howto secure older keys after the recent attacks
reynt0 at cs.albany.edu
Fri Sep 11 02:36:39 CEST 2009
On Fri, 2009-09-11 Christoph Anton Mitterer wrote:
. . .
> sell bad devices that produce poor entropy thus rendering
> our (symmetric and asymmetric) keys, signatures etc. "useless".
. . .
Just out of curiousity, about how "poor" entropy might make
it easy to break encryption: Is it necessary for an attacker
to know pre-attack that a specific targeted file has been
encrypted or etc using poor entropy? Or is the weakness one
which can efficiently be exploited en mass, by attacking all
files in a batch of files and just being successful against
any of the files which happened to be encrypted using poor
More information about the Gnupg-users