Encryption to key with multiple subkeys

[Joke de Buhr]

On Wednesday 12 May 2010 00:44:37 Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> I'm not suggesting that joke's proposal of
> encrypt-to-all-encryption-capable-subkeys is the right choice, but it's
> not clear that there's any particular reason to prefer one key over
> another (perhaps if you were introducing a new asymmetric algorithm,
> you'd want to keep your old RSA encryption key around for users who
> don't have support for the new algorithm).

The encrypt-to-all-encryption-capable-subkeys ensures that the owner of the 
primary key will always be able to decrypt the message no matter what (not-
revoke) encryption key secrets he can access at the moment.

And since it's his primary key the message is intended to read by him.

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