an accurate Backus-Naur Form (BNF, a programming tool) for people who need to parse GnuPG keyrings. The more crazy keys I get, the more confident all of us can be in the accuracy of the finished product. Please send them to me directly. Let's not spam the list. Thank you all very much for your help! From bnsmith001 at gmail.com Thu Jan 8 18:52:32 2009 From: bnsmith001 at gmail.com (Barry Smith) Date: Thu, 8 Jan 2009 12:52:32 -0500 Subject: Clarification -- Re: Initial pass at a BNF Message-ID: <123d590b0901080952w3d0f8d9fm9d7ee18cd2f29363@mail.gmail.com> Robert: I'm not intending to spam the list, just requesting a clarification. You are asking for keys. Do you need complete keypairs, or just the public key? If you are working on a complete BNF for encryption/decryption, won't you need multiple _full_ keypairs to -- work with, document, etc. I'm aware of a few people who users who use fairly complex keys Peace, Barry Smith From cpollock at embarqmail.com Fri Jan 9 00:37:02 2009 From: cpollock at embarqmail.com (Chris) Date: Thu, 8 Jan 2009 17:37:02 -0600 Subject: 5 - 2009-01-08 17:29:06 gpg-agent[31643.6] DBG: -> ERR 67108881 No secret key Message-ID: <200901081737.02380.cpollock@embarqmail.com> What would cause this to be displayed in the log? My secret key has been imported and I can sign messages. After signing a message this error disappears. Any idea what is causing this? -- Chris KeyID 0xE372A7DA98E6705C Mandriva Linux 2009, kernel 2.6.27-desktop-0.rc8.2mnb -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 197 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From Paul.Strenger at lfg.com Thu Jan 8 21:56:31 2009 From: Paul.Strenger at lfg.com (Strenger, Paul V.) Date: Thu, 8 Jan 2009 15:56:31 -0500 Subject: PGP on Window 2003 Message-ID: Hello, we are creating a new VM Windows 2003 server and are trying to mirror it like our old VM Windows 2000 VM server. We are currently running Active Perl 5.8 to use for our PGP Encryption processes and the encryption is not working properly on the new machine. We downloaded the version from the web. Is there something additional we need because it has a different OS? 2000 vs 2003. Thanks, Paul Notice of Confidentiality: **This E-mail and any of its attachments may contain Lincoln National Corporation proprietary information, which is privileged, confidential, or subject to copyright belonging to the Lincoln National Corporation family of companies. This E-mail is intended solely for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient of this E-mail, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution, copying, or action taken in relation to the contents of and attachments to this E-mail is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have received this E-mail in error, please notify the sender immediately and permanently delete the original and any copy of this E-mail and any printout. Thank You.** -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jacobbjerrum at gmail.com Fri Jan 9 08:25:14 2009 From: jacobbjerrum at gmail.com (jakse) Date: Thu, 8 Jan 2009 23:25:14 -0800 (PST) Subject: recover private key In-Reply-To: <4963FAFF.7030906@gmail.com> References: <21268023.post@talk.nabble.com> <4963FAFF.7030906@gmail.com> Message-ID: <21367391.post@talk.nabble.com> Does'nt look good ! i dont have secring.gpg but i doo have one called secring.asc does that help me? Thanks for the answers! Faramir-2 wrote: > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA256 > > jakse escribi?: >> dear forum. >> >> I am using GnuPG on my mac. had a problem and had to reinstall >> everything... lost all data. > > Unless you have a backup, you can't recover the private key. However, > there are chances you can recover deleted files (unfortunately, if you > reinstalled everything in the same hard drive where you had your > keyring, the chance is very small... and becomes smaller each time you > write something in the hard drive). Now, I am talking about recovering > files with the help of recovery software... I am not talking about > sending the hard drive to an specialized laboratory... > >> from old backup i have some info on my key. The trustdb was created and >> so >> on, and i have a fingerprint for my pub key, "uid" and "sub". however i >> dont >> know what this means?! > > Well, if there is an old backup... maybe you have some luck... Did you > recovered the trustdb? What files do you have in the backup? If you have > a file named secring.gpg then there is a big chance you can recover the > key... Tell us more about the files in your backup... look for files > with 'asc' extension... like mykey_key-pair.asc or something like that... > >> Is there any way i can recover my private key? > > Only if it was backed up, or the area in the hdd where the key was > stored has not been overwritten... unfortunately, I am not a mac user, > so I don't know about any recovery software for macs... > > Best Regards > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) > Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org > > iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJJY/r/AAoJEMV4f6PvczxAetoH/R8lxmS27hd1w8bSMnC26ap8 > uS3Xelwb/pptr91KMf+upnfFtU7JY8Ne1ujB1rk78ttVoc59G8TMRLBG4dsCPA5s > UmmTeapoJlOWO0fQur1MU2oADClGgpYvFbErc9s8nl+JLRY7La4sLiLoW7XNozGG > VFq8cLqG4kX5c6PIRnc3se8mR5vKQhzbbfmwtJanDn89QamrKnQs55dFbIiCAIjy > hC2XCXcb1AvIW6zxOLmzFJJQAprUMvJuJdI45QxWs8GXVyN92ZIIlZM2wFxV31v9 > pmTQP9UQA/4NFn/Kp2GWmWuAWP4ZP5SEI5SEiB4uVJQ8Qa84Fni60DEM0dqSabE= > =Ol5/ > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users > > -- View this message in context: http://www.nabble.com/recover-private-key-tp21268023p21367391.html Sent from the GnuPG - User mailing list archive at Nabble.com. From wk at gnupg.org Fri Jan 9 13:12:55 2009 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Fri, 09 Jan 2009 13:12:55 +0100 Subject: [Announce] Signing key updated Message-ID: <87zli0ada0.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> Hi! The key used to sign GnuPG releases expired at the end of last year. The original plan was to create a new key using a 2048 bit RSA capable smartcard. However those smartcards will become generally available only in a few months months and I need to crank out new releases earlier. Thus I decided to keep on using the existing key for another years. The OpenPGP protocol allows to change the expiration date of a key and that is what I did. Please update the copy of your key, either from a keyserver or using the one below. Shalom-Salam, Werner pub 1024R/1CE0C630 2006-01-01 [expires: 2009-12-31] Key fingerprint = 7B96 D396 E647 1601 754B E4DB 53B6 20D0 1CE0 C630 uid Werner Koch (dist sig) -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (GNU/Linux) mI4EQ7f6xwEEANCZGXorXMkDKpNsRnf+ZhqHOPmDcEKPDkplcCL2PFACN7QaK4Re oWvZ4mqmVOL3ZXU51zFNI9aD3JAIToET2jr2hGYWFExdBf9eaYgBeXZGUOnbJl1V JDzWDGU6ZHNpwPiAAgYjpsoBgZCxbl7x0VtYukjc9vIkR/1GXGC4v9ohACCBVlCZ tCZXZXJuZXIgS29jaCAoZGlzdCBzaWcpIDxkZDlqbkBnbnUub3JnPoi8BBMBAgAm BQJDt/rIAhsDBQkFo5qABgsJCAcDAgQVAggDBBYCAwECHgECF4AACgkQU7Yg0Bzg xjB5owQAh0MO0kuQ7hM6AKj8YK4bRGapHBmeIniaer9Y6vwXgErfDUci7BUQTxXo FFTgKHHzBz39bzeStyQgTm5plGaOEJcJayIr07DaeBtcC/dMoVUJswybKMFtP7fU z05PRKjChvxrWzhe/Yn6BAmPF+6YxQo2W98rzq0THS5wKJjXmHyIRgQQEQIABgUC Q7gRQwAKCRBd4kmWWwNYopHmAJ92KI2MZ2P3+YxquJThye5KZo9AiQCeP7Nb1/1n YzQrav6CV0QLYTDbJOWIvAQTAQIAJgIbAwYLCQgHAwIEFQIIAwQWAgMBAh4BAheA BQJJZzlfBQkHhTItAAoJEFO2INAc4MYw66QEAKUlnH7ceUG3/8j83/9BRON0L7Jf OFwPx9UkcgxfiUEpN5dDpu+0BkLzX/F2FBt7vqeRbwxUBJIznGHEZ+MSVMoH56gA nepcmDVOab554LApgi6IMLz0niz1ASrWqZOow7QF6Wgn5ZVuQ/BzlH6xPmywEtQ7 38ugOh5IaH3ts/M5 =pSi0 -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Other locations of my keys are: gpg --fetch-key finger:wk at g10code.com gpg --fetch-key http://werner.eifelkommune.de/mykey.asc -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Auschnahme regelt ein Bundeschgesetz. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 205 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- _______________________________________________ Gnupg-announce mailing list Gnupg-announce at gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-announce From wk at gnupg.org Fri Jan 9 13:16:06 2009 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Fri, 09 Jan 2009 13:16:06 +0100 Subject: [Announce] Libksba 1.0.5 released Message-ID: <87tz88ad4p.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> Hello! We are pleased to announce version 1.0.5 of Libksba. Libksba is an X.509 and CMS (PKCS#7) library. It is for example required to build the S/MIME part of GnuPG-2 (gpgsm). The only build requirement for Libksba itself is the libgpg-error package. There are no other dependencies; actual cryptographic operations need to be done by the user. Libksba is distributed under the GPLv3+. There are no user tools accompanying this software, thus it is mostly relevant to developers. This is a maintenance release. You may download the library and its OpenPGP signature from: ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libksba/libksba-1.0.5.tar.bz2 (555k) ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libksba/libksba-1.0.5.tar.bz2.sig As an alternative you may use a patch file to upgrade the previous version of the library: ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libksba/libksba-1.0.4-1.0.5.diff.bz2 (7k) or from any mirror of that server (http://www.gnupg.org/mirrors.html). SHA-1 checksums are: 2d5939d21f02142197158cd252b2725414a64b33 libksba-1.0.5.tar.bz2 46e4be795a04777be98e1f265773da845d6a28f8 libksba-1.0.4-1.0.5.diff.bz2 Noteworthy changes in version 1.0.5 (2009-01-09) ------------------------------------------------ * Minor bug fixes. Commercial support contracts for Libksba are available, and they help finance continued maintenance. g10 Code, a Duesseldorf based company owned and headed by Libksba's principal author, is currently funding its development. We are always looking for interesting development projects. See also http://www.gnupg.org/service.html . Happy hacking, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Auschnahme regelt ein Bundeschgesetz. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 205 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- _______________________________________________ Gnupg-announce mailing list Gnupg-announce at gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-announce From jmoore3rd at bellsouth.net Fri Jan 9 13:38:05 2009 From: jmoore3rd at bellsouth.net (John W. Moore III) Date: Fri, 09 Jan 2009 07:38:05 -0500 Subject: recover private key In-Reply-To: <21367391.post@talk.nabble.com> References: <21268023.post@talk.nabble.com> <4963FAFF.7030906@gmail.com> <21367391.post@talk.nabble.com> Message-ID: <4967452D.7010907@bellsouth.net> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 jakse wrote: > Does'nt look good ! i dont have secring.gpg but i doo have one called > secring.asc Try Importing secring.asc into GPG. JOHN ;) Timestamp: Friday 09 Jan 2009, 07:37 --500 (Eastern Standard Time) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.10-svn4907: (MingW32) Comment: Public Key at: http://tinyurl.com/8cpho Comment: Gossamer Spider Web of Trust: https://www.gswot.org Comment: Homepage: http://tinyurl.com/yzhbhx iQEcBAEBCgAGBQJJZ0UqAAoJEBCGy9eAtCsPkroH/imawsPDlrmytS+Mm+q7QJSh MT5/y3Jv9vGuUSyYnQ9goUKvrifB7XnRm6hz9cmhbgRPPOeRbQlb7+/QRiNgCW6I aLK6cjLtqC/BmhttWotYnUJYPyhHus5CXL2IAdVXIQj/7WqlDD9LbkmkieL4plO9 6eTV1DPGDISjO9Txdw+dtQxKlXpWma5qvskaFtGvotQ9ZEcQYr/lbDQCaj2lu1nj kofO5vwbr9zIHfxDT1SX/Izo8wGKKSfRGkM6svGz5hEs9Xccenym1DeMQTTCZBax CkGE1YhnrkZICBkJZQTgEjic2y2t8aJ4v/Y68aHOd659Q1w3ParTUwiJz/hQKjQ= =LAjr -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Fri Jan 9 13:50:05 2009 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Fri, 09 Jan 2009 07:50:05 -0500 Subject: PGP on Window 2003 In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <496747FD.3080007@sixdemonbag.org> Strenger, Paul V. wrote: > Hello, we are creating a new VM Windows 2003 server and are trying > to mirror it like our old VM Windows 2000 VM server. We are currently > running Active Perl 5.8 to use for our PGP Encryption processes and the > encryption is not working properly on the new machine. We downloaded the > version from the web. Is there something additional we need because it > has a different OS? We can't help you. This mailing list is for the GNU Privacy Guard (GPG), not Pretty Good Privacy (PGP). The two programs are interoperable, but they are not the same, and their setup is totally different. You may want to ask PGP Support. From wk at gnupg.org Fri Jan 9 14:02:52 2009 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Fri, 09 Jan 2009 14:02:52 +0100 Subject: 5 - 2009-01-08 17:29:06 gpg-agent[31643.6] DBG: -> ERR 67108881 No secret key In-Reply-To: <200901081737.02380.cpollock@embarqmail.com> (cpollock@embarqmail.com's message of "Thu, 8 Jan 2009 17:37:02 -0600") References: <200901081737.02380.cpollock@embarqmail.com> Message-ID: <87mye0aayr.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> On Fri, 9 Jan 2009 00:37, cpollock at embarqmail.com said: > What would cause this to be displayed in the log? My secret key has been > imported and I can sign messages. After signing a message this error > disappears. Any idea what is causing this? There is a gpg-agent command HAVEKEY which is used to check whether an X.509 key is available. The error message may come from there. Or if you try to decrypt or sign an CMS message without having information on the key used. Thus this all pertains to X.509/CMS and thus to gpgsm. It might be possible that you see this if you use --enable-ssh-support. OpenPGP (gpg2) should not use the agent in this way. To further check you should look back in the log for the actual command send to the agent. This will be a line with "gpg-agent[31643.6]" in it. The first number in brackets is the PID of the agent and the second one the file descriptor of the connection. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Auschnahme regelt ein Bundeschgesetz. From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Fri Jan 9 17:28:13 2009 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Fri, 09 Jan 2009 11:28:13 -0500 Subject: PGP on Window 2003 In-Reply-To: References: <496747FD.3080007@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <49677B1D.30101@sixdemonbag.org> Strenger, Paul V. wrote: > My mistake, it is GNU Privacy Guard (GPG) and not PGP. Let me know if > you can still assist. We need to know a lot more details. Let's start with: 1. What version of GnuPG are you using? 2. From where did you get it? 3. What errors are you getting? 4. Does it work from the command line? From faramir.cl at gmail.com Fri Jan 9 18:31:59 2009 From: faramir.cl at gmail.com (Faramir) Date: Fri, 09 Jan 2009 14:31:59 -0300 Subject: recover private key In-Reply-To: <21367391.post@talk.nabble.com> References: <21268023.post@talk.nabble.com> <4963FAFF.7030906@gmail.com> <21367391.post@talk.nabble.com> Message-ID: <49678A0F.6080509@gmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 jakse escribi?: > Does'nt look good ! i dont have secring.gpg but i doo have one called > secring.asc While I can't be sure about that, it looks VERY good... > does that help me? *I think* there is a good chance it is what you need. GnuPG uses the files secring.gpg and pubring.gpg to store the private and public keys. But the .ASC file extension is used to store files as "armored ascii" format, which can be opened as a text file, printed, etc. But the content of an .ASC file is still the same content it would have if it was stored as .GPG (I mean, the format doesn't remove the info). Maybe you exported your whole private keyring as an ascii armored file, and if that is what you did, you just need to import it back. Please note I don't know how to export the multiple private keys into a single .asc file, but if you just had 1 private key, probably it is backed up inside that file. I think the command you need is: gpg --import secring.asc Let us know if you can recover your key. Best Regards -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJJZ4oPAAoJEMV4f6PvczxA4pYH/REkqS0qpLPRAxOWW0wb3kL6 EG5Xam2lxOCn0ZwndNNEqYSJOkc9JfzUD36VFwgBKXQWsfyt3JnLvhHQ72uYz6jt +nhCy7pqeP2AzXws7ZWT1S/pkP78/u8HjQTJzWte2Ouh8f/tIc3kWjFHCCMcLvqJ Rt61At/ypbMz70qN9zQmJhHp4hFTNsaZOYLTdwA6GRI565D7k175BCLIRqjCHRMz Pe/lYnURKhzZ8jbB77EvI+Gmody8L/3gKChImHq5Hv+YirroJ2N3rDDVw26fepsX ownwV8oIunuvjWCidHD3k1XNrxVhAom7qZ3zpizr2nV+c6l7hg2svHDiZrjW06w= =09kB -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Fri Jan 9 19:34:59 2009 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Fri, 09 Jan 2009 13:34:59 -0500 Subject: PGP on Window 2003 In-Reply-To: References: <496747FD.3080007@sixdemonbag.org> <49677B1D.30101@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <496798D3.3010204@sixdemonbag.org> Strenger, Paul V. wrote: > 1. What version of GnuPG are you using? > gnupg-w32cli-1.2.3 This version is very old and has some known security problems. Upgrading to 1.4.9 is definitely recommended. ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/binary/gnupg-w32cli-1.4.9.exe The error message you've attached indicates the problem is with your Perl installation, not your GnuPG installation. Particularly, the module Mail::Sender does not appear to be installed. From John at Mozilla-Enigmail.org Fri Jan 9 20:21:48 2009 From: John at Mozilla-Enigmail.org (John Clizbe) Date: Fri, 09 Jan 2009 13:21:48 -0600 Subject: PGP on Window 2003 In-Reply-To: <496798D3.3010204@sixdemonbag.org> References: <496747FD.3080007@sixdemonbag.org> <49677B1D.30101@sixdemonbag.org> <496798D3.3010204@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <4967A3CC.4070205@Mozilla-Enigmail.org> Robert J. Hansen wrote: > Strenger, Paul V. wrote: >> 1. What version of GnuPG are you using? >> gnupg-w32cli-1.2.3 > > This version is very old and has some known security problems. > Upgrading to 1.4.9 is definitely recommended. > > ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/binary/gnupg-w32cli-1.4.9.exe > > The error message you've attached indicates the problem is with your > Perl installation, not your GnuPG installation. Particularly, the > module Mail::Sender does not appear to be installed. This thread is like trying to figure out a phone conversation by hearing only one party. Pleaser take it completely private or Paul add the list to your replies. -- John P. Clizbe Inet:John (a) Mozilla-Enigmail.org You can't spell fiasco without SCO. hkp://keyserver.gingerbear.net or mailto:pgp-public-keys at gingerbear.net?subject=HELP Q:"Just how do the residents of Haiku, Hawai'i hold conversations?" A:"An odd melody / island voices on the winds / surplus of vowels" -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 680 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From faramir.cl at gmail.com Fri Jan 9 21:05:50 2009 From: faramir.cl at gmail.com (Faramir) Date: Fri, 09 Jan 2009 17:05:50 -0300 Subject: Paperkey on windows Message-ID: <4967AE1E.1050505@gmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Hello! I while ago, there was some talk about Paperkey, and John Clizbe was very kind and sent me the binary file compiled for ms-windows. Today, in other list, I saw a question about "what about windows users?" and paperkey, so, I wanted to ask both David Shaw and John Clizbe, if is it OK if I send a copy of the compiled windows binary file to other users... If I understood the license the right way, I can send it, as long as I include the source code... but while I trust John didn't modified the code before sending the compiled file to me, I am not sure if I saying "I trust the binary file is true to the tarball, but just because I trust the guy that compiled it, I don't have any real proof of that" would be enough. Best Regards -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJJZ64eAAoJEMV4f6PvczxAL+UH/A6XmCR8EIo4BkksapJA0deN XX1eX9YjVyax6sWQvq/8jFWQidUy56KmC2CpzeFzVUqJV4j9l1QylSLTczuz5pMt Ag0sZeJvV+McNZTeXbk9PpWHqccKmMhEj7wVSs/Szq/D1vcs0coLGiUrzutWDj9U vf4u1/QbV4A7MNB2DtYoVuqZqqxA0mgUmZUoaHD7lvrYkoozwVLT5osknJ289dAV gUWf7Uesg+t+LCWHeQ6IYttp2Qd2iPwAkAoZz9HCbFk/6GGRb9Sgw8EIzGhCo8D3 QL6oehLfj6h4Par5E+D+cc7RW+SWdBBvuW2+0LGHjQjAqJmMl5cO011DoD9F1Ck= =XxYz -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From lopaki at gmail.com Fri Jan 9 21:33:05 2009 From: lopaki at gmail.com (Scott Lambdin) Date: Fri, 9 Jan 2009 15:33:05 -0500 Subject: encryption bloats file Message-ID: <529e76830901091233s6f4a8a15v18823a1319764007@mail.gmail.com> Hello - Someone sends us a big ~700MB pgp encrypted file and when we decrypt it the resulting file is about half that size. Anyone have an idea what they might be doing to swell it up like that? -- There's a box? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From faramir.cl at gmail.com Fri Jan 9 23:15:33 2009 From: faramir.cl at gmail.com (Faramir) Date: Fri, 09 Jan 2009 19:15:33 -0300 Subject: encryption bloats file In-Reply-To: <529e76830901091233s6f4a8a15v18823a1319764007@mail.gmail.com> References: <529e76830901091233s6f4a8a15v18823a1319764007@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <4967CC85.30809@gmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Hello! Scott Lambdin escribi?: ... > Someone sends us a big ~700MB pgp encrypted file and when we decrypt it > the resulting file is about half that size. Anyone have an idea what > they might be doing to swell it up like that? That sounds weird... GPG is supposed to compress the files before encrypting them, IIRC... Best Regards -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJJZ8yFAAoJEMV4f6PvczxAA30H/3d26oUhHP0ecGOcEaZI/7I9 Urq373GhpHlxvlf9Tj+Akc/qex8l7uMJ6bGap2dX6rXah5oFV681ceJZIf9LYt3Y +Ej/uEGuipq+25cWc4484SfQu6J6k29dhnwVv4E3Zr2+9Wm4d9eVYnpH70lKmbNc xOZ+fEKT8vlu9oM6e9viZEbpmkxgzNKJDC+/mLdxeDC7AAl9PM8x8Md+G07WGutO BO4CAg9Wx3xCPIRXwL9tftpl5wqtZmpJvsCxAKeG7QCjrd8yU2LoRr9IxJGV45gb 0vZo/QXHfIrRb3HedZKVW+6Xp+MJxr6TIfVr+UVbyLwQmUurKF4Rw2HuNRZuZbg= =oKi3 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From m.mansfeld at mansfeld-elektronik.de Fri Jan 9 23:22:37 2009 From: m.mansfeld at mansfeld-elektronik.de (Matthias Mansfeld) Date: Fri, 09 Jan 2009 23:22:37 +0100 Subject: encryption bloats file In-Reply-To: <4967CC85.30809@gmail.com> References: <529e76830901091233s6f4a8a15v18823a1319764007@mail.gmail.com>, <4967CC85.30809@gmail.com> Message-ID: <4967DC3D.12985.1C972EA1@m.mansfeld.mansfeld-elektronik.de> On 9 Jan 2009 at 19:15, Faramir wrote: > Hello! > > Scott Lambdin escribi?: > ... > > Someone sends us a big ~700MB pgp encrypted file and when we decrypt > > it the resulting file is about half that size. Anyone have an idea > > what they might be doing to swell it up like that? > > That sounds weird... GPG is supposed to compress the files before > encrypting them, IIRC... What type is the file? If it is just an already perfectly compressed *.zip, *.jpg, *.pdf or similar, then I would guess GPG can not squeeze it further. The encryption itself adds data, thus the result may be bigger than the original. -- Matthias Mansfeld Elektronik * Leiterplattenlayout Neithardtstr. 3, 85540 Haar; Tel.: 089/4620 093-7, Fax: -8 Internet: http://www.mansfeld-elektronik.de GPG http://www.mansfeld-elektronik.de/gnupgkey/mansfeld.asc From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Fri Jan 9 23:45:37 2009 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Fri, 9 Jan 2009 17:45:37 -0500 Subject: encryption bloats file In-Reply-To: <529e76830901091233s6f4a8a15v18823a1319764007@mail.gmail.com> References: <529e76830901091233s6f4a8a15v18823a1319764007@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <20090109224537.GA3612@jabberwocky.com> On Fri, Jan 09, 2009 at 03:33:05PM -0500, Scott Lambdin wrote: > Hello - > > Someone sends us a big ~700MB pgp encrypted file and when we decrypt it the > resulting file is about half that size. Anyone have an idea what they might > be doing to swell it up like that? Most OpenPGP programs compress files before they are encrypted. Some files (for example, already compressed files) are poison to compression and actually get bigger. Doubling in size, however, is not likely. In any event, you don't say that program generated this file, but at least GPG detects common forms of already-compressed data and will not attempt to compress it further. If you can send me such an encrypted file (my key is 99242560) I will look at it and see what is going on. David From lopaki at gmail.com Fri Jan 9 23:44:00 2009 From: lopaki at gmail.com (Scott Lambdin) Date: Fri, 9 Jan 2009 17:44:00 -0500 Subject: encryption bloats file In-Reply-To: <529e76830901091436m171329abra9540e6d2d887b5b@mail.gmail.com> References: <529e76830901091233s6f4a8a15v18823a1319764007@mail.gmail.com> <4967CC85.30809@gmail.com> <529e76830901091436m171329abra9540e6d2d887b5b@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <529e76830901091444q2e7ed9a0t2ec2af55ccd3b800@mail.gmail.com> --armor option swells it up some but doesn't double it. gpg -r B00BFACE --armor -e -z 0 vshell2.txt 43261322 Mar 6 2008 vshell2.txt 58583901 Jan 9 14:40 vshell2.txt.asc On Fri, Jan 9, 2009 at 5:36 PM, Scott Lambdin wrote: > Yes, even with compression disabled, my test files were about the same size > encrypted or not. > > Oh! armored? will test. > > On Fri, Jan 9, 2009 at 5:15 PM, Faramir wrote: > >> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >> Hash: SHA256 >> >> Hello! >> >> Scott Lambdin escribi?: >> ... >> > Someone sends us a big ~700MB pgp encrypted file and when we decrypt it >> > the resulting file is about half that size. Anyone have an idea what >> > they might be doing to swell it up like that? >> >> That sounds weird... GPG is supposed to compress the files before >> encrypting them, IIRC... >> >> Best Regards >> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- >> Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) >> Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org >> >> iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJJZ8yFAAoJEMV4f6PvczxAA30H/3d26oUhHP0ecGOcEaZI/7I9 >> Urq373GhpHlxvlf9Tj+Akc/qex8l7uMJ6bGap2dX6rXah5oFV681ceJZIf9LYt3Y >> +Ej/uEGuipq+25cWc4484SfQu6J6k29dhnwVv4E3Zr2+9Wm4d9eVYnpH70lKmbNc >> xOZ+fEKT8vlu9oM6e9viZEbpmkxgzNKJDC+/mLdxeDC7AAl9PM8x8Md+G07WGutO >> BO4CAg9Wx3xCPIRXwL9tftpl5wqtZmpJvsCxAKeG7QCjrd8yU2LoRr9IxJGV45gb >> 0vZo/QXHfIrRb3HedZKVW+6Xp+MJxr6TIfVr+UVbyLwQmUurKF4Rw2HuNRZuZbg= >> =oKi3 >> -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Gnupg-users mailing list >> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org >> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users >> > > > > -- > There's a box? > -- There's a box? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From lopaki at gmail.com Fri Jan 9 23:53:22 2009 From: lopaki at gmail.com (Scott Lambdin) Date: Fri, 9 Jan 2009 17:53:22 -0500 Subject: encryption bloats file In-Reply-To: <20090109224537.GA3612@jabberwocky.com> References: <529e76830901091233s6f4a8a15v18823a1319764007@mail.gmail.com> <20090109224537.GA3612@jabberwocky.com> Message-ID: <529e76830901091453w55059705r3c9d02a2ca47a9e5@mail.gmail.com> Thanks for the offer but I would be put in Guantanamo bay if I did that. ^_^ On Fri, Jan 9, 2009 at 5:45 PM, David Shaw wrote: > On Fri, Jan 09, 2009 at 03:33:05PM -0500, Scott Lambdin wrote: > > Hello - > > > > Someone sends us a big ~700MB pgp encrypted file and when we decrypt it > the > > resulting file is about half that size. Anyone have an idea what they > might > > be doing to swell it up like that? > > Most OpenPGP programs compress files before they are encrypted. Some > files (for example, already compressed files) are poison to > compression and actually get bigger. Doubling in size, however, is > not likely. In any event, you don't say that program generated this > file, but at least GPG detects common forms of already-compressed data > and will not attempt to compress it further. > > If you can send me such an encrypted file (my key is 99242560) I will > look at it and see what is going on. > > David > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users > -- There's a box? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From lopaki at gmail.com Fri Jan 9 23:36:25 2009 From: lopaki at gmail.com (Scott Lambdin) Date: Fri, 9 Jan 2009 17:36:25 -0500 Subject: encryption bloats file In-Reply-To: <4967CC85.30809@gmail.com> References: <529e76830901091233s6f4a8a15v18823a1319764007@mail.gmail.com> <4967CC85.30809@gmail.com> Message-ID: <529e76830901091436m171329abra9540e6d2d887b5b@mail.gmail.com> Yes, even with compression disabled, my test files were about the same size encrypted or not. Oh! armored? will test. On Fri, Jan 9, 2009 at 5:15 PM, Faramir wrote: > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA256 > > Hello! > > Scott Lambdin escribi?: > ... > > Someone sends us a big ~700MB pgp encrypted file and when we decrypt it > > the resulting file is about half that size. Anyone have an idea what > > they might be doing to swell it up like that? > > That sounds weird... GPG is supposed to compress the files before > encrypting them, IIRC... > > Best Regards > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) > Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org > > iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJJZ8yFAAoJEMV4f6PvczxAA30H/3d26oUhHP0ecGOcEaZI/7I9 > Urq373GhpHlxvlf9Tj+Akc/qex8l7uMJ6bGap2dX6rXah5oFV681ceJZIf9LYt3Y > +Ej/uEGuipq+25cWc4484SfQu6J6k29dhnwVv4E3Zr2+9Wm4d9eVYnpH70lKmbNc > xOZ+fEKT8vlu9oM6e9viZEbpmkxgzNKJDC+/mLdxeDC7AAl9PM8x8Md+G07WGutO > BO4CAg9Wx3xCPIRXwL9tftpl5wqtZmpJvsCxAKeG7QCjrd8yU2LoRr9IxJGV45gb > 0vZo/QXHfIrRb3HedZKVW+6Xp+MJxr6TIfVr+UVbyLwQmUurKF4Rw2HuNRZuZbg= > =oKi3 > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users > -- There's a box? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Sat Jan 10 00:59:26 2009 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Fri, 09 Jan 2009 18:59:26 -0500 Subject: PGP on Window 2003 In-Reply-To: <4967A3CC.4070205@Mozilla-Enigmail.org> References: <496747FD.3080007@sixdemonbag.org> <49677B1D.30101@sixdemonbag.org> <496798D3.3010204@sixdemonbag.org> <4967A3CC.4070205@Mozilla-Enigmail.org> Message-ID: <4967E4DE.3030601@sixdemonbag.org> John Clizbe wrote: > Pleaser take it completely private or Paul add the list to your replies. Bizarre; his emails to me are showing up as being cc'd to the list. Perhaps he's not a subscriber, and thus his emails to the list are being held pending moderation? If this is the case, Paul, it will do the list a favor if you subscribe to the list. From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Sat Jan 10 01:02:28 2009 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Fri, 09 Jan 2009 19:02:28 -0500 Subject: Paperkey on windows In-Reply-To: <4967AE1E.1050505@gmail.com> References: <4967AE1E.1050505@gmail.com> Message-ID: <4967E594.5050704@sixdemonbag.org> Faramir wrote: > If I understood the license the right way, I can send it, as long as > I include the source code... Not quite. The GPL doesn't require you to give source with the binary. It just requires that if you give someone a binary, you make sure they know they can also get the source from you. > but while I trust John didn't modified the code before sending the > compiled file to me, I am not sure if I saying "I trust the binary > file is true to the tarball, but just because I trust the guy that > compiled it, I don't have any real proof of that" would be enough. Trust is a dodgy thing. My best advice is to say exactly what you've said here: "I trust the guy who compiled it, but I don't have any proof that he didn't do evil things to it." From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Sat Jan 10 01:07:02 2009 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Fri, 09 Jan 2009 19:07:02 -0500 Subject: encryption bloats file In-Reply-To: <529e76830901091233s6f4a8a15v18823a1319764007@mail.gmail.com> References: <529e76830901091233s6f4a8a15v18823a1319764007@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <4967E6A6.7040706@sixdemonbag.org> Scott Lambdin wrote: > Someone sends us a big ~700MB pgp encrypted file and when we decrypt it > the resulting file is about half that size. Anyone have an idea what > they might be doing to swell it up like that? Option 1: they're not using compression and they're ASCII-armoring the file. You can expect to see a large size swell. Option 2: they're sending a file that's carefully crafted to blow up. I've seen a ridiculously tiny zip archive (a couple of K) that expands into hundreds of terabytes. There are sixteen zip archives in that zip archive, each zip archive expands into another sixteen zip archives, each of those zip archives expands into several gigs of zeros, etc., etc. From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Sat Jan 10 01:50:09 2009 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Fri, 9 Jan 2009 19:50:09 -0500 Subject: encryption bloats file In-Reply-To: <4967E6A6.7040706@sixdemonbag.org> References: <529e76830901091233s6f4a8a15v18823a1319764007@mail.gmail.com> <4967E6A6.7040706@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <4FC5572B-639D-48DC-88DA-55146AA0D12D@jabberwocky.com> On Jan 9, 2009, at 7:07 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > Scott Lambdin wrote: >> Someone sends us a big ~700MB pgp encrypted file and when we >> decrypt it >> the resulting file is about half that size. Anyone have an idea what >> they might be doing to swell it up like that? > > Option 1: they're not using compression and they're ASCII-armoring the > file. You can expect to see a large size swell. Not double. By definition ASCII armor is around 1/3 larger (actually 137%) than the original document (not counting headers and such, but they only amount to a few hundred bytes, not megs). > Option 2: they're sending a file that's carefully crafted to blow up. > I've seen a ridiculously tiny zip archive (a couple of K) that expands > into hundreds of terabytes. There are sixteen zip archives in that > zip > archive, each zip archive expands into another sixteen zip archives, > each of those zip archives expands into several gigs of zeros, etc., > etc. Other way around - the original file was ~700MB. The decrypted file was ~350MB. Incidentally, GPG has code to deal with the potential denial of service from a "bzip bomb" like you mention. See the --max-output option. Scott, do you know what OpenPGP program created the file that was sent to you? Can you tell us what sort of data it it? (text? binary? image file? (if so, jpeg? mpeg? other?) Also please try decrypting the file again and add "-v -v" to the command line. Please send us anything you can that isn't sensitive (specifically the compressed packet algo number, and the raw data size and mode from the literal data packet). David From faramir.cl at gmail.com Sat Jan 10 01:55:46 2009 From: faramir.cl at gmail.com (Faramir) Date: Fri, 09 Jan 2009 21:55:46 -0300 Subject: encryption bloats file In-Reply-To: <529e76830901091453w55059705r3c9d02a2ca47a9e5@mail.gmail.com> References: <529e76830901091233s6f4a8a15v18823a1319764007@mail.gmail.com> <20090109224537.GA3612@jabberwocky.com> <529e76830901091453w55059705r3c9d02a2ca47a9e5@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <4967F212.8030101@gmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Scott Lambdin escribi?: > Thanks for the offer but I would be put in Guantanamo bay if I did > that. ^_^ LOL... well, maybe you could ask the sender to send some harmless file to you, in order to check if the problem happens again... Best Regards -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJJZ/ISAAoJEMV4f6PvczxAdD8H/igGsAHpAIfZpF+7jMaOZvFX wSP/IM8LTQ0UXNhU1FYNksOmReLrkVnvDpjzMW06SUx1occ3KitFytiyuHiA9+Cg AWWRjDya4k9W3F4IVsL9bs/C5Nj2wwmgSoNhbcMTXztZJrpNzi0uksFHNOzuxiIH B9gc7c+SBKzo6GQClqVbmLOSTT0ZXitlmP6dZdPWgRsCIffXaa31FRBp2Fz3bNpP 4vjdbCTnPH2UImq8q3zVvdzmcEShLiwUFA0cQE75YeOXEjbAQGRpt9IPaM+YE+is M30U8XpdB4aRiGMOPTQt0tx8hcA1kS8kDyYWLATr8ullmNrX+jU4bkBEGBItHGw= =Nbp7 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From lopaki at gmail.com Sat Jan 10 02:04:50 2009 From: lopaki at gmail.com (Scott Lambdin) Date: Fri, 9 Jan 2009 20:04:50 -0500 Subject: encryption bloats file In-Reply-To: <4FC5572B-639D-48DC-88DA-55146AA0D12D@jabberwocky.com> References: <529e76830901091233s6f4a8a15v18823a1319764007@mail.gmail.com> <4967E6A6.7040706@sixdemonbag.org> <4FC5572B-639D-48DC-88DA-55146AA0D12D@jabberwocky.com> Message-ID: <529e76830901091704l1925e768kb66321ec8ebb081a@mail.gmail.com> It looks like all digits and capital letters. And some kind of spaces or tabs. It's not a bomb. These file come in routinely. All the ones I have looked at (ftp'd size vs the unencrypted file sitting in archive) are right about 2-to-1. To get a still encrypted file, I would have to file a request to modify a script and at least 3 groups would have to approve the request. And I would have to wait at least 1 week before I actually made the change. I remember freedom. . . . . Thanks. On Fri, Jan 9, 2009 at 7:50 PM, David Shaw wrote: > On Jan 9, 2009, at 7:07 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > > Scott Lambdin wrote: >> >>> Someone sends us a big ~700MB pgp encrypted file and when we decrypt it >>> the resulting file is about half that size. Anyone have an idea what >>> they might be doing to swell it up like that? >>> >> >> Option 1: they're not using compression and they're ASCII-armoring the >> file. You can expect to see a large size swell. >> > > Not double. By definition ASCII armor is around 1/3 larger (actually 137%) > than the original document (not counting headers and such, but they only > amount to a few hundred bytes, not megs). > > Option 2: they're sending a file that's carefully crafted to blow up. >> I've seen a ridiculously tiny zip archive (a couple of K) that expands >> into hundreds of terabytes. There are sixteen zip archives in that zip >> archive, each zip archive expands into another sixteen zip archives, >> each of those zip archives expands into several gigs of zeros, etc., etc. >> > > Other way around - the original file was ~700MB. The decrypted file was > ~350MB. > > Incidentally, GPG has code to deal with the potential denial of service > from a "bzip bomb" like you mention. See the --max-output option. > > Scott, do you know what OpenPGP program created the file that was sent to > you? Can you tell us what sort of data it it? (text? binary? image file? > (if so, jpeg? mpeg? other?) Also please try decrypting the file again and > add "-v -v" to the command line. Please send us anything you can that isn't > sensitive (specifically the compressed packet algo number, and the raw data > size and mode from the literal data packet). > > David > -- There's a box? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Sat Jan 10 02:15:29 2009 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Fri, 9 Jan 2009 20:15:29 -0500 Subject: Paperkey on windows In-Reply-To: <4967AE1E.1050505@gmail.com> References: <4967AE1E.1050505@gmail.com> Message-ID: <20090110011529.GA4447@jabberwocky.com> On Fri, Jan 09, 2009 at 05:05:50PM -0300, Faramir wrote: > Hello! > I while ago, there was some talk about Paperkey, and John Clizbe > was very kind and sent me the binary file compiled for ms-windows. > Today, in other list, I saw a question about "what about windows users?" > and paperkey, so, I wanted to ask both David Shaw and John Clizbe, if is > it OK if I send a copy of the compiled windows binary file to other > users... If I understood the license the right way, I can send it, as > long as I include the source code... but while I trust John didn't > modified the code before sending the compiled file to me, I am not sure > if I saying "I trust the binary file is true to the tarball, but just > because I trust the guy that compiled it, I don't have any real proof of > that" would be enough. It is absolutely ok and encouraged to send paperkey to whoever wants it. There are various ways to comply with the license (the GPL), but one easy way is to do what you suggest and send a copy of the source along with the binary. In terms of trusting - well, that's up to you. Windows users tend to have to trust the people who compile things for them. For what it's worth, I can probably release a Windows binary with the next release of paperkey, which means it'll be signed by the same key that signs the source tarball. John, did you have to do anything special to get it to build (is this mingw or something else?) David From cpollock at embarqmail.com Sat Jan 10 02:16:39 2009 From: cpollock at embarqmail.com (Chris) Date: Fri, 9 Jan 2009 19:16:39 -0600 Subject: 5 - 2009-01-08 17:29:06 gpg-agent[31643.6] DBG: -> ERR 67108881 No secret key In-Reply-To: <87mye0aayr.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> References: <200901081737.02380.cpollock@embarqmail.com> <87mye0aayr.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> Message-ID: <200901091916.48348.cpollock@embarqmail.com> On Friday 09 January 2009 07:02:52 Werner Koch wrote: > On Fri, 9 Jan 2009 00:37, cpollock at embarqmail.com said: > > What would cause this to be displayed in the log? My secret key has been > > imported and I can sign messages. After signing a message this error > > disappears. Any idea what is causing this? > > There is a gpg-agent command HAVEKEY which is used to check whether an > X.509 key is available. The error message may come from there. > > Or if you try to decrypt or sign an CMS message without having > information on the key used. > > Thus this all pertains to X.509/CMS and thus to gpgsm. It might be > possible that you see this if you use --enable-ssh-support. OpenPGP > (gpg2) should not use the agent in this way. To further check you should > look back in the log for the actual command send to the agent. This > will be a line with "gpg-agent[31643.6]" in it. The first number in > brackets is the PID of the agent and the second one the file descriptor > of the connection. > > > Salam-Shalom, > > Werner Thank you for the reply Werner, the error seems to have gone away now and it seems to be working correctly. I did notice one error I'd made and that was a failure to import my secret key when setting this new version up though secring.gpg was in my .gnupg folder. Thanks -- Chris KeyID 0xE372A7DA98E6705C -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 197 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Sat Jan 10 02:27:30 2009 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Fri, 09 Jan 2009 20:27:30 -0500 Subject: encryption bloats file In-Reply-To: <4FC5572B-639D-48DC-88DA-55146AA0D12D@jabberwocky.com> References: <529e76830901091233s6f4a8a15v18823a1319764007@mail.gmail.com> <4967E6A6.7040706@sixdemonbag.org> <4FC5572B-639D-48DC-88DA-55146AA0D12D@jabberwocky.com> Message-ID: <4967F982.3000105@sixdemonbag.org> David Shaw wrote: > Not double. By definition ASCII armor is around 1/3 larger (actually > 137%) than the original document (not counting headers and such, but > they only amount to a few hundred bytes, not megs). I was assuming that "about double" was a term of art, and it was perhaps possible that it was being stretched to mean a much smaller increase. > Other way around - the original file was ~700MB. The decrypted file was > ~350MB. D'oh! Right. Sorry. From allen.schultz at gmail.com Sat Jan 10 02:19:22 2009 From: allen.schultz at gmail.com (Allen Schultz) Date: Fri, 9 Jan 2009 18:19:22 -0700 Subject: Paperkey on windows In-Reply-To: <20090110011529.GA4447@jabberwocky.com> References: <4967AE1E.1050505@gmail.com> <20090110011529.GA4447@jabberwocky.com> Message-ID: <3f34f8420901091719g30cad561had44cc370e58ff82@mail.gmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 If it is that questionable for anyone, you can always refer them back to the homepage to get the original source. http://www.jabberwocky.com/software/paperkey/ Allen -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) Comment: http://getfiregpg.org iEYEARECAAYFAkln97UACgkQBii+WJwtK7YAcACeOxeHAWZmoA/o63C2ywi6QgP1 6zgAnj9tcjcSPkgDVThvfpY9IgtP9IEm =yuHe -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From faramir.cl at gmail.com Sat Jan 10 02:58:46 2009 From: faramir.cl at gmail.com (Faramir) Date: Fri, 09 Jan 2009 22:58:46 -0300 Subject: encryption bloats file In-Reply-To: <529e76830901091704l1925e768kb66321ec8ebb081a@mail.gmail.com> References: <529e76830901091233s6f4a8a15v18823a1319764007@mail.gmail.com> <4967E6A6.7040706@sixdemonbag.org> <4FC5572B-639D-48DC-88DA-55146AA0D12D@jabberwocky.com> <529e76830901091704l1925e768kb66321ec8ebb081a@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <496800D6.2080101@gmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Scott Lambdin escribi?: ... > To get a still encrypted file, I would have to file a request to modify > a script and at least 3 groups would have to approve the request. And I > would have to wait at least 1 week before I actually made the change. I > remember freedom. . . . . In that case... maybe you can ask the sender what was the size of the file? Or maybe the sender can check the details... provided that is not considered sensitive info (I mean, I'm sure David doesn't want you to "ask too much"). Best Regards -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJJaADWAAoJEMV4f6PvczxA71AH/0wW9YwTa30VebqsQWcu6Flv oYwWqOJVj7WHyDnrFMOgapn+8lytuy3PlKo7LxClQvsOwaqePwR5oGBY594LhbwY aabqdAQOivNqArO/G5XVz+u5SyQthIN++hp6dv54glNIeLcU+w9HgJKMZaUFMrV1 cQ4MLhzmpzZnaX6RU2MvWgTv92JvzxbNxf5ITpLFVF9c/vF06RLxe0mDJMZbILzz /D78JbPjsf7O3ecwKlsVOnCWXu8pBwlOmyjUp37/dIGBj98iTgmxpvi4UdGnehN0 ieYxJ+Jdb4tOzcN2Wc3mWHmpdg6BPb+AxOVk/52CruLPnI/donx+5fdBMMdHIAU= =9CWb -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From eocsor at gmail.com Sat Jan 10 04:02:08 2009 From: eocsor at gmail.com (Roscoe) Date: Sat, 10 Jan 2009 11:02:08 +0800 Subject: encryption bloats file In-Reply-To: <529e76830901091233s6f4a8a15v18823a1319764007@mail.gmail.com> References: <529e76830901091233s6f4a8a15v18823a1319764007@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: Dunno how likely it is, but maybe someone made an attempt at hiding the size of the file in transit via appending arbitrary data. 2009/1/10 Scott Lambdin : > Hello - > > Someone sends us a big ~700MB pgp encrypted file and when we decrypt it the > resulting file is about half that size. Anyone have an idea what they might > be doing to swell it up like that? > > -- > There's a box? > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users > > From lopaki at gmail.com Sat Jan 10 04:33:52 2009 From: lopaki at gmail.com (Scott Lambdin) Date: Fri, 9 Jan 2009 22:33:52 -0500 Subject: encryption bloats file In-Reply-To: References: <529e76830901091233s6f4a8a15v18823a1319764007@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <529e76830901091933m409b7dcdj508412264f7524a5@mail.gmail.com> I found a file in rejects, but it may be partial. It gives us some information, though. The pgp file was 406184088 bytes and unencrypted is 175246253 bytes. gpg -v -v -o a_file.out -d a_file.pgp gpg: armor: BEGIN PGP MESSAGE gpg: armor header: Version: McAfee E-Business Server v7.5 - Full License :pubkey enc packet: version 3, algo 1, keyid 123456789012345 data: [2047 bits] gpg: public key is ABCD1234 You need a passphrase to unlock the secret key for user: "Janeane Garofalo " 2048-bit RSA key, ID ABCD4321 gpg: public key encrypted data: good DEK :encrypted data packet: length: 42097820 gpg: encrypted with 2048-bit RSA key, ID ABCD4321 gpg: IDEA encrypted data :compressed packet: algo=1 :literal data packet: mode t (74), created 1509949440, name="file-100-1", raw data: 227869810 bytes gpg: original file name="file100" gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found. gpg: fatal: zlib inflate problem: invalid block type secmem usage: 2208/4704 bytes in 5/15 blocks of pool 4960/32768 On Fri, Jan 9, 2009 at 10:02 PM, Roscoe wrote: > Dunno how likely it is, but maybe someone made an attempt at hiding > the size of the file in transit via appending arbitrary data. > > 2009/1/10 Scott Lambdin : > > Hello - > > > > Someone sends us a big ~700MB pgp encrypted file and when we decrypt it > the > > resulting file is about half that size. Anyone have an idea what they > might > > be doing to swell it up like that? > > > > -- > > There's a box? > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Gnupg-users mailing list > > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users > > > > > -- There's a box? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From lopaki at gmail.com Sat Jan 10 04:41:16 2009 From: lopaki at gmail.com (Scott Lambdin) Date: Fri, 9 Jan 2009 22:41:16 -0500 Subject: encryption bloats file In-Reply-To: <529e76830901091933m409b7dcdj508412264f7524a5@mail.gmail.com> References: <529e76830901091233s6f4a8a15v18823a1319764007@mail.gmail.com> <529e76830901091933m409b7dcdj508412264f7524a5@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <529e76830901091941m2f073dc2q4a99c979a8f96e73@mail.gmail.com> Looks like Roscoe got it. literal data block that makes up the difference. Thanks everyone. Now to see if there is some reason for it. --Scott On Fri, Jan 9, 2009 at 10:33 PM, Scott Lambdin wrote: > I found a file in rejects, but it may be partial. It gives us some > information, though. > > The pgp file was 406184088 bytes and unencrypted is 175246253 bytes. > > gpg -v -v -o a_file.out -d a_file.pgp > > gpg: armor: BEGIN PGP MESSAGE > gpg: armor header: Version: McAfee E-Business Server v7.5 - Full License > :pubkey enc packet: version 3, algo 1, keyid 123456789012345 > data: [2047 bits] > gpg: public key is ABCD1234 > You need a passphrase to unlock the secret key for > user: "Janeane Garofalo " > 2048-bit RSA key, ID ABCD4321 > > gpg: public key encrypted data: good DEK > :encrypted data packet: > length: 42097820 > gpg: encrypted with 2048-bit RSA key, ID ABCD4321 > gpg: IDEA encrypted data > :compressed packet: algo=1 > :literal data packet: > mode t (74), created 1509949440, name="file-100-1", > raw data: 227869810 bytes > gpg: original file name="file100" > gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found. > gpg: fatal: zlib inflate problem: invalid block type > secmem usage: 2208/4704 bytes in 5/15 blocks of pool 4960/32768 > > On Fri, Jan 9, 2009 at 10:02 PM, Roscoe wrote: > >> Dunno how likely it is, but maybe someone made an attempt at hiding >> the size of the file in transit via appending arbitrary data. >> >> 2009/1/10 Scott Lambdin : >> > Hello - >> > >> > Someone sends us a big ~700MB pgp encrypted file and when we decrypt it >> the >> > resulting file is about half that size. Anyone have an idea what they >> might >> > be doing to swell it up like that? >> > >> > -- >> > There's a box? >> > >> > _______________________________________________ >> > Gnupg-users mailing list >> > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org >> > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users >> > >> > >> > > > > -- > There's a box? > -- There's a box? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Sat Jan 10 04:49:54 2009 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Fri, 9 Jan 2009 22:49:54 -0500 Subject: encryption bloats file In-Reply-To: <529e76830901091933m409b7dcdj508412264f7524a5@mail.gmail.com> References: <529e76830901091233s6f4a8a15v18823a1319764007@mail.gmail.com> <529e76830901091933m409b7dcdj508412264f7524a5@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <20090110034954.GA4666@jabberwocky.com> On Fri, Jan 09, 2009 at 10:33:52PM -0500, Scott Lambdin wrote: > I found a file in rejects, but it may be partial. It gives us some > information, though. > > The pgp file was 406184088 bytes and unencrypted is 175246253 bytes. > > gpg -v -v -o a_file.out -d a_file.pgp > > gpg: armor: BEGIN PGP MESSAGE > gpg: armor header: Version: McAfee E-Business Server v7.5 - Full License > :pubkey enc packet: version 3, algo 1, keyid 123456789012345 > data: [2047 bits] > gpg: public key is ABCD1234 > You need a passphrase to unlock the secret key for > user: "Janeane Garofalo " > 2048-bit RSA key, ID ABCD4321 > > gpg: public key encrypted data: good DEK > :encrypted data packet: > length: 42097820 > gpg: encrypted with 2048-bit RSA key, ID ABCD4321 > gpg: IDEA encrypted data > :compressed packet: algo=1 > :literal data packet: > mode t (74), created 1509949440, name="file-100-1", > raw data: 227869810 bytes > gpg: original file name="file100" > gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found. > gpg: fatal: zlib inflate problem: invalid block type > secmem usage: 2208/4704 bytes in 5/15 blocks of pool 4960/32768 That's helpful, as it indicates that the file was corrupt. This could explain why an encrypted file is so much larger than the decrypted file - the decrypted file is truncated because the decryption failed partway through. Of course, that could just be this rejected file. Can you check if your real file has some non-OpenPGP cruft glued to the end of it? David From shavital at mac.com Sat Jan 10 07:22:01 2009 From: shavital at mac.com (Charly Avital) Date: Sat, 10 Jan 2009 01:22:01 -0500 Subject: Paperkey on windows In-Reply-To: <20090110011529.GA4447@jabberwocky.com> References: <4967AE1E.1050505@gmail.com> <20090110011529.GA4447@jabberwocky.com> Message-ID: <49683E89.4080307@mac.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 David Shaw wrote the following on 1/9/09 8:15 PM: [...] > It is absolutely ok and encouraged to send paperkey to whoever wants > it. There are various ways to comply with the license (the GPL), but > one easy way is to do what you suggest and send a copy of the source > along with the binary. > > In terms of trusting - well, that's up to you. Windows users tend to > have to trust the people who compile things for them. > > For what it's worth, I can probably release a Windows binary with the > next release of paperkey, which means it'll be signed by the same key > that signs the source tarball. John, did you have to do anything > special to get it to build (is this mingw or something else?) > > David Hi David, A couple of days ago, I compiled the source code (with the flags indicated in your paperkey homepage), for a MacBook Intel Core 2 Duo running MacOSX 10.5.6 (code named Leopard). I passed on the compiling information to other Mac Users. I used the flags you indicated for a universal binary: ./configure CFLAGS="-arch ppc -arch i386" --disable-dependency-tracking I took into consideration that "The additional isysroot is not necessary on Intel Tiger boxes, or any Leopard (or later) boxes." Questions: - - which should be the required flags for an Intel Core 2 Duo processor, only? - - ditto for Linux Ubuntu 8.10_64-bits? Now I have: $ paperkey --version paperkey 0.8 Copyright (C) 2007, 2008 David Shaw This is free software. You may redistribute copies of it under the terms of the GNU General Public License . There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law. $ man paperkey and $ paperkey --help generated the expected outputs. Question: could you please point me to the path to the man file PAPERKEY(1)? I was unable to find it, but then, I am not very knowledgeable with Unix and CLIs. Using: gpg --export-secret-key my-key | paperkey --output my-key-text-file.txt a text file was generated at root level. For information, I quote the first 18 lines: # Secret portions of key [mysecretkey fingerprint] # Base 16 data extracted Sat Jan 10 01:02:04 2009 # Created with paperkey 0.8 by David Shaw # File format: # a) 1 octet: version of the paperkey format (currently 0). # b) 1 octet: OpenPGP key version (currently 4) # c) n octets: Key fingerprint (20 octets for a version 4 key) # d) 2 octets: 16-bit length of the following secret data # e) n octets: secret data: an OpenPGP secret key or subkey as specified in # RFC-4880, starting with the string-to-key usage octet and # continuing until the end of the packet. # Repeat fields b through e as needed to cover all subkeys. # To recover, use the fingerprint to match an existing public key with the # corresponding secret data, then append field e to the public key to # create a secret key. # Each base 16 line ends with a CRC-24 of that line. # The entire block of data ends with a CRC-24 of the entire block of data. - - Thank you David, for paperkey. Charly MacOS 10.5.6 - MacBook Intel C2Duo "Aluminum Late 2008"- GnuPG 1.4.9 - GPG2 2.0.10rc1 - Thunderbird 2.0.0.18 - Enigmail 0.95.7 (Testing TB 3.0b1+EM 0.96a)- Apple's Mail+GPGMail 1.2.0 (v56) PGP key: 0xA57A8EFA -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.10rc1 (Darwin) Comment: GnuPG for Privacy Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJJaD6EAAoJEM3GMi2FW4PvZMsIALtLJN8SyILCZtaSWIjihDN4 faZjPefnUrYmJ5mgoevB2dkqhy1CRTIhAQtSic+OgK5CsA1gvgEavckejfDWtU65 Pq4E+1B/xnz539wCUO0I2dg+pyRSO1XXFZ9kqiRlaIANrPzzSjomnk/hfOOnFjvr 2QRxgXpgzr4FJIn3R4FlS7TZgvxLOBgfy+FdjZ8ww1lmbViY67+e7wUeeBjrTp3V CRsQ5Pz0yDU4AHjhM101gEh8OJh0T5jI7I/F4QJAWRRt9MMd9kLI9jeUrIPWYgZN PCWoAg3SeUVQo8XlUCQkK2Qdzkmzs2Hw8TLzzedodJguVdWLdL9twS7Jx+RqeM8= =bCK+ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From cannewilson at googlemail.com Sat Jan 10 09:02:45 2009 From: cannewilson at googlemail.com (Anne Wilson) Date: Sat, 10 Jan 2009 08:02:45 +0000 Subject: Can't find one identity Message-ID: <200901100802.45897.cannewilson@googlemail.com> I'm not sure whether this is a gpg or keychain/ssh issue. I use keychain to handle mounts to my server box for maintenance. Every day, the first time I start konsole, I'm asked for my ssh password. I get a connection, but also get '* Warning: can't find annew at kde.org; skipping' I did wonder whether my keyring on the server needed updating, but using 'gpg --refresh-keys' told me that 1 key was processed but unchanged. Does this error message spring from the fact that annew at kde.org was not an identity when I created the ssh password, or is it something I'm overlooking in gpg? Thanks Anne -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 197 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From shavital at mac.com Sat Jan 10 09:53:22 2009 From: shavital at mac.com (Charly Avital) Date: Sat, 10 Jan 2009 03:53:22 -0500 Subject: Paperkey on MacOSX - was:Paperkey on windows In-Reply-To: <20090110011529.GA4447@jabberwocky.com> References: <4967AE1E.1050505@gmail.com> <20090110011529.GA4447@jabberwocky.com> Message-ID: <49686202.3070708@mac.com> Hi, my apologies for not having edited the subject of my post about compiling and using paperkey under MacOSX. Charly From benjamin at py-soft.co.uk Sat Jan 10 14:50:45 2009 From: benjamin at py-soft.co.uk (Benjamin Donnachie) Date: Sat, 10 Jan 2009 13:50:45 +0000 Subject: Paperkey on windows In-Reply-To: <49683E89.4080307@mac.com> References: <4967AE1E.1050505@gmail.com> <20090110011529.GA4447@jabberwocky.com> <49683E89.4080307@mac.com> Message-ID: <732076a80901100550r3b6ae995o3f7e02be63bca2c5@mail.gmail.com> 2009/1/10 Charly Avital : > A couple of days ago, I compiled the source code (with the flags > indicated in your paperkey homepage), for a MacBook Intel Core 2 Duo > running MacOSX 10.5.6 (code named Leopard). I passed on the compiling > information to other Mac Users. > > I used the flags you indicated for a universal binary: > ./configure CFLAGS="-arch ppc -arch i386" --disable-dependency-tracking Unless you're distributing the binary, I wouldn't bother building a Universal Binary - it'll just add unnecessary bloat that your machine will never use. > Questions: > - - which should be the required flags for an Intel Core 2 Duo processor, > only? > - - ditto for Linux Ubuntu 8.10_64-bits? In general, it should only be necessary to run the configure script - that should pick up all the required flags. Take care, Ben From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Sat Jan 10 15:54:34 2009 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Sat, 10 Jan 2009 09:54:34 -0500 Subject: Paperkey on windows In-Reply-To: <49683E89.4080307@mac.com> References: <4967AE1E.1050505@gmail.com> <20090110011529.GA4447@jabberwocky.com> <49683E89.4080307@mac.com> Message-ID: On Jan 10, 2009, at 1:22 AM, Charly Avital wrote: > A couple of days ago, I compiled the source code (with the flags > indicated in your paperkey homepage), for a MacBook Intel Core 2 Duo > running MacOSX 10.5.6 (code named Leopard). I passed on the compiling > information to other Mac Users. > > I used the flags you indicated for a universal binary: > ./configure CFLAGS="-arch ppc -arch i386" --disable-dependency- > tracking A universal binary will run on both a PowerPC and Intel Mac. Unless you are using the same binary on both Macs (i.e. if you have multiple Macs with different processors or are distributing binaries to people who have PowerPC boxes), there is little point to doing this. Just do plain ./configure and let it figure out what options to use. > Questions: > - - which should be the required flags for an Intel Core 2 Duo > processor, > only? None. ./configure does all the magic for you. > - - ditto for Linux Ubuntu 8.10_64-bits? Same here. As a general rule (for paperkey and really most programs), you just build with ./configure and nothing else unless you are doing something unusual or special. > Now I have: > $ paperkey --version > paperkey 0.8 > Copyright (C) 2007, 2008 David Shaw > This is free software. You may redistribute copies of it under the > terms of > the GNU General Public License . > There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law. > > $ man paperkey and $ paperkey --help generated the expected outputs. > > Question: could you please point me to the path to the man file > PAPERKEY(1)? I was unable to find it, but then, I am not very > knowledgeable with Unix and CLIs. It's probably in /usr/local/share/man/man1/paperkey.1, but that doesn't matter unless you want to read the raw nroff manual file. Just do "man paperkey" and let the machine do the work for you. David From Paul.Strenger at lfg.com Fri Jan 9 16:05:40 2009 From: Paul.Strenger at lfg.com (Strenger, Paul V.) Date: Fri, 9 Jan 2009 10:05:40 -0500 Subject: PGP on Window 2003 In-Reply-To: <496747FD.3080007@sixdemonbag.org> References: <496747FD.3080007@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: My mistake, it is GNU Privacy Guard (GPG) and not PGP. Let me know if you can still assist. Thanks, Paul Strenger -----Original Message----- From: Robert J. Hansen [mailto:rjh at sixdemonbag.org] Sent: Friday, January 09, 2009 7:50 AM To: Strenger, Paul V. Cc: gnupg-users at gnupg.org Subject: Re: PGP on Window 2003 Strenger, Paul V. wrote: > Hello, we are creating a new VM Windows 2003 server and are trying > to mirror it like our old VM Windows 2000 VM server. We are currently > running Active Perl 5.8 to use for our PGP Encryption processes and the > encryption is not working properly on the new machine. We downloaded the > version from the web. Is there something additional we need because it > has a different OS? We can't help you. This mailing list is for the GNU Privacy Guard (GPG), not Pretty Good Privacy (PGP). The two programs are interoperable, but they are not the same, and their setup is totally different. You may want to ask PGP Support. Notice of Confidentiality: **This E-mail and any of its attachments may contain Lincoln National Corporation proprietary information, which is privileged, confidential, or subject to copyright belonging to the Lincoln National Corporation family of companies. This E-mail is intended solely for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient of this E-mail, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution, copying, or action taken in relation to the contents of and attachments to this E-mail is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have received this E-mail in error, please notify the sender immediately and permanently delete the original and any copy of this E-mail and any printout. Thank You.** From Paul.Strenger at lfg.com Fri Jan 9 18:16:01 2009 From: Paul.Strenger at lfg.com (Strenger, Paul V.) Date: Fri, 9 Jan 2009 12:16:01 -0500 Subject: PGP on Window 2003 In-Reply-To: <49677B1D.30101@sixdemonbag.org> References: <496747FD.3080007@sixdemonbag.org> <49677B1D.30101@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: -----Original Message----- From: Robert J. Hansen [mailto:rjh at sixdemonbag.org] Sent: Friday, January 09, 2009 11:28 AM To: Strenger, Paul V. Cc: gnupg-users at gnupg.org Subject: Re: PGP on Window 2003 Strenger, Paul V. wrote: > My mistake, it is GNU Privacy Guard (GPG) and not PGP. Let me know if > you can still assist. We need to know a lot more details. Let's start with: 1. What version of GnuPG are you using? gnupg-w32cli-1.2.3 2. From where did you get it? Not sure, was here when I started using it. 3. What errors are you getting? Attached. 4. Does it work from the command line? Havent tried that yet, but it does work on the Windows 2000 box. Notice of Confidentiality: **This E-mail and any of its attachments may contain Lincoln National Corporation proprietary information, which is privileged, confidential, or subject to copyright belonging to the Lincoln National Corporation family of companies. This E-mail is intended solely for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient of this E-mail, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution, copying, or action taken in relation to the contents of and attachments to this E-mail is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have received this E-mail in error, please notify the sender immediately and permanently delete the original and any copy of this E-mail and any printout. Thank You.** -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Test_Encrypt_and_FTP.err Type: application/octet-stream Size: 318 bytes Desc: Test_Encrypt_and_FTP.err URL: From lou.palladino at fnis.com Fri Jan 9 19:07:47 2009 From: lou.palladino at fnis.com (Lou Palladino) Date: Fri, 09 Jan 2009 13:07:47 -0500 Subject: Trying to build libassuan for gnupg Message-ID: Hi I am trying to build a 64-bit libassuan on Solaris 10 SPARC. I have tried with Sun?s CC, GCC, make, and gmake (as well as 32-bit) but they all bomb here: gmake[3]: Entering directory `/tmp/libassuan-1.0.5/tests' /opt/gcc/bin/gcc -DHAVE_CONFIG_H -I. -I.. -m64 -Wall -Wcast-align -Wshadow -Wstrict-prototypes -Wpointer-arith -MT fdpassing.o -MD -MP -MF .deps/fdpassing.Tpo -c -o fdpassing.o fdpassing.c mv -f .deps/fdpassing.Tpo .deps/fdpassing.Po /opt/gcc/bin/gcc -m64 -Wall -Wcast-align -Wshadow -Wstrict-prototypes -Wpointer-arith -o fdpassing fdpassing.o ../src/libassuan.a -lsocket Undefined first referenced symbol in file nanosleep ../src/libassuan.a(assuan-io.o) ld: fatal: Symbol referencing errors. No output written to fdpassing collect2: ld returned 1 exit status gmake[3]: *** [fdpassing] Error 1 gmake[3]: Leaving directory `/tmp/libassuan-1.0.5/tests' gmake[2]: *** [all] Error 2 gmake[2]: Leaving directory `/tmp/libassuan-1.0.5/tests' gmake[1]: *** [all-recursive] Error 1 gmake[1]: Leaving directory `/tmp/libassuan-1.0.5' gmake: *** [all] Error 2 root at atlst2000 # All of the other GnuPG dependencies have built fine in 64-bit mode with GCC and gmake on this box. Thanks in advance. -Lou Palladino _____________ The information contained in this message is proprietary and/or confidential. If you are not the intended recipient, please: (i) delete the message and all copies; (ii) do not disclose, distribute or use the message in any manner; and (iii) notify the sender immediately. In addition, please be aware that any message addressed to our domain is subject to archiving and review by persons other than the intended recipient. Thank you. _____________ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jacobbjerrum at gmail.com Sat Jan 10 11:08:36 2009 From: jacobbjerrum at gmail.com (jakse) Date: Sat, 10 Jan 2009 02:08:36 -0800 (PST) Subject: recover private key In-Reply-To: <49678A0F.6080509@gmail.com> References: <21268023.post@talk.nabble.com> <4963FAFF.7030906@gmail.com> <21367391.post@talk.nabble.com> <49678A0F.6080509@gmail.com> Message-ID: <21386574.post@talk.nabble.com> Thanks so much! i really think it worked Faramir-2 wrote: > > *I think* there is a good chance it is what you need. GnuPG uses the > files secring.gpg and pubring.gpg to store the private and public keys. > But the .ASC file extension is used to store files as "armored ascii" > format, which can be opened as a text file, printed, etc. But the > content of an .ASC file is still the same content it would have if it > was stored as .GPG (I mean, the format doesn't remove the info). > you where right! i did cat secring.asc and it returned my private key! Faramir-2 wrote: > > I think the command you need is: > > gpg --import secring.asc > > That was the right command i think!! NOW! does anyone have the time to test it with me? see - i'm kinda of semi nerdy and really dont know anyone who sends encrypted files... i justed wanted this stuff to work so that i have the skill and posibility to use it when it is needed! J -- View this message in context: http://www.nabble.com/recover-private-key-tp21268023p21386574.html Sent from the GnuPG - User mailing list archive at Nabble.com. From jacobbjerrum at gmail.com Sat Jan 10 11:11:07 2009 From: jacobbjerrum at gmail.com (jakse) Date: Sat, 10 Jan 2009 02:11:07 -0800 (PST) Subject: recover private key Message-ID: <21386574.post@talk.nabble.com> Thanks so much! i really think it worked Faramir-2 wrote: > > *I think* there is a good chance it is what you need. GnuPG uses the > files secring.gpg and pubring.gpg to store the private and public keys. > But the .ASC file extension is used to store files as "armored ascii" > format, which can be opened as a text file, printed, etc. But the > content of an .ASC file is still the same content it would have if it > was stored as .GPG (I mean, the format doesn't remove the info). > you where right! i did cat secring.asc and it returned my private key! Faramir-2 wrote: > > I think the command you need is: > > gpg --import secring.asc > > That was the right command i think!! NOW! does anyone have the time to test it with me? see - i'm kinda of semi nerdy and really dont know anyone who sends encrypted files... i justed wanted this stuff to work so that i have the skill and posibility to use it when it is needed! J Edit ps: i did get some warnings on the way, dont know what it really means; gpg: WARNING: key ECABF51D contains preferences for unavailable gpg: algorithms on these user IDs: gpg: "Test three (no pp) ": preference for cipher algorithm 1 gpg: it is strongly suggested that you update your preferences and gpg: re-distribute this key to avoid potential algorithm mismatch problems -- View this message in context: http://www.nabble.com/recover-private-key-tp21268023p21386574.html Sent from the GnuPG - User mailing list archive at Nabble.com. From jacobbjerrum at gmail.com Sat Jan 10 11:14:20 2009 From: jacobbjerrum at gmail.com (jakse) Date: Sat, 10 Jan 2009 02:14:20 -0800 (PST) Subject: recover private key Message-ID: <21386574.post@talk.nabble.com> Thanks so much! i really think it worked Faramir-2 wrote: > > *I think* there is a good chance it is what you need. GnuPG uses the > files secring.gpg and pubring.gpg to store the private and public keys. > But the .ASC file extension is used to store files as "armored ascii" > format, which can be opened as a text file, printed, etc. But the > content of an .ASC file is still the same content it would have if it > was stored as .GPG (I mean, the format doesn't remove the info). > you where right! i did cat secring.asc and it returned my private key! Faramir-2 wrote: > > I think the command you need is: > > gpg --import secring.asc > > That was the right command i think!! NOW! does anyone have the time to test it with me? see - i'm kinda of semi nerdy and really dont know anyone who sends encrypted files... i justed wanted this stuff to work so that i have the skill and posibility to use it when it is needed! J Edit ps: i did get some warnings on the way, dont know what it really means - dont hope the secring.asc file was just a "demofile" of some sort?! gpg: WARNING: key ECABF51D contains preferences for unavailable gpg: algorithms on these user IDs: gpg: "Test three (no pp) ": preference for cipher algorithm 1 gpg: it is strongly suggested that you update your preferences and gpg: re-distribute this key to avoid potential algorithm mismatch problems -- View this message in context: http://www.nabble.com/recover-private-key-tp21268023p21386574.html Sent from the GnuPG - User mailing list archive at Nabble.com. From shavital at mac.com Sat Jan 10 19:05:22 2009 From: shavital at mac.com (Charly Avital) Date: Sat, 10 Jan 2009 13:05:22 -0500 Subject: Paperkey on windows In-Reply-To: References: <4967AE1E.1050505@gmail.com> <20090110011529.GA4447@jabberwocky.com> <49683E89.4080307@mac.com> Message-ID: <4968E362.8030403@mac.com> David Shaw wrote the following on 1/10/09 9:54 AM: [...] > Just do > plain ./configure and let it figure out what options to use. Thanks, I figured that should be way to go, but I wanted to have an expert opinion. [...] > As a general rule (for paperkey and really most programs), you just > build with ./configure and nothing else unless you are doing something > unusual or special. Noted. [...] > > It's probably in /usr/local/share/man/man1/paperkey.1, Indeed it is. > but that > doesn't matter unless you want to read the raw nroff manual file. > Just do "man paperkey" and let the machine do the work for you. As I indicated in my post, man paperkey works fine. I just wanted to include the path in 'ManOpen's' Preferences. Thanks for your prompt answer. Charly > > David > From faramir.cl at gmail.com Sat Jan 10 22:47:35 2009 From: faramir.cl at gmail.com (Faramir) Date: Sat, 10 Jan 2009 18:47:35 -0300 Subject: recover private key In-Reply-To: <21386574.post@talk.nabble.com> References: <21386574.post@talk.nabble.com> Message-ID: <49691777.7080200@gmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 jakse escribi?: > Thanks so much! i really think it worked You are welcome ;) > does anyone have the time to test it with me? see - i'm kinda of semi nerdy > and really dont know anyone who sends encrypted files... i justed wanted > this stuff to work so that i have the skill and posibility to use it when it > is needed! Yes, you can send messages to me, and I am sure other people here will volunteer to test encryption with you. But currently there is a problem with your key... keep reading. > Edit > ps: i did get some warnings on the way, dont know what it really means - > dont hope the secring.asc file was just a "demofile" of some sort?! Well, when I install GPG, the keyrings are empty, so I don't think it comes with a "demo"... > gpg: WARNING: key ECABF51D contains preferences for unavailable > gpg: algorithms on these user IDs: > gpg: "Test three (no pp) ": preference for > cipher algorithm 1 > gpg: it is strongly suggested that you update your preferences and > gpg: re-distribute this key to avoid potential algorithm mismatch problems There are several problems: 1.- I downloaded the key ECABF51D from keyservers, and it doesn't have a subkey for encryption purposes, so you can only sign and certify, but not encrypt/decrypt. 2.- Also, the key lists in it's preferences, the encryption algorithm IDEA (cipher algorithm 1). And GPG doesn't include that algorithm, because it is not free. It seems it can be used for non-business purposes, but I am not really sure about that, so if somebody sends a message to you, and it is encrypted with IDEA, you would be unable to decrypt it (but I think that is not your worst problem, since as long as you don't get encryption capabilities -by adding a subkey capable of encryption- I *think* people won't be able to send encrypted messages to you). You can download idea.dll and configure gpg to use it, but unless you are sure you are not breaking the copyright... I am NOT sure about that, I have read somewhere it was allowed to use it if you are not doing business, but I am not sure about the reliability of the place where I read that. Also, when I tried to find the company that is supposed to hold de copyright, I couldn't find it on internet... (and since I was just curious about it, I didn't keep searching). Last words: I am not sure if you should add a subkey first, and edit preferences latter, or to edit pref first, and add the key latter... Best Regards -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJJaRd3AAoJEMV4f6PvczxAcfIH/iGRIb01lNltgS/CXzmMVc7S 2/jGbEdXXKYSXqPhP0kxv5cwv+7hKh9VV8v7adZp+ulO+u3PVXkNlvF1navOlzLH WOxQIRVI+ED++Y/r05usR3AENVayuKtocU6wGkukreqC0rRWayF+eVH3JSTQUQZS eWdTmt/Mqj58c5x9Q/DI3PxZX+lEM90P3p57cp156hfp701JoMsEnk5HErvcfneB GEbP1FFu3bDv3rdkBdbwI4RbjvaYOlbWGaEUe4SRu0p3AbcEdbmnmj8UnFWyyN+M q0IC6ZwLxrN/iyU4CnUSuwJUg7xDd04b9SMgT0340eSNTJMbiK8aFHvVYPFbwSw= =O8Ox -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From benjamin at py-soft.co.uk Sun Jan 11 02:59:17 2009 From: benjamin at py-soft.co.uk (Benjamin Donnachie) Date: Sun, 11 Jan 2009 01:59:17 +0000 Subject: Fwd: MacGPG2 v2.0.10RC1 for Intel Macs released! In-Reply-To: <732076a80901101252t4b87bd77nc3e749db469675d4@mail.gmail.com> References: <732076a80901101252t4b87bd77nc3e749db469675d4@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <732076a80901101759u5db5e5ecv6ec2cfff7b3a9bde@mail.gmail.com> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- MacGPG2 for GnuPG v2.0.10rc1 is now available for download from sourceforge - https://sourceforge.net/project/showfiles.php?group_id=248469&package_id=303406&release_id=652661 This download will work under Tiger and Leopard but only on Intel-based Macs. PowerPC support is planned for the full release of GnuPG v2.0.10. For assistance with the software, please see the project homepage http://macgpg2.sourceforge.net and the project mailing list - http://lists.sourceforge.net/mailman/listinfo/macgpg2-users There has been a substantial departure from the previous way of implementing GnuPG2 functionality so please patient while I update the project wiki. NOTES: This a beta release of the GnuPG v2.x package for MacOSX. Please use the accompanying signature, available as MacGPG2-2.0.10rc1-BETA5.zip.asc, to verify your download before extracting. Report any problems to the macgpg2 team - http://macgpg2.sourceforge.net/ CHANGE LOG: MacGPG2 now uses St?phane Corth?sy's gpg-agent launchd patch for use with Leopard and above. For MacOS versions prior, a login item is now used. MacGPG2 no longer needs login or logout scripts in order to function correctly and these will be disabled. Under most circumstances, MacGPG2 no longer needs to interact with the ~/.MacOSX/environment.plist file and any unneeded entries will be automatically removed. From wk at gnupg.org Mon Jan 12 10:55:53 2009 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Mon, 12 Jan 2009 10:55:53 +0100 Subject: [Announce] GnuPG 2.0.10 released Message-ID: <87eiz897bq.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> Hello! We are pleased to announce the availability of a new stable GnuPG-2 release: Version 2.0.10. The GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) is GNU's tool for secure communication and data storage. It can be used to encrypt data, create digital signatures, help authenticating using Secure Shell and to provide a framework for public key cryptography. It includes an advanced key management facility and is compliant with the OpenPGP and S/MIME standards. GnuPG-2 has a different architecture than GnuPG-1 (e.g. 1.4.9) in that it splits up functionality into several modules. However, both versions may be installed alongside without any conflict. In fact, the gpg version from GnuPG-1 is able to make use of the gpg-agent as included in GnuPG-2 and allows for seamless passphrase caching. The advantage of GnuPG-1 is its smaller size and the lack of dependency on other modules at run and build time. We will keep maintaining GnuPG-1 versions because they are very useful for small systems and for server based applications requiring only OpenPGP support. GnuPG is distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License (GPL version 3). GnuPG-2 works best on GNU/Linux or *BSD systems. What's New =========== * [gpg] New keyserver helper gpg2keys_kdns as generic DNS CERT lookup. Run with --help for a short description. Requires the ADNS library. * [gpg] New mechanisms "local" and "nodefault" for --auto-key-locate. Fixed a few problems with this option. * [gpg] New command --locate-keys. * [gpg] New options --with-sig-list and --with-sig-check. * [gpg] The option "-sat" is no longer an alias for --clearsign. * [gpg] The option --fixed-list-mode is now implicitly used and obsolete. * [gpg] New control statement %ask-passphrase for the unattended key generation. * [gpg] The algorithm to compute the SIG_ID status has been changed. * [gpgsm] Now uses AES by default. * [gpgsm] Made --output option work with --export-secret-key-p12. * [gpg-agent] Terminate process if the own listening socket is not anymore served by ourself. * [scdaemon] Made it more robust on W32. * [gpg-connect-agent] Accept commands given as command line arguments. * [w32] Initialized the socket subsystem for all keyserver helpers. * [w32] The sysconf directory has been moved from a subdirectory of the installation directory to %CSIDL_COMMON_APPDATA%/GNU/etc/gnupg. * [w32] The gnupg2.nls directory is not anymore used. The standard locale directory is now used. * [w32] Fixed a race condition between gpg and gpgsm in the use of temporary file names. * The gpg-preset-passphrase mechanism works again. An arbitrary string may now be used for a custom cache ID. * Admin PINs are cached again (bug in 2.0.9). * Support for version 2 OpenPGP cards. * Libgcrypt 1.4 is now required. Getting the Software ==================== Please follow the instructions found at http://www.gnupg.org/download/ or read on: GnuPG 2.0.10 may be downloaded from one of the GnuPG mirror sites or direct from ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/gnupg/ . The list of mirrors can be found at http://www.gnupg.org/mirrors.html . Note, that GnuPG is not available at ftp.gnu.org. On the FTP server and its mirrors you should find the following files in the gnupg/ directory: gnupg-2.0.10.tar.bz2 (3736k) gnupg-2.0.10.tar.bz2.sig GnuPG source compressed using BZIP2 and OpenPGP signature. gnupg-2.0.9-2.0.10.diff.bz2 (264k) A patch file to upgrade a 2.0.9 GnuPG source tree. This patch does not include updates of the language files. Note, that we don't distribute gzip compressed tarballs for GnuPG-2. Checking the Integrity ====================== In order to check that the version of GnuPG which you are going to install is an original and unmodified one, you can do it in one of the following ways: * If you already have a trusted version of GnuPG installed, you can simply check the supplied signature. For example to check the signature of the file gnupg-2.0.10.tar.bz2 you would use this command: gpg --verify gnupg-2.0.10.tar.bz2.sig This checks whether the signature file matches the source file. You should see a message indicating that the signature is good and made by that signing key. Make sure that you have the right key, either by checking the fingerprint of that key with other sources or by checking that the key has been signed by a trustworthy other key. Note, that you can retrieve the signing key using the command finger wk ,at' g10code.com or using a keyserver like gpg --recv-key 1CE0C630 The distribution key 1CE0C630 is signed by the well known key 5B0358A2. If you get an key expired message, you should retrieve a fresh copy as the expiration date might have been prolonged. NEVER USE A GNUPG VERSION YOU JUST DOWNLOADED TO CHECK THE INTEGRITY OF THE SOURCE - USE AN EXISTING GNUPG INSTALLATION! * If you are not able to use an old version of GnuPG, you have to verify the SHA-1 checksum. Assuming you downloaded the file gnupg-2.0.10.tar.bz2, you would run the sha1sum command like this: sha1sum gnupg-2.0.10.tar.bz2 and check that the output matches the first line from the following list: d25e41a8cc607334b707d13af819ceaa217800b5 gnupg-2.0.10.tar.bz2 2a375f4d6cb171f3358bce2b6b3a26ba208ab3ac gnupg-2.0.9-2.0.10.diff.bz2 Internationalization ==================== GnuPG comes with support for 27 languages. Due to a lot of new and changed strings many translations are not entirely complete. Jedi, Maxim Britov, Jaime Su?rez and Nilg?n Belma Bug?ner have been kind enough to go over their translations and thus the Chinese, German, Russian, Spanish, and Turkish translations are pretty much complete. Documentation ============= We are currently working on an installation guide to explain in more detail how to configure the new features. As of now the chapters on gpg-agent and gpgsm include brief information on how to set up the whole thing. Please watch the GnuPG website for updates of the documentation. In the meantime you may search the GnuPG mailing list archives or ask on the gnupg-users mailing lists for advise on how to solve problems. Many of the new features are around for several years and thus enough public knowledge is already available. KDE's KMail is the most prominent user of GnuPG-2. In fact it has been developed along with the KMail folks. Mutt users might want to use the configure option "--enable-gpgme" and "set use_crypt_gpgme" in ~/.muttrc to make use of GnuPG-2 to enable S/MIME in addition to a reworked OpenPGP support. The manual is also available online in HTML format at http://www.gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gnupg/ and in Portable Document Format at http://www.gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gnupg.pdf . Support ======= Improving GnuPG is costly, but you can help! We are looking for organizations that find GnuPG useful and wish to contribute back. You can contribute by reporting bugs, improve the software, order extensions or support or more general by donating money to the Free Software movement (e.g. http://www.fsfeurope.org/help/donate.en.html). Commercial support contracts for GnuPG are available, and they help finance continued maintenance. g10 Code GmbH, a Duesseldorf based company owned and headed by GnuPG's principal author, is currently funding GnuPG development. We are always looking for interesting development projects. The GnuPG service directory is available at: http://www.gnupg.org/service.html Thanks ====== We have to thank all the people who helped with this release, be it testing, coding, translating, suggesting, auditing, administering the servers, spreading the word or answering questions on the mailing lists. Happy Hacking, The GnuPG Team (David, Marcus, Werner and all other contributors) -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Auschnahme regelt ein Bundeschgesetz. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 205 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- _______________________________________________ Gnupg-announce mailing list Gnupg-announce at gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-announce From cannewilson at googlemail.com Mon Jan 12 16:36:45 2009 From: cannewilson at googlemail.com (Anne Wilson) Date: Mon, 12 Jan 2009 15:36:45 +0000 Subject: Setting up a new laptop - importing keyrings Message-ID: <200901121536.52224.cannewilson@googlemail.com> I'm setting up a new netbook, and have copied into the .gnupg folder my keyrings and associated files from this laptop. Kgpg lists the keys correctly, but all is not well. When I try to set keys for signing and encryption I get the endless searching bar, as Chris described a few days ago. I considered starting from an empty keyring and importing signatures as they arrive in kmail, but I think the problem is that I don't know how to get the secret key recognised. I'm happy to delete everything and start again if there is a better way, but I need help to get this sorted. Thanks Anne -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 197 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From neil.yan at akmii.com Sat Jan 10 20:47:46 2009 From: neil.yan at akmii.com (Neil Yan) Date: Sat, 10 Jan 2009 11:47:46 -0800 Subject: Question of using GNUPG on Win OS Message-ID: Hi, Currently i have a project need some data from PGP encrypted files. I need to decrypt these files by program. I think GNUPG should be a greate tool for my requirement. But I am really confused by the GNUPG version and usage since I don't have many experience of Linux OS. My project will be executed on Win OS. So, I have following questions need your help. Really appriciated for any helps. 1. Where can I download a windows version of GNUPG? The files on GNUPG download ftp site seems all are Linux version. 2. How can I decrypt files by using GNUPG programmatic? Using some DLL API or call the command? 3. Are there any guid or documents for GNUPG windows version? -- Thanks, Neil -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From patrick.matthaei at web.de Sat Jan 10 22:05:06 2009 From: patrick.matthaei at web.de (=?UTF-8?B?UGF0cmljayBNYXR0aMOkaQ==?=) Date: Sat, 10 Jan 2009 22:05:06 +0100 Subject: Expire of elgamal sub In-Reply-To: <49640984.1060008@gmail.com> References: <4960A7E1.4080100@web.de> <49640984.1060008@gmail.com> Message-ID: <49690D82.9030801@web.de> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Faramir schrieb: > Hello Patrick, > >> A much more time later I saw, that my elgamal still has got an >> expiration date and I can not find anything how I could change it. > > gpg -edit--key 7A5A6CC7 (press enter) > key 1 (press enter -this will select the subkey to edit) > expire (press enter -this will tell gpg you want to modify the > expiration date) > and then, select the new expiration time. 0 means it will never expire, > (n)w means it will expire in n weeks... gpg will show you the available > options. > Once everything is ok, use the 'save' command to save the changes, and > all you need to do after that, is to send your public key to your > friends (or to upload it again to keyservers) in order to let them know > your subkey is not going to expire. Hm the key 1 one was the right thing I searched weeks for! I just thought I could select keys etc with 1,2,3 etc, with key I also could select my elgamal :) >> Then I added a new elgamal, the 2048g/610BB46C one. >> Is this right so? Can I edit the expire of the elgamal? What would > > Well, you can always add more subkeys... but *never* delete them, even > if they expire or are revoked... if you delete an encrypting subkey, you > will be unable to decrypt anything encrypted to that subkey... > >> happen *now* if the elgamal 2048g/D6395C9A has been expired? > > If that elgamal subkey expires, people (including you) will be unable > to use it to encrypt messages. But since you already have another > elgamal subkey with encryption capability, *I think* you would not > notice anything strange (unless your friends don't have the updated > public key containing the new subkey... if they don't have it, they > won't be able to send you encrypted things). Anyway, old messages > encrypted to the expired subkey can still be decrypted, as long as you > don't delete the expired subkey. > >> Please CC my while I am not subscribed and thanks. :-) > > Done... but maybe you would like to subscribe... I think the list > always carries interesting stuff. > > Now, I will paste an example about how to edit the expiration date of > your subkey. Unfortunately, the language is Spanish, but I think that > won't be a big problem, since it's very few text... My comments go > behind '//' signs: > //this is a comment, not a command > > Orden> gpg -edit--key 88EB95D7 //Orden = Command > pub 1024D/0x88EB95D7 creado: 2009-01-07 caduca: nunca uso: SCA > confianza: absoluta validez: absoluta > sub 2048g/0xDEF0DD90 creado: 2009-01-07 caduca: nunca uso: E > sub 2048g/0x53AD1366 creado: 2009-01-07 caduca: 2009-01-14 uso: E > [ absoluta ] (1). Tester3 (for test purposes) > //since the subkey I need to edit is the second one displayed, > //I need to select the subkey number 2. I think you will need to select > //your subkey number 1 > > Orden> key 2 //this will select it > > pub 1024D/0x88EB95D7 creado: 2009-01-07 caduca: nunca uso: SCA > confianza: absoluta validez: absoluta > sub 2048g/0xDEF0DD90 creado: 2009-01-07 caduca: nunca uso: E > sub* 2048g/0x53AD1366 creado: 2009-01-07 caduca: 2009-01-14 uso: E > [ absoluta ] (1). Tester3 (for test purposes) > //please note the '*' sign near the selected subkey. If you select the > //wrong one, repeat the command to deselect it, and then select the > //right one > > Orden> expire > Cambiando fecha de caducidad de subclave. > Por favor, especifique el per?odo de validez de la clave. > 0 = la clave nunca caduca > = la clave caduca en n d?as > w = la clave caduca en n semanas > m = la clave caduca en n meses > y = la clave caduca en n a?os > ?Validez de la clave (0)? 0 > //here I had to enter how much time I want to give it before > //it expires. I entered 0 to set it to never expire > La clave nunca caduca > ?Es correcto? (s/n) s > > //gpg ask me if it is right to never expire it. I told it it was right > > Necesita una frase contrase?a para desbloquear la clave secreta > del usuario: "Tester3 (for test purposes) " > clave $s de $u bits, ID $s, creada el $s > > pub 1024D/0x88EB95D7 creado: 2009-01-07 caduca: nunca uso: SCA > confianza: absoluta validez: absoluta > sub 2048g/0xDEF0DD90 creado: 2009-01-07 caduca: nunca uso: E > sub* 2048g/0x53AD1366 creado: 2009-01-07 caduca: nunca uso: E > [ absoluta ] (1). Tester3 (for test purposes) > > //gpg request the passphrasse in order to be able to make the changes > > Orden> save > //I gave the 'save' command to save the changes, and that's all > > Best Regards Okay now I understand it with the "key" cmd. Much thanks also for your complete howto! :-) - -- /* Mit freundlichem Gru? / With kind regards, Patrick Matth?i E-Mail: patrick.matthaei at web.de Comment: Always if we think we are right, we were maybe wrong. */ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (GNU/Linux) iEYEARECAAYFAklpDYIACgkQ2XA5inpabMeVuwCcDQeLZUSbSdoF1L/uyKTtWHXj dmwAn0unPEjXwRFySQ+95sZg1nYbqzp1 =dWF1 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From jacobbjerrum at gmail.com Sun Jan 11 11:58:24 2009 From: jacobbjerrum at gmail.com (jakse) Date: Sun, 11 Jan 2009 02:58:24 -0800 (PST) Subject: recover private key In-Reply-To: <49691777.7080200@gmail.com> References: <21268023.post@talk.nabble.com> <4963FAFF.7030906@gmail.com> <21367391.post@talk.nabble.com> <49678A0F.6080509@gmail.com> <21386574.post@talk.nabble.com> <49691777.7080200@gmail.com> Message-ID: <21397920.post@talk.nabble.com> Once again! Thanks you guys for helping me out! Faramir-2 wrote: > > Yes, you can send messages to me, and I am sure other people here will > volunteer to test encryption with you. > You are right, john and I already tested it, i had to send the public key to him by mail though. He could find it on the key server... hmmm?! which is strange since i think i uploaded it at some point in time. Faramir-2 wrote: > > Well, when I install GPG, the keyrings are empty, so I don't think it > comes with a "demo"... > my private key starts with the following: This is a test secret keyring simply stored by GNUPG so that it is easier to make diff files. sec XXXX/XXXXXXX 2003-12-31 Test one (pp=def) ssb XXXX/XXXXXXX 2003-12-31 sec XXXX/XXXXXXX 2003-12-31 Test two (no pp) ssb XXXX/XXXXXXX 2003-12-31 sec XXXX/XXXXXXX 2003-12-31 Test three (no pp) How come it has those example mails there?! Faramir-2 wrote: > >> gpg: WARNING: key ECABF51D contains preferences for unavailable >> gpg: algorithms on these user IDs: >> gpg: "Test three (no pp) ": preference for >> cipher algorithm 1 >> gpg: it is strongly suggested that you update your preferences and >> gpg: re-distribute this key to avoid potential algorithm mismatch >> problems > > There are several problems: > 1.- I downloaded the key ECABF51D from keyservers, and it doesn't have a > subkey for encryption purposes, so you can only sign and certify, but > not encrypt/decrypt. > Hm. I'm starting to think that i may be better of starting over again?! Maybe it is easier if I just try to generate a new key!? I don't know what went wrong when i uploaded to the keyserver?! Faramir-2 wrote: > > 2.- Also, the key lists in it's preferences, the encryption algorithm > IDEA (cipher algorithm 1). And GPG doesn't include that algorithm, > because it is not free. It seems it can be used for non-business > purposes, but I am not really sure about that, so if somebody sends a > message to you, and it is encrypted with IDEA, you would be unable to > decrypt it (but I think that is not your worst problem, since as long as > you don't get encryption capabilities -by adding a subkey capable of > encryption- I *think* people won't be able to send encrypted messages to > you). > > You can download idea.dll and configure gpg to use it, but unless you > are sure you are not breaking the copyright... I am NOT sure about that, > I have read somewhere it was allowed to use it if you are not doing > business, but I am not sure about the reliability of the place where I > read that. Also, when I tried to find the company that is supposed to > hold de copyright, I couldn't find it on internet... (and since I was > just curious about it, I didn't keep searching). > > do you all use IDEA?! if it is not commonly used i dont think i'll try and get it. Enough work to get the standard algorithm working for me ;) Faramir-2 wrote: > > Last words: I am not sure if you should add a subkey first, and edit > preferences latter, or to edit pref first, and add the key latter... > Again: do you think it would be better for me to just start over?! And by the way... why do you all sign your messages here? I'm not sure i have understood the signing idea completely? it is to make sure that the reader knows the sender is the person he/she says he/she is!? right!? hope you are all enjoying the weekend! J -- View this message in context: http://www.nabble.com/recover-private-key-tp21268023p21397920.html Sent from the GnuPG - User mailing list archive at Nabble.com. From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Tue Jan 13 00:11:14 2009 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Mon, 12 Jan 2009 18:11:14 -0500 Subject: Question of using GNUPG on Win OS In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <496BCE12.1030102@sixdemonbag.org> Neil Yan wrote: > 1. Where can I download a windows version of GNUPG? The files on GNUPG > download ftp site seems all are Linux version. ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/binary/gnupg-w32cli-1.4.9.exe > 2. How can I decrypt files by using GNUPG programmatic? Using some DLL > API or call the command? Calling the command. You may find Perl to be very useful for this. > 3. Are there any guid or documents for GNUPG windows version? I assume you mean GUIs, as in Graphical User Interface. (GUID is another acronym: Globally Unique Identifier.) Yes; Google for WinPT or GPGshell. From tmz at pobox.com Tue Jan 13 00:20:33 2009 From: tmz at pobox.com (Todd Zullinger) Date: Mon, 12 Jan 2009 18:20:33 -0500 Subject: Setting up a new laptop - importing keyrings In-Reply-To: <200901121536.52224.cannewilson@googlemail.com> References: <200901121536.52224.cannewilson@googlemail.com> Message-ID: <20090112232033.GQ18365@inocybe.teonanacatl.org> Anne Wilson wrote: > I'm setting up a new netbook, and have copied into the .gnupg folder > my keyrings and associated files from this laptop. Kgpg lists the > keys correctly, but all is not well. When I try to set keys for > signing and encryption I get the endless searching bar, as Chris > described a few days ago. I know nothing of Kpg, but perhaps we can determine whether the issue is with gpg or Kgpg and that might narrow down where to look. > I considered starting from an empty keyring and importing signatures > as they arrive in kmail, but I think the problem is that I don't > know how to get the secret key recognised. Are your secret keys listed by "gpg --list-secret-keys" ? If so, then the problem isn't with the keyrings. It could be with Kgpg or the gpg-agent setup (IIRC, that was what the problem a few days ago was). -- Todd OpenPGP -> KeyID: 0xBEAF0CE3 | URL: www.pobox.com/~tmz/pgp ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ A hen is only an egg's way of making another egg. -- Samuel Butler -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 542 bytes Desc: not available URL: From cannewilson at googlemail.com Tue Jan 13 09:15:16 2009 From: cannewilson at googlemail.com (Anne Wilson) Date: Tue, 13 Jan 2009 08:15:16 +0000 Subject: Setting up a new laptop - importing keyrings In-Reply-To: <20090112232033.GQ18365@inocybe.teonanacatl.org> References: <200901121536.52224.cannewilson@googlemail.com> <20090112232033.GQ18365@inocybe.teonanacatl.org> Message-ID: <200901130815.17233.cannewilson@googlemail.com> On Monday 12 January 2009 23:20:33 Todd Zullinger wrote: > Anne Wilson wrote: > > I'm setting up a new netbook, and have copied into the .gnupg folder > > my keyrings and associated files from this laptop. Kgpg lists the > > keys correctly, but all is not well. When I try to set keys for > > signing and encryption I get the endless searching bar, as Chris > > described a few days ago. > > I know nothing of Kpg, but perhaps we can determine whether the issue > is with gpg or Kgpg and that might narrow down where to look. > > > I considered starting from an empty keyring and importing signatures > > as they arrive in kmail, but I think the problem is that I don't > > know how to get the secret key recognised. > > Are your secret keys listed by "gpg --list-secret-keys" ? Yes, they are. All CLI commands work fine. > If so, then > the problem isn't with the keyrings. It could be with Kgpg or the > gpg-agent setup (IIRC, that was what the problem a few days ago was). I think something is preventing communication between kmail and the keyrings, but only in some circumstances. While I can't, in the Fedora installations, set my key to encrypt mail, I can read the encrypted mail that comes to me. I don't think that agent is the problem - it holds the passphrase for the correct amount of time. This is the agent conf file: pinentry-program /usr/bin/pinentry-qt no-grab allow-mark-trusted default-cache-ttl 3600 # GPGConf disabled this option here at Fri 13 Jul 2007 10:47:33 IST # log-file socket:///home/anne/.gnupg/log-socket ###+++--- GPGConf ---+++### default-cache-ttl 3600 allow-mark-trusted debug-level basic log-file socket:///home/anne/.gnupg/log-socket ###+++--- GPGConf ---+++### Sun 11 Jan 2009 08:44:43 GMT # GPGConf edited this configuration file. # It will disable options before this marked block, but it will # never change anything below these lines. It may be relevant to mention that on my Mandriva laptop I use keychain to help with remote administration. There, when I open konsole for the first time each morning, I'm asked for the passphrase. I always then see * Warning: can't find annew at kde.org; skipping Identity added: /home/anne/.ssh/id_dsa (/home/anne/.ssh/id_dsa) can't connect to `/home/anne/.gnupg/log-socket': Connection refused If this (the last line) isn't relevant to this particular problem I'll deal with it in a separate thread later. It doesn't appear to stop anything working. On that particular laptop everything works as expected except for automatically importing keys for signed emails. Anne -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 197 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From faramir.cl at gmail.com Tue Jan 13 11:09:04 2009 From: faramir.cl at gmail.com (Faramir) Date: Tue, 13 Jan 2009 07:09:04 -0300 Subject: recover private key In-Reply-To: <21397920.post@talk.nabble.com> References: <21268023.post@talk.nabble.com> <4963FAFF.7030906@gmail.com> <21367391.post@talk.nabble.com> <49678A0F.6080509@gmail.com> <21386574.post@talk.nabble.com> <49691777.7080200@gmail.com> <21397920.post@talk.nabble.com> Message-ID: <496C6840.2000908@gmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 jakse escribi?: > You are right, john and I already tested it, i had to send the public key to > him by mail though. He could find it on the key server... hmmm?! which is > strange since i think i uploaded it at some point in time. Mmm... it is strange, I think I found it on a keyserver, but it had the problems I told you about (or what I think there are problems, while I think I am right, I know it would not be strange if I am wrong). > my private key starts with the following: > This is a test secret keyring simply stored by GNUPG so that it is easier to > make diff files. I have never seen that... by the way, I am using version 1.4.9, I think the first version I installed was 1.4.7, and the key you are talking about seems to be a lot older than that version... also, I use Windows, I am not sure about your operating system... > Hm. I'm starting to think that i may be better of starting over again?! > Maybe it is easier if I just try to generate a new key!? I don't know what > went wrong when i uploaded to the keyserver?! Well, since you are already doing tests with John, I figure you should ask him about what does he think about that... > do you all use IDEA?! if it is not commonly used i dont think i'll try and > get it. Enough work to get the standard algorithm working for me ;) No, most people don't use it, since it is not natively supported by GnuPG, and there is that copyright problem... I installed it just in case somebody sends a message to me using that algorithm, but I would never use it to send a message, and I have not listed it in my preferences... my keys don't list it, so the only chance somebody could send a message encrypted with IDEA to me, is if the sender forces GPG to do what it is not supposed to do (to use algorithms not supported by the recipient). So you are right, use just the standard algorithms... > Again: do you think it would be better for me to just start over?! Probably, but, as I said, I'd ask John about the subject first... he can provide some advices about what to do with the old key, and what kind of key you should generate (well, since it will be YOUR key, you can generate any kind of key you want, but I mean, probably there are some options better than other options...). > And by the way... why do you all sign your messages here? I'm not sure i > have understood the signing idea completely? it is to make sure that the > reader knows the sender is the person he/she says he/she is!? right!? Well... because I set up Thunderbird to sign messages by default... it's my ineffective attempt to promote the use of OpenPGP... I am still unsure about if I will keep that setting that way... Best Regards -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJJbGhAAAoJEMV4f6PvczxAxLUH/itA1jS5c/RpEcbiBqFyMyaG L9dQUoTgy9LUDDGCyeKH+q2WOc6sWjd5KYl9h7FHo2yKgQHfhVL+C0Y8KHW17f66 Fo35D4Es7/GPtjxqpnQNuZXmz0xm9FhXYS1sFHNyDhbHH5vulU6qaEtBuu/4oW9N SQxgkR1ztkFmc0LP8B1qAN2Ucw0ozt1L0OAinDPDAMcY07MKOLH7BMFoA323Tb9N emYpuJntqNUs2Pj248XXCZLH+iJ5b9WJQz4KpvHrW1cjR23AAPfgpY2wRgg7gCJE 5+d25RBE2HRFPjMwgp22tQNjsP4tk6DsWADVsnGBZmn/M+WWfRzwzbWnhRl8oyU= =QxLo -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From faramir.cl at gmail.com Tue Jan 13 11:31:13 2009 From: faramir.cl at gmail.com (Faramir) Date: Tue, 13 Jan 2009 07:31:13 -0300 Subject: recover private key In-Reply-To: <21397920.post@talk.nabble.com> References: <21268023.post@talk.nabble.com> <4963FAFF.7030906@gmail.com> <21367391.post@talk.nabble.com> <49678A0F.6080509@gmail.com> <21386574.post@talk.nabble.com> <49691777.7080200@gmail.com> <21397920.post@talk.nabble.com> Message-ID: <496C6D71.3080606@gmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 jakse escribi?: > And by the way... why do you all sign your messages here? I'm not sure i > have understood the signing idea completely? it is to make sure that the > reader knows the sender is the person he/she says he/she is!? right!? Sorry, I didn't fully answered your question... The purpose of signatures is to prove messages have not been tampered in transit from the sender to the recipient, but sometimes the signature can be broken without any malicious attempt to modify the message... It also should prove the message comes from the sender and not from somebody impersonating him/her, but all it can prove, is the sender has control of the key... I mean, if somebody steals my key, that somebody would be able to use it to sign messages, but it would not be me the one writing them... but as long as there are not legal or economical consequences, I'd consider signatures as a proof of the sender identity... For more details about what can a signature prove, ask Robert J. Hansen, he knows a lot more about that (well, a lot more about a lot of things related to GPG and signatures) than me. I just started using GPG on april 2008... Best Regards -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJJbG1xAAoJEMV4f6PvczxA3VAH/A2AKEFfe++G3g2UWwaPQXhQ hxoj6echu/rWMy2XHuSZ/59ChLTnX+EUE6Ymtm21MmwXy80lCZGNFRGe+V9JA0mb k6gTuQwyoBOagwtoLvtMc5xsdEw8w5ALTEnXpvxADxP8CiVrAFCEN6kKA7NaV38G kqUI45/WpbpQyygtEHm4a78MIOfMw9/arTlH4CW0YdD+LdKjorgGJAFNHd3lBUq/ d9yZEaeq3aC+r0eSpeh6gSvt1vAa6XsGyy9jyyAPgen1JHY9EDa8595gzl8Zt1F1 qgzwHKkEKw+lAOO7krJhx0eAdgsYZ6ZoaV1AinDuozEtEMhYukaGJcspnVtR5Jo= =HlOY -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From neil.yan at akmii.com Tue Jan 13 09:14:30 2009 From: neil.yan at akmii.com (Neil Yan) Date: Tue, 13 Jan 2009 00:14:30 -0800 Subject: Question of using GNUPG on Win OS In-Reply-To: <496BCE12.1030102@sixdemonbag.org> References: <496BCE12.1030102@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: Thanks for you reply. I mean are there any guide or documents for GNUPG windows version? I am sorry for the typo. Here I have one more question. If I want to use one key on multiple machine, or i want to save the private key in some removable device. Is that possible? I cannot find any command used to backup private key. Thanks, Neil On Mon, Jan 12, 2009 at 3:11 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > Neil Yan wrote: > > 1. Where can I download a windows version of GNUPG? The files on GNUPG > > download ftp site seems all are Linux version. > > ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/binary/gnupg-w32cli-1.4.9.exe > > > 2. How can I decrypt files by using GNUPG programmatic? Using some DLL > > API or call the command? > > Calling the command. You may find Perl to be very useful for this. > > > 3. Are there any guid or documents for GNUPG windows version? > > I assume you mean GUIs, as in Graphical User Interface. (GUID is > another acronym: Globally Unique Identifier.) Yes; Google for WinPT or > GPGshell. > > -- Thanks, Neil -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Tue Jan 13 14:45:32 2009 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Tue, 13 Jan 2009 08:45:32 -0500 Subject: recover private key In-Reply-To: <496C6D71.3080606@gmail.com> References: <21268023.post@talk.nabble.com> <4963FAFF.7030906@gmail.com> <21367391.post@talk.nabble.com> <49678A0F.6080509@gmail.com> <21386574.post@talk.nabble.com> <49691777.7080200@gmail.com> <21397920.post@talk.nabble.com> <496C6D71.3080606@gmail.com> Message-ID: <496C9AFC.7010509@sixdemonbag.org> (This email is for jakse, although I'm responding to Faramir's email.) > And by the way... why do you all sign your messages here? I'm not sure i > have understood the signing idea completely? it is to make sure that the > reader knows the sender is the person he/she says he/she is!? right!? An ideal signature requires four things: 1. Your recipient knows you 2. Your recipient trusts you 3. Your recipient has verified your key fingerprint 4. Your recipient trusts your computer has not been hijacked The more of these requirements that are missing, the less utility there is in a signature. If I send a signed email message to, say, Faramir, well ... Faramir barely knows me at all. I don't know if he trusts me. (I'd be surprised if he did; it's not like I ever bought him a beer.) He hasn't verified my key fingerprint, either directly or through the WoT. And in an era where 20%+ of all desktops are hijacked, how can he be sure of #4? Add up all the ways in which we're departing from the Platonic ideal and you can tell that my signature on a message to Faramir really counts for astonishingly little. Signing posts to a mailing list is much the same: of all the people who receive it, hardly anyone will know you, trust you, or have verified your fingerprint. Usually when people sign mailing list posts they are doing one of three things: 1. Testing their system to make sure everything works 2. Making a small public show of support for our right to use strong cryptography 3. Grossly misunderstanding the utility of their signature #1 and #2 are both great ideas and I'm all in favor of it. It's okay to sign your messages if you're doing so to make sure that you understand how it's done. Someday you'll need signatures, and when that day comes the practice will pay off. Likewise, showing public support for email cryptography is a Good Thing and should be encouraged. Unfortunately, #3 is true much more often than it's not. Probably the biggest myth about signatures is they provide either repudiability by proxy. Even very intelligent and experienced users fall victim to it. A lot of people will say, "I sign everything so that if later on someone tampers with my messages I can prove I didn't write it." Unfortunately, digital signatures don't provide this capability. Imagine that I'm back in grad school teaching a class and I give a student a poor grade. The student decides to get revenge on me by posting to notorious white supremacist message boards in my name, then conveniently blows the whistle on "my" activities. I get hauled into the Dean's office where I get told I'm being suspended pending the investigation. "But I didn't write those!" I say. "I sign absolutely everything! Were those messages signed? They were either missing a signature or had a bad signature, right? Clearly, obviously, I didn't write them!" "Ah," the Dean answers, "but you're a smart guy, Rob, and you're smart enough to have deliberately omitted a signature, or put a bad one, on incriminating messages you wanted to later repudiate. The lack of your signature, or the presence of a bad one, doesn't prove anything about whether you wrote it. Sorry. We'll have the investigation wrapped up by next semester." From cannewilson at googlemail.com Tue Jan 13 16:16:25 2009 From: cannewilson at googlemail.com (Anne Wilson) Date: Tue, 13 Jan 2009 15:16:25 +0000 Subject: Setting up a new laptop - importing keyrings In-Reply-To: <200901130815.17233.cannewilson@googlemail.com> References: <200901121536.52224.cannewilson@googlemail.com> <20090112232033.GQ18365@inocybe.teonanacatl.org> <200901130815.17233.cannewilson@googlemail.com> Message-ID: <200901131516.25493.cannewilson@googlemail.com> On Tuesday 13 January 2009 08:15:16 Anne Wilson wrote: > On Monday 12 January 2009 23:20:33 Todd Zullinger wrote: > > Anne Wilson wrote: > > > I'm setting up a new netbook, and have copied into the .gnupg folder > > > my keyrings and associated files from this laptop. Kgpg lists the > > > keys correctly, but all is not well. When I try to set keys for > > > signing and encryption I get the endless searching bar, as Chris > > > described a few days ago. > > > > I know nothing of Kpg, but perhaps we can determine whether the issue > > is with gpg or Kgpg and that might narrow down where to look. > > > > > I considered starting from an empty keyring and importing signatures > > > as they arrive in kmail, but I think the problem is that I don't > > > know how to get the secret key recognised. > > > > Are your secret keys listed by "gpg --list-secret-keys" ? > > Yes, they are. All CLI commands work fine. > > > If so, then > > the problem isn't with the keyrings. It could be with Kgpg or the > > gpg-agent setup (IIRC, that was what the problem a few days ago was). > > I think something is preventing communication between kmail and the > keyrings, but only in some circumstances. While I can't, in the Fedora > installations, set my key to encrypt mail, I can read the encrypted mail > that comes to me. > > I don't think that agent is the problem - it holds the passphrase for the > correct amount of time. This is the agent conf file: > > pinentry-program /usr/bin/pinentry-qt > no-grab > allow-mark-trusted > default-cache-ttl 3600 > # GPGConf disabled this option here at Fri 13 Jul 2007 10:47:33 IST > # log-file socket:///home/anne/.gnupg/log-socket > > ###+++--- GPGConf ---+++### > default-cache-ttl 3600 > allow-mark-trusted > debug-level basic > log-file socket:///home/anne/.gnupg/log-socket > ###+++--- GPGConf ---+++### Sun 11 Jan 2009 08:44:43 GMT > # GPGConf edited this configuration file. > # It will disable options before this marked block, but it will > # never change anything below these lines. > > It may be relevant to mention that on my Mandriva laptop I use keychain to > help with remote administration. There, when I open konsole for the first > time each morning, I'm asked for the passphrase. I always then see > > * Warning: can't find annew at kde.org; skipping > Identity added: /home/anne/.ssh/id_dsa (/home/anne/.ssh/id_dsa) > can't connect to `/home/anne/.gnupg/log-socket': Connection refused > > If this (the last line) isn't relevant to this particular problem I'll deal > with it in a separate thread later. It doesn't appear to stop anything > working. On that particular laptop everything works as expected except for > automatically importing keys for signed emails. > Are these log messages likely to be relevant? kdm: :0: PAM adding faulty module: /lib/security/pam_gnome_keyring.so: 5 Time(s) kdm: :0: PAM unable to dlopen(/lib/security/pam_gnome_keyring.so): /lib/security/pam_gnome_keyring.so: cannot open shared object file: No such file or directory: 5 Time(s) polkit-grant-helper: granted authorization for org.freedesktop.packagekit.package-install-untrusted to pid 9436 [uid=500] [auth=root]: 1 Time(s) Anne -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 197 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From wk at gnupg.org Tue Jan 13 17:32:27 2009 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Tue, 13 Jan 2009 17:32:27 +0100 Subject: Can't find one identity In-Reply-To: <200901100802.45897.cannewilson@googlemail.com> (Anne Wilson's message of "Sat, 10 Jan 2009 08:02:45 +0000") References: <200901100802.45897.cannewilson@googlemail.com> Message-ID: <87mydv415w.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> On Sat, 10 Jan 2009 09:02, cannewilson at googlemail.com said: > I'm not sure whether this is a gpg or keychain/ssh issue. I use keychain to > handle mounts to my server box for maintenance. Every day, the first time I > start konsole, I'm asked for my ssh password. I get a connection, but also > get '* Warning: can't find annew at kde.org; skipping' That is an ssh or keychain problem. It does not come from GnuPG. If you are using keychain (or whatever gnome ssh stuff) along with "gpg-agent --enable-ssh-support" you will get into problems because they don't work cleanly with gpg-agent. I don't have any details but I once looked at it and they try to workaround gpg-agent with some false assumption's of gpg-agent's internal working. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Auschnahme regelt ein Bundeschgesetz. From cannewilson at googlemail.com Tue Jan 13 18:53:12 2009 From: cannewilson at googlemail.com (Anne Wilson) Date: Tue, 13 Jan 2009 17:53:12 +0000 Subject: Can't find one identity In-Reply-To: <87mydv415w.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> References: <200901100802.45897.cannewilson@googlemail.com> <87mydv415w.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> Message-ID: <200901131753.12532.cannewilson@googlemail.com> On Tuesday 13 January 2009 16:32:27 Werner Koch wrote: > On Sat, 10 Jan 2009 09:02, cannewilson at googlemail.com said: > > I'm not sure whether this is a gpg or keychain/ssh issue. I use keychain > > to handle mounts to my server box for maintenance. Every day, the first > > time I start konsole, I'm asked for my ssh password. I get a connection, > > but also get '* Warning: can't find annew at kde.org; skipping' > > That is an ssh or keychain problem. It does not come from GnuPG. > > If you are using keychain (or whatever gnome ssh stuff) along with > "gpg-agent --enable-ssh-support" you will get into problems because they > don't work cleanly with gpg-agent. I don't have any details but I once > looked at it and they try to workaround gpg-agent with some false > assumption's of gpg-agent's internal working. > OK - thanks for the clarification. It doesn't appear to cause any problems, so I'll just ignore it. Anne -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 197 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From faramir.cl at gmail.com Tue Jan 13 20:26:35 2009 From: faramir.cl at gmail.com (Faramir) Date: Tue, 13 Jan 2009 16:26:35 -0300 Subject: Question of using GNUPG on Win OS In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <496CEAEB.60100@gmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Neil Yan escribi?: > Hi, Hello! I am not sure if you got replies, so I'll reply now... > tool for my requirement. But I am really confused by the GNUPG version > and usage since I don't have many experience of Linux OS. My project > will be executed on Win OS. So, I have following questions need your Don't worry, GnuPG is available for windows. > 1. Where can I download a windows version of GNUPG? The files on GNUPG > download ftp site seems all are Linux version. http://www.gnupg.org/download/index.en.html Go to the binaries section of that page (just scroll down), the one you want is: GnuPG 1.4.9 compiled for Microsoft Windows. (click on the FTP link) Probably you will need to add GnuPG manually to the path global environment variable. > 2. How can I decrypt files by using GNUPG programmatic? Using some DLL > API or call the command? I don't know how to do it, but surely there is a way to do it, since there are third parties GUIs (like GPGShell and Enigmail). > 3. Are there any guid or documents for GNUPG windows version? Well, the program comes with an user manual, that explains how to use it from command line. And the site has links to HowTo's and other resources. I think the usage of GPG is the same, no matter the operating system you are using, but I can be wrong about that. The manual included in windows binaries works fine (open it using WordPad, or notepad). Best Regards -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJJbOrrAAoJEMV4f6PvczxA7rIH/Aq88tvdnqCvuL6brMl2IjlY GUn0V1JF1HjM4TLxXIwYcgEZZ3nX4e6diA5ik9mJFInEL3+FiSQZzm/P8K6hWDiz 7T8aZD2H83o1KCyUCk0kHlb0ePAAhpihJTj5LMPVJxpcthS+8ykm1SNkWed3yeJ6 O4J38EvTAWsQfHK7sFHmJvdrcdDzMLguySiQyX3aCaNkoYySTDBZnBjqBi8BghvF TXHDEF9ifJHhfV26zZaaStOPuIOu+9HKuBeCVBdZrL5HKuMUZPudczgbCmBvBLh7 7hzELs2XdnmDT85/PJ9/RF7sgCjHoYuhlQftLkXLeFVs4BqDDeDMtKa4Dx4RY7s= =eV1N -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From faramir.cl at gmail.com Tue Jan 13 21:20:31 2009 From: faramir.cl at gmail.com (Faramir) Date: Tue, 13 Jan 2009 17:20:31 -0300 Subject: Question of using GNUPG on Win OS In-Reply-To: References: <496BCE12.1030102@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <496CF78F.4040905@gmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Neil Yan escribi?: ... > Here I have one more question. > > If I want to use one key on multiple machine, or i want to save the > private key in some removable device. Is that possible? I cannot find > any command used to backup private key. C:\GnuPG>gpg --output public.asc --armor --export ABCD1234 C:\GnuPG>gpg --output secret.asc --armor --export-secret-keys ABCD1234 If you export the key, you will need to import it in the other machine C:\GnuPG>gpg --import secret.asc Best Regards -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJJbPePAAoJEMV4f6PvczxAhlIIAKIP4T1Kz3UXCfFppn2abPik m0eSz/BA8hPyq5jNRZFJTVxzM2qgJu5NUl+9gQvbdJeifarx3yJI4Uj/TZycwKMl I8xJxdtLwxSF7vvK8ZNXIZhWV9qBwOLgPqI50kpcmFolXzHj18Y0WWKyfpUXDS03 wro3Ge2hqLoY8vRraAuiwecHZpx8ao2XFcNnF8E+Lz2HLVqR6Sh0fH3r2ETaeBR5 V790nQvb4A9Lsa7ebv9pTDdBSWcpzYPX1Q7b/dQT10TXE2zMlFo/Gld7nYN1mokt Nf40RVj+nlUEuE+Y9Dl42jWT8TtQahzY5HspuUksuQJVeeqCygi45dY3pYo4vR8= =dhhx -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From avi.wiki at gmail.com Tue Jan 13 22:14:19 2009 From: avi.wiki at gmail.com (Avi) Date: Tue, 13 Jan 2009 16:14:19 -0500 Subject: Subject: Re: recover private key Message-ID: <27ee9bfb0901131314q4b59d565k31dcc02f14172c8d@mail.gmail.com> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > From: "Robert J. Hansen" > To: Faramir > Date: Tue, 13 Jan 2009 08:45:32 -0500 > Subject: Re: recover private key > (This email is for jakse, although I'm responding to Faramir's email.) > > [snip] > > Usually when people sign mailing list posts they are doing one of three > things: > > 1. Testing their system to make sure everything works > 2. Making a small public show of support for our right > to use strong cryptography > 3. Grossly misunderstanding the utility of their > signature > > #1 and #2 are both great ideas and I'm all in favor of it. It's okay to > sign your messages if you're doing so to make sure that you understand > how it's done. Someday you'll need signatures, and when that day comes > the practice will pay off. Likewise, showing public support for email > cryptography is a Good Thing and should be encouraged. > > Unfortunately, #3 is true much more often than it's not. > > Probably the biggest myth about signatures is they provide either > repudiability by proxy. Even very intelligent and experienced users > fall victim to it. A lot of people will say, "I sign everything so that > if later on someone tampers with my messages I can prove I didn't write > it." > > Unfortunately, digital signatures don't provide this capability. > > Imagine that I'm back in grad school teaching a class and I give a > student a poor grade. The student decides to get revenge on me by > posting to notorious white supremacist message boards in my name, then > conveniently blows the whistle on "my" activities. I get hauled into > the Dean's office where I get told I'm being suspended pending the > investigation. > > "But I didn't write those!" I say. "I sign absolutely everything! Were > those messages signed? They were either missing a signature or had a > bad signature, right? Clearly, obviously, I didn't write them!" > > "Ah," the Dean answers, "but you're a smart guy, Rob, and you're smart > enough to have deliberately omitted a signature, or put a bad one, on > incriminating messages you wanted to later repudiate. The lack of your > signature, or the presence of a bad one, doesn't prove anything about > whether you wrote it. Sorry. We'll have the investigation wrapped up > by next semester." -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: RIPEMD160 Far be it from me to argue with Rob, who likely has forgotten more about cryptography than I will ever learn, let alone know now, but while signing messages cannot prove that an unsigned message is false, it can prove that signed messages are true. For example, given the possibility of a piece of an e-mail being quoted out of context, signing my messages allows me to demonstrate the totality of what I did write at the time I wrote it, so I have a recourse to show the entire post and its context. The same would apply for text documents, etc. - --Avi -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) - GPGshell v3.71 iEYEAREDAAYFAkltA74ACgkQy6A/Rnheoimb/gCfah/4X5sOuxhymqmuWrOtEQoy 4kcAn2iefpmuWtnHPW/lKSWpq43Tm6vH =5J12 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- en:User:Avraham pub 1024D/785EA229 3/6/2007 Avi (Wikipedia-related) Primary key fingerprint: D233 20E7 0697 C3BC 4445 7D45 CBA0 3F46 785E A229 -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Wed Jan 14 00:21:26 2009 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Tue, 13 Jan 2009 18:21:26 -0500 Subject: Subject: Re: recover private key In-Reply-To: <27ee9bfb0901131314q4b59d565k31dcc02f14172c8d@mail.gmail.com> References: <27ee9bfb0901131314q4b59d565k31dcc02f14172c8d@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <496D21F6.2090204@sixdemonbag.org> Avi wrote: > For example, given the possibility of a piece of an e-mail being > quoted out of context, signing my messages allows me to > demonstrate the totality of what I did write at the time I wrote > it, so I have a recourse to show the entire post and its > context. The same would apply for text documents, etc. Yes and no. If I ask "Avi, did you really say 'I liked Yasser Arafat'?'", you might present me with this message: "With respect to the Munich Massacre -- I don't know who was ultimately responsible for it, but I always liked Yasser Arafat as the chief culprit." ... But unbeknownst to me, you /did/ actually say "I liked Yasser Arafat. I liked him quite a bit, really. I often had him over for tea and scones and we would talk about our families." When confronted with the quote "I like Yasser Arafat", you wanted to be able to deny saying it. So you wrote up an innocuous text message involving the Munich Massacre, reset your computer clock back, signed it, and then presented me with the doctored message as proof of what you _really_ said at that point in time. You cannot use signatures to put excerpts in context, not in the general case. The timestamp problem is a killer. If the person presenting you with a quote also includes the signature of the message they're quoting, though, then yes, this becomes possible. But if they're excerpting you, odds are good they don't have your signature. From avi.wiki at gmail.com Wed Jan 14 00:34:34 2009 From: avi.wiki at gmail.com (Avi) Date: Tue, 13 Jan 2009 18:34:34 -0500 Subject: Subject: Re: recover private key In-Reply-To: <496D21F6.2090204@sixdemonbag.org> References: <27ee9bfb0901131314q4b59d565k31dcc02f14172c8d@mail.gmail.com> <496D21F6.2090204@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <27ee9bfb0901131534p7b358d8dx5554b4eaa9ac62fc@mail.gmail.com> Yes, Robert, that is possible. However, IIRC, signatures come with a time stamp. In the case I am envisioning, the quotER is taking it from somwhere, and the quotEE can show the prior, complete post. Yes, this does not prevent someone from pre-creating two different messages, but someone resorting to that level of duplicity is both uncommon and will likely have other prevaricatory methods as well. --Avi On 1/13/09, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > Avi wrote: >> For example, given the possibility of a piece of an e-mail being >> quoted out of context, signing my messages allows me to >> demonstrate the totality of what I did write at the time I wrote >> it, so I have a recourse to show the entire post and its >> context. The same would apply for text documents, etc. > > Yes and no. If I ask "Avi, did you really say 'I liked Yasser > Arafat'?'", you might present me with this message: > > > "With respect to the Munich Massacre -- I don't know > who was ultimately responsible for it, but I always > liked Yasser Arafat as the chief culprit." > > > ... But unbeknownst to me, you /did/ actually say "I liked Yasser > Arafat. I liked him quite a bit, really. I often had him over for tea > and scones and we would talk about our families." > > When confronted with the quote "I like Yasser Arafat", you wanted to be > able to deny saying it. So you wrote up an innocuous text message > involving the Munich Massacre, reset your computer clock back, signed > it, and then presented me with the doctored message as proof of what you > _really_ said at that point in time. > > You cannot use signatures to put excerpts in context, not in the general > case. The timestamp problem is a killer. > > If the person presenting you with a quote also includes the signature of > the message they're quoting, though, then yes, this becomes possible. > But if they're excerpting you, odds are good they don't have your signature. > -- Sent from my mobile device ---- en:User:Avraham pub 1024D/785EA229 3/6/2007 Avi (Wikipedia-related) Primary key fingerprint: D233 20E7 0697 C3BC 4445 7D45 CBA0 3F46 785E A229 From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Wed Jan 14 04:34:36 2009 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Tue, 13 Jan 2009 22:34:36 -0500 Subject: Subject: Re: recover private key In-Reply-To: <27ee9bfb0901131534p7b358d8dx5554b4eaa9ac62fc@mail.gmail.com> References: <27ee9bfb0901131314q4b59d565k31dcc02f14172c8d@mail.gmail.com> <496D21F6.2090204@sixdemonbag.org> <27ee9bfb0901131534p7b358d8dx5554b4eaa9ac62fc@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <496D5D4C.1020003@sixdemonbag.org> Avi wrote: > Yes, Robert, that is possible. However, IIRC, signatures come with a > time stamp. The OpenPGP time stamp is not a trusted timestamp and should not be relied upon for any trusted purpose. > In the case I am envisioning, the quotER is taking it from > somwhere, and the quotEE can show the prior, complete post. Assuming you still have a copy of the message, yes. But in the case you're talking about, what does the signature buy you? "Yes, I did write that, but in the full context (available at this link...) you see I meant something quite different." That's as effective with a signature as without. So I don't see how this is an example of the utility of a signature. > Yes, this does not prevent someone from pre-creating two different > messages, but someone resorting to that level of duplicity is both > uncommon and will likely have other prevaricatory methods as well. There's no pre-creation necessary in the scenario I outlined. Maybe I just know an uncommon class of scoundrels, but that level of skullduggery is fairly tame in my experience. From faramir.cl at gmail.com Wed Jan 14 04:55:04 2009 From: faramir.cl at gmail.com (Faramir) Date: Wed, 14 Jan 2009 00:55:04 -0300 Subject: Subject: Re: recover private key In-Reply-To: <496D21F6.2090204@sixdemonbag.org> References: <27ee9bfb0901131314q4b59d565k31dcc02f14172c8d@mail.gmail.com> <496D21F6.2090204@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <496D6218.5060000@gmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Robert J. Hansen escribi?: ... > If the person presenting you with a quote also includes the signature of > the message they're quoting, though, then yes, this becomes possible. > But if they're excerpting you, odds are good they don't have your signature. If they excerpt the message, I can claim it was forged... sure, people can believe my word, or not... but at least, signing the message would not harm me. And if the present the whole message, including the signature, then they can't change the context... In that context my signature is "protecting me" or at least, it would be neutral... Anyway, *I* think digital signatures doesn't have to be perfect, since they intend to (somehow) replace the handwritten signatures, which can also be forged... if a digital signature is not easier to forge than a handwritten signature, I would consider it as a "authenticity proof". Of course, if there are legal or economical stuff involved, I would also need to know the security policies used to keep the private key safe, but usually I would not require something so elaborated... But that is just _my opinion, if somebody is a bank CEO, probably he would have a different point of view about this subject... Best Regards. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJJbWIYAAoJEMV4f6PvczxAYU8H/37jZf5sFq2SLS27DgX1Caam UCMw3JOqnUUGkwFDT9G2C9cfP/nYRG2jAMd5z5Nd8O1m+C9Umuew/8x2+z0a3JhV YOLoiiRqJ3KacFKPEROnaFEyf3Vyh1Wf49PtRB51HEnA+EeHg5VvXlaKlCuDlQ7u w8q7SPX1d300+WgFg4+2owFFFfiVam4canjVTe8A3OmIq1ybTUTHkTDY4t1qR7kV SZSPjau7SB0PVNMdmS1JAU5M0Atn0WkKXI2StMYo1+MnwUYshztj3ND2RQT8XgOs v9LUkTrZ6Ys1GjPL9pdJC7PLWfnhlsccCdaGRVhQprv2r229qqXA53/Q/MaxtZ4= =i2sE -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From avi.wiki at gmail.com Wed Jan 14 14:46:40 2009 From: avi.wiki at gmail.com (Avi) Date: Wed, 14 Jan 2009 08:46:40 -0500 Subject: Subject: Re: recover private key In-Reply-To: <496D5D4C.1020003@sixdemonbag.org> References: <27ee9bfb0901131314q4b59d565k31dcc02f14172c8d@mail.gmail.com> <496D21F6.2090204@sixdemonbag.org> <27ee9bfb0901131534p7b358d8dx5554b4eaa9ac62fc@mail.gmail.com> <496D5D4C.1020003@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <27ee9bfb0901140546l6e9a1f3qff4f8492f094b4dd@mail.gmail.com> On Tue, Jan 13, 2009 at 10:34 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > Avi wrote: > > Yes, Robert, that is possible. However, IIRC, signatures come with a > > time stamp. > > The OpenPGP time stamp is not a trusted timestamp and should not be > relied upon for any trusted purpose. Point taken. > > > > In the case I am envisioning, the quotER is taking it from > > somwhere, and the quotEE can show the prior, complete post. > > > > Yes, this does not prevent someone from pre-creating two different > > messages, but someone resorting to that level of duplicity is both > > uncommon and will likely have other prevaricatory methods as well. > > There's no pre-creation necessary in the scenario I outlined. Maybe I > just know an uncommon class of scoundrels, but that level of > skullduggery is fairly tame in my experience. > Again, point taken, and remind me not to trust your friends with my wallet 8-) Thanks for the explanations, Robert. --Avi ---- en:User:Avraham pub 1024D/785EA229 3/6/2007 Avi (Wikipedia-related) Primary key fingerprint: D233 20E7 0697 C3BC 4445 7D45 CBA0 3F46 785E A229 -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Wed Jan 14 15:47:03 2009 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Wed, 14 Jan 2009 09:47:03 -0500 Subject: Paperkey on windows In-Reply-To: <4967AE1E.1050505@gmail.com> References: <4967AE1E.1050505@gmail.com> Message-ID: <20090114144703.GA29374@jabberwocky.com> On Fri, Jan 09, 2009 at 05:05:50PM -0300, Faramir wrote: > Hello! > I while ago, there was some talk about Paperkey, and John Clizbe > was very kind and sent me the binary file compiled for ms-windows. > Today, in other list, I saw a question about "what about windows users?" I'm gearing up for a new release of paperkey in the next several days. No major change to the code - it's mainly a documentation update. For this release, I'm going to try and release a Win32 binary at the same time. This turned out to be much easier than I was expecting - plus it's rather amusing to cross-compile a 32-bit Windows binary on a 64-bit Linux box, which is itself running within VMware on a Mac. Anyway, if someone was willing to give the resultant Win32 binary a quick test, please let me know (offlist). David From decouk at gmail.com Wed Jan 14 15:49:36 2009 From: decouk at gmail.com (Andre Amorim) Date: Wed, 14 Jan 2009 14:49:36 +0000 Subject: Dan Brown - Digital Fortress book Message-ID: Hi all, Anyone knows what's is fact (real) and what is fiction in Dan Brown novel, Digital Fortress ? Kind Regards, [s] -- Andre Amorim GnuPG KEY ID: 0x587B1970 FingerPrint: 42AE C929 4D91 4591 4E75 430F 78D9 53B4 587B 1970 Download: http://pgp.mit.edu:11371/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x587B1970 From shavital at mac.com Wed Jan 14 16:15:47 2009 From: shavital at mac.com (Charly Avital) Date: Wed, 14 Jan 2009 10:15:47 -0500 Subject: Dan Brown - Digital Fortress book In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <496E01A3.5020506@mac.com> Andre Amorim wrote the following on 1/14/09 9:49 AM: > Hi all, > > Anyone knows what's is fact (real) and what is fiction in Dan Brown > novel, Digital Fortress ? > > Kind Regards, > [s] I read it years ago. I believe it's the worst book ever written by Dan Brown. Some excerpts from: . I believe the following list of Mr. Brown's errors (or delusions) is not exclusive, to say the least. Still, it's my opinion, only. Charly ---------- "Although the book's website cites reviews lauding Digital Fortress for being extremely realistic, the book contains a number of technical errors and misunderstandings in computers, math and technology. * Brown mentions a Hungarian mathematician, Josef Harne, who in 1987 proposed an encryption algorithm that, in addition to encrypting, shifted decrypted cleartext over a time variant. However, neither Harne nor the concept of rotating-cleartext ever existed.[1] * Brown says the atomic bomb dropped on Nagasaki was fueled by the uranium isotope U-238. The Fat Man bomb dropped on Nagasaki was fueled by plutonium 239, and U-238 is not an easily fissionable isotope of uranium (needing a fusion reaction to initiate fission in the U-238). * Brown also inaccurately portrays the leadership of the NSA. As part of the Department of Defense, the NSA director - by law - must be a three-star Lieutenant General or Vice Admiral. * Brown confuses bits with bytes, describing a 64bit string as containing 64 alphanumeric characters. In fact it would be just 8 assuming the most basic 8bit character encoding, each character being a byte or 8 bits. * Brown suggests that TRANSLTR, a machine capable of breaking a 64bit key in 10 minutes would take just an hour to break a 10,000 bit key. This is a gross misunderstanding of the relationship between key lengths and the time required to brute force them. Such a machine would take over 80,000 years to break a 96-bit key and over 350,000 billion years (nearly 30,000 times the current age of the universe) to break a 128-bit key. The number of years it would take to break a 10,000 bit key isn't even practical to write down - it has 2,987 digits. * Brown repeatedly confuses storage or processing of data with execution. For example, TRANSLTR is threatened because it has tried to crack Digital Fortress, which is actually a virus, and the database is similarly threatened because Digital Fortress is sent to it by TRANSLTR. Databases and password crackers do not execute the information presented to them, so it wouldn't matter that Digital Fortress contains harmful instructions. * Characters who are supposedly experts in cryptography seem to think there is no such thing as an unbreakable encryption scheme. See one-time pad." ---------- From decouk at gmail.com Wed Jan 14 17:12:07 2009 From: decouk at gmail.com (Andre Amorim) Date: Wed, 14 Jan 2009 16:12:07 +0000 Subject: Dan Brown - Digital Fortress book In-Reply-To: <496E01A3.5020506@mac.com> References: <496E01A3.5020506@mac.com> Message-ID: >concept of rotating-cleartext ever existed.[1] >Charly Avital Thanks Charly Avital for explanations. I know, I'd had read his others books firstly... and yes... I read like Dan as who is reading comics books, no worrys. The thing that really catch my attention was the concept of rotating-cleartext thing. But I think the book is good in the sense that it's encourage those who are not expert in the subject to know more about. Thats why I'm here asking. [s] -AA 2009/1/14 Charly Avital : > Andre Amorim wrote the following on 1/14/09 9:49 AM: >> Hi all, >> >> Anyone knows what's is fact (real) and what is fiction in Dan Brown >> novel, Digital Fortress ? >> >> Kind Regards, >> [s] > > > I read it years ago. I believe it's the worst book ever written by Dan > Brown. > > Some excerpts from: . I > believe the following list of Mr. Brown's errors (or delusions) is not > exclusive, to say the least. > > Still, it's my opinion, only. > > Charly > > ---------- > "Although the book's website cites reviews lauding Digital Fortress for > being extremely realistic, the book contains a number of technical > errors and misunderstandings in computers, math and technology. > > * Brown mentions a Hungarian mathematician, Josef Harne, who in 1987 > proposed an encryption algorithm that, in addition to encrypting, > shifted decrypted cleartext over a time variant. However, neither Harne > nor the concept of rotating-cleartext ever existed.[1] > * Brown says the atomic bomb dropped on Nagasaki was fueled by the > uranium isotope U-238. The Fat Man bomb dropped on Nagasaki was fueled > by plutonium 239, and U-238 is not an easily fissionable isotope of > uranium (needing a fusion reaction to initiate fission in the U-238). > * Brown also inaccurately portrays the leadership of the NSA. As > part of the Department of Defense, the NSA director - by law - must be a > three-star Lieutenant General or Vice Admiral. > * Brown confuses bits with bytes, describing a 64bit string as > containing 64 alphanumeric characters. In fact it would be just 8 > assuming the most basic 8bit character encoding, each character being a > byte or 8 bits. > * Brown suggests that TRANSLTR, a machine capable of breaking a > 64bit key in 10 minutes would take just an hour to break a 10,000 bit > key. This is a gross misunderstanding of the relationship between key > lengths and the time required to brute force them. Such a machine would > take over 80,000 years to break a 96-bit key and over 350,000 billion > years (nearly 30,000 times the current age of the universe) to break a > 128-bit key. The number of years it would take to break a 10,000 bit key > isn't even practical to write down - it has 2,987 digits. > * Brown repeatedly confuses storage or processing of data with > execution. For example, TRANSLTR is threatened because it has tried to > crack Digital Fortress, which is actually a virus, and the database is > similarly threatened because Digital Fortress is sent to it by TRANSLTR. > Databases and password crackers do not execute the information presented > to them, so it wouldn't matter that Digital Fortress contains harmful > instructions. > * Characters who are supposedly experts in cryptography seem to > think there is no such thing as an unbreakable encryption scheme. See > one-time pad." > ---------- > -- Andre Amorim GnuPG KEY ID: 0x587B1970 FingerPrint: 42AE C929 4D91 4591 4E75 430F 78D9 53B4 587B 1970 Download: http://pgp.mit.edu:11371/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x587B1970 From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Wed Jan 14 17:47:58 2009 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Wed, 14 Jan 2009 11:47:58 -0500 Subject: Dan Brown - Digital Fortress book In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <496E173E.4080608@sixdemonbag.org> Andre Amorim wrote: > Anyone knows what's is fact (real) and what is fiction in Dan Brown > novel, Digital Fortress ? The book is almost wholly fiction with the occasional bit of name-dropping thrown in to make it sound authentic. The idea of a cipher that shifts over time and thus making it unbreakable is patently ridiculous. All you're doing is making a timestamp part of the encryption key, nothing more or less. The TRANSLATR machine does not work and cannot work, not under the laws of physics as we know them to be. The description of life in a secure high-reliability datacenter is also absurd. E.g., the book mentions several times how they use Freon to cool the machinery. Real datacenters explicitly forbid Freon. When Freon catches fire it decomposes into phosgene, a nerve gas, which makes it kind of hard to fight the fire. In the book, a fire ravages the datacenter and yet somehow people in it aren't dead from phosgene exposure. The portrayal of the NSA doesn't even rise to the level of a caricature. The book is a miserable, insufferable, abysmal waste of time. A friend of mine once gave me a copy with the caveat that I wouldn't be able to finish it. I did, but only to prove him wrong. From shavital at mac.com Wed Jan 14 17:49:32 2009 From: shavital at mac.com (Charly Avital) Date: Wed, 14 Jan 2009 11:49:32 -0500 Subject: GnuPG 2.0.10 In-Reply-To: <87skoxsgls.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> References: <87skoxsgls.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> Message-ID: <496E179C.5020503@mac.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Hi, 1. Installed and running on MacBook Intel Core 2 Duo, using Benjamin Donnachie's binary installer (Intel). 2. Compiled on Mac PPC from src and Benjamin Donnachie's Mac native pinentry package. 3. Compiled from src on Ubuntu 8.10_64bits, running under VMware All installations function fine. Charly Ubuntu 8.10 64bits under VMware (MacOSX 10.5.6) - gpg 1.4.9 - gpg 2.0.10 - - 0xA57A8EFA -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.10 (GNU/Linux) Comment: GnuPG for Privacy Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJJbheXAAoJEM3GMi2FW4Pv2xIH/i8v00wQE9Xf3zKxgvKhfBBK ttRQjqmW2JJrNiKZ1y8XuY838+klq+hrPF+K6M4RflKqheiHWXqBgduKMcYaOrqC LgczIHCDr6AMtvjrfktO7cWsJHzEA5T6Zn/MJsdnt5Z+XLbTa5DYi+W8TyGfE7/L y/RWayatRoo9fFryk7BLivuOzMQYCgAtanB15wx3CbaTcOBB0nMgqxVFJmFBrUBo Zb17XEeD+pTqOs50e7ZQUrICN6+6wsZMu46rk1P4ucee65yGLdv6Tw0R6Dp/mjxs 8uPIyEELNxGhblCLAgHaxrIh6HfxXNpNIGzkh41nh3sqLWQvmhgqao6S6UYrr28= =S7Xq -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Wed Jan 14 17:53:36 2009 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Wed, 14 Jan 2009 11:53:36 -0500 Subject: Dan Brown - Digital Fortress book In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20090114165336.GA29568@jabberwocky.com> On Wed, Jan 14, 2009 at 02:49:36PM +0000, Andre Amorim wrote: > Hi all, > > Anyone knows what's is fact (real) and what is fiction in Dan Brown > novel, Digital Fortress ? In Digital Fortress there are things called "computers" and things called "human beings". Quite near everything else - including what these computers and human beings do - is fiction. Well, maybe not that bad, but it certainly isn't good. http://kasmana.people.cofc.edu/MATHFICT/mfview.php?callnumber=mf340 David From decouk at gmail.com Wed Jan 14 19:44:12 2009 From: decouk at gmail.com (Andre Amorim) Date: Wed, 14 Jan 2009 18:44:12 +0000 Subject: Dan Brown - Digital Fortress book In-Reply-To: <20090114165336.GA29568@jabberwocky.com> References: <20090114165336.GA29568@jabberwocky.com> Message-ID: Guys, I'm in the midle of this book rigth now, so let me try to finish it LOL... by the way... is there any other book, for a guy like me that find pleasant read about neuromancer, crypto, computers and fiction ... ??? 2009/1/14 David Shaw : > On Wed, Jan 14, 2009 at 02:49:36PM +0000, Andre Amorim wrote: >> Hi all, >> >> Anyone knows what's is fact (real) and what is fiction in Dan Brown >> novel, Digital Fortress ? > > In Digital Fortress there are things called "computers" and things > called "human beings". Quite near everything else - including what > these computers and human beings do - is fiction. > > Well, maybe not that bad, but it certainly isn't good. > > http://kasmana.people.cofc.edu/MATHFICT/mfview.php?callnumber=mf340 > > David > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users > -- Andre Amorim GnuPG KEY ID: 0x587B1970 FingerPrint: 42AE C929 4D91 4591 4E75 430F 78D9 53B4 587B 1970 Download: http://pgp.mit.edu:11371/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x587B1970 From benjamin at py-soft.co.uk Wed Jan 14 20:05:12 2009 From: benjamin at py-soft.co.uk (Benjamin Donnachie) Date: Wed, 14 Jan 2009 19:05:12 +0000 Subject: Dan Brown - Digital Fortress book In-Reply-To: References: <20090114165336.GA29568@jabberwocky.com> Message-ID: <732076a80901141105m6f3bb077te770a7dfb462e84c@mail.gmail.com> 2009/1/14 Andre Amorim : > I'm in the midle of this book rigth now, so let me try to finish it LOL... > by the way... is there any other book, for a guy like me that find > pleasant read about neuromancer, crypto, computers and fiction ... I really enjoyed Cryptonomicon and Snow Crash by Neal Stephenson. Both are very geeky, the former has a lot about encryption in it if I remember correctly, and the latter is based around virtual reality. Though I was a bit disappointed with the ending of Cryptonomicon - I expected something more spectacular. Have a look on wikipedia for more info. Ben From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Wed Jan 14 20:10:30 2009 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Wed, 14 Jan 2009 14:10:30 -0500 Subject: Dan Brown - Digital Fortress book In-Reply-To: References: <20090114165336.GA29568@jabberwocky.com> Message-ID: <496E38A6.1040701@sixdemonbag.org> Andre Amorim wrote: > I'm in the midle of this book rigth now, so let me try to finish it LOL... > by the way... is there any other book, for a guy like me that find > pleasant read about neuromancer, crypto, computers and fiction ... Off-topic, but hey, we all need to unwind and relax sometime, right? All these books are, IMO, absolutely excellent, and all connect in one way or another -- in intelligent and accurate ways -- to computer security. Charles Stross, _The Atrocity Archives_. This one's an excellent mix of Len Deighton spy thriller and _Dilbert_. It's also rife with mathematical in-jokes for people astute enough to notice them. Bob Howard is one of geekdom's great characters: he's every single tech nerd who's ever worked in a large, faceless bureaucracy. Neal Stephenson, _Cryptonomicon_. It's a little dated now, but when it came out this book was an excellent slice of the Zeitgeist of the dot-com boom. Most of the crypto holds up relatively well; the algorithms have been broken, but the principles are sound. Rudy Rucker. Just about anything, really. Rucker is a mathematician and computer scientist. It shows in his writing. Greg Egan, _Permutation City_. Words fail me when I try to describe it. I guess you could say it's one long discourse on Nick Bostrum's simulation hypothesis, or maybe the implications of the 't Hooft holographic hypothesis. No matter how you slice it, this book will bend your mind. Daniel Keys Moran. Just about anything, really. Moran is a database geek in Los Angeles. In the late '80s and early '90s he published a trilogy of books. Trent's discourse on the root causes of network failure, and the consequences of widespread network failure on a networked society, is one of the best technology-explained-for-the-layman things I've read. ... For movies, the best one is hands-down _Sneakers_, a 1992 crime caper starring Robert Redford and Ben Kingsley. In 1992, Kingsley talked about how he might be able to crash the entire world economic system with the aid of computers and some carefully chosen bad information. We laughed at it then: what he was talking about was pure, utter science fiction. In 2009, we're seeing that happen all around us, and few of us are laughing. From John at Mozilla-Enigmail.org Wed Jan 14 20:32:09 2009 From: John at Mozilla-Enigmail.org (John Clizbe) Date: Wed, 14 Jan 2009 13:32:09 -0600 Subject: Subject: Re: recover private key In-Reply-To: <27ee9bfb0901140546l6e9a1f3qff4f8492f094b4dd@mail.gmail.com> References: <27ee9bfb0901131314q4b59d565k31dcc02f14172c8d@mail.gmail.com> <496D21F6.2090204@sixdemonbag.org> <27ee9bfb0901131534p7b358d8dx5554b4eaa9ac62fc@mail.gmail.com> <496D5D4C.1020003@sixdemonbag.org> <27ee9bfb0901140546l6e9a1f3qff4f8492f094b4dd@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <496E3DB9.6020509@Mozilla-Enigmail.org> Avi wrote: > On Tue, Jan 13, 2009 at 10:34 PM, Robert J. Hansen > There's no pre-creation necessary in the scenario I outlined. Maybe I > just know an uncommon class of scoundrels, but that level of > skulduggery is fairly tame in my experience. > > > Again, point taken, and remind me not to trust your friends with my > wallet 8-) The first lesson in computer security is to *think* like the bad guys. One must foresee the skulduggery to defend against it in advance. Good idea on the wallet. ;-} -- John P. Clizbe Inet:John (a) Mozilla-Enigmail.org You can't spell fiasco without SCO. hkp://keyserver.gingerbear.net or mailto:pgp-public-keys at gingerbear.net?subject=HELP Q:"Just how do the residents of Haiku, Hawai'i hold conversations?" A:"An odd melody / island voices on the winds / surplus of vowels" -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 680 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From emartinson at insurancevisions.com Wed Jan 14 23:49:11 2009 From: emartinson at insurancevisions.com (Erik Martinson) Date: Wed, 14 Jan 2009 14:49:11 -0800 (PST) Subject: Upgrade GPG on Windows Message-ID: <1231973351.79123409@192.168.1.71> I have used GPG for years in a automated environment and I now need to upgrade the installed version of GPG from 1.0.6-2 to current. I have tried to copy the new .exe and .dll files in the folder and I loose my keys. I have figured out that my homedir is "HOME: C:/gnupg" for the old version and the new version uses the windows/user folders. I searched the net can can not find a command to update/change the default folder. Please advise. Thanks, Erik Martinson Insurance Visions, Inc. www.InsuranceVisions.com (800) 497-9996 x210 From John at Mozilla-Enigmail.org Thu Jan 15 00:36:06 2009 From: John at Mozilla-Enigmail.org (John Clizbe) Date: Wed, 14 Jan 2009 17:36:06 -0600 Subject: Upgrade GPG on Windows In-Reply-To: <1231973351.79123409@192.168.1.71> References: <1231973351.79123409@192.168.1.71> Message-ID: <496E76E6.4030601@Mozilla-Enigmail.org> Erik Martinson wrote: > I have used GPG for years in a automated environment and I now need to > upgrade the installed version of GPG from 1.0.6-2 to current. > > I have tried to copy the new .exe and .dll files in the folder and I loose my > keys. I have figured out that my homedir is "HOME: C:/gnupg" for the old version > and the new version uses the windows/user folders. I searched the net can can > not find a command to update/change the default folder. Please advise. There are several mechanisms possible: 1) add --homedir=C:\gnupg to the command line or 2) Set the environment variable GNUPGHOME or 3) Edit the registry. Depending on your needs edit the value of \Software\GNU\GNUPG:HomeDir in HKCU, HKLM, and/or HKEY_USERS\.DEFAULT Optionally, it may work for you to delete the value. See below. or 4) Move the files +++++++++++++++++++++ From the entry for GnuPG 1.4.1 in NEWS.txt (installed in the Doc directory within the program installation, default: C:\Program Files\GNU\GnuPG\Doc.) * [W32] The algorithm for the default home directory changed: First we look at the environment variable GNUPGHOME, if this one is not set, we check whether the registry entry {HKCU,HKLM}\Software\GNU\GnuPG:HomeDir has been set. If this fails we use a GnuPG directory below the standard application data directory (APPDATA) of the current user. Only in the case that this directory cannot be determined, the old default of c:\gnupg will be used. The option --homedir still overrides all of them. Other files of particular interest in the Doc directory are gpg.man and README-W32.txt. If you wish to discuss which option would be best, let me know via pvt mail. -- John P. Clizbe Inet:John (a) Mozilla-Enigmail.org You can't spell fiasco without SCO. hkp://keyserver.gingerbear.net or mailto:pgp-public-keys at gingerbear.net?subject=HELP Q:"Just how do the residents of Haiku, Hawai'i hold conversations?" A:"An odd melody / island voices on the winds / surplus of vowels" -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 680 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From ml at mareichelt.de Thu Jan 15 14:21:12 2009 From: ml at mareichelt.de (markus reichelt) Date: Thu, 15 Jan 2009 14:21:12 +0100 Subject: Dan Brown - Digital Fortress book In-Reply-To: <496E173E.4080608@sixdemonbag.org> References: <496E173E.4080608@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <20090115132112.GA4667@tatooine.rebelbase.local> * "Robert J. Hansen" wrote: > When Freon catches fire it decomposes into phosgene, a nerve gas, > which makes it kind of hard to fight the fire. In the book, a fire > ravages the datacenter and yet somehow people in it aren't dead > from phosgene exposure. Phosgene is not a nerve gas, it is "just" a pulmonary agent. Deadly doses are higher and death is painful and slow (within 24-48 hours). Not all Freon would be converted into Phosgene and I'd guess the firefighters wore gas masks thus limiting the exposure (they know about the Freon?) Anyway, enough nitpicking (and I haven't even read the book ;-) -- left blank, right bald -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 189 bytes Desc: not available URL: From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Thu Jan 15 15:52:00 2009 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Thu, 15 Jan 2009 09:52:00 -0500 Subject: Dan Brown - Digital Fortress book In-Reply-To: <20090115132112.GA4667@tatooine.rebelbase.local> References: <496E173E.4080608@sixdemonbag.org> <20090115132112.GA4667@tatooine.rebelbase.local> Message-ID: <496F4D90.7070303@sixdemonbag.org> markus reichelt wrote: > Not all Freon would be converted into Phosgene and I'd guess the > firefighters wore gas masks thus limiting the exposure (they know > about the Freon?) First responders -- the people in the office who rush to the fire armed with fire extinguishers -- don't wear respiratory equipment. This is why data centers don't use Freon; in case of fire, it's hazardous to the people evacuating and especially to the people who are trying to slow the fire's spread. In the book, several people without respiratory equipment are exposed to large doses of Freon in a large building fire without harmful effect. From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Thu Jan 15 16:43:32 2009 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Thu, 15 Jan 2009 10:43:32 -0500 Subject: Dan Brown - Digital Fortress book In-Reply-To: <496F4D90.7070303@sixdemonbag.org> References: <496E173E.4080608@sixdemonbag.org> <20090115132112.GA4667@tatooine.rebelbase.local> <496F4D90.7070303@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <20090115154332.GA42400@jabberwocky.com> On Thu, Jan 15, 2009 at 09:52:00AM -0500, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > markus reichelt wrote: > > Not all Freon would be converted into Phosgene and I'd guess the > > firefighters wore gas masks thus limiting the exposure (they know > > about the Freon?) > > First responders -- the people in the office who rush to the fire armed > with fire extinguishers -- don't wear respiratory equipment. This is > why data centers don't use Freon; in case of fire, it's hazardous to the > people evacuating and especially to the people who are trying to slow > the fire's spread. Possibly Dan Brown used "freon" where he should have used "halon". It wouldn't be the first mistake in that book. Not that halon doesn't have its own dangers - the whole point of a gas fire supression system is that it displaces or removes oxygen. Which both humans and fires are rather fond of... I believe Halon is banned now (at least in the US) because of ozone layer concerns, but there are some older systems that were grandfathered in that are still in use. Still, to give Dan Brown the benefit of the doubt, I've heard many fire supression gases referred to as "Freon", whether they were or not. Freon is really a marketing catchall name for a lot of different gases, some of which were actually used for fire supression before we saw what they were doing to the ozone layer. David From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Thu Jan 15 17:56:13 2009 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Thu, 15 Jan 2009 11:56:13 -0500 Subject: Dan Brown - Digital Fortress book In-Reply-To: <20090115154332.GA42400@jabberwocky.com> References: <496E173E.4080608@sixdemonbag.org> <20090115132112.GA4667@tatooine.rebelbase.local> <496F4D90.7070303@sixdemonbag.org> <20090115154332.GA42400@jabberwocky.com> Message-ID: <496F6AAD.2030309@sixdemonbag.org> David Shaw wrote: > Possibly Dan Brown used "freon" where he should have used "halon". Possibly: it wouldn't be the first time he used terminology glibly to the point of gross error. That said, the last time I looked into Halon fire systems they were advertised as not producing thermal shock, which would seem to indicate they wouldn't be effective coolants -- which was the purpose the book gave to the Freon, they kept TRANSLATR cold. (For anyone who's confused about thermal shock: take a wineglass and heat it to a few hundred degrees in your oven. Then dunk it in ice water and watch it shatter. Thermal shock is the culprit. The same thing happens in data centers when there's a fire raging. The servers get heated up and the liquid Freon cools them down in a big hurry.) From vedaal at hush.com Thu Jan 15 17:31:12 2009 From: vedaal at hush.com (vedaal at hush.com) Date: Thu, 15 Jan 2009 11:31:12 -0500 Subject: Dan Brown - Digital Fortress book Message-ID: <20090115163113.0562A158045@smtp.hushmail.com> >Message: 1 >Date: Wed, 14 Jan 2009 11:47:58 -0500 >From: "Robert J. Hansen" >Subject: Re: Dan Brown - Digital Fortress book >The TRANSLATR machine does not work and cannot work, not under the >laws of physics as we know them to be. ok, granted, as well as the inaccurate crypto of the 'uncrackable' cipher, but it does raise a fascinating question: "assuming a brute force attack is feasible in real time, how could one design a cipher that is invulnerable to brute force attack (other than an OTP )?" as a general possibility: (1) [as explained in the Digital Fortress book] what if the decryption program didn't know when it had successfully decrypted ... (a) change the ciphertext, and let the brute force machine merrily try to crack the wrong ciphertext ... (re-encrypt the ciphertext with another random session key, then if the brute force attack tries all possible ciphertexts to find which one is the right one, it sort-of becomes similar to attacking an OTP, in that the brute force decryption would yield several plaintexts of contradictory information in practice, though, the attacking program could just brute force the keyspace of the re- encrypted ciphertext, until it would get a ciphertext that would decrypt to a real plaintext, so, unless there is a way to re-encrypt the ciphertext in a way that it could produce multiple different plaintexts when using different session keys, it wouldn't work anyway, for me, the book presented interesting crypto concepts that would be fascinating if explored ... vedaal any ads or links below this message are added by hushmail without my endorsement or awareness of the nature of the link -- Chart your path to success with a smart new business plan. Click here! http://tagline.hushmail.com/fc/PnY6qxuGjH0bAoYNLlgSwxAbAOPbFAIUKUFsAtjCQvRzonDO04TM7/ From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Thu Jan 15 19:57:17 2009 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Thu, 15 Jan 2009 13:57:17 -0500 Subject: Dan Brown - Digital Fortress book In-Reply-To: <20090115163113.0562A158045@smtp.hushmail.com> References: <20090115163113.0562A158045@smtp.hushmail.com> Message-ID: <496F870D.30203@sixdemonbag.org> vedaal at hush.com wrote: > "assuming a brute force attack is feasible in real time, how could > one design a cipher that is invulnerable to brute force attack > (other than an OTP )?" You don't. > (1) [as explained in the Digital Fortress book] what if the > decryption program didn't know when it had successfully decrypted ... >From a computational theory perspective, this means putting decryption into PSPACE. Once you leave NP behind you, your next stop is the one-time pad. > (a) change the ciphertext, and let the brute force machine merrily > try to crack the wrong ciphertext Delivering a false message to your enemies is a classic tactic in the history of communications security. In recent history, that's how we knew to intercept the Japanese fleet at Midway Island. Going back to classical history, it's one of the ways Belisarius kept the Germanic tribes divided, facilitating his successes during the reign of Justinian. > anyway, for me, the book presented interesting crypto concepts that > would be fascinating if explored ... To the extent people are inspired by it to think critically about crypto, I'm glad. But I cannot recommend it be read as an exposure to concepts in crypto. _Cryptonomicon_ (and Jon Evans' _The Blood Price_, which I should've listed on my recommended books before) are much better for that. From mwood at IUPUI.Edu Fri Jan 16 14:21:27 2009 From: mwood at IUPUI.Edu (Mark H. Wood) Date: Fri, 16 Jan 2009 08:21:27 -0500 Subject: Dan Brown - Digital Fortress book In-Reply-To: <20090115132112.GA4667@tatooine.rebelbase.local> References: <496E173E.4080608@sixdemonbag.org> <20090115132112.GA4667@tatooine.rebelbase.local> Message-ID: <20090116132127.GA22466@IUPUI.Edu> [Freon decomposition products include phosgene] Well, it's a tangled mess. There are many different chemicals which have been sold under the Freon name. Mr. Brown may have confused any of these with Halon, another large family of fluorocarbons which *have* been used for fire suppression, including data centers. They all seem to be on the way out, due to the ozone-depleting properties of halogens in the upper atmosphere. I haven't examined all of the Halons, but I don't recall seeing any chlorinated ones, and without chlorine you can't make phosgene. I'd sometimes wondered about the phosgene link, and finally looked it up. Its name has got nothing to do with phosphorus (which isn't used in any of these chemicals), but to the use of light to power the reaction in which it was first synthesized. So says Wikipedia, anyway. -- Mark H. Wood, Lead System Programmer mwood at IUPUI.Edu Friends don't let friends publish revisable-form documents. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 197 bytes Desc: not available URL: From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Fri Jan 16 14:57:03 2009 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Fri, 16 Jan 2009 08:57:03 -0500 Subject: Dan Brown - Digital Fortress book In-Reply-To: <20090116132127.GA22466@IUPUI.Edu> References: <496E173E.4080608@sixdemonbag.org> <20090115132112.GA4667@tatooine.rebelbase.local> <20090116132127.GA22466@IUPUI.Edu> Message-ID: <4970922F.4040301@sixdemonbag.org> Mark H. Wood wrote: > Well, it's a tangled mess. There are many different chemicals which > have been sold under the Freon name. Mr. Brown may have confused any > of these with Halon, another large family of fluorocarbons which > *have* been used for fire suppression, including data centers. Right. But in the book, the Freon is explicitly said to be a _cooling_ agent. The cooling cables come loose in the fire and Freon sprays everywhere. It's not Freon being deliberately released as a fire suppression agent. I don't know about every Halon out there -- maybe there are some which can do double duty as cooling agents. But the fact the Freon is ascribed as a coolant first and has no fire-fighting properties Brown sees fit to talk about makes me think he intended for it to be coolant gas which was escaping, not a fire suppression system which was activating. From jhs at berklix.org Fri Jan 16 15:14:43 2009 From: jhs at berklix.org (Julian Stacey) Date: Fri, 16 Jan 2009 15:14:43 +0100 Subject: Dan Brown - Digital Fortress book In-Reply-To: Your message "Fri, 16 Jan 2009 08:57:03 EST." <4970922F.4040301@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <200901161414.n0GEEha6085774@fire.js.berklix.net> Hi gnupg-users@, Speculting what Dan Brown, novelist to the masses, might have meant re. Freon is outside list remit. Better discussed tonight at the Friday bars of your choice :-) Cheers, Julian -- Julian Stacey: BSDUnixLinux C Prog Admin SysEng Consult Munich www.berklix.com Mail plain ASCII text. HTML & Base64 text are spam. www.asciiribbon.org From neil.yan at akmii.com Tue Jan 13 22:02:59 2009 From: neil.yan at akmii.com (Neil Yan) Date: Tue, 13 Jan 2009 13:02:59 -0800 Subject: Question of using GNUPG on Win OS In-Reply-To: <496CF78F.4040905@gmail.com> References: <496BCE12.1030102@sixdemonbag.org> <496CF78F.4040905@gmail.com> Message-ID: Thank you very much. It really help me a lot. On Tue, Jan 13, 2009 at 12:20 PM, Faramir wrote: > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA256 > > Neil Yan escribi?: > ... > > Here I have one more question. > > > > If I want to use one key on multiple machine, or i want to save the > > private key in some removable device. Is that possible? I cannot find > > any command used to backup private key. > > C:\GnuPG>gpg --output public.asc --armor --export ABCD1234 > > C:\GnuPG>gpg --output secret.asc --armor --export-secret-keys ABCD1234 > > > If you export the key, you will need to import it in the other machine > > C:\GnuPG>gpg --import secret.asc > > > Best Regards > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) > Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org > > iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJJbPePAAoJEMV4f6PvczxAhlIIAKIP4T1Kz3UXCfFppn2abPik > m0eSz/BA8hPyq5jNRZFJTVxzM2qgJu5NUl+9gQvbdJeifarx3yJI4Uj/TZycwKMl > I8xJxdtLwxSF7vvK8ZNXIZhWV9qBwOLgPqI50kpcmFolXzHj18Y0WWKyfpUXDS03 > wro3Ge2hqLoY8vRraAuiwecHZpx8ao2XFcNnF8E+Lz2HLVqR6Sh0fH3r2ETaeBR5 > V790nQvb4A9Lsa7ebv9pTDdBSWcpzYPX1Q7b/dQT10TXE2zMlFo/Gld7nYN1mokt > Nf40RVj+nlUEuE+Y9Dl42jWT8TtQahzY5HspuUksuQJVeeqCygi45dY3pYo4vR8= > =dhhx > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > -- Thanks, Neil -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From cjw2004d at comcast.net Fri Jan 16 05:32:31 2009 From: cjw2004d at comcast.net (Chris Walters) Date: Thu, 15 Jan 2009 23:32:31 -0500 Subject: A circular dependency problem with notification-daemon and libnotify... Message-ID: <49700DDF.8010701@comcast.net> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Hello, I was wondering if anyone else was having this problem. I am running an AMD64 arch, and when I try to "emerge notification-daemon", it will not compile because libnotify is not present. If I try to emerge libnotify, it tries to merge notification-daemon first, and I get the same problem. When I run: "emerge --keep-going libnotify", it will not compile because it depends on notification-daemon. More information to follow (I have to reboot to Gentoo, capture what I need and send it to this OS). Regards, Chris PS: I was wondering if removing the 'gstreamer' USE flag from notification-daemon might fix the problem. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJJcA3cAAoJEIAhA8M9p9DA+zgP/24dIsoJL2aId0w5GHcrnHYj WUeWYs98/s3Pqw0nHayCA/AaEqi0UBwt11QJrXWlJr044J61HaKBpWoy/qqLUaAW 1dwAy9kQSx3Db9hqCYK40kbggmyr7fg00pwWYU4fsE41fy9jGpmXNPfA46hp0I/M bU+TT13kFdyoBn43RYEXcPcjTyTSh3TiJi6x9n0Xqi2dmji0Jx1fj5wv+AyppI3m 5WbUOQUi7hvTPzStiuyaJYKOCQGqidVsM6K3rHEi5wh1d/FN7uDo+GlzfpgOWmpB rqpweAgli/Gt3ph3vdKEL5bWeGpPPhLNtoiq0T9D5bUPzd9lQXPrNNjMzmFTMehg GdunkSuIxkgXcZVLvxLqQCEmGnsY9xikXLO2Tw/uPzfHKaBC2EpyXjIDTKSOpd/5 hwk2ahPgWCswtMAbOXAGYrOV1nlPqZ2eAtS6Xyt6FbVQ/FrBvP5sr2doHEcrNCiN tZH3/NOhm5yWsu9/SQPu8/ySLg0JRNuar4sO1Q4jl0eQRWNI+TKKxKgLcD8IZLYf LoPuNqFkhtGziMhmzgjsIif/wPyAEULZOrbjXUSJ6KcDOWSoE545HWVZFO4adJfX DpDulK0SRd4GNPqWOpnNscT+FNTsydPUpudiPx7KslAeVPnrv7hA2t3KF3Ni8bL3 l0jyL6HnuuzsT4F/hoIJ =IYpO -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From patrick_kox at fsfe.org Thu Jan 15 17:13:48 2009 From: patrick_kox at fsfe.org (Patrick Kox) Date: Thu, 15 Jan 2009 17:13:48 +0100 Subject: GnuPG asks for other card Message-ID: <496F60BC.5010805@fsfe.org> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Hi, Yesterday I configured my Fellowship card and it works fine (after some trouble with the wrong cardreader). Today I got a "normal" OpenPGP card and I created a new key (based on the same keyring as the one I used for the FSFE card). Everything seems to work, but when I want to sign or decrypt something GPG first asks for the 1st card (the FSFE one) and then after pressing "c" for about 3 times I can use the OpenPGP card. When sending email it's even worse, I use IceDove with Enigmail and there I just get a "general error" when I use the OpenPGP card. My idea was to have 2 OpenPGP cards so I have 1 as backup. I edited the gpg.conf file to default encrypt to both keys so I don't think that's the problem. Any help would be apreciated. Patrick -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.6 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iQCVAwUBSW9guSOf4kcnfsIOAQL4bQP+PleP42h5zVYPu4n8/P8ocBVSnkVBs7t7 Y8lk6azTF3xOTX9aSRhxFhX6xJFiHnsR6Xzi4BdJrN/W7SVSNoagOOXxUQySmzPJ 4Galf/RU8VS6iaQU0ORblqIAy1ryWcAK4Ko4Si41i2bjFMW6yxs5PO8nJwH6mJ0J aEGXrqWrSQE= =7j9W -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From Thomas.Lai at cn.fid-intl.com Fri Jan 16 10:35:29 2009 From: Thomas.Lai at cn.fid-intl.com (Lai, Thomas) Date: Fri, 16 Jan 2009 18:35:29 +0900 Subject: Need help for decrypt Message-ID: Hello anyboby, I am not sure if anybody can receive this email, though... just have a try. I have problem when decryting files with gpg. I have to write a bash script to decrypt files using my private key everyday, But I cannot avoid entering passphrase manually. Is there any way to decrypt files without entering my private key's passphrass? Thank you and Best regards, Thomas Lai / FIL - Dalian -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From robster3323 at yahoo.com Fri Jan 16 20:41:11 2009 From: robster3323 at yahoo.com (Rob Desjarlais) Date: Fri, 16 Jan 2009 11:41:11 -0800 (PST) Subject: End of Line characters disappear after decryption Message-ID: <996656.84603.qm@web110415.mail.gq1.yahoo.com> When I decrypt a file using GPG 1.4.9, the file decrypts just fine, but all the formatting is lost. Key thing that is missing is the End of Line characters. Any suggestions? I have a 100 100 byte records that are stored in a file, it gets encrypted and shipped over the wire and decrypted, I can decrypt the file, but all the records run together and look like one contiguous line. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Fri Jan 16 21:26:20 2009 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Fri, 16 Jan 2009 15:26:20 -0500 Subject: End of Line characters disappear after decryption In-Reply-To: <996656.84603.qm@web110415.mail.gq1.yahoo.com> References: <996656.84603.qm@web110415.mail.gq1.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <4970ED6C.6090906@sixdemonbag.org> Rob Desjarlais wrote: > When I decrypt a file using GPG 1.4.9, the file decrypts just fine, but > all the formatting is lost. Key thing that is missing is the End of > Line characters. Any suggestions? Yes -- give us the command line you're using. :) Knowing that you're using 1.4.9 is a good start, but we need more information. From sattva at pgpru.com Fri Jan 16 21:49:31 2009 From: sattva at pgpru.com (Vlad "SATtva" Miller) Date: Sat, 17 Jan 2009 02:49:31 +0600 Subject: Need help for decrypt In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <4970F2DB.5060907@pgpru.com> Lai, Thomas (16.01.2009 15:35): > Is there any way to decrypt files without entering my private key's > passphrass? Yes. You could remove passphrase from your private key (do --edit-key [your_key], then passwd, and finally save). Or you could write your passphrase in some text file and supply it to gpg with --passphrase-file parameter. Both options could be just fine or quite dangerous depending on your security considerations and actual environment, I'll leave that part alone. -- SATtva | security & privacy consulting www.vladmiller.info | www.pgpru.com From sattva at pgpru.com Fri Jan 16 21:56:05 2009 From: sattva at pgpru.com (Vlad "SATtva" Miller) Date: Sat, 17 Jan 2009 02:56:05 +0600 Subject: A circular dependency problem with notification-daemon and libnotify... In-Reply-To: <49700DDF.8010701@comcast.net> References: <49700DDF.8010701@comcast.net> Message-ID: <4970F465.3010900@pgpru.com> Chris Walters (16.01.2009 10:32): > Hello, > > I was wondering if anyone else was having this problem. I am running an AMD64 > arch, and when I try to "emerge notification-daemon", it will not compile > because libnotify is not present. If I try to emerge libnotify, it tries to > merge notification-daemon first, and I get the same problem. I suppose bugs.gentoo.org is a more appropriate place for such report of a problem with specific distribution system. Nevertheless, I have both x11-misc/notification-daemon-0.3.7 and x11-libs/libnotify-0.4.4 installed on my Gentoo amd64 systems. And yes, notification-daemon was compiled without gstreamer use-flag. And no, I don't know would it compile with it or not. Give it a shot. -- SATtva | security & privacy consulting www.vladmiller.info | www.pgpru.com From robster3323 at yahoo.com Fri Jan 16 22:12:30 2009 From: robster3323 at yahoo.com (Rob Desjarlais) Date: Fri, 16 Jan 2009 13:12:30 -0800 (PST) Subject: End of Line characters disappear after decryption Message-ID: <834770.4698.qm@web110414.mail.gq1.yahoo.com> Here is the command line we are using, and the return codes we are seeing. Again we are using GPG 1.4.9. $gpg -r Lynn --output decr2.tst -d testfile.gpg gpg: [don't know]: invalid packet (ctb=6f) The file is readable in VI, it successfully decrypts the message, but all of the formatting is lost. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Fri Jan 16 22:32:45 2009 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Fri, 16 Jan 2009 16:32:45 -0500 Subject: End of Line characters disappear after decryption In-Reply-To: <834770.4698.qm@web110414.mail.gq1.yahoo.com> References: <834770.4698.qm@web110414.mail.gq1.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <4970FCFD.2050702@sixdemonbag.org> Rob Desjarlais wrote: > Here is the command line we are using, and the return codes we are > seeing. Again we are using GPG 1.4.9. > > $gpg -r Lynn --output decr2.tst -d testfile.gpg What command line is the encrypting side using? From robbat2 at gentoo.org Fri Jan 16 22:14:42 2009 From: robbat2 at gentoo.org (Robin H. Johnson) Date: Fri, 16 Jan 2009 13:14:42 -0800 Subject: A circular dependency problem with notification-daemon and libnotify... In-Reply-To: <49700DDF.8010701@comcast.net> References: <49700DDF.8010701@comcast.net> Message-ID: <20090116211442.GN7944@curie-int.orbis-terrarum.net> On Thu, Jan 15, 2009 at 11:32:31PM -0500, Chris Walters wrote: > I was wondering if anyone else was having this problem. I am running an AMD64 > arch, and when I try to "emerge notification-daemon", it will not compile > because libnotify is not present. If I try to emerge libnotify, it tries to > merge notification-daemon first, and I get the same problem. > > When I run: > "emerge --keep-going libnotify", it will not compile because it depends on > notification-daemon. > > More information to follow (I have to reboot to Gentoo, capture what I need and > send it to this OS). This email is entirely unrelated to the gnupg-users mailing list. See Gentoo bug 252521 for your issue. -- Robin Hugh Johnson Gentoo Linux Developer & Infra Guy E-Mail : robbat2 at gentoo.org GnuPG FP : 11AC BA4F 4778 E3F6 E4ED F38E B27B 944E 3488 4E85 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 329 bytes Desc: not available URL: From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Fri Jan 16 22:50:20 2009 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Fri, 16 Jan 2009 16:50:20 -0500 Subject: End of Line characters disappear after decryption In-Reply-To: <996656.84603.qm@web110415.mail.gq1.yahoo.com> References: <996656.84603.qm@web110415.mail.gq1.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <20090116215020.GC45801@jabberwocky.com> On Fri, Jan 16, 2009 at 11:41:11AM -0800, Rob Desjarlais wrote: > When I decrypt a file using GPG 1.4.9, the file decrypts just fine, > but all the formatting is lost. Key thing that is missing is the > End of Line characters. Any suggestions? This is almost a FAQ. Most likely there is a textmode mismatch between the encrypting side and decrypting side. The issue is that different platforms handle text files in different ways. If you tell GPG to, it will resolve out these differences for you, but some applications need their particular line endings regardless of the platform. Can you give us the details on how the file was encrypted? Was it encrypted with GPG or PGP? The encrypting command line would be the most useful thing here. Also, please state the platforms (i.e. Unix, Windows, etc) that you are encrypting and decrypting on. David From taurus366 at gmail.com Sat Jan 17 06:26:13 2009 From: taurus366 at gmail.com (taurus) Date: Sat, 17 Jan 2009 05:26:13 +0000 Subject: gpg error clearing forced signature Message-ID: Hi list. k$ gpg --card-status Application ID ...: D276000124010101000100000BC00000 Version ..........: 1.1 Manufacturer .....: PPC Card Systems Serial number ....: 00000BC0 ... Signature PIN ....: forced Max. PIN lengths .: 254 254 254 PIN retry counter : 3 3 3 Signature counter : 0 Signature key ....: [none] Encryption key....: [none] Authentication key: [none] General key info..: [none] $ gpg --card-edit Application ID ...: D276000124010101000100000BC00000 Version ..........: 1.1 Manufacturer .....: PPC Card Systems Serial number ....: 00000BC0 ... Signature PIN ....: forced Max. PIN lengths .: 254 254 254 PIN retry counter : 3 3 3 Signature counter : 0 Signature key ....: [none] Encryption key....: [none] Authentication key: [none] General key info..: [none] Command> admin Admin commands are allowed Command> generate Make off-card backup of encryption key? (Y/n) y gpg: error clearing forced signature PIN flag: Permission denied Command> quit $ gpg: error clearing forced signature PIN flag: Permission denied why this error? I can change the PIN but not adminPin neither generate a key. MacOSX 10.5.6 MacPGP2-2.0.10 TIA. Taur. From wk at gnupg.org Sat Jan 17 12:14:49 2009 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Sat, 17 Jan 2009 12:14:49 +0100 Subject: gpg error clearing forced signature In-Reply-To: (taurus366@gmail.com's message of "Sat, 17 Jan 2009 05:26:13 +0000") References: Message-ID: <877i4uw5ee.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> On Sat, 17 Jan 2009 06:26, taurus366 at gmail.com said: > Command> generate > Make off-card backup of encryption key? (Y/n) y > gpg: error clearing forced signature PIN flag: Permission denied It seems you are using the gpg-agent. You need to allow admin commands for scdaemon: Put a line allow-admin into ~/.gnupg/scdaemon.conf and kill a running scdaemon. If this does not work, run gpg with the options "-v --debug 2048" to see what is going on. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Auschnahme regelt ein Bundeschgesetz. From simon at bleah.co.uk Sat Jan 17 15:40:01 2009 From: simon at bleah.co.uk (Simon Ward) Date: Sat, 17 Jan 2009 14:40:01 +0000 Subject: Dan Brown - Digital Fortress book In-Reply-To: <496E01A3.5020506@mac.com> References: <496E01A3.5020506@mac.com> Message-ID: <20090117144001.GB18775@whoosh.cosgrove.lan> On Wed, Jan 14, 2009 at 10:15:47AM -0500, Charly Avital wrote: > Some excerpts from: . I > believe the following list of Mr. Brown's errors (or delusions) is not > exclusive, to say the least. ? > * Characters who are supposedly experts in cryptography seem to > think there is no such thing as an unbreakable encryption scheme. See > one-time pad." Perfect secrecy doesn?t really mean unbreakable in practice. Sure, a one?time pad itself is considered ?unbreakable?, but you still need to solve key exchange and hope your pseudo?random numbers are cryptographically secure. Simon -- A complex system that works is invariably found to have evolved from a simple system that works.?John Gall -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 197 bytes Desc: Digital signature URL: From shavital at mac.com Sat Jan 17 16:31:21 2009 From: shavital at mac.com (Charly Avital) Date: Sat, 17 Jan 2009 10:31:21 -0500 Subject: Dan Brown - Digital Fortress book In-Reply-To: <20090117144001.GB18775@whoosh.cosgrove.lan> References: <496E01A3.5020506@mac.com> <20090117144001.GB18775@whoosh.cosgrove.lan> Message-ID: <4971F9C9.8050504@mac.com> Hi, may I suggest, with all due respect, that this thread be closed? Thanks, Charly From taurus366 at gmail.com Sat Jan 17 17:50:20 2009 From: taurus366 at gmail.com (taurus) Date: Sat, 17 Jan 2009 16:50:20 +0000 Subject: gpg error clearing forced signature In-Reply-To: <877i4uw5ee.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> References: <877i4uw5ee.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> Message-ID: On 17 January 2009, at 11:14, Werner Koch wrote: > On Sat, 17 Jan 2009 06:26, taurus366 at gmail.com said: > >> Command> generate >> Make off-card backup of encryption key? (Y/n) y >> gpg: error clearing forced signature PIN flag: Permission denied > > It seems you are using the gpg-agent. You need to allow admin > commands > for scdaemon: Put a line > > allow-admin > > into ~/.gnupg/scdaemon.conf and kill a running scdaemon. Created the file and put allow-admin on it, and appears it solved the problem. Command> generate Make off-card backup of encryption key? (Y/n) y Please specify how long the key should be valid. 0 = key does not expire = key expires in n days w = key expires in n weeks m = key expires in n months y = key expires in n years Key is valid for? (0) 0 ..... Now there's another problem. ..... Change (N)ame, (C)omment, (E)mail or (O)kay/(Q)uit? o gpg: key generation failed: Card error Key generation failed: Card error gpg: error setting forced signature PIN flag: General error Command> quit Howto solve this? Thank You. T. From faramir.cl at gmail.com Sat Jan 17 18:26:40 2009 From: faramir.cl at gmail.com (Faramir) Date: Sat, 17 Jan 2009 14:26:40 -0300 Subject: Dan Brown - Digital Fortress book In-Reply-To: <4971F9C9.8050504@mac.com> References: <496E01A3.5020506@mac.com> <20090117144001.GB18775@whoosh.cosgrove.lan> <4971F9C9.8050504@mac.com> Message-ID: <497214D0.80909@gmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Charly Avital escribi?: > Hi, > > may I suggest, with all due respect, that this thread be closed? Why don't we move this thread to PGP-Basics-OT at yahoogroups.com ? Best Regards -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJJchTQAAoJEMV4f6PvczxAX9wH/jJjv00moI0mj9Cw7njiUbGu BAqMyI5RubsY1Jq8ESN+0p3OqbMBxQNZ3NDpMPMSYY7wO2vCCRQ+0givEMlrBc+P OHFj3sFq7cEBZd3QX7aZXY+0759VYYCOpf/ibGwIKDJv8n4P/GjZvvEMvHsItXQV /nJJsrNCh7s/z573aMakh4kt+SFaQdHjZlndKgwDAaOa47gYlR37IUqRk2DvtJLV 1xZEBFMfjXLFRA/+VFIokECEjrhW/b7Wyw9nUgcxrClTvJlvviwO4tCe2eZ1kzjA 0MK6qX6lU1uPvr6Ie4NiiSmffs5dUSI7W9qFJqz4XBkWJTY036pu2brgGbnYJ9g= =ZvaT -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From taurus366 at gmail.com Sat Jan 17 22:22:28 2009 From: taurus366 at gmail.com (taurus) Date: Sat, 17 Jan 2009 21:22:28 +0000 Subject: gpg error clearing forced signature (solved) References: Message-ID: <5ED428A3-A374-46BE-A413-4ACB35F98C4A@gmail.com> > On 17 January 2009, at 11:14, Werner Koch wrote: > >> On Sat, 17 Jan 2009 06:26, taurus366 at gmail.com said: >> >>> Command> generate >>> Make off-card backup of encryption key? (Y/n) y >>> gpg: error clearing forced signature PIN flag: Permission denied >> >> It seems you are using the gpg-agent. You need to allow admin >> commands >> for scdaemon: Put a line >> >> allow-admin >> >> into ~/.gnupg/scdaemon.conf and kill a running scdaemon. > > Created the file and put allow-admin on it, and appears it solved > the problem. > > Command> generate > Make off-card backup of encryption key? (Y/n) y > Please specify how long the key should be valid. > 0 = key does not expire > = key expires in n days > w = key expires in n weeks > m = key expires in n months > y = key expires in n years > Key is valid for? (0) 0 > ..... > > Now there's another problem. > > ..... > Change (N)ame, (C)omment, (E)mail or (O)kay/(Q)uit? o > gpg: key generation failed: Card error > Key generation failed: Card error > gpg: error setting forced signature PIN flag: General error > > Command> quit > > Howto solve this? I'm sorry list for replying to myself but I have solve the last error. As it can serve others, I'll explain. 1st. Updated Gemalto PC Twin Driver from Gemalto. 2nd. When I pressed "(O)kay/(Q)uit? O" I move the mouse open disks, etc for entropy! Which of the two actions did the trick I don't know. Thank You. Taur. From jmoore3rd at bellsouth.net Sun Jan 18 14:39:16 2009 From: jmoore3rd at bellsouth.net (John W. Moore III) Date: Sun, 18 Jan 2009 08:39:16 -0500 Subject: Dan Brown - Digital Fortress book In-Reply-To: <497214D0.80909@gmail.com> References: <496E01A3.5020506@mac.com> <20090117144001.GB18775@whoosh.cosgrove.lan> <4971F9C9.8050504@mac.com> <497214D0.80909@gmail.com> Message-ID: <49733104.2080409@bellsouth.net> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Faramir wrote: > Charly Avital escribi??: >> Hi, > >> may I suggest, with all due respect, that this thread be closed? > > Why don't we move this thread to PGP-Basics-OT at yahoogroups.com ? I "Second" both of the above Motions. JOHN 8-) Timestamp: Sunday 18 Jan 2009, 08:38 --500 (Eastern Standard Time) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.10-svn4907: (MingW32) Comment: Public Key at: http://tinyurl.com/8cpho Comment: Gossamer Spider Web of Trust: https://www.gswot.org Comment: Homepage: http://tinyurl.com/yzhbhx iQEcBAEBCgAGBQJJczEBAAoJEBCGy9eAtCsPX4UH/2Yh6bDScIeu/e47GCgV5Ya7 GGoeJL/wL7ppV1AzHJSx38dalGs/QqHQIpKai1vsAK66C2ytovV60xjjW5wJvKLA a3VQCr31baqXXu2eAMcW1RamqGSNgoI4qP5DKzkuCNFI3Wxw8oKDCJ9mtEY9xjGp zipzBNhp3FJ8w4DTVw7wJcBThoFHUzOm1i+WreM6xYaqtnrXzxUBNwu1/ayXAxUA kDklfuNB0vzHUgbVMjZa/lRI7rFu8k59TvfRYoTFo8+qyzodA6/uxbbKMMHT1rdt Rrk5cEQqOaqKvROBaDpbkqLrEVonJmG20vHNCZWrekcWrBeq0/R2SmU4gSZ1Zzg= =OLrt -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From petr.uzel at suse.cz Mon Jan 19 09:59:12 2009 From: petr.uzel at suse.cz (Petr Uzel) Date: Mon, 19 Jan 2009 09:59:12 +0100 Subject: GnuPG 2.0.10 - t-convert test fails on ppc and s390 Message-ID: <20090119085912.GD17796@localhost> Hi list, On ppc, s390 and s390x : cd gnupg-2.0.10 ./configure make check make[3]: Entering directory `/suse/puzel/packages/gnupg-2.0.10/common' t-convert.c:373: test 7 failed FAIL: t-convert PASS: t-percent PASS: t-gettime PASS: t-sysutils PASS: t-sexputil ==================================== 1 of 5 tests failed Please report to bug-gnupg at gnupg.org ==================================== make[3]: *** [check-TESTS] Error 1 make[3]: Leaving directory `/suse/puzel/packages/gnupg-2.0.10/common' make[2]: *** [check-am] Error 2 make[2]: Leaving directory `/suse/puzel/packages/gnupg-2.0.10/common' make[1]: *** [check] Error 2 make[1]: Leaving directory `/suse/puzel/packages/gnupg-2.0.10/common' make: *** [check-recursive] Error 1 On other architectures (x86_64, i586, ppc64, ia64), everything works fine. Does anybody has the same issue? Any ideas? Thanks in advance, -- Best regards / s pozdravem Petr Uzel, Packages maintainer --------------------------------------------------------------------- SUSE LINUX, s.r.o. e-mail: puzel at suse.cz Lihovarsk? 1060/12 tel: +420 284 028 964 190 00 Prague 9 fax: +420 284 028 951 Czech Republic http://www.suse.cz From Thomas.Lai at cn.fid-intl.com Mon Jan 19 02:15:26 2009 From: Thomas.Lai at cn.fid-intl.com (Lai, Thomas) Date: Mon, 19 Jan 2009 10:15:26 +0900 Subject: Need help for decrypt In-Reply-To: <4970F2DB.5060907@pgpru.com> References: <4970F2DB.5060907@pgpru.com> Message-ID: Hello Vlad "SATtva" Miller, Your answer is very helpful. The first option is ok, however about the second, I could not find the option --passphrase-file in command gpg. The gpg version I used is gpg (GnuPG) 1.2.1. I find another option --passphrase-fd; I found it had the similar function as --passphrase-file. Anyway, really appreciated for your such good and quick reply. Thank you and Best regards, Thomas Lai / FIL - Dalian -----Original Message----- From: Vlad "SATtva" Miller [mailto:sattva at pgpru.com] Sent: Saturday, January 17, 2009 4:50 AM To: Lai, Thomas Cc: Gnupg-users at gnupg.org Subject: Re: Need help for decrypt Lai, Thomas (16.01.2009 15:35): > Is there any way to decrypt files without entering my private key's > passphrass? Yes. You could remove passphrase from your private key (do --edit-key [your_key], then passwd, and finally save). Or you could write your passphrase in some text file and supply it to gpg with --passphrase-file parameter. Both options could be just fine or quite dangerous depending on your security considerations and actual environment, I'll leave that part alone. -- SATtva | security & privacy consulting www.vladmiller.info | www.pgpru.com From ramon.loureiro at upf.edu Mon Jan 19 11:23:21 2009 From: ramon.loureiro at upf.edu (Ramon Loureiro) Date: Mon, 19 Jan 2009 11:23:21 +0100 Subject: storing gpg keys on a database Message-ID: <49745499.90702@upf.edu> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Hi! Could you give me some references (libraries, structures...) on how to store GPG keys on a database? Thanks! - -- Ramon Loureiro -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJJdFSZAAoJEMVZKsuAx9ZHlO8H/iTgmgx3vGeUnNF+dRPA0itA 1OiBT36Qke4a8ZJdFHey/+mM+wuSeihD29KYjpyUXu3nMykKrCpf/9kjAhuyLIfG Sp3MLHSqCNfrz+vadQSH8YNefAvr23QZZYXXUwSF7wSxzNkai9x5bTyUzCuwlp6o UY/A9aKii3S0cEpJvIg3+1LMYxv94vrJHLccCOQR5IEx4coXjif9F6u7Inqr3hLn p87eRjabd5LqDF1sG/PiJOj62TQ1Wawh+9tVrdepuRFmJKkeC5Q5d+tFKFLCp6X+ QPb9Q9eZjeD8+R9bVh2enjv27M9kqhr8hDrnwkZBEOuWoMWqQnwYSldiEUxMRPw= =/+7n -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From wk at gnupg.org Mon Jan 19 11:25:05 2009 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Mon, 19 Jan 2009 11:25:05 +0100 Subject: GnuPG 2.0.10 - t-convert test fails on ppc and s390 In-Reply-To: <20090119085912.GD17796@localhost> (Petr Uzel's message of "Mon, 19 Jan 2009 09:59:12 +0100") References: <20090119085912.GD17796@localhost> Message-ID: <87ljt7vbi6.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> On Mon, 19 Jan 2009 09:59, petr.uzel at suse.cz said: > make[3]: Entering directory `/suse/puzel/packages/gnupg-2.0.10/common' > t-convert.c:373: test 7 failed Can you please add some debug output; in particular the fprintf line below: tail = hex2str (tests[idx].hex, buffer, sizeof buffer, &count); if (tests[idx].str) { /* Good case test. */ if (!tail) fail (idx); else if (strcmp (tests[idx].str, buffer)) fail (idx); else if (tail - tests[idx].hex != tests[idx].off) fail (idx); else if (strlen (buffer) != count) { fprintf (stderr, "buffer=-->%s<-- count=%d\n", buffer, (int)count); fail (idx); } and run the test manually: cd common; ./t-convert Or give me a test account on one of these machines. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Auschnahme regelt ein Bundeschgesetz. From wk at gnupg.org Mon Jan 19 11:27:14 2009 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Mon, 19 Jan 2009 11:27:14 +0100 Subject: storing gpg keys on a database In-Reply-To: <49745499.90702@upf.edu> (Ramon Loureiro's message of "Mon, 19 Jan 2009 11:23:21 +0100") References: <49745499.90702@upf.edu> Message-ID: <87hc3vvbel.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> On Mon, 19 Jan 2009 11:23, ramon.loureiro at upf.edu said: > Could you give me some references (libraries, structures...) on how to > store GPG keys on a database? Export them _without_ the option --armor and store them as a binary blob. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Auschnahme regelt ein Bundeschgesetz. From ramon.loureiro at upf.edu Mon Jan 19 11:43:21 2009 From: ramon.loureiro at upf.edu (Ramon Loureiro) Date: Mon, 19 Jan 2009 11:43:21 +0100 Subject: storing gpg keys on a database In-Reply-To: <87hc3vvbel.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> References: <49745499.90702@upf.edu> <87hc3vvbel.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> Message-ID: <49745949.2010207@upf.edu> Werner Koch wrote: > On Mon, 19 Jan 2009 11:23, ramon.loureiro at upf.edu said: > > >> Could you give me some references (libraries, structures...) on how to >> store GPG keys on a database? >> > > Export them _without_ the option --armor and store them as a binary blob. > > > Hi, Thanks, but I'd like to build an application to quick search for keys and the input should be an email... If I have to export on the fly every key, it will be very slow.... isn't? _ ramon From petr.uzel at suse.cz Mon Jan 19 12:29:08 2009 From: petr.uzel at suse.cz (Petr Uzel) Date: Mon, 19 Jan 2009 12:29:08 +0100 Subject: GnuPG 2.0.10 - t-convert test fails on ppc and s390 In-Reply-To: <87ljt7vbi6.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> References: <20090119085912.GD17796@localhost> <87ljt7vbi6.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> Message-ID: <20090119112908.GF17796@localhost> On Mon, Jan 19, 2009 at 11:25:05AM +0100, Werner Koch wrote: > On Mon, 19 Jan 2009 09:59, petr.uzel at suse.cz said: > > > make[3]: Entering directory `/suse/puzel/packages/gnupg-2.0.10/common' > > t-convert.c:373: test 7 failed > > Can you please add some debug output; in particular the fprintf line > below: > > tail = hex2str (tests[idx].hex, buffer, sizeof buffer, &count); > if (tests[idx].str) > { > /* Good case test. */ > if (!tail) > fail (idx); > else if (strcmp (tests[idx].str, buffer)) > fail (idx); > else if (tail - tests[idx].hex != tests[idx].off) > fail (idx); > else if (strlen (buffer) != count) > { > fprintf (stderr, "buffer=-->%s<-- count=%d\n", > buffer, (int)count); > fail (idx); > } > > > and run the test manually: > > cd common; ./t-convert ~/packages/gnupg-2.0.10/common> ./t-convert buffer=--><-- count=-1 t-convert.c:374: test 7 failed > Or give me a test account on one of these machines. I'd like to, but I can't as those are suse internal machines. Sorry. I'll try to look at it with a debugger... -- Best regards / s pozdravem Petr Uzel, Packages maintainer --------------------------------------------------------------------- SUSE LINUX, s.r.o. e-mail: puzel at suse.cz Lihovarsk? 1060/12 tel: +420 284 028 964 190 00 Prague 9 fax: +420 284 028 951 Czech Republic http://www.suse.cz From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Mon Jan 19 13:57:54 2009 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Mon, 19 Jan 2009 07:57:54 -0500 Subject: storing gpg keys on a database In-Reply-To: <49745949.2010207@upf.edu> References: <49745499.90702@upf.edu> <87hc3vvbel.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> <49745949.2010207@upf.edu> Message-ID: <497478D2.8050007@sixdemonbag.org> Ramon Loureiro wrote: > Thanks, but I'd like to build an application to quick search for keys > and the input should be an email... A couple of options: 1. Create a regular SQL database with an email address as part of a composite primary key, and a binary blob as an unindexed column 2. Run your own local keyserver and run your queries against that. #1 will probably be easier; #2 seems like it will probably be faster and more reliable. I did some looking into this a few years ago That said, database engines tend to handle binary blobs very poorly. You'll probably want to strip as many signatures as possible from the keys before you import them, to keep their size down. > If I have to export on the fly every key, it will be very slow.... isn't? This is why you export the keys, and import them into the database, in advance. From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Mon Jan 19 14:00:03 2009 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Mon, 19 Jan 2009 08:00:03 -0500 Subject: storing gpg keys on a database In-Reply-To: <497478D2.8050007@sixdemonbag.org> References: <49745499.90702@upf.edu> <87hc3vvbel.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> <49745949.2010207@upf.edu> <497478D2.8050007@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <49747953.5010208@sixdemonbag.org> Robert J. Hansen wrote: > I did some looking into this a few years ago Weird: could've sworn I finished that sentence. Please add, "... and it was pretty clear that for my needs, #2 was the way to go. Your mileage may vary." From wk at gnupg.org Mon Jan 19 14:00:43 2009 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Mon, 19 Jan 2009 14:00:43 +0100 Subject: GnuPG 2.0.10 - t-convert test fails on ppc and s390 In-Reply-To: <20090119112908.GF17796@localhost> (Petr Uzel's message of "Mon, 19 Jan 2009 12:29:08 +0100") References: <20090119085912.GD17796@localhost> <87ljt7vbi6.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> <20090119112908.GF17796@localhost> Message-ID: <874ozvv4as.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> Hi, Can you please test this patch: 2009-01-19 Werner Koch * convert.c (hex2str): Fix optimization to append a nul character. Index: common/convert.c =================================================================== --- common/convert.c (revision 4915) +++ common/convert.c (working copy) @@ -194,7 +194,9 @@ ; if (*s && (!isascii (*s) || !isspace (*s)) ) return NULL; /* Not followed by Nul or white space. */ - need_nul = !(s[-2] == '0' && s[-1] == '0'); + /* We need to append a nul character. However we don't want that if + the hexstring already ends with "00". */ + need_nul = ((s == hexstring) || !(s[-2] == '0' && s[-1] == '0')); if (need_nul) count++; -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Auschnahme regelt ein Bundeschgesetz. From wk at gnupg.org Mon Jan 19 14:02:42 2009 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Mon, 19 Jan 2009 14:02:42 +0100 Subject: storing gpg keys on a database In-Reply-To: <49745949.2010207@upf.edu> (Ramon Loureiro's message of "Mon, 19 Jan 2009 11:43:21 +0100") References: <49745499.90702@upf.edu> <87hc3vvbel.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> <49745949.2010207@upf.edu> Message-ID: <87zlhntpn1.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> On Mon, 19 Jan 2009 11:43, ramon.loureiro at upf.edu said: > Thanks, but I'd like to build an application to quick search for keys > and the input should be an email... Then you need to use: gpg --list-keys --with-colons --fixed-list-mode there is no other way. The format gpg uses to store its keys is not a part of the API and subject to change at any time. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Auschnahme regelt ein Bundeschgesetz. From wk at gnupg.org Mon Jan 19 14:07:44 2009 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Mon, 19 Jan 2009 14:07:44 +0100 Subject: A quick not on IDNA (was: storing gpg keys on a database) In-Reply-To: <49745949.2010207@upf.edu> (Ramon Loureiro's message of "Mon, 19 Jan 2009 11:43:21 +0100") References: <49745499.90702@upf.edu> <87hc3vvbel.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> <49745949.2010207@upf.edu> Message-ID: <87vdsbtpen.fsf_-_@wheatstone.g10code.de> Hi, Please note that the email addresses OpenPGP and thus gpg uses are always in UTF8 encoded (with --with-colons). Thus don' t expect any IDNA encoding in the user IDs you receive from gpg. Although it looks like an email address it is not in the RFC2822 required encoding but rather uses UTF8. It is expected that the mail client software does the conversion to Punycode. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Auschnahme regelt ein Bundeschgesetz. From wk at gnupg.org Mon Jan 19 14:34:53 2009 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Mon, 19 Jan 2009 14:34:53 +0100 Subject: storing gpg keys on a database In-Reply-To: <497478D2.8050007@sixdemonbag.org> (Robert J. Hansen's message of "Mon, 19 Jan 2009 07:57:54 -0500") References: <49745499.90702@upf.edu> <87hc3vvbel.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> <49745949.2010207@upf.edu> <497478D2.8050007@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <87r62zto5e.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> On Mon, 19 Jan 2009 13:57, rjh at sixdemonbag.org said: > 1. Create a regular SQL database with an email address as part of a > composite primary key, and a binary blob as an unindexed column Alternatively store the fingerprint and then use the fingerprint to specify the key or to extract it. If you want to have a format that will work in the future you may prepend a "2:" to the fingerprint. Example: $ gpg --list-keys --with-fingerprint --with-colons --fixed-list-mode [...] pub:f:2048:17:F2AD85AC1E42B367:1199118275:1546232400::-:::scESC: fpr:::::::::80615870F5BAD690333686D0F2AD85AC1E42B367: uid:f::::1199120023::[...]::Werner Koch : uid:f::::1199120000::[...] sub:f:2048:1:8117B6EBFA8FE1F9:1206105295:1325286000:::::e: With that data you would insert this into your DB. "wk at gnupg.org" -> "2:80615870F5BAD690333686D0F2AD85AC1E42B367" The reason for the "2:" is that the OpenPGP format will eventually be changed to compute the fingerprint using a different algorithm. The "2:" indicates the curent algorithm. If you need to save space you would of course not use the hex encoding of the fingerprint. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Auschnahme regelt ein Bundeschgesetz. From petr.uzel at suse.cz Mon Jan 19 15:42:21 2009 From: petr.uzel at suse.cz (Petr Uzel) Date: Mon, 19 Jan 2009 15:42:21 +0100 Subject: GnuPG 2.0.10 - t-convert test fails on ppc and s390 In-Reply-To: <874ozvv4as.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> References: <20090119085912.GD17796@localhost> <87ljt7vbi6.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> <20090119112908.GF17796@localhost> <874ozvv4as.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> Message-ID: <20090119144221.GA11966@localhost> On Mon, Jan 19, 2009 at 02:00:43PM +0100, Werner Koch wrote: > Hi, > > Can you please test this patch: > > 2009-01-19 Werner Koch > > * convert.c (hex2str): Fix optimization to append a nul character. > > Index: common/convert.c > =================================================================== > --- common/convert.c (revision 4915) > +++ common/convert.c (working copy) > @@ -194,7 +194,9 @@ > ; > if (*s && (!isascii (*s) || !isspace (*s)) ) > return NULL; /* Not followed by Nul or white space. */ > - need_nul = !(s[-2] == '0' && s[-1] == '0'); > + /* We need to append a nul character. However we don't want that if > + the hexstring already ends with "00". */ > + need_nul = ((s == hexstring) || !(s[-2] == '0' && s[-1] == '0')); > if (need_nul) > count++; Thanks, this made make check happy. -- Best regards / s pozdravem Petr Uzel, Packages maintainer --------------------------------------------------------------------- SUSE LINUX, s.r.o. e-mail: puzel at suse.cz Lihovarsk? 1060/12 tel: +420 284 028 964 190 00 Prague 9 fax: +420 284 028 951 Czech Republic http://www.suse.cz From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Mon Jan 19 16:12:40 2009 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Mon, 19 Jan 2009 10:12:40 -0500 Subject: storing gpg keys on a database In-Reply-To: <87r62zto5e.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> References: <49745499.90702@upf.edu> <87hc3vvbel.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> <49745949.2010207@upf.edu> <497478D2.8050007@sixdemonbag.org> <87r62zto5e.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> Message-ID: <49749868.2090508@sixdemonbag.org> Werner Koch wrote: > Alternatively store the fingerprint and then use the fingerprint to > specify the key or to extract it. This is O(n) lookup, isn't it? If Ramon is looking at a db or a custom solution, I was assuming he needed something a lot faster. But yes, if O(n) is good enough, the right thing to do is to just let GnuPG handle it. From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Mon Jan 19 16:39:24 2009 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Mon, 19 Jan 2009 10:39:24 -0500 Subject: storing gpg keys on a database In-Reply-To: <49745949.2010207@upf.edu> References: <49745499.90702@upf.edu> <87hc3vvbel.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> <49745949.2010207@upf.edu> Message-ID: <20090119153924.GA63294@jabberwocky.com> On Mon, Jan 19, 2009 at 11:43:21AM +0100, Ramon Loureiro wrote: > Werner Koch wrote: > > On Mon, 19 Jan 2009 11:23, ramon.loureiro at upf.edu said: > > > > > >> Could you give me some references (libraries, structures...) on how to > >> store GPG keys on a database? > >> > > > > Export them _without_ the option --armor and store them as a binary blob. > > > > > > > Hi, > > Thanks, but I'd like to build an application to quick search for keys > and the input should be an email... > If I have to export on the fly every key, it will be very slow.... isn't? Almost everything you need is done for you: set up a keyserver. Given what you're describing, it sounds like a LDAP keyserver is the way to go. GPG talks to it natively, and you can do any sort of queries you like. For example, an email search can be as simple as: (pgpUserID=*the-address at i.am.looking.for*) David From sattva at pgpru.com Mon Jan 19 18:22:45 2009 From: sattva at pgpru.com (Vlad "SATtva" Miller) Date: Mon, 19 Jan 2009 23:22:45 +0600 Subject: Need help for decrypt In-Reply-To: References: <4970F2DB.5060907@pgpru.com> Message-ID: <4974B6E5.9060702@pgpru.com> Lai, Thomas (19.01.2009 07:15): > Hello Vlad "SATtva" Miller, > > Your answer is very helpful. > > The first option is ok, however about the second, > I could not find the option --passphrase-file in command gpg. > The gpg version I used is gpg (GnuPG) 1.2.1. Your version is antique! Consider upgrading it on first occasion. > I find another option --passphrase-fd; I found it had the similar > function as --passphrase-file. > > Anyway, really appreciated for your such good and quick reply. > > > Thank you and Best regards, > > Thomas Lai / FIL - Dalian > > > -----Original Message----- > From: Vlad "SATtva" Miller [mailto:sattva at pgpru.com] > Sent: Saturday, January 17, 2009 4:50 AM > To: Lai, Thomas > Cc: Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > Subject: Re: Need help for decrypt > > Lai, Thomas (16.01.2009 15:35): >> Is there any way to decrypt files without entering my private key's >> passphrass? > > Yes. You could remove passphrase from your private key (do --edit-key > [your_key], then passwd, and finally save). Or you could write your > passphrase in some text file and supply it to gpg with --passphrase-file > parameter. Both options could be just fine or quite dangerous depending > on your security considerations and actual environment, I'll leave that > part alone. > -- SATtva | security & privacy consulting www.vladmiller.info | www.pgpru.com -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 513 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From faramir.cl at gmail.com Mon Jan 19 19:50:01 2009 From: faramir.cl at gmail.com (Faramir) Date: Mon, 19 Jan 2009 15:50:01 -0300 Subject: Need help for decrypt In-Reply-To: References: <4970F2DB.5060907@pgpru.com> Message-ID: <4974CB59.8080505@gmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Lai, Thomas escribi?: ... > The first option is ok, however about the second, > I could not find the option --passphrase-file in command gpg. > The gpg version I used is gpg (GnuPG) 1.2.1. I am not sure how old is your GnuPG version, but current version is 1.4.9, maybe you should consider upgrading to the new version, if possible. Best Regards -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJJdMtYAAoJEMV4f6PvczxAbjEIAJJu7lyOr9e5eQ830GrQa+rn 3S9j7DC2vlrVbgoPdhQsInbLYubJuYCaXHe0O9a+tDwom0ajon49BSm4z1VbY8+I U5oMX07OWIOHDXGgnkALF7JtAo3J4dtC/znzFvGlrfuXndMD8CKIHgM9THk7VUPM uVB8IS1NVVcDIq87chE8OAsKAsrM1hJ0GAPzRfagiT+D51ttghzGh52Rro9qCcxo 3bfxQa+r/JA9409dB+rWQx6Jbf4w5xrI76Rl+N54r3ln7b/fHzTB1NfrG9yJrtH7 xPAv1f73fARd4jWW7mJhsCh4SKkrLXln+UtU73cV8Kx4Om5eqLKatG4twUGWZnI= =IQeL -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From wk at gnupg.org Tue Jan 20 09:12:29 2009 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Tue, 20 Jan 2009 09:12:29 +0100 Subject: storing gpg keys on a database In-Reply-To: <49749868.2090508@sixdemonbag.org> (Robert J. Hansen's message of "Mon, 19 Jan 2009 10:12:40 -0500") References: <49745499.90702@upf.edu> <87hc3vvbel.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> <49745949.2010207@upf.edu> <497478D2.8050007@sixdemonbag.org> <87r62zto5e.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> <49749868.2090508@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <87tz7us8eq.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> On Mon, 19 Jan 2009 16:12, rjh at sixdemonbag.org said: > This is O(n) lookup, isn't it? If Ramon is looking at a db or a custom > solution, I was assuming he needed something a lot faster. But yes, if > O(n) is good enough, the right thing to do is to just let GnuPG handle it. It depends on what he want to do with the key. If he eventually needs the key to encrypt a message using gpg, the fingerprint approach saves a lot of disk space and voids importing a key right before encrypting to it. BTW, gpg has all the infrastructure to add another storage backend, for example a DB backend. In fact there used to be a gdbm backend once. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Auschnahme regelt ein Bundeschgesetz. From ramon.loureiro at upf.edu Tue Jan 20 10:10:43 2009 From: ramon.loureiro at upf.edu (Ramon Loureiro) Date: Tue, 20 Jan 2009 10:10:43 +0100 Subject: storing gpg keys on a database In-Reply-To: <20090119153924.GA63294@jabberwocky.com> References: <49745499.90702@upf.edu> <87hc3vvbel.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> <49745949.2010207@upf.edu> <20090119153924.GA63294@jabberwocky.com> Message-ID: <49759513.5060705@upf.edu> David Shaw wrote: > On Mon, Jan 19, 2009 at 11:43:21AM +0100, Ramon Loureiro wrote: > >> Werner Koch wrote: >> >>> On Mon, 19 Jan 2009 11:23, ramon.loureiro at upf.edu said: >>> >>> >>> >>>> Could you give me some references (libraries, structures...) on how to >>>> store GPG keys on a database? >>>> >>>> >>> Export them _without_ the option --armor and store them as a binary blob. >>> >>> >>> >>> >> Hi, >> >> Thanks, but I'd like to build an application to quick search for keys >> and the input should be an email... >> If I have to export on the fly every key, it will be very slow.... isn't? >> > > Almost everything you need is done for you: set up a keyserver. > And does a keyserver use a database? or is it based on a filesystem and on the fly operations? (I know how to handle online-databases (mySQL, Postgres...) with perl, pyton or PHP but I don't know anything about LDAP...) My idea is having these structures to easy see who has signed someone's key -------------------------------------------- keyID | fingerprint | uid-1| email-1| isRevocated keyID | fingerprint | uid-2| email-2| isRevocated .... keyID | fingerprint | uid-N|email-N| isRevocated -------------------------------------------- keyID |signedbyKeyID-1| isRevocated keyID |signedbyKeyID-2| isRevocated keyID |signedbyKeyID-3| isRevocated keyID |signedbyKeyID-M | isRevocated ------------------------------------------- So I "only" need to store the fingerprint, the email and the signatures... Thanks to all of you Ramon From manuel.leithner at runbox.com Mon Jan 19 12:11:36 2009 From: manuel.leithner at runbox.com (Manuel Leithner) Date: Mon, 19 Jan 2009 12:11:36 +0100 Subject: storing gpg keys on a database In-Reply-To: <49745949.2010207@upf.edu> Message-ID: On Mon, 19 Jan 2009 11:43:21 +0100, gnupg-users-bounces at gnupg.org wrote: > Werner Koch wrote: > > On Mon, 19 Jan 2009 11:23, ramon.loureiro at upf.edu said: > > > > > >> Could you give me some references (libraries, structures...) on how to > >> store GPG keys on a database? > >> > > > > Export them _without_ the option --armor and store them as a binary blob. > > > > > > > Hi, > > Thanks, but I'd like to build an application to quick search for keys > and the input should be an email... > If I have to export on the fly every key, it will be very slow.... isn't? > > _ > ramon > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users > If I understand you correctly, you want to build a database with a table like this: mailaddress VARCHAR(100) PRIMARY KEY, pubkey BLOB NOT NULL Is that correct? If so, it shouldn't be that hard to do - just run a cronjob every now and then which fetches exactly those values and inserts them into the database (if you were to use a bash script or something, chances are you have to ascii armor it). By the way, what exactly would your application do that gpg --export does not? Regards, Manuel From timo.wolf at itk-engineering.de Mon Jan 19 16:12:48 2009 From: timo.wolf at itk-engineering.de (zim2901) Date: Mon, 19 Jan 2009 07:12:48 -0800 (PST) Subject: PHP Frontend Message-ID: <21544949.post@talk.nabble.com> Hi, I want to create a frontend to generate gpg public keys in PHP. There is a function called shell_exec. This function, execute a command via shell. But you can only pass one command to the funktion. If I start cmd.exe and take the command "gpg --gen-key", gpg opens a dialog. My problem is that gpg only works with this dialog. It gives a question and anticipate a responce. So I tried to pipe the necessary informations with a txt.- file, but it doesn't work! My question is, if it is possible to generate keys without do that dialog? In an other forum, sombody explains that this is not possible, because of secureness... If that is true, my whole projekt stops! Has anybody an idea? Thanks zim2901 -- View this message in context: http://www.nabble.com/PHP-Frontend-tp21544949p21544949.html Sent from the GnuPG - User mailing list archive at Nabble.com. From John at Mozilla-Enigmail.org Tue Jan 20 12:14:33 2009 From: John at Mozilla-Enigmail.org (John Clizbe) Date: Tue, 20 Jan 2009 05:14:33 -0600 Subject: PHP Frontend In-Reply-To: <21544949.post@talk.nabble.com> References: <21544949.post@talk.nabble.com> Message-ID: <4975B219.8000009@Mozilla-Enigmail.org> zim2901 wrote: > Hi, > > I want to create a frontend to generate gpg public keys in PHP. There is a > function called shell_exec. This function, execute a command via shell. But > you can only pass one command to the funktion. > If I start cmd.exe and take the command "gpg --gen-key", gpg opens a dialog. > My problem is that gpg only works with this dialog. It gives a question and > anticipate a responce. So I tried to pipe the necessary informations with a > txt.- file, but it doesn't work! > My question is, if it is possible to generate keys without do that dialog? > In an other forum, sombody explains that this is not possible, because of > secureness... If that is true, my whole projekt stops! > > Has anybody an idea? See the section "Unattended key generation" in the file DETAILS in the doc directory of the source code distribution. [...]From DETAILS... Here is an example: $ cat >foo < ssb 1024g/8F70E2C0 2000-03-09 -- John P. Clizbe Inet:John (a) Mozilla-Enigmail.org You can't spell fiasco without SCO. hkp://keyserver.gingerbear.net or mailto:pgp-public-keys at gingerbear.net?subject=HELP Q:"Just how do the residents of Haiku, Hawai'i hold conversations?" A:"An odd melody / island voices on the winds / surplus of vowels" -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 680 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From wk at gnupg.org Tue Jan 20 12:15:30 2009 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Tue, 20 Jan 2009 12:15:30 +0100 Subject: PHP Frontend In-Reply-To: <21544949.post@talk.nabble.com> (timo.wolf@itk-engineering.de's message of "Mon, 19 Jan 2009 07:12:48 -0800 (PST)") References: <21544949.post@talk.nabble.com> Message-ID: <87vdsaqld9.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> On Mon, 19 Jan 2009 16:12, timo.wolf at itk-engineering.de said: > If I start cmd.exe and take the command "gpg --gen-key", gpg opens a dialog. > My problem is that gpg only works with this dialog. It gives a question and Nope. Checkout doc/DETAILS: Unattended key generation ========================= This feature allows unattended generation of keys controlled by a parameter file. To use this feature, you use --gen-key together with --batch and feed the parameters either from stdin or from a file given on the commandline. [...] Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Auschnahme regelt ein Bundeschgesetz. From f.schwind at chili-radiology.com Tue Jan 20 12:15:45 2009 From: f.schwind at chili-radiology.com (Florian Schwind) Date: Tue, 20 Jan 2009 12:15:45 +0100 Subject: PHP Frontend In-Reply-To: <21544949.post@talk.nabble.com> References: <21544949.post@talk.nabble.com> Message-ID: <4975B261.1010504@chili-radiology.com> zim2901 wrote: > I want to create a frontend to generate gpg public keys in PHP. > My question is, if it is possible to generate keys without do that dialog? > In an other forum, sombody explains that this is not possible, because of > secureness... If that is true, my whole projekt stops! The real question is, if you want to create keys over the web? I would never trust any key I haven't created myself... and definitely not some key generated with a webapp. > Thanks zim2901 Best Regards Florian From BruderB at cation.de Tue Jan 20 12:17:13 2009 From: BruderB at cation.de (B) Date: Tue, 20 Jan 2009 12:17:13 +0100 Subject: PHP Frontend In-Reply-To: <21544949.post@talk.nabble.com> References: <21544949.post@talk.nabble.com> Message-ID: <4975B2B9.1090700@cation.de> zim2901 schrieb: > Hi, > > I want to create a frontend to generate gpg public keys in PHP. There is a > function called shell_exec. This function, execute a command via shell. But > you can only pass one command to the funktion. > If I start cmd.exe and take the command "gpg --gen-key", gpg opens a dialog. > My problem is that gpg only works with this dialog. It gives a question and > anticipate a responce. So I tried to pipe the necessary informations with a > txt.- file, but it doesn't work! > My question is, if it is possible to generate keys without do that dialog? > In an other forum, sombody explains that this is not possible, because of > secureness... If that is true, my whole projekt stops! > Hej Timo, I guess the keyword for google is 'unattended keygeneration'. You will be prompted to the batch mode of gpg: gpg --batch --gen-key < ./keygen Regards, Boris From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Tue Jan 20 14:54:55 2009 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Tue, 20 Jan 2009 08:54:55 -0500 Subject: storing gpg keys on a database In-Reply-To: <49759513.5060705@upf.edu> References: <49745499.90702@upf.edu> <87hc3vvbel.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> <49745949.2010207@upf.edu> <20090119153924.GA63294@jabberwocky.com> <49759513.5060705@upf.edu> Message-ID: <20090120135454.GA66946@jabberwocky.com> On Tue, Jan 20, 2009 at 10:10:43AM +0100, Ramon Loureiro wrote: > David Shaw wrote: > > On Mon, Jan 19, 2009 at 11:43:21AM +0100, Ramon Loureiro wrote: > > > >> Werner Koch wrote: > >> > >>> On Mon, 19 Jan 2009 11:23, ramon.loureiro at upf.edu said: > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>>> Could you give me some references (libraries, structures...) on how to > >>>> store GPG keys on a database? > >>>> > >>>> > >>> Export them _without_ the option --armor and store them as a binary blob. > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >> Hi, > >> > >> Thanks, but I'd like to build an application to quick search for keys > >> and the input should be an email... > >> If I have to export on the fly every key, it will be very slow.... isn't? > >> > > > > Almost everything you need is done for you: set up a keyserver. > > > And does a keyserver use a database? or is it based on a filesystem and > on the fly operations? > (I know how to handle online-databases (mySQL, Postgres...) with perl, > pyton or PHP but I don't know anything about LDAP...) You can think of an LDAP keyserver as a database. It stores data, and there is a query language to retrieve data in various ways. > My idea is having these structures to easy see who has signed someone's key You can do this in LDAP with something like (&(pgpcertid=long-key-id)(pgpsignerid=other-long-key-id)) > So I "only" need to store the fingerprint, the email and the signatures... Hard to say - it's not clear what you're trying to do and why, so we're all sort of feeling around in the dark. Why don't you say what you're trying to do, and we can help? David From ramon.loureiro at upf.edu Mon Jan 26 15:18:03 2009 From: ramon.loureiro at upf.edu (Ramon Loureiro) Date: Mon, 26 Jan 2009 15:18:03 +0100 Subject: storing gpg keys on a database In-Reply-To: <20090120135454.GA66946@jabberwocky.com> References: <49745499.90702@upf.edu> <87hc3vvbel.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> <49745949.2010207@upf.edu> <20090119153924.GA63294@jabberwocky.com> <49759513.5060705@upf.edu> <20090120135454.GA66946@jabberwocky.com> Message-ID: <497DC61B.4040206@upf.edu> David Shaw wrote: > On Tue, Jan 20, 2009 at 10:10:43AM +0100, Ramon Loureiro wrote: > >> David Shaw wrote: >> >>> On Mon, Jan 19, 2009 at 11:43:21AM +0100, Ramon Loureiro wrote: >>> >>> >>>> Werner Koch wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> On Mon, 19 Jan 2009 11:23, ramon.loureiro at upf.edu said: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Could you give me some references (libraries, structures...) on how to >>>>>> store GPG keys on a database? >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> Export them _without_ the option --armor and store them as a binary blob. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> Hi, >>>> >>>> Thanks, but I'd like to build an application to quick search for keys >>>> and the input should be an email... >>>> If I have to export on the fly every key, it will be very slow.... isn't? >>>> >>>> >>> Almost everything you need is done for you: set up a keyserver. >>> >>> >> And does a keyserver use a database? or is it based on a filesystem and >> on the fly operations? >> (I know how to handle online-databases (mySQL, Postgres...) with perl, >> pyton or PHP but I don't know anything about LDAP...) >> > > You can think of an LDAP keyserver as a database. It stores data, and > there is a query language to retrieve data in various ways. > > >> My idea is having these structures to easy see who has signed someone's key >> > > You can do this in LDAP with something like > (&(pgpcertid=long-key-id)(pgpsignerid=other-long-key-id)) > > >> So I "only" need to store the fingerprint, the email and the signatures... >> > > Hard to say - it's not clear what you're trying to do and why, so > we're all sort of feeling around in the dark. Why don't you say what > you're trying to do, and we can help? > What I have in mind is to get an easy way to see if I have signed he key of the people who has signed mine and viceversa. If it takes the aspect of a table it looks like (let's say key2 is mine) key1 key2 key3 key4 key5 key1 ok key2 ok ok ok ok ok key3 ok key4 ok key5 ok Only "my row/ my column" is usefull for me, but the other values will be useful for the other owners... That's the idea -- Ramon Loureiro Universitat Pompeu Fabra e-Confidential Project http://www.itea-econfidential.org/ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Tue Jan 20 15:56:43 2009 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Tue, 20 Jan 2009 09:56:43 -0500 Subject: storing gpg keys on a database In-Reply-To: <497DC61B.4040206@upf.edu> References: <49745499.90702@upf.edu> <87hc3vvbel.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> <49745949.2010207@upf.edu> <20090119153924.GA63294@jabberwocky.com> <49759513.5060705@upf.edu> <20090120135454.GA66946@jabberwocky.com> <497DC61B.4040206@upf.edu> Message-ID: <20090120145643.GA67276@jabberwocky.com> On Mon, Jan 26, 2009 at 03:18:03PM +0100, Ramon Loureiro wrote: > >> My idea is having these structures to easy see who has signed someone's key > >> > > > > You can do this in LDAP with something like > > (&(pgpcertid=long-key-id)(pgpsignerid=other-long-key-id)) > > > > > >> So I "only" need to store the fingerprint, the email and the signatures... > >> > > > > Hard to say - it's not clear what you're trying to do and why, so > > we're all sort of feeling around in the dark. Why don't you say what > > you're trying to do, and we can help? > > > What I have in mind is to get an easy way to see if I have signed he key > of the people who has signed mine and viceversa. You can do this sort of thing with LDAP. All keys signed by X: (pgpsignerid=X) Keys that have signed each other: (&(pgpcertid=long-key-id)(pgpsignerid=other-long-key-id)) Did key "X" sign key "Y"?: (&(pgpcertid=Y)(pgpsignerid=X)) All keys not signed by X: (!pgpsignerid=X) And so on. To be sure, LDAP isn't SQL - you can't do all the complex joins and relations you could do with a true database. LDAP does have the big advantage of being already written for you, though. If you can express the questions you want to ask of your data in LDAP, then I'd go the LDAP route. If not, then a true database would probably work better for you. David From toothache200873 at yahoo.com Wed Jan 21 06:59:06 2009 From: toothache200873 at yahoo.com (Condor Kim) Date: Tue, 20 Jan 2009 21:59:06 -0800 (PST) Subject: how to get private keys out of a old computer Message-ID: <669773.63845.qm@web46107.mail.sp1.yahoo.com> I have a question, can anyone help me? ? on my old computer i had gpg4win and enigmail all installed with several private keys created. but then i bought a new computer and and reinstalled gpg4win on it. now how do i recover the old private keys from the previous computer? i do still have the hard drive of the previous old computer. i tried to retrieve keys with PTA, and found a file called "trustedkeys" outside the "users" file on the old hard drive, but when i retrieved this file, it said "no keys are found". ? both computers use windows vista. ? thanks please help me out with this problem. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From faramir.cl at gmail.com Wed Jan 21 08:05:00 2009 From: faramir.cl at gmail.com (Faramir) Date: Wed, 21 Jan 2009 04:05:00 -0300 Subject: how to get private keys out of a old computer In-Reply-To: <669773.63845.qm@web46107.mail.sp1.yahoo.com> References: <669773.63845.qm@web46107.mail.sp1.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <4976C91C.4020405@gmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Condor Kim escribi?: > I have a question, can anyone help me? I hope so... > from the previous computer? i do still have the hard drive of the > previous old computer. i tried to retrieve keys with PTA, and found a > file called "trustedkeys" outside the "users" file on the old hard > drive, but when i retrieved this file, it said "no keys are found". I'd bet the name of that file was "trustdb.gpg". That is the file that keeps info about how much you trust the signatures issued by the keys... but the private keys are stored in the file "secring.gpg" and the public keys are stored in the file "pubring.gpg". Those are the files you need to retrieve. If you have not yet used gpg4win in the new computer, then just copy these files into gpg home dir, that should solve your problem. If you already have keys in the new machine, I am not sure how to merge both keyrings... I have never had to do it. Tell us if you need more advices... Best Regards -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJJdskcAAoJEMV4f6PvczxAy7MH/3ZLLp/p++f2421D6JsPmXfX 49BDWzm0A3llMj+v/EbGQ3pwLy/p4DnBQuBH7KWBUzCJZKV1rD/Tua4bTb8RDABL d2d313qgjsW0Hqy5U5lcy6m5mqv2LV9yywn+K0WQ0HQ2SQkzVaibm+Pnc5Xzljj/ ppwRNUbb1bAGNyCtb5DBHfUon7hFMY4kmWnnSR2zPtvem4VR/l3NfoAhtBx7+63d 6Ous2LPmtOVySQqjR30c/i1r/6ul9RJAuki2TJsE5TpwNaL+bcUB1v733dlEvtPx Qh9E82WXf3BLoAo5KEYloMAuJKNdSwEoC/ID1WmcnyzU54RA7da8jKTRNJluiig= =PPOS -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From laurent.jumet at skynet.be Wed Jan 21 07:53:52 2009 From: laurent.jumet at skynet.be (Laurent Jumet) Date: Wed, 21 Jan 2009 07:53:52 +0100 Subject: how to get private keys out of a old computer In-Reply-To: <669773.63845.qm@web46107.mail.sp1.yahoo.com> Message-ID: Hello Condor ! Condor Kim wrote: > on my old computer i had gpg4win and enigmail all installed with several > private keys created. but then i bought a new computer and and reinstalled > gpg4win on it. now how do i recover the old private keys from the previous > computer? i do still have the hard drive of the previous old computer. i > tried to retrieve keys with PTA, and found a file called "trustedkeys" > outside the "users" file on the old hard drive, but when i retrieved this > file, it said "no keys are found". ? both computers use windows > vista. ? thanks please help me out with this problem. Usually, public and secret keyrings are in C:\GnuPG\Keyrings and are named pubring.gpg and secring.gpg but the extension and the name may change depending what you decided at first. You only need to copy those files to the adequate directory in your new pc. -- Laurent Jumet KeyID: 0xCFAF704C From Steve.Brockbank at masergy.com Tue Jan 20 15:07:50 2009 From: Steve.Brockbank at masergy.com (Steve Brockbank) Date: Tue, 20 Jan 2009 08:07:50 -0600 Subject: Passphrase problem References: Message-ID: <2B1AAAE9D6221F48BB14D121615FAF94D04A9E@mtxexch01.add0.masergy.com> Can anyone tell me how to replace a passphrase in a key - when the current passphrase is unknown ? regards steve brockbank No virus found in this outgoing message. Checked by AVG - http://www.avg.com Version: 8.0.176 / Virus Database: 270.10.10/1903 - Release Date: 1/19/2009 8:52 PM From timo.wolf at itk-engineering.de Tue Jan 20 15:19:19 2009 From: timo.wolf at itk-engineering.de (zim2901) Date: Tue, 20 Jan 2009 06:19:19 -0800 (PST) Subject: PHP Frontend In-Reply-To: <4975B2B9.1090700@cation.de> References: <21544949.post@talk.nabble.com> <4975B2B9.1090700@cation.de> Message-ID: <21563939.post@talk.nabble.com> BruderB wrote: > > > > zim2901 schrieb: >> Hi, >> >> I want to create a frontend to generate gpg public keys in PHP. There is >> a >> function called shell_exec. This function, execute a command via shell. >> But >> you can only pass one command to the funktion. >> If I start cmd.exe and take the command "gpg --gen-key", gpg opens a >> dialog. >> My problem is that gpg only works with this dialog. It gives a question >> and >> anticipate a responce. So I tried to pipe the necessary informations with >> a >> txt.- file, but it doesn't work! >> My question is, if it is possible to generate keys without do that >> dialog? >> In an other forum, sombody explains that this is not possible, because of >> secureness... If that is true, my whole projekt stops! >> > > Hej Timo, > > I guess the keyword for google is 'unattended keygeneration'. > > You will be prompted to the batch mode of gpg: > > gpg --batch --gen-key < ./keygen > > Regards, > > > Boris > > Ok, thank you for your answers! I think I will do it with the batch file. > I have another question! I also have to read out the fingerprint of an > existing key. > But I have s similar problem, the shell funktions don't give me any reply. > If I do it direkt at the shell, > I get the fingerprint, but with php funktions not. It is not a problem of > php, I tested the funktions with other files! > Has anybody an idea? > > Thank you! zim2901 > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users > > -- View this message in context: http://www.nabble.com/PHP-Frontend-tp21544949p21563939.html Sent from the GnuPG - User mailing list archive at Nabble.com. From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Wed Jan 21 12:30:47 2009 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Wed, 21 Jan 2009 06:30:47 -0500 Subject: Passphrase problem In-Reply-To: <2B1AAAE9D6221F48BB14D121615FAF94D04A9E@mtxexch01.add0.masergy.com> References: <2B1AAAE9D6221F48BB14D121615FAF94D04A9E@mtxexch01.add0.masergy.com> Message-ID: <49770767.3000403@sixdemonbag.org> Steve Brockbank wrote: > Can anyone tell me how to replace a passphrase in a key - when the > current passphrase is unknown ? This is not possible. If it were possible, there wouldn't be much point in a passphrase in the first place. From John at Mozilla-Enigmail.org Wed Jan 21 13:26:06 2009 From: John at Mozilla-Enigmail.org (John Clizbe) Date: Wed, 21 Jan 2009 06:26:06 -0600 Subject: how to get private keys out of a old computer In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <4977145E.6090609@Mozilla-Enigmail.org> Laurent Jumet wrote: > > Usually, public and secret keyrings are in C:\GnuPG\Keyrings and are named > pubring.gpg and secring.gpg but the extension and the name may change depending > what you decided at first. > You only need to copy those files to the adequate directory in your new pc. The default directory on Windows has not been C:\GnuPG since at least 1.4.1 The default directory is %APPDATA%\GnuPG On 2000 & XP this expands to 'C:\Documents and Settings\\Application Data\GnuPG' On Vista this expands to 'C:\Users\AppData\Roaming\GnuPG' Only the *.gpg (pubring.gpg, secring,gpg, and trustdb.gpg) and gpg.conf if it exists need be copied/moved. (Many folks neglect to advise copying trustdb.gpg.) -- John P. Clizbe Inet:John (a) Mozilla-Enigmail.org You can't spell fiasco without SCO. hkp://keyserver.gingerbear.net or mailto:pgp-public-keys at gingerbear.net?subject=HELP Q:"Just how do the residents of Haiku, Hawai'i hold conversations?" A:"An odd melody / island voices on the winds / surplus of vowels" -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 680 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From John at Mozilla-Enigmail.org Wed Jan 21 13:33:03 2009 From: John at Mozilla-Enigmail.org (John Clizbe) Date: Wed, 21 Jan 2009 06:33:03 -0600 Subject: how to get private keys out of a old computer In-Reply-To: <669773.63845.qm@web46107.mail.sp1.yahoo.com> References: <669773.63845.qm@web46107.mail.sp1.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <497715FF.4090403@Mozilla-Enigmail.org> Condor Kim wrote: > I have a question, can anyone help me? > > on my old computer i had gpg4win and enigmail all installed with several > private keys created. but then i bought a new computer and and > reinstalled gpg4win on it. now how do i recover the old private keys > from the previous computer? i do still have the hard drive of the > previous old computer. i tried to retrieve keys with PTA, and found a > file called "trustedkeys" outside the "users" file on the old hard > drive, but when i retrieved this file, it said "no keys are found". The default keyring location on Windows for GnuPG is %APPDATA%\GnuPG. On Vista this typically expands to C:\Users\\AppData\Roaming\GnuPG Copy/Move this entire directory to the same location on your new machine, changing if necessary. running 'gpg -version' at a command prompt on either machine will list out the expected location of your keyring files. -- John P. Clizbe Inet:John (a) Mozilla-Enigmail.org You can't spell fiasco without SCO. hkp://keyserver.gingerbear.net or mailto:pgp-public-keys at gingerbear.net?subject=HELP Q:"Just how do the residents of Haiku, Hawai'i hold conversations?" A:"An odd melody / island voices on the winds / surplus of vowels" -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 680 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From cbabcock at kolonelpanic.com Wed Jan 21 13:20:29 2009 From: cbabcock at kolonelpanic.com (Chris Babcock) Date: Wed, 21 Jan 2009 05:20:29 -0700 Subject: Passphrase problem In-Reply-To: <2B1AAAE9D6221F48BB14D121615FAF94D04A9E@mtxexch01.add0.masergy.com> References: <2B1AAAE9D6221F48BB14D121615FAF94D04A9E@mtxexch01.add0.masergy.com> Message-ID: <20090121052029.0e378631@mail.asciiking.com> On Tue, 20 Jan 2009 08:07:50 -0600 "Steve Brockbank" wrote: > > Can anyone tell me how to replace a passphrase in a key - when the > current passphrase is unknown ? No. Can't be done. Not possible. By design. Chris Babcock -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 489 bytes Desc: not available URL: From John at Mozilla-Enigmail.org Wed Jan 21 13:41:46 2009 From: John at Mozilla-Enigmail.org (John Clizbe) Date: Wed, 21 Jan 2009 06:41:46 -0600 Subject: Passphrase problem In-Reply-To: <2B1AAAE9D6221F48BB14D121615FAF94D04A9E@mtxexch01.add0.masergy.com> References: <2B1AAAE9D6221F48BB14D121615FAF94D04A9E@mtxexch01.add0.masergy.com> Message-ID: <4977180A.6050706@Mozilla-Enigmail.org> Steve Brockbank wrote: > > Can anyone tell me how to replace a passphrase in a key - when the current passphrase is unknown ? If you had the forethought to generate a revocation certificate, import it and revoke the key. Generate a new key. There is absolutely no feasible way to recover a passphrase. -- John P. Clizbe Inet:John (a) Mozilla-Enigmail.org You can't spell fiasco without SCO. hkp://keyserver.gingerbear.net or mailto:pgp-public-keys at gingerbear.net?subject=HELP Q:"Just how do the residents of Haiku, Hawai'i hold conversations?" A:"An odd melody / island voices on the winds / surplus of vowels" -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 680 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From BruderB at cation.de Wed Jan 21 17:04:03 2009 From: BruderB at cation.de (B) Date: Wed, 21 Jan 2009 17:04:03 +0100 Subject: PHP Frontend In-Reply-To: <21563939.post@talk.nabble.com> References: <21544949.post@talk.nabble.com> <4975B2B9.1090700@cation.de> <21563939.post@talk.nabble.com> Message-ID: <49774773.6020403@cation.de> zim2901 schrieb: >> >> Ok, thank you for your answers! I think I will do it with the batch file. >> I have another question! I also have to read out the fingerprint of an >> existing key. >> But I have s similar problem, the shell funktions don't give me any reply. >> If I do it direkt at the shell, >> I get the fingerprint, but with php funktions not. It is not a problem of >> php, I tested the funktions with other files! >> Has anybody an idea? >> Hej Timo, here is the hard way: Pipe the output (fingerprint) into a file and read the file from php (and optionally delete it). Boris From faramir.cl at gmail.com Thu Jan 22 08:19:00 2009 From: faramir.cl at gmail.com (Faramir) Date: Thu, 22 Jan 2009 04:19:00 -0300 Subject: OT: virus on the wild? Message-ID: <49781DE4.40707@gmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Hello! I know this is off-topic, but this is related with security, and as we know, if the computer is infected, the game is over. Tonight, a friend told me he was searching for a site at google, and his AV warned him about a virus, and asked me what could it be (I recommended him the AV we both use). So I went to google, entered the name of the site and clicked "search". Right after the results page loaded, the AV said it had just blocked a virus (yes, I didn't even have time to click on the link to the site). I searched the name of the virus (without much hope, I never find any info about the virus Avast detects), and found the following info: - ---quoting--- Jan 18th - On Friday January 16th, a large number of websites worldwide became the focus of a targeted attack. A malicious script was added to the attacked pages, which redirects visitors to malicious servers operated by the attackers and results in the the users' computers becoming infected. This malicious script is detected by avast! as JS:Packed-AB [Trj]. We have recorded almost 5000 attacks during the last 48 hours detected on more than 2000 websites worldwide. At the moment, avast! is the only antivirus software fully detecting this new malware. - ---end of quote--- source: http://www.avast.com/eng/press-release-js-packed-ab-trj-.html So, my first question is about if this is too much off topic to talk here about it (I figure PGP-Basics OT can the a better place, but I thought it was a good idea to send this message here, since it seems it's a "big issue", and not everybody uses pgp-basics-ot). And the second question is: Does somebody know about this virus? Is is as fast spreading as it looks like? And the third and last question is: why the AV detected the virus _before_ I visited the site? Best Regards -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJJeB3kAAoJEMV4f6PvczxAxf4H/2z0VyXLOUMHaw6vZHwh4Nt2 71wMA2MJDgozda7478CBV6qyvJST1qDoNjZAiJ1b1kchow7k3Rsf17hKBh6bW9zB osInC9g7p5uM4dK8IFjIgLkj1loMiqiw4GX2mcgP3hm/l8KT76n6H4XFfOSFyNrj PtQ64m/jdU/55rDLfJLW2HV9FTM2N2FmdztmTflQRQzXquAyRaLW0j7I/4zpqx4S fiZTaUDVtGMqIMaBrMMdz4OBvH9j37jU0uCd4dKq7mz3OcCnOllmLHlurWe6OnQE pnl8qnVepv0cLIwhAP4sfYS9gTPJ6CJdzUDzSNMMC2a7azeKm7HS5XKjCQ6Q7Rg= =7t/g -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Thu Jan 22 14:51:23 2009 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Thu, 22 Jan 2009 08:51:23 -0500 Subject: OT: virus on the wild? In-Reply-To: <49781DE4.40707@gmail.com> References: <49781DE4.40707@gmail.com> Message-ID: <497879DB.3070101@sixdemonbag.org> Faramir wrote: > So, my first question is about if this is too much off topic to talk > here about it (I figure PGP-Basics OT can the a better place, but I > thought it was a good idea to send this message here, since it seems > it's a "big issue", and not everybody uses pgp-basics-ot). It's probably off-topic for here, but then again, Werner, David and the others have generally been fairly indulgent of off-topic posts. Still, let's do them a favor and not continue it longer than necessary. > And the second question is: Does somebody know about this virus? Is is > as fast spreading as it looks like? Yes. No. Moo. Ten pounds of flax. Getting accurate intelligence about the spread of malware is a very difficult task. Vendors like to sound authoritative, but the reality is they're often almost as much in the dark as the rest of us. > And the third and last question is: why the AV detected the virus > _before_ I visited the site? How do you know that it actually did? AV software has false positives and false negatives. People tend to put much more faith in AV software than they should. From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Thu Jan 22 16:39:52 2009 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Thu, 22 Jan 2009 10:39:52 -0500 Subject: Paperkey 1.0 released Message-ID: <20090122153952.GA13970@jabberwocky.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Given the recent paperkey discussion, I thought I'd mention that paperkey 1.0 is now out. A reasonable way to achieve a long term backup of OpenPGP (PGP, GnuPG, etc) keys is to print them out on paper. Paper and ink have amazingly long retention qualities - far longer than the magnetic or optical means that are generally used to back up computer data. A paper backup isn't a replacement for the usual machine readable (tape, CD-R, DVD-R, etc) backups, but rather as an if-all-else-fails method of restoring a key. Unix (POSIX) source and Win32 binaries are downloadable at: http://www.jabberwocky.com/software/paperkey/ Enjoy. David -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.10-svn4826 (Darwin) iEYEARECAAYFAkl4k0cACgkQ4mZch0nhy8m+ZwCfVG+F+iJendo0cTFalqQF8cd2 qaEAoKDoxlh63EtfvKojXZ678pdv1t8T =k3ba -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From reynt0 at cs.albany.edu Thu Jan 22 17:32:41 2009 From: reynt0 at cs.albany.edu (reynt0) Date: Thu, 22 Jan 2009 11:32:41 -0500 (EST) Subject: OT: virus on the wild? In-Reply-To: <49781DE4.40707@gmail.com> References: <49781DE4.40707@gmail.com> Message-ID: To be brief, since this is pretty far OT: On Thu, 22 Jan 2009, Faramir wrote: . . . > And the third and last question is: why the AV detected the virus > _before_ I visited the site? . . . It is easy to imagine a software automatically reviewing all browser page-loads, and, before any links are followed by the user, checking all further web pages indicated by any urls included in the loaded-page's code. (Similar to how link-following bots search the web.) This would be more thorough and helpful than checking some next web page only as the user happens to click on a link to it; and maybe simpler since is proactve in the AV software, not requiring reactively to interrupt a page-load action being initiated in the browser software. From lists at michel-messerschmidt.de Thu Jan 22 15:57:32 2009 From: lists at michel-messerschmidt.de (Michel Messerschmidt) Date: Thu, 22 Jan 2009 15:57:32 +0100 Subject: OT: virus on the wild? In-Reply-To: <497879DB.3070101@sixdemonbag.org> References: <49781DE4.40707@gmail.com> <497879DB.3070101@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <20090122145731.GA6676@koshi.matrix> On Thu, Jan 22, 2009 at 08:51:23AM -0500, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > Faramir wrote: > > And the second question is: Does somebody know about this virus? Is is > > as fast spreading as it looks like? > > Yes. No. Moo. Ten pounds of flax. Getting accurate intelligence > about the spread of malware is a very difficult task. Agreed, but does it really matter?. I suppose you really wanted to know whether your computer is at risk because of this AV warning? And the only definitve answer is obvious: Ask your AV vendor. There exist AV products that issue a warning even whenever they encounter a zip file :) Therefore any speculation here won't give you the level of assurance you probably want. > > And the third and last question is: why the AV detected the virus > > _before_ I visited the site? Assumption: Your AV adheres to common virus naming conventions here. 1. Your AV stated that it detected a Trj = trojan but not a virus. So it won't replicate itself (no spreading in the usual sense) but waits for users/browsers to execute it. 2. The malware class JS means JavaScript. Your AV detected some malicious javascript maybe on the google search page or on one of the result pages. Some AV products prefetch linked pages to scan them before the user clicks on a link. Also some browsers prefetch web pages and an AV may detect the javascript in the browser cache. Conclusion: It is absolutely possible that your AV warned you without anything malicious happening on your computer. OTOH if something happened it won't be easy to track down the origin of the attack. Whatever your AV vendor will tell you, these apply in general: - disable javascript / browser scripting as much as possible - don't use outdated browser versions - know the behaviour of your browser Michel -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 315 bytes Desc: Digital signature URL: From shavital at mac.com Thu Jan 22 18:21:49 2009 From: shavital at mac.com (Charly Avital) Date: Thu, 22 Jan 2009 12:21:49 -0500 Subject: Paperkey 1.0 released In-Reply-To: <20090122153952.GA13970@jabberwocky.com> References: <20090122153952.GA13970@jabberwocky.com> Message-ID: <4978AB2D.5030207@mac.com> David Shaw wrote the following on 1/22/09 10:39 AM: > Given the recent paperkey discussion, I thought I'd mention that > paperkey 1.0 is now out. [...] > Enjoy. Hi, enjoyed! Configured without flags as you indicated. checking build system type... i386-apple-darwin9.6.0 checking host system type... i386-apple-darwin9.6.0 $ paperkey --version paperkey 1.0 Copyright (C) 2007, 2008, 2009 David Shaw This is free software. You may redistribute copies of it under the terms of the GNU General Public License . There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law. Thanks, David. Charly MacOS 10.5.6 - MacBook Intel C2Duo "Aluminum Late 2008"- GnuPG 1.4.9 - GPG2 2.0.10 - Thunderbird 2.0.0.19 - Enigmail 0.95.7 (Testing TB 3.0b1+EM 0.96a)- Apple's Mail+GPGMail 1.2.0 (v56), PGP key: 0xA57A8EFA From charlesw123456 at gmail.com Wed Jan 21 14:09:10 2009 From: charlesw123456 at gmail.com (Charles Wang) Date: Wed, 21 Jan 2009 05:09:10 -0800 (PST) Subject: When the plain text is 128 bytes, encrypt/decrypt failed. Message-ID: <21582842.post@talk.nabble.com> Hi: I'm using libgcrypt-1.4.3. When I try to use RSA to encrypt and decrypt my data, libgcrypt failed in case. I'm very confused. So I write the following code: #include #include #include static void random_set(unsigned char * buf, size_t szbuf) { long rval; unsigned char * cur, * last = buf + szbuf; for (cur = buf; cur + sizeof(rval) <= last; cur += sizeof(rval)) { rval = random(); memcpy(cur, &rval, sizeof(rval)); } if (cur < last) { rval = random(); memcpy(cur, &rval, last - cur); } } static void show_sexp(const char * prompt, gcry_sexp_t sexp) { char dumpbuf[4096]; gcry_sexp_sprint(sexp, GCRYSEXP_FMT_ADVANCED, dumpbuf, sizeof(dumpbuf)); printf("%s: %s\n", prompt, dumpbuf); } static void show_mpi(const char * prompt, gcry_mpi_t mpi) { char dumpbuf[4096]; gcry_mpi_print(GCRYMPI_FMT_HEX, dumpbuf, sizeof(dumpbuf), NULL, mpi); printf("%s: %s\n", prompt, dumpbuf); } int main(void) { int count; int nbits_data; gcry_sexp_t key_spec, key, pubkey, privkey; gcry_sexp_t plain0, cipher, plain1; gcry_mpi_t x0, x1; unsigned char xbuf0[128], xbuf1[128]; size_t nwritten; gcry_control(GCRYCTL_DISABLE_SECMEM, 0); if (!gcry_check_version(GCRYPT_VERSION)) { fprintf(stderr, "version check failed.\n"); exit(-1); } gcry_control(GCRYCTL_INITIALIZATION_FINISHED, 0); gcry_control(GCRYCTL_ENABLE_QUICK_RANDOM, 0); gcry_sexp_new(&key_spec, "(genkey (rsa (nbits 4:1024)))", 0, 1); gcry_pk_genkey(&key, key_spec); gcry_sexp_release(key_spec); pubkey = gcry_sexp_find_token(key, "public-key", 0); privkey = gcry_sexp_find_token(key, "private-key", 0); gcry_sexp_release(key); show_sexp("public-key", pubkey); show_sexp("private-key", privkey); nbits_data = 1016; for (count = 0; count < 8192; ++count) { random_set(xbuf0, sizeof(xbuf0)); gcry_mpi_scan(&x0, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, xbuf0, nbits_data / 8, NULL); /*gcry_mpi_randomize(x0, nbits_data, GCRY_WEAK_RANDOM);*/ gcry_sexp_build(&plain0, NULL, "(data (flags raw) (value %m))", x0); show_sexp("plain0", plain0); gcry_pk_encrypt(&cipher, plain0, pubkey); show_sexp("cipher", cipher); gcry_pk_decrypt(&plain1, cipher, privkey); show_sexp("plain1", plain1); x1 = gcry_sexp_nth_mpi(plain1, 0, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG); show_mpi("x0", x0); show_mpi("x1", x1); gcry_mpi_print(GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, xbuf1, sizeof(xbuf1), &nwritten, x1); printf("%03d: cmp = %d, cmp = %d\n", count, gcry_mpi_cmp(x0, x1), memcmp(xbuf0, xbuf1, nwritten)); gcry_mpi_release(x1); gcry_mpi_release(x0); gcry_sexp_release(plain1); gcry_sexp_release(cipher); gcry_sexp_release(plain0); } gcry_sexp_release(pubkey); gcry_sexp_release(privkey); return 0; } When nbits_data > 1016 ( 127 bytes ), libgcrypt failed by chance. But if nbits_data <= 1016, libgcrypt always success! Is this is a correct way or my code is wrong? I have noticed that 'pubkey.c' in libgcrypt-1.4.3/tests use 800 for nbits_data. Thanks greatly. The previous file is provided as an attachment too. http://www.nabble.com/file/p21582842/tryrsa.c tryrsa.c Charles Wang -- View this message in context: http://www.nabble.com/When-the-plain-text-is-128-bytes%2C-encrypt-decrypt-failed.-tp21582842p21582842.html Sent from the GnuPG - User mailing list archive at Nabble.com. From jdooris at coastalfcu.org Thu Jan 22 16:43:19 2009 From: jdooris at coastalfcu.org (Joel Dooris) Date: Thu, 22 Jan 2009 10:43:19 -0500 Subject: 1K file creation in PGP Message-ID: I have had several problems with PGP command line v8.5 build 303 creating 1K files that contain nothing when decrypted. I was told by PGP tech support that it was a known issue in that version of he software and if I upgraded it would resolve the issue. My question is will GnuPG have this same issue or not? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Thu Jan 22 18:38:56 2009 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Thu, 22 Jan 2009 12:38:56 -0500 Subject: 1K file creation in PGP In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20090122173856.GA14394@jabberwocky.com> On Thu, Jan 22, 2009 at 10:43:19AM -0500, Joel Dooris wrote: > I have had several problems with PGP command line v8.5 build 303 creating > 1K files that contain nothing when decrypted. I was told by PGP tech > support that it was a known issue in that version of he software and if I > upgraded it would resolve the issue. > > My question is will GnuPG have this same issue or not? No, it will not. GnuPG and PGP are two completely different code bases. David From faramir.cl at gmail.com Thu Jan 22 18:59:01 2009 From: faramir.cl at gmail.com (Faramir) Date: Thu, 22 Jan 2009 14:59:01 -0300 Subject: OT: virus on the wild? (it looks very suspicious to me) In-Reply-To: References: <49781DE4.40707@gmail.com> Message-ID: <4978B3E5.8050109@gmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 I took a look at the partial file in the virus chest, and it looked very suspicious... I couldn't understand most of it, but even the names of functions and variables seems to have been randomly generated... If somebody is curious about this, we can talk off-list... Best Regards -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJJeLPlAAoJEMV4f6PvczxAA+MIAKpAukIKKeADy0NwfhU3CgBu 9NLEhvi8jA56Wt8CxXrF8AdVJ49ERpX5sYXHr1P/V0KKSh2E7/pKt5Egty9hYnVH 8OXcB0hrgAz4N4bRmmL9nEmbAW5dDtAyptpIX95Bm4o2WoHdRvUeuEU44e7YQ4Xl Ee0FjlcJA902AVbWVpNBtOM6pTi2N6s3BtEkMzj95RYseNL86/M2GoJSMfA9bAXi AwuC/9ajA/KeFPr9XEsxZoE8/Nsl7dDgboh4Zx8DBN3nYTs/HIECIT68f1A5Jhyh RYdeJvAZRzksd5oqeSHmLE4Ghh2LOuXJhTJIkkeU8l/kFQzws3vMntg+Ao1iw6w= =obaD -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From wk at gnupg.org Thu Jan 22 19:57:08 2009 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Thu, 22 Jan 2009 19:57:08 +0100 Subject: [Announce] Libgcrypt 1.4.4 released Message-ID: <87ab9jp3sr.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> Hello! The GNU project is pleased to announce the availability of Libgcrypt version 1.4.4. Libgcrypt is a general purpose library of cryptographic building blocks. It is originally based on code used by GnuPG. It does not provide any implementation of OpenPGP or other protocols. Thorough understanding of applied cryptography is required to use Libgcrypt. Noteworthy changes in version 1.4.4: * Publish GCRY_MODULE_ID_USER and GCRY_MODULE_ID_USER_LAST constants. This functionality has been in Libgcrypt since 1.3.0. * MD5 may now be used in non-enforced fips mode. * Fixed HMAC for SHA-384 and SHA-512 with keys longer than 64 bytes. * In fips mode, RSA keys are now generated using the X9.31 algorithm and DSA keys using the FIPS 186-2 algorithm. * The transient-key flag is now also supported for DSA key generation. DSA domain parameters may be given as well. Source code is hosted at the GnuPG FTP server and its mirrors as listed at http://www.gnupg.org/download/mirrors.html . On the primary server the source file and its digital signatures is: ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libgcrypt/libgcrypt-1.4.4.tar.bz2 (1116k) ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libgcrypt/libgcrypt-1.4.4.tar.bz2.sig This file is bzip2 compressed. A gzip compressed version is also available: ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libgcrypt/libgcrypt-1.4.4.tar.gz (1387k) ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libgcrypt/libgcrypt-1.4.4.tar.gz.sig Alternativley you may upgrade version 1.4.3 using this patch file: ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libgcrypt/libgcrypt-1.4.3-1.4.4.diff.bz2 (90k) The SHA-1 checksums are: 6f156593ce0833856b59580a7d430d0a5153b324 libgcrypt-1.4.4.tar.gz 3987f0efcbb7048c136d5c859e88eee1763a14f6 libgcrypt-1.4.4.tar.bz2 51947f0753ac61af96e075fcb5a1d4a6305c284b libgcrypt-1.4.3-1.4.4.diff.bz2 For help on developing with Libgcrypt you should read the included manual and optional ask on the gcrypt-devel mailing list [1]. Improving Libgcrypt is costly, but you can help! We are looking for organizations that find Libgcrypt useful and wish to contribute back. You can contribute by reporting bugs, improve the software [2], order extensions or support or more general by donating money to the Free Software movement [3]. Commercial support contracts for Libgcrypt are available [4], and they help finance continued maintenance. g10 Code GmbH, a Duesseldorf based company, is currently funding Libgcrypt development. We are always looking for interesting development projects. Many thanks to all who contributed to Libgcrypt development, be it bug fixes, code, documentation, testing or helping users. Happy hacking, Werner [1] See http://www.gnupg.org/documentation/mailing-lists.html . [2] Note that copyright assignments to the FSF are required. [3] For example see http://donate.fsf.org . [4] See the service directory at http://www.gnupg.org/service.html . -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Auschnahme regelt ein Bundeschgesetz. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 205 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- _______________________________________________ Gnupg-announce mailing list Gnupg-announce at gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-announce From kevhilton at gmail.com Thu Jan 22 23:52:48 2009 From: kevhilton at gmail.com (Kevin Hilton) Date: Thu, 22 Jan 2009 16:52:48 -0600 Subject: Paperkey 1.0 released Message-ID: <96c450350901221452iaba17a8p7dd08abe7a29a085@mail.gmail.com> Thanks for this release. Reading the explanation on the website: http://www.jabberwocky.com/software/paperkey/ got me thinking. Is there an explanation or description of all the metadata that is contained within the secret key? -- Kevin Hilton From John at Mozilla-Enigmail.org Fri Jan 23 00:31:51 2009 From: John at Mozilla-Enigmail.org (John Clizbe) Date: Thu, 22 Jan 2009 17:31:51 -0600 Subject: Paperkey 1.0 released In-Reply-To: <96c450350901221452iaba17a8p7dd08abe7a29a085@mail.gmail.com> References: <96c450350901221452iaba17a8p7dd08abe7a29a085@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <497901E7.5060300@Mozilla-Enigmail.org> Kevin Hilton wrote: > Thanks for this release. Reading the explanation on the website: > http://www.jabberwocky.com/software/paperkey/ got me thinking. Is > there an explanation or description of all the metadata that is > contained within the secret key? > RFC 4880 http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#section-5.5 -- John P. Clizbe Inet:John (a) Mozilla-Enigmail.org You can't spell fiasco without SCO. hkp://keyserver.gingerbear.net or mailto:pgp-public-keys at gingerbear.net?subject=HELP Q:"Just how do the residents of Haiku, Hawai'i hold conversations?" A:"An odd melody / island voices on the winds / surplus of vowels" -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 680 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Fri Jan 23 00:58:27 2009 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Thu, 22 Jan 2009 18:58:27 -0500 Subject: Paperkey 1.0 released In-Reply-To: <96c450350901221452iaba17a8p7dd08abe7a29a085@mail.gmail.com> References: <96c450350901221452iaba17a8p7dd08abe7a29a085@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <20090122235826.GA15277@jabberwocky.com> On Thu, Jan 22, 2009 at 04:52:48PM -0600, Kevin Hilton wrote: > Thanks for this release. Reading the explanation on the website: > http://www.jabberwocky.com/software/paperkey/ got me thinking. Is > there an explanation or description of all the metadata that is > contained within the secret key? Yes. See RFC 4880, sections 5.5.3 and 11.2. What makes paperkey possible is that in OpenPGP, a secret key is actually the same thing as a public key with a few extra fields tacked on (the ones specified in 5.5.3). Another nice side effect of this is that you can transform any secret key into a public key. In fact, GPG will do this for you - try importing a secret key that you don't already have a public key for. GPG will import the secret key, and then create a public key for it automatically. David From danbensen at att.net Fri Jan 23 11:31:30 2009 From: danbensen at att.net (Dan Bensen) Date: Fri, 23 Jan 2009 02:31:30 -0800 (PST) Subject: Wiping HD (noob question) Message-ID: <634208.66050.qm@web180004.mail.gq1.yahoo.com> What do I have to do to keep my current gpg authentication if I reformat the hard drive it's installed on and reinstall gpg with a new OS? I'm not sure where the authentication info is stored or how (or whether) it can be moved. --Dan -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From John at Mozilla-Enigmail.org Fri Jan 23 12:38:33 2009 From: John at Mozilla-Enigmail.org (John Clizbe) Date: Fri, 23 Jan 2009 05:38:33 -0600 Subject: Wiping HD (noob question) In-Reply-To: <634208.66050.qm@web180004.mail.gq1.yahoo.com> References: <634208.66050.qm@web180004.mail.gq1.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <4979AC39.9000202@Mozilla-Enigmail.org> Dan Bensen wrote: > What do I have to do to keep my current gpg authentication if I reformat > the hard drive it's installed on and reinstall gpg with a new OS? I'm > not sure where the authentication info is stored or how (or whether) it > can be moved. Open a command prompt and issue the command: gpg --version It'll print several lines similar to: jpclizbe at yogi:/var/sks$ gpg --version gpg (GnuPG) 1.4.9 Copyright (C) 2008 Free Software Foundation, Inc. License GPLv3+: GNU GPL version 3 or later This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it. There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law. Home: ~/.gnupg Supported algorithms: Pubkey: RSA, RSA-E, RSA-S, ELG-E, DSA Cipher: 3DES, CAST5, BLOWFISH, AES, AES192, AES256, TWOFISH Hash: MD5, SHA1, RIPEMD160, SHA256, SHA384, SHA512, SHA224 Compression: Uncompressed, ZIP, ZLIB, BZIP2 jpclizbe at yogi:/var/sks$ You're interested in the line beginning "Home:". Copy that directory to your backup media before reformatting. On Windows 2000/XP, you should see something similar to: Home: C:\Documents and Settings\\Application Data\GnuPG On Vista this is typically C:\Users\\AppData\Roaming\GnuPG Windows, Linux, Mac OS,... just copy the entire directory. If space is tight, at a minimum, you need the files with a .gpg extension in that directory: pubring.gpg, secring.gpg, trustdb.gpg. If you have a file named gpg.conf, it contains any customized settings and should also be preserved. -- John P. Clizbe Inet:John (a) Mozilla-Enigmail.org You can't spell fiasco without SCO. hkp://keyserver.gingerbear.net or mailto:pgp-public-keys at gingerbear.net?subject=HELP Q:"Just how do the residents of Haiku, Hawai'i hold conversations?" A:"An odd melody / island voices on the winds / surplus of vowels" -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 680 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From danbensen at att.net Fri Jan 23 12:53:17 2009 From: danbensen at att.net (Dan Bensen) Date: Fri, 23 Jan 2009 03:53:17 -0800 (PST) Subject: Wiping HD (noob question) References: <634208.66050.qm@web180004.mail.gq1.yahoo.com> <4979AC39.9000202@Mozilla-Enigmail.org> Message-ID: <715230.40767.qm@web180013.mail.gq1.yahoo.com> Dan Bensen wrote: > What do I have to do to keep my current gpg authentication if I reformat > the hard drive it's installed on and reinstall gpg with a new OS? From: John Clizbe > Open a command prompt and issue the command: > gpg --version I think it's too late for that :/ I did copy my home directory though, so I have ~/.gnupg/, which contains gpg.conf, public.gpg, pubring.gpg, random_seed, revoke.gpg, secring.gpg, and trustdb.gpg. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From faramir.cl at gmail.com Fri Jan 23 20:48:18 2009 From: faramir.cl at gmail.com (Faramir) Date: Fri, 23 Jan 2009 16:48:18 -0300 Subject: Wiping HD (noob question) In-Reply-To: <715230.40767.qm@web180013.mail.gq1.yahoo.com> References: <634208.66050.qm@web180004.mail.gq1.yahoo.com> <4979AC39.9000202@Mozilla-Enigmail.org> <715230.40767.qm@web180013.mail.gq1.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <497A1F02.2060703@gmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Dan Bensen escribi?: > *From:* John Clizbe >> Open a command prompt and issue the command: >> gpg --version > > I think it's too late for that :/ Don't worry, that command was to check where was your gpg home dir, but since you already copied it... Best Regards -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJJeh8CAAoJEMV4f6PvczxAfBsH/AvXGsteVnqGEHoc1FgyGkBQ kd9ji73ASTYvjWhxyrhdyrt5m/0Vmh0RokxFCp0ON5bVbsOL/3C7wjhyrSajnhva 0Y6K+WntiEDwg1M1KEr9DJ/VTb0Q811YXo69mHI9nLVg0eRqqwPaOvE3pn+B9YDz gT//fvOiBFEQBMxI5ndYZoDM1/61buSJYCjqS+wnk1gqUDsFMrwp4RO9sSwAg+En At+Y1T9+ngIFj0TSYXs9l2e2bSX2Vj6fJjIhRWVMN9GPnLycycqB8mm1WMh6Fsa6 gf2TTl0c1dHLMW3EcV0CY0P10SbqzTX2mArTX87MMJkEDoDgG6fs0/lhzAx2adc= =CMpG -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From faramir.cl at gmail.com Fri Jan 23 21:13:32 2009 From: faramir.cl at gmail.com (Faramir) Date: Fri, 23 Jan 2009 17:13:32 -0300 Subject: A question about Camellia Message-ID: <497A24EC.30906@gmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Sorry to ask what was already answered some time ago, but: why GnuPG doesn't implement Camellia? IIRC (but probably I misunderstood it), it is enabled for Japanese version, since they need it. But in that case, why it is not enabled for "occidental" people too? By the way, I talk from a windows user point of view, I rely on binary packages, not in source code (so the answer: "well, since people can change it before compiling, there is not a big deal" would be a "big deal" for me). Please don't take this message as a request to enable it in the windows binary file, it's just a question... Best Regards -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJJeiTsAAoJEMV4f6PvczxA/kYH/j/s81qWEhi2Xr7iBGGZwhkC rWin04dzKvHx/ibtb/BLmxLRnicl/U9rMPY5ExH+6v0mqdYqKj4ZyWLCLc8Fs9Iz faN2DQuZFI9i8ecp5Hj67pXTETblMSo0jXws5/R0JIs5Nny9KIUmN7k1bgsMaaKP KVkJ+oSI7KyRxToRZSzGk6gYmVXODbWT2psFxVDPjMh17T88N/o1FTLaOWkEsBev fpZyDaV7iKr9beducWwuMScfUqBvX+l//zAM7EEgN6vZbYYAKIqOCJRJsKKypN6p RloA7KbEormHjjgvf3JHNZ5Em3dDikrfUO8QiA72oBk0/z5erDLVJ25Z+swTVp8= =B06u -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From faramir.cl at gmail.com Fri Jan 23 21:33:12 2009 From: faramir.cl at gmail.com (Faramir) Date: Fri, 23 Jan 2009 17:33:12 -0300 Subject: Silly question about secure deletion of files Message-ID: <497A2988.1050404@gmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Well, I already know why it is not reliable to "securely delete" a file, I understand the hdd can do the "overwrite" process in the "wrong" place of the hdd. But yesterday I had to defrag my hdd, and that made me wonder: why we can't overwrite a file, but we still can defrag the hdd? Is there a hardware feature that allows SO to defrag the hdd? Best Regards -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJJeimIAAoJEMV4f6PvczxAnUEH/jZAzugm0NlqZx0HHsBfxDbk N1rvA0GPCNajufrgcuD4udkXhURNZqh4h/UCMRv4/ye/M8T4mMfyO6P7KLigP9/C TR/GCnoFVvlrvqzd7eQ8ftDSv+jDvjDWnVvjEmMr/XrTQfzelnUn4irmqZUDtF2M 9cT7Ch5Ge0XLmiNPSf16DcyIr39CI8Ko5agxIbe6f4CyYqYTauf1TkWDA+Mf+7Tu X7ecrp8IvTQmaqGWidc2vRktOKC6nJ9DMk/DdfQpwCYzwcKvwERYDFn2r7jKAVq5 QhSuYi8tLqiGtx/zhBDMQbrW+y7e9ze+3jxj/QLj/fzzaQxwP/r5EmVUfcermR0= =shsv -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Fri Jan 23 21:34:00 2009 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Fri, 23 Jan 2009 15:34:00 -0500 Subject: A question about Camellia In-Reply-To: <497A24EC.30906@gmail.com> References: <497A24EC.30906@gmail.com> Message-ID: <497A29B8.60103@sixdemonbag.org> Faramir wrote: > Sorry to ask what was already answered some time ago, but: why GnuPG > doesn't implement Camellia? Camellia is not yet part of the OpenPGP standard. The standardization process for it is still underway. Once it's standardized, GnuPG will support Camellia the same as any other algorithm -- but please don't use it. From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Fri Jan 23 21:39:42 2009 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Fri, 23 Jan 2009 15:39:42 -0500 Subject: Silly question about secure deletion of files In-Reply-To: <497A2988.1050404@gmail.com> References: <497A2988.1050404@gmail.com> Message-ID: <497A2B0E.6020008@sixdemonbag.org> Faramir wrote: > Well, I already know why it is not reliable to "securely delete" a file, > I understand the hdd can do the "overwrite" process in the "wrong" place > of the hdd. Right. > But yesterday I had to defrag my hdd, and that made me wonder: why we > can't overwrite a file, but we still can defrag the hdd? Is there a > hardware feature that allows SO to defrag the hdd? Not really. It's more a question of context. With a defrag, if you successfully rearrange 95% of the affected blocks then you've substantially improved your drive performance. Sure, it'll report that it's done 100%, but who cares, really? With disk overwriting, if you successfully overwrite 95% of your sensitive data, you may still be putting yourself at substantial risk. Especially since it will report that it overwrote all your data. From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Fri Jan 23 21:39:52 2009 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Fri, 23 Jan 2009 15:39:52 -0500 Subject: A question about Camellia In-Reply-To: <497A24EC.30906@gmail.com> References: <497A24EC.30906@gmail.com> Message-ID: <20090123203952.GB18216@jabberwocky.com> On Fri, Jan 23, 2009 at 05:13:32PM -0300, Faramir wrote: > Sorry to ask what was already answered some time ago, but: why GnuPG > doesn't implement Camellia? IIRC (but probably I misunderstood it), it > is enabled for Japanese version, since they need it. But in that case, > why it is not enabled for "occidental" people too? It's not enabled for anyone yet, whether in Japan or not, and really can't be until Camellia is part of the OpenPGP standard. There is a draft RFC that adds Camellia (see http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-openpgp-camellia-04.txt), but until that draft is accepted as a new RFC, Camellia will not be turned on. It is true that the Camellia code already exists in GnuPG, but this is there to help test the implementation. It is not for general use, and while we can't stop people from turning it on, they do so at their own risk. David From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Fri Jan 23 21:41:59 2009 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Fri, 23 Jan 2009 15:41:59 -0500 Subject: Silly question about secure deletion of files In-Reply-To: <497A2988.1050404@gmail.com> References: <497A2988.1050404@gmail.com> Message-ID: <20090123204159.GC18216@jabberwocky.com> On Fri, Jan 23, 2009 at 05:33:12PM -0300, Faramir wrote: > Well, I already know why it is not reliable to "securely delete" a file, > I understand the hdd can do the "overwrite" process in the "wrong" place > of the hdd. > > But yesterday I had to defrag my hdd, and that made me wonder: why we > can't overwrite a file, but we still can defrag the hdd? Is there a > hardware feature that allows SO to defrag the hdd? The two things have nothing to do with each other. It's like asking why human beings can't fly, but we still can eat lunch. David From faramir.cl at gmail.com Fri Jan 23 21:43:40 2009 From: faramir.cl at gmail.com (Faramir) Date: Fri, 23 Jan 2009 17:43:40 -0300 Subject: A question about Camellia In-Reply-To: <497A29B8.60103@sixdemonbag.org> References: <497A24EC.30906@gmail.com> <497A29B8.60103@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <497A2BFC.3020507@gmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Robert J. Hansen escribi?: > Camellia is not yet part of the OpenPGP standard. The standardization > process for it is still underway. Once it's standardized, GnuPG will > support Camellia the same as any other algorithm -- but please don't use it. Don't worry, while I like to change some settings, I also like to "play safe". Even if I could use Camellia, I would not use it to send messages (maybe it would be interesting to be able to receive messages encrypted with it). I thought about this question when I logged in an https site, and noticed the connection was encrypted with Camellia 256, instead of AES-256, as I had seen in other sites (each time I took the time to look at the cypher algo used by the connection). Best Regards -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJJeiv8AAoJEMV4f6PvczxAvdAH/jFVYNbKkeDs105asYXyLlnk S8Yrd3hMTN0j+n1FhbvGxSf3dG2jw7IZ3Q5+jzee8uriuV9XDLmAbqr4YTvEzex9 0QqpWw30Du1OaR7eiV0sK4uEn59YAgi0O6SmLaJASbm1isq1S2qbpnN4Kb7BvBc/ zf1I4Sby4Im7nlWjxPMrr9AULKWoQFdS7cDk2C9V9cskunAF9E4crbVAsLnjFp2x iZYcJJ9CHPcRR8vvPkIVefnkpc3imGVDcN8Rn/OT+wyK6DIZh939uFox/ZCQRXtg 19SfyprajPYnN2mQBJ9OjgAs8QfyLWtt6J8PzocK1AGNZ6HCUq/BRBlW90eZLYM= =ptvF -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Fri Jan 23 21:55:20 2009 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Fri, 23 Jan 2009 15:55:20 -0500 Subject: A question about Camellia In-Reply-To: <497A2BFC.3020507@gmail.com> References: <497A24EC.30906@gmail.com> <497A29B8.60103@sixdemonbag.org> <497A2BFC.3020507@gmail.com> Message-ID: <497A2EB8.4040406@sixdemonbag.org> Faramir wrote: > Don't worry, while I like to change some settings, I also like to > "play safe". Even if I could use Camellia, I would not use it to send > messages (maybe it would be interesting to be able to receive messages > encrypted with it). There's no real reason to avoid Camellia, by the way. It's a trusted algorithm, cryppies have a lot of confidence in it -- I'm just part of the (vocal) minority which screams that OpenPGP has way too many algorithms and we need to start cutting algorithms out. I would like GnuPG a lot more if it only supported 3DES, SHA-1, SHA256, and DSA/ELG keypairs in 1k and 2k sizes. There is a (less vocal) majority which seems to think I am crazy, though. :) From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Fri Jan 23 22:36:52 2009 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Fri, 23 Jan 2009 16:36:52 -0500 Subject: A question about Camellia In-Reply-To: <497A2EB8.4040406@sixdemonbag.org> References: <497A24EC.30906@gmail.com> <497A29B8.60103@sixdemonbag.org> <497A2BFC.3020507@gmail.com> <497A2EB8.4040406@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <20090123213652.GA18280@jabberwocky.com> On Fri, Jan 23, 2009 at 03:55:20PM -0500, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > Faramir wrote: > > Don't worry, while I like to change some settings, I also like to > > "play safe". Even if I could use Camellia, I would not use it to send > > messages (maybe it would be interesting to be able to receive messages > > encrypted with it). > > There's no real reason to avoid Camellia, by the way. It's a trusted > algorithm, cryppies have a lot of confidence in it -- I'm just part of > the (vocal) minority which screams that OpenPGP has way too many > algorithms and we need to start cutting algorithms out. While I understand, and even agree with many of their points, I tend to disagree with the "strip it all out" folks. OpenPGP is designed to be flexible in dealing with multiple ciphers, and gives its users good ways to pick a cipher that both the sender and recipient favor. If you only want to receive messages encrypted with 3DES, that's your privilege, and when I send you encrypted mail I (or really, my copy of GPG) will respect that and send you 3DES. Similarly, when you send me a message, it's my priviledge to give a list of ciphers, and it's your privilege to pick from that list. Send it in 3DES, and I will accept that. Nobody but you and I have any input into the cipher choice when you and I are communicating. Which is as it should be. The flip side of that, of course, is that you do not have any input into the cipher choice when I'm communicating with someone else. Does that mean that I feel a particular need to use Camellia/Blowfish/Cipher-X? No, not really. But I do want the choice of what I use to be mine. > I would like > GnuPG a lot more if it only supported 3DES, SHA-1, SHA256, and DSA/ELG > keypairs in 1k and 2k sizes. You have the ability to do pretty much that, but: [ unknown] (1). Robert J. Hansen Cipher: AES256, AES192, AES, CAST5, 3DES, IDEA Digest: SHA1, SHA256, RIPEMD160 Compression: ZLIB, BZIP2, ZIP, Uncompressed Features: MDC, Keyserver no-modify David From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Fri Jan 23 23:14:15 2009 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Fri, 23 Jan 2009 17:14:15 -0500 Subject: A question about Camellia In-Reply-To: <20090123213652.GA18280@jabberwocky.com> References: <497A24EC.30906@gmail.com> <497A29B8.60103@sixdemonbag.org> <497A2BFC.3020507@gmail.com> <497A2EB8.4040406@sixdemonbag.org> <20090123213652.GA18280@jabberwocky.com> Message-ID: <497A4137.8070101@sixdemonbag.org> David Shaw wrote: > You have the ability to do pretty much that, but: I actually don't, but for policy reasons. My local policy is "have total control over what I send, but don't assert control over what I receive." I guess you could call it my small-l libertarian philosophy as applied to OpenPGP. Whatever traffic someone decides to send me, if it's valid OpenPGP traffic, I want to be able to make sense of it. However, when it comes to sending traffic, I tend to be much more restrained: I have most of my machines set up with a personal-cipher-preference of 3DES, and a personal-digest-preference of SHA256. I don't mind if we as a community decide to restrict OpenPGP to a smaller subset of algorithms. I don't think I should try to coerce my prejudices on the traffic sent to me by others. I think the best way to restrict algorithms is by community consensus, not by me restricting the list of algorithms in my key preference list. From faramir.cl at gmail.com Fri Jan 23 23:39:25 2009 From: faramir.cl at gmail.com (Faramir) Date: Fri, 23 Jan 2009 19:39:25 -0300 Subject: Silly question about secure deletion of files In-Reply-To: <497A2B0E.6020008@sixdemonbag.org> References: <497A2988.1050404@gmail.com> <497A2B0E.6020008@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <497A471D.1030903@gmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Robert J. Hansen escribi?: ... > With a defrag, if you successfully rearrange 95% of the affected blocks > then you've substantially improved your drive performance. Sure, it'll > report that it's done 100%, but who cares, really? Not me ;) > With disk overwriting, if you successfully overwrite 95% of your > sensitive data, you may still be putting yourself at substantial risk. > Especially since it will report that it overwrote all your data. Ok, that answers my question. Usually I don't see thing from the same point of view than you, I mean, usually I think about "secure deletion" if the file can't be fully recovered by the use of a simple recovery tool (let's say, Norton unDelete)... but of course, in other context, fragments of information can be very dangerous and the attacker can bring the hdd to an specialized lab... In other words, if I intend to destroy the PhD thesis of my brother, overwritting 50% of it would be more than enough to make him cry like a baby. But if I intend to destroy the list of infiltrated agents of the Rebel Alliance, even a 5% of the list would make Darth Vader be really happy. To David Shaw: I didn't get your point, since both defragmenting and overwriting files involve to be able to control what is written and where is written... I think both concepts are related somehow. Anyway, I already got my answer. Best Regards -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJJekcdAAoJEMV4f6PvczxA4vIH/34C2s57GTRwZsie5xj7gDjl bdsPjjSlrkuih1VdaVD0Lg9qHZZNGKzTpBlZh7i3zyb+TA9twmJ8sNT9mXApdWgb wPz5e6ww6OseroCO6LcDiRrFQrn0g6EuAu9qaVALmGNE/org94V/EfbbxU8Eb8VT T0j6z88d0MMknJj3p+/seHVHr8BG04YMRuDZONt7SHj1m5ScekPAzxMMIbckBm6Q G+NC86ONhmZ1th57ulavef+nivaYJ9ZlplB9W2uJyntRBgxUX3/rq33rz380w5nn MbkgtFQ2DhO4oyd97KA7dM2qb/1gFDFtK7pNi79o4nGH91526/NgxbfKf6QKC5w= =7Lp3 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Fri Jan 23 23:49:55 2009 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Fri, 23 Jan 2009 17:49:55 -0500 Subject: A question about Camellia In-Reply-To: <497A4137.8070101@sixdemonbag.org> References: <497A24EC.30906@gmail.com> <497A29B8.60103@sixdemonbag.org> <497A2BFC.3020507@gmail.com> <497A2EB8.4040406@sixdemonbag.org> <20090123213652.GA18280@jabberwocky.com> <497A4137.8070101@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <20090123224955.GA18462@jabberwocky.com> On Fri, Jan 23, 2009 at 05:14:15PM -0500, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > David Shaw wrote: > > You have the ability to do pretty much that, but: > > I actually don't, but for policy reasons. My local policy is "have > total control over what I send, but don't assert control over what I > receive." I guess you could call it my small-l libertarian philosophy > as applied to OpenPGP. > > Whatever traffic someone decides to send me, if it's valid OpenPGP > traffic, I want to be able to make sense of it. This has nothing to do with your preference list. GPG will happily decrypt messages to any cipher, whether it is in your preference list or not, as per the spec: "If an implementation can decrypt a message that a keyholder doesn't have in their preferences, the implementation SHOULD decrypt the message anyway, but MUST warn the keyholder that the protocol has been violated." > I don't mind if we as a community decide to restrict OpenPGP to a > smaller subset of algorithms. I don't think I should try to coerce my > prejudices on the traffic sent to me by others. I think the best way to > restrict algorithms is by community consensus, not by me restricting the > list of algorithms in my key preference list. You seem to be advocating that the community sweep away the ciphers you don't favor so that nobody can use them. I disagree, but can understand the desire for simplicity. At the same time, though, you argue that using the part of the protocol that *as part of community consensus* allows you to sweep away ciphers that you don't favor is you imposing your prejudices on the community. I'm not sure how to reconcile those two statements. David From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Fri Jan 23 23:52:48 2009 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Fri, 23 Jan 2009 17:52:48 -0500 Subject: Silly question about secure deletion of files In-Reply-To: <497A471D.1030903@gmail.com> References: <497A2988.1050404@gmail.com> <497A2B0E.6020008@sixdemonbag.org> <497A471D.1030903@gmail.com> Message-ID: <20090123225247.GB18462@jabberwocky.com> On Fri, Jan 23, 2009 at 07:39:25PM -0300, Faramir wrote: > Robert J. Hansen escribi??: > ... > > With a defrag, if you successfully rearrange 95% of the affected blocks > > then you've substantially improved your drive performance. Sure, it'll > > report that it's done 100%, but who cares, really? > > Not me ;) > > > With disk overwriting, if you successfully overwrite 95% of your > > sensitive data, you may still be putting yourself at substantial risk. > > Especially since it will report that it overwrote all your data. > > Ok, that answers my question. > > Usually I don't see thing from the same point of view than you, I > mean, usually I think about "secure deletion" if the file can't be fully > recovered by the use of a simple recovery tool (let's say, Norton > unDelete)... but of course, in other context, fragments of information > can be very dangerous and the attacker can bring the hdd to an > specialized lab... > In other words, if I intend to destroy the PhD thesis of my brother, > overwritting 50% of it would be more than enough to make him cry like a > baby. But if I intend to destroy the list of infiltrated agents of the > Rebel Alliance, even a 5% of the list would make Darth Vader be really > happy. > > To David Shaw: I didn't get your point, since both defragmenting and > overwriting files involve to be able to control what is written and > where is written... I think both concepts are related somehow. This is incorrect. Defragmentation does not need to land on a exact place on the disk, and overwriting does. Defragmentation ignores remapped blocks, while overwriting cannot, etc. David From faramir.cl at gmail.com Fri Jan 23 23:58:40 2009 From: faramir.cl at gmail.com (Faramir) Date: Fri, 23 Jan 2009 19:58:40 -0300 Subject: A question about Camellia In-Reply-To: <497A2EB8.4040406@sixdemonbag.org> References: <497A24EC.30906@gmail.com> <497A29B8.60103@sixdemonbag.org> <497A2BFC.3020507@gmail.com> <497A2EB8.4040406@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <497A4BA0.8020709@gmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Robert J. Hansen escribi?: ... > algorithm, cryppies have a lot of confidence in it -- I'm just part of > the (vocal) minority which screams that OpenPGP has way too many > algorithms and we need to start cutting algorithms out. I would like ... > There is a (less vocal) majority which seems to think I am crazy, > though. :) Well, I don't think you are crazy, but I am part of the group that likes to be able to chose between several options, provided all the options are secure. About DSA 2k, while I have enabled DSA 2 support, I'm still nervous about the warning message about compatibility issues... so I use RSA 2k, just in case. Best Regards -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJJekugAAoJEMV4f6PvczxAQeIIAJPVKYfLsfkAvSgruCHYpqKA wek2FniGon72yTkxysya3Ni6HfAkGO9xXaPJ5Dhy/ve91iuAL/o8Nr2m0UqpyN4d Lnfcj1mWafCHwO4brq4sI231UvXiWAr3v6IVN5YGsUW0fU8o2OaACJXrvXjx0SrA CDAZFiu2D0QJYDdNNMp3VdEJu9YgVOStPiHRqfGTlddObYjk8mBgYK3/jYcZUqQv Y9llinQS2CIdtrL87JzGKieD2WRIa2WzJIG5WztCCsboxTjFGKsFl5zaAXX+I7tf xOnNdHeFV8qWiWrVL9zy1luXcYmMTwuosFEeTKDG0o0Ltflnl10Wv4uETGBWS7Q= =HA1R -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Sat Jan 24 00:49:41 2009 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Fri, 23 Jan 2009 18:49:41 -0500 Subject: A question about Camellia In-Reply-To: <20090123224955.GA18462@jabberwocky.com> References: <497A24EC.30906@gmail.com> <497A29B8.60103@sixdemonbag.org> <497A2BFC.3020507@gmail.com> <497A2EB8.4040406@sixdemonbag.org> <20090123213652.GA18280@jabberwocky.com> <497A4137.8070101@sixdemonbag.org> <20090123224955.GA18462@jabberwocky.com> Message-ID: <497A5795.6040008@sixdemonbag.org> David Shaw wrote: > This has nothing to do with your preference list. GPG will happily > decrypt messages to any cipher, whether it is in your preference list > or not, as per the spec: Yes, which sort of demonstrates the point that the preference mechanism is just needless complexity. It's a recommendation mechanism without either enforcement mechanism or standardized semantics. Should the key preference list be Borda-counted with the sender's preferences? Should the sender use the first sender preference that's in the recipient's preferences? The last? If I send 3DES to absolutely everyone, then I'm still respecting their preferences, even if I never bother to read their preferences. That seems pretty weird to me. If I give you a plate of General Tso's chicken without even asking you what sorts of food you like, I don't think it's reasonable for me to say I've taken your preferences into account. > You seem to be advocating that the community sweep away the ciphers > you don't favor so that nobody can use them. I take objection to the "so that." That ascribes to me motives I don't possess. If someone waved a magic wand and said, "okay, OpenPGP now uses only AES, RSA and WHIRLPOOL," I'd consider it to be an improvement, despite the fact the ciphers you're alleging I favor would now be removed from the spec. My goal is simplicity -- which algorithm suite is used is really an afterthought. This should also explain why I care so little about preference lists. I don't care if someone wants to send me AES256, IDEA, 3DES or CAST5 traffic. IMO, they're all perfectly defensible choices. But I care a lot about the complexity generated by supporting all those ciphers. (As an example, look at what happened with Elgamal signing keys. That bug would have never been introduced if the GnuPG devs had said "Elgamal signing keys are rare, they're not required by the spec, and we're not going to support them.") What I want is simple: a smaller GnuPG codebase and a smaller OpenPGP standard. Changing my preference list will not advance either cause one iota, so I don't see the point in changing things. On the other hand, if there's a community consensus that RFC4880 has grown too complex and needs to get pruned, then I think that consensus could turn into a smaller spec, a smaller codebase, and more trust. If you can think of a way to use the existing mechanisms of RFC4880 to achieve my goals, I'd love to hear it. Maybe there is some way to do it yet and I've just been too dumb to see it -- it's been known to happen. From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Sat Jan 24 00:56:49 2009 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Fri, 23 Jan 2009 18:56:49 -0500 Subject: A question about Camellia In-Reply-To: <497A4BA0.8020709@gmail.com> References: <497A24EC.30906@gmail.com> <497A29B8.60103@sixdemonbag.org> <497A2BFC.3020507@gmail.com> <497A2EB8.4040406@sixdemonbag.org> <497A4BA0.8020709@gmail.com> Message-ID: <497A5941.5070407@sixdemonbag.org> Faramir wrote: > Well, I don't think you are crazy, but I am part of the group that > likes to be able to chose between several options, provided all the > options are secure. That "provided" is the sticking point. Small is beautiful, IMO. YMMV. There is an apocryphal story about the United States Navy and the United States Air Force. In the 1970s, the USAF and USN made an agreement that they were going to field the same jet fighter. This would make it easier for Navy and Air Force pilots to work together, to simplify logistics, and so forth. Two jets made it to the finalist stage: the YF-16 and the YF-18. The Navy decided on the YF-18, a twin-engine jet fighter. They liked the fact it had two engines: after all, if one engine goes out, the jet could still get back to the carrier on the other engine. The Air Force was shocked by this and canceled their cooperation in the program. They learned from the F-4 and the F-15 that twin-engine aircraft had more than twice the engine problems of single-engine aircraft. The downside of the extra complexity was greater than the upside of having a second engine. They refused to buy any YF-18s. The single-engine YF-16 was far superior. And this is, according to the story, why the Navy flies F-18 Hornets and the Air Force flies F-16 Falcons. From hidekis at gmail.com Fri Jan 23 23:58:56 2009 From: hidekis at gmail.com (Hideki Saito) Date: Fri, 23 Jan 2009 14:58:56 -0800 Subject: Paperkey 1.0 released In-Reply-To: <20090122235826.GA15277@jabberwocky.com> References: <96c450350901221452iaba17a8p7dd08abe7a29a085@mail.gmail.com> <20090122235826.GA15277@jabberwocky.com> Message-ID: Hello, Paperkey is great, and I've put up some Japanese introduction of the tool. http://d.hatena.ne.jp/unsignedint/20090122/1232679511 One thing I saw on Windows version is that piping doesn't work. It seems like it corrupt the output when redirection is used, so this could be something to do with the operating system, but just reporting the issue. (Earlier GnuPG on Windows also had same problem, for example, gpg --export > foobar would cause corrupted data on foobar, not sure it's related.) So on Windows, instead of doing, gpg --export-secret-key 51A00A8E | paperkey --output output.txt I have to do gpg --output output.sec --export-secret-key 51A00A8E paperkey --secret-key output.sec --output output.txt Thank you. -- Hideki Saito 2009/1/22 David Shaw : > On Thu, Jan 22, 2009 at 04:52:48PM -0600, Kevin Hilton wrote: >> Thanks for this release. Reading the explanation on the website: >> http://www.jabberwocky.com/software/paperkey/ got me thinking. Is >> there an explanation or description of all the metadata that is >> contained within the secret key? > > Yes. See RFC 4880, sections 5.5.3 and 11.2. What makes paperkey > possible is that in OpenPGP, a secret key is actually the same thing > as a public key with a few extra fields tacked on (the ones specified > in 5.5.3). > > Another nice side effect of this is that you can transform any secret > key into a public key. In fact, GPG will do this for you - try > importing a secret key that you don't already have a public key for. > GPG will import the secret key, and then create a public key for it > automatically. > > David > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users > From er.rahulkausik at gmail.com Fri Jan 23 11:17:57 2009 From: er.rahulkausik at gmail.com (rahul kaushik) Date: Fri, 23 Jan 2009 02:17:57 -0800 (PST) Subject: compatibility of Gnupg-1.4.9 to Gnupg-1.0.6 Message-ID: <21621863.post@talk.nabble.com> Hi all, I have an issue which is described below: earlier i was using Gnupg-1.0.6 for my appliaction. Now i have replaced it with Gnupg-1.4.9. I am facing some issue related to keyrings. As per my application. I need to perform following application. I did finally get these encrypt/decrypt procedures to work: gpg (1.0.6) for encryption followed by gpg (1.4.9) for decryption gpg (1.4.9) for encryption followed by gpg (1.0.6) for decryption But for that i have to use same ( gnupg-1.0.6 ) keyrings file for both situations. as for Gnupg-1.4.9 ~.gnupg/gpg.conf and ~.gnupg/options are default options file. I am having some trouble understanding why keys created (--gen-key) using the 'gpg' of Gnupg-1.4.9 can't be exported to the Gnupg-1.0.6 key ring properly. The gpge(2.0) followed by gpgd(1.2) fails in ths case... I'm puzzled, for sure. Could anyone please help me ASAP in sorting out this problem so that my application could work properly. Thanks in advance. Regards, Rahul Kaushik -- View this message in context: http://www.nabble.com/compatibility-of-Gnupg-1.4.9-to-Gnupg-1.0.6-tp21621863p21621863.html Sent from the GnuPG - User mailing list archive at Nabble.com. From faramir.cl at gmail.com Sat Jan 24 04:37:57 2009 From: faramir.cl at gmail.com (Faramir) Date: Sat, 24 Jan 2009 00:37:57 -0300 Subject: A question about Camellia In-Reply-To: <497A5941.5070407@sixdemonbag.org> References: <497A24EC.30906@gmail.com> <497A29B8.60103@sixdemonbag.org> <497A2BFC.3020507@gmail.com> <497A2EB8.4040406@sixdemonbag.org> <497A4BA0.8020709@gmail.com> <497A5941.5070407@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <497A8D15.9090901@gmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Robert J. Hansen escribi?: > Faramir wrote: >> Well, I don't think you are crazy, but I am part of the group that >> likes to be able to chose between several options, provided all the >> options are secure. > > That "provided" is the sticking point. Small is beautiful, IMO. YMMV. Well, you have always said any algo in GPG is safe enough to use... and given the size windows applications have these days, I find GPG amazingly small. Of course, that is just mi point of view... and also, my programming skills are so small and pitiful, probably I don't really realize the complexity of GPG. > There is an apocryphal story about the United States Navy and the United > States Air Force. In the 1970s, the USAF and USN made an agreement that ... > Two jets made it to the finalist stage: the YF-16 and the YF-18. The > Navy decided on the YF-18, a twin-engine jet fighter. They liked the > fact it had two engines: after all, if one engine goes out, the jet > could still get back to the carrier on the other engine. Sound very reasonable... > The Air Force was shocked by this and canceled their cooperation in the > program. They learned from the F-4 and the F-15 that twin-engine > aircraft had more than twice the engine problems of single-engine > aircraft. The downside of the extra complexity was greater than the > upside of having a second engine. They refused to buy any YF-18s. The > single-engine YF-16 was far superior. Well, if you have land under the plane, your point of view can be different... I mean, the single jet fails, you bail out, and walk home. If that happens over sea, you bail out, fall to the sea, and the sharks take lunch before the rescue vessel arrives. > And this is, according to the story, why the Navy flies F-18 Hornets and > the Air Force flies F-16 Falcons. It's a very interesting story. Some years ago, Chilean Air Force announced they would sell some jet fighters (I can't remember what kind of fighters they were), and buy new ones. That would make them use only Mirage jet fighters, which was good for some reasons I never knew... After a shot amount of time, they decided to buy F-16 jet fighters, to don't have to rely in just 1 manufacturer... So I suppose it is bad to put all the eggs in the same basket... maybe to use 1 basket for each egg is too much, but there must be something between both extremes... I have seen you don't like the preferences list of GPG, and I remember why you don't like it, but I remember David said he had modified it to make GPG to consider the order of preferences... I remember there were some "but...", but I can't recall them now. Best Regards -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJJeo0VAAoJEMV4f6PvczxADZwH/1yWRjn08Jvpb96Q8VWtsTmT URBMZrL2FaAU4CaG+LRw/T1OQ35xTa/jNoLm2OJ5OyamzF770tvmrY+BPqUBINLF VAYP37wZK9QrSKYSPH9cpEnPpdHnq2sMfiqnLH2uRS1kImPCxJ06hDxLyZkPszYe /RLoiRJF4u03XWd0AIksci6Mvo5V5rxAk0QIwJ9vDto5FtgcPzmPApLr2k0ssohn iYmoq7UPG1OHQcfIJ0ITOE6NwBMDXrZJNFLOxMy5sL0x1YTYB/+13LHFS4uQSTRE CGkYFzgNKBl9IFiv+ZD70PmnqZElPsKOeyU9yUgngYcc/xz3Me3d9gkYj9Qe5wo= =QqC5 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Sat Jan 24 04:57:32 2009 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Fri, 23 Jan 2009 22:57:32 -0500 Subject: A question about Camellia In-Reply-To: <497A8D15.9090901@gmail.com> References: <497A24EC.30906@gmail.com> <497A29B8.60103@sixdemonbag.org> <497A2BFC.3020507@gmail.com> <497A2EB8.4040406@sixdemonbag.org> <497A4BA0.8020709@gmail.com> <497A5941.5070407@sixdemonbag.org> <497A8D15.9090901@gmail.com> Message-ID: <497A91AC.30608@sixdemonbag.org> Faramir wrote: > Well, you have always said any algo in GPG is safe enough to use... First, I've said the algorithms are safe enough to use. I've never said GnuPG's implementation of them is correct and error-free. There's a _big_ difference between saying "3DES is a trusted algorithm" and saying "GnuPG correctly implements 3DES." I think GnuPG's implementations are probably good; I don't have any evidence to suggest they're not. But I can't say they're good. Second, please don't trust a word I say. Seriously. I make a ton of mistakes every single day. I might be making one right now. Do your own research, find out facts for yourself. > Well, if you have land under the plane, your point of view can be > different... Yes. Please note that I'm not saying either of them made a right or wrong choice. They each came to the table with certain basic assumptions and came to very different conclusions. David and I disagree pretty substantially on the subject of the size of the OpenPGP spec, and how much of it GnuPG should be implementing. I think both he and I are being sensible. We're just coming to very different conclusions. In the world of Free Software, he who writes the code gets to make the decisions. For GnuPG, that means David and Werner. I don't begrudge them that one bit. It's their barbecue, and on the whole the barbecue is good. I don't want anyone to mistake me on this. My quibbles are not with GnuPG. My quibbles are with the OpenPGP spec. I think GnuPG is the best implementation of OpenPGP out there right now. From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Sat Jan 24 05:57:25 2009 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Fri, 23 Jan 2009 23:57:25 -0500 Subject: A question about Camellia In-Reply-To: <497A5795.6040008@sixdemonbag.org> References: <497A24EC.30906@gmail.com> <497A29B8.60103@sixdemonbag.org> <497A2BFC.3020507@gmail.com> <497A2EB8.4040406@sixdemonbag.org> <20090123213652.GA18280@jabberwocky.com> <497A4137.8070101@sixdemonbag.org> <20090123224955.GA18462@jabberwocky.com> <497A5795.6040008@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <0958980D-B837-45C5-9EB1-90FABB0FEAB0@jabberwocky.com> On Jan 23, 2009, at 6:49 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > David Shaw wrote: >> This has nothing to do with your preference list. GPG will happily >> decrypt messages to any cipher, whether it is in your preference list >> or not, as per the spec: > > Yes, which sort of demonstrates the point that the preference > mechanism > is just needless complexity. It's a recommendation mechanism without > either enforcement mechanism or standardized semantics. Should the > key > preference list be Borda-counted with the sender's preferences? > Should > the sender use the first sender preference that's in the recipient's > preferences? The last? The spec is very clear on which preference must be used when it matters to the protocol, and explicitly disclaims a choice when it does not matter to the protocol. This gives implementers the flexibility to do useful things within the hard limits of the protocol. The semantics are extremely clear, including the places where the spec dictates that the implementor can follow his desires. If I allow (say) 3DES, AES, and Camellia, you can't send me anything that isn't 3DES, AES, or Camellia. If you really really really like Camellia best, you can send that, even if I like 3DES better. Why? Because it's *your* message. You're sending it. It's your choice within the boundaries of what I permit. Standards are not written by the "Everything not forbidden is compulsory" ants. OpenPGP lays down the law where it matters, and steps back when it makes no difference to the security of the protocol. > If I send 3DES to absolutely everyone, then I'm still respecting their > preferences, even if I never bother to read their preferences. That > seems pretty weird to me. Why weird? Every OpenPGP program supports 3DES (section 9.2). 3DES is in every preference list (section 13.2). You can pick from any cipher in the preference list (also 13.2). Thus, you can send 3DES to everyone without reading the preferences, because you know from the protocol that you are participating in that every preference list always contains 3DES. Just in case that wasn't clear, the spec even mentions this exact case so there can't be any doubt: "Note also that if an implementation does not implement the preference, then it is implicitly a TripleDES-only implementation." > If I give you a plate of General Tso's > chicken without even asking you what sorts of food you like, I don't > think it's reasonable for me to say I've taken your preferences into > account. Computers, lucky us, are not people. Still, if I told you ahead of time that I would accept General Tso's chicken, a hamburger, or a piece of pizza, and then asked you to choose, I should be quite content with General Tso's chicken, even if I really wanted pizza. Our "protocol" requires that. > This should also explain why I care so little about preference > lists. I > don't care if someone wants to send me AES256, IDEA, 3DES or CAST5 > traffic. IMO, they're all perfectly defensible choices. But I care a > lot about the complexity generated by supporting all those ciphers. I believe this is shortsighted. Simple is good, but too simple is inflexible. "Make everything as simple as possible, but not simpler." When MD5 bit the dust, OpenPGP had several algorithms to switch to (note that PGP 2.x did not). When SHA1 was broken, OpenPGP could almost shrug that off. I say 'almost' because of the hard-coded fingerprint issues - which also helps prove my point. If fingerprints were not hard-wired to SHA-1, the OpenPGP WG would not now be trying to figure out a new fingerprint scheme. OpenPGP benefits from the flexibility of being able to use multiple algorithms. Note that I'm also not saying which algorithms - like you, I don't actually care all that much which are chosen, but I do strongly care that the protocol as a whole can support different algorithms safely and allow for changes without breaking things. This ability, to me, is necessary complexity. Take the case of TLS 1.1: it has MD5 and SHA-1 hard-wired throughout the design. Now that it's time to move away from those hashes, the TLS 1.2 designers had to do a lot of painful hard work (causing much code complexity and compatibility problems) to un-wire them. It may be years before TLS 1.2 is really widely supported, and in the meantime TLS users are going to use MD5 and SHA-1. (There is interesting thread on this right now on the cryptography mailing list, by the way). > (As > an example, look at what happened with Elgamal signing keys. That bug > would have never been introduced if the GnuPG devs had said "Elgamal > signing keys are rare, they're not required by the spec, and we're not > going to support them.") I think this is actually a good example for my point as well (I love an example which points out multiple things): Note when the Elgamal signing key bug happened, it did not take down the rest of the protocol. People with RSA or DSA signing keys kept right on chugging. Once you accept the idea that protocol algorithm flexibility is a good thing (if you do), then you realize it doesn't really matter terribly much which algorithms are in or out of the protocol, or even how many there are. If you like an algorithm, you use it. If you don't, you don't. If you want smaller code or simplicity, you simply leave out whatever you want to leave out. 4880 helpfully states what is required (DSA, Elgamal, and 3DES, basically). Everything else is optional - the protocol does not require any of them. The main thing the protocol requires is that there is a concept of multiple algorithms and the tools for dealing with that. > What I want is simple: a smaller GnuPG codebase and a smaller OpenPGP > standard. Changing my preference list will not advance either cause > one > iota, so I don't see the point in changing things. It does tend to argue against what you desire though: if you are advocating that everyone in the community use a smaller algorithm list, it does not really help your case when you don't use that smaller list yourself, "proving" that it is workable in practice. We had something close to what you describe though: RFC-1991, the old PGP 2.x protocol. It broke badly when MD5 broke badly (it was already pretty broken). It wasn't flexible enough to adapt. > If you can think of a way to use the existing mechanisms of RFC4880 to > achieve my goals, I'd love to hear it. Maybe there is some way to > do it > yet and I've just been too dumb to see it -- it's been known to > happen. Sure, just remove any algorithm you don't want. The protocol in 4880 guarantees that you have the ability to do this: ./configure --disable-blowfish --disable-cast5 --disable-(etc) I promise you that if you remove an algorithm, any bugs in those algorithms, be they implementation problems or design flaws, will never affect you. :) Despite the joke, I'm really not kidding. I added the --disable-xxx flags because while I believe strongly that OpenPGP needs the *ability* to handle multiple ciphers, I also believe just as strongly that nobody should be forced into an algorithm they don't want used. Set those flags, and you have a smaller codebase (the code is actually left out of the build altogether) and smaller standard (you can ignore any references to those ciphers in the standard). David From faramir.cl at gmail.com Sat Jan 24 05:59:15 2009 From: faramir.cl at gmail.com (Faramir) Date: Sat, 24 Jan 2009 01:59:15 -0300 Subject: Paperkey 1.0 released In-Reply-To: References: <96c450350901221452iaba17a8p7dd08abe7a29a085@mail.gmail.com> <20090122235826.GA15277@jabberwocky.com> Message-ID: <497AA023.2010508@gmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Hideki Saito escribi?: ... > So on Windows, > instead of doing, > gpg --export-secret-key 51A00A8E | paperkey --output output.txt Yes, some months ago, when I tried it, it failed too... > I have to do > gpg --output output.sec --export-secret-key 51A00A8E > paperkey --secret-key output.sec --output output.txt I made a couple of batch files for the lazy windows users, I tried them and worked fine... maybe they will work fine for other people too. I put the files at http://faramir.cl.googlepages.com/batchs4paperkey Best Regards -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJJeqAjAAoJEMV4f6PvczxAKvYH/Aztk729T/2p07rKPNw8kg+t xudFkzGBDnBqUr/9UR5gqQNzwZyXKM7lNjiUlXwmh5vpq3E41FHVAgUCG8r58gQk XkijQ0q44CRJ1AdmfrfegBMMCkXNFS5W+McDVoV/JyBvLENFErU/p6sHRv/n5CJM NFNq8TjOurb5ET+fOV8TNHg061k8FD/x5h7APDrcEJQa7yH+IOUvIq/McxYBnm/x YwuGEZ8cWcCVHIc9WULdzc+qXFS1ynsNyz0oCy7SOiv0zoKVyiQoF1DfMFdFc0hW Shvwew1+ek6aNziMC9JmqRqlz43LF/pvmLPVubteKEygG5+64owyyZh0nI2VM3s= =xbuM -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Sat Jan 24 05:59:29 2009 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Fri, 23 Jan 2009 23:59:29 -0500 Subject: compatibility of Gnupg-1.4.9 to Gnupg-1.0.6 In-Reply-To: <21621863.post@talk.nabble.com> References: <21621863.post@talk.nabble.com> Message-ID: On Jan 23, 2009, at 5:17 AM, rahul kaushik wrote: > > Hi all, > I have an issue which is described below: > > earlier i was using Gnupg-1.0.6 for my appliaction. Now i have > replaced it > with Gnupg-1.4.9. > I am facing some issue related to keyrings. As per my application. > I need to perform following application. > > I did finally get these encrypt/decrypt procedures to work: > > gpg (1.0.6) for encryption followed by gpg (1.4.9) for decryption > gpg (1.4.9) for encryption followed by gpg (1.0.6) for > decryption > > But for that i have to use same ( gnupg-1.0.6 ) keyrings file for > both > situations. In the GPG tarball, in the "tools" directory, there is a script "convert-from-106". Run it, and you should be in better shape. David From faramir.cl at gmail.com Sat Jan 24 06:21:20 2009 From: faramir.cl at gmail.com (Faramir) Date: Sat, 24 Jan 2009 02:21:20 -0300 Subject: A question about Camellia In-Reply-To: <497A91AC.30608@sixdemonbag.org> References: <497A24EC.30906@gmail.com> <497A29B8.60103@sixdemonbag.org> <497A2BFC.3020507@gmail.com> <497A2EB8.4040406@sixdemonbag.org> <497A4BA0.8020709@gmail.com> <497A5941.5070407@sixdemonbag.org> <497A8D15.9090901@gmail.com> <497A91AC.30608@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <497AA550.6090706@gmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Robert J. Hansen escribi?: > Faramir wrote: >> Well, you have always said any algo in GPG is safe enough to use... > First, I've said the algorithms are safe enough to use. I've never said > GnuPG's implementation of them is correct and error-free. There's a > _big_ difference between saying "3DES is a trusted algorithm" and saying > "GnuPG correctly implements 3DES." Ok, I get the point... ... > Second, please don't trust a word I say. Seriously. I make a ton of > mistakes every single day. I might be making one right now. Do your > own research, find out facts for yourself. Well, I have seen what you have said, and what other users of the list say, and I form my opinion based on that. Since I don't want to rely on Wikipedia for information about GPG, I think this list is the best source of information about GPG I can find. Since I lack the knowledge to check things by myself, I'll have to rely in what other people think about security. > My quibbles are not with GnuPG. My quibbles are with the OpenPGP spec. > I think GnuPG is the best implementation of OpenPGP out there right now. Well, I just know about 2 implementations, and I am not going to use PGP... Anyway, GPG has never crashed in my PC, and considering I use Windows... Best Regards -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJJeqVQAAoJEMV4f6PvczxA7rsIAJyKE0CSw+bkjHeZW9cAk327 8RAYb3YwLhJR7kq2kgTtckpameYaIwdexXuEOQ4mnWGbP0DUmWRhsOD3mFwPVq/s hOm49QNAOoH5yxVNuxsLHG1nGu+uCj13pRu0AUmVRh1CHQ+bS0fpgI6zUoI8ZvlQ 8sv+Gmc6vzveuz9gyvEIswJb8cQIelcH4l7fuLxkTbqL72GAWAy411QfadAnaWVc YkvbOIbjedaWMpqFuHkpErMHwObXDI3KdqGhXRwPnGkI9spCX+I9GfJDhEuXwXUZ tRmPbdIv+Eh4rvORtErnKpMY+vC4AHPjygCk+cynJUKkSIrYH2d/gNpaCWUxSNk= =l8Nf -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Sat Jan 24 06:44:35 2009 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Sat, 24 Jan 2009 00:44:35 -0500 Subject: A question about Camellia In-Reply-To: <0958980D-B837-45C5-9EB1-90FABB0FEAB0@jabberwocky.com> References: <497A24EC.30906@gmail.com> <497A29B8.60103@sixdemonbag.org> <497A2BFC.3020507@gmail.com> <497A2EB8.4040406@sixdemonbag.org> <20090123213652.GA18280@jabberwocky.com> <497A4137.8070101@sixdemonbag.org> <20090123224955.GA18462@jabberwocky.com> <497A5795.6040008@sixdemonbag.org> <0958980D-B837-45C5-9EB1-90FABB0FEAB0@jabberwocky.com> Message-ID: <497AAAC3.5010400@sixdemonbag.org> David Shaw wrote: > OpenPGP benefits from the flexibility of being able to use multiple > algorithms. The ability to use multiple algorithms is independent of how many algorithms are in the spec and in each implementation. Algorithm agility is a great idea and I think protocols ought be designed with it in mind; but at the same time I think protocols ought to focus on a minimal set of algorithms. An extension mechanism is a great idea. I don't think that should be carte blanche for a spec throwing the kitchen sink into the RFC, though. > I think this is actually a good example for my point as well (I love an > example which points out multiple things): Note when the Elgamal signing > key bug happened, it did not take down the rest of the protocol. People > with RSA or DSA signing keys kept right on chugging. Yes. We're in total agreement that algorithm agility is a good idea. > It does tend to argue against what you desire though: if you are > advocating that everyone in the community use a smaller algorithm list, Looking over RFC4880, 3DES is the only MUST symmetric cipher, but it makes mention of Twofish, Blowfish, CAST, IDEA and AES. Better, in my mind, to reduce this to 3DES (or AES, take your pick, algorithm agnosticism and all). Move the others to an appendix. Note them for history and interoperability with old versions, but encourage implementors to not use old algorithms for new traffic unless there is a compelling reason not to. I don't see how to use preference lists to argue for that transformation in how the implementor community views the standard. > I promise you that if you remove an algorithm, any bugs in those > algorithms, be they implementation problems or design flaws, will never > affect you. :) This is actually what I do. If someone sends me traffic that's encrypted with an exotic, well, I'll use my system's GnuPG (as opposed to the one living in $HOME/bin) to decrypt it. ... I'm motivated, to some degree, by my own frustrations in implementing RFC2440 for a telco back in '99. My implementation was simple: 3DES, SHA1, DSA/ELG, no compression, no MDC, no nothing, but it was -- as far as I could tell; it's been ten years, please understand my memory isn't perfect -- standards-conformant. I could send traffic to PGP and GnuPG, PGP and GnuPG could, with the proper settings, send traffic to me. Success. It was not enough of a success for Management. They insisted on supporting IDEA, CAST, MD5, RIPEMD160, etc. -- when I got knocked down on a performance review because I hadn't yet implemented double-width SHA or HAVAL, I knew they were viewing each and every algorithm as a checkbox. [*] This is obviously far, far more a failing of management than a failing of the spec. That said, I think the spec contributes to this kind of misreading and misunderstanding. This bit of work history anecdote should not be read as any kind of argument for or against anything. It's just a where-I've-come-from sort of thing. That said, if you ever have the chance to write software for the telephone company, don't. [*] For people on the list who don't remember the state of the RFC from the '99-'00 era, double-width SHA and HAVAL were mentioned in RFC2440. To the best of my knowledge, though, nobody ever actually implemented them. (In the case of double-width SHA, I don't know if the algorithm even existed.) From rippit at oggfrog.com Sat Jan 24 07:32:31 2009 From: rippit at oggfrog.com (Rippit the Ogg Frog) Date: Fri, 23 Jan 2009 22:32:31 -0800 Subject: OT: virus on the wild? In-Reply-To: <49781DE4.40707@gmail.com> References: <49781DE4.40707@gmail.com> Message-ID: <497AB5FF.9070908@oggfrog.com> Faramir wrote: > And the third and last question is: why the AV detected the virus > _before_ I visited the site? Were you using Firefox? It has what I regard as a mis-feature, in which it preloads at least the top hit of any Google search results. That way the page will load quicker if you do click its link. Your virus is one reason it's a mis-feature. Consider also how much trouble you could find yourself in, should that top hit be an FBI pedophile honeypot. Possibly there is a way to disable the mis-feature, but I don't know what it is. If you weren't using Firefox, possibly other browsers have the mis-feature now as well. -- Rippit the Ogg Frog ripp at oggfrog.com http://www.oggfrog.com/ From faramir.cl at gmail.com Sat Jan 24 07:55:20 2009 From: faramir.cl at gmail.com (Faramir) Date: Sat, 24 Jan 2009 03:55:20 -0300 Subject: OT: virus on the wild? In-Reply-To: <497AB5FF.9070908@oggfrog.com> References: <49781DE4.40707@gmail.com> <497AB5FF.9070908@oggfrog.com> Message-ID: <497ABB58.4040700@gmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Rippit the Ogg Frog escribi?: >> And the third and last question is: why the AV detected the virus >> _before_ I visited the site? > > Were you using Firefox? It has what I regard as a mis-feature, in which > it preloads at least the top hit of any Google search results. That way > the page will load quicker if you do click its link. Yes, it was FireFox, and the top hit on the Google search results page, was both the infected site, and the site I was looking for. > Your virus is one reason it's a mis-feature. Consider also how much > trouble you could find yourself in, should that top hit be an FBI > pedophile honeypot. Well, it would be less terrible if that happen to somebody living at USA, but it still could cause some problems... > Possibly there is a way to disable the mis-feature, but I don't know > what it is. Bingo! I found it... http://www.technipages.com/disable-the-firefox-prefetch-setting.html > If you weren't using Firefox, possibly other browsers have the > mis-feature now as well. From the titles of the results I didn't click (but maybe FireFox prefetched them, anyway), it seems IE 7 has prefetchs too... Thanks for the message, I have disabled prefetch now. Best Regards -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJJertXAAoJEMV4f6PvczxAq98H/jMmrnqScFTmRvnNHFgItM5U ODiWMdxtKR1Bb1QtkKEDkxqwmkjfuJcrmXNFSAoW9Ln5FwK5XEkFAU/wIZV9ydEK zlKMiMSHotqQ62y3yOdTVkpW71kbALyaseofHm8pmOAV2JtYvLoVAmmgMoLSipxw aeWB09lgoXOVOQ3Wq9q/PQQ7ZacDzq7LPJsHDAr+O6J72qJbbiyTqHAin8z+mso5 dw9Pi6dRLTGFduw1bTpGIsNnNMtCwehL/FwNxHEH95imq+NycIY20Gvvzas4zvQt Na+jyXLcr2qN/T0yV2wB3yNFihzcgP7aTJLOqBuCtTgXwsVMCGj2goE09MX6pqk= =+XRp -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From shavital at mac.com Sat Jan 24 08:49:40 2009 From: shavital at mac.com (Charly Avital) Date: Sat, 24 Jan 2009 02:49:40 -0500 Subject: OT: virus on the wild? In-Reply-To: <497ABB58.4040700@gmail.com> References: <49781DE4.40707@gmail.com> <497AB5FF.9070908@oggfrog.com> <497ABB58.4040700@gmail.com> Message-ID: <497AC814.9020603@mac.com> Faramir wrote the following on 1/24/09 1:55 AM: [...] > Bingo! I found it... > http://www.technipages.com/disable-the-firefox-prefetch-setting.html Great, thank you! >> If you weren't using Firefox, possibly other browsers have the >> mis-feature now as well. Flock 2.0.2 (Macintosh) had it. Not any more. Regards. Charly From cannewilson at googlemail.com Sat Jan 24 09:19:03 2009 From: cannewilson at googlemail.com (Anne Wilson) Date: Sat, 24 Jan 2009 08:19:03 +0000 Subject: compatibility of Gnupg-1.4.9 to Gnupg-1.0.6 In-Reply-To: References: <21621863.post@talk.nabble.com> Message-ID: <200901240819.03411.cannewilson@googlemail.com> On Saturday 24 January 2009 04:59:29 David Shaw wrote: > On Jan 23, 2009, at 5:17 AM, rahul kaushik wrote: > > Hi all, > > I have an issue which is described below: > > > > earlier i was using Gnupg-1.0.6 for my appliaction. Now i have > > replaced it > > with Gnupg-1.4.9. > > I am facing some issue related to keyrings. As per my application. > > I need to perform following application. > > > > I did finally get these encrypt/decrypt procedures to work: > > > > gpg (1.0.6) for encryption followed by gpg (1.4.9) for decryption > > gpg (1.4.9) for encryption followed by gpg (1.0.6) for > > decryption > > > > But for that i have to use same ( gnupg-1.0.6 ) keyrings file for > > both > > situations. > > In the GPG tarball, in the "tools" directory, there is a script > "convert-from-106". Run it, and you should be in better shape. > Is this something that all of us with old keyrings need to do? If so, can you please either point us to instructions that a user could follow, or explain how to do it? Thanks. I'm wondering if that is part of the problems I've been having lately. Anne -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 197 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From shavital at mac.com Sat Jan 24 09:54:52 2009 From: shavital at mac.com (Charly Avital) Date: Sat, 24 Jan 2009 03:54:52 -0500 Subject: compatibility of Gnupg-1.4.9 to Gnupg-1.0.6 In-Reply-To: <200901240819.03411.cannewilson@googlemail.com> References: <21621863.post@talk.nabble.com> <200901240819.03411.cannewilson@googlemail.com> Message-ID: <497AD75C.5010209@mac.com> Anne Wilson wrote the following on 1/24/09 3:19 AM: >> On Jan 23, 2009, at 5:17 AM, rahul kaushik wrote: [...] > as for Gnupg-1.4.9 ~.gnupg/gpg.conf and ~.gnupg/options are default options > file. David Shaw indicated: >> In the GPG tarball, in the "tools" directory, there is a script >> "convert-from-106". Run it, and you should be in better shape. Anne Wilson asks: > Is this something that all of us with old keyrings need to do? If so, can you > please either point us to instructions that a user could follow, or explain > how to do it? Thanks. > > I'm wondering if that is part of the problems I've been having lately. > > Anne Please note that as of GnuPG 1.2.* ~/.gnupg/options was deprecated and replaced with ~/.gnupg/gpg.conf I don't know how having *both* files as default can influence GnuPG's performance. Charly From dan at geer.org Sat Jan 24 15:13:34 2009 From: dan at geer.org (dan at geer.org) Date: Sat, 24 Jan 2009 09:13:34 -0500 Subject: OT: virus on the wild? In-Reply-To: Your message of "Sat, 24 Jan 2009 03:55:20 -0300." <497ABB58.4040700@gmail.com> Message-ID: <20090124141334.C12EF341D6@absinthe.tinho.net> FWIW, Camino is a branch from Firefox and this same discussion applies to it --dan From grahamtodd2 at googlemail.com Sat Jan 24 17:08:53 2009 From: grahamtodd2 at googlemail.com (Graham Todd) Date: Sat, 24 Jan 2009 16:08:53 +0000 Subject: OT: virus on the wild? In-Reply-To: <497AC814.9020603@mac.com> References: <49781DE4.40707@gmail.com> <497AB5FF.9070908@oggfrog.com> <497ABB58.4040700@gmail.com> <497AC814.9020603@mac.com> Message-ID: <20090124160853.0163e0a5@graham-desktop> On Sat, 24 Jan 2009 02:49:40 -0500 Charly Avital wrote: > > Bingo! I found it... > > http://www.technipages.com/disable-the-firefox-prefetch-setting.html > > Great, thank you! [snipped] When you get a URL such as this (or an IP number), add them at the bottom of yours hosts file in /etc/hosts and have the IP referencer as 127.0.0.1 Computers don't actually look up URLs as such, they route them through DNS servers who gives the computer the IP number and then it connects with that. The hosts file cuts this down by making your computer connect with the IP number listed in the hosts file for a given URL. By convention, the IP address which your computer recognises as itself is 127.0.0.1, and if this were listed in /etc/hosts as the reference for a "bad" URL, in trying to connect to the URL, your computer would simply be trying to connect with itself - which kills the attempt to connect. A good hosts file is a good second line of defence and you can get one at : http://www.mvps.org/winhelp2002/hosts.htm The webpage explains it all. Add it to the bottom of the exist /etc/hosts file and comment out (put # at the begining) the line in which the mvps.org file says: 127.0.0.1 localhost Also for a double line of protection, use a filtering proxy such as privoxy. -- Graham Todd From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Sat Jan 24 18:50:34 2009 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Sat, 24 Jan 2009 12:50:34 -0500 Subject: A question about Camellia In-Reply-To: <497AAAC3.5010400@sixdemonbag.org> References: <497A24EC.30906@gmail.com> <497A29B8.60103@sixdemonbag.org> <497A2BFC.3020507@gmail.com> <497A2EB8.4040406@sixdemonbag.org> <20090123213652.GA18280@jabberwocky.com> <497A4137.8070101@sixdemonbag.org> <20090123224955.GA18462@jabberwocky.com> <497A5795.6040008@sixdemonbag.org> <0958980D-B837-45C5-9EB1-90FABB0FEAB0@jabberwocky.com> <497AAAC3.5010400@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <7A56E119-B694-448D-B01E-F9867D449FA9@jabberwocky.com> On Jan 24, 2009, at 12:44 AM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > David Shaw wrote: >> OpenPGP benefits from the flexibility of being able to use multiple >> algorithms. > > The ability to use multiple algorithms is independent of how many > algorithms are in the spec and in each implementation. Algorithm > agility is a great idea and I think protocols ought be designed with > it > in mind; but at the same time I think protocols ought to focus on a > minimal set of algorithms. > > An extension mechanism is a great idea. I don't think that should be > carte blanche for a spec throwing the kitchen sink into the RFC, > though. > >> I think this is actually a good example for my point as well (I >> love an >> example which points out multiple things): Note when the Elgamal >> signing >> key bug happened, it did not take down the rest of the protocol. >> People >> with RSA or DSA signing keys kept right on chugging. > > Yes. We're in total agreement that algorithm agility is a good idea. But then, once we have algorithm agility, that means we must have a means for dealing with that agility (preference lists being the defined OpenPGP mechanism for that). And then, having such means, why do we care all that much whether an algorithm is present or not? Camellia is a good example here. It does not really bring something new to OpenPGP in terms of security. Sure, Camellia is believed to be strong, and some studies have shown it to be strong. But we don't really *need* that - we have other ciphers that are (arm-wave here) roughly as strong. So why add it? Because it brings something helpful to the protocol as a whole - it means OpenPGP can be used in certain environments in Japan that mandate Camellia. More people using OpenPGP is good. That helps the community. Do we want to add every cipher that comes down the pike? Certainly not. Do we want to add well designed ciphers that have strong evidence behind them? Maybe, but still, why bother? We have that already. Do we want to add well designed ciphers with strong evidence behind them that people actually want to use (as opposed to the oft- heard "Yeah, it would be neat if OpenPGP had the new BLAH-256 cipher")? Sure we do. Or at least, I do. >> It does tend to argue against what you desire though: if you are >> advocating that everyone in the community use a smaller algorithm >> list, > > Looking over RFC4880, 3DES is the only MUST symmetric cipher, but it > makes mention of Twofish, Blowfish, CAST, IDEA and AES. > > Better, in my mind, to reduce this to 3DES (or AES, take your pick, > algorithm agnosticism and all). Move the others to an appendix. Note > them for history and interoperability with old versions, but encourage > implementors to not use old algorithms for new traffic unless there > is a > compelling reason not to. So if I understand, the change you advocate is to move the optional algorithms to an appendix? They're already tagged as optional (they can't, after all, be made *more* optional). I think the 4880 language here is very clear: you MUST support 3DES (the protocol requires it), you SHOULD support AES and CAST5 (we recommend this, but you're free to disagree, and the protocol will work just fine either way), and you MAY support anything else you like (i.e. completely optional, do what you like). Remember that 4880 is not a guide to the coder, nor is it intended to be used to favor or un-favor particular ciphers beyond what is necessary for interoperability. It is a mainly message format document (note the title of 4880 is in fact "The OpenPGP Message Format"). While there have been various suggestions for a "OpenPGP Best Practices" sort of RFC, nobody has of yet stepped up to write one. I suspect this is due to the currently limited community of people developing OpenPGP software, so it is not clear who the audience of such an RFC would be. In the meantime, though, we have a message format. There is a section for ciphers, and all the ciphers are in that section. Having two sections for ciphers would just makes people scroll around when reading it. My understanding is that you do not favor Camellia in OpenPGP (which is what started this thread). I don't quite see how to reconcile that with your "algorithm appendix" comment. After all, Camellia is in its whole own draft. You can't be more detached from the main RFC 4880 than that. > ... I'm motivated, to some degree, by my own frustrations in > implementing RFC2440 for a telco back in '99. My implementation was > simple: 3DES, SHA1, DSA/ELG, no compression, no MDC, no nothing, but > it > was -- as far as I could tell; it's been ten years, please > understand my > memory isn't perfect -- standards-conformant. I could send traffic to > PGP and GnuPG, PGP and GnuPG could, with the proper settings, send > traffic to me. Success. > > It was not enough of a success for Management. They insisted on > supporting IDEA, CAST, MD5, RIPEMD160, etc. -- when I got knocked down > on a performance review because I hadn't yet implemented double-width > SHA or HAVAL, I knew they were viewing each and every algorithm as a > checkbox. [*] > > This is obviously far, far more a failing of management than a failing > of the spec. That said, I think the spec contributes to this kind of > misreading and misunderstanding. How? You don't think they'd have just asked for all of the algorithms in "Appendix A" rather than "Section 9.2" ? David From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Sat Jan 24 18:50:49 2009 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Sat, 24 Jan 2009 12:50:49 -0500 Subject: compatibility of Gnupg-1.4.9 to Gnupg-1.0.6 In-Reply-To: <200901240819.03411.cannewilson@googlemail.com> References: <21621863.post@talk.nabble.com> <200901240819.03411.cannewilson@googlemail.com> Message-ID: <93A6094A-BEA7-4EBE-903D-EB76C8688D80@jabberwocky.com> On Jan 24, 2009, at 3:19 AM, Anne Wilson wrote: > On Saturday 24 January 2009 04:59:29 David Shaw wrote: >> On Jan 23, 2009, at 5:17 AM, rahul kaushik wrote: >>> Hi all, >>> I have an issue which is described below: >>> >>> earlier i was using Gnupg-1.0.6 for my appliaction. Now i have >>> replaced it >>> with Gnupg-1.4.9. >>> I am facing some issue related to keyrings. As per my application. >>> I need to perform following application. >>> >>> I did finally get these encrypt/decrypt procedures to work: >>> >>> gpg (1.0.6) for encryption followed by gpg (1.4.9) for decryption >>> gpg (1.4.9) for encryption followed by gpg (1.0.6) for >>> decryption >>> >>> But for that i have to use same ( gnupg-1.0.6 ) keyrings file for >>> both >>> situations. >> >> In the GPG tarball, in the "tools" directory, there is a script >> "convert-from-106". Run it, and you should be in better shape. >> > Is this something that all of us with old keyrings need to do? If > so, can you > please either point us to instructions that a user could follow, or > explain > how to do it? Thanks. If "old" is 1.0.6 (circa 2001), and you haven't used any version of GPG after 1.0.6 (i.e. you just upgraded from 1.0.6 to 1.4.9 like the original poster) then you just need to run the convert-from-106 script. There aren't any instructions beyond that. The script takes care of the various changes for you. If you're not sure what to do, run it. There is no harm in running it when it is not needed. David From shavital at mac.com Sat Jan 24 18:50:54 2009 From: shavital at mac.com (Charly Avital) Date: Sat, 24 Jan 2009 12:50:54 -0500 Subject: OT: virus on the wild? In-Reply-To: <20090124160853.0163e0a5@graham-desktop> References: <49781DE4.40707@gmail.com> <497AB5FF.9070908@oggfrog.com> <497ABB58.4040700@gmail.com> <497AC814.9020603@mac.com> <20090124160853.0163e0a5@graham-desktop> Message-ID: <497B54FE.2050300@mac.com> Graham Todd wrote the following on 1/24/09 11:08 AM: [...] > A good hosts file is a good second line of defence and you can get one > at : > > http://www.mvps.org/winhelp2002/hosts.htm Great for Win users. Thanks. Mac users might find this interesting: Similar tutorials are available for Linux users. Personally, I am through with this thread. It has been very instructive, but definitely OT. Charly From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Sat Jan 24 19:29:06 2009 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Sat, 24 Jan 2009 13:29:06 -0500 Subject: A question about Camellia In-Reply-To: <7A56E119-B694-448D-B01E-F9867D449FA9@jabberwocky.com> References: <497A24EC.30906@gmail.com> <497A29B8.60103@sixdemonbag.org> <497A2BFC.3020507@gmail.com> <497A2EB8.4040406@sixdemonbag.org> <20090123213652.GA18280@jabberwocky.com> <497A4137.8070101@sixdemonbag.org> <20090123224955.GA18462@jabberwocky.com> <497A5795.6040008@sixdemonbag.org> <0958980D-B837-45C5-9EB1-90FABB0FEAB0@jabberwocky.com> <497AAAC3.5010400@sixdemonbag.org> <7A56E119-B694-448D-B01E-F9867D449FA9@jabberwocky.com> Message-ID: <497B5DF2.3070201@sixdemonbag.org> David Shaw wrote: > But then, once we have algorithm agility, that means we must have a > means for dealing with that agility (preference lists being the > defined OpenPGP mechanism for that). And then, having such means, > why do we care all that much whether an algorithm is present or not? To quote one of the best, most promising, and most vastly underused, statements in engineering: Hmm. I need to think about that... > Do we want to add every cipher that comes down the pike? Certainly > not. Do we want to add well designed ciphers that have strong > evidence behind them? Maybe, but still, why bother? We have that > already. Do we want to add well designed ciphers with strong > evidence behind them that people actually want to use (as opposed to > the oft-heard "Yeah, it would be neat if OpenPGP had the new BLAH-256 > cipher")? Sure we do. Or at least, I do. This doesn't explain Twofish, Blowfish, RIPEMD160, etc., etc. These are well-designed algorithms that very few people use, and they're still littering the standard. I don't think it's at all unreasonable to say "Camellia has users supporting it, sure, but before we go about adding new algorithms, let's prune out old ones." The cruft needs to be removed, and I don't see the WG addressing the problem. (I'm on the WG mailing list, although I rarely speak up there.) > I think the 4880 language here is very clear: you MUST support 3DES > (the protocol requires it), you SHOULD support AES and CAST5 (we > recommend this, but you're free to disagree, and the protocol will > work just fine either way), and you MAY support anything else you > like (i.e. completely optional, do what you like). Clear to you, yes. Clear to me, yes. It seems that it is not clear to others. People say "well, CAST5 is in the RFC, so I'll use it," not "well, CAST5 isn't a MUST, so I shouldn't depend on it being present." > My understanding is that you do not favor Camellia in OpenPGP I favor it being defined for the people who need it. I also favor putting in forty-eight-point boldface type "don't depend on other people supporting this because they probably won't and it's probably a good idea not to support it unless you have a pressing need." You say this is already conveyed by the fact it's optional. I disagree. > How? You don't think they'd have just asked for all of the > algorithms in "Appendix A" rather than "Section 9.2" ? My counterargument of, "it's a conformant implementation that matches all the MUSTs of the RFC, that's what I said I'd do, that's what I did," fell on deaf ears. After all, how could be be a conformant implementation if it didn't have double-width SHA or HAVAL? They're right there in the spec, after all. If I had said, "I have total coverage of the entire spec, the appendices are optional, that's why they're in appendices," I think it would have gone over better. However, counterfactuals being historical fiction, I can't definitively say it would have helped, only that I think it would have. As simple as we tend to think MUST, MAY, SHOULD, etc., are, Management is often not capable of understanding those words. From cannewilson at googlemail.com Sat Jan 24 19:48:30 2009 From: cannewilson at googlemail.com (Anne Wilson) Date: Sat, 24 Jan 2009 18:48:30 +0000 Subject: compatibility of Gnupg-1.4.9 to Gnupg-1.0.6 In-Reply-To: <93A6094A-BEA7-4EBE-903D-EB76C8688D80@jabberwocky.com> References: <21621863.post@talk.nabble.com> <200901240819.03411.cannewilson@googlemail.com> <93A6094A-BEA7-4EBE-903D-EB76C8688D80@jabberwocky.com> Message-ID: <200901241848.31192.cannewilson@googlemail.com> On Saturday 24 January 2009 17:50:49 David Shaw wrote: > On Jan 24, 2009, at 3:19 AM, Anne Wilson wrote: > > On Saturday 24 January 2009 04:59:29 David Shaw wrote: > >> On Jan 23, 2009, at 5:17 AM, rahul kaushik wrote: > >>> Hi all, > >>> I have an issue which is described below: > >>> > >>> earlier i was using Gnupg-1.0.6 for my appliaction. Now i have > >>> replaced it > >>> with Gnupg-1.4.9. > >>> I am facing some issue related to keyrings. As per my application. > >>> I need to perform following application. > >>> > >>> I did finally get these encrypt/decrypt procedures to work: > >>> > >>> gpg (1.0.6) for encryption followed by gpg (1.4.9) for decryption > >>> gpg (1.4.9) for encryption followed by gpg (1.0.6) for > >>> decryption > >>> > >>> But for that i have to use same ( gnupg-1.0.6 ) keyrings file for > >>> both > >>> situations. > >> > >> In the GPG tarball, in the "tools" directory, there is a script > >> "convert-from-106". Run it, and you should be in better shape. > > > > Is this something that all of us with old keyrings need to do? If > > so, can you > > please either point us to instructions that a user could follow, or > > explain > > how to do it? Thanks. > > If "old" is 1.0.6 (circa 2001), and you haven't used any version of > GPG after 1.0.6 (i.e. you just upgraded from 1.0.6 to 1.4.9 like the > original poster) then you just need to run the convert-from-106 > script. There aren't any instructions beyond that. The script takes > care of the various changes for you. > > If you're not sure what to do, run it. There is no harm in running it > when it is not needed. > Thanks for replying. I didn't realise that we were talking of such a big time-span. I think I started using gpg around 2003, but I've been updating my distros fairly regularly since then, so it looks as though it's unnecessary for me. Anne -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 197 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From dnewman at networktest.com Sat Jan 24 20:15:15 2009 From: dnewman at networktest.com (David Newman) Date: Sat, 24 Jan 2009 11:15:15 -0800 Subject: expiring gpg keys Message-ID: <497B68C3.4030805@networktest.com> Michael Lucas' gpg/pgp book recommends setting a relatively short expiration time, such as a year, for personal keys. Would an expired key still work into the future? If, for example, I sign/encrypt a file today using a key that expires next year, would I be able to decrypt the file three years from now? I've been using a key that never expires to sign/encrypt mail and files on the assumption that keys with discrete lifetimes don't work after their expiration dates. thanks dn From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Sat Jan 24 21:07:21 2009 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Sat, 24 Jan 2009 15:07:21 -0500 Subject: expiring gpg keys In-Reply-To: <497B68C3.4030805@networktest.com> References: <497B68C3.4030805@networktest.com> Message-ID: On Jan 24, 2009, at 2:15 PM, David Newman wrote: > Michael Lucas' gpg/pgp book recommends setting a relatively short > expiration time, such as a year, for personal keys. > > Would an expired key still work into the future? If, for example, I > sign/encrypt a file today using a key that expires next year, would > I be > able to decrypt the file three years from now? Yes. > I've been using a key that never expires to sign/encrypt mail and > files > on the assumption that keys with discrete lifetimes don't work after > their expiration dates. That is not the case. You won't be able to make new signatures or encrypt new files with an expired key, but you can still verify old signatures and decrypt old files after expiration. David From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Sat Jan 24 21:14:51 2009 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Sat, 24 Jan 2009 15:14:51 -0500 Subject: A question about Camellia In-Reply-To: <497B5DF2.3070201@sixdemonbag.org> References: <497A24EC.30906@gmail.com> <497A29B8.60103@sixdemonbag.org> <497A2BFC.3020507@gmail.com> <497A2EB8.4040406@sixdemonbag.org> <20090123213652.GA18280@jabberwocky.com> <497A4137.8070101@sixdemonbag.org> <20090123224955.GA18462@jabberwocky.com> <497A5795.6040008@sixdemonbag.org> <0958980D-B837-45C5-9EB1-90FABB0FEAB0@jabberwocky.com> <497AAAC3.5010400@sixdemonbag.org> <7A56E119-B694-448D-B01E-F9867D449FA9@jabberwocky.com> <497B5DF2.3070201@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: On Jan 24, 2009, at 1:29 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > David Shaw wrote: >> But then, once we have algorithm agility, that means we must have a >> means for dealing with that agility (preference lists being the >> defined OpenPGP mechanism for that). And then, having such means, >> why do we care all that much whether an algorithm is present or not? > > To quote one of the best, most promising, and most vastly underused, > statements in engineering: > > Hmm. I need to think about that... > >> Do we want to add every cipher that comes down the pike? Certainly >> not. Do we want to add well designed ciphers that have strong >> evidence behind them? Maybe, but still, why bother? We have that >> already. Do we want to add well designed ciphers with strong >> evidence behind them that people actually want to use (as opposed to >> the oft-heard "Yeah, it would be neat if OpenPGP had the new BLAH-256 >> cipher")? Sure we do. Or at least, I do. > > This doesn't explain Twofish, Blowfish, RIPEMD160, etc., etc. These > are > well-designed algorithms that very few people use, and they're still > littering the standard. Why do Twofish, Blowfish, etc, need to be removed? Mind you, I don't care very much if they are, but we're drifting away from the "what to do about new algorithms" question, to the "what do we do with old algorithms once their useful life has passed" question. Who do these algorithms hurt? Remember - they're all optional, all still considered strong, and we have a robust system for choosing algorithms so that nobody is ever forced to use them. OpenPGP inherited some algorithms from PGP 5, before there was a standard. All of these algorithms were grandfathered in. Some others were added because people needed them. If I recall, Twofish was added to the spec before AES was finalized. Twofish has a block size of 128 bits, which was needed, and at the time, no other ciphers in the standard had that block size. > I don't think it's at all unreasonable to say > "Camellia has users supporting it, sure, but before we go about adding > new algorithms, let's prune out old ones." The cruft needs to be > removed, and I don't see the WG addressing the problem. (I'm on the > WG > mailing list, although I rarely speak up there.) Adding new algorithms has nothing whatsoever to do with removing old ones. If Camellia is useful and needed, it is useful and needed whether (say) Blowfish exists or not. If someone wants to pursue removing Blowfish, go right ahead, but they mustn't expect all forward momentum to stop while the removal is discussed. This is not an algorithm swap. Again, though: we have the means for people to remove the "cruft" on their own. I don't see people doing it. One user's cruft is another user's vital part of the system. >> I think the 4880 language here is very clear: you MUST support 3DES >> (the protocol requires it), you SHOULD support AES and CAST5 (we >> recommend this, but you're free to disagree, and the protocol will >> work just fine either way), and you MAY support anything else you >> like (i.e. completely optional, do what you like). > > Clear to you, yes. Clear to me, yes. It seems that it is not clear > to > others. People say "well, CAST5 is in the RFC, so I'll use it," not > "well, CAST5 isn't a MUST, so I shouldn't depend on it being present." Who are the "others"? Who is "people"? Implementers aren't confused. We all know how to read a standards document. The RFC isn't meant for end users. If the goal was a user manual, that's a different document. > As simple as we tend to think MUST, MAY, SHOULD, etc., are, Management > is often not capable of understanding those words. Management is not the target of a message format document, and we cannot redefine how the thousands of RFCs are written just for them. You can't make everyone happy with the same document, and trying is frequently a fool's errand. David From sattva at pgpru.com Sat Jan 24 21:18:30 2009 From: sattva at pgpru.com (Vlad "SATtva" Miller) Date: Sun, 25 Jan 2009 02:18:30 +0600 Subject: expiring gpg keys In-Reply-To: <497B68C3.4030805@networktest.com> References: <497B68C3.4030805@networktest.com> Message-ID: <497B7796.4000106@pgpru.com> David Newman (25.01.2009 01:15): > Michael Lucas' gpg/pgp book recommends setting a relatively short > expiration time, such as a year, for personal keys. > > Would an expired key still work into the future? If, for example, I > sign/encrypt a file today using a key that expires next year, would I be > able to decrypt the file three years from now? While you keep the private key on the keyring, you may continue to use it for decryption (and everybody else would be able to use the corresponding public key for signature verification) even after it has expired or been revoked. You, however, will not be able to use it for signing, and others won't be able to encrypt data with the public key. > I've been using a key that never expires to sign/encrypt mail and files > on the assumption that keys with discrete lifetimes don't work after > their expiration dates. > > thanks > > dn -- SATtva | security & privacy consulting www.vladmiller.info | www.pgpru.com From faramir.cl at gmail.com Sat Jan 24 22:46:18 2009 From: faramir.cl at gmail.com (Faramir) Date: Sat, 24 Jan 2009 18:46:18 -0300 Subject: expiring gpg keys In-Reply-To: <497B68C3.4030805@networktest.com> References: <497B68C3.4030805@networktest.com> Message-ID: <497B8C2A.4050402@gmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 David Newman escribi?: > Michael Lucas' gpg/pgp book recommends setting a relatively short > expiration time, such as a year, for personal keys. Well... I am not sure if that is a good idea... since if your key expires, you need to exchange signatures again, and sometimes, it is hard to do a face to face meeting with all your contacts. For GPG users, there is an alternative, to add a signing subkey, and to remove the main key, and work with the subkeys. The main key would be stored in a safe place, and would only be imported to sign other keys, or to generate new subkeys, as the old subkeys expire. That way, you don't need to go through the whole process of exchanging keys each year. There is a tutorial about how to do that, but I have not followed it (yet)... currently I try to keep my machine secure, and that's all. Best Regards -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJJe4wqAAoJEMV4f6PvczxA5OAIAIcAjD4nXNiLugsw1l0rNaN/ sKY+ALhSSOnmCp2hkFQa1iKCRmGMmdUEEetJ+eHYI1CzuEvUZHZ3fXDokviVpCB3 RzA4F7wJp6B6PN0oMSN3FbvqF5P9dSiI3xdYnhbhzYQfPPA65fCwV/hUf3vHT/MI qsNwrHw/xSIN3j4YGoluvaI0b01nZJq4gqq18ykYfjDJIMNaqM4CbUpbUcHQ2w3B WLAY/RIJF8JRwGl+Z8tj27+A1Otc94Rip1JWt4N3Smf346lXTJzYT1cXt5wy1ud4 /zV/9Fe8E5bviiXuSpGIPYfhWEFZLJtHHIt42aXXfXCdmW1rGUG5VBnTn/n4ekg= =CaGc -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From dougb at dougbarton.us Sun Jan 25 00:48:11 2009 From: dougb at dougbarton.us (Doug Barton) Date: Sat, 24 Jan 2009 15:48:11 -0800 Subject: A question about Camellia In-Reply-To: <497A5941.5070407@sixdemonbag.org> References: <497A24EC.30906@gmail.com> <497A29B8.60103@sixdemonbag.org> <497A2BFC.3020507@gmail.com> <497A2EB8.4040406@sixdemonbag.org> <497A4BA0.8020709@gmail.com> <497A5941.5070407@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <497BA8BB.6050603@dougbarton.us> Robert J. Hansen wrote: > Faramir wrote: >> Well, I don't think you are crazy, but I am part of the group that >> likes to be able to chose between several options, provided all the >> options are secure. > > That "provided" is the sticking point. Small is beautiful, IMO. YMMV. I agree that small is beautiful. I also think that there is something to be said for pruning seldom-used code paths in a security-related application since there is always the possibility of bit rot, as well as longstanding bugs that have not yet been identified yet because the code has not been exposed to a wide enough variety of use cases. OTOH, in something like PGP there is a definite need to maintain backwards compatibility. There is also the issue of needing options that can easily be exercised with existing tools should a current "favorite" be found to be insecure down the road. My personal opinion is that gnupg treads this line pretty well. If it were up to me I would like to see more configure --options to not include some of the options I'm not likely to ever need, but I don't care enough about it to put the work into making a patch. :) > The Air Force was shocked by this and canceled their cooperation in the > program. They learned from the F-4 and the F-15 that twin-engine > aircraft had more than twice the engine problems of single-engine > aircraft. The downside of the extra complexity was greater than the > upside of having a second engine. Regardless of whether this story is apocryphal or not, there is something to be learned here. The AF's conclusion seems obvious, however it ignores a critical factor of the Navy's use case. Because most of the time Navy jets operate over water (I would hazard a guess to say that it's a significant majority of the time, but I'm not an expert), and because having to eject over water has a much higher fatality rate than ejecting over land, "getting back to the carrier" is much, much more important for the Navy and (likely, again, not an expert) justifies the additional complexity. The lesson here being, make sure you understand ALL the parameters before you make your conclusions. BTW, to get back to Camellia, I had to do some research on this in another context and while I'm not prepared to judge the "safety" of the cipher, I did come across this post from David which I thought was important. Short version, don't use this for production stuff since things you encrypt now might be undecryptable in future versions of gnupg. http://www.nabble.com/Camellia-td11158599.html hope this helps, Doug From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Sun Jan 25 02:04:31 2009 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Sat, 24 Jan 2009 20:04:31 -0500 Subject: A question about Camellia In-Reply-To: <497BA8BB.6050603@dougbarton.us> References: <497A24EC.30906@gmail.com> <497A29B8.60103@sixdemonbag.org> <497A2BFC.3020507@gmail.com> <497A2EB8.4040406@sixdemonbag.org> <497A4BA0.8020709@gmail.com> <497A5941.5070407@sixdemonbag.org> <497BA8BB.6050603@dougbarton.us> Message-ID: <497BBA9F.4060109@sixdemonbag.org> Doug Barton wrote: > The AF's conclusion seems obvious, however it ignores a critical > factor of the Navy's use case. The story is apocryphal, so it doesn't make much sense to talk about the motives of the people involved -- it's fiction. But even were it true, I'd be hard-pressed to agree that it shows ignorance on the part of the AF engineers. It shows the AF engineers and the Navy engineers looked at the same data and drew two completely different conclusions -- and both of them were right. From dougb at dougbarton.us Sun Jan 25 02:17:18 2009 From: dougb at dougbarton.us (Doug Barton) Date: Sat, 24 Jan 2009 17:17:18 -0800 Subject: A question about Camellia In-Reply-To: <497BBA9F.4060109@sixdemonbag.org> References: <497A24EC.30906@gmail.com> <497A29B8.60103@sixdemonbag.org> <497A2BFC.3020507@gmail.com> <497A2EB8.4040406@sixdemonbag.org> <497A4BA0.8020709@gmail.com> <497A5941.5070407@sixdemonbag.org> <497BA8BB.6050603@dougbarton.us> <497BBA9F.4060109@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <497BBD9E.5020107@dougbarton.us> Robert J. Hansen wrote: > Doug Barton wrote: >> The AF's conclusion seems obvious, however it ignores a critical >> factor of the Navy's use case. > > The story is apocryphal, so it doesn't make much sense to talk > about the motives of the people involved -- it's fiction. Has every example you've ever learned from been true? :) > But even were it true, I'd be hard-pressed to agree that it shows > ignorance on the part of the AF engineers. It shows the AF > engineers and the Navy engineers looked at the same data and drew > two completely different conclusions -- and both of them were > right. Perhaps I misread what you wrote then. It seemed to me that you were implying that the AF guys were obviously correct in their conclusion and that the Navy guys were obviously wrong. What you said above makes sense though. Doug From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Sun Jan 25 04:38:44 2009 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Sat, 24 Jan 2009 22:38:44 -0500 Subject: expiring gpg keys In-Reply-To: <497B8C2A.4050402@gmail.com> References: <497B68C3.4030805@networktest.com> <497B8C2A.4050402@gmail.com> Message-ID: On Jan 24, 2009, at 4:46 PM, Faramir wrote: > David Newman escribi?: >> Michael Lucas' gpg/pgp book recommends setting a relatively short >> expiration time, such as a year, for personal keys. > > Well... I am not sure if that is a good idea... since if your key > expires, you need to exchange signatures again, and sometimes, it is > hard to do a face to face meeting with all your contacts. You don't have to do this if you don't want to. If you set an expiration date and the key expires, you can always change the expiration date to a further date in the future (i.e. 'un-expiring' your key). > For GPG users, there is an alternative, to add a signing subkey, and > to remove the main key, and work with the subkeys. The main key > would be > stored in a safe place, and would only be imported to sign other keys, > or to generate new subkeys, as the old subkeys expire. That way, you > don't need to go through the whole process of exchanging keys each > year. This is what I do, FWIW. David From faramir.cl at gmail.com Sun Jan 25 06:06:55 2009 From: faramir.cl at gmail.com (Faramir) Date: Sun, 25 Jan 2009 02:06:55 -0300 Subject: expiring gpg keys In-Reply-To: References: <497B68C3.4030805@networktest.com> <497B8C2A.4050402@gmail.com> Message-ID: <497BF36F.9040101@gmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 David Shaw escribi?: > On Jan 24, 2009, at 4:46 PM, Faramir wrote: > >> David Newman escribi?: >>> Michael Lucas' gpg/pgp book recommends setting a relatively short >>> expiration time, such as a year, for personal keys. >> >> Well... I am not sure if that is a good idea... since if your key ... > You don't have to do this if you don't want to. If you set an > expiration date and the key expires, you can always change the > expiration date to a further date in the future (i.e. 'un-expiring' your > key). Now I think about it, what is the point about expiring the main key? Protecting against losing the secret key and being unable to revoke it? In the case of subkeys, if they are compromised, the attacker still can't change their expiration date (since the main key remains secure), but in the case of the main key... if it is compromised, the attacker can do anything he/she wants... except un-revoking the copy from keyservers. >> For GPG users, there is an alternative, to add a signing subkey, and >> to remove the main key, and work with the subkeys. The main key would be >> stored in a safe place, and would only be imported to sign other keys, ... > This is what I do, FWIW. It's very worth, since I didn't know the opinion about that alternative, from experienced users (in your case, a developer of) of GPG. Of course I suppose the author of the tutorial I saw thinks it's a good idea, but I don't really know anything about him, so... The tutorial is available at: http://tjl73.altervista.org/secure_keygen/en/index.html Best Regards -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJJe/NvAAoJEMV4f6PvczxA5S8H/j7yEeHsc2I/Gh6Sn0RL5goM ognC6jB6qlW8RGQpFnmBCmN1gEu6N+0H0T4RvLskuUtKCgl5QBk/kQfSCHFcC3Hs 4HW2lH6DIBtZGsfjZkE8tDMSkIy1Eu6Qu8kyThU18OIXI4EiicK2FMIXGdJsAOCM yuxZhw5vtbK08j8Q3umJRKjnyBOSfB584eMrtMAV6XDy7K+FVgqB0xC80Djehn5D MVv8cepklfXZmWACcQyHpHaPvu7TJK7J0O5ZCqLqG/GTfFcsBsIJBmaXWj5br0Nu GG4zPqACs+//CE9bV/Zn9lE8GvMR8cveHyEkkHbIf83SPUfRiQk3LqcCqPJtL00= =/zGY -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From kloecker at kde.org Sun Jan 25 11:50:11 2009 From: kloecker at kde.org (Ingo =?utf-8?q?Kl=C3=B6cker?=) Date: Sun, 25 Jan 2009 11:50:11 +0100 Subject: expiring gpg keys In-Reply-To: <497BF36F.9040101@gmail.com> References: <497B68C3.4030805@networktest.com> <497BF36F.9040101@gmail.com> Message-ID: <200901251150.12481@thufir.ingo-kloecker.de> On Sunday 25 January 2009, Faramir wrote: > David Shaw escribi?: > > On Jan 24, 2009, at 4:46 PM, Faramir wrote: > >> David Newman escribi?: > >>> Michael Lucas' gpg/pgp book recommends setting a relatively short > >>> expiration time, such as a year, for personal keys. > >> > >> Well... I am not sure if that is a good idea... since if your key > > ... > > > You don't have to do this if you don't want to. If you set an > > expiration date and the key expires, you can always change the > > expiration date to a further date in the future (i.e. 'un-expiring' > > your key). > > Now I think about it, what is the point about expiring the main > key? Protecting against losing the secret key and being unable to > revoke it? Yes, I'd say this is the main reason behind Michael Lucas's recommendation. Does Michael Lucas also recommend creating a revocation certificate and storing it at a safe place (best printed on paper)? > In the case of subkeys, if they are compromised, the > attacker still can't change their expiration date (since the main key > remains secure), but in the case of the main key... if it is > compromised, the attacker can do anything he/she wants... except > un-revoking the copy from keyservers. Exactly. Therefore you should always have a revocation certificate (or even multiple revocation certificates with different reasons for revocation) at hand. Moreover, I'd say one should explicitely revoke expired keys one does not intend to re-use/un-expire, so that they can never be un-expired by someone else. Regards, Ingo -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 197 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From ml at mareichelt.de Sun Jan 25 14:11:35 2009 From: ml at mareichelt.de (markus reichelt) Date: Sun, 25 Jan 2009 14:11:35 +0100 Subject: FYI: Keysigning events at FOSDEM (Feb 8th) and Chemnitzer Linux-Tage (March 14th) In-Reply-To: <20090108131359.GD5981@tatooine.rebelbase.local> References: <20090108131359.GD5981@tatooine.rebelbase.local> Message-ID: <20090125131135.GA19548@tatooine.rebelbase.local> * markus reichelt wrote: > PGP/GPG/CA Keysigning events on Sunday Feb 8th at FOSDEM in > Brussels The exact time is yet to be announced, more info (in > English) at http://fosdem.org/2009/keysigning > > Deadline for key submission: Thursday Jan 29th, 8:00 PM CEST This is just a friendly (and last) reminder that you can still participate, just honour the deadline. More info about it all at http://ksp.mdcc.cx/ Hope to see you there. -- left blank, right bald -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 189 bytes Desc: not available URL: From mgol86 at gmail.com Mon Jan 26 14:10:55 2009 From: mgol86 at gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?TWljaGHFgiBHb8WCxJliaW93c2tp?=) Date: Mon, 26 Jan 2009 14:10:55 +0100 Subject: Safety of the key and it's length Message-ID: <497DB65F.4060701@gmail.com> I generated a gpg key using 'gpg --gen-key' (using GPG 1.4.6). What concerns me is that no matter how strong agorithm would I choose, it doesn't affect the size of the public & private key. It's probably ok, but I wonder - how safe is the private key having exported ASCII signature sized circa 2600 bytes? Public key is similar in size. I see many people have keys sized 4800 bytes and even 10x bigger. How to generate such longer keys? Is the size connected with GPG version I use? Is my key secure? I used a passphrase sized about 40 symbols, all English letters not making any word/phrase/etc., so it's quite long. I would appreciate Your help. -- Pozdrawiam, Micha? Go??biowski From p4.thomas at googlemail.com Mon Jan 26 15:02:19 2009 From: p4.thomas at googlemail.com (Peter Thomas) Date: Mon, 26 Jan 2009 15:02:19 +0100 Subject: Series of minor questions about OpenPGP 1 Message-ID: <9ef756150901260602g2ca87672kdd1fa2affdd4b1@mail.gmail.com> Hi folks. I'm currently reading RFC4880 and I think I have many minor questions... is the gnupg-users list the right place to ask? Or is there any better place? Anyway,... I think I start right now and ask my first question,.. (think it's easier to handle if I ask only one or two questions per mail-thread). Hopefully you can help me and hopefully I'm not to annoying ;-) 1) In chapter 3.7.2.1 on page 13 it says that the octet can have values "255 or 254". Is there any difference between the two? 2) I've digged a little bit into the bit layout of gpg created keys (with hd and pgpdump), and it seems that gpg creates packets with old packed format (bit 6 in the packet header cleard) whenever possible. What's the reason for this? I mean the RFC recommends to use the new packet format. Can I change that default behaviour? And if I have a key, that's already used and signed by others, could I convert it to using the new format? Thanks in advance, Peter -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Mon Jan 26 15:52:19 2009 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Mon, 26 Jan 2009 09:52:19 -0500 Subject: Series of minor questions about OpenPGP 1 In-Reply-To: <9ef756150901260602g2ca87672kdd1fa2affdd4b1@mail.gmail.com> References: <9ef756150901260602g2ca87672kdd1fa2affdd4b1@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: On Jan 26, 2009, at 9:02 AM, Peter Thomas wrote: > Hi folks. > > I'm currently reading RFC4880 and I think I have many minor > questions... is the gnupg-users list the right place to ask? Or is > there any better place? Look for the ietf-openpgp mailing list at http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/openpgp-charter.html > Anyway,... I think I start right now and ask my first question,.. > (think it's easier to handle if I ask only one or two questions per > mail-thread). > > Hopefully you can help me and hopefully I'm not to annoying ;-) > > 1) In chapter 3.7.2.1 on page 13 it says that the octet can have > values "255 or 254". Is there any difference between the two? Yes, see section 5.5.3 for the exact details, but in general 254 indicates that there is a SHA-1 hash of the secret data included. This is to prevent a secret key tampering attack. > 2) I've digged a little bit into the bit layout of gpg created keys > (with hd and pgpdump), and it seems that gpg creates packets with > old packed format (bit 6 in the packet header cleard) whenever > possible. > What's the reason for this? I mean the RFC recommends to use the new > packet format. Can I change that default behaviour? And if I have a > key, that's already used and signed by others, could I convert it to > using the new format? You could convert it, but there is little point. The function of a packet is the same no matter what. It's purely a question of the *contents* of the packet. GPG uses the old format when possible for backwards compatibility reasons. David From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Mon Jan 26 15:54:49 2009 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Mon, 26 Jan 2009 09:54:49 -0500 Subject: Safety of the key and it's length In-Reply-To: <497DB65F.4060701@gmail.com> References: <497DB65F.4060701@gmail.com> Message-ID: On Jan 26, 2009, at 8:10 AM, Micha? Go??biowski wrote: > I generated a gpg key using 'gpg --gen-key' (using GPG 1.4.6). What > concerns me is that no matter how strong agorithm would I choose, it > doesn't affect the size of the public & private key. It's probably ok, > but I wonder - how safe is the private key having exported ASCII > signature sized circa 2600 bytes? Public key is similar in size. It's difficult to say from the information here. If you want to know the size of your key, just do a --list-keys. The size of the exported key (especially when ASCII armored) does not really give you the number you're looking for. In the --list-keys output, the size of the key is the number after the "pub" and before the "D" or "R" that indicates key type. David From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Mon Jan 26 16:01:38 2009 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Mon, 26 Jan 2009 10:01:38 -0500 Subject: Safety of the key and it's length In-Reply-To: <497DB65F.4060701@gmail.com> References: <497DB65F.4060701@gmail.com> Message-ID: <497DD052.9080901@sixdemonbag.org> Micha? Go??biowski wrote: > I generated a gpg key using 'gpg --gen-key' (using GPG 1.4.6). What > concerns me is that no matter how strong agorithm would I choose, it > doesn't affect the size of the public & private key. A 2048-bit number is just 256 bytes of data. There's a lot of stuff which goes into a key, of which the secret values are only the smallest part. > It's probably ok, but I wonder - how safe is the private key having > exported ASCII signature sized circa 2600 bytes? Public key is > similar in size. Impossible to say from this information. > I see many people have keys sized 4800 bytes and even 10x bigger. How > to generate such longer keys? Is the size connected with GPG version > I use? Even a small key, 1024 bits, is probably much more secure than you are. If your traffic is encrypted with even a 1k key, the likelihood of someone attacking your traffic cryptanalytically is about zero. They'll decide to try other means instead. It's best not to obsess over key size. Larger is not better, but it's not as if it hurts you, either. From werewolf6851 at gmail.com Mon Jan 26 15:36:50 2009 From: werewolf6851 at gmail.com (Werewolf) Date: Mon, 26 Jan 2009 08:36:50 -0600 Subject: Safety of the key and it's length In-Reply-To: <497DB65F.4060701@gmail.com> References: <497DB65F.4060701@gmail.com> Message-ID: <497DCA82.9000509@gmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Micha? Go??biowski wrote: > I generated a gpg key using 'gpg --gen-key' (using GPG 1.4.6). What > concerns me is that no matter how strong agorithm would I choose, it > doesn't affect the size of the public & private key. It's probably ok, > but I wonder - how safe is the private key having exported ASCII > signature sized circa 2600 bytes? Public key is similar in size. > > I see many people have keys sized 4800 bytes and even 10x bigger. How to > generate such longer keys? Is the size connected with GPG version I use? > Is my key secure? I used a passphrase sized about 40 symbols, all > English letters not making any word/phrase/etc., so it's quite long. > > I would appreciate Your help. > Try either putting the line enable-dsa2 in your gpg.conf file or on the commandline add the command gpg --enable-dsa2 --gen-key Or instead of DSA key, choose to make a RSA key. All three those options will then open a key size query dialog for you. - -- Werewolf =====- http://www.nyx.net/~mdkeith/ -==== GPG key F52A14B4 with following fingerprint 35CD 0611 2F71 BC17 5C53 29A2 5F5A 4309 F52A 14B4 =====- http://spandex31095.tripod.com/ -== Book: "The important thing is the spices. A man could live on enough packaged food from here till judgment day as long as he has enough rosemary." --Episode #1, "Serenity" -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) Comment: Portable Thunderbird version 2.0.0.17 (20080914) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iFYEAREKAAYFAkl9yoEACgkQyKLEzsWkrWiAZgDfeKXoc56tR/aVf1dg5n2eFvH+ wtwvmEJknhOLcADghXS+OotrVwgP2qHGTTwGqIGjh7PGyYEbmYKwLw== =L4yn -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From faramir.cl at gmail.com Mon Jan 26 16:26:55 2009 From: faramir.cl at gmail.com (Faramir) Date: Mon, 26 Jan 2009 12:26:55 -0300 Subject: Safety of the key and it's length In-Reply-To: <497DB65F.4060701@gmail.com> References: <497DB65F.4060701@gmail.com> Message-ID: <497DD63F.2070005@gmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Micha? Go??biowski escribi?: > I generated a gpg key using 'gpg --gen-key' (using GPG 1.4.6). What Maybe you should consider upgrading to 1.4.9, if possible... If you don't have enabled dsa2 at gpg.conf file, DSA keys can be just 1024 bits long, while ElGammal can have greater lengths. If you enable DSA2, then you can chose DSA keys length 1024 and 2048. RSA keys can be up to 4096 bits long. Best Regards -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJJfdY/AAoJEMV4f6PvczxAcgwIAKZu9C2iyGSelz4sWavH9bxj kuBRmead6xFjFRfZO9Th802jIXTekz1vm8nfOAOV+P3aIK/d0wVsjq8nVzVwW62y QDTYIyFV6+WI0Y6xrMZVvoy4Z7ZgCvWxVfgXRNLBOvvpptWIn0152Dx5Bw5KadtN X3aBI+EeHPi9vIlfT193Z+o0Twzk6389W1jxCkc2RKTydJqW68PtAuX4TcKJOz0f iYWz/ge7LY7FZajqIpEkoCXWBExyhpG1Q1AnyWlEeRikdvk4Com7VwvkanxYIRnX pYvYuOFYgLzHc5b9v26ygRoKe+xXk688oOOHwuKUNwdpBM6P2j6M7hqZJGhAcGQ= =E3tW -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From jh at jameshoward.us Mon Jan 26 16:06:45 2009 From: jh at jameshoward.us (James P. Howard, II) Date: Mon, 26 Jan 2009 10:06:45 -0500 Subject: Safety of the key and it's length In-Reply-To: <497DD052.9080901@sixdemonbag.org> References: <497DB65F.4060701@gmail.com> <497DD052.9080901@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <37821B99-1B81-4B23-B384-735B964D2670@jameshoward.us> On Jan 26, 2009, at 10:01 AM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > Even a small key, 1024 bits, is probably much more secure than you > are. > If your traffic is encrypted with even a 1k key, the likelihood of > someone attacking your traffic cryptanalytically is about zero. > They'll > decide to try other means instead. > > It's best not to obsess over key size. Larger is not better, but it's > not as if it hurts you, either. There are some ancient keys out there which are 512 bits (and I think I've seen smaller). Are these likely still secure enough to use? -- James P. Howard, II, MPA jh at jameshoward.us -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: PGP.sig Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 197 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part URL: From p4.thomas at googlemail.com Mon Jan 26 17:22:11 2009 From: p4.thomas at googlemail.com (Peter Thomas) Date: Mon, 26 Jan 2009 17:22:11 +0100 Subject: Series of minor questions about OpenPGP 1 In-Reply-To: References: <9ef756150901260602g2ca87672kdd1fa2affdd4b1@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <9ef756150901260822j4cbb1fefv960e09aa08ae31f0@mail.gmail.com> Hi David. On Mon, Jan 26, 2009 at 3:52 PM, David Shaw wrote: >> I'm currently reading RFC4880 and I think I have many minor questions... is the gnupg-users list the right place to ask? Or is there any better place? > Look for the ietf-openpgp mailing list at http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/openpgp-charter.html I'll have a look at this, but as at least some of my questions seem to be gnupg specific I'll continue to ask some stuff here. >> 1) In chapter 3.7.2.1 on page 13 it says that the octet can have values "255 or 254". Is there any difference between the two? > Yes, see section 5.5.3 for the exact details, but in general 254 indicates that there is a SHA-1 hash of the secret data included. This is to prevent a secret key tampering attack. Ah, thanks. So I'd should be 254 for better security of the private key, right? >> What's the reason for this? I mean the RFC recommends to use the new packet format. Can I change that default behaviour? And if I have a key, that's already used and signed by others, could I convert it to using the new format? > You could convert it, but there is little point. Uhm, I just wanted to follow the recommendation of the RFC ;-) >The function of a packet is the same no matter what. So all other signatures would still be valid? But there is probably no function in gnupg to do this conversion, is it? Cheers, Peter From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Mon Jan 26 17:31:16 2009 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Mon, 26 Jan 2009 11:31:16 -0500 Subject: Safety of the key and it's length In-Reply-To: <37821B99-1B81-4B23-B384-735B964D2670@jameshoward.us> References: <497DB65F.4060701@gmail.com> <497DD052.9080901@sixdemonbag.org> <37821B99-1B81-4B23-B384-735B964D2670@jameshoward.us> Message-ID: <20090126163115.GA27006@jabberwocky.com> On Mon, Jan 26, 2009 at 10:06:45AM -0500, James P. Howard, II wrote: > On Jan 26, 2009, at 10:01 AM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > >> Even a small key, 1024 bits, is probably much more secure than you >> are. >> If your traffic is encrypted with even a 1k key, the likelihood of >> someone attacking your traffic cryptanalytically is about zero. >> They'll >> decide to try other means instead. >> >> It's best not to obsess over key size. Larger is not better, but it's >> not as if it hurts you, either. > > There are some ancient keys out there which are 512 bits (and I think > I've seen smaller). Are these likely still secure enough to use? It depends on who you need it to be secure against. If we're talking about protecting something from your roommate, then yes. If we're talking about protecting something from even a moderately funded attacker, then no. By way of example, a 512-bit number was factored way back in 1999. It took 5 months on around 300 machines running at 200-600 Mhz. Today, 10 years later, I can buy multicore processors running at 3Ghz at the office supply store down the street. It would be interesting to see how long such a job would take nowadays: even if we account for the vast increase in computer performance, and the vast reduction in cost, we also know more about how to attack the problem than we did 10 years ago. David From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Mon Jan 26 17:40:04 2009 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Mon, 26 Jan 2009 11:40:04 -0500 Subject: Series of minor questions about OpenPGP 1 In-Reply-To: <9ef756150901260822j4cbb1fefv960e09aa08ae31f0@mail.gmail.com> References: <9ef756150901260602g2ca87672kdd1fa2affdd4b1@mail.gmail.com> <9ef756150901260822j4cbb1fefv960e09aa08ae31f0@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <20090126164004.GB27006@jabberwocky.com> On Mon, Jan 26, 2009 at 05:22:11PM +0100, Peter Thomas wrote: > Hi David. > > On Mon, Jan 26, 2009 at 3:52 PM, David Shaw wrote: > >> I'm currently reading RFC4880 and I think I have many minor questions... is the gnupg-users list the right place to ask? Or is there any better place? > > Look for the ietf-openpgp mailing list at http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/openpgp-charter.html > I'll have a look at this, but as at least some of my questions seem to > be gnupg specific I'll continue to ask some stuff here. > > >> 1) In chapter 3.7.2.1 on page 13 it says that the octet can have values "255 or 254". Is there any difference between the two? > > Yes, see section 5.5.3 for the exact details, but in general 254 indicates that there is a SHA-1 hash of the secret data included. This is to prevent a secret key tampering attack. > Ah, thanks. So I'd should be 254 for better security of the private key, right? Yes. See http://eprint.iacr.org/2002/076.pdf for the attack that prompted this extra layer of protection. > >> What's the reason for this? I mean the RFC recommends to use the new packet format. Can I change that default behaviour? And if I have a key, that's already used and signed by others, could I convert it to using the new format? > > You could convert it, but there is little point. > Uhm, I just wanted to follow the recommendation of the RFC ;-) The RFC says "If interoperability is not an issue, the new packet format is RECOMMENDED." Given that interoperability *is* an issue (GPG works with PGP 2.x), we don't use the new packet format except when necessary. Really, though, it just doesn't matter. It's the equivalent of writing the number ten as "10" or "ten". It contains the same value, using different notation. > >The function of a packet is the same no matter what. > So all other signatures would still be valid? Yes. > But there is probably no function in gnupg to do this conversion, is > it? No, but you could patch it if you liked. Take a look at the write_header() and write_new_header() functions in build-packet.c David From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Mon Jan 26 18:07:26 2009 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Mon, 26 Jan 2009 12:07:26 -0500 Subject: Safety of the key and it's length In-Reply-To: <37821B99-1B81-4B23-B384-735B964D2670@jameshoward.us> References: <497DB65F.4060701@gmail.com> <497DD052.9080901@sixdemonbag.org> <37821B99-1B81-4B23-B384-735B964D2670@jameshoward.us> Message-ID: <497DEDCE.8050001@sixdemonbag.org> James P. Howard, II wrote: > There are some ancient keys out there which are 512 bits (and I think > I've seen smaller). Are these likely still secure enough to use? Depends on your threat model. Secure against a casual snoop? Probably. Secure against someone who knows what they're doing and is willing to put a little thought and effort into it? Not at all. From chronoflux at underworld-infinity.dnsalias.org Mon Jan 26 20:41:15 2009 From: chronoflux at underworld-infinity.dnsalias.org (Greenhead, Christopher) Date: Mon, 26 Jan 2009 14:41:15 -0500 Subject: Safety of the key and it's length In-Reply-To: <497DB65F.4060701@gmail.com> References: <497DB65F.4060701@gmail.com> Message-ID: <20090126194103.GD28042@infinity.underworld-infinity.dnsalias.org> On Mon, Jan 26, 2009 at 02:10:55PM +0100, Micha?? Go????biowski wrote: >but I wonder - how safe is the private key having exported ASCII >signature sized circa 2600 bytes? Public key is similar in size. > >I see many people have keys sized 4800 bytes and even 10x bigger. How to You seem to be referring to the size that the exported public key occupies on disk... I'm not an expert by any stretch, but I believe that you find the public keys of others to be larger because they include all of the signatures that the key owners have accumulated on them. Your brand new key would lack this extra "baggage". Of course, if I've made any error here, I'd very much appreciate clarification from those more experienced. Good luck, -- Christopher Greenhead O< ascii ribbon campaign - stop html mail - www.asciiribbon.org ENCRYPTED email preferred -- OpenPGP key ID: 0x(4C7EBA7A)87CA962A -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 195 bytes Desc: not available URL: From p4.thomas at googlemail.com Mon Jan 26 22:36:21 2009 From: p4.thomas at googlemail.com (Peter Thomas) Date: Mon, 26 Jan 2009 22:36:21 +0100 Subject: Series of minor questions about OpenPGP 1 In-Reply-To: <20090126164004.GB27006@jabberwocky.com> References: <9ef756150901260602g2ca87672kdd1fa2affdd4b1@mail.gmail.com> <9ef756150901260822j4cbb1fefv960e09aa08ae31f0@mail.gmail.com> <20090126164004.GB27006@jabberwocky.com> Message-ID: <9ef756150901261336m7b52893o613718273e428f5a@mail.gmail.com> On Mon, Jan 26, 2009 at 5:40 PM, David Shaw wrote: >> Ah, thanks. So I'd should be 254 for better security of the private key, right? > Yes. See http://eprint.iacr.org/2002/076.pdf for the attack that > prompted this extra layer of protection. Ah,.. interesting,.. thanks for that pointer. >> Uhm, I just wanted to follow the recommendation of the RFC ;-) > The RFC says "If interoperability is not an issue, the new packet > format is RECOMMENDED." Given that interoperability *is* an issue > (GPG works with PGP 2.x), we don't use the new packet format except > when necessary. Ah,.. ok so to support older applications. Good decision. Uhm what happens if one of these older implementations sees a packet type above 15? Do they give a warning? Or is there something similar to the critical bit? >> But there is probably no function in gnupg to do this conversion, is >> it? > No, but you could patch it if you liked. Take a look at the > write_header() and write_new_header() functions in build-packet.c Thanks for that info,.. but you're right and it's probably better to stay with the compatible-mode. From p4.thomas at googlemail.com Mon Jan 26 22:54:55 2009 From: p4.thomas at googlemail.com (Peter Thomas) Date: Mon, 26 Jan 2009 22:54:55 +0100 Subject: Series of minor questions about OpenPGP 2 Message-ID: <9ef756150901261354q17d60f44lbf5dd6ff87a6f8b@mail.gmail.com> Hi again. This is about signature types and how gnupg uses them. I've looked through the signature types in chapter 5.2.1 1) The 0x02 standalone signature: What is its intended use (by the standard) and is it ever used by gnupg? I mean it's clear to me that it signs just it's own subpackets, but how could this be ever used? 2) The 0x1F direct key signature: Is it ever used by gpg? I mean it would perfectly fit for all subpacket types that apply directly to the key, e.g. key expiration time (9), revocation key (12) or key flags (27). But gpg always puts these kind of information in the 0x13 signature. 3) Last but not least, the 0x50 3rd party signature. I must admit that I absolutely don't understand its usage. Do you have an example? And is this used by gpg? Once again,.. thanks in advance. Cheers, Peter From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Mon Jan 26 23:28:15 2009 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Mon, 26 Jan 2009 17:28:15 -0500 Subject: Series of minor questions about OpenPGP 2 In-Reply-To: <9ef756150901261354q17d60f44lbf5dd6ff87a6f8b@mail.gmail.com> References: <9ef756150901261354q17d60f44lbf5dd6ff87a6f8b@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <20090126222815.GA27590@jabberwocky.com> On Mon, Jan 26, 2009 at 10:54:55PM +0100, Peter Thomas wrote: > Hi again. > > This is about signature types and how gnupg uses them. > > I've looked through the signature types in chapter 5.2.1 > > 1) The 0x02 standalone signature: What is its intended use (by the > standard) and is it ever used by gnupg? > I mean it's clear to me that it signs just it's own subpackets, but > how could this be ever used? It's a "token", that can be given from one person to another. The token contains only what is stated inside the signature itself. Let's say I put some useful information inside a notation packet, or perhaps it contains identity inside a keyID packet, etc. Think of it as a physical token and some uses come to mind. GPG doesn't support it. Neither does any other OpenPGP program that I know of. > 2) The 0x1F direct key signature: Is it ever used by gpg? I mean it > would perfectly fit for all subpacket types that apply directly to the > key, e.g. key expiration time (9), revocation key (12) or key flags > (27). > But gpg always puts these kind of information in the 0x13 signature. It's used for designated revocation signatures. There is no reason why it *couldn't* be used for key expiration or key flags, but 0x13 works just as well for this. OpenPGP supports both 0x1F and 0x13 (0x10, 0x11, 0x12), and historically people used 0x13, so there was never a real reason to change. > 3) Last but not least, the 0x50 3rd party signature. I must admit that > I absolutely don't understand its usage. Do you have an example? And > is this used by gpg? It's a Notary signature. For example: Alice writes a document. She later wants to be able to prove when it was written. Obviously we can't trust Alice's signature to prove that since she can set her clock to whatever she likes. We can, however, trust the notary (or many notaries). Alice signs the document, and then brings the signature to the Notary. The Notary verifies that the signature is sane (i.e. the date is current) and then signs the signature (with an 0x50). Alice gets her proof, and significantly does not have to show the Notary her original document. GPG doesn't support it. Neither does any other OpenPGP program that I know of. David From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Mon Jan 26 23:31:39 2009 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Mon, 26 Jan 2009 17:31:39 -0500 Subject: Series of minor questions about OpenPGP 1 In-Reply-To: <9ef756150901261336m7b52893o613718273e428f5a@mail.gmail.com> References: <9ef756150901260602g2ca87672kdd1fa2affdd4b1@mail.gmail.com> <9ef756150901260822j4cbb1fefv960e09aa08ae31f0@mail.gmail.com> <20090126164004.GB27006@jabberwocky.com> <9ef756150901261336m7b52893o613718273e428f5a@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <20090126223139.GB27590@jabberwocky.com> On Mon, Jan 26, 2009 at 10:36:21PM +0100, Peter Thomas wrote: > On Mon, Jan 26, 2009 at 5:40 PM, David Shaw wrote: > >> Uhm, I just wanted to follow the recommendation of the RFC ;-) > > The RFC says "If interoperability is not an issue, the new packet > > format is RECOMMENDED." Given that interoperability *is* an issue > > (GPG works with PGP 2.x), we don't use the new packet format except > > when necessary. > Ah,.. ok so to support older applications. Good decision. > Uhm what happens if one of these older implementations sees a packet > type above 15? Do they give a warning? Or is there something similar > to the critical bit? No, they don't have a concept of a packet type above 15. There are only 4 type bits in the old-style packet header. :) Old programs will basically blow up if they see something they don't understand. There is a special packet, the Marker Packet (tag 10) which basically exists to make PGP 2.x print out "You need a newer version of PGP" before PGP 2.x would blow up. David From p4.thomas at googlemail.com Tue Jan 27 00:15:10 2009 From: p4.thomas at googlemail.com (Peter Thomas) Date: Tue, 27 Jan 2009 00:15:10 +0100 Subject: Series of minor questions about OpenPGP 1 In-Reply-To: <20090126223139.GB27590@jabberwocky.com> References: <9ef756150901260602g2ca87672kdd1fa2affdd4b1@mail.gmail.com> <9ef756150901260822j4cbb1fefv960e09aa08ae31f0@mail.gmail.com> <20090126164004.GB27006@jabberwocky.com> <9ef756150901261336m7b52893o613718273e428f5a@mail.gmail.com> <20090126223139.GB27590@jabberwocky.com> Message-ID: <9ef756150901261515v15aa27bbif2fe5b5bce178c5a@mail.gmail.com> On Mon, Jan 26, 2009 at 11:31 PM, David Shaw wrote: > No, they don't have a concept of a packet type above 15. There are > only 4 type bits in the old-style packet header. :) Yes, that was clear > Old programs will basically blow up if they see something they don't > understand. There is a special packet, the Marker Packet (tag 10) > which basically exists to make PGP 2.x print out "You need a newer > version of PGP" before PGP 2.x would blow up. My intention (and also behind the question whether there is something like the critical bit for packet types) is this: Suppose a new packet type (above 15) is added which is VERY critical for the security, meaning that it would be very very bad if some implementation isn't able to interpret it. Is it secured that those applications will blow up, give errors etc.? If not (and that was my motivation behind the general usage of new packet headers) it would be better if no packet type (even those below 16) are understood by these legacy applications and thus the whole key/message would be unusable for them. See what I mean? From p4.thomas at googlemail.com Tue Jan 27 00:20:35 2009 From: p4.thomas at googlemail.com (Peter Thomas) Date: Tue, 27 Jan 2009 00:20:35 +0100 Subject: Series of minor questions about OpenPGP 2 In-Reply-To: <20090126222815.GA27590@jabberwocky.com> References: <9ef756150901261354q17d60f44lbf5dd6ff87a6f8b@mail.gmail.com> <20090126222815.GA27590@jabberwocky.com> Message-ID: <9ef756150901261520v4a745bc6n6144417a96581421@mail.gmail.com> Hi David. btw: Thanks for your excellent answers. Great to have one of the RFC authors here :-) On Mon, Jan 26, 2009 at 11:28 PM, David Shaw wrote: > It's a "token", that can be given from one person to another. The > token contains only what is stated inside the signature itself. Let's > say I put some useful information inside a notation packet, or perhaps > it contains identity inside a keyID packet, etc. Think of it as a > physical token and some uses come to mind. Ah,.. I see. > GPG doesn't support it. Neither does any other OpenPGP program that I > know of. What a pity :-( > It's used for designated revocation signatures. There is no reason > why it *couldn't* be used for key expiration or key flags, but 0x13 > works just as well for this. OpenPGP supports both 0x1F and 0x13 > (0x10, 0x11, 0x12), and historically people used 0x13, so there was > never a real reason to change. Ok,.. I'll come back to this later when I ask some stuff about signature subpackets. Would gnupg understand these subpackets in a 0x1F signature? > It's a Notary signature. For example: Alice writes a document. She > later wants to be able to prove when it was written. Obviously we > can't trust Alice's signature to prove that since she can set her > clock to whatever she likes. We can, however, trust the notary (or > many notaries). Alice signs the document, and then brings the > signature to the Notary. The Notary verifies that the signature is > sane (i.e. the date is current) and then signs the signature (with an > 0x50). Alice gets her proof, and significantly does not have to show > the Notary her original document. Ah,.. now I understand :-) So it's somehow comparable to the timestamp signatures, isn't it? From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Tue Jan 27 04:57:37 2009 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Mon, 26 Jan 2009 22:57:37 -0500 Subject: Series of minor questions about OpenPGP 1 In-Reply-To: <9ef756150901261515v15aa27bbif2fe5b5bce178c5a@mail.gmail.com> References: <9ef756150901260602g2ca87672kdd1fa2affdd4b1@mail.gmail.com> <9ef756150901260822j4cbb1fefv960e09aa08ae31f0@mail.gmail.com> <20090126164004.GB27006@jabberwocky.com> <9ef756150901261336m7b52893o613718273e428f5a@mail.gmail.com> <20090126223139.GB27590@jabberwocky.com> <9ef756150901261515v15aa27bbif2fe5b5bce178c5a@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: On Jan 26, 2009, at 6:15 PM, Peter Thomas wrote: > On Mon, Jan 26, 2009 at 11:31 PM, David Shaw > wrote: >> No, they don't have a concept of a packet type above 15. There are >> only 4 type bits in the old-style packet header. :) > Yes, that was clear > >> Old programs will basically blow up if they see something they don't >> understand. There is a special packet, the Marker Packet (tag 10) >> which basically exists to make PGP 2.x print out "You need a newer >> version of PGP" before PGP 2.x would blow up. > My intention (and also behind the question whether there is something > like the critical bit for packet types) is this: > Suppose a new packet type (above 15) is added which is VERY critical > for the security, meaning that it would be very very bad if some > implementation isn't able to interpret it. > Is it secured that those applications will blow up, give errors etc.? They should at least fail - a new style RFC-4880 (or 2440) packet (of any type) is unreadable by an old RFC-1991 program. It simply won't be meaningful. At to *how* it will fail, that depends on the program. The point of the Marker Packet is to force a graceful failure early. > If not (and that was my motivation behind the general usage of new > packet headers) it would be better if no packet type (even those below > 16) are understood by these legacy applications and thus the whole > key/message would be unusable for them. If there was such a situation, then forcing the use of a new packet header would certainly break old programs, but this isn't sufficient: most programs understand new packet headers, but they may not understand your new packet type. Or put another way - you can't solve that problem with packet headers. David From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Tue Jan 27 05:18:59 2009 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Mon, 26 Jan 2009 23:18:59 -0500 Subject: Series of minor questions about OpenPGP 2 In-Reply-To: <9ef756150901261520v4a745bc6n6144417a96581421@mail.gmail.com> References: <9ef756150901261354q17d60f44lbf5dd6ff87a6f8b@mail.gmail.com> <20090126222815.GA27590@jabberwocky.com> <9ef756150901261520v4a745bc6n6144417a96581421@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <60E7E188-FB53-4F27-9E4E-83536476E2AB@jabberwocky.com> On Jan 26, 2009, at 6:20 PM, Peter Thomas wrote: >> It's used for designated revocation signatures. There is no reason >> why it *couldn't* be used for key expiration or key flags, but 0x13 >> works just as well for this. OpenPGP supports both 0x1F and 0x13 >> (0x10, 0x11, 0x12), and historically people used 0x13, so there was >> never a real reason to change. > Ok,.. I'll come back to this later when I ask some stuff about > signature subpackets. > Would gnupg understand these subpackets in a 0x1F signature? Yes. It's a valid key as per the spec, even though no program actually generates such a key that I know of. Note that I can't make that same guarantee for other programs. I suspect they'd work, but you'd have to check to be sure. >> It's a Notary signature. For example: Alice writes a document. She >> later wants to be able to prove when it was written. Obviously we >> can't trust Alice's signature to prove that since she can set her >> clock to whatever she likes. We can, however, trust the notary (or >> many notaries). Alice signs the document, and then brings the >> signature to the Notary. The Notary verifies that the signature is >> sane (i.e. the date is current) and then signs the signature (with an >> 0x50). Alice gets her proof, and significantly does not have to show >> the Notary her original document. > Ah,.. now I understand :-) So it's somehow comparable to the timestamp > signatures, isn't it? They are similar, except that a timestamp signature is presumed to be over actual data. A notary signature is made over another signature. David From p4.thomas at googlemail.com Tue Jan 27 11:49:42 2009 From: p4.thomas at googlemail.com (Peter Thomas) Date: Tue, 27 Jan 2009 11:49:42 +0100 Subject: Series of minor questions about OpenPGP 1 In-Reply-To: References: <9ef756150901260602g2ca87672kdd1fa2affdd4b1@mail.gmail.com> <9ef756150901260822j4cbb1fefv960e09aa08ae31f0@mail.gmail.com> <20090126164004.GB27006@jabberwocky.com> <9ef756150901261336m7b52893o613718273e428f5a@mail.gmail.com> <20090126223139.GB27590@jabberwocky.com> <9ef756150901261515v15aa27bbif2fe5b5bce178c5a@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <9ef756150901270249i62845663i2820b4764acfdb72@mail.gmail.com> On Tue, Jan 27, 2009 at 4:57 AM, David Shaw wrote: > They should at least fail - a new style RFC-4880 (or 2440) packet (of any > type) is unreadable by an old RFC-1991 program. It simply won't be > meaningful. At to *how* it will fail, that depends on the program. > > The point of the Marker Packet is to force a graceful failure early. > If there was such a situation, then forcing the use of a new packet header > would certainly break old programs, but this isn't sufficient: most programs > understand new packet headers, but they may not understand your new packet > type. Or put another way - you can't solve that problem with packet > headers. Ok,.. I see :-) From p4.thomas at googlemail.com Tue Jan 27 13:15:46 2009 From: p4.thomas at googlemail.com (Peter Thomas) Date: Tue, 27 Jan 2009 13:15:46 +0100 Subject: Series of minor questions about OpenPGP 1 In-Reply-To: <20090126164004.GB27006@jabberwocky.com> References: <9ef756150901260602g2ca87672kdd1fa2affdd4b1@mail.gmail.com> <9ef756150901260822j4cbb1fefv960e09aa08ae31f0@mail.gmail.com> <20090126164004.GB27006@jabberwocky.com> Message-ID: <9ef756150901270415t5efb356ag995d7fb5768df1c6@mail.gmail.com> On Mon, Jan 26, 2009 at 5:40 PM, David Shaw wrote: > No, but you could patch it if you liked. Take a look at the > write_header() and write_new_header() functions in build-packet.c Although you've convinced me that using old packet types where possible is preferable, I still tried to get this working (just for a better understanding of gpg's sources). I didn't found what I've needed in those two functions, though. I used the following patch: --- gnupg-1.4.9/g10/build-packet.c 2007-10-23 09:50:33.000000000 +0200 +++ foo/g10/build-packet.c 2009-01-27 13:00:57.569232835 +0100 @@ -86,10 +86,7 @@ default: break; } - if( new_ctb || pkttype > 15 ) /* new format */ ctb = 0xc0 | (pkttype & 0x3f); - else - ctb = 0x80 | ((pkttype & 15)<<2); switch( pkttype ) { case PKT_ATTRIBUTE: @@ -1261,9 +1258,6 @@ static int write_new_header( IOBUF out, int ctb, u32 len, int hdrlen ) { - if( hdrlen ) - log_bug("can't cope with hdrlen yet\n"); - if( iobuf_put(out, ctb ) ) return -1; if( !len ) { Does this seem ok? Or what did you meant, that I should change? Not sure why I had to remove that log_bug call. But when I create a new key,.. pgpdump lists new packet headers. When I do e.g. passwd (in --edit-key) the secret key is rewritten with new paket types, and if I do e.g. adduid, the public key is rewritten. The trustpackets however continue to use the old style headers. *weird* ;-) I've seen that you have some switches like force-v4-certs in gpg. Would you be interested in a patch that adds --force-new-paket-headers? Best wishes, Peter From p4.thomas at googlemail.com Tue Jan 27 13:46:30 2009 From: p4.thomas at googlemail.com (Peter Thomas) Date: Tue, 27 Jan 2009 13:46:30 +0100 Subject: Series of minor questions about OpenPGP 3 Message-ID: <9ef756150901270446t3808fbb6k51ae6112da252d74@mail.gmail.com> Hi again. Ok this is a first bunch of questions on signatures (again both specific for gnupg but perhaps also common for OpenPGP). Would be glad if someone could help me with answering these (David?! xD). 1) For the 0x11 signature the RFC says "...has not done any verification of the claim that ..." which as far as I understand means "The signer simply signed the key without checking the keyholders identity". Does gpg include this signature type in its trust-calculations or is it simply ignored (no matter whether I directly signed another key with a 0x11 or whether its "in the middle" of a trust-path between me and someone else? And if so, is this generally claimed by the RFC? I mean will every implementation behave like this (ignoring 0x11s) when it follows the RFC? 2) Why are the 0x19 signatures only used as embedded signatures? I mean wouldn't it be the same to simply add them as another "top level" signature packet? 3) I've understood why we need a "backsignature" (the 0x19) for signature subkeys, but why don't we need one for encryption subkeys? 4) I've looked at the different revocation signature types. It seems that it's not possible to revoke 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x40 and 0x50 signature types? Is this desired? I mean I understand that these signature types can also be applied to casual data (and not just keys) but one could think of "revocation servers" like keyservers that could be asked whether some signature is still considered to be valid. 5) I've looked at the layout of v4 signatures, which lead me to two questions: a) What does gnupg put in this unhashed area. I mean which subpacket types (at maximum). b) This two octet field containing the left 16 bits of the signed hash, doesn't this allow some kind of DoS attack? In the sense that someone that captures and modifies the OpenPGP message can change these two octets and an implementation that looks at these would immediately say "invalid signature"? Cheers, Peter From vedaal at hush.com Tue Jan 27 16:02:18 2009 From: vedaal at hush.com (vedaal at hush.com) Date: Tue, 27 Jan 2009 10:02:18 -0500 Subject: Series of minor questions about OpenPGP 2 Message-ID: <20090127150218.88D7B28040@smtp.hushmail.com> >Date: Mon, 26 Jan 2009 17:31:39 -0500 >From: David Shaw >Subject: Re: Series of minor questions about OpenPGP 1 >Old programs will basically blow up if they see something they >don't >understand. There is a special packet, the Marker Packet (tag 10) >which basically exists to make PGP 2.x print out "You need a newer >version of PGP" before PGP 2.x would blow up. on this note, i was recently playing with a 64 bit vista laptop, and couldn't get my portable pgp 2.x to initiate. (Disastry's version) the dos pgp window command line just opened and immediately closed i was using the 16 bit dos build, and didn't switch yet to the 32 bit win build how does gnupg manage to maintain 16, 32, 64 bit hardware independence? TIA, vedaal -- Get a wet and wonderful shower head. Click now! http://tagline.hushmail.com/fc/PnY6qxs2RCKE4j8VCOcH5gc2UF9uKpX1Ab5PfvMCZsBWNFVlKnqmL/ From mgol86 at gmail.com Tue Jan 27 15:42:17 2009 From: mgol86 at gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?TWljaGHFgiBHb8WCxJliaW93c2tp?=) Date: Tue, 27 Jan 2009 15:42:17 +0100 Subject: Safety of the key and it's length In-Reply-To: <497DCA82.9000509@gmail.com> References: <497DB65F.4060701@gmail.com> <497DCA82.9000509@gmail.com> Message-ID: <497F1D49.4010309@gmail.com> Werewolf wrote: > Try either putting the line > enable-dsa2 > in your gpg.conf file or on the commandline add the command > gpg --enable-dsa2 --gen-key Thanks for help and info, to You and anybody who explained connected issues. :) -- Pozdrawiam, Micha? Go??biowski From p4.thomas at googlemail.com Tue Jan 27 16:27:33 2009 From: p4.thomas at googlemail.com (Peter Thomas) Date: Tue, 27 Jan 2009 16:27:33 +0100 Subject: Series of minor questions about OpenPGP 4 Message-ID: <9ef756150901270727o32cb1c79qd4e2caa69a2ce839@mail.gmail.com> Hello. This time it's all about signature subpackets: Sorry that this got longer, but I think these points are all somehow connected. So feel free to split up as you like :-) I know that these questions are more about OpenPGP itself than gnupg, but perhaps you, David, can have a look at them here, before I post it on their mailing list (don't want to look stupid there ^^ and I'm still quite new in OpenPGP's standard). 1) gnupg (and as far as I can see other implementations, too) don't set the critical bit on much signature subpackets by default. The RFC (AFAIK) doesn't demand any subpacket to be understood by applications. Unknown subpackets should be ignored, except the critical bit is set. Correct so far? Now when I go through the currently defined signature subpackets, I see several which are or at least could be critical for security and for the correct evaluation of signatures: 2, 3: a signature might not be valid yet, or might be expired already 7: an attacker might manage to revoke an irrevocable signature 9: they key is expired and the owner does not want it to be used any longer (maybe also due to security reasons) 12: if an implementation doesn't understand this, it might not notice, that a key/UID is already revoked 26: the policy may contain critical information for security (e.g. "this key signs any applicant without validating his personal data) 27: it might be a security issue, if a key that was marked for certification-only (0x01) has signed some casual data 31: required for revocation signatures and thus possibly security critical 32: required for the signing subkey backsigs (0x19) I'd even consider the following as critical: 28: the signer might want to express that a specific role/UID made the signature, and this might be security critical depending on the policy Of course no one can force the user to actually read and follow these subpackets (the policy (26) is the best example for this ^^), but wouldn't it make sense that the RFC _REQUIRES_ these subpackets to be understood by conforming implementations? Just an idea, though :-) 2) Selfsignatures and possible ambiguities: In an email before David told me that it's fully ok that some signature subpackets are on 0x13 and/or 0x1F self signatures. I said I'll come back to this; here it is. The RFC is very clear (5.2.3.3) about which signature types may be self-signatures, namely 0x10-0x13, 0x1F and 0x18 (I assume 0x19 is let out, as it's made by the subkey, right?). This chapter also says that an implementation should interpret it as narrowly as possible. a) That's by the way the first "problem" which _could_ lead to secrutiy issues, as the standard doesn't define for every case what "as narrowly as possible" mean. Of course everyone could say "just follow the common human sense" but this is always problematic, isn't it? ;-) b) What for example, if a 0x13 and a 0x1F have conflicting key expiration times? Should an implementation use the time in the most recent of the two? Should it use the information from the 0x1F, as key expiration time is "clearly" related to the key, and not the the User ID? Should it just use the smallest value of the two? Should it use the value accordingly by which the key was found (if by Key ID -> use 0x1F, if by User ID -> use 0x13). One can easily think of similar examples for other subpacket types, and its easy to think of examples where this could lead to security problems (Imagine a user resets the expiration time of his key to denote that it should not longer be used. His implementation updates only the 0x13 self-signature but not the "unlimited" in the 0x1F, made by some other implementation. A third implementation may now choose the "right one" or not.) c) It's nowhere clearly specified if and what meaning these supackets have on the subkey binding self-signature (0x18) A solution would be, that the RFC clearly specifies which subpackets MAY go to which self-signature, which one takes priority, and for which the implementation is allowed to choose itself (e.g. according to the way the key was found). btw: The example on page 27 "If the key is located via Key ID => use the subpacket from the primary User ID self-signature also shows the conflict with 0x1F signatures that could arise in that case. 3) This is probably clear for everybody, but the part on revocation signatures should perhaps highlight, that all subpackets in revoked signatures MUST NOT be used, e.g. imagine the key expiration time is only stored in an 0x1F and not in any 0x10-0x13. If that 0x1F gets revoked, the key has no longer an expiration time. btw: Is it specified what happens when possibly security critical subpackets like the expiration time or key usage are absent? 4) In chapter 5.2.3.3 it is explicitly allowed that the key expiration time is reset by a user (of course this cannot be prevented as the key expiration time is no longer part of the key itself). Isn't this possibility comparable to revoke a revocation? I mean the creators states: "This key SHOULD NOT be used after ." for example because he thinks an RSA786 key SHOULD no longer be used in 10 years. An attacker might simply revoke this (implicit) revocation by issuing a new self-signature with an updated date. 5) Chapter 5.2.3.3. also says what should happen when multiple self-signatures are encountered by an implementation. Wouldn't it be more secure to require that ONLY the most recent self signature of a given type (per primary key in the case of 0x1F, per User ID in the case of 0x10-0x13 and per subkey in the case of 0x18) may be used and if that one could not be parsed (e.g. because of unknown subpackets with the critical bit set) no self-signature MUST be considered as valid? My idea is about this: Imagine a very old self-signature that still uses MD5 (which is now broken, isn't it?) and a newer (in the sense of it's signature creation time) self-signature which uses say SHA512. Both self-signatures specify a designated revoker (subpacket 12). Now an implementation doesn't understand SHA512 signatures and thus uses the older one with MD5 (as far as I understand the RFC allows to do so). But than one is probably a forged one by an attacker which doesn't contain the subpacket 12. See what I mean? I think it's quite easy to create similar examples with other subpackets involved. So a solution would be that the RFC requires, that always and only the most recent self-signature is used. Ok,.. enough for now,.. but I fear that I'm still not finished :-( Is it possible to donate a few bugs to gnupg in order to compensate the time you spend for answering my questions? Cheerio, Peter From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Tue Jan 27 16:48:09 2009 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Tue, 27 Jan 2009 10:48:09 -0500 Subject: Series of minor questions about OpenPGP 3 In-Reply-To: <9ef756150901270446t3808fbb6k51ae6112da252d74@mail.gmail.com> References: <9ef756150901270446t3808fbb6k51ae6112da252d74@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: On Jan 27, 2009, at 7:46 AM, Peter Thomas wrote: > Hi again. > > Ok this is a first bunch of questions on signatures (again both > specific for gnupg but perhaps also common for OpenPGP). > Would be glad if someone could help me with answering these (David?! > xD). > > 1) For the 0x11 signature the RFC says "...has not done any > verification of the claim that ..." which as far as I understand means > "The signer simply signed the key without checking the keyholders > identity". Pretty much, yes. It's "the keyholder claims to be X and I believe them, but didn't check." > Does gpg include this signature type in its trust-calculations or is > it simply ignored (no matter whether I directly signed another key > with a 0x11 or whether its "in the middle" of a trust-path between me > and someone else? In GPG, by default, it is simply ignored. A 0x11 signature has no value anywhere in a trust calculation. You can change the default if you like (or even make it more strict, by, say, ignoring 0x12 signatures as well) with the --min-cert-level option. > And if so, is this generally claimed by the RFC? I mean will every > implementation behave like this (ignoring 0x11s) when it follows the > RFC? The RFC is really a file format document more so than a "how to use trust" document. Every now and then it is suggested that a trust document or something like an OpenPGP best practices document should be written, but nobody has taken up the suggestion yet. So the RFC that we have (4880) does not specify or deny this behavior: it simply lists the signature types for reference. So all that said, I don't know if any other products ignore 0x11 signatures. Keep in mind that few products draw any distinction between 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, and 0x13 at all. They treat all of the types identically and issue only 0x10 signatures. > 2) Why are the 0x19 signatures only used as embedded signatures? I > mean wouldn't it be the same to simply add them as another "top level" > signature packet? 0x19 lives inside a signature subpacket on a signature that the 0x19 is making a statement about. This makes it easy to find (it's always on the subkey binding signature), and makes it naturally travel along with the subkey that it is issued by (if you delete the subkey, the 0x19 vanishes along with it). Semantically, it could be a top-level signature. > 3) I've understood why we need a "backsignature" (the 0x19) for > signature subkeys, but why don't we need one for encryption subkeys? The purpose of the back signature is to prevent "stealing" a signature subkey. For example, say Alice has a key with a signing subkey (but no back signature). She signs a document with her subkey and later tries to prove that it is her work. Baker, however, takes Alice's subkey and attaches it to his key. He can now try and prove that it is his work. To be sure, he doesn't have the passphrase for the key and can't make more signatures, but he can verify signatures, and verifying signatures would look like they were verified by "his" (really Alice's) subkey. One fix for this attack would be to ask both Alice and Baker to sign something for you as only Alice could, but back signatures avoids the whole shebang by having the subkey sign the primary key, making it obvious which primary "owns" the subkey. This attack isn't meaningful for encryption subkeys. Baker can choose to steal Alice's encryption subkey, but without the passphrase he can't decrypt anything with it, and he can't claim anything in particular after he has stolen it. In any event, you couldn't make a back signature with, say, an Elgamal encryption-only key. > 4) I've looked at the different revocation signature types. It seems > that it's not possible to revoke 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x40 and 0x50 > signature types? > Is this desired? I mean I understand that these signature types can > also be applied to casual data (and not just keys) but one could think > of "revocation servers" like keyservers that could be asked whether > some signature is still considered to be valid. There is no current means to do this in the standard. There is no reason for this beyond that nobody, as yet, has needed the ability. > 5) I've looked at the layout of v4 signatures, which lead me to two > questions: > a) What does gnupg put in this unhashed area. I mean which subpacket > types (at maximum). The basic rule for this is put it in the hashed area unless there is a reason not to. The only subpackets that can safely live in the unhashed area are those where, if they are modified, the security semantics of the signature do not change, or the signature is broken. Note that some programs put some things in one area that other programs would put in the other. All that said, GPG puts the Issuer and Signature subpackets in the unhashed area. These are the two subpackets that are naturally tamper-proof. Sure, an attacker can tamper with them - but all they would accomplish is make the signature not work (either because the signing key could not be found if they mess with the Issuer, or invalidate the backsig for the Signature). > b) This two octet field containing the left 16 bits of the signed > hash, doesn't this allow some kind of DoS attack? In the sense that > someone that captures and modifies the OpenPGP message can change > these two octets and an implementation that looks at these would > immediately say "invalid signature"? Yes and no. Sure, if someone has the ability to modify the message they can mangle the 16 bit "quick check" field. But then, if they have the ability to modify the message, they can mangle anything they like. Why restrain themselves to those particular 16 bits? Mangling - of any part of a signature - should cause the signature to be invalid. David From wk at gnupg.org Tue Jan 27 16:56:23 2009 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Tue, 27 Jan 2009 16:56:23 +0100 Subject: Series of minor questions about OpenPGP 2 In-Reply-To: <20090127150218.88D7B28040@smtp.hushmail.com> (vedaal@hush.com's message of "Tue, 27 Jan 2009 10:02:18 -0500") References: <20090127150218.88D7B28040@smtp.hushmail.com> Message-ID: <874ozkagk8.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> On Tue, 27 Jan 2009 16:02, vedaal at hush.com said: > how does gnupg manage to maintain 16, 32, 64 bit There is and will never be a 16 bit version of GnuPG. Under Windows we currently only support 32 bit. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Auschnahme regelt ein Bundeschgesetz. From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Tue Jan 27 17:21:40 2009 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Tue, 27 Jan 2009 11:21:40 -0500 Subject: Series of minor questions about OpenPGP 2 In-Reply-To: <20090127150218.88D7B28040@smtp.hushmail.com> References: <20090127150218.88D7B28040@smtp.hushmail.com> Message-ID: <7DCA90DA-7E99-44ED-94CE-6B1EBA73F652@jabberwocky.com> On Jan 27, 2009, at 10:02 AM, vedaal at hush.com wrote: >> Date: Mon, 26 Jan 2009 17:31:39 -0500 >> From: David Shaw >> Subject: Re: Series of minor questions about OpenPGP 1 > >> Old programs will basically blow up if they see something they >> don't >> understand. There is a special packet, the Marker Packet (tag 10) >> which basically exists to make PGP 2.x print out "You need a newer >> version of PGP" before PGP 2.x would blow up. > > > on this note, > i was recently playing with a 64 bit vista laptop, > and couldn't get my portable pgp 2.x to initiate. > (Disastry's version) > the dos pgp window command line just opened and immediately closed > > i was using the 16 bit dos build, > and didn't switch yet to the 32 bit win build > > how does gnupg manage to maintain 16, 32, 64 bit > hardware independence? The magic of autoconf and careful programming. When you run the configure script when building GPG, it figures out what the sizes of various items are in your system. The code is written to do the right thing and adapt to these sizes. GPG doesn't run on a Windows 16-bit system, though. That's ancient. David From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Tue Jan 27 17:32:46 2009 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Tue, 27 Jan 2009 11:32:46 -0500 Subject: Series of minor questions about OpenPGP 4 In-Reply-To: <9ef756150901270727o32cb1c79qd4e2caa69a2ce839@mail.gmail.com> References: <9ef756150901270727o32cb1c79qd4e2caa69a2ce839@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <62CBFD55-F694-4F36-A684-7D2CAFF34FD6@jabberwocky.com> I think at this point you should take the discussion to the ietf- openpgp list. This is really the GnuPG users lists, and the questions are in-depth design questions for the protocol itself. David On Jan 27, 2009, at 10:27 AM, Peter Thomas wrote: > Hello. > > This time it's all about signature subpackets: > Sorry that this got longer, but I think these points are all somehow > connected. So feel free to split up as you like :-) > I know that these questions are more about OpenPGP itself than gnupg, > but perhaps you, David, can have a look at them here, before I post it > on their mailing list (don't want to look stupid there ^^ and I'm > still quite new in OpenPGP's standard). > > 1) gnupg (and as far as I can see other implementations, too) don't > set the critical bit on much signature subpackets by default. The RFC > (AFAIK) doesn't demand any subpacket to be understood by applications. > Unknown subpackets should be ignored, except the critical bit is set. > Correct so far? > Now when I go through the currently defined signature subpackets, I > see several which are or at least could be critical for security and > for the correct evaluation of signatures: > 2, 3: a signature might not be valid yet, or might be expired already > 7: an attacker might manage to revoke an irrevocable signature > 9: they key is expired and the owner does not want it to be used any > longer (maybe also due to security reasons) > 12: if an implementation doesn't understand this, it might not notice, > that a key/UID is already revoked > 26: the policy may contain critical information for security (e.g. > "this key signs any applicant without validating his personal data) > 27: it might be a security issue, if a key that was marked for > certification-only (0x01) has signed some casual data > 31: required for revocation signatures and thus possibly security > critical > 32: required for the signing subkey backsigs (0x19) > > I'd even consider the following as critical: > 28: the signer might want to express that a specific role/UID made the > signature, and this might be security critical depending on the policy > > Of course no one can force the user to actually read and follow these > subpackets (the policy (26) is the best example for this ^^), but > wouldn't it make sense that the RFC _REQUIRES_ these subpackets to be > understood by conforming implementations? > Just an idea, though :-) > > 2) Selfsignatures and possible ambiguities: > In an email before David told me that it's fully ok that some > signature subpackets are on 0x13 and/or 0x1F self signatures. I said > I'll come back to this; here it is. > The RFC is very clear (5.2.3.3) about which signature types may be > self-signatures, namely 0x10-0x13, 0x1F and 0x18 (I assume 0x19 is let > out, as it's made by the subkey, right?). > This chapter also says that an implementation should interpret it as > narrowly as possible. > a) That's by the way the first "problem" which _could_ lead to > secrutiy issues, as the standard doesn't define for every case what > "as narrowly as possible" mean. Of course everyone could say "just > follow the common human sense" but this is always problematic, isn't > it? ;-) > b) What for example, if a 0x13 and a 0x1F have conflicting key > expiration times? Should an implementation use the time in the most > recent of the two? Should it use the information from the 0x1F, as key > expiration time is "clearly" related to the key, and not the the User > ID? Should it just use the smallest value of the two? Should it use > the value accordingly by which the key was found (if by Key ID -> use > 0x1F, if by User ID -> use 0x13). > One can easily think of similar examples for other subpacket types, > and its easy to think of examples where this could lead to security > problems (Imagine a user resets the expiration time of his key to > denote that it should not longer be used. His implementation updates > only the 0x13 self-signature but not the "unlimited" in the 0x1F, made > by some other implementation. A third implementation may now choose > the "right one" or not.) > c) It's nowhere clearly specified if and what meaning these supackets > have on the subkey binding self-signature (0x18) > > A solution would be, that the RFC clearly specifies which subpackets > MAY go to which self-signature, which one takes priority, and for > which the implementation is allowed to choose itself (e.g. according > to the way the key was found). > > btw: The example on page 27 "If the key is located via Key ID => use > the subpacket from the primary User ID self-signature also shows the > conflict with 0x1F signatures that could arise in that case. > > 3) This is probably clear for everybody, but the part on revocation > signatures should perhaps highlight, that all subpackets in revoked > signatures MUST NOT be used, e.g. imagine the key expiration time is > only stored in an 0x1F and not in any 0x10-0x13. If that 0x1F gets > revoked, the key has no longer an expiration time. > btw: Is it specified what happens when possibly security critical > subpackets like the expiration time or key usage are absent? > > 4) In chapter 5.2.3.3 it is explicitly allowed that the key expiration > time is reset by a user (of course this cannot be prevented as the key > expiration time is no longer part of the key itself). Isn't this > possibility comparable to revoke a revocation? > I mean the creators states: "This key SHOULD NOT be used after expiration>." for example because he thinks an RSA786 key SHOULD no > longer be used in 10 years. An attacker might simply revoke this > (implicit) revocation by issuing a new self-signature with an updated > date. > > 5) Chapter 5.2.3.3. also says what should happen when multiple > self-signatures are encountered by an implementation. > Wouldn't it be more secure to require that ONLY the most recent self > signature of a given type (per primary key in the case of 0x1F, per > User ID in the case of 0x10-0x13 and per subkey in the case of 0x18) > may be used and if that one could not be parsed (e.g. because of > unknown subpackets with the critical bit set) no self-signature MUST > be considered as valid? > My idea is about this: > Imagine a very old self-signature that still uses MD5 (which is now > broken, isn't it?) and a newer (in the sense of it's signature > creation time) self-signature which uses say SHA512. Both > self-signatures specify a designated revoker (subpacket 12). > Now an implementation doesn't understand SHA512 signatures and thus > uses the older one with MD5 (as far as I understand the RFC allows to > do so). But than one is probably a forged one by an attacker which > doesn't contain the subpacket 12. > See what I mean? I think it's quite easy to create similar examples > with other subpackets involved. > > So a solution would be that the RFC requires, that always and only the > most recent self-signature is used. > > Ok,.. enough for now,.. but I fear that I'm still not finished :-( > Is it possible to donate a few bugs to gnupg in order to compensate > the time you spend for answering my questions? > > Cheerio, > Peter > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users > From John at Mozilla-Enigmail.org Tue Jan 27 19:53:22 2009 From: John at Mozilla-Enigmail.org (John Clizbe) Date: Tue, 27 Jan 2009 12:53:22 -0600 Subject: Series of minor questions about OpenPGP 4 In-Reply-To: <62CBFD55-F694-4F36-A684-7D2CAFF34FD6@jabberwocky.com> References: <9ef756150901270727o32cb1c79qd4e2caa69a2ce839@mail.gmail.com> <62CBFD55-F694-4F36-A684-7D2CAFF34FD6@jabberwocky.com> Message-ID: <497F5822.3090403@Mozilla-Enigmail.org> David Shaw wrote: > I think at this point you should take the discussion to the ietf- > openpgp list. This is really the GnuPG users lists, and the questions > are in-depth design questions for the protocol itself. Seconded. IETF OpenPGP Working Group http://www.imc.org/ietf-openpgp/ -- John P. Clizbe Inet:John (a) Mozilla-Enigmail.org You can't spell fiasco without SCO. hkp://keyserver.gingerbear.net or mailto:pgp-public-keys at gingerbear.net?subject=HELP Q:"Just how do the residents of Haiku, Hawai'i hold conversations?" A:"An odd melody / island voices on the winds / surplus of vowels" -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 680 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From benjamin at py-soft.co.uk Tue Jan 27 21:49:47 2009 From: benjamin at py-soft.co.uk (Benjamin Donnachie) Date: Tue, 27 Jan 2009 20:49:47 +0000 Subject: Series of minor questions about OpenPGP 4 In-Reply-To: <62CBFD55-F694-4F36-A684-7D2CAFF34FD6@jabberwocky.com> References: <9ef756150901270727o32cb1c79qd4e2caa69a2ce839@mail.gmail.com> <62CBFD55-F694-4F36-A684-7D2CAFF34FD6@jabberwocky.com> Message-ID: <732076a80901271249r10c959b8nde41a1704816af04@mail.gmail.com> 2009/1/27 David Shaw : > I think at this point you should take the discussion to the ietf-openpgp > list. This is really the GnuPG users lists, and the questions are in-depth > design questions for the protocol itself. Or at least keep it all in the same thread so it's easier for me to delete... Ben From p4.thomas at googlemail.com Tue Jan 27 22:44:37 2009 From: p4.thomas at googlemail.com (Peter Thomas) Date: Tue, 27 Jan 2009 22:44:37 +0100 Subject: Series of minor questions about OpenPGP 3 In-Reply-To: References: <9ef756150901270446t3808fbb6k51ae6112da252d74@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <9ef756150901271344y61c5124cn71d0d69bdd5c34c@mail.gmail.com> On Tue, Jan 27, 2009 at 4:48 PM, David Shaw wrote: > The RFC is really a file format document more so than a "how to use trust" > document. Every now and then it is suggested that a trust document or > something like an OpenPGP best practices document should be written, but > nobody has taken up the suggestion yet. So the RFC that we have (4880) does > not specify or deny this behavior: it simply lists the signature types for > reference. So all that said, I don't know if any other products ignore 0x11 > signatures. Ok,.. so this means basically that I, as an end user, must expect that some (stupid) implementation may take my 0x11 and fully trusts it, right? And the "descriptions" from chapter 5.2.1 on page 20 are just "informal" and not strictly normative, right? (If so, then perhaps this should be added as a kind of "rationale" in a future revision of the RFC.) btw: As you're one of the RFC authors: If the meaning of the 0x10-0x13 will ever be specified more normatively and strictly it should be noted, that the 0x10-0x12 (especially the 0x11) may no longer make sense to be used as self-signature (which seems to be allowed right now) :-) >Keep in mind that few products draw any distinction between > 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, and 0x13 at all. They treat all of the types identically > and issue only 0x10 signatures. Ok,.. that's not a question but: I'm very sad about this. Would like to see that people have their policies and give 0x10-0x13 according to their personal policy :-) > 0x19 lives inside a signature subpacket on a signature that the 0x19 is > making a statement about. This makes it easy to find (it's always on the > subkey binding signature), and makes it naturally travel along with the > subkey that it is issued by (if you delete the subkey, the 0x19 vanishes > along with it). >Semantically, it could be a top-level signature. That's what I wanted to know xD > This attack isn't meaningful for encryption subkeys. Baker can choose to > steal Alice's encryption subkey, but without the passphrase he can't decrypt > anything with it, and he can't claim anything in particular after he has > stolen it. Lol I'm so stupid! It's so obvious... >> 4) I've looked at the different revocation signature types. It seems >> that it's not possible to revoke 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x40 and 0x50 >> signature types? >> Is this desired? I mean I understand that these signature types can >> also be applied to casual data (and not just keys) but one could think >> of "revocation servers" like keyservers that could be asked whether >> some signature is still considered to be valid. > There is no current means to do this in the standard. There is no reason > for this beyond that nobody, as yet, has needed the ability. Perhaps this can be suggested in a future version of the RFC? Not that I'd need it, but I think it's not the worst idea, and we also have already some other stuff (like signature types) that are probably unused. >> a) What does gnupg put in this unhashed area. I mean which subpacket >> types (at maximum). > The basic rule for this is put it in the hashed area unless there is a > reason not to. The only subpackets that can safely live in the unhashed > area are those where, if they are modified, the security semantics of the > signature do not change, or the signature is broken. Yes... > Note that some > programs put some things in one area that other programs would put in the > other. > All that said, GPG puts the Issuer and Signature subpackets in the > unhashed area. The first one, Issuer (16), is it only kind of a hint? I mean the signing key follows from that hashed/and encrypted data and not from the Issuer subpacket right? If so why does it exist? To speed up validation? And which one did you mean with the second? > These are the two subpackets that are naturally > tamper-proof. Sure, an attacker can tamper with them - but all they would > accomplish is make the signature not work (either because the signing key > could not be found if they mess with the Issuer, or invalidate the backsig > for the Signature). Yeah, that's clear,.. so all an attacker could do is some kind of denial of service or better said, denial of validation,.. but he could do this in any case. > Yes and no. Sure, if someone has the ability to modify the message they can > mangle the 16 bit "quick check" field. But then, if they have the ability > to modify the message, they can mangle anything they like. Why restrain > themselves to those particular 16 bits? Mangling - of any part of a > signature - should cause the signature to be invalid. Yeah,.. you are right,... it's actually obvious but sometimes one doesn't see those things when writing about. Ok so I assume the Issuer (16) subpacket is a hint that tells which public key should be used for verification, and the 16 bits are the 16 leftmost bits. So to speed up things, an implementation uses the public key from the Issuer subpacket for calculations, makes a first check after the 16 bits of the signature hash, and only if these are equal, checks the remaining ones. Is this correct? Thanks again so far :-) From p4.thomas at googlemail.com Wed Jan 28 00:28:28 2009 From: p4.thomas at googlemail.com (Peter Thomas) Date: Wed, 28 Jan 2009 00:28:28 +0100 Subject: [MOVED] Re: Series of minor questions about OpenPGP 4 In-Reply-To: <732076a80901271249r10c959b8nde41a1704816af04@mail.gmail.com> References: <9ef756150901270727o32cb1c79qd4e2caa69a2ce839@mail.gmail.com> <62CBFD55-F694-4F36-A684-7D2CAFF34FD6@jabberwocky.com> <732076a80901271249r10c959b8nde41a1704816af04@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <9ef756150901271528g74c32186nc39e7e54b74953f3@mail.gmail.com> For those who are interested, I've moved this thread to that location: http://www.imc.org/ietf-openpgp/mail-archive/msg30794.html Peter From p4.thomas at googlemail.com Wed Jan 28 12:05:30 2009 From: p4.thomas at googlemail.com (Peter Thomas) Date: Wed, 28 Jan 2009 12:05:30 +0100 Subject: Series of minor questions about OpenPGP 1 In-Reply-To: <9ef756150901270415t5efb356ag995d7fb5768df1c6@mail.gmail.com> References: <9ef756150901260602g2ca87672kdd1fa2affdd4b1@mail.gmail.com> <9ef756150901260822j4cbb1fefv960e09aa08ae31f0@mail.gmail.com> <20090126164004.GB27006@jabberwocky.com> <9ef756150901270415t5efb356ag995d7fb5768df1c6@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <9ef756150901280305p7b41e52dq97683339e51c7e6@mail.gmail.com> Hi. I've just made some tests. And it showed that anybody can change the paket header from old to new for any key (even without the secret key). Of course I've expected this, but is this the case for all signature types, that gnupg doesn't include the paket header in the signing but just the body? Thanks, Peter. From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Wed Jan 28 15:15:36 2009 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Wed, 28 Jan 2009 09:15:36 -0500 Subject: Series of minor questions about OpenPGP 1 In-Reply-To: <9ef756150901280305p7b41e52dq97683339e51c7e6@mail.gmail.com> References: <9ef756150901260602g2ca87672kdd1fa2affdd4b1@mail.gmail.com> <9ef756150901260822j4cbb1fefv960e09aa08ae31f0@mail.gmail.com> <20090126164004.GB27006@jabberwocky.com> <9ef756150901270415t5efb356ag995d7fb5768df1c6@mail.gmail.com> <9ef756150901280305p7b41e52dq97683339e51c7e6@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <9DA411F8-1CBB-4F6C-A668-6599B07FE609@jabberwocky.com> On Jan 28, 2009, at 6:05 AM, Peter Thomas wrote: > Hi. > > I've just made some tests. And it showed that anybody can change the > paket header from old to new for any key (even without the secret > key). > Of course I've expected this, but is this the case for all signature > types, that gnupg doesn't include the paket header in the signing but > just the body? That is correct. The packet header is not relevant to the contents. You can change the packet header from old style to new style, or change the length representation at will. David From p4.thomas at googlemail.com Wed Jan 28 15:59:22 2009 From: p4.thomas at googlemail.com (Peter Thomas) Date: Wed, 28 Jan 2009 15:59:22 +0100 Subject: Series of minor questions about OpenPGP 5 Message-ID: <9ef756150901280659s15359bddt4c47d549ab2f268c@mail.gmail.com> Hi. Now this is surely gnupg specific again ;-) Ok let me see... 1) When creating keys or other data which needs random numbers, how is this done in gnupg? I mean does it per default use /dev/random? Or does it have its own means like a modified Mersenne Twister or whatever? I wonder because I'd to test the used source with this http://www.cacert.at/random/ so is there perhaps some function in gpg to just generate a bunch of random data as it would be used for key generation (both symmetric and asymmetric). 2) It seems that the following is an old issue coming again and again over this list. gpg per default does not create keys larger than 4096 bits (talking about RSA), but it can use keys (and signatures/encrypted data created by such keys) larger than that, right? Is there any actual limit (apart from computation power and life time)? I fully agree that it makes sense to set this limit, as keys larger than 4096 bits are not that much usable and its questionable if one gets that much security by using a say 65563 bits key. However I wanted to do some compatibility tests with gnupg and other implementations (PGP, BPG and perhaps some others). It seems that it's quite easy to disable this limit in the gnupg source, all I have to do is set max=something in keygen.c, correct? Is there any knowledge about specific weaknesses of such large keys? I mean there might be strange effects with the PNRGs that don't happen until some large keysizes, but would effectively render these super large keys completely unsecure. Cheers, Peter From wk at gnupg.org Wed Jan 28 17:10:15 2009 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Wed, 28 Jan 2009 17:10:15 +0100 Subject: Series of minor questions about OpenPGP 5 In-Reply-To: <9ef756150901280659s15359bddt4c47d549ab2f268c@mail.gmail.com> (Peter Thomas's message of "Wed, 28 Jan 2009 15:59:22 +0100") References: <9ef756150901280659s15359bddt4c47d549ab2f268c@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <87fxj376oo.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> On Wed, 28 Jan 2009 15:59, p4.thomas at googlemail.com said: > 1) When creating keys or other data which needs random numbers, how is > this done in gnupg? I mean does it per default use /dev/random? Or > does it have its own means like a modified Mersenne Twister or > whatever? Read the manual of libgcrypt 1.4.4 - it includes a description of the RNG. The code in 1.4 is basically the same. > I wonder because I'd to test the used source with this > http://www.cacert.at/random/ so is there perhaps some function in gpg That are plainstupid tests. It does no make any sense at all to run statistically tests on the output of a hash digest. Almost all RNG use either a hash algorithm or a cipher function in the last processing stage. > to just generate a bunch of random data as it would be used for key > generation (both symmetric and asymmetric). The man page gives the answer: --gen-random 0|1|2 [count] Emit COUNT random bytes of the given quality level. If count is not given or zero, an endless sequence of random bytes will be emitted. PLEASE, don't use this command unless you know what you are doing; it may remove precious entropy from the system! > It seems that it's quite easy to disable this limit in the gnupg > source, all I have to do is set max=something in keygen.c, correct? No, there is some limit in the RNG too. > Is there any knowledge about specific weaknesses of such large keys? I Yes, you need to have a backup and that backup will be larger than others ;-) Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Auschnahme regelt ein Bundeschgesetz. From p4.thomas at googlemail.com Wed Jan 28 17:45:37 2009 From: p4.thomas at googlemail.com (Peter Thomas) Date: Wed, 28 Jan 2009 17:45:37 +0100 Subject: Series of minor questions about OpenPGP 5 In-Reply-To: <87fxj376oo.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> References: <9ef756150901280659s15359bddt4c47d549ab2f268c@mail.gmail.com> <87fxj376oo.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> Message-ID: <9ef756150901280845o152e035ay83dd64d32fc0e0ff@mail.gmail.com> Hello Werner. On Wed, Jan 28, 2009 at 5:10 PM, Werner Koch wrote: > Read the manual of libgcrypt 1.4.4 - it includes a description of the > RNG. The code in 1.4 is basically the same. That's what I was looking for :-) These levels described on http://www.gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gcrypt/Quality-of-random-numbers.html ... Is it possible to tell gnupg to use GCRY_VERY_STRONG_RANDOM also for the session keys? Or wouldn't that make much better? I've read about special hardware devices that (claim to) give true random numbers, some based on thermodynamics some even on quantum mechanics. Have you heard about them? Are there any supported in Linux and would it make sense or is it even possible to use them with gnupg? >> I wonder because I'd to test the used source with this >> http://www.cacert.at/random/ so is there perhaps some function in gpg > That are plainstupid tests. It does no make any sense at all to run > statistically tests on the output of a hash digest. Almost all RNG use > either a hash algorithm or a cipher function in the last processing > stage. Ah ok,.. thanks for saving me that time ;-) >> to just generate a bunch of random data as it would be used for key >> generation (both symmetric and asymmetric). > The man page gives the answer: > --gen-random 0|1|2 [count] Sorry,.. must have overread this. I've actually (!) read the manpage. >> It seems that it's quite easy to disable this limit in the gnupg >> source, all I have to do is set max=something in keygen.c, correct? > No, there is some limit in the RNG too. Ok,.. but I suppose an error will tell me when I've reached this limit? >> Is there any knowledge about specific weaknesses of such large keys? I > Yes, you need to have a backup and that backup will be larger than > others ;-) Uhm,.. I could as a friend of mine who administrates a Tier2 with something over of storage,... wonder if I could fill this with an RSA key *G* Regards, Peter From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Wed Jan 28 18:26:04 2009 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Wed, 28 Jan 2009 12:26:04 -0500 Subject: Series of minor questions about OpenPGP 5 In-Reply-To: <9ef756150901280659s15359bddt4c47d549ab2f268c@mail.gmail.com> References: <9ef756150901280659s15359bddt4c47d549ab2f268c@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <4980952C.1050904@sixdemonbag.org> Werner has already answered most of this, so I'll confine my remarks to just this -- > 1) When creating keys or other data which needs random numbers, how is > this done in gnupg? I mean does it per default use /dev/random? Or > does it have its own means like a modified Mersenne Twister or > whatever? Anyone who uses the Mersenne Twister to generate cryptographic pseudorandom values is living in sin. From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Wed Jan 28 18:36:10 2009 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Wed, 28 Jan 2009 12:36:10 -0500 Subject: Series of minor questions about OpenPGP 5 In-Reply-To: <9ef756150901280845o152e035ay83dd64d32fc0e0ff@mail.gmail.com> References: <9ef756150901280659s15359bddt4c47d549ab2f268c@mail.gmail.com> <87fxj376oo.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> <9ef756150901280845o152e035ay83dd64d32fc0e0ff@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <4980978A.8070903@sixdemonbag.org> Peter Thomas wrote: > I've read about special hardware devices that (claim to) give true > random numbers, some based on thermodynamics some even on quantum > mechanics. True randomness exists in nature, but so far we're unable to detect it. (Seriously.) Imagine you have a Geiger counter and a radioactive sample. Over each time frame, the Geiger counter reports how many decays it measures. That number becomes your random value. So far, so random, right? But a Geiger counter has a reset time. Once it clicks, there's a small time window in which it's unable to detect new decay events. This has the effect of introducing a bias into your random number generator: some decay events will be transformed into non-events. There are some tricks of physics and mathematics you can use to get very high quality values out of this kind of radioisotope setup, but the basic problem remains: even when measuring a totally nondeterministic event, determinism in the detection mechanism will undercut you. You can get really, really close to truly random numbers, but you can't get there. > Are there any supported in Linux and would > it make sense or is it even possible to use them with gnupg? Linux has support for some hardware RNGs, yes. I don't know offhand which ones. OpenBSD apparently has support for a lot of them. From benjamin at py-soft.co.uk Wed Jan 28 19:00:39 2009 From: benjamin at py-soft.co.uk (Benjamin Donnachie) Date: Wed, 28 Jan 2009 18:00:39 +0000 Subject: Series of minor questions about OpenPGP 5 In-Reply-To: <9ef756150901280659s15359bddt4c47d549ab2f268c@mail.gmail.com> References: <9ef756150901280659s15359bddt4c47d549ab2f268c@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <732076a80901281000o7d7df11y2137d1f2076538ab@mail.gmail.com> 2009/1/28 Peter Thomas : > Now this is surely gnupg specific again ;-) Please please please stop starting new threads! It makes it much easier for me to ignore if you keep to just the one. Ben From kloecker at kde.org Wed Jan 28 21:09:38 2009 From: kloecker at kde.org (Ingo =?iso-8859-1?q?Kl=F6cker?=) Date: Wed, 28 Jan 2009 21:09:38 +0100 Subject: Series of minor questions about OpenPGP 5 In-Reply-To: <4980978A.8070903@sixdemonbag.org> References: <9ef756150901280659s15359bddt4c47d549ab2f268c@mail.gmail.com> <9ef756150901280845o152e035ay83dd64d32fc0e0ff@mail.gmail.com> <4980978A.8070903@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <200901282109.39936@thufir.ingo-kloecker.de> On Wednesday 28 January 2009, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > Peter Thomas wrote: > > I've read about special hardware devices that (claim to) give true > > random numbers, some based on thermodynamics some even on quantum > > mechanics. > > True randomness exists in nature, but so far we're unable to detect > it. (Seriously.) > > Imagine you have a Geiger counter and a radioactive sample. Over > each time frame, the Geiger counter reports how many decays it > measures. That number becomes your random value. So far, so random, > right? > > But a Geiger counter has a reset time. Once it clicks, there's a > small time window in which it's unable to detect new decay events. > This has the effect of introducing a bias into your random number > generator: some decay events will be transformed into non-events. > > There are some tricks of physics and mathematics you can use to get > very high quality values out of this kind of radioisotope setup, but > the basic problem remains: even when measuring a totally > nondeterministic event, determinism in the detection mechanism will > undercut you. You can get really, really close to truly random > numbers, but you can't get there. See http://www.fourmilab.ch/hotbits/ for a random number generator using radioactive decay. Under http://von-und-fuer-lau.de/ct-randcam.html you can download a (mostly) non-deterministic random number generator using a webcam. The page is in German. Regards, Ingo -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 197 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From vedaal at hush.com Wed Jan 28 21:10:54 2009 From: vedaal at hush.com (vedaal at hush.com) Date: Wed, 28 Jan 2009 15:10:54 -0500 Subject: randomness // how important is it 'really', if it's not *absolutely* random ? Message-ID: <20090128201055.112EB158045@smtp.hushmail.com> if the randomness collected for generation of a gnupg session key, isn't *absolutely* random, then it may introduce a bias whereby the session key space can be theoretically be able to be attacked by a 'better-than-brute-force' method, by selectively concentrating on the possibilities the bias in in favor of ok how much of a threat is this really, given the nature of how gnupg collects random data on the various computer platforms? is there any practical way of exploiting this 'less-than-absolute' randomness, so that the attack is even approaching the threat level of anything a crypto user needs to be concerned with? to put it in quantitative terms, can the 'pseudo-randomness' affect a 256 bit session key, so that it would effectively be easier to attack than a 'truly- random' 128 bit key? if not, then it shouldn't be a practical concern is there any test of a computer system that can be done to know when the level of 'pseudo-randomness' has decreased to where it should be of practical concern ? tia, vedaal any ads or links below this message are added by hushmail without my endorsement or awareness of the nature of the link -- Never be in the dark again. Click now for a new generator! http://tagline.hushmail.com/fc/PnY6qxsz5e1NtuH5v6j1pZZg64Dd5ytllyp4QuhTXZe4BigcQK8Np/ From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Wed Jan 28 21:31:52 2009 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Wed, 28 Jan 2009 15:31:52 -0500 Subject: Series of minor questions about OpenPGP 5 In-Reply-To: <4980978A.8070903@sixdemonbag.org> References: <9ef756150901280659s15359bddt4c47d549ab2f268c@mail.gmail.com> <87fxj376oo.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> <9ef756150901280845o152e035ay83dd64d32fc0e0ff@mail.gmail.com> <4980978A.8070903@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <594931A7-6D2B-4CCF-89E5-1E46E4F6C8C2@jabberwocky.com> On Jan 28, 2009, at 12:36 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: >> Are there any supported in Linux and would >> it make sense or is it even possible to use them with gnupg? > > Linux has support for some hardware RNGs, yes. I don't know offhand > which ones. OpenBSD apparently has support for a lot of them. On some platforms, a hardware RNG actually ends up feeding /dev/ random. This is particularly nice as it means GPG (or any program that uses /dev/random) benefits without code modification. David From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Wed Jan 28 21:50:38 2009 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Wed, 28 Jan 2009 15:50:38 -0500 Subject: randomness // how important is it 'really', if it's not *absolutely* random ? In-Reply-To: <20090128201055.112EB158045@smtp.hushmail.com> References: <20090128201055.112EB158045@smtp.hushmail.com> Message-ID: <4980C51E.1010203@sixdemonbag.org> vedaal at hush.com wrote: > if the randomness collected for generation of a gnupg session key, > isn't *absolutely* random, then it may introduce a bias whereby the > session key space can be theoretically be able to be attacked by a > 'better-than-brute-force' method, by selectively concentrating on > the possibilities the bias in in favor of Sure. John von Neumann, one of the Grand Old Men of computer science, once said something to the effect of "anyone producing random numbers by algorithmic means is, of course, living in sin." (Which is also why I used the "living in sin" wording a couple of posts ago; it was an homage to von Neumann.) The interesting questions are then, (a) how do we do it, (b) what constraints are put on it, (c) how many resources it will take, and (d) if there's anyone smart enough to figure out (a) through (c). > how much of a threat is this really, Somewhere between "not at all" and "run for the hills." Wish I could give a more precise answer than that. The pace of mathematical and technological development is not linear. It's a series of plateaus and enormous jumps. E.g., for a long time SHA-1 was one of the strongest hashes out there, up until some researchers from Shengdong University blew us all away. Plateau, and jump. It is possible that tomorrow someone will discover an attack against the Merkle-Damgard construction and all the hashes in GnuPG will become vulnerable. And it's just as possible that we'll be in a plateau for the next ten years. It's impossible to say with any certainty. > is there any practical way of exploiting this 'less-than-absolute' > randomness Not that we know of. Yet. Maybe tomorrow, maybe in ten years. From chd at chud.net Wed Jan 28 22:02:07 2009 From: chd at chud.net (Chris De Young) Date: Wed, 28 Jan 2009 14:02:07 -0700 Subject: randomness // how important is it 'really', if it's not *absolutely* random ? In-Reply-To: <20090128201055.112EB158045@smtp.hushmail.com> References: <20090128201055.112EB158045@smtp.hushmail.com> Message-ID: <4980C7CF.6000601@chud.net> vedaal at hush.com wrote: [...] > how much of a threat is this really, > given the nature of how gnupg collects random data on the various > computer platforms? I don't have the math or crypto background to answer you definitively, but I feel confident that *today* the difference between the randomness of a good /dev/random and theoretically perfect randomness is probably not of significant practical concern. > can the 'pseudo-randomness' affect a 256 bit session key, > so that it would effectively be easier to attack than a 'truly- > random' 128 bit key? If a practical attack were known that reduced a 256-bit key to the effective strength of a 128-bit key, that would be huge news. So, I really doubt it. But that's today. As they say, attacks never get worse, they only get better; that huge news might only be one major breakthrough away. (We don't for sure of course, but that's what makes it a breakthrough. :) ) -Chris -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 250 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From avi.wiki at gmail.com Wed Jan 28 21:34:40 2009 From: avi.wiki at gmail.com (Avi) Date: Wed, 28 Jan 2009 15:34:40 -0500 Subject: Series of minor questions about OpenPGP 5 Message-ID: <27ee9bfb0901281234l5940267fi2824ecddb56f2ec6@mail.gmail.com> > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > From: Ingo Kl?cker > To: gnupg-users at gnupg.org > Date: Wed, 28 Jan 2009 21:09:38 +0100 > Subject: Re: Series of minor questions about OpenPGP 5 > On Wednesday 28 January 2009, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > > Peter Thomas wrote: > > > I've read about special hardware devices that (claim to) give true > > > random numbers, some based on thermodynamics some even on quantum > > > mechanics. > > > > True randomness exists in nature, but so far we're unable to detect > > it. (Seriously.) > > > > Imagine you have a Geiger counter and a radioactive sample. Over > > each time frame, the Geiger counter reports how many decays it > > measures. That number becomes your random value. So far, so random, > > right? > > > > But a Geiger counter has a reset time. Once it clicks, there's a > > small time window in which it's unable to detect new decay events. > > This has the effect of introducing a bias into your random number > > generator: some decay events will be transformed into non-events. > > > > There are some tricks of physics and mathematics you can use to get > > very high quality values out of this kind of radioisotope setup, but > > the basic problem remains: even when measuring a totally > > nondeterministic event, determinism in the detection mechanism will > > undercut you. You can get really, really close to truly random > > numbers, but you can't get there. > > See http://www.fourmilab.ch/hotbits/ for a random number generator using > radioactive decay. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: RIPEMD160 That still suffers from Robert's point about the deterministic effect of resetting the detector. - --Avi -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) - GPGshell v3.71 iEYEAREDAAYFAkmAwVAACgkQy6A/RnheoimFngCeJP2aTAdfOKlEW2feXTIPK692 +xsAnA5IXUHLTGHdrbl8BvtB2CyVmTRq =l4U9 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ---- en:User:Avraham pub 1024D/785EA229 3/6/2007 Avi (Wikipedia-related) Primary key fingerprint: D233 20E7 0697 C3BC 4445 7D45 CBA0 3F46 785E A229 -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From email at sven-radde.de Thu Jan 29 00:06:43 2009 From: email at sven-radde.de (Sven Radde) Date: Thu, 29 Jan 2009 00:06:43 +0100 Subject: Selection of digest algorithm Message-ID: <1233184003.7102.28.camel@carbon> Hi gnupg-users! I noticed some "oddities" (to me) with the selection of a hash algorithm by GnuPG. I assume that the particular use-cases have additional limitations which are not obvious to me, so could you please clarify? First, when sending a signed email from Evolution, SHA1 seems to be chosen, no matter what "personal-digest-preferences" or even "digest-algo" is set in the gpg.conf file (other parts of gpg.conf are honored, however). Is this a limitation of the PGP/MIME standard that Evolution uses? Second, when using the smartcard, and "personal-digest-preferences SHA256 RIPEMD160", the latter is chosen as digest algorithm. Is the smartcard limited to 160 Bit hashes? Talking about the smartcard... Any news regarding a 2048 bit version? ;-) Thanks for your insights, Sven From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Thu Jan 29 00:44:00 2009 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Wed, 28 Jan 2009 18:44:00 -0500 Subject: Selection of digest algorithm In-Reply-To: <1233184003.7102.28.camel@carbon> References: <1233184003.7102.28.camel@carbon> Message-ID: <4980EDC0.8070201@sixdemonbag.org> Sven Radde wrote: > First, when sending a signed email from Evolution, SHA1 seems to be > chosen, no matter what "personal-digest-preferences" or even > "digest-algo" is set in the gpg.conf file (other parts of gpg.conf are > honored, however). > Is this a limitation of the PGP/MIME standard that Evolution uses? Evolution's GnuPG support is in many ways broken, FYI. I have repeatedly had troubles with it misreporting inline signed messages as having bad signatures, misreporting inline signed and encrypted messages as being only encrypted, as misreporting trust levels, as... etc., etc. Evolution's core developers seem to believe RFC3156 is the be-all and end-all of OpenPGP support, and even then, it's a somewhat idiosyncratic 3156, if I recall correctly. > Second, when using the smartcard, and "personal-digest-preferences > SHA256 RIPEMD160", the latter is chosen as digest algorithm. > Is the smartcard limited to 160 Bit hashes? What sort of smartcard are you using, and what does it support as far as hash algorithms? From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Thu Jan 29 00:50:34 2009 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Wed, 28 Jan 2009 18:50:34 -0500 Subject: Selection of digest algorithm In-Reply-To: <1233184003.7102.28.camel@carbon> References: <1233184003.7102.28.camel@carbon> Message-ID: <639AE013-9967-4D95-87BE-B0899C7F80AC@jabberwocky.com> On Jan 28, 2009, at 6:06 PM, Sven Radde wrote: > Hi gnupg-users! > > I noticed some "oddities" (to me) with the selection of a hash > algorithm > by GnuPG. I assume that the particular use-cases have additional > limitations which are not obvious to me, so could you please clarify? > > First, when sending a signed email from Evolution, SHA1 seems to be > chosen, no matter what "personal-digest-preferences" or even > "digest-algo" is set in the gpg.conf file (other parts of gpg.conf are > honored, however). > Is this a limitation of the PGP/MIME standard that Evolution uses? No. OpenPGP/MIME can use any hash that OpenPGP can. Possibly Evolution is overriding the gpg.conf setting for your hashes? > Second, when using the smartcard, and "personal-digest-preferences > SHA256 RIPEMD160", the latter is chosen as digest algorithm. > Is the smartcard limited to 160 Bit hashes? Yes. Or at least the current one is. There is a new version of the spec that allows for more hashes, but I don't believe there is a physical card based on the updated spec that you can purchase yet. David From John at Mozilla-Enigmail.org Thu Jan 29 01:46:52 2009 From: John at Mozilla-Enigmail.org (John Clizbe) Date: Wed, 28 Jan 2009 18:46:52 -0600 Subject: Selection of digest algorithm In-Reply-To: <1233184003.7102.28.camel@carbon> References: <1233184003.7102.28.camel@carbon> Message-ID: <4980FC7C.20908@Mozilla-Enigmail.org> Sven Radde wrote: > First, when sending a signed email from Evolution, SHA1 seems to be > chosen, no matter what "personal-digest-preferences" or even > "digest-algo" is set in the gpg.conf file (other parts of gpg.conf are > honored, however). > Is this a limitation of the PGP/MIME standard that Evolution uses? Sort of... maybe. For PGP/MIME it is necessary to know the hash used when constructing the message, before it is passed off for signing. Enigmail fixed this some time ago by first signing and examining a small test message to obtain the hash which will be used. I guess the Evo folks "fixed" it by always using SHA-1. -- John P. Clizbe Inet:John (a) Mozilla-Enigmail.org You can't spell fiasco without SCO. hkp://keyserver.gingerbear.net or mailto:pgp-public-keys at gingerbear.net?subject=HELP Q:"Just how do the residents of Haiku, Hawai'i hold conversations?" A:"An odd melody / island voices on the winds / surplus of vowels" -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 680 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From pg at futureware.at Thu Jan 29 01:35:49 2009 From: pg at futureware.at (=?ISO-8859-1?Q?Philipp_G=FChring?=) Date: Thu, 29 Jan 2009 01:35:49 +0100 Subject: Series of minor questions about OpenPGP 5 In-Reply-To: <87fxj376oo.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> References: <9ef756150901280659s15359bddt4c47d549ab2f268c@mail.gmail.com> <87fxj376oo.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> Message-ID: <4980F9E5.6030009@futureware.at> Hi, >> I wonder because I'd to test the used source with this >> http://www.cacert.at/random/ so is there perhaps some function in gpg > That are plainstupid tests. Yes, I agree. I haven't discovered any intelligent algorithms yet, only statistical tests seem to be available. If anyone knows better tests, please let me know. (I am currently working to add better statistical tests, but they will still be statistical tests, nothing groundbreaking) > It does no make any sense at all to run > statistically tests on the output of a hash digest. We have successfully discovered a weak RNG, notified the vendor and got the vendor to actually fix the product. So I would say that it actually makes sense to do it, to detect weak RNGs. An actual counter-example to this claim is the Debian-OpenSSL bug. OpenSSL processed the random numbers through a hash, but it still showed statistical weaknesses on the hash digest output. Best regards, Philipp G?hring From wk at gnupg.org Thu Jan 29 08:22:14 2009 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Thu, 29 Jan 2009 08:22:14 +0100 Subject: Selection of digest algorithm In-Reply-To: <639AE013-9967-4D95-87BE-B0899C7F80AC@jabberwocky.com> (David Shaw's message of "Wed, 28 Jan 2009 18:50:34 -0500") References: <1233184003.7102.28.camel@carbon> <639AE013-9967-4D95-87BE-B0899C7F80AC@jabberwocky.com> Message-ID: <874oziinkp.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> On Thu, 29 Jan 2009 00:50, dshaw at jabberwocky.com said: > Yes. Or at least the current one is. There is a new version of the > spec that allows for more hashes, but I don't believe there is a The problem is that card checks that the correct padding, inclusive the OID of the hash is used and thus rejects other hashs than implemented. OpenPGP cards specs 2 are not that restrictive anymore and merely check that there is enough padding. Thus any hash usable with the key size is allowed. We expect fist samples of the card next month. If we are lucky production may start in late spring. The card or better the chip used with the card will also be used by the German health card project (50 million cards or so) and that stupid project is very much delayed - thus the delays with card production. Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Auschnahme regelt ein Bundeschgesetz. From wk at gnupg.org Thu Jan 29 08:09:10 2009 From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch) Date: Thu, 29 Jan 2009 08:09:10 +0100 Subject: Series of minor questions about OpenPGP 5 In-Reply-To: <4980978A.8070903@sixdemonbag.org> (Robert J. Hansen's message of "Wed, 28 Jan 2009 12:36:10 -0500") References: <9ef756150901280659s15359bddt4c47d549ab2f268c@mail.gmail.com> <87fxj376oo.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> <9ef756150901280845o152e035ay83dd64d32fc0e0ff@mail.gmail.com> <4980978A.8070903@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <878wouio6h.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> On Wed, 28 Jan 2009 18:36, rjh at sixdemonbag.org said: > Linux has support for some hardware RNGs, yes. I don't know offhand > which ones. OpenBSD apparently has support for a lot of them. Using Libgcrypt (and thus GnuPG-2) on a modern VIA CPU will make use of the Padlock engine's HW RNG as an additional source of entropy. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Auschnahme regelt ein Bundeschgesetz. From ramon.loureiro at upf.edu Thu Jan 29 11:25:14 2009 From: ramon.loureiro at upf.edu (Ramon Loureiro) Date: Thu, 29 Jan 2009 11:25:14 +0100 Subject: gpg --list-keys --with-colons Message-ID: <4981840A.9090502@upf.edu> Hi! How can I get an output like this gpg --list-keys --with-fingerprint --with-colons --fixed-list-mode for an individual key? The first command gives me: fpr:::::::::BE8E51366A32B5EF01050DFBC5592ACB80C7D647: uid:-::::1227007455::AF22C2EEE20225B675535975D39D55B385ED6EDA::Ramon Loureiro Alonso: uid:-::::1225455630::AFFC972DC009F22F1C40EFE992C5D4663D03B8B8::Ramon Loureiro : uid:-::::1225455630::FB0A955D846500FF68A578EC5B473028B2395662::Ramon Loureiro : uid:-::::1225455630::4FE138B26FF82EA19D7A2B474B4663D40A4369C7::Ramon Loureiro Alonso (Thawte Notary): uid:-::::1227007451::B1650511D910BEAB9BC20F5C7CD8F93D0824AF70::Ramon Loureiro : uid:-::::1225455630::9E7A3AF3CE4208C145F7682ABC7CB4FC32CA87CA::Ramon Loureiro : uid:r::::::C570496C64343A572B987B9BB13861588406847A::Ramon Loureiro (GSWoT\x3aSP66) : uid:-::::1228770984::A1FF7441DBAA7F3E731D0BD9D963A0F24E12DB8E::Ramon Loureiro Alonso (GSWoT\x3aES66) : .... for the whole keyring, and that is the kind of output that I want. but if I try gpg --list-key 0x80C7D647 --with-fingerprint --with-colons --fixed-list-mode it gives me this: pub 2048R/80C7D647 2008-04-29 uid Ramon Loureiro Alonso uid Ramon Loureiro uid Ramon Loureiro uid Ramon Loureiro Alonso (Thawte Notary) uid Ramon Loureiro uid Ramon Loureiro uid Ramon Loureiro Alonso (GSWoT:ES66) sub 2048R/32A7F276 2008-04-29 Thanks! -- Ramon Loureiro Universitat Pompeu Fabra e-Confidential Project http://www.itea-econfidential.org/ From email at sven-radde.de Thu Jan 29 11:58:42 2009 From: email at sven-radde.de (Sven Radde) Date: Thu, 29 Jan 2009 11:58:42 +0100 Subject: Selection of digest algorithm In-Reply-To: <639AE013-9967-4D95-87BE-B0899C7F80AC@jabberwocky.com> References: <1233184003.7102.28.camel@carbon> <639AE013-9967-4D95-87BE-B0899C7F80AC@jabberwocky.com> Message-ID: <49818BE2.40505@sven-radde.de> Hi! David Shaw schrieb: >> First, when sending a signed email from Evolution, SHA1 seems to be >> chosen, no matter what "personal-digest-preferences" or even >> "digest-algo" is set in the gpg.conf file (other parts of gpg.conf are >> honored, however). >> Is this a limitation of the PGP/MIME standard that Evolution uses? > No. OpenPGP/MIME can use any hash that OpenPGP can. Possibly > Evolution is overriding the gpg.conf setting for your hashes? I looked into RFC 2015 and 3156, and they appear to restrict the allowed values for the "micalg" parameter. 2015 defines "pgp-md5" and "pgp-sha1" as valid, whereas 3156 allows "pgp-md5", "pgp-sha1", "pgp-ripemd160", "pgp-md2", "pgp-tiger192", and "pgp-haval-5-160". So it would appear that Evolution uses RFC 2015, skipping the obsolete MD5. Is there a GnuPG setting to find out more about the exact calls that Evolution does? As I said, other parts of gpg.conf are honored and I do not seem to be able to set some "debug-flag" within Evolution to log its calls to gpg (which may be based on the fact that I'm by far no expert with Evolution). Is there some kind of "recommended" email application when it comes to GnuPG support? Or, put differently, which ones are known for "good" integration? I have used Enigmail in the past but I was under the impression that its integration was hampered by limitations of Thunderbird's plugin API. Thanks (also @the others) for the info about the OpenPGP card. I found the limitation to SHA1 and RIPEMD Bits in the v1.1 spec. cu, Sven From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Thu Jan 29 15:07:41 2009 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Thu, 29 Jan 2009 09:07:41 -0500 Subject: gpg --list-keys --with-colons In-Reply-To: <4981840A.9090502@upf.edu> References: <4981840A.9090502@upf.edu> Message-ID: On Jan 29, 2009, at 5:25 AM, Ramon Loureiro wrote: > > Hi! > How can I get an output like this > > gpg --list-keys --with-fingerprint --with-colons --fixed-list-mode > > for an individual key? > > The first command gives me: > fpr:::::::::BE8E51366A32B5EF01050DFBC5592ACB80C7D647: > uid:-::::1227007455::AF22C2EEE20225B675535975D39D55B385ED6EDA::Ramon > Loureiro Alonso: > uid:-::::1225455630::AFFC972DC009F22F1C40EFE992C5D4663D03B8B8::Ramon > Loureiro : > uid:-::::1225455630::FB0A955D846500FF68A578EC5B473028B2395662::Ramon > Loureiro : > uid:-::::1225455630::4FE138B26FF82EA19D7A2B474B4663D40A4369C7::Ramon > Loureiro Alonso (Thawte Notary): > uid:-::::1227007451::B1650511D910BEAB9BC20F5C7CD8F93D0824AF70::Ramon > Loureiro : > uid:-::::1225455630::9E7A3AF3CE4208C145F7682ABC7CB4FC32CA87CA::Ramon > Loureiro : > uid:r::::::C570496C64343A572B987B9BB13861588406847A::Ramon Loureiro > (GSWoT\x3aSP66) : > uid:-::::1228770984::A1FF7441DBAA7F3E731D0BD9D963A0F24E12DB8E::Ramon > Loureiro Alonso (GSWoT\x3aES66) : > .... > for the whole keyring, and that is the kind of output that I want. > > but if I try > > gpg --list-key 0x80C7D647 --with-fingerprint --with-colons > --fixed-list-mode > > it gives me this: > pub 2048R/80C7D647 2008-04-29 > uid Ramon Loureiro Alonso > uid Ramon Loureiro > uid Ramon Loureiro > uid Ramon Loureiro Alonso (Thawte Notary) > uid Ramon Loureiro > uid Ramon Loureiro > uid Ramon Loureiro Alonso (GSWoT:ES66) > > sub 2048R/32A7F276 2008-04-29 Put the keyid at the end of the line: gpg --with-fingerprint --with-colons --fixed-list-mode --list-keys 0x80C7D647 David From rjh at sixdemonbag.org Thu Jan 29 15:22:18 2009 From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen) Date: Thu, 29 Jan 2009 09:22:18 -0500 Subject: Selection of digest algorithm In-Reply-To: <49818BE2.40505@sven-radde.de> References: <1233184003.7102.28.camel@carbon> <639AE013-9967-4D95-87BE-B0899C7F80AC@jabberwocky.com> <49818BE2.40505@sven-radde.de> Message-ID: <4981BB9A.4050703@sixdemonbag.org> Sven Radde wrote: > So it would appear that Evolution uses RFC 2015, skipping the obsolete MD5. No. Jeff Anderson, Evolution's main GnuPG author, told me directly they supported RFC3156. He went on at great length about how inline traffic is stupid and it isn't RFC-approved for email use, and how RFC3156 was the One True Way regardless of what people wanted. So yeah, taking Jeff at his word, he implemented RFC3156. He's just artificially restricting which hash algorithms can be used, which has the added side effect of completely breaking Evolution for DSA2 keys. Evolution cannot sign messages with a DSA2 key -- or at least, I've never found a way to do it short of going in and hacking up the source code. I do not think very highly of Evolution's OpenPGP support. > Is there a GnuPG setting to find out more about the exact calls that > Evolution does? I found out just by writing a tiny shellscript wrapper which echoed the arguments given to GnuPG. > As I said, other parts of gpg.conf are honored These would be the parts they're not setting on the command line. > Is there some kind of "recommended" email application when it comes to > GnuPG support? Or, put differently, which ones are known for "good" > integration? At last year's USENIX, in a panel discussion, Dan Wallach of Rice declared Enigmail the best thing going in terms of OpenPGP integration. That's high praise coming from a very well-respected guy in computer security. This was said as part of a sidebar he made about the difficulty in getting 30+ Ph.Ds in computer science to all use PGP for a particular mailing list. Some were using Evolution, some were using ancient PGP, some were using modern PGP, some were using plugins, others were C&Ping into a Microsoft Word document then using some weird Word PGP plugin, some were using Enigmail, etc. He capped it off with an exasperated sigh, then recommended Enigmail to people who needed OpenPGP integration, as Enigmail gave the least troubles. > I have used Enigmail in the past but I was under the impression that its > integration was hampered by limitations of Thunderbird's plugin API. It is. But it's not /severely/ hampered. E.g., address book integration doesn't work because the address book internals are such a maze of twisty little passages, all alike. From er.rahulkausik at gmail.com Mon Jan 26 12:16:07 2009 From: er.rahulkausik at gmail.com (rahul kaushik) Date: Mon, 26 Jan 2009 03:16:07 -0800 (PST) Subject: compatibility of Gnupg-1.4.9 to Gnupg-1.0.6 In-Reply-To: References: <21621863.post@talk.nabble.com> Message-ID: <21663800.post@talk.nabble.com> Hi All, Thanks for your attention towards my problem. One thing that i still would like to know about gpg is Is it possible for me to use keyring and trustdb of Gnupg-1.4.9 while using Gnupg-1.0.6. can keyring generated ( using --gen-key ) by Gnupg-1.4.9 be used with gnupg-1.0.6. What i think, it may not be possible to convert keyring or trustdb from upper version ( 1.4.9 ) to keyring of lower version ( 1.0.6 ). Please correct me if i am wrong. Thanks & Regards, Rahul Kaushik David Shaw wrote: > > On Jan 23, 2009, at 5:17 AM, rahul kaushik wrote: > >> >> Hi all, >> I have an issue which is described below: >> >> earlier i was using Gnupg-1.0.6 for my appliaction. Now i have >> replaced it >> with Gnupg-1.4.9. >> I am facing some issue related to keyrings. As per my application. >> I need to perform following application. >> >> I did finally get these encrypt/decrypt procedures to work: >> >> gpg (1.0.6) for encryption followed by gpg (1.4.9) for decryption >> gpg (1.4.9) for encryption followed by gpg (1.0.6) for >> decryption >> >> But for that i have to use same ( gnupg-1.0.6 ) keyrings file for >> both >> situations. > > In the GPG tarball, in the "tools" directory, there is a script > "convert-from-106". Run it, and you should be in better shape. > > David > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users at gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users > > -- View this message in context: http://www.nabble.com/compatibility-of-Gnupg-1.4.9-to-Gnupg-1.0.6-tp21621863p21663800.html Sent from the GnuPG - User mailing list archive at Nabble.com. From Anitha.Narayanamoorthy at Globalcollect.com Mon Jan 26 13:21:49 2009 From: Anitha.Narayanamoorthy at Globalcollect.com (Anitha Narayanamoorthy) Date: Mon, 26 Jan 2009 13:21:49 +0100 Subject: Using the GPG in the batch mode. Message-ID: <126521125FFAD447A425D3DDA05B70100C978A@HFDEXH01.network.lan> Hello, I need some help on how to run the gpg agent in the batch mode without the agent prompting for the pass phrase... The situation is that we need two pass phrases to start the agent, and now we wanna do the same in the batch mode as well, but the problem is that these batches run on unattended machines... Please let me know how I can accomplish this... Best Regards, Anitha -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From p4.thomas at googlemail.com Thu Jan 29 17:22:01 2009 From: p4.thomas at googlemail.com (Peter Thomas) Date: Thu, 29 Jan 2009 17:22:01 +0100 Subject: Series of minor questions about OpenPGP 2 In-Reply-To: <60E7E188-FB53-4F27-9E4E-83536476E2AB@jabberwocky.com> References: <9ef756150901261354q17d60f44lbf5dd6ff87a6f8b@mail.gmail.com> <20090126222815.GA27590@jabberwocky.com> <9ef756150901261520v4a745bc6n6144417a96581421@mail.gmail.com> <60E7E188-FB53-4F27-9E4E-83536476E2AB@jabberwocky.com> Message-ID: <9ef756150901290822g2e662385jf8fda40a90bbb83b@mail.gmail.com> Hi David. One more thing on this: On Tue, Jan 27, 2009 at 5:18 AM, David Shaw wrote: >> Would gnupg understand these subpackets in a 0x1F signature? > Yes. It's a valid key as per the spec, even though no program actually > generates such a key that I know of. Note that I can't make that same > guarantee for other programs. I suspect they'd work, but you'd have to > check to be sure. I had already wrote in another message that I'm trying to do some interoperability tests (with large keysizes for example). I'd also like to play with these signature types (0x1F, 0x13 and even 0x18 !) a little bit especially the with the subpackets: preferred symmetric/hash/compression algorithms, policy URI and key flags (I think it would even make semantic sense to put them on 0x18s). Anyway to do this I need to generate those signatures (of course) and I'd like to use the wonderful code of gnupg :-) Could you perhaps point me to the useful function names where I can modify these signatures (0x1F,0x13,0x18) and the functions that are used to inject subpackages? Was a great help when you pointed me to the write_header()/etc functions before :-) Thanks in advance, Peter From p4.thomas at googlemail.com Thu Jan 29 17:33:11 2009 From: p4.thomas at googlemail.com (Peter Thomas) Date: Thu, 29 Jan 2009 17:33:11 +0100 Subject: Series of minor questions about OpenPGP 5 In-Reply-To: <87fxj376oo.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> References: <9ef756150901280659s15359bddt4c47d549ab2f268c@mail.gmail.com> <87fxj376oo.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> Message-ID: <9ef756150901290833v20687b17rc3bd690b965d2eb9@mail.gmail.com> One more thing On Wed, Jan 28, 2009 at 5:10 PM, Werner Koch wrote: >> It seems that it's quite easy to disable this limit in the gnupg >> source, all I have to do is set max=something in keygen.c, correct? > No, there is some limit in the RNG too. I've grep'ed through the sources and there are many other locations with hardcoded 4096 e.g. the following excerpt: configure: --enable-key-cache=SIZE Set key cache to SIZE (default 4096) configure: enableval=4096 configure: enableval=4096 configure: pgsize = 4096; configure: pool = malloc( 4096 + pgsize ); configure: err = mlock( pool, 4096 ); configure.ac: AC_HELP_STRING([--enable-key-cache=SIZE],[Set key cache to SIZE (default 4096)]),,enableval=4096) configure.ac: enableval=4096 doc/samplekeys.asc: pub 4096R/99242560 2002-01-28 g10/app-openpgp.c: max_length = 4096; g10/parse-packet.c: if (pktlen > 4096) g10/apdu.c: size_t bufsize = 4096; g10/apdu.c: bufsize += resultlen > 4096? resultlen: 4096; g10/apdu.c: size_t bufsize = 4096; g10/apdu.c: bufsize += resultlen > 4096? resultlen: 4096; g10/status.c: if ( requested_shm_size > 2 * 4096 ) g10/status.c: shm_size = 4096 /* one page for us */ + requested_shm_size; g10/ChangeLog: (ask_keysize): Only allow keysizes up to 4096 g10/sign.c: byte copy_buffer[4096]; g10/sign.c: while ((bytes_copied = iobuf_read(inp, copy_buffer, 4096)) != -1) g10/sign.c: wipememory(copy_buffer,4096); /* burn buffer */ g10/encode.c: byte copy_buffer[4096]; g10/encode.c: while ((bytes_copied = iobuf_read(inp, copy_buffer, 4096)) != -1) g10/encode.c: wipememory(copy_buffer, 4096); /* burn buffer */ g10/encode.c: byte copy_buffer[4096]; g10/encode.c: while ((bytes_copied = iobuf_read(inp, copy_buffer, 4096)) != -1) g10/encode.c: wipememory(copy_buffer, 4096); /* burn buffer */ Does any of these have to do with key generation or usage? I mean if I just change that max= setting in keygen.c will everything be fine and will it produce fully valid secure keys or do I have to look at other locations, too? Cheers, Peter btw: I've already tried to create a 65563 bit RSA key, but it took me to long and my notebook ran out of battery *lol* From p4.thomas at googlemail.com Thu Jan 29 17:36:01 2009 From: p4.thomas at googlemail.com (Peter Thomas) Date: Thu, 29 Jan 2009 17:36:01 +0100 Subject: Series of minor questions about OpenPGP 5 In-Reply-To: <4980952C.1050904@sixdemonbag.org> References: <9ef756150901280659s15359bddt4c47d549ab2f268c@mail.gmail.com> <4980952C.1050904@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <9ef756150901290836h2b135a58w84a232d726a1abc0@mail.gmail.com> On Wed, Jan 28, 2009 at 6:26 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > Anyone who uses the Mersenne Twister to generate cryptographic > pseudorandom values is living in sin. xD ... Well I've read that "without modification it is not usable for cryptography" so I thought maybe there is a modified version which works great. Thanks for your comments, Peter From p4.thomas at googlemail.com Thu Jan 29 17:38:17 2009 From: p4.thomas at googlemail.com (Peter Thomas) Date: Thu, 29 Jan 2009 17:38:17 +0100 Subject: Series of minor questions about OpenPGP 5 In-Reply-To: <4980978A.8070903@sixdemonbag.org> References: <9ef756150901280659s15359bddt4c47d549ab2f268c@mail.gmail.com> <87fxj376oo.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> <9ef756150901280845o152e035ay83dd64d32fc0e0ff@mail.gmail.com> <4980978A.8070903@sixdemonbag.org> Message-ID: <9ef756150901290838i9bd345fs86bc3bdab88801d4@mail.gmail.com> On Wed, Jan 28, 2009 at 6:36 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > Imagine you have a Geiger counter and a radioactive sample. Over each > time frame, the Geiger counter reports how many decays it measures. > That number becomes your random value. So far, so random, right? Using a radioactive sample for gnupg key generation is probably a very bad idea,.. I mean image all of use getting cancer or so ^^ From p4.thomas at googlemail.com Thu Jan 29 17:41:42 2009 From: p4.thomas at googlemail.com (Peter Thomas) Date: Thu, 29 Jan 2009 17:41:42 +0100 Subject: Series of minor questions about OpenPGP 5 In-Reply-To: <732076a80901281000o7d7df11y2137d1f2076538ab@mail.gmail.com> References: <9ef756150901280659s15359bddt4c47d549ab2f268c@mail.gmail.com> <732076a80901281000o7d7df11y2137d1f2076538ab@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <9ef756150901290841wcf4cc9fhd4dd76e173a7afa@mail.gmail.com> On Wed, Jan 28, 2009 at 7:00 PM, Benjamin Donnachie wrote: > 2009/1/28 Peter Thomas : > Please please please stop starting new threads! Sorry Benjamin. I thought it was better to somehow group my questions according to what they're about. An normal mail user clients should provide threaded views which can be used to collapse the thread. So I think it's better to start new threads or otherwise people taking part in them (at least me ;-) ) would completely loose their overview. Is there a how-to-use-this-list or so which guidelines on posting? Best wishes, Peter From p4.thomas at googlemail.com Thu Jan 29 17:44:05 2009 From: p4.thomas at googlemail.com (Peter Thomas) Date: Thu, 29 Jan 2009 17:44:05 +0100 Subject: Series of minor questions about OpenPGP 5 In-Reply-To: <200901282109.39936@thufir.ingo-kloecker.de> References: <9ef756150901280659s15359bddt4c47d549ab2f268c@mail.gmail.com> <9ef756150901280845o152e035ay83dd64d32fc0e0ff@mail.gmail.com> <4980978A.8070903@sixdemonbag.org> <200901282109.39936@thufir.ingo-kloecker.de> Message-ID: <9ef756150901290844l5efdd1b7h6bcda1c0a1c41f2f@mail.gmail.com> 2009/1/28 Ingo Kl?cker : > See http://www.fourmilab.ch/hotbits/ for a random number generator using > radioactive decay. > > Under http://von-und-fuer-lau.de/ct-randcam.html you can download a > (mostly) non-deterministic random number generator using a webcam. The > page is in German. This sounds interesting. Is there any data available about the quality of these random sources? Thanks for your comments, Peter From p4.thomas at googlemail.com Thu Jan 29 17:48:34 2009 From: p4.thomas at googlemail.com (Peter Thomas) Date: Thu, 29 Jan 2009 17:48:34 +0100 Subject: Series of minor questions about OpenPGP 5 In-Reply-To: <594931A7-6D2B-4CCF-89E5-1E46E4F6C8C2@jabberwocky.com> References: <9ef756150901280659s15359bddt4c47d549ab2f268c@mail.gmail.com> <87fxj376oo.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> <9ef756150901280845o152e035ay83dd64d32fc0e0ff@mail.gmail.com> <4980978A.8070903@sixdemonbag.org> <594931A7-6D2B-4CCF-89E5-1E46E4F6C8C2@jabberwocky.com> Message-ID: <9ef756150901290848r3b8e84f7s8726c36fae5feb20@mail.gmail.com> On Wed, Jan 28, 2009 at 9:31 PM, David Shaw wrote: > On some platforms, a hardware RNG actually ends up feeding /dev/random. > This is particularly nice as it means GPG (or any program that uses > /dev/random) benefits without code modification. But this has a disadvantage if that hardware RNG is of bad quality. Werner said that that VIA thing is used as _additional_ source, isn't it? So I assume even if it would produce bad data, gnupg would merge it with the normal /dev/random and still produce random data which is not worse than without having that VIA thing, or am I missing something? btw: This VIA thing is an onboard chip, right? It would be nice to have something available that I can buy on connect e.g. via USB and get support for gnupg :-) Cheerio, Peter From faramir.cl at gmail.com Thu Jan 29 18:03:53 2009 From: faramir.cl at gmail.com (Faramir) Date: Thu, 29 Jan 2009 14:03:53 -0300 Subject: Series of minor questions about OpenPGP 5 In-Reply-To: <9ef756150901290838i9bd345fs86bc3bdab88801d4@mail.gmail.com> References: <9ef756150901280659s15359bddt4c47d549ab2f268c@mail.gmail.com> <87fxj376oo.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> <9ef756150901280845o152e035ay83dd64d32fc0e0ff@mail.gmail.com> <4980978A.8070903@sixdemonbag.org> <9ef756150901290838i9bd345fs86bc3bdab88801d4@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <4981E179.4050102@gmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Peter Thomas escribi?: ... > Using a radioactive sample for gnupg key generation is probably a very > bad idea,.. I mean image all of use getting cancer or so ^^ Well, not if the sample emits beta particles, these are supposed to be easily blocked by some millimeters of skin, so as long as you don't touch them too much, they would be safe to use. But I suppose as beta radiation is composed of electrons, it would be a good idea to put the radioactive entropy generator inside a case grounded, just in case... Best Regards -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJJgeF5AAoJEMV4f6PvczxAVHQIAIka77JoeLb5LM3HI+c+6wqh yquH1qJFPck50h6h6SQsc64oewTfYGO5wabbOghCmBs3t/hyR6N7f7Fwlc/+9S9+ +9N+O9bLjcIprWCyjpcdgJaZG07OkukhcrygGWLWSC15n0bJMUlwY0gIAyxI8ebi yQp6v9Q7xxfhPluXsNjtBIeIx4IBeNJm/dOAxKQXMqwj52nHj9bukneGPAKOFzoS 7BAyYxS1DAngjGvbRC0g9k4DMJyFDugVUu0QA22qxuWlWOD1O7X9RqTQUx9N68K5 7T7QVAfI2DMGXSOjUHOkjNJJ8qqkCPOIRYDLYa/bb/lf9hFxvqhTdAC3EwaY5qo= =krLy -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From p4.thomas at googlemail.com Thu Jan 29 18:43:57 2009 From: p4.thomas at googlemail.com (Peter Thomas) Date: Thu, 29 Jan 2009 18:43:57 +0100 Subject: Series of minor questions about OpenPGP 5 In-Reply-To: <4981E179.4050102@gmail.com> References: <9ef756150901280659s15359bddt4c47d549ab2f268c@mail.gmail.com> <87fxj376oo.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> <9ef756150901280845o152e035ay83dd64d32fc0e0ff@mail.gmail.com> <4980978A.8070903@sixdemonbag.org> <9ef756150901290838i9bd345fs86bc3bdab88801d4@mail.gmail.com> <4981E179.4050102@gmail.com> Message-ID: <9ef756150901290943v3412c0acm123531de4a4f327@mail.gmail.com> On Thu, Jan 29, 2009 at 6:03 PM, Faramir wrote: > Well, not if the sample emits beta particles, these are supposed to be > easily blocked by some millimeters of skin, so as long as you don't > touch them too much, they would be safe to use. But I suppose as beta > radiation is composed of electrons, it would be a good idea to put the > radioactive entropy generator inside a case grounded, just in case... Of course I know about the nature of the different kinds of radiation ;-) Just wanted to but some fun in the daily grind of a cryptologist ^^ Peter From faramir.cl at gmail.com Thu Jan 29 19:35:58 2009 From: faramir.cl at gmail.com (Faramir) Date: Thu, 29 Jan 2009 15:35:58 -0300 Subject: Series of minor questions about OpenPGP 5 In-Reply-To: <9ef756150901290943v3412c0acm123531de4a4f327@mail.gmail.com> References: <9ef756150901280659s15359bddt4c47d549ab2f268c@mail.gmail.com> <87fxj376oo.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> <9ef756150901280845o152e035ay83dd64d32fc0e0ff@mail.gmail.com> <4980978A.8070903@sixdemonbag.org> <9ef756150901290838i9bd345fs86bc3bdab88801d4@mail.gmail.com> <4981E179.4050102@gmail.com> <9ef756150901290943v3412c0acm123531de4a4f327@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <4981F70E.6040904@gmail.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Peter Thomas escribi?: > On Thu, Jan 29, 2009 at 6:03 PM, Faramir wrote: >> Well, not if the sample emits beta particles, these are supposed to be ... > Of course I know about the nature of the different kinds of radiation ;-) > Just wanted to but some fun in the daily grind of a cryptologist ^^ Yes, but you made me remember the time I was studying physics (before I bailed out from that). By the way, why do you need so much entropy? To ensure the quality of CAcert certificates? Best Regards -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJJgfcOAAoJEMV4f6PvczxAehkH/jqEwE4H2PAusSd/u0Bk73Lf 2a19swQGNf0Dlo3wCaBir6YQfihlY47XIKQvxLANGIC/+n3wxxwMKnLGyZf1F2WV EY0g/9ZihVEsiePltc/TsQUQdUQyBYtOUOxU0rQRRMqKv2H/VOa5GRb8/6++ZvhP R69VbjkVGnwyXh5qVbCykOjCXh70LEw4+tVMiDtTOZ8E9MwfRWS3yGZuBX0WpQw8 13y24OP2y9G0krub31bkU2Fg1i/2OLMyfsyNjv5iWWDAJEVygqMavnNIEhSwQQoN tJjXKWHNX0L6R8Eqg8M2EFZ8YOQlFJMBeI11Qf7xQEw70A1O97L6ipNMQtfmnig= =YE/y -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From p4.thomas at googlemail.com Thu Jan 29 19:45:06 2009 From: p4.thomas at googlemail.com (Peter Thomas) Date: Thu, 29 Jan 2009 19:45:06 +0100 Subject: Series of minor questions about OpenPGP 5 In-Reply-To: <4981F70E.6040904@gmail.com> References: <9ef756150901280659s15359bddt4c47d549ab2f268c@mail.gmail.com> <87fxj376oo.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> <9ef756150901280845o152e035ay83dd64d32fc0e0ff@mail.gmail.com> <4980978A.8070903@sixdemonbag.org> <9ef756150901290838i9bd345fs86bc3bdab88801d4@mail.gmail.com> <4981E179.4050102@gmail.com> <9ef756150901290943v3412c0acm123531de4a4f327@mail.gmail.com> <4981F70E.6040904@gmail.com> Message-ID: <9ef756150901291045t6b5629d5kd3a26485eb3d1cb8@mail.gmail.com> On Thu, Jan 29, 2009 at 7:35 PM, Faramir wrote: > Yes, but you made me remember the time I was studying physics (before > I bailed out from that). Ah :-) > By the way, why do you need so much entropy? To ensure the quality of > CAcert certificates? Uhm,... to speed up my monster-65563-or-even-more-bits-RSA-key-tests?! XD No, just kidding. Well I just wanted to be informed :-) Peter From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Thu Jan 29 21:56:43 2009 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Thu, 29 Jan 2009 15:56:43 -0500 Subject: compatibility of Gnupg-1.4.9 to Gnupg-1.0.6 In-Reply-To: <21663800.post@talk.nabble.com> References: <21621863.post@talk.nabble.com> <21663800.post@talk.nabble.com> Message-ID: <20090129205643.GC16331@jabberwocky.com> On Mon, Jan 26, 2009 at 03:16:07AM -0800, rahul kaushik wrote: > > Hi All, > Thanks for your attention towards my problem. > One thing that i still would like to know about gpg is > Is it possible for me to use keyring and trustdb of Gnupg-1.4.9 while using > Gnupg-1.0.6. can keyring generated ( using --gen-key ) by Gnupg-1.4.9 be > used with gnupg-1.0.6. > > > What i think, it may not be possible to convert keyring or trustdb from > upper version ( 1.4.9 ) > to keyring of lower version ( 1.0.6 ). That is correct. The file conversion from 1.0.6 to 1.4.9 is one way. If you want to go back to 1.0.6, you need to export your keyrings from 1.4.9 and then re-import them to 1.0.6. You cannot simply use the same files. David From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Thu Jan 29 22:10:00 2009 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Thu, 29 Jan 2009 16:10:00 -0500 Subject: Series of minor questions about OpenPGP 5 In-Reply-To: <9ef756150901290848r3b8e84f7s8726c36fae5feb20@mail.gmail.com> References: <9ef756150901280659s15359bddt4c47d549ab2f268c@mail.gmail.com> <87fxj376oo.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> <9ef756150901280845o152e035ay83dd64d32fc0e0ff@mail.gmail.com> <4980978A.8070903@sixdemonbag.org> <594931A7-6D2B-4CCF-89E5-1E46E4F6C8C2@jabberwocky.com> <9ef756150901290848r3b8e84f7s8726c36fae5feb20@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <20090129210959.GD16331@jabberwocky.com> On Thu, Jan 29, 2009 at 05:48:34PM +0100, Peter Thomas wrote: > btw: This VIA thing is an onboard chip, right? It would be nice to > have something available that I can buy on connect e.g. via USB and > get support for gnupg :-) Use a Whirlygig device plus rng-tools to integrate the hardware device randomness into the regular kernel /dev/random pool. http://warmcat.com/_wp/whirlygig-rng/ http://sourceforge.net/project/showfiles.php?group_id=3242&package_id=87734 David From dshaw at jabberwocky.com Thu Jan 29 22:19:48 2009 From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw) Date: Thu, 29 Jan 2009 16:19:48 -0500 Subject: Series of minor questions about OpenPGP 2 In-Reply-To: <9ef756150901290822g2e662385jf8fda40a90bbb83b@mail.gmail.com> References: <9ef756150901261354q17d60f44lbf5dd6ff87a6f8b@mail.gmail.com> <20090126222815.GA27590@jabberwocky.com> <9ef756150901261520v4a745bc6n6144417a96581421@mail.gmail.com> <60E7E188-FB53-4F27-9E4E-83536476E2AB@jabberwocky.com> <9ef756150901290822g2e662385jf8fda40a90bbb83b@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <20090129211948.GE16331@jabberwocky.com> On Thu, Jan 29, 2009 at 05:22:01PM +0100, Peter Thomas wrote: > Hi David. > > One more thing on this: > > On Tue, Jan 27, 2009 at 5:18 AM, David Shaw wrote: > >> Would gnupg understand these subpackets in a 0x1F signature? > > Yes. It's a valid key as per the spec, even though no program actually > > generates such a key that I know of. Note that I can't make that same > > guarantee for other programs. I suspect they'd work, but you'd have to > > check to be sure. > I had already wrote in another message that I'm trying to do some > interoperability tests (with large keysizes for example). > I'd also like to play with these signature types (0x1F, 0x13 and even > 0x18 !) a little bit especially the with the subpackets: > preferred symmetric/hash/compression algorithms, policy URI and key flags > (I think it would even make semantic sense to put them on 0x18s). > > Anyway to do this I need to generate those signatures (of course) and > I'd like to use the wonderful code of gnupg :-) > Could you perhaps point me to the useful function names where I can > modify these signatures (0x1F,0x13,0x18) and the functions that are > used to inject subpackages? > Was a great help when you pointed me to the write_header()/etc > functions before :-) build-packet.c:build_sig_subpkt() sign.c:make_keysig_packet() sign.c:update_keysig_packet() David From p4.thomas at googlemail.com Fri Jan 30 01:03:12 2009 From: p4.thomas at googlemail.com (Peter Thomas) Date: Fri, 30 Jan 2009 01:03:12 +0100 Subject: Series of minor questions about OpenPGP 2 In-Reply-To: <20090129211948.GE16331@jabberwocky.com> References: <9ef756150901261354q17d60f44lbf5dd6ff87a6f8b@mail.gmail.com> <20090126222815.GA27590@jabberwocky.com> <9ef756150901261520v4a745bc6n6144417a96581421@mail.gmail.com> <60E7E188-FB53-4F27-9E4E-83536476E2AB@jabberwocky.com> <9ef756150901290822g2e662385jf8fda40a90bbb83b@mail.gmail.com> <20090129211948.GE16331@jabberwocky.com> Message-ID: <9ef756150901291603n2ed66c40te19763520020630@mail.gmail.com> On Thu, Jan 29, 2009 at 10:19 PM, David Shaw wrote: > build-packet.c:build_sig_subpkt() > sign.c:make_keysig_packet() > sign.c:update_keysig_packet() Thanks :-) I'll have a look at it and come back to you if I should have questions ;-) Peter From ramon.loureiro at upf.edu Fri Jan 30 09:19:49 2009 From: ramon.loureiro at upf.edu (Ramon Loureiro) Date: Fri, 30 Jan 2009 09:19:49 +0100 Subject: Format of colon listings for list-sigs? Message-ID: <4982B825.5000500@upf.edu> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Hi! I've found the format of colon listings for --list-keys in docs/DETAILS http://cvs.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/viewcvs.cgi/branches/STABLE-BRANCH-1-4/doc/DETAILS?rev=4268&root=GnuPG&view=markup but where is the info for --list-sigs ? Thanks again - -- Ramon Loureiro Universitat Pompeu Fabra e-Confidential Project http://www.itea-econfidential.org/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJJgrglAAoJEMVZKsuAx9ZHOrIH/RA1IiGFBlqU/8DB8G/4Tk+l nUPnl+gCeRkdh/GpMSrRQ0MtlWsc308nEeL+3AyWhzM4pMap/wQXPM+IYXSsKsUV 8M3LGR/ajMJMqfD/tNn+NMEP7jW7QW+4XbvvICAytVJIqt6f0i/DDrNF3Yvoa+16 6RbJ4F43uQsiqm7cXbkcyHwcAxqJaLEEElZ8EZNnZfTW3fUfxPt8tXgJVcLn4bY0 RL1L32I/gsaJYqI3G0zNCSpAGv7mndEFHXDSMkOJPoGpRqpdGPxtHWErhS4mGLpj 4gtqJ9qlNGx/5lx+H2Mst9yObTGJBazWtMD1hJ8hdG0K5jTtrt66+zIPQWvkAoc= =/cGj -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From belstsrv at gmail.com Fri Jan 30 15:37:56 2009 From: belstsrv at gmail.com (Brian) Date: Fri, 30 Jan 2009 09:37:56 -0500 Subject: gpg.exe Vista Crash Message-ID: <498310C4.8020805@gmail.com> I recently moved to MS Vista and I've installed the gpg4win-1.1.3.exe package from http://www.gpg4win.org. When trying to run GPA or WinPT though, or even gpg from a command line, I always get an error saying gpg.exe has crashed. Does anyone know how to overcome this? Thanks! From henkdebruijn at gswot.org Fri Jan 30 19:15:18 2009 From: henkdebruijn at gswot.org (Henk M. de Bruijn) Date: Fri, 30 Jan 2009 19:15:18 +0100 Subject: gpg.exe Vista Crash In-Reply-To: <498310C4.8020805@gmail.com> References: <498310C4.8020805@gmail.com> Message-ID: <810345752.20090130191518@gswot.org> On Fri, 30 Jan 2009, at 09:37:56 [GMT -0500] (which was 15:37 where I live) Brian wrote: > I recently moved to MS Vista and I've installed the gpg4win-1.1.3.exe > package from http://www.gpg4win.org. > When trying to run GPA or WinPT though, or even gpg from a command line, > I always get an error saying gpg.exe has crashed. > Does anyone know how to overcome this? I have GPG and GPGshell in my program folder but all the files that are changing I have moved to: %AppData% (hidden) %Roaming% (hidden) GnuPG GPGshell HTH -- Met vriendelijke groet, Henk M. de Bruijn _________________________________________________________________________ The Bat! Natural Email System 4.1.11 on Microsoft? Windows Vista? Home Premium Versie 6.0.6001 Service Pack 1 Build 6001 Intel(R) Core(TM)2 Quad CPU Q8200 @ 2.33GHz, 2333 MHz,4 core('s),4 logic processors AntispamSniper for The Bat! Pro 3.0.1.2 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 505 bytes Desc: not available URL: From John at Mozilla-Enigmail.org Fri Jan 30 19:44:15 2009 From: John at Mozilla-Enigmail.org (John Clizbe) Date: Fri, 30 Jan 2009 12:44:15 -0600 Subject: gpg.exe Vista Crash In-Reply-To: <498310C4.8020805@gmail.com> References: <498310C4.8020805@gmail.com> Message-ID: <49834A7F.60407@Mozilla-Enigmail.org> Brian wrote: > I recently moved to MS Vista and I've installed the gpg4win-1.1.3.exe > package from http://www.gpg4win.org. > > When trying to run GPA or WinPT though, or even gpg from a command line, > I always get an error saying gpg.exe has crashed. > > Does anyone know how to overcome this? It's almost a FAQ ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/binary/gnupg-w32cli-1.4.9.exe Signature ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/binary/gnupg-w32cli-1.4.9.exe.sig SHA-1 c2efad983dfe50e6d8007257bad2c76604be389a gnupg-w32cli-1.4.9.exe -- John P. Clizbe Inet:John (a) Mozilla-Enigmail.org You can't spell fiasco without SCO. hkp://keyserver.gingerbear.net or mailto:pgp-public-keys at gingerbear.net?subject=HELP Q:"Just how do the residents of Haiku, Hawai'i hold conversations?" A:"An odd melody / island voices on the winds / surplus of vowels" -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 680 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From John at Mozilla-Enigmail.org Fri Jan 30 19:53:54 2009 From: John at Mozilla-Enigmail.org (John Clizbe) Date: Fri, 30 Jan 2009 12:53:54 -0600 Subject: gpg.exe Vista Crash In-Reply-To: <810345752.20090130191518@gswot.org> References: <498310C4.8020805@gmail.com> <810345752.20090130191518@gswot.org> Message-ID: <49834CC2.3050300@Mozilla-Enigmail.org> Henk M. de Bruijn wrote: > On Fri, 30 Jan 2009, at 09:37:56 [GMT -0500] (which was 15:37 where I > live) Brian wrote: > >> I recently moved to MS Vista and I've installed the gpg4win-1.1.3.exe >> package from http://www.gpg4win.org. > >> When trying to run GPA or WinPT though, or even gpg from a command line, >> I always get an error saying gpg.exe has crashed. > >> Does anyone know how to overcome this? > > I have GPG and GPGshell in my program folder but all the files that are > changing I have moved to: > %AppData% (hidden) > %Roaming% (hidden) > GnuPG > GPGshell Nothing at all to do with that, Henk. This a problem with the code in gpg.exe. IIRC, gpg4win 1.1.3 includes GnuPG 1.4.7. The patch that allows execution on Vista was committed about a week after 1.4.7's release and first appears in 1.4.8. -- John P. Clizbe Inet:John (a) Mozilla-Enigmail.org You can't spell fiasco without SCO. hkp://keyserver.gingerbear.net or mailto:pgp-public-keys at gingerbear.net?subject=HELP Q:"Just how do the residents of Haiku, Hawai'i hold conversations?" A:"An odd melody / island voices on the winds / surplus of vowels" -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 680 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From henkdebruijn at gswot.org Fri Jan 30 20:33:32 2009 From: henkdebruijn at gswot.org (Henk M. de Bruijn) Date: Fri, 30 Jan 2009 20:33:32 +0100 Subject: gpg.exe Vista Crash In-Reply-To: <49834CC2.3050300@Mozilla-Enigmail.org> References: <498310C4.8020805@gmail.com> <810345752.20090130191518@gswot.org> <49834CC2.3050300@Mozilla-Enigmail.org> Message-ID: <110672754.20090130203332@gswot.org> On Fri, 30 Jan 2009, at 12:53:54 [GMT -0600] (which was 19:53 where I live) John Clizbe wrote: >> I have GPG and GPGshell in my program folder but all the files that are >> changing I have moved to: >> %AppData% (hidden) >> %Roaming% (hidden) >> GnuPG >> GPGshell > Nothing at all to do with that, Henk. This a problem with the code in gpg.exe. > IIRC, gpg4win 1.1.3 includes GnuPG 1.4.7. > The patch that allows execution on Vista was committed about a week after > 1.4.7's release and first appears in 1.4.8. Thanks John, sorry for stepping in, thought it had something to do with Vista security... -- Henk M. de Bruijn _________________________________________________________________________ The Bat! Natural Email System 4.1.11 on Microsoft? Windows Vista? Home Premium Versie 6.0.6001 Service Pack 1 Build 6001 Intel(R) Core(TM)2 Quad CPU Q8200 @ 2.33GHz, 2333 MHz,4 core('s),4 logic processors AntispamSniper for The Bat! Pro 3.0.1.2 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 505 bytes Desc: not available URL: From belstsrv at gmail.com Fri Jan 30 20:18:31 2009 From: belstsrv at gmail.com (Brian) Date: Fri, 30 Jan 2009 14:18:31 -0500 Subject: gpg.exe Vista Crash In-Reply-To: <49834A7F.60407@Mozilla-Enigmail.org> References: <498310C4.8020805@gmail.com> <49834A7F.60407@Mozilla-Enigmail.org> Message-ID: <49835287.7060802@gmail.com> John Clizbe wrote: > Brian wrote: >> I recently moved to MS Vista and I've installed the gpg4win-1.1.3.exe >> package from http://www.gpg4win.org. >> >> When trying to run GPA or WinPT though, or even gpg from a command line, >> I always get an error saying gpg.exe has crashed. >> >> Does anyone know how to overcome this? > > It's almost a FAQ > > ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/binary/gnupg-w32cli-1.4.9.exe > > Signature > > ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/binary/gnupg-w32cli-1.4.9.exe.sig > > SHA-1 c2efad983dfe50e6d8007257bad2c76604be389a gnupg-w32cli-1.4.9.exe Thanks for the replies. Would I be OK to install the package from gpg4win and then install 1.4.9 effectively overwriting the gpg.exe? I'd swear I did that at some point during my troubleshooting, but I could be wrong. Or, should I install things separately like gpg.exe and then WinPT? Thanks again. From John at Mozilla-Enigmail.org Fri Jan 30 20:45:45 2009 From: John at Mozilla-Enigmail.org (John Clizbe) Date: Fri, 30 Jan 2009 13:45:45 -0600 Subject: gpg.exe Vista Crash In-Reply-To: <110672754.20090130203332@gswot.org> References: <498310C4.8020805@gmail.com> <810345752.20090130191518@gswot.org> <49834CC2.3050300@Mozilla-Enigmail.org> <110672754.20090130203332@gswot.org> Message-ID: <498358E9.7060602@Mozilla-Enigmail.org> Henk M. de Bruijn wrote: > On Fri, 30 Jan 2009, at 12:53:54 [GMT -0600] (which was 19:53 where I > live) John Clizbe wrote: > >> IIRC, gpg4win 1.1.3 includes GnuPG 1.4.7. > >> The patch that allows execution on Vista was committed about a week after >> 1.4.7's release and first appears in 1.4.8. > > Thanks John, sorry for stepping in, thought it had something to do with > Vista security... It does, just not the way you were thinking. ;-) Microsoft changed the way the access() system call operated. A pre-patched gpg.exe partially works on Vista - it'll fail accessing any of the keyserver helper programs. -- John P. Clizbe Inet:John (a) Mozilla-Enigmail.org You can't spell fiasco without SCO. hkp://keyserver.gingerbear.net or mailto:pgp-public-keys at gingerbear.net?subject=HELP Q:"Just how do the residents of Haiku, Hawai'i hold conversations?" A:"An odd melody / island voices on the winds / surplus of vowels" -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 680 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: From kloecker at kde.org Fri Jan 30 21:14:56 2009 From: kloecker at kde.org (Ingo =?iso-8859-1?q?Kl=F6cker?=) Date: Fri, 30 Jan 2009 21:14:56 +0100 Subject: Series of minor questions about OpenPGP 5 In-Reply-To: <9ef756150901290844l5efdd1b7h6bcda1c0a1c41f2f@mail.gmail.com> References: <9ef756150901280659s15359bddt4c47d549ab2f268c@mail.gmail.com> <200901282109.39936@thufir.ingo-kloecker.de> <9ef756150901290844l5efdd1b7h6bcda1c0a1c41f2f@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <200901302114.57458@thufir.ingo-kloecker.de> On Thursday 29 January 2009, Peter Thomas wrote: > 2009/1/28 Ingo Kl?cker : > > See http://www.fourmilab.ch/hotbits/ for a random number generator > > using radioactive decay. > > > > Under http://von-und-fuer-lau.de/ct-randcam.html you can download a > > (mostly) non-deterministic random number generator using a webcam. > > The page is in German. > > This sounds interesting. Is there any data available about the > quality of these random sources? There was an article about random number generators in the German magazine c't (issue 02/2009). The author of the article is also the author of ct-randcam. The article claims that ct-randcam passes all common/popular (German: g?ngig) statistical tests. hotbits is also claimed to pass all statistical tests. Regards, Ingo -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 197 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: From wolfgang at rosenauer.org Fri Jan 30 22:27:34 2009 From: wolfgang at rosenauer.org (Wolfgang Rosenauer) Date: Fri, 30 Jan 2009 22:27:34 +0100 Subject: app_readcert failed (smartcard) Message-ID: <498370C6.3020202@rosenauer.org> Hi, I'm trying to use my OpenPGP smartcard on openSUSE 11.1 which has gpg2 2.0.9. I'm using a Reiner SCT cyberjack reader and pcsc-lite (for now) to access the reader from scdaemon. But I get the following error for a simple gpg --card-status: wolfi at Hygiea:~> gpg --card-status gpg: OpenPGP Karte ist nicht vorhanden: Nicht unterst?tzte Verarbeitungsaufgabe In scdaemon.log that translates to: scdaemon[18495.0] DBG: <- READKEY OPENPGP.1 scdaemon[18495.0] DBG: -> [ 44 20 28 31 30 3a 70 75 62 6c 69 63 ...(165 bytes skipped) ] scdaemon[18495.0] DBG: -> OK scdaemon[18495.0] DBG: <- READCERT OPENPGP.1 2009-01-30 22:24:17 scdaemon[18495] app_readcert failed: Nicht unterst?tzte Verarbeitungsaufgabe scdaemon[18495.0] DBG: -> ERR 100663420 Nicht unterst?tzte Verarbeitungsaufgabe What is the problem with that? Another question is about the status of ctapi support. I failed to set it up and read that it's deprecated. But my online banking software is also using ctapi so I think having gnupg using pcsc-lite and the onlinebanking software ctapi interferes somehow. Thanks, Wolfgang From cbabcock at kolonelpanic.com Fri Jan 30 22:56:06 2009 From: cbabcock at kolonelpanic.com (Chris Babcock) Date: Fri, 30 Jan 2009 14:56:06 -0700 Subject: Where to find message processing how-to's Message-ID: <20090130145606.2ae1d20c@mail.asciiking.com> I'm developing wrapper scripts to provide OpenPGP-based authentication and transport layer encryption for email applications like mailing lists and play by email game servers. A lot of the functionality of these scripts will be provided by making system calls to gpg commands as the scripting language is very much specialized for parsing and filtering applications. In addition to "info gpg" and RFC 3156, are there any other resources that would be useful for parsing, decrypting and/or verifying inbound mail? Docs oriented towards Linux shell scripting would be ideal, but I understand why these are scarce. Chris Babcock -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 489 bytes Desc: not available URL: From belstsrv at gmail.com Sat Jan 31 23:38:08 2009 From: belstsrv at gmail.com (Brian) Date: Sat, 31 Jan 2009 17:38:08 -0500 Subject: gpg.exe Vista Crash In-Reply-To: <49834A7F.60407@Mozilla-Enigmail.org> References: <498310C4.8020805@gmail.com> <49834A7F.60407@Mozilla-Enigmail.org> Message-ID: <4984D2D0.3010903@gmail.com> John Clizbe wrote: > Brian wrote: >> I recently moved to MS Vista and I've installed the gpg4win-1.1.3.exe >> package from http://www.gpg4win.org. >> >> When trying to run GPA or WinPT though, or even gpg from a command line, >> I always get an error saying gpg.exe has crashed. >> >> Does anyone know how to overcome this? > > It's almost a FAQ > > ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/binary/gnupg-w32cli-1.4.9.exe > > Signature > > ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/binary/gnupg-w32cli-1.4.9.exe.sig > > SHA-1 c2efad983dfe50e6d8007257bad2c76604be389a gnupg-w32cli-1.4.9.exe I downloaded 1.4.9 and installed it. I then grabbed WinPT and when launching WinPT, I get repeated gpg.exe crashes, like I did before. I also downloaded GnuPT and installed that, which comes with 1.4.9 and running that also causes gpg.exe crashes. I then took all of the EXEs from w32cli install and copied them over to the GnuPT folder and had the same result. I am really at a loss as to how to get a GUI interface to work with GnuPG. What should I try next?