multiple subkeys and key transition
expires2010 at ymail.com
Sun Dec 12 03:14:07 CET 2010
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On Saturday 11 December 2010 at 11:49:23 PM, in
<mid:4D040E03.1020404 at fifthhorseman.net>, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> On 12/11/2010 06:22 PM, MFPA wrote:
>> A question on the subject of SSL/TLS certificates and
>> HTTPS: often there is no user requirement to
>> "authenticate" the identity of the server, but rather
>> a simple requirement to prevent snooping; why does
>> this need a certificate?
> "prevent snooping" means "only me and the remote server
> i'm connected to has access to the communication".
> if you don't know who the remote server actually *is*,
> you cannot prevent snooping by a man-in-the-middle.
That's a fair point; it depends on the threat model. RFC 5246 says the
authentication is optional, but that completely anonymous connections
only provide protection against passive eavesdropping, and server
authentication is required where active man-in-the-middle attacks are
But couldn't a man-in-the-middle server authenticate by presenting the
user's browser with an acceptable certificate signed by a "trusted"
CA? And is a self-signed certificate any more or any less secure in
MFPA mailto:expires2010 at ymail.com
Was time invented by an Irishman named O'Clock?
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