multiple subkeys and key transition

[Ben McGinnes]

On 10/12/10 11:16 AM, David Shaw wrote:
> 
> Yes, but at the risk of pedantry:

I'd rather the accuracy of pedantry than be mired in uffish thought.

> The attacks against SHA-1 haven't been extended to the SHA-2 family
> yet.  By truncating a SHA-2 to 160 bits, you're creating a
> non-broken (for now) 160-bit hash.  Think of it as a non-broken
> SHA-1: it's theoretically as strong as SHA-1 once was thought to be,
> but not stronger.
>
> (i.e. it's a great SHA-1 alternative, but it's not as strong as a
> full-sized SHA-2).

Alright, that's pretty clear, thanks.


Regards,
Ben

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