From marcio.barbado at gmail.com  Mon Aug  1 21:47:39 2011
From: marcio.barbado at gmail.com (Marcio B. Jr.)
Date: Mon, 1 Aug 2011 16:47:39 -0300
Subject: secring and dropbox
In-Reply-To: <20110723000702.GA9838@poseidon.cocyt.us>
References: <8739i1wbjz.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<20110720153916.GB7497@poseidon.cocyt.us>
	<CABvAZ+GTm9vjDHM6X2ie73tsrcx1jQzLsvYAxG-iQ_EhMJ0a3A@mail.gmail.com>
	<20110720165535.GD7497@poseidon.cocyt.us>
	<4E276C53.8000906@freenet.edmonton.ab.ca>
	<20110721142009.GG7497@poseidon.cocyt.us>
	<4E2838FF.7070303@adversary.org>
	<20110721231525.GH7497@poseidon.cocyt.us>
	<20110721231727.GI7497@poseidon.cocyt.us>
	<20110722193709.GA5656@hiro.matrix>
	<20110723000702.GA9838@poseidon.cocyt.us>
Message-ID: <CA+0jWE3LgxcgcH6+=5y6_rjUGun7yG7iJ7n8U4gy5ugd5jncUQ@mail.gmail.com>

https://twitter.com/#!/csoghoian/status/98116328677834752


On Fri, Jul 22, 2011 at 9:07 PM, Aaron Toponce <aaron.toponce at gmail.com> wrote:
> On Fri, Jul 22, 2011 at 09:37:09PM +0200, Michel Messerschmidt wrote:
>> set pgp_auto_decode = yes
>
> Perfect! That was the variable I was looking for! Thanks!
>
> --
> . o . ? o . o ? . . o ? o . . ? . o .
> . . o ? . o o ? o . o ? . o o ? . . o
> o o o ? . o . ? . o o ? o o . ? o o o
>
> _______________________________________________
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
>
>



Marcio Barbado, Jr.


From rbraun at footlocker.com  Tue Aug  2 15:55:24 2011
From: rbraun at footlocker.com (Randy Braun)
Date: Tue, 2 Aug 2011 08:55:24 -0500
Subject: decrypt adding ^M characters at the end of each line
Message-ID: <OF7ED41273.BADEE3B2-ON852578E0.004C1374-862578E0.004C7C2B@corp.footlocker.net>


Anyone have any ideas as to why I am seeing ^M characters at the end of
each line after decrypting a file?

I am using the following:

/sftw/gnupg/bin/gpg --output /path/path/testfile.txt
--decrypt /path/path/testfile.txt.pgp

This is gnupg 1.4.10 on AIX 5.3.12.2




From david at systemoverlord.com  Tue Aug  2 17:18:06 2011
From: david at systemoverlord.com (David Tomaschik)
Date: Tue, 2 Aug 2011 11:18:06 -0400
Subject: decrypt adding ^M characters at the end of each line
In-Reply-To: <OF7ED41273.BADEE3B2-ON852578E0.004C1374-862578E0.004C7C2B@corp.footlocker.net>
References: <OF7ED41273.BADEE3B2-ON852578E0.004C1374-862578E0.004C7C2B@corp.footlocker.net>
Message-ID: <CAOy4VzdAGQb6zdoCsVuup7r3=h0xUp_T0ojsKXzjVzb4UcYa+g@mail.gmail.com>

On Tue, Aug 2, 2011 at 9:55 AM, Randy Braun <rbraun at footlocker.com> wrote:
>
> Anyone have any ideas as to why I am seeing ^M characters at the end of
> each line after decrypting a file?
>
> I am using the following:
>
> /sftw/gnupg/bin/gpg --output /path/path/testfile.txt
> --decrypt /path/path/testfile.txt.pgp
>
> This is gnupg 1.4.10 on AIX 5.3.12.2


Was the file encrypted on another platform?  Windows, for example,
places \r\n (carriage return, newline) at the end of each line.  UNIX
OSs use just \n, and Mac OS 9 and earlier used just \r.  ^M is another
representation of the carriage return character.  (Aka \r.)

David



-- 
David Tomaschik, RHCE, LPIC-1
System Administrator/Open Source Advocate
OpenPGP: 0x5DEA789B
http://systemoverlord.com
david at systemoverlord.com


From dshaw at jabberwocky.com  Tue Aug  2 17:43:30 2011
From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw)
Date: Tue, 2 Aug 2011 11:43:30 -0400
Subject: decrypt adding ^M characters at the end of each line
In-Reply-To: <OF7ED41273.BADEE3B2-ON852578E0.004C1374-862578E0.004C7C2B@corp.footlocker.net>
References: <OF7ED41273.BADEE3B2-ON852578E0.004C1374-862578E0.004C7C2B@corp.footlocker.net>
Message-ID: <09F23D8B-79BB-4A00-A884-3D5B1446FC9F@jabberwocky.com>

On Aug 2, 2011, at 9:55 AM, Randy Braun wrote:

> 
> Anyone have any ideas as to why I am seeing ^M characters at the end of
> each line after decrypting a file?
> 
> I am using the following:
> 
> /sftw/gnupg/bin/gpg --output /path/path/testfile.txt
> --decrypt /path/path/testfile.txt.pgp
> 
> This is gnupg 1.4.10 on AIX 5.3.12.2

This sort of thing can happen when the sender and receiver machines have different conventions for what ends a line of text.  Unix machines use LF, Windows uses CRLF, etc.  GPG has built-in support for handling this confusion, but you have to tell it that the input file is text.

So, on the *encrypting* side, add "--textmode" to the command, and that will tell GPG to store things appropriately, and the decrypting side will recognize this and use the appropriate line endings in the resulting file.

David



From rbraun at footlocker.com  Tue Aug  2 18:17:47 2011
From: rbraun at footlocker.com (Randy Braun)
Date: Tue, 2 Aug 2011 11:17:47 -0500
Subject: decrypt adding ^M characters at the end of each line
In-Reply-To: <CAOy4VzdAGQb6zdoCsVuup7r3=h0xUp_T0ojsKXzjVzb4UcYa+g@mail.gmail.com>
References: <OF7ED41273.BADEE3B2-ON852578E0.004C1374-862578E0.004C7C2B@corp.footlocker.net>
	<CAOy4VzdAGQb6zdoCsVuup7r3=h0xUp_T0ojsKXzjVzb4UcYa+g@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <OF98E028E3.6B967831-ON852578E0.0058D6E1-862578E0.0059853B@corp.footlocker.net>

I have that very question out to the vendor to see what platform the file
was created on prior to encrypting it.

I have seen this same behavior with ftp when you go from windows to unix or
vice versa when you don't use binary mode.

I guess I as wondering if there is some sort of switch I can use with pgp
to strip out the ^M? I know I could cat the output file to sed and strip
out the ^M but I was hoping there was something in gpg that would do this.

Randy Braun
Foot Locker Corporate Services
Office 414-357-4148
Email  rbraun at footlocker.com


|------------>
| From:      |
|------------>
  >--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |David Tomaschik <david at systemoverlord.com>                                                                                                        |
  >--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|------------>
| To:        |
|------------>
  >--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |Randy Braun <rbraun at footlocker.com>                                                                                                               |
  >--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|------------>
| Cc:        |
|------------>
  >--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |gnupg-users at gnupg.org                                                                                                                             |
  >--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|------------>
| Date:      |
|------------>
  >--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |08/02/2011 10:18 AM                                                                                                                               |
  >--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|------------>
| Subject:   |
|------------>
  >--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |Re: decrypt adding ^M characters at the end of each line                                                                                          |
  >--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|





On Tue, Aug 2, 2011 at 9:55 AM, Randy Braun <rbraun at footlocker.com> wrote:
>
> Anyone have any ideas as to why I am seeing ^M characters at the end of
> each line after decrypting a file?
>
> I am using the following:
>
> /sftw/gnupg/bin/gpg --output /path/path/testfile.txt
> --decrypt /path/path/testfile.txt.pgp
>
> This is gnupg 1.4.10 on AIX 5.3.12.2


Was the file encrypted on another platform?  Windows, for example,
places \r\n (carriage return, newline) at the end of each line.  UNIX
OSs use just \n, and Mac OS 9 and earlier used just \r.  ^M is another
representation of the carriage return character.  (Aka \r.)

David



--
David Tomaschik, RHCE, LPIC-1
System Administrator/Open Source Advocate
OpenPGP: 0x5DEA789B
http://systemoverlord.com
david at systemoverlord.com





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From rbraun at footlocker.com  Tue Aug  2 18:19:33 2011
From: rbraun at footlocker.com (Randy Braun)
Date: Tue, 2 Aug 2011 11:19:33 -0500
Subject: decrypt adding ^M characters at the end of each line
In-Reply-To: <09F23D8B-79BB-4A00-A884-3D5B1446FC9F@jabberwocky.com>
References: <OF7ED41273.BADEE3B2-ON852578E0.004C1374-862578E0.004C7C2B@corp.footlocker.net>
	<09F23D8B-79BB-4A00-A884-3D5B1446FC9F@jabberwocky.com>
Message-ID: <OF26FCCBE6.D2F04C6E-ON852578E0.00599798-862578E0.0059AE95@corp.footlocker.net>

Thanks... I'll see if I can get the vendor to add --textmode to their
encryption process.



|------------>
| From:      |
|------------>
  >--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |David Shaw <dshaw at jabberwocky.com>                                                                                                                |
  >--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|------------>
| To:        |
|------------>
  >--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |Randy Braun <rbraun at footlocker.com>                                                                                                               |
  >--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|------------>
| Cc:        |
|------------>
  >--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |gnupg-users at gnupg.org                                                                                                                             |
  >--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|------------>
| Date:      |
|------------>
  >--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |08/02/2011 10:43 AM                                                                                                                               |
  >--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|------------>
| Subject:   |
|------------>
  >--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |Re: decrypt adding ^M characters at the end of each line                                                                                          |
  >--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|





On Aug 2, 2011, at 9:55 AM, Randy Braun wrote:

>
> Anyone have any ideas as to why I am seeing ^M characters at the end of
> each line after decrypting a file?
>
> I am using the following:
>
> /sftw/gnupg/bin/gpg --output /path/path/testfile.txt
> --decrypt /path/path/testfile.txt.pgp
>
> This is gnupg 1.4.10 on AIX 5.3.12.2

This sort of thing can happen when the sender and receiver machines have
different conventions for what ends a line of text.  Unix machines use LF,
Windows uses CRLF, etc.  GPG has built-in support for handling this
confusion, but you have to tell it that the input file is text.

So, on the *encrypting* side, add "--textmode" to the command, and that
will tell GPG to store things appropriately, and the decrypting side will
recognize this and use the appropriate line endings in the resulting file.

David








From dshaw at jabberwocky.com  Tue Aug  2 18:55:35 2011
From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw)
Date: Tue, 2 Aug 2011 12:55:35 -0400
Subject: decrypt adding ^M characters at the end of each line
In-Reply-To: <OF98E028E3.6B967831-ON852578E0.0058D6E1-862578E0.0059853B@corp.footlocker.net>
References: <OF7ED41273.BADEE3B2-ON852578E0.004C1374-862578E0.004C7C2B@corp.footlocker.net>
	<CAOy4VzdAGQb6zdoCsVuup7r3=h0xUp_T0ojsKXzjVzb4UcYa+g@mail.gmail.com>
	<OF98E028E3.6B967831-ON852578E0.0058D6E1-862578E0.0059853B@corp.footlocker.net>
Message-ID: <93745E54-E902-4B8A-9466-3C59F03D305A@jabberwocky.com>

On Aug 2, 2011, at 12:17 PM, Randy Braun wrote:

> I have that very question out to the vendor to see what platform the file
> was created on prior to encrypting it.
> 
> I have seen this same behavior with ftp when you go from windows to unix or
> vice versa when you don't use binary mode.
> 
> I guess I as wondering if there is some sort of switch I can use with pgp
> to strip out the ^M? I know I could cat the output file to sed and strip
> out the ^M but I was hoping there was something in gpg that would do this.

There is just textmode, which is something the sender sets.  On the recipient side, GPG follows the encoding inside the message.  If that message is not textmode (i.e. no transformation) then GPG won't touch the content, so you need to break out the sed.

David



From rbraun at footlocker.com  Tue Aug  2 19:44:47 2011
From: rbraun at footlocker.com (Randy Braun)
Date: Tue, 2 Aug 2011 12:44:47 -0500
Subject: decrypt adding ^M characters at the end of each line
In-Reply-To: <93745E54-E902-4B8A-9466-3C59F03D305A@jabberwocky.com>
References: <OF7ED41273.BADEE3B2-ON852578E0.004C1374-862578E0.004C7C2B@corp.footlocker.net>
	<CAOy4VzdAGQb6zdoCsVuup7r3=h0xUp_T0ojsKXzjVzb4UcYa+g@mail.gmail.com>
	<OF98E028E3.6B967831-ON852578E0.0058D6E1-862578E0.0059853B@corp.footlocker.net>
	<93745E54-E902-4B8A-9466-3C59F03D305A@jabberwocky.com>
Message-ID: <OFF26A5157.EE35F221-ON852578E0.00615A67-862578E0.00617C27@corp.footlocker.net>

OK thanks.... I'm going to try to get the vendor to encrypt in text mode if
not I'll have to strip out the ^M with sed before we process the file.




|------------>
| From:      |
|------------>
  >--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |David Shaw <dshaw at jabberwocky.com>                                                                                                                |
  >--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|------------>
| To:        |
|------------>
  >--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |Randy Braun <rbraun at footlocker.com>                                                                                                               |
  >--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|------------>
| Cc:        |
|------------>
  >--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |David Tomaschik <david at systemoverlord.com>, gnupg-users at gnupg.org                                                                                 |
  >--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|------------>
| Date:      |
|------------>
  >--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |08/02/2011 11:55 AM                                                                                                                               |
  >--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|------------>
| Subject:   |
|------------>
  >--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |Re: decrypt adding ^M characters at the end of each line                                                                                          |
  >--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|





On Aug 2, 2011, at 12:17 PM, Randy Braun wrote:

> I have that very question out to the vendor to see what platform the file
> was created on prior to encrypting it.
>
> I have seen this same behavior with ftp when you go from windows to unix
or
> vice versa when you don't use binary mode.
>
> I guess I as wondering if there is some sort of switch I can use with pgp
> to strip out the ^M? I know I could cat the output file to sed and strip
> out the ^M but I was hoping there was something in gpg that would do
this.

There is just textmode, which is something the sender sets.  On the
recipient side, GPG follows the encoding inside the message.  If that
message is not textmode (i.e. no transformation) then GPG won't touch the
content, so you need to break out the sed.

David








From tigresetdragons at yahoo.fr  Tue Aug  2 20:10:34 2011
From: tigresetdragons at yahoo.fr (=?ISO-8859-1?Q?S=E9bastien?=)
Date: Tue, 02 Aug 2011 20:10:34 +0200
Subject: Extract numbers from a key
Message-ID: <4E383D9A.5050204@yahoo.fr>

Hello,
I would like to know an easy way to get numbers used in a key.
For example, in a RSA key, N and e (used like this: message^e modulus N)

Here is one RSA 1024 bits public key:
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: GnuPG v1.4.10 (GNU/Linux)
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=lNKN
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

What are N and e ?


From melvincarvalho at gmail.com  Wed Aug  3 12:23:11 2011
From: melvincarvalho at gmail.com (Melvin Carvalho)
Date: Wed, 3 Aug 2011 12:23:11 +0200
Subject: Extract numbers from a key
In-Reply-To: <4E383D9A.5050204@yahoo.fr>
References: <4E383D9A.5050204@yahoo.fr>
Message-ID: <CAKaEYhLZ2On0zkC_Jq8He0YEpk53WdFaFp=yaZS0Mf6brLkMyA@mail.gmail.com>

On 2 August 2011 20:10, S?bastien <tigresetdragons at yahoo.fr> wrote:
> Hello,
> I would like to know an easy way to get numbers used in a key.
> For example, in a RSA key, N and e (used like this: message^e modulus N)

Why do you want N and E?

I think exponent is almost always 65537

Some apps display these numbers, e.g. firefox does for X.509 RSA keys.
  Maybe the app you are using has the value.

Not sure the easiest way to get the modulus otherwise but I know you
can do it with the bouncycastle java library.

>
> Here is one RSA 1024 bits public key:
> -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
> Version: GnuPG v1.4.10 (GNU/Linux)
>
> mI0ETjgHawEEAMy2xBB1f2tQBd5pIlztN9FrtS3pHEzT73tgOLVLat4h5rhIjMo4
> 9zx7PSucB+v/W/l4w1OuABwXwbiyZmYs6xrXsHWLWS3HQzz1c7Kqytr2yLUn8+Ua
> oZfHnHfHXBVen7r3fCF6HmLoUt6i6EMIdKeXgLgw56Imi+vuUP4Tk+T/ABEBAAG0
> PnRvdG8gYmlzICgyw6htZSBlc3NhaSBkZSBjcsOpYXRpb24gZGUgY2zDqSkgPHRv
> dG8yQG91aS1vdWkuZnI+iLgEEwECACIFAk44B2sCGwMGCwkIBwMCBhUIAgkKCwQW
> AgMBAh4BAheAAAoJEPL2A707YVbW198D/3zFEv9BBwaU1c4ynOzpA7snpe1my79y
> FPmPtZ+hA1KIMQjEVhGX2Frg9gI0Ctruoyg6xKnxup/lD90MFGstVg+4NQNrQ69p
> oXGV/VlrT0iM0vvN55WIu5Kdqpg2/OHyrABe9mxvRbQRFCXmPSQ5u4V6MJw29W5i
> 2jhWZbrxGDASuI0ETjgHawEEALsT4E4TiLKyt7vRADTY2gHOoLISC0Raw/Idxqph
> WtMw/onfa75GS8tx6DzTueVULyyWwh+iMMUbX5ZoMvFmpft32NdJBF7FPhFYTfoQ
> /qTshjUHMAVsdgjJ4INBUNj8+2TiLdXS1aGxv7chg1OJynGCV3Uw5VFgTVS1GQku
> HknJABEBAAGInwQYAQIACQUCTjgHawIbDAAKCRDy9gO9O2FW1nHlA/4p9H+ko3y/
> cuLWUmT5ytq1TYSvFzp7vP2NRlNtgL9RgUSO3T+Qi83RiCrqI6XIGH92cKG661kn
> ZFdkD5KUVzyCUV+Aotp10KDlzb9yEPxjULkvgGy7RR5tsP0yDHSdcdZ0qI7Uikla
> gfwM5a1NqG2nerqlcvzx4t+Qw/P6OsdcwA==
> =lNKN
> -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
>
> What are N and e ?
>
> _______________________________________________
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
>


From jerome at jeromebaum.com  Wed Aug  3 12:24:57 2011
From: jerome at jeromebaum.com (Jerome Baum)
Date: Wed, 3 Aug 2011 12:24:57 +0200
Subject: Extract numbers from a key
In-Reply-To: <4E383D9A.5050204@yahoo.fr>
References: <4E383D9A.5050204@yahoo.fr>
Message-ID: <CABvAZ+HeaDA=SYYq7WFz+sOEzujTWrE2KwuDirHpvyC4TGeMcQ@mail.gmail.com>

> For example, in a RSA key, N and e (used like this: message^e modulus N)

Note that gpg uses hybrid (session key) encryption. There are various
advantages, e.g. you can reveal the session key to someone else (think
subpoena) without giving up your entire key.

-- 
Jerome Baum

Hessenweg 222
48432 Rheine
GERMANY

tel +49-1578-8434336
email jerome at jeromebaum.com
web www.jeromebaum.com
--
PGP: A0E4 B2D4 94E6 20EE 85BA E45B 63E4 2BD8 C58C 753A
PGP: 2C23 EBFF DF1A 840D 2351 F5F5 F25B A03F 2152 36DA
--
Q: Why is this email five sentences or less?
A: http://five.sentenc.es


From wk at gnupg.org  Wed Aug  3 14:23:09 2011
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Wed, 03 Aug 2011 14:23:09 +0200
Subject: Extract numbers from a key
In-Reply-To: <4E383D9A.5050204@yahoo.fr> (=?utf-8?Q?=22S=C3=A9bastien=22's?=
	message of "Tue, 02 Aug 2011 20:10:34 +0200")
References: <4E383D9A.5050204@yahoo.fr>
Message-ID: <8739hiadle.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Tue,  2 Aug 2011 20:10, tigresetdragons at yahoo.fr said:

> I would like to know an easy way to get numbers used in a key.
> For example, in a RSA key, N and e (used like this: message^e modulus N)

Import the key and then:

$ gpg --list-keys --with-key-data KEYID

In the output look for pkd records:

If field 1 has the tag "pkd", a listing looks like this:
pkd:0:1024:B665B1435F4C2 .... FF26ABB:
    !  !   !-- the value
    !  !------ for information: number of bits in the value
    !--------- index (eg. DSA goes from 0 to 3: p,q,g,y)

The entire format is decribed in doc/DETAILS.


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From vedaal at nym.hush.com  Wed Aug  3 15:35:58 2011
From: vedaal at nym.hush.com (vedaal at nym.hush.com)
Date: Wed, 03 Aug 2011 09:35:58 -0400
Subject: Extract numbers from a key
Message-ID: <20110803133558.6FB68E673F@smtp.hushmail.com>

S?bastien tigresetdragons at yahoo.fr wrote on
Tue Aug 2 20:10:34 CEST 2011 :

>an easy way to get numbers used in a key.
> For example, in a RSA key, N and e (used like this: message^e 
modulus N)

Try the PGP dump interface:
http://www.pgpdump.net/cgi-bin/pgpdump

check all the boxes to get the maximum amount of information


vedaal




From vedaal at nym.hush.com  Wed Aug  3 15:40:25 2011
From: vedaal at nym.hush.com (vedaal at nym.hush.com)
Date: Wed, 03 Aug 2011 09:40:25 -0400
Subject: Extract numbers from a key // wrong pgpdump link :-(
Message-ID: <20110803134025.42EDAE6739@smtp.hushmail.com>

Sorry, wrong link extension,

here is the correct one:
http://www.pgpdump.net/


vedaal



From tigresetdragons at yahoo.fr  Wed Aug  3 12:43:17 2011
From: tigresetdragons at yahoo.fr (=?UTF-8?B?U8OpYmFzdGllbg==?=)
Date: Wed, 03 Aug 2011 12:43:17 +0200
Subject: Extract numbers from a key
In-Reply-To: <CABvAZ+HeaDA=SYYq7WFz+sOEzujTWrE2KwuDirHpvyC4TGeMcQ@mail.gmail.com>
References: <4E383D9A.5050204@yahoo.fr>
	<CABvAZ+HeaDA=SYYq7WFz+sOEzujTWrE2KwuDirHpvyC4TGeMcQ@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <4E392645.2020208@yahoo.fr>

I know that gpg is an hybrid system.
I want to know these numbers to check with a mathematica-like program 
that numbers supposed to be primes are actually real prime numbers.


From tigresetdragons at yahoo.fr  Wed Aug  3 23:39:45 2011
From: tigresetdragons at yahoo.fr (=?ISO-8859-1?Q?S=E9bastien?=)
Date: Wed, 03 Aug 2011 23:39:45 +0200
Subject: Extract numbers from a key
In-Reply-To: <8739hiadle.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <4E383D9A.5050204@yahoo.fr> <8739hiadle.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <4E39C021.4010501@yahoo.fr>

I tried the --with-key-data option which gives the numbers I'm looking 
for. Unfortunately, this doesn't work with the secret key.
I tried with pgpdump but it doesn't work anymore because numbers in 
secret keys are encrypted.
Is there any way to decrypt these numbers in the secret key?

Le 03/08/2011 14:23, Werner Koch a ?crit :
> On Tue,  2 Aug 2011 20:10, tigresetdragons at yahoo.fr said:
>
>> I would like to know an easy way to get numbers used in a key.
>> For example, in a RSA key, N and e (used like this: message^e modulus N)
>
> Import the key and then:
>
> $ gpg --list-keys --with-key-data KEYID
>
> In the output look for pkd records:
>
> If field 1 has the tag "pkd", a listing looks like this:
> pkd:0:1024:B665B1435F4C2 .... FF26ABB:
>      !  !   !-- the value
>      !  !------ for information: number of bits in the value
>      !--------- index (eg. DSA goes from 0 to 3: p,q,g,y)
>
> The entire format is decribed in doc/DETAILS.
>
>
> Salam-Shalom,
>
>     Werner
>


From jerome at jeromebaum.com  Thu Aug  4 15:05:31 2011
From: jerome at jeromebaum.com (Jerome Baum)
Date: Thu, 4 Aug 2011 15:05:31 +0200
Subject: Extract numbers from a key
In-Reply-To: <4E392645.2020208@yahoo.fr>
References: <4E383D9A.5050204@yahoo.fr>
	<CABvAZ+HeaDA=SYYq7WFz+sOEzujTWrE2KwuDirHpvyC4TGeMcQ@mail.gmail.com>
	<4E392645.2020208@yahoo.fr>
Message-ID: <CABvAZ+EF8=XpzGeeV9NZFHMAD5H4GxGcGhYGK7Jb5ND_qMy8cA@mail.gmail.com>

> I know that gpg is an hybrid system.
> I want to know these numbers to check with a mathematica-like program that
> numbers supposed to be primes are actually real prime numbers.

What is that supposed to tell you? It's not like Mathematica does an
exhaustive check either.

A healthy dose of paranoia is good though, so maybe you can decrypt
the key (set an empty password or remove the password) before sending
it to pgpdump?

-- 
Jerome Baum

Hessenweg 222
48432 Rheine
GERMANY

tel +49-1578-8434336
email jerome at jeromebaum.com
web www.jeromebaum.com
--
PGP: A0E4 B2D4 94E6 20EE 85BA E45B 63E4 2BD8 C58C 753A
PGP: 2C23 EBFF DF1A 840D 2351 F5F5 F25B A03F 2152 36DA
--
Q: Why is this email five sentences or less?
A: http://five.sentenc.es


From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Thu Aug  4 15:21:42 2011
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Thu, 04 Aug 2011 09:21:42 -0400
Subject: Extract numbers from a key
In-Reply-To: <CABvAZ+EF8=XpzGeeV9NZFHMAD5H4GxGcGhYGK7Jb5ND_qMy8cA@mail.gmail.com>
References: <4E383D9A.5050204@yahoo.fr>
	<CABvAZ+HeaDA=SYYq7WFz+sOEzujTWrE2KwuDirHpvyC4TGeMcQ@mail.gmail.com>
	<4E392645.2020208@yahoo.fr>
	<CABvAZ+EF8=XpzGeeV9NZFHMAD5H4GxGcGhYGK7Jb5ND_qMy8cA@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <4E3A9CE6.10300@sixdemonbag.org>

On 8/4/11 9:05 AM, Jerome Baum wrote:
> What is that supposed to tell you? It's not like Mathematica does an
> exhaustive check either.

The PRIMES algorithm can be expressed in Mathematica, and provides an
exhaustive check.  Mathematica's built-in tools don't provide PRIMES,
but it can be added by a modestly proficient Mathematica user.


From jerome at jeromebaum.com  Thu Aug  4 15:32:21 2011
From: jerome at jeromebaum.com (Jerome Baum)
Date: Thu, 4 Aug 2011 15:32:21 +0200
Subject: Extract numbers from a key
In-Reply-To: <4E3A9CE6.10300@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <4E383D9A.5050204@yahoo.fr>
	<CABvAZ+HeaDA=SYYq7WFz+sOEzujTWrE2KwuDirHpvyC4TGeMcQ@mail.gmail.com>
	<4E392645.2020208@yahoo.fr>
	<CABvAZ+EF8=XpzGeeV9NZFHMAD5H4GxGcGhYGK7Jb5ND_qMy8cA@mail.gmail.com>
	<4E3A9CE6.10300@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <CABvAZ+FriT2K=LMypVJnG4+U4yUSp_Mpzm9Un9b0nRWPowFOZw@mail.gmail.com>

> The PRIMES algorithm can be expressed in Mathematica, and provides an
> exhaustive check. ?Mathematica's built-in tools don't provide PRIMES,
> but it can be added by a modestly proficient Mathematica user.

So just a sieve? Isn't that going to take ages on any reasonable key?

-- 
Jerome Baum

Hessenweg 222
48432 Rheine
GERMANY

tel +49-1578-8434336
email jerome at jeromebaum.com
web www.jeromebaum.com
--
PGP: A0E4 B2D4 94E6 20EE 85BA E45B 63E4 2BD8 C58C 753A
PGP: 2C23 EBFF DF1A 840D 2351 F5F5 F25B A03F 2152 36DA
--
Q: Why is this email five sentences or less?
A: http://five.sentenc.es


From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Thu Aug  4 15:54:05 2011
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Thu, 04 Aug 2011 09:54:05 -0400
Subject: Extract numbers from a key
In-Reply-To: <CABvAZ+FriT2K=LMypVJnG4+U4yUSp_Mpzm9Un9b0nRWPowFOZw@mail.gmail.com>
References: <4E383D9A.5050204@yahoo.fr>
	<CABvAZ+HeaDA=SYYq7WFz+sOEzujTWrE2KwuDirHpvyC4TGeMcQ@mail.gmail.com>
	<4E392645.2020208@yahoo.fr>
	<CABvAZ+EF8=XpzGeeV9NZFHMAD5H4GxGcGhYGK7Jb5ND_qMy8cA@mail.gmail.com>
	<4E3A9CE6.10300@sixdemonbag.org>
	<CABvAZ+FriT2K=LMypVJnG4+U4yUSp_Mpzm9Un9b0nRWPowFOZw@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <4E3AA47D.2090204@sixdemonbag.org>

On 8/4/11 9:32 AM, Jerome Baum wrote:
> So just a sieve? Isn't that going to take ages on any reasonable key?

No.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AKS_primality_test




From vedaal at nym.hush.com  Thu Aug  4 16:14:55 2011
From: vedaal at nym.hush.com (vedaal at nym.hush.com)
Date: Thu, 04 Aug 2011 10:14:55 -0400
Subject: Extract numbers from a key
Message-ID: <20110804141455.579BCE6730@smtp.hushmail.com>

>Date: Wed, 03 Aug 2011 12:43:17 +0200
>From: S?bastien <tigresetdragons at yahoo.fr>
>Cc: gnupg-users at gnupg.org
>Subject: Re: Extract numbers from a key
>Message-ID: <4E392645.2020208 at yahoo.fr>
>Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed

>I know that gpg is an hybrid system.
>I want to know these numbers to check with a mathematica-like 
>program 
>that numbers supposed to be primes are actually real prime 
>numbers.
-----
>I tried with pgpdump but it doesn't work anymore because numbers 
in 
>secret keys are encrypted.
>Is there any way to decrypt these numbers in the secret key?


Remove the password and then check it in pgpdump
but NOT over the internet ;-)

Download the sourcecode and compile pgpdump on your computer and 
then check it.
http://www.pgpdump.net/about.html

Or, alternatively, if all you want to do is see how gnupg makes a 
key and if primes are used,
then generate a test key for this purpose, with the passphrase 
blank, and send it to pgpdump.

But, if you are suspecting gnupg (or any openpgp implementation), 
of generating a composite key with a secret prime factor that the 
implementation can use for master decryption, then there is an 
easier way for them to accomplish this, in a way where the the 
prime numbers are definitely primes, but the program can still 
decrypt:

All that is necessary, is to use pre-canned primes, 
(i.e. to generate a prime which falls within a range of primes 
stored in an offsite area by the implementation.)

The decryption can be accomplished with relatively little 
difficulty, by checking all the pre-canned primes, which would be 
much, much fewer, [but still large enough that someone using the 
program, would not be likely to generate duplicate keys].

Short of thoroughly checking the source code, this would not be 
user-detectable,
and if you are already checking the gnupg sourcecode, 
you can see that the generation of primes for keys is quite 
impeccably done ;-)


vedaal



From jerome at jeromebaum.com  Thu Aug  4 16:30:26 2011
From: jerome at jeromebaum.com (Jerome Baum)
Date: Thu, 4 Aug 2011 16:30:26 +0200
Subject: Extract numbers from a key
In-Reply-To: <CABvAZ+Hdq_XchMWAM4vdehLLvPaQZ0C=y9hoSGEjcoPSzc+ThA@mail.gmail.com>
References: <4E383D9A.5050204@yahoo.fr>
	<CABvAZ+HeaDA=SYYq7WFz+sOEzujTWrE2KwuDirHpvyC4TGeMcQ@mail.gmail.com>
	<4E392645.2020208@yahoo.fr>
	<CABvAZ+EF8=XpzGeeV9NZFHMAD5H4GxGcGhYGK7Jb5ND_qMy8cA@mail.gmail.com>
	<4E3A9CE6.10300@sixdemonbag.org>
	<CABvAZ+FriT2K=LMypVJnG4+U4yUSp_Mpzm9Un9b0nRWPowFOZw@mail.gmail.com>
	<4E3AA47D.2090204@sixdemonbag.org>
	<CABvAZ+Hdq_XchMWAM4vdehLLvPaQZ0C=y9hoSGEjcoPSzc+ThA@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <CABvAZ+HhpjbME-dqwBPhVx1AQwEPpTECfOxFVcQCcV6pWY2ggg@mail.gmail.com>

Ah, I see why you referred to it as "the PRIMES algorithm" -- was mislead by
a Google search on that string.

Did you manage to get an unencrypted version of the private key?

(Mobile/Handy)

Am 04.08.2011 15:54 schrieb "Robert J. Hansen" <rjh at sixdemonbag.org>:

On 8/4/11 9:32 AM, Jerome Baum wrote:
> So just a sieve? Isn't that going to take ages on any reason...
No.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AKS_primality_test
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From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Thu Aug  4 16:51:45 2011
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Thu, 04 Aug 2011 10:51:45 -0400
Subject: Extract numbers from a key
In-Reply-To: <CABvAZ+HhpjbME-dqwBPhVx1AQwEPpTECfOxFVcQCcV6pWY2ggg@mail.gmail.com>
References: <4E383D9A.5050204@yahoo.fr>
	<CABvAZ+HeaDA=SYYq7WFz+sOEzujTWrE2KwuDirHpvyC4TGeMcQ@mail.gmail.com>
	<4E392645.2020208@yahoo.fr>
	<CABvAZ+EF8=XpzGeeV9NZFHMAD5H4GxGcGhYGK7Jb5ND_qMy8cA@mail.gmail.com>
	<4E3A9CE6.10300@sixdemonbag.org>
	<CABvAZ+FriT2K=LMypVJnG4+U4yUSp_Mpzm9Un9b0nRWPowFOZw@mail.gmail.com>
	<4E3AA47D.2090204@sixdemonbag.org>
	<CABvAZ+Hdq_XchMWAM4vdehLLvPaQZ0C=y9hoSGEjcoPSzc+ThA@mail.gmail.com>
	<CABvAZ+HhpjbME-dqwBPhVx1AQwEPpTECfOxFVcQCcV6pWY2ggg@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <4E3AB201.8070108@sixdemonbag.org>

On 8/4/11 10:30 AM, Jerome Baum wrote:
> Ah, I see why you referred to it as "the PRIMES algorithm" -- was
> mislead by a Google search on that string.

PRIMES isn't the name of an algorithm: PRIMES is the name of a problem
in computer science.  "the PRIMES algorithm" isn't "the algorithm named
PRIMES," but "the algorithm which solves PRIMES" -- either the AKS
primality algorithm or else Miller's test.  There might be some new
additions to that list, but those are the only two fast deterministic
primality tests I know of.

I'm sorry if I was unclear.

> Did you manage to get an unencrypted version of the private key?

Didn't even try: that question doesn't interest me.


From johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl  Thu Aug  4 17:11:18 2011
From: johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl (Johan Wevers)
Date: Thu, 04 Aug 2011 17:11:18 +0200
Subject: Extract numbers from a key
In-Reply-To: <20110804141455.579BCE6730@smtp.hushmail.com>
References: <20110804141455.579BCE6730@smtp.hushmail.com>
Message-ID: <4E3AB696.8070703@vulcan.xs4all.nl>

On 04-08-2011 16:14, vedaal at nym.hush.com wrote:

> All that is necessary, is to use pre-canned primes, 
> (i.e. to generate a prime which falls within a range of primes 
> stored in an offsite area by the implementation.)

This would be fat to easy noticed by inspecting the sourcecode. If you
just limited the generation of primes to Mersenne (2^n - 1) or Fermat
numbers (2^n + 1) with a very limited range of n, decryption would still
be easy but it would not be so easily noticed.

An even more subtle way to add a backdoor would be tampering with the
RNG that creates the session keys and the factors in key generation. A
bug such as this existed in the Unix version of pgp 5.0 and it took
quite some time before it was found.

-- 
Met vriendelijke groet,

Johan Wevers



From peter at digitalbrains.com  Thu Aug  4 17:14:30 2011
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Thu, 04 Aug 2011 17:14:30 +0200
Subject: Extract numbers from a key
In-Reply-To: <4E392645.2020208@yahoo.fr>
References: <4E383D9A.5050204@yahoo.fr>	<CABvAZ+HeaDA=SYYq7WFz+sOEzujTWrE2KwuDirHpvyC4TGeMcQ@mail.gmail.com>
	<4E392645.2020208@yahoo.fr>
Message-ID: <4E3AB756.7030405@digitalbrains.com>

On 03/08/11 12:43, S?bastien wrote:
> I know that gpg is an hybrid system. I want to know these numbers to check 
> with a mathematica-like program that numbers supposed to be primes are 
> actually real prime numbers.

And suppose GnuPG accidentally picked a composite. What would be the security
implications of that? I am supposing that the adversary does *not* know your key
isn't actually based on 2 primes.

As far as I can see, there would be a few messages that would be corrupted when
encrypted to this key, because it turns out the message is not co-prime with a
factor of the key. If this is a possibility in practice, I don't know. It would
depend on the padding of the session key and which numbers that can lead to for
the RSA operation. But I don't really know if it becomes easier to extract the
private part from the public key, as long as the attacker does not know a
composite was used.

If it is known that a certain piece of software often accidentally produces
composites, you could account for this in your cracking software and indeed gain
an advantage, I think.

I'm even thinking it might be *harder* to factorize the public key because the
attacker expects a number with two prime factors and dismisses the possibility
of one of the "factors" being composite ;D. This is somewhat tongue-in-cheeck,
but it might have a grain of truth to it.

By the way, on a related subject: I suppose the padding scheme is chosen in such
a way that the message is never a multiple of one of the primes of the key?
Because I suppose in that case the message would be corrupted, as it is not
co-prime with n?

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at http://wwwhome.cs.utwente.nl/~lebbing/pubkey.txt


From peter at digitalbrains.com  Thu Aug  4 17:22:49 2011
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Thu, 04 Aug 2011 17:22:49 +0200
Subject: Extract numbers from a key
In-Reply-To: <4E3AB696.8070703@vulcan.xs4all.nl>
References: <20110804141455.579BCE6730@smtp.hushmail.com>
	<4E3AB696.8070703@vulcan.xs4all.nl>
Message-ID: <4E3AB949.4020309@digitalbrains.com>

On 04/08/11 17:11, Johan Wevers wrote:
> An even more subtle way to add a backdoor would be tampering with the
> RNG that creates the session keys and the factors in key generation. A
> bug such as this existed in the Unix version of pgp 5.0 and it took
> quite some time before it was found.

Let's not forget the bug in the Debian OpenSSL package that limited the key
generation to about 2^15 keys.

Backdoors aren't limited to software where the source is not available. It can
be subtly done so it won't be discovered. It's not always:

/* Open a shell if secret knock is received on door. Teehee. */
if (knock)
  execve ("/bin/bash", ...


Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at http://wwwhome.cs.utwente.nl/~lebbing/pubkey.txt


From wk at gnupg.org  Thu Aug  4 18:16:14 2011
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Thu, 04 Aug 2011 18:16:14 +0200
Subject: [Announce] GnuPG 2.0.18 released
Message-ID: <878vr9884x.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

Hello!

We are pleased to announce the availability of a new stable GnuPG-2
release:  Version 2.0.18.

The GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) is GNU's tool for secure communication
and data storage.  It can be used to encrypt data, create digital
signatures, help authenticating using Secure Shell and to provide a
framework for public key cryptography.  It includes an advanced key
management facility and is compliant with the OpenPGP and S/MIME
standards.

GnuPG-2 has a different architecture than GnuPG-1 (e.g. 1.4.11) in
that it splits up functionality into several modules.  However, both
versions may be installed alongside without any conflict.  In fact,
the gpg version from GnuPG-1 is able to make use of the gpg-agent as
included in GnuPG-2 and allows for seamless passphrase caching.  The
advantage of GnuPG-1 is its smaller size and the lack of dependency on
other modules at run and build time.  We will keep maintaining GnuPG-1
versions because they are very useful for small systems and for server
based applications requiring only OpenPGP support.

GnuPG is distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License
(GPLv3+).  GnuPG-2 works best on GNU/Linux and *BSD systems but is
also available for other Unices, Microsoft Windows and Mac OS X.


What's New
===========

 * Bug fix for newer versions of Libgcrypt.

 * Support the SSH confirm flag and show SSH fingerprints in ssh
   related pinentries.

 * Improved dirmngr/gpgsm interaction for OCSP.

 * Allow generation of card keys up to 4096 bit.


Getting the Software
====================

Please follow the instructions found at http://www.gnupg.org/download/
or read on:

GnuPG 2.0.18 may be downloaded from one of the GnuPG mirror sites or
direct from ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/gnupg/ .  The list of mirrors
can be found at http://www.gnupg.org/mirrors.html .  Note, that GnuPG
is not available at ftp.gnu.org.

On the FTP server and its mirrors you should find the following files
in the gnupg/ directory:

  gnupg-2.0.18.tar.bz2 (3922k)
  gnupg-2.0.18.tar.bz2.sig

      GnuPG source compressed using BZIP2 and OpenPGP signature.

  gnupg-2.0.17-2.0.18.diff.bz2 (188k)

      A patch file to upgrade a 2.0.17 GnuPG source tree.  This patch
      does not include updates of the language files.

Note, that we don't distribute gzip compressed tarballs for GnuPG-2.


Checking the Integrity
======================

In order to check that the version of GnuPG which you are going to
install is an original and unmodified one, you can do it in one of
the following ways:

 * If you already have a trusted version of GnuPG installed, you
   can simply check the supplied signature.  For example to check the
   signature of the file gnupg-2.0.18.tar.bz2 you would use this command:

     gpg --verify gnupg-2.0.18.tar.bz2.sig

   This checks whether the signature file matches the source file.
   You should see a message indicating that the signature is good and
   made by that signing key.  Make sure that you have the right key,
   either by checking the fingerprint of that key with other sources
   or by checking that the key has been signed by a trustworthy other
   key.  Note, that you can retrieve the signing key using the command

     finger wk ,at' g10code.com

   or using a keyserver like

     gpg --keyserver keys.gnupg.net --recv-key 4F25E3B6

   The distribution key 4F25E3B6 is signed by the well known key
   1E42B367.

   NEVER USE A GNUPG VERSION YOU JUST DOWNLOADED TO CHECK THE
   INTEGRITY OF THE SOURCE - USE AN EXISTING GNUPG INSTALLATION!

 * If you are not able to use an old version of GnuPG, you have to verify
   the SHA-1 checksum.  Assuming you downloaded the file
   gnupg-2.0.18.tar.bz2, you would run the sha1sum command like this:

     sha1sum gnupg-2.0.17.tar.bz2

   and check that the output matches the first line from the
   following list:

5ec2f718760cc3121970a140aeea004b64545c46  gnupg-2.0.18.tar.bz2
998cde3e4383bea771930e9f4934494fa09ed669  gnupg-2.0.17-2.0.18.diff.bz2


Documentation
=============

The gnupg.info file has the complete user manual of the system.
Separate man pages are included as well; however they have not all the
details available in the manual.  It is also possible to read the
complete manual online in HTML format at

  http://www.gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gnupg/

or in Portable Document Format at

  http://www.gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gnupg.pdf .

The chapters on gpg-agent, gpg and gpgsm include information on how
to set up the whole thing.  You may also want search the GnuPG mailing
list archives or ask on the gnupg-users mailing lists for advise on
how to solve problems.  Many of the new features are around for
several years and thus enough public knowledge is already available.

Almost all mail clients support GnuPG-2.  Kmail might be the most
prominent user of all GnuPG-2 features.  In fact it has been developed
in cooperation with the Kmail folks.  Mutt users may want to use the
configure option "--enable-gpgme" during build time and put a
"set use_crypt_gpgme" in ~/.muttrc to enable S/MIME support along with
the reworked OpenPGP support.


Support
=======

Please consult the archive of the gnupg-users mailing list before
reporting a bug <http://gnupg.org/documentation/mailing-lists.html>.
We suggest to send bug reports for a new release to this list in favor
of filing a bug at <http://bugs.gnupg.org>.  We also have a dedicated
service directory at:

  http://www.gnupg.org/service.html

Maintaining and improving GnuPG is costly.  For more than 10 years
now, g10 Code, a German company owned and headed by GnuPG's principal
author Werner Koch, is bearing the majority of these costs.  To help
them carry on this work, they need your support.  Please consider to
visit the GnuPG donation page at:

  http://g10code.com/gnupg-donation.html


Thanks
======

We have to thank all the people who helped with this release, be it
testing, coding, translating, suggesting, auditing, administering the
servers, spreading the word or answering questions on the mailing
lists.


Happy Hacking,

  The GnuPG Team


-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.

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_______________________________________________
Gnupg-announce mailing list
Gnupg-announce at gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-announce

From tigresetdragons at yahoo.fr  Thu Aug  4 19:23:48 2011
From: tigresetdragons at yahoo.fr (=?UTF-8?B?U8OpYmFzdGllbg==?=)
Date: Thu, 04 Aug 2011 19:23:48 +0200
Subject: Extract numbers from a key
In-Reply-To: <CABvAZ+EF8=XpzGeeV9NZFHMAD5H4GxGcGhYGK7Jb5ND_qMy8cA@mail.gmail.com>
References: <4E383D9A.5050204@yahoo.fr>
	<CABvAZ+HeaDA=SYYq7WFz+sOEzujTWrE2KwuDirHpvyC4TGeMcQ@mail.gmail.com>
	<4E392645.2020208@yahoo.fr>
	<CABvAZ+EF8=XpzGeeV9NZFHMAD5H4GxGcGhYGK7Jb5ND_qMy8cA@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <4E3AD5A4.9040805@yahoo.fr>

I success to catch the numbers with a blank passphrase and pgpdump.

I found something strange with the number d. The operation e*d mod phi 
is not equal to 1, as expected with the RSA algo. I looked in 
cipher/rsa.c and I found that d is evaluated to match e*d mod f = 1 , 
with f = phi/gcd((p-1),(q-1)) .
Why is it coded like that ? Is it safe ?

Le 04/08/2011 15:05, Jerome Baum a ?crit :
>> I know that gpg is an hybrid system.
>> I want to know these numbers to check with a mathematica-like program that
>> numbers supposed to be primes are actually real prime numbers.
>
> What is that supposed to tell you? It's not like Mathematica does an
> exhaustive check either.
>
> A healthy dose of paranoia is good though, so maybe you can decrypt
> the key (set an empty password or remove the password) before sending
> it to pgpdump?
>


From peter at digitalbrains.com  Thu Aug  4 20:30:57 2011
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Thu, 04 Aug 2011 20:30:57 +0200
Subject: Extract numbers from a key
In-Reply-To: <4E3AD5A4.9040805@yahoo.fr>
References: <4E383D9A.5050204@yahoo.fr>	<CABvAZ+HeaDA=SYYq7WFz+sOEzujTWrE2KwuDirHpvyC4TGeMcQ@mail.gmail.com>	<4E392645.2020208@yahoo.fr>	<CABvAZ+EF8=XpzGeeV9NZFHMAD5H4GxGcGhYGK7Jb5ND_qMy8cA@mail.gmail.com>
	<4E3AD5A4.9040805@yahoo.fr>
Message-ID: <4E3AE561.30005@digitalbrains.com>

> Why is it coded like that ? Is it safe ?

I'm pretty sure there is only one inverse given n and e, that is, d is unique.
Accidentally choosing the wrong d because you made an algorithmic/programming
error will create a non-working keypair. I'd say, since it works, it is correct.

Perhaps the better question is: *why* does it work? Why are the operations
equivalent?

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at http://wwwhome.cs.utwente.nl/~lebbing/pubkey.txt


From peter at digitalbrains.com  Thu Aug  4 20:48:39 2011
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Thu, 04 Aug 2011 20:48:39 +0200
Subject: Extract numbers from a key
In-Reply-To: <4E3AE561.30005@digitalbrains.com>
References: <4E383D9A.5050204@yahoo.fr>	<CABvAZ+HeaDA=SYYq7WFz+sOEzujTWrE2KwuDirHpvyC4TGeMcQ@mail.gmail.com>	<4E392645.2020208@yahoo.fr>	<CABvAZ+EF8=XpzGeeV9NZFHMAD5H4GxGcGhYGK7Jb5ND_qMy8cA@mail.gmail.com>	<4E3AD5A4.9040805@yahoo.fr>
	<4E3AE561.30005@digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <4E3AE987.2060806@digitalbrains.com>

On 04/08/11 20:30, Peter Lebbing wrote:
> Perhaps the better question is: *why* does it work? Why are the operations
> equivalent?

Hmmmm. Per the Handbook of Applied Cryptography 5th ed[1], section 8.5,
computation of d can also be done modulo lambda, with
lambda = lcm(p-1,q-1) = (p-1)(q-1)/gcd(p-1,q-1)

So that answers your question. I'd hazard it's safe :).

I also found the answer to my own question in section 8.3. It does not matter if
the message and p or q are not co-prime, the equivalency still holds.

Which goes to show, when you have a question about cryptography, it's a good
idea to consult the HAC first :).

Peter.

[1] http://www.cacr.math.uwaterloo.ca/hac/
-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at http://wwwhome.cs.utwente.nl/~lebbing/pubkey.txt


From wk at gnupg.org  Thu Aug  4 21:25:25 2011
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Thu, 04 Aug 2011 21:25:25 +0200
Subject: Extract numbers from a key
In-Reply-To: <4E3AD5A4.9040805@yahoo.fr> (=?utf-8?Q?=22S=C3=A9bastien=22's?=
	message of "Thu, 04 Aug 2011 19:23:48 +0200")
References: <4E383D9A.5050204@yahoo.fr>
	<CABvAZ+HeaDA=SYYq7WFz+sOEzujTWrE2KwuDirHpvyC4TGeMcQ@mail.gmail.com>
	<4E392645.2020208@yahoo.fr>
	<CABvAZ+EF8=XpzGeeV9NZFHMAD5H4GxGcGhYGK7Jb5ND_qMy8cA@mail.gmail.com>
	<4E3AD5A4.9040805@yahoo.fr>
Message-ID: <87r5516kt6.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Thu,  4 Aug 2011 19:23, tigresetdragons at yahoo.fr said:

> cipher/rsa.c and I found that d is evaluated to match e*d mod f = 1 ,
> with f = phi/gcd((p-1),(q-1)) .
> Why is it coded like that ? Is it safe ?

Using the universal exponent of n (lambda, in the code denoted as f) has
the advantages that d will be smaller.  And thus decryption will be
faster.  It is more a theoretical advantages because we choose p and q
at random and thus lambda won't be much smaller than phi.

Yes, it is secure.  IIRC, X9.31 even requires that.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From dougb at dougbarton.us  Thu Aug  4 23:32:10 2011
From: dougb at dougbarton.us (Doug Barton)
Date: Thu, 04 Aug 2011 14:32:10 -0700
Subject: [Announce] GnuPG 2.0.18 released
In-Reply-To: <878vr9884x.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <878vr9884x.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <4E3B0FDA.2040703@dougbarton.us>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256

On 08/04/2011 09:16, Werner Koch wrote:
> * Support the SSH confirm flag and show SSH fingerprints in ssh 
> related pinentries.

First, congratulations on the new release. I've got it up and running on
FreeBSD, hope to have the port updated soon.
http://www.freebsd.org/cgi/query-pr.cgi?pr=159520

Meanwhile, about the new feature listed above, a couple of
comments/questions. First, would it be possible to have a run-time
option not to display the fingerprints? I think it's an interesting
idea, but not particularly useful to me as I don't already have them
memorized. :)

The other question is about the display of the path to the key (which
for me actually is relevant since it tells me what password I need to
type). I have several keys, and so far for one it displays the path in
the ()s, but for one of my others it does not. How would I debug this?


Thanks,

Doug

- -- 

	Nothin' ever doesn't change, but nothin' changes much.
			-- OK Go

	Breadth of IT experience, and depth of knowledge in the DNS.
	Yours for the right price.  :)  http://SupersetSolutions.com/

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v2.0.18 (FreeBSD)

iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJOOw/aAAoJEFzGhvEaGryEmTUH/2Gb9uh195VozHZAUZfFkwT6
caU0iJnzGTvZjR3AUK17Hn9yT8W6QVtWlZTA7YP4YTHRfPlvIrD/Exm9P10h9MoY
GanlEpWtZ8Xm8Z7e0WNNVsdjwpqVgt42ysKHqrSBxv0qspHrRkcGYt2pXIl/lj4P
XlXXAYPQ8jObZrB9mk+K3TR3oKMOLjDvBo4XVNgjayVV/Nt8uICP19fG1QPV63NI
ES/uB0T/xWyXtOMOC+Se3U5jlyiv1YAUEt3UBWp2nHP+chlVa0ySCzjLM5hpysth
7XClJJnPBB/sAFb9JTd0/2ViS+TIM0KfA9CJLJ9mK/jxvPMGRkn0h4CQ3ePyRV4=
=Vrb8
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


From thajsta at gmail.com  Thu Aug  4 23:36:18 2011
From: thajsta at gmail.com (Jonathan Ely)
Date: Thu, 04 Aug 2011 17:36:18 -0400
Subject: [Announce] GnuPG 2.0.18 released
In-Reply-To: <4E3B0FDA.2040703@dougbarton.us>
References: <878vr9884x.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<4E3B0FDA.2040703@dougbarton.us>
Message-ID: <4E3B10D2.6050906@gmail.com>

Will the

On 04/08/2011 05:32 PM, Doug Barton wrote:
> On 08/04/2011 09:16, Werner Koch wrote:
>> * Support the SSH confirm flag and show SSH fingerprints in ssh
>> related pinentries.
> 
> First, congratulations on the new release. I've got it up and running on
> FreeBSD, hope to have the port updated soon.
> http://www.freebsd.org/cgi/query-pr.cgi?pr=159520
> re be a Windows executable like 1.4.11? That is what I can not find with
any version of the 2.x branch. I do not need GPG4WIN and can not
understand why the same thing has not been compiled like the version 1.x
branch.
> Meanwhile, about the new feature listed above, a couple of
> comments/questions. First, would it be possible to have a run-time
> option not to display the fingerprints? I think it's an interesting
> idea, but not particularly useful to me as I don't already have them
> memorized. :)
> 
> The other question is about the display of the path to the key (which
> for me actually is relevant since it tells me what password I need to
> type). I have several keys, and so far for one it displays the path in
> the ()s, but for one of my others it does not. How would I debug this?
> 
> 
> Thanks,
> 
> Doug
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
> 
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From luis at debethencourt.com  Fri Aug  5 01:49:21 2011
From: luis at debethencourt.com (Luis de Bethencourt)
Date: Fri, 5 Aug 2011 01:49:21 +0200
Subject: Card only available to root user
Message-ID: <20110804234921.GC31134@atlas>

Hi everybody and thanks for the help.

I recently upgraded my GnuPG setup with a Smart Card (GnuPG Card v2).

I can get/set the information of the card through the root user, but this is
not good for everyday use. I think I have pinpointed the problem, scdaemon
iny my machine doesn't like anybody but root.

Here is a paste of a few commands to show the problem:

luisbg at atlas ~ $ gpg --card-status
gpg: selecting openpgp failed: Unsupported certificate
gpg: OpenPGP card not available: Unsupported certificate

luisbg at atlas ~ $ sudo gpg --card-status
scdaemon[31077]: reading public key failed: Missing item in object
scdaemon[31077]: reading public key failed: Missing item in object
Application ID ...: D276000124010200000500000CC90000
Version ..........: 2.0
Manufacturer .....: ZeitControl
Serial number ....: 00000CC9
Name of cardholder: Luis de Bethencourt
Language prefs ...: en
Sex ..............: male
URL of public key : http://people.collabora.com/~luisbg/gpg_pub_key_873B518D
Login data .......: luisbg
Signature PIN ....: not forced
Key attributes ...: 2048R 2048R 2048R
Max. PIN lengths .: 32 32 32
PIN retry counter : 3 0 3
Signature counter : 2
Signature key ....: 3F4A 28A6 568A CD30 480A  F9EB 6BBF 9F19 873B 518D
      created ....: 2011-07-26 12:22:00
Encryption key....: [none]
Authentication key: [none]
General key info..: [none]
scdaemon[31077]: updating slot 0 status: 0x0000->0x0007 (0->1)

luisbg at atlas ~ $ gpg-agent --server gpg-connect-agent
OK Pleased to meet you
SCD LEARN
S SERIALNO D276000124010200000500000CC90000 0
INQUIRE KNOWNCARDP D276000124010200000500000CC90000 0
scdaemon[31088]: updating slot 0 status: 0x0000->0x0007 (0->1)


Notice how I can check the status as root, and do SCD Learn as my user. But=
 not
check the status as my user (or sign my mails, which is the main problem). =
Also
pcsc_scan works with my user, it shows the Serial number of the card.

If it helps, I'm running gentoo with:
gpg (GnuPG) 2.0.17
scdaemon (GnuPG) 2.0.17
pcsc-lite version 1.7.2
gpg-agent (GnuPG) 2.0.17

luisbg at atlas ~ $ gpgconf=20
gpg:GPG for OpenPGP:/usr/bin/gpg2
gpg-agent:GPG Agent:/usr/bin/gpg-agent
scdaemon:Smartcard Daemon:/usr/bin/scdaemon
gpgsm:GPG for S/MIME:/usr/bin/gpgsm
dirmngr:Directory Manager:/usr/bin/dirmngr

Thanks a million for the help,
Luis
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From luis at debethencourt.com  Fri Aug  5 01:51:17 2011
From: luis at debethencourt.com (Luis de Bethencourt)
Date: Fri, 5 Aug 2011 01:51:17 +0200
Subject: Card only available to root user
In-Reply-To: <20110804234921.GC31134@atlas>
References: <20110804234921.GC31134@atlas>
Message-ID: <20110804235117.GD31134@atlas>

On Fri, Aug 05, 2011 at 01:49:21AM +0200, Luis de Bethencourt wrote:
> Hi everybody and thanks for the help.
> 
> I recently upgraded my GnuPG setup with a Smart Card (GnuPG Card v2).
> 
> I can get/set the information of the card through the root user, but this is
> not good for everyday use. I think I have pinpointed the problem, scdaemon
> iny my machine doesn't like anybody but root.
> 
> Here is a paste of a few commands to show the problem:
> 
> luisbg at atlas ~ $ gpg --card-status
> gpg: selecting openpgp failed: Unsupported certificate
> gpg: OpenPGP card not available: Unsupported certificate
> 
> luisbg at atlas ~ $ sudo gpg --card-status
> scdaemon[31077]: reading public key failed: Missing item in object
> scdaemon[31077]: reading public key failed: Missing item in object
> Application ID ...: D276000124010200000500000CC90000
> Version ..........: 2.0
> Manufacturer .....: ZeitControl
> Serial number ....: 00000CC9
> Name of cardholder: Luis de Bethencourt
> Language prefs ...: en
> Sex ..............: male
> URL of public key : http://people.collabora.com/~luisbg/gpg_pub_key_873B518D
> Login data .......: luisbg
> Signature PIN ....: not forced
> Key attributes ...: 2048R 2048R 2048R
> Max. PIN lengths .: 32 32 32
> PIN retry counter : 3 0 3
> Signature counter : 2
> Signature key ....: 3F4A 28A6 568A CD30 480A  F9EB 6BBF 9F19 873B 518D
>       created ....: 2011-07-26 12:22:00
> Encryption key....: [none]
> Authentication key: [none]
> General key info..: [none]
> scdaemon[31077]: updating slot 0 status: 0x0000->0x0007 (0->1)
> 
> luisbg at atlas ~ $ gpg-agent --server gpg-connect-agent
> OK Pleased to meet you
> SCD LEARN
> S SERIALNO D276000124010200000500000CC90000 0
> INQUIRE KNOWNCARDP D276000124010200000500000CC90000 0
> scdaemon[31088]: updating slot 0 status: 0x0000->0x0007 (0->1)
> 
> 
> Notice how I can check the status as root, and do SCD Learn as my user. But=
>  not
> check the status as my user (or sign my mails, which is the main problem). =
> Also
> pcsc_scan works with my user, it shows the Serial number of the card.
> 
> If it helps, I'm running gentoo with:
> gpg (GnuPG) 2.0.17
> scdaemon (GnuPG) 2.0.17
> pcsc-lite version 1.7.2
> gpg-agent (GnuPG) 2.0.17
> 
> luisbg at atlas ~ $ gpgconf=20
> gpg:GPG for OpenPGP:/usr/bin/gpg2
> gpg-agent:GPG Agent:/usr/bin/gpg-agent
> scdaemon:Smartcard Daemon:/usr/bin/scdaemon
> gpgsm:GPG for S/MIME:/usr/bin/gpgsm
> dirmngr:Directory Manager:/usr/bin/dirmngr
> 
> Thanks a million for the help,
> Luis

By the way, I should mention I have replicated this issue in my two gentoo-based machines.

But then got the card and reader working very easily in an other machine which runs debian. So the hardware is OK. Unforunately for this case, my laptop is one of the gentoo machines, and that is the machine I will make more use of the card.

Thanks,
Luis
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From mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de  Fri Aug  5 00:14:47 2011
From: mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de (Hauke Laging)
Date: Fri, 5 Aug 2011 00:14:47 +0200
Subject: Card only available to root user
In-Reply-To: <20110804234921.GC31134@atlas>
References: <20110804234921.GC31134@atlas>
Message-ID: <201108050014.55387.mailinglisten@hauke-laging.de>

Am Freitag, 5. August 2011, 01:49:21 schrieb Luis de Bethencourt:

> I can get/set the information of the card through the root user

> Notice how I can check the status as root, and do SCD Learn as my user.
> But= not
> check the status as my user (or sign my mails, which is the main problem).
> = Also
> pcsc_scan works with my user, it shows the Serial number of the card.

Is this an access rights problem with the card reader device file? Different 
defaults with Gentoo and Debian maybe?

Of course, this explanation does not make sense if pcsc_scan can access the 
device. Is pcsc_scan installed with SUID or SGID?


CU

Hauke
-- 
PGP: D44C 6A5B 71B0 427C CED3 025C BD7D 6D27 ECCB 5814
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From luis at debethencourt.com  Fri Aug  5 03:02:07 2011
From: luis at debethencourt.com (Luis de Bethencourt)
Date: Fri, 5 Aug 2011 03:02:07 +0200
Subject: Card only available to root user
In-Reply-To: <201108050014.55387.mailinglisten@hauke-laging.de>
References: <20110804234921.GC31134@atlas>
	<201108050014.55387.mailinglisten@hauke-laging.de>
Message-ID: <20110805010207.GE31134@atlas>

On Fri, Aug 05, 2011 at 12:14:47AM +0200, Hauke Laging wrote:
> Am Freitag, 5. August 2011, 01:49:21 schrieb Luis de Bethencourt:
> 
> > I can get/set the information of the card through the root user
> 
> > Notice how I can check the status as root, and do SCD Learn as my user.
> > But= not
> > check the status as my user (or sign my mails, which is the main problem).
> > = Also
> > pcsc_scan works with my user, it shows the Serial number of the card.
> 
> Is this an access rights problem with the card reader device file? Different 
> defaults with Gentoo and Debian maybe?
>

device in debian:
crw-rw-r--+ 1 root root 189, 516 2011-08-05 00:46 /dev/bus/usb/005/005

device in gentoo:
crw-rw-r-- 1 root pcscd 189, 395 Aug  5 02:56 /dev/bus/usb/004/012

my user is part of the pcscd group. I just checked.

 
> Of course, this explanation does not make sense if pcsc_scan can access the 
> device. Is pcsc_scan installed with SUID or SGID?
>

-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 15K Aug  4 22:47 /usr/bin/pcsc_scan

no suid/guid as far as I can see.
 
> 
> CU
> 
> Hauke
> -- 
> PGP: D44C 6A5B 71B0 427C CED3 025C BD7D 6D27 ECCB 5814

Thanks for thinking about this :)

Luis


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From mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de  Fri Aug  5 01:07:19 2011
From: mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de (Hauke Laging)
Date: Fri, 5 Aug 2011 01:07:19 +0200
Subject: Card only available to root user
In-Reply-To: <20110805010207.GE31134@atlas>
References: <20110804234921.GC31134@atlas>
	<201108050014.55387.mailinglisten@hauke-laging.de>
	<20110805010207.GE31134@atlas>
Message-ID: <201108050107.19765.mailinglisten@hauke-laging.de>

Am Freitag, 5. August 2011, 03:02:07 schrieb Luis de Bethencourt:
> device in debian:
> crw-rw-r--+ 1 root root 189, 516 2011-08-05 00:46 /dev/bus/usb/005/005
> 
> device in gentoo:
> crw-rw-r-- 1 root pcscd 189, 395 Aug  5 02:56 /dev/bus/usb/004/012
> 
> my user is part of the pcscd group. I just checked.

I have no certain problem in mind. My general advice is to check with strace 
what's going on. Often the problem can easily be seen shortly before the 
program abort. If not you may compare the outputs of the root and user calls.


CU

Hauke
-- 
PGP: D44C 6A5B 71B0 427C CED3 025C BD7D 6D27 ECCB 5814
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From luis at debethencourt.com  Fri Aug  5 01:43:14 2011
From: luis at debethencourt.com (Luis de Bethencourt)
Date: Fri, 5 Aug 2011 01:43:14 +0200
Subject: Card only available to root user
In-Reply-To: <201108050107.19765.mailinglisten@hauke-laging.de>
References: <20110804234921.GC31134@atlas>
	<201108050014.55387.mailinglisten@hauke-laging.de>
	<20110805010207.GE31134@atlas>
	<201108050107.19765.mailinglisten@hauke-laging.de>
Message-ID: <20110804234314.GB6131@atlas>

On Fri, Aug 05, 2011 at 01:07:19AM +0200, Hauke Laging wrote:
> Am Freitag, 5. August 2011, 03:02:07 schrieb Luis de Bethencourt:
> > device in debian:
> > crw-rw-r--+ 1 root root 189, 516 2011-08-05 00:46 /dev/bus/usb/005/005
> > 
> > device in gentoo:
> > crw-rw-r-- 1 root pcscd 189, 395 Aug  5 02:56 /dev/bus/usb/004/012
> > 
> > my user is part of the pcscd group. I just checked.
> 
> I have no certain problem in mind. My general advice is to check with strace 
> what's going on. Often the problem can easily be seen shortly before the 
> program abort. If not you may compare the outputs of the root and user calls.
>

I run strace both running gpg --card-status as user and root, but without the
card reader plugged in to make it simpler and I noticed that it diverts
right before at the end. Pasting where it diverts:

user:

read(3, "ERR 103 unknown command\n", 1002) = 24
mmap(NULL, 8192, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0) = 0x7fa69e8ad000
write(2, "gpg: selecting openpgp failed: U"..., 55gpg: selecting openpgp failed: Unsupported certificate
) = 55
write(2, "gpg: OpenPGP card not available:"..., 57gpg: OpenPGP card not available: Unsupported certificate
) = 57
munmap(0x7fa69e8af000, 32768)           = 0
exit_group(2)                           = ?


root:

read(3, scdaemon[6104]: PC/SC OPEN failed: unknown PC/SC error code
"ERR 100663404 Card error <SCD>\n", 1002) = 31
mmap(NULL, 8192, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0) = 0x7fa70a56f000
write(2, "gpg: selecting openpgp failed: C"..., 42gpg: selecting openpgp failed: Card error
) = 42
write(2, "gpg: OpenPGP card not available:"..., 44gpg: OpenPGP card not available: Card error
) = 44
munmap(0x7fa70a571000, 32768)           = 0
exit_group(2)                           = ?


this are the few lines before the diversion:

write(6, "OPTION allow-pinentry-notify", 28) = 28
write(6, "\n", 1)                       = 1
read(3, "OK\n", 1002)                   = 3
write(6, "SCD SERIALNO openpgp", 20)    = 20
write(6, "\n", 1)                       = 1


not sure if this helps, or if anybody can read any problem here. I certainly can't :P

Thanks,
Luis
 
> 
> CU
> 
> Hauke
> -- 
> PGP: D44C 6A5B 71B0 427C CED3 025C BD7D 6D27 ECCB 5814


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From wk at gnupg.org  Fri Aug  5 08:18:56 2011
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Fri, 05 Aug 2011 08:18:56 +0200
Subject: [Announce] GnuPG 2.0.18 released
In-Reply-To: <4E3B10D2.6050906@gmail.com> (Jonathan Ely's message of "Thu, 04
	Aug 2011 17:36:18 -0400")
References: <878vr9884x.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<4E3B0FDA.2040703@dougbarton.us> <4E3B10D2.6050906@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <87ei10754f.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Thu,  4 Aug 2011 23:36, thajsta at gmail.com said:

> any version of the 2.x branch. I do not need GPG4WIN and can not
> understand why the same thing has not been compiled like the version 1.x
> branch.

Gpg4win is the official binary distribution of GnuPG.  Use the light
installer and you are done.  It is far too much work to have a
ultralight installer.


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From wk at gnupg.org  Fri Aug  5 09:17:08 2011
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Fri, 05 Aug 2011 09:17:08 +0200
Subject: [Announce] GnuPG 2.0.18 released
In-Reply-To: <4E3B0FDA.2040703@dougbarton.us> (Doug Barton's message of "Thu, 
	04 Aug 2011 14:32:10 -0700")
References: <878vr9884x.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<4E3B0FDA.2040703@dougbarton.us>
Message-ID: <87aabo72ff.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Thu,  4 Aug 2011 23:32, dougb at dougbarton.us said:

> comments/questions. First, would it be possible to have a run-time
> option not to display the fingerprints? I think it's an interesting
> idea, but not particularly useful to me as I don't already have them
> memorized. :)

No.  The fingerprint is required for the confirm option ("ssh-add -c" or
the confirm flag in sshcontrol) because ssh-agent displays the same
information.

> The other question is about the display of the path to the key (which
> for me actually is relevant since it tells me what password I need to
> type). I have several keys, and so far for one it displays the path in
> the ()s, but for one of my others it does not. How would I debug this?

Ssh-add should send the comment from the key via the
ssh-agent-protocol.  However for PEM encoded keys is uses the filename
instead.  I am not sure why it does that:

  		prv = key_load_private_pem(fd, KEY_UNSPEC, passphrase, NULL);
		/* use the filename as a comment for PEM */
		if (commentp && prv)
			*commentp = xstrdup(filename);

You may change the comment by editing the corresponding file in
/gnupg/private-keys-v1.d/  like this:

  $ /usr/local/libexec/gpg-protect-tool \
               8147AB71CC2CB61C56A3E3F9C9F0A2A656B38AF8.key
  (protected-private-key 
   (dsa 
  ...]
    (protected-at "20110720T142801")
    )
   (comment foo_dsa)
   )
  
save the output to a file and change the value of the comment field.  It
is best to put the value into quotes (comment "this is my comment").
The save the output under the same name.  It doesn't matter that it is
now in advanced representation.  However if you would like to store it
in canonical format, you may pipe it through

  $ /usr/local/libexec/gpg-protect-tool --canonical

So now, how to find the name of the file.  The name is the so-called
keygrip and not the fingerprint.  To translate them you may look at a
listing of all files in private-keys-v1.d:

  $ gpg-connect-agent 'keyinfo --list --ssh-fpr' /bye
  [...]
  S KEYINFO 8147AB71CC2CB61C56A3E3F9C9F0A2A656B38AF8 \
D - - - P 2d:b1:70:1a:04:9e:41:a3:ce:27:a5:c7:22:fe:3a:a3
  [...]
  OK

[I used the backslash to split the long line just for this mail]

You see a lot of these lines.  The important information is the 7th
field after KEYINFO; it is the ssh fingerprint.  You may simply grep for
it.  The 1st field is the keygrip.  Append a ".key" and you have the
filename you are looking for.  Note that with 2.0.18 you will see a '-'
instead of the 'P' flag.  To see the help string for the keyinfo command
you may use

  $ gpg-connect-agent 'help keyinfo' /bye




Shalom-Salam,

   Werner


-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From wk at gnupg.org  Fri Aug  5 09:32:35 2011
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Fri, 05 Aug 2011 09:32:35 +0200
Subject: Card only available to root user
In-Reply-To: <20110804234921.GC31134@atlas> (Luis de Bethencourt's message of
	"Fri, 5 Aug 2011 01:49:21 +0200")
References: <20110804234921.GC31134@atlas>
Message-ID: <8762mc71po.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Fri,  5 Aug 2011 01:49, luis at debethencourt.com said:
>
> luisbg at atlas ~ $ gpg --card-status
> gpg: selecting openpgp failed: Unsupported certificate

What kind of reader are you using?

> luisbg at atlas ~ $ gpg-agent --server gpg-connect-agent

Now that is a strange command.  The "gpg-connect-agent" argument is
simply ignored.  What you do is sto start a new gpg-agent in --server
mode, that is without it listening on a socket but connected to the tty.

You should first start gpg-agent after checking that no other one is
running.  For testing I do it this way

  $ gpg-agent --daemon sh

This creates a new shell and if you terminate this shell (exit) the
gpg-agent will terminate as well after a few seconds.  Then use

  $ gpg-connect-agent
  SCD SERIALNO
  BYE

or 

  $ gpg-connect-agent 'SCD SERIALNO' /bye

or to get all info from the card

  $ gpg-connect-agent 'scd learn --force' /bye


My guess at your problem is that there is another gpg-agent running
which has the scdaemon open.  The one you started under root?

To debug this you should put these lines into scdaemon.conf

log-file /foo/bar/scd.log
debug 2049
debug-ccid-driver
verbose


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner


-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From luis at debethencourt.com  Fri Aug  5 10:25:33 2011
From: luis at debethencourt.com (Luis de Bethencourt)
Date: Fri, 5 Aug 2011 10:25:33 +0200
Subject: Card only available to root user
In-Reply-To: <8762mc71po.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <20110804234921.GC31134@atlas> <8762mc71po.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <20110805082533.GA7505@atlas>

On Fri, Aug 05, 2011 at 09:32:35AM +0200, Werner Koch wrote:
> On Fri,  5 Aug 2011 01:49, luis at debethencourt.com said:
> >
> > luisbg at atlas ~ $ gpg --card-status
> > gpg: selecting openpgp failed: Unsupported certificate
> 
> What kind of reader are you using?
> 
> > luisbg at atlas ~ $ gpg-agent --server gpg-connect-agent
> 
> Now that is a strange command.  The "gpg-connect-agent" argument is
> simply ignored.  What you do is sto start a new gpg-agent in --server
> mode, that is without it listening on a socket but connected to the tty.
> 
> You should first start gpg-agent after checking that no other one is
> running.  For testing I do it this way
> 
>   $ gpg-agent --daemon sh
> 
> This creates a new shell and if you terminate this shell (exit) the
> gpg-agent will terminate as well after a few seconds.  Then use
> 
>   $ gpg-connect-agent
>   SCD SERIALNO
>   BYE
> 
> or 
> 
>   $ gpg-connect-agent 'SCD SERIALNO' /bye
> 
> or to get all info from the card
> 
>   $ gpg-connect-agent 'scd learn --force' /bye
>

When I do it as you say I get:
gpg-connect-agent 'scd learn --force' /bye
ERR 103 unknown command

I always get that 'unknown command' error in all the variatons you explained.

But it works when I do it through gpg-agent --server.
 
> 
> My guess at your problem is that there is another gpg-agent running
> which has the scdaemon open.  The one you started under root?
> 

It looks like everytime I do gpg --card-status it spawns a new scdaemon. After
the card information you can see the following line:

scdaemon[7684]: scdaemon (GnuPG) 2.0.17 stopped

and ps doesn't show any scdaemon running after that.

> To debug this you should put these lines into scdaemon.conf
> 
> log-file /foo/bar/scd.log
> debug 2049
> debug-ccid-driver
> verbose
> 
> 
> Salam-Shalom,
> 
>    Werner
> 
> 
> -- 
> Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.
> 

Thanks for the help,
Luis
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From luis at debethencourt.com  Fri Aug  5 10:31:47 2011
From: luis at debethencourt.com (Luis de Bethencourt)
Date: Fri, 5 Aug 2011 10:31:47 +0200
Subject: Card only available to root user
In-Reply-To: <20110805082533.GA7505@atlas>
References: <20110804234921.GC31134@atlas> <8762mc71po.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<20110805082533.GA7505@atlas>
Message-ID: <20110805083147.GB7505@atlas>

On Fri, Aug 05, 2011 at 10:25:33AM +0200, Luis de Bethencourt wrote:
> On Fri, Aug 05, 2011 at 09:32:35AM +0200, Werner Koch wrote:
> > On Fri,  5 Aug 2011 01:49, luis at debethencourt.com said:
> > >
> > > luisbg at atlas ~ $ gpg --card-status
> > > gpg: selecting openpgp failed: Unsupported certificate
> > 
> > What kind of reader are you using?

Missed this question the first time around...
It is a SCM Microsystems SCR 335

> > 
> > > luisbg at atlas ~ $ gpg-agent --server gpg-connect-agent
> > 
> > Now that is a strange command.  The "gpg-connect-agent" argument is
> > simply ignored.  What you do is sto start a new gpg-agent in --server
> > mode, that is without it listening on a socket but connected to the tty.
> > 
> > You should first start gpg-agent after checking that no other one is
> > running.  For testing I do it this way
> > 
> >   $ gpg-agent --daemon sh
> > 
> > This creates a new shell and if you terminate this shell (exit) the
> > gpg-agent will terminate as well after a few seconds.  Then use
> > 
> >   $ gpg-connect-agent
> >   SCD SERIALNO
> >   BYE
> > 
> > or 
> > 
> >   $ gpg-connect-agent 'SCD SERIALNO' /bye
> > 
> > or to get all info from the card
> > 
> >   $ gpg-connect-agent 'scd learn --force' /bye
> >
> 
> When I do it as you say I get:
> gpg-connect-agent 'scd learn --force' /bye
> ERR 103 unknown command
> 
> I always get that 'unknown command' error in all the variatons you explained.
> 
> But it works when I do it through gpg-agent --server.
>  
> > 
> > My guess at your problem is that there is another gpg-agent running
> > which has the scdaemon open.  The one you started under root?
> > 
> 
> It looks like everytime I do gpg --card-status it spawns a new scdaemon. After
> the card information you can see the following line:
> 
> scdaemon[7684]: scdaemon (GnuPG) 2.0.17 stopped
> 
> and ps doesn't show any scdaemon running after that.
> 
> > To debug this you should put these lines into scdaemon.conf
> > 
> > log-file /foo/bar/scd.log
> > debug 2049
> > debug-ccid-driver
> > verbose
> > 

I've created this conf file both in my home and root's.
When I run gpg --card-status as my user, there is no file created.
But when I run it in root it does create this file.

Is this confirmation that when running as root scdaemon is being spawned
but when running as user it can't use scdaemon?

I can paste the content of that log file if you want it. Asking before doing
so since it's a bit lengthy.

Thanks for all the help,
Luis

> > 
> > Salam-Shalom,
> > 
> >    Werner
> > 
> > 
> > -- 
> > Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.
> > 
> 
> Thanks for the help,
> Luis


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From peter at digitalbrains.com  Fri Aug  5 10:59:28 2011
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Fri, 05 Aug 2011 10:59:28 +0200
Subject: Card only available to root user
In-Reply-To: <20110805010207.GE31134@atlas>
References: <20110804234921.GC31134@atlas>	<201108050014.55387.mailinglisten@hauke-laging.de>
	<20110805010207.GE31134@atlas>
Message-ID: <4E3BB0F0.50905@digitalbrains.com>

On 05/08/11 03:02, Luis de Bethencourt wrote:
> device in debian:
> crw-rw-r--+ 1 root root 189, 516 2011-08-05 00:46 /dev/bus/usb/005/005
> 
> device in gentoo:
> crw-rw-r-- 1 root pcscd 189, 395 Aug  5 02:56 /dev/bus/usb/004/012
> 
> my user is part of the pcscd group. I just checked.

Look closely at the permissions for Debian. It has a plus-sign. This means there
is an ACL. Probably ConsoleKit is adding you to the ACL when you log in.

You can get the ACL with getfacl. Here is the output from my box:

peter at tweek:~$ getfacl /dev/bus/usb/008/004
getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names
# file: dev/bus/usb/008/004
# owner: root
# group: pcscd
user::rw-
user:peter:rw-
group::rw-
mask::rw-
other::r--

Note how user peter has read/write as well.

However, I've been fighting with access rights to the cardreader as well, so
please don't take this as correct. In fact, the whole pcscd group business
stopped working for me at some point, oddly enough. Some Debian update
conflicted with my own tinkering in udev.

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at http://wwwhome.cs.utwente.nl/~lebbing/pubkey.txt


From wk at gnupg.org  Fri Aug  5 11:00:26 2011
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Fri, 05 Aug 2011 11:00:26 +0200
Subject: Card only available to root user
In-Reply-To: <20110805083147.GB7505@atlas> (Luis de Bethencourt's message of
	"Fri, 5 Aug 2011 10:31:47 +0200")
References: <20110804234921.GC31134@atlas>
	<8762mc71po.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <20110805082533.GA7505@atlas>
	<20110805083147.GB7505@atlas>
Message-ID: <871ux06xn9.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Fri,  5 Aug 2011 10:31, luis at debethencourt.com said:

> Missed this question the first time around...
> It is a SCM Microsystems SCR 335

Well that one works.  It even works fine with the scdaemon internal
driver, thus try after stopping pcscd.

>> When I do it as you say I get:
>> gpg-connect-agent 'scd learn --force' /bye
>> ERR 103 unknown command
>> 
>> I always get that 'unknown command' error in all the variatons you explained.

Please run

  gpg-connect-agent 'getinfo version' /bye

and 

  gpg-connect-agent 'scd getinfo version' /bye

> I've created this conf file both in my home and root's.

Well under ~/.gnupg/ of course.

> When I run gpg --card-status as my user, there is no file created.

Is this really gpg2 (check using gpg --version).

> But when I run it in root it does create this file.

That smells like a file permission problem.

> Is this confirmation that when running as root scdaemon is being spawned
> but when running as user it can't use scdaemon?

No. 

> I can paste the content of that log file if you want it. Asking before doing
> so since it's a bit lengthy.

Please send by private mail.  Note that this may reveal PINs if you
entered one.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From luis at debethencourt.com  Thu Aug  4 23:49:55 2011
From: luis at debethencourt.com (Luis de Bethencourt)
Date: Thu, 4 Aug 2011 23:49:55 +0200
Subject: Card only available to root user
In-Reply-To: <20110804212536.GA31134@atlas>
References: <20110804212536.GA31134@atlas>
Message-ID: <20110804214955.GB31134@atlas>

On Thu, Aug 04, 2011 at 11:25:36PM +0200, Luis de Bethencourt wrote:
> Hi everybody and thanks for the help.
> 
> I recently upgraded my GnuPG setup with a Smart Card (GnuPG Card v2).
> 
> I can get/set the information of the card through the root user, but this is
> not good for everyday use. I think I have pinpointed the problem, scdaemon
> iny my machine doesn't like anybody but root.
> 
> Here is a paste of a few commands to show the problem:
> 
> luisbg at atlas ~ $ gpg --card-status
> gpg: selecting openpgp failed: Unsupported certificate
> gpg: OpenPGP card not available: Unsupported certificate
> 
> luisbg at atlas ~ $ sudo gpg --card-status
> scdaemon[31077]: reading public key failed: Missing item in object
> scdaemon[31077]: reading public key failed: Missing item in object
> Application ID ...: D276000124010200000500000CC90000
> Version ..........: 2.0
> Manufacturer .....: ZeitControl
> Serial number ....: 00000CC9
> Name of cardholder: Luis de Bethencourt
> Language prefs ...: en
> Sex ..............: male
> URL of public key : http://people.collabora.com/~luisbg/gpg_pub_key_873B518D
> Login data .......: luisbg
> Signature PIN ....: not forced
> Key attributes ...: 2048R 2048R 2048R
> Max. PIN lengths .: 32 32 32
> PIN retry counter : 3 0 3
> Signature counter : 2
> Signature key ....: 3F4A 28A6 568A CD30 480A  F9EB 6BBF 9F19 873B 518D
>       created ....: 2011-07-26 12:22:00
> Encryption key....: [none]
> Authentication key: [none]
> General key info..: [none]
> scdaemon[31077]: updating slot 0 status: 0x0000->0x0007 (0->1)
> 
> luisbg at atlas ~ $ gpg-agent --server gpg-connect-agent
> OK Pleased to meet you
> SCD LEARN
> S SERIALNO D276000124010200000500000CC90000 0
> INQUIRE KNOWNCARDP D276000124010200000500000CC90000 0
> scdaemon[31088]: updating slot 0 status: 0x0000->0x0007 (0->1)
> 
> 
> Notice how I can check the status as root, and do SCD Learn as my user. But not
> check the status as my user (or sign my mails, which is the main problem). Also
> pcsc_scan works with my user, it shows the Serial number of the card.
> 
> If it helps, I'm running gentoo with:
> gpg (GnuPG) 2.0.17
> scdaemon (GnuPG) 2.0.17
> pcsc-lite version 1.7.2
> gpg-agent (GnuPG) 2.0.17
> 
> luisbg at atlas ~ $ gpgconf 
> gpg:GPG for OpenPGP:/usr/bin/gpg2
> gpg-agent:GPG Agent:/usr/bin/gpg-agent
> scdaemon:Smartcard Daemon:/usr/bin/scdaemon
> gpgsm:GPG for S/MIME:/usr/bin/gpgsm
> dirmngr:Directory Manager:/usr/bin/dirmngr
> 
> 
> Thanks a million for the help,
> Luis


By the way, I should mention I have replicated this issue in my two gentoo-based
machines.

But then got the card and reader working very easily in an other machine which
runs debian. So the hardware is OK. Unforunately for this case, my laptop is
one of the gentoo machines, and that is the machine I will make more use of the
card.

Thanks,
Luis
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From luis at debethencourt.com  Thu Aug  4 23:25:36 2011
From: luis at debethencourt.com (Luis de Bethencourt)
Date: Thu, 4 Aug 2011 23:25:36 +0200
Subject: Card only available to root user
Message-ID: <20110804212536.GA31134@atlas>

Hi everybody and thanks for the help.

I recently upgraded my GnuPG setup with a Smart Card (GnuPG Card v2).

I can get/set the information of the card through the root user, but this is
not good for everyday use. I think I have pinpointed the problem, scdaemon
iny my machine doesn't like anybody but root.

Here is a paste of a few commands to show the problem:

luisbg at atlas ~ $ gpg --card-status
gpg: selecting openpgp failed: Unsupported certificate
gpg: OpenPGP card not available: Unsupported certificate

luisbg at atlas ~ $ sudo gpg --card-status
scdaemon[31077]: reading public key failed: Missing item in object
scdaemon[31077]: reading public key failed: Missing item in object
Application ID ...: D276000124010200000500000CC90000
Version ..........: 2.0
Manufacturer .....: ZeitControl
Serial number ....: 00000CC9
Name of cardholder: Luis de Bethencourt
Language prefs ...: en
Sex ..............: male
URL of public key : http://people.collabora.com/~luisbg/gpg_pub_key_873B518D
Login data .......: luisbg
Signature PIN ....: not forced
Key attributes ...: 2048R 2048R 2048R
Max. PIN lengths .: 32 32 32
PIN retry counter : 3 0 3
Signature counter : 2
Signature key ....: 3F4A 28A6 568A CD30 480A  F9EB 6BBF 9F19 873B 518D
      created ....: 2011-07-26 12:22:00
Encryption key....: [none]
Authentication key: [none]
General key info..: [none]
scdaemon[31077]: updating slot 0 status: 0x0000->0x0007 (0->1)

luisbg at atlas ~ $ gpg-agent --server gpg-connect-agent
OK Pleased to meet you
SCD LEARN
S SERIALNO D276000124010200000500000CC90000 0
INQUIRE KNOWNCARDP D276000124010200000500000CC90000 0
scdaemon[31088]: updating slot 0 status: 0x0000->0x0007 (0->1)


Notice how I can check the status as root, and do SCD Learn as my user. But not
check the status as my user (or sign my mails, which is the main problem). Also
pcsc_scan works with my user, it shows the Serial number of the card.

If it helps, I'm running gentoo with:
gpg (GnuPG) 2.0.17
scdaemon (GnuPG) 2.0.17
pcsc-lite version 1.7.2
gpg-agent (GnuPG) 2.0.17

luisbg at atlas ~ $ gpgconf 
gpg:GPG for OpenPGP:/usr/bin/gpg2
gpg-agent:GPG Agent:/usr/bin/gpg-agent
scdaemon:Smartcard Daemon:/usr/bin/scdaemon
gpgsm:GPG for S/MIME:/usr/bin/gpgsm
dirmngr:Directory Manager:/usr/bin/dirmngr


Thanks a million for the help,
Luis
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From richard at r-selected.de  Sat Aug  6 12:46:52 2011
From: richard at r-selected.de (Richard)
Date: Sat, 6 Aug 2011 12:46:52 +0200
Subject: How secure are smartcards?
In-Reply-To: <4E2D3FCD.70801@enigmail.net>
References: <4E2C7D27.6090305@lists.grepular.com> <4E2D3FCD.70801@enigmail.net>
Message-ID: <CA+WmQokF28qCm=oMpziwdza8KzOuaJ86Eae4tUPREAREKyPYBA@mail.gmail.com>

Hello,

On Mon, Jul 25, 2011 at 12:05, Olav Seyfarth <olav at enigmail.net> wrote:
> I did so but unfortunately my (old) card broke. So I was busted. To avoid that
> in the future, I now generated my new key for usage in the card on an offline
> system (e.g. Live-CD in RAM disk) and copied it on an old small memony card (to
> allow to easily decrypt by importing the whole key to my keyring after revoking
> it) which I encrypted differently and physically locked securely. I imported
> the key to 2 SmartCards while also locking one away as easy backup and another
> one for daily use. After shutting down the offline system, only the one card is
> used with computers connected to the net. If this one is lost or stolen, I'd
> revoke the key (with a rev cert that I also generated separately).

would it be sensible to encrypt the key on the memory card key using
the encryption key stored on both smartcards? If one smartcard breaks,
you could still decrypt the key using the other card. And since the
secret key for decryption cannot leave the cards, it would be a pretty
secure solution, I guess. :)

Richard


From richard at r-selected.de  Sat Aug  6 12:48:06 2011
From: richard at r-selected.de (Richard)
Date: Sat, 6 Aug 2011 12:48:06 +0200
Subject: How secure are smartcards?
In-Reply-To: <CA+WmQokF28qCm=oMpziwdza8KzOuaJ86Eae4tUPREAREKyPYBA@mail.gmail.com>
References: <4E2C7D27.6090305@lists.grepular.com> <4E2D3FCD.70801@enigmail.net>
	<CA+WmQokF28qCm=oMpziwdza8KzOuaJ86Eae4tUPREAREKyPYBA@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <CA+WmQokbm-v=Ee8bTZVOtkVFPf_eOSW5K0ZsrfE38ukQqrV=kg@mail.gmail.com>

Whoops, typo:

On Sat, Aug 6, 2011 at 12:46, Richard <richard at r-selected.de> wrote:
> would it be sensible to encrypt the key on the memory card key using
> the encryption key stored on both smartcards?

was meant to read:

> would it be sensible to encrypt the key on the memory card using
> the encryption key stored on both smartcards?


From peter at digitalbrains.com  Sat Aug  6 18:40:46 2011
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Sat, 06 Aug 2011 18:40:46 +0200
Subject: Card only available to root user
In-Reply-To: <20110806175054.GB9160@atlas.wlan.hu-berlin.de>
References: <20110804234921.GC31134@atlas>
	<201108050014.55387.mailinglisten@hauke-laging.de>
	<20110805010207.GE31134@atlas> <4E3BB0F0.50905@digitalbrains.com>
	<20110806175054.GB9160@atlas.wlan.hu-berlin.de>
Message-ID: <4E3D6E8E.8060704@digitalbrains.com>

On 06/08/11 19:50, Luis de Bethencourt wrote:
> Thanks for that information! I agree with you that if could also have a similar
> ACL in my gentoo machine it would work. Where is this set? 

Unfortunately, I don't know much, hardly anything, about ConsoleKit and friends.
I suppose it is related to the following snippets out of the following files:

/lib/udev/rules.d/60-gnupg.rules:

ATTR{idVendor}=="04e6", ATTR{idProduct}=="5115", ENV{ID_SMARTCARD_READER}="1",\
ENV{ID_SMARTCARD_READER_DRIVER}="gnupg"

/lib/udev/rules.d/70-acl.rules:

# smart-card readers
ENV{ID_SMARTCARD_READER}=="*?", TAG+="udev-acl"

[...]

# apply ACL for all locally logged in users
TAG=="udev-acl", TEST=="/var/run/ConsoleKit/database", \
  RUN+="udev-acl --action=$env{ACTION} --device=$env{DEVNAME}"


Here I picked a somewhat random vendor/product-id that is matched in the first
file. You might need a lot more configuration to get it working, I don't know.

By the way, I added the \ in the snippet from the first file, but not in the
second; that one was already there.

Good luck,

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at http://wwwhome.cs.utwente.nl/~lebbing/pubkey.txt


From luis at debethencourt.com  Sat Aug  6 19:46:58 2011
From: luis at debethencourt.com (Luis de Bethencourt)
Date: Sat, 6 Aug 2011 19:46:58 +0200
Subject: Card only available to root user
In-Reply-To: <871ux06xn9.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <20110804234921.GC31134@atlas> <8762mc71po.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<20110805082533.GA7505@atlas> <20110805083147.GB7505@atlas>
	<871ux06xn9.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <20110806174658.GA9160@atlas.wlan.hu-berlin.de>

On Fri, Aug 05, 2011 at 11:00:26AM +0200, Werner Koch wrote:
> On Fri,  5 Aug 2011 10:31, luis at debethencourt.com said:
> 
> > Missed this question the first time around...
> > It is a SCM Microsystems SCR 335
> 
> Well that one works.  It even works fine with the scdaemon internal
> driver, thus try after stopping pcscd.
> 
> >> When I do it as you say I get:
> >> gpg-connect-agent 'scd learn --force' /bye
> >> ERR 103 unknown command
> >> 
> >> I always get that 'unknown command' error in all the variatons you explained.
> 
> Please run
> 
>   gpg-connect-agent 'getinfo version' /bye
> 

gpg-connect-agent 'getinfo version' /bye
ERR 100 not implemented

> and 
> 
>   gpg-connect-agent 'scd getinfo version' /bye
> 

gpg-connect-agent 'scd getinfo version' /bye
ERR 103 unknown command

:S

> > I've created this conf file both in my home and root's.
> 
> Well under ~/.gnupg/ of course.
> 
> > When I run gpg --card-status as my user, there is no file created.
> 
> Is this really gpg2 (check using gpg --version).
> 

gpg --version
gpg (GnuPG) 2.0.17

> > But when I run it in root it does create this file.
> 
> That smells like a file permission problem.
> 

Both the user and root have access to where the log file should be dropped.

By the way, since I'm not using a ccid script in /dev/ for the reader, where
are the permissions of the device set? I see that the device is owned by
root and group pcscd. Where could I change this?

Thanks,
Luis

> > Is this confirmation that when running as root scdaemon is being spawned
> > but when running as user it can't use scdaemon?
> 
> No. 
> 
> > I can paste the content of that log file if you want it. Asking before doing
> > so since it's a bit lengthy.
> 
> Please send by private mail.  Note that this may reveal PINs if you
> entered one.
> 
> 
> Shalom-Salam,
> 
>    Werner
> 
> -- 
> Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.
> 
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From luis at debethencourt.com  Sat Aug  6 19:50:54 2011
From: luis at debethencourt.com (Luis de Bethencourt)
Date: Sat, 6 Aug 2011 19:50:54 +0200
Subject: Card only available to root user
In-Reply-To: <4E3BB0F0.50905@digitalbrains.com>
References: <20110804234921.GC31134@atlas>
	<201108050014.55387.mailinglisten@hauke-laging.de>
	<20110805010207.GE31134@atlas> <4E3BB0F0.50905@digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <20110806175054.GB9160@atlas.wlan.hu-berlin.de>

On Fri, Aug 05, 2011 at 10:59:28AM +0200, Peter Lebbing wrote:
> On 05/08/11 03:02, Luis de Bethencourt wrote:
> > device in debian:
> > crw-rw-r--+ 1 root root 189, 516 2011-08-05 00:46 /dev/bus/usb/005/005
> > 
> > device in gentoo:
> > crw-rw-r-- 1 root pcscd 189, 395 Aug  5 02:56 /dev/bus/usb/004/012
> > 
> > my user is part of the pcscd group. I just checked.
> 
> Look closely at the permissions for Debian. It has a plus-sign. This means there
> is an ACL. Probably ConsoleKit is adding you to the ACL when you log in.
> 
> You can get the ACL with getfacl. Here is the output from my box:
> 
> peter at tweek:~$ getfacl /dev/bus/usb/008/004
> getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names
> # file: dev/bus/usb/008/004
> # owner: root
> # group: pcscd
> user::rw-
> user:peter:rw-
> group::rw-
> mask::rw-
> other::r--
> 
> Note how user peter has read/write as well.
> 
> However, I've been fighting with access rights to the cardreader as well, so
> please don't take this as correct. In fact, the whole pcscd group business
> stopped working for me at some point, oddly enough. Some Debian update
> conflicted with my own tinkering in udev.
> 
> Peter.
> 
> -- 
> I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
> You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
> My key is available at http://wwwhome.cs.utwente.nl/~lebbing/pubkey.txt

Thanks for that information! I agree with you that if could also have a similar
ACL in my gentoo machine it would work. Where is this set? 

Unfortunately I don't have access to the debian machine until next week, I'm at
the Desktop Summit in Berlin. Ohh... if anyone is around I would be happy to
meet them and sign their key :)

Thanks,
Luis
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From luis at debethencourt.com  Sat Aug  6 20:02:21 2011
From: luis at debethencourt.com (Luis de Bethencourt)
Date: Sat, 6 Aug 2011 20:02:21 +0200
Subject: Desktop Summit Key Signing
Message-ID: <20110806180221.GC9160@atlas.wlan.hu-berlin.de>

Hi everybody :)

Anybody also attending the Desktop Summit in Berlin would be interested in
some GPG key signing?

Luis
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From remco at webconquest.com  Sun Aug  7 06:24:46 2011
From: remco at webconquest.com (Remco Rijnders)
Date: Sun, 7 Aug 2011 06:24:46 +0200
Subject: Desktop Summit Key Signing
In-Reply-To: <20110806180221.GC9160@atlas.wlan.hu-berlin.de>
References: <20110806180221.GC9160@atlas.wlan.hu-berlin.de>
Message-ID: <De.4rJ@r78.nl>

On Sat, Aug 06, 2011 at 08:02:21PM +0200, Luis de Bethencourt wrote:
>Anybody also attending the Desktop Summit in Berlin would be interested in
>some GPG key signing?

I won't be there, but I will attend the keysigning in Bonn [1] at FrOSCon 
[2] on August 20th.

Remco

[1]: http://ksp.froscon.org/
[2]: http://www.froscon.org/
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From wk at gnupg.org  Mon Aug  8 09:38:49 2011
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Mon, 08 Aug 2011 09:38:49 +0200
Subject: Card only available to root user
In-Reply-To: <20110806174658.GA9160@atlas.wlan.hu-berlin.de> (Luis de
	Bethencourt's message of "Sat, 6 Aug 2011 19:46:58 +0200")
References: <20110804234921.GC31134@atlas>
	<8762mc71po.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <20110805082533.GA7505@atlas>
	<20110805083147.GB7505@atlas> <871ux06xn9.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<20110806174658.GA9160@atlas.wlan.hu-berlin.de>
Message-ID: <877h6owdx2.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Sat,  6 Aug 2011 19:46, luis at debethencourt.com said:

> gpg-connect-agent 'getinfo version' /bye
> ERR 100 not implemented

You are running a *very* old version of gpg-agent (< 2.0.5) - or
something hijacked the connection to gpg-agent (seehorse?
gnome-keyring?)


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From lists.gnupg-users at duinheks.nl  Mon Aug  8 14:58:30 2011
From: lists.gnupg-users at duinheks.nl (lists.gnupg-users at duinheks.nl)
Date: Mon, 8 Aug 2011 14:58:30 +0200 (CEST)
Subject: Problem with GPG
Message-ID: <alpine.LNX.2.00.1108081429360.25870@duinheks.nl>

Hello,

I call PGP from Pine with a simple script:
   #!/bin/sh
   echo "xxxxxxxxxxxx" | /usr/bin/gpg --batch --sign --armour --clearsig --passphrase-fd 0 $1
   mv $1.asc $2
   Lately I noticed that it did not work, withour giving me any
   warning.

When I use it 'by hand' I see an error:
   echo "xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx" | /usr/bin/gpg --batch --sign
     --armour --clearsig --passphrase-fd test
   -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
   Hash: SHA1
   gpg: pkglue.c:41: mpi_from_sexp: Assertion `data' failed.
   Aborted

What's happening and how can I repair it?

The file test contains nothing spectacular:
   /home/jbeekhui/.gnupg/pubring.gpg
   ---------------------------------
   pub  1024D/4F702D4A 2001-10-27 Johannes D.H. Beekhuizen
        Key fingerprint = C913 300F FEF9 92BE 8320  07B4 2DF2 2641 4F70 2D4A
   uid                            Johannes Beekhuizen
   sub  1024g/1074CC1A 2001-10-27

I'm running GNUpg 2.0.18 under SlackWare 13.0, built with the
libraries:
   libgpg-error	1.9
   libgrypt	1.5.0
   libksba	1.2.0
   libassuan	2.0.2

Maby yhnals for any helpful help,

 	Hans Beekhuizen.


J.D.H. Beekhuizen
e-mail:	jdh.beekhuizen at duinheks.nl
tel:	+31(0)714015437
fax:	+31(0)714017198


From luis at debethencourt.com  Mon Aug  8 18:05:52 2011
From: luis at debethencourt.com (Luis de Bethencourt)
Date: Mon, 8 Aug 2011 18:05:52 +0200
Subject: Card only available to root user
In-Reply-To: <877h6owdx2.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <20110804234921.GC31134@atlas> <8762mc71po.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<20110805082533.GA7505@atlas> <20110805083147.GB7505@atlas>
	<871ux06xn9.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<20110806174658.GA9160@atlas.wlan.hu-berlin.de>
	<877h6owdx2.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <20110808145023.GF9160@atlas.wlan.hu-berlin.de>

On Mon, Aug 08, 2011 at 09:38:49AM +0200, Werner Koch wrote:
> On Sat,  6 Aug 2011 19:46, luis at debethencourt.com said:
> 
> > gpg-connect-agent 'getinfo version' /bye
> > ERR 100 not implemented
> 
> You are running a *very* old version of gpg-agent (< 2.0.5) - or
> something hijacked the connection to gpg-agent (seehorse?
> gnome-keyring?)
> 
> 
> Shalom-Salam,
> 
>    Werner
> 
> -- 
> Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.
> 

luisbg at atlas ~ $ gpg-connect-agent --version
gpg-connect-agent (GnuPG) 2.0.17

this is very strange, that shows it as 2.0.17, but it still says that
'getinfo version' is not implemented.

:S

Luis
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From wk at gnupg.org  Mon Aug  8 19:54:32 2011
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Mon, 08 Aug 2011 19:54:32 +0200
Subject: Problem with GPG
In-Reply-To: <alpine.LNX.2.00.1108081429360.25870@duinheks.nl> (lists
	gnupg-users's message of "Mon, 8 Aug 2011 14:58:30 +0200 (CEST)")
References: <alpine.LNX.2.00.1108081429360.25870@duinheks.nl>
Message-ID: <87zkjju6uf.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Mon,  8 Aug 2011 14:58, lists.gnupg-users at duinheks.nl said:

>   #!/bin/sh
>   echo "xxxxxxxxxxxx" | /usr/bin/gpg --batch --sign --armour --clearsig --passphrase-fd 0 $1

You should better use

 gpg --batch --sign --armour --clearsig --passphrase-fd 0 --yes -o "$1".asc "$1"

to avoid the mv.  Even better use gpg-agent.

>   echo "xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx" | /usr/bin/gpg --batch --sign
>     --armour --clearsig --passphrase-fd test
>   -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>   Hash: SHA1
>   gpg: pkglue.c:41: mpi_from_sexp: Assertion `data' failed.
>   Aborted

Please show us the output of 

   /usr/bin/gpg --version 


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner


-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From wk at gnupg.org  Mon Aug  8 19:57:44 2011
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Mon, 08 Aug 2011 19:57:44 +0200
Subject: Card only available to root user
In-Reply-To: <20110808145023.GF9160@atlas.wlan.hu-berlin.de> (Luis de
	Bethencourt's message of "Mon, 8 Aug 2011 18:05:52 +0200")
References: <20110804234921.GC31134@atlas>
	<8762mc71po.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <20110805082533.GA7505@atlas>
	<20110805083147.GB7505@atlas> <871ux06xn9.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<20110806174658.GA9160@atlas.wlan.hu-berlin.de>
	<877h6owdx2.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<20110808145023.GF9160@atlas.wlan.hu-berlin.de>
Message-ID: <87vcu7u6p3.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Mon,  8 Aug 2011 18:05, luis at debethencourt.com said:

> this is very strange, that shows it as 2.0.17, but it still says that
> 'getinfo version' is not implemented.

One if these GNOME tools is intercepting the connection and acts as a
MITM between gpg-connect-agent and gpg-agent.

Check the owner of the socket decribed by $GPG_AGENT_INFO and if used
the socket ~/.gnupg/S.gpg-agent .


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From luis at debethencourt.com  Tue Aug  9 02:44:53 2011
From: luis at debethencourt.com (Luis de Bethencourt)
Date: Tue, 9 Aug 2011 02:44:53 +0200
Subject: Card only available to root user
In-Reply-To: <87vcu7u6p3.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <20110804234921.GC31134@atlas> <8762mc71po.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<20110805082533.GA7505@atlas> <20110805083147.GB7505@atlas>
	<871ux06xn9.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<20110806174658.GA9160@atlas.wlan.hu-berlin.de>
	<877h6owdx2.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<20110808145023.GF9160@atlas.wlan.hu-berlin.de>
	<87vcu7u6p3.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <20110809004453.GG9160@atlas.wlan.hu-berlin.de>

On Mon, Aug 08, 2011 at 07:57:44PM +0200, Werner Koch wrote:
> On Mon,  8 Aug 2011 18:05, luis at debethencourt.com said:
> 
> > this is very strange, that shows it as 2.0.17, but it still says that
> > 'getinfo version' is not implemented.
> 
> One if these GNOME tools is intercepting the connection and acts as a
> MITM between gpg-connect-agent and gpg-agent.
> 
> Check the owner of the socket decribed by $GPG_AGENT_INFO and if used
> the socket ~/.gnupg/S.gpg-agent .
>

So it looks like GNOME's ssh-agent is interfering. How can I avoid this?

Thanks,
Luis
 
> 
> Shalom-Salam,
> 
>    Werner
> 
> -- 
> Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.
> 
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From dougb at dougbarton.us  Tue Aug  9 01:09:30 2011
From: dougb at dougbarton.us (Doug Barton)
Date: Mon, 08 Aug 2011 16:09:30 -0700
Subject: Problem with GPG
In-Reply-To: <alpine.LNX.2.00.1108081429360.25870@duinheks.nl>
References: <alpine.LNX.2.00.1108081429360.25870@duinheks.nl>
Message-ID: <4E406CAA.5020206@dougbarton.us>

On 08/08/2011 05:58, lists.gnupg-users at duinheks.nl wrote:
> Hello,
> 
> I call PGP from Pine with a simple script:

Take a look at http://dougbarton.us/PGP/ppf/index.html


>   gpg: pkglue.c:41: mpi_from_sexp: Assertion `data' failed.
>   Aborted

> I'm running GNUpg 2.0.18 under SlackWare 13.0, built with the
> libraries:
>   libgpg-error    1.9
>   libgrypt    1.5.0
>   libksba    1.2.0
>   libassuan    2.0.2

That's the same error I was getting when I ran 2.0.17 compiled against
the old libgcrypt after upgrading libgcrypt to 1.5.0. Does gpg --version
tell you that you're running 2.0.18?


Doug

-- 

	Nothin' ever doesn't change, but nothin' changes much.
			-- OK Go

	Breadth of IT experience, and depth of knowledge in the DNS.
	Yours for the right price.  :)  http://SupersetSolutions.com/



From wk at gnupg.org  Tue Aug  9 11:15:13 2011
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Tue, 09 Aug 2011 11:15:13 +0200
Subject: Problems with gnome-keyring et al. (was: Card only available to root
	user)
In-Reply-To: <20110809004453.GG9160@atlas.wlan.hu-berlin.de> (Luis de
	Bethencourt's message of "Tue, 9 Aug 2011 02:44:53 +0200")
References: <20110804234921.GC31134@atlas>
	<8762mc71po.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <20110805082533.GA7505@atlas>
	<20110805083147.GB7505@atlas> <871ux06xn9.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<20110806174658.GA9160@atlas.wlan.hu-berlin.de>
	<877h6owdx2.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<20110808145023.GF9160@atlas.wlan.hu-berlin.de>
	<87vcu7u6p3.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<20110809004453.GG9160@atlas.wlan.hu-berlin.de>
Message-ID: <87r54vt07y.fsf_-_@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Tue,  9 Aug 2011 02:44, luis at debethencourt.com said:

> So it looks like GNOME's ssh-agent is interfering. How can I avoid this?

Tell them that they should not interfere with GnuPG.  

If you put a line 

  use-standard-socket

into ~/.gnupg/gpg-agent.conf and stop starting gpg-agent in the xsession
etc., all tools requiring gpg-agent will start gpg-agent on the fly.
There is even no more need for the GPG_AGENT_INFO envvar; I even
explicitly unset this variable in my profile.  Thus the only envvar you
need is GPG_TTY.

If you want to use gpg-agent as ssh-agent you should also put a line

  enable-ssh-support

into ~/.gnupg/gpg-agent.conf and put into your profile 

  unset SSH_AGENT_PID
  SSH_AUTH_SOCK="${HOME}/.gnupg/S.gpg-agent.ssh"
  export SSH_AUTH_SOCK

Now you only need to make sure that gpg-agent is started before you use
ssh.  This is because ssh has no way to start gpg-agent on the fly; I do
this with a simple

  gpg-connect-agent /bye

If you want to check whether gpg-agent is _configured_ to use the
standard socket, you may call

 gpg-agent --use-standard-socket-p

This is actually what all GnuPG tools do to see whether they may start
gpg-agent on the fly.

The standard socket makes things easier and hopefully harder for
gnome-keyring to interfere with it.


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From wk at gnupg.org  Tue Aug  9 11:38:27 2011
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Tue, 09 Aug 2011 11:38:27 +0200
Subject: Working with a system-shared keyring
In-Reply-To: <4DF265D6.8010507@dougbarton.us> (Doug Barton's message of "Fri, 
	10 Jun 2011 11:43:34 -0700")
References: <BANLkTi=r++WkENR3QiiGMGGQseBcHsR7nQ@mail.gmail.com>
	<877h93z8jq.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4DF12F55.2020707@dougbarton.us>
	<87d3imtbs9.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4DF265D6.8010507@dougbarton.us>
Message-ID: <87ipq6udpo.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Fri, 10 Jun 2011 20:43, dougb at dougbarton.us said:

>> But fixes a lot of problems.  The keyring is a database and if we
>> distribute this database to several files without a way to sync them;
>> this leads to problems.  You may have not been affected by such problems
>> but only due to the way you use gpg.
>
> Can you elaborate on those problems? I can think of several examples
> of databases whose contents are stored in multiple files without any
> difficulty, so I'm curious.

But in those cases the files are either under the control of the
database or partitioned using a well defined scheme.  With the --keyring
option this is different: You may add several keyrings to GnuPG and
remove them later.  There is no way GPG can tell whether there are
duplicates or which instances of a duplicated entry it needs to update.
Sure, we could make this working but I it will get really complex.  Thus
it is far easier to have one file or set of files which are under the
sole control of GPG.


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From oleksandr.shneyder at obviously-nice.de  Tue Aug  9 12:04:25 2011
From: oleksandr.shneyder at obviously-nice.de (Oleksandr Shneyder)
Date: Tue, 09 Aug 2011 12:04:25 +0200
Subject: Card Reader on Cherry Keyboard (omnikey) with OpenPGP Smart Card
In-Reply-To: <87r54vt07y.fsf_-_@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <20110804234921.GC31134@atlas>	<8762mc71po.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<20110805082533.GA7505@atlas>	<20110805083147.GB7505@atlas>
	<871ux06xn9.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>	<20110806174658.GA9160@atlas.wlan.hu-berlin.de>	<877h6owdx2.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>	<20110808145023.GF9160@atlas.wlan.hu-berlin.de>	<87vcu7u6p3.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>	<20110809004453.GG9160@atlas.wlan.hu-berlin.de>
	<87r54vt07y.fsf_-_@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <4E410629.5010304@obviously-nice.de>

Hello list,

I have issues using OpenPGP smart cards from "kernel concepts" with
omnikey card reader integrated in Cherry keyboard (Cherry XX44 USB keyboard)

I can read a smart card status:

$ gpg --card-status
Application ID ...: D27600012401020000050000102E0000
Version ..........: 2.0
Manufacturer .....: ZeitControl
Serial number ....: 0000102E
Name of cardholder: John Dow
Language prefs ...: de
Sex ..............: unspecified
URL of public key : [not set]
Login data .......: alex
Private DO 1 .....: [not set]
Private DO 2 .....: [not set]
Signature PIN ....: forced
Key attributes ...: 2048R 2048R 2048R
Max. PIN lengths .: 32 32 32
PIN retry counter : 3 0 3
Signature counter : 5
Signature key ....: F14E 8ED6 2459 8260 9D0B  D1F3 839F 90E1 8D22 1FF8
      created ....: 2011-08-09 09:38:42
Encryption key....: 1D98 37A5 BE5D 185F BDC0  AD1C 2D05 CC10 6206 765E
      created ....: 2011-08-09 09:38:42
Authentication key: 361B 505C DD7F 2F88 0C04  C5B1 BA91 2945 B68E 90D3
      created ....: 2011-08-09 09:38:42
General key info..: [none]




I can also change login data, PINs, etc.
But I can not generate a keys:



gpg/card> admin
Admin commands are allowed

gpg/card> generate
Make off-card backup of encryption key? (Y/n) n

gpg: NOTE: keys are already stored on the card!

Replace existing keys? (y/N) y
gpg: 3 Admin PIN attempts remaining before card is permanently locked

Please enter the Admin PIN

Please enter the PIN
What keysize do you want for the Signature key? (2048)
What keysize do you want for the Encryption key? (2048)
What keysize do you want for the Authentication key? (2048)
Please specify how long the key should be valid.
         0 = key does not expire
      <n>  = key expires in n days
      <n>w = key expires in n weeks
      <n>m = key expires in n months
      <n>y = key expires in n years
Key is valid for? (0)
Key does not expire at all
Is this correct? (y/N) y

You need a user ID to identify your key; the software constructs the user ID
from the Real Name, Comment and Email Address in this form:
    "Heinrich Heine (Der Dichter) <heinrichh at duesseldorf.de>"

Real name: John Dow
Email address:
Comment:
You selected this USER-ID:
    "John Dow"

Change (N)ame, (C)omment, (E)mail or (O)kay/(Q)uit? o
gpg: existing key will be replaced
gpg: please wait while key is being generated ...
gpg: apdu_send_simple(0) failed: unknown status error
gpg: generating key failed
gpg: key generation failed: general error
Key generation failed: general error

gpg/card>


Using existing key for authentication works neither:

$gpg-agent --enable-ssh-support --daemon --log-file /tmp/gpg-agent.log

$ ssh-add -L
The agent has no identities.

$ cat /tmp/gpg-agent.log
2011-08-09 11:47:02 gpg-agent[16906] listening on socket
`/tmp/gpg-3QmD1w/S.gpg-agent'
2011-08-09 11:47:02 gpg-agent[16906] listening on socket
`/tmp/gpg-YdDV3Y/S.gpg-agent.ssh'
2011-08-09 11:47:02 gpg-agent[16907] gpg-agent (GnuPG) 2.0.14 started
2011-08-09 11:47:14 gpg-agent[16907] ssh handler 0xff1d20 for fd 8 started
2011-08-09 11:47:14 gpg-agent[16907] ssh request 1 is not supported
2011-08-09 11:47:14 gpg-agent[16907] ssh request handler for
request_identities (11) started
2011-08-09 11:47:14 gpg-agent[16907] no running SCdaemon - starting it
2011-08-09 11:47:14 gpg-agent[16907] DBG: first connection to SCdaemon
established
gpg-agent[16907.10] DBG: -> GETINFO socket_name
gpg-agent[16907.10] DBG: <- D /tmp/gpg-XE8ndK/S.scdaemon
gpg-agent[16907.10] DBG: <- OK
2011-08-09 11:47:14 gpg-agent[16907] DBG: additional connections at
`/tmp/gpg-XE8ndK/S.scdaemon'
gpg-agent[16907.10] DBG: -> OPTION event-signal=12
gpg-agent[16907.10] DBG: <- OK
gpg-agent[16907.10] DBG: -> GETATTR $AUTHKEYID
gpg-agent[16907.10] DBG: <- S $AUTHKEYID OPENPGP.3
gpg-agent[16907.10] DBG: <- OK
gpg-agent[16907.10] DBG: -> GETATTR SERIALNO
2011-08-09 11:47:15 gpg-agent[16907] SIGUSR2 received - updating card
event counter
gpg-agent[16907.10] DBG: <- S SERIALNO D27600012401020000050000102E0000
gpg-agent[16907.10] DBG: <- OK
gpg-agent[16907.10] DBG: -> READKEY OPENPGP.3
gpg-agent[16907.10] DBG: <- ERR 100663305 No public key <SCD>
2011-08-09 11:47:15 gpg-agent[16907] no suitable card key found: No
public key
2011-08-09 11:47:15 gpg-agent[16907] ssh request handler for
request_identities (11) ready
gpg-agent[16907.10] DBG: -> RESTART
gpg-agent[16907.10] DBG: <- OK
2011-08-09 11:47:15 gpg-agent[16907] ssh handler 0xff1d20 for fd 8
terminated



If I using SCM card readers with this cards everything works just fine.
I have some older smart cards from "kernel concepts", they working also
perfect with both card readers (SCM and Omnikey in Cherry keyboard).

Have anybody the same problem? Is there a chance that we can use this
Open PGP cards with Cherry keyboards? (we have bought a 100 smart cards
and keyboards for our company)

System is debian squeeze
# dpkg --list | grep -i gnupg
ii  debian-archive-keyring                2010.08.28
          GnuPG archive keys of the Debian archive
ii  gnupg                                 1.4.10-4
          GNU privacy guard - a free PGP replacement
ii  gnupg-agent                           2.0.14-2
          GNU privacy guard - password agent
ii  gnupg2                                2.0.14-2
          GNU privacy guard - a free PGP replacement (new v2.x)
ii  libassuan-dev                         1.0.5-1
          IPC library for the GnuPG components
ii  libgpg-error-dev                      1.6-1
          library for common error values and messages in GnuPG components
ii  libgpg-error0                         1.6-1
          library for common error values and messages in GnuPG components
ii  libgpgme11                            1.2.0-1.2
          GPGME - GnuPG Made Easy
ii  libgpgme11-dev                        1.2.0-1.2
          GPGME - GnuPG Made Easy
ii  libkleopatra1                         4:3.5.9-5
          KDE GnuPG interface libraries
ii  pinentry-gtk                          0.7.5-2.1
          GTK+-based PIN or pass-phrase entry dialog for GnuPG
ii  pinentry-gtk2                         0.8.0-1
          GTK+-2-based PIN or pass-phrase entry dialog for GnuPG
ii  python-gnupginterface                 0.3.2-9.1
          Python interface to GnuPG (GPG)
ii  seahorse                              2.30.1-2
          GNOME front end for GnuPG

thanks,
-- 
Oleksandr Shneyder
Dipl. Informatik
X2go Core Developer Team

email:  oleksandr.shneyder at obviously-nice.de
web: www.obviously-nice.de

--> X2go - everywhere at home

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From lists.gnupg-users at duinheks.nl  Tue Aug  9 13:34:40 2011
From: lists.gnupg-users at duinheks.nl (lists.gnupg-users at duinheks.nl)
Date: Tue, 9 Aug 2011 13:34:40 +0200 (CEST)
Subject: Problem with GPG
In-Reply-To: <87zkjju6uf.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <alpine.LNX.2.00.1108081429360.25870@duinheks.nl>
	<87zkjju6uf.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <alpine.LNX.2.00.1108091330060.30751@duinheks.nl>

Hello Werner,

Yesterday, Aug 8, Werner Koch wrote to lists.gnupg-users at duinheks.nl about...:

WK > You should better use
WK >  gpg --batch --sign --armour --clearsig --passphrase-fd 0 --yes -o "$1".asc "$1"

I will do that in future.

WK > to avoid the mv.  Even better use gpg-agent.

That will take some thinking. Will look into it.

WK > >   gpg: pkglue.c:41: mpi_from_sexp: Assertion `data' failed.
WK > >   Aborted
WK > Please show us the output of 
WK >    /usr/bin/gpg --version 

Of course:
  $ gpg --version
  gpg (GnuPG) 2.0.18
  libgcrypt 1.5.0
  Copyright (C) 2011 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
  License GPLv3+: GNU GPL version 3 or later
  <http://gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html>
  This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
  There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.
  Home: ~/.gnupg
  Supported algorithms:
  Pubkey: RSA, ELG, DSA
  Cipher: 3DES, CAST5, BLOWFISH, AES, AES192, AES256, TWOFISH, CAMELLIA128,
          CAMELLIA192, CAMELLIA256
  Hash: MD5, SHA1, RIPEMD160, SHA256, SHA384, SHA512, SHA224
  Compression: Uncompressed, ZIP, ZLIB, BZIP2

Regards,
	
	Hans.


J.D.H. Beekhuizen
e-mail:	jdh.beekhuizen at duinheks.nl
tel:	+31(0)714015437
fax:	+31(0)714017198


From wk at gnupg.org  Tue Aug  9 15:31:37 2011
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Tue, 09 Aug 2011 15:31:37 +0200
Subject: Card Reader on Cherry Keyboard (omnikey) with OpenPGP Smart Card
In-Reply-To: <4E410629.5010304@obviously-nice.de> (Oleksandr Shneyder's
	message of "Tue, 09 Aug 2011 12:04:25 +0200")
References: <20110804234921.GC31134@atlas>
	<8762mc71po.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <20110805082533.GA7505@atlas>
	<20110805083147.GB7505@atlas> <871ux06xn9.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<20110806174658.GA9160@atlas.wlan.hu-berlin.de>
	<877h6owdx2.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<20110808145023.GF9160@atlas.wlan.hu-berlin.de>
	<87vcu7u6p3.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<20110809004453.GG9160@atlas.wlan.hu-berlin.de>
	<87r54vt07y.fsf_-_@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<4E410629.5010304@obviously-nice.de>
Message-ID: <87ei0uu2x2.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Tue,  9 Aug 2011 12:04, oleksandr.shneyder at obviously-nice.de said:

> I have issues using OpenPGP smart cards from "kernel concepts" with
> omnikey card reader integrated in Cherry keyboard (Cherry XX44 USB keyboard)

Omnikey based readers don't work with that card because the readers
don't support Extended Length APDUs.  Well, under Windows they work
because their driver uses undocumented tricks to do it.  I tried to the
same in GnuPG's internal driver but that is not really reliable.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From oleksandr.shneyder at obviously-nice.de  Tue Aug  9 16:28:03 2011
From: oleksandr.shneyder at obviously-nice.de (Oleksandr Shneyder)
Date: Tue, 09 Aug 2011 16:28:03 +0200
Subject: Card Reader on Cherry Keyboard (omnikey) with OpenPGP Smart Card
In-Reply-To: <87ei0uu2x2.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <20110804234921.GC31134@atlas>	<8762mc71po.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<20110805082533.GA7505@atlas>	<20110805083147.GB7505@atlas>
	<871ux06xn9.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>	<20110806174658.GA9160@atlas.wlan.hu-berlin.de>	<877h6owdx2.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>	<20110808145023.GF9160@atlas.wlan.hu-berlin.de>	<87vcu7u6p3.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>	<20110809004453.GG9160@atlas.wlan.hu-berlin.de>	<87r54vt07y.fsf_-_@vigenere.g10code.de>	<4E410629.5010304@obviously-nice.de>
	<87ei0uu2x2.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <4E4143F3.4010801@obviously-nice.de>

Thank you for your answer, Werner

Actually, I only need, that ssh authentication works with that cards and
omnikey card readers. How do you think, is there are a chances, that
it'll be work soon? Should I try to use pc/sc driver?

lg,
alex


Am 09.08.2011 15:31, schrieb Werner Koch:
> On Tue,  9 Aug 2011 12:04, oleksandr.shneyder at obviously-nice.de said:
> 
>> I have issues using OpenPGP smart cards from "kernel concepts" with
>> omnikey card reader integrated in Cherry keyboard (Cherry XX44 USB keyboard)
> 
> Omnikey based readers don't work with that card because the readers
> don't support Extended Length APDUs.  Well, under Windows they work
> because their driver uses undocumented tricks to do it.  I tried to the
> same in GnuPG's internal driver but that is not really reliable.
> 
> 
> Shalom-Salam,
> 
>    Werner
> 


-- 
Oleksandr Shneyder
Dipl. Informatik
X2go Core Developer Team

email:  oleksandr.shneyder at obviously-nice.de
web: www.obviously-nice.de

--> X2go - everywhere at home

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From wk at gnupg.org  Tue Aug  9 17:55:16 2011
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Tue, 09 Aug 2011 17:55:16 +0200
Subject: Card Reader on Cherry Keyboard (omnikey) with OpenPGP Smart Card
In-Reply-To: <4E4143F3.4010801@obviously-nice.de> (Oleksandr Shneyder's
	message of "Tue, 09 Aug 2011 16:28:03 +0200")
References: <20110804234921.GC31134@atlas>
	<8762mc71po.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <20110805082533.GA7505@atlas>
	<20110805083147.GB7505@atlas> <871ux06xn9.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<20110806174658.GA9160@atlas.wlan.hu-berlin.de>
	<877h6owdx2.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<20110808145023.GF9160@atlas.wlan.hu-berlin.de>
	<87vcu7u6p3.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<20110809004453.GG9160@atlas.wlan.hu-berlin.de>
	<87r54vt07y.fsf_-_@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<4E410629.5010304@obviously-nice.de>
	<87ei0uu2x2.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<4E4143F3.4010801@obviously-nice.de>
Message-ID: <87aabitw9n.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Tue,  9 Aug 2011 16:28, oleksandr.shneyder at obviously-nice.de said:

> Actually, I only need, that ssh authentication works with that cards and
> omnikey card readers. How do you think, is there are a chances, that
> it'll be work soon? Should I try to use pc/sc driver?

The pc/sc driver won't work; thus better stop pcscd.  The internal
driver often works; it usually does not work for key generation.


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From dougb at dougbarton.us  Tue Aug  9 18:51:56 2011
From: dougb at dougbarton.us (Doug Barton)
Date: Tue, 09 Aug 2011 09:51:56 -0700
Subject: Working with a system-shared keyring
In-Reply-To: <87ipq6udpo.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <BANLkTi=r++WkENR3QiiGMGGQseBcHsR7nQ@mail.gmail.com>
	<877h93z8jq.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<4DF12F55.2020707@dougbarton.us>
	<87d3imtbs9.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<4DF265D6.8010507@dougbarton.us>
	<87ipq6udpo.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <4E4165AC.9080908@dougbarton.us>

On 08/09/2011 02:38, Werner Koch wrote:
> On Fri, 10 Jun 2011 20:43, dougb at dougbarton.us said:
> 
>>> But fixes a lot of problems.  The keyring is a database and if we
>>> distribute this database to several files without a way to sync them;
>>> this leads to problems.  You may have not been affected by such problems
>>> but only due to the way you use gpg.
>>
>> Can you elaborate on those problems? I can think of several examples
>> of databases whose contents are stored in multiple files without any
>> difficulty, so I'm curious.
> 
> But in those cases the files are either under the control of the
> database or partitioned using a well defined scheme.  With the --keyring
> option this is different: You may add several keyrings to GnuPG and
> remove them later.  There is no way GPG can tell whether there are
> duplicates or which instances of a duplicated entry it needs to update.
> Sure, we could make this working but I it will get really complex.  Thus
> it is far easier to have one file or set of files which are under the
> sole control of GPG.

Easier to code maybe. But I still maintain that losing the ability to
have multiple keyrings will be a significant loss of functionality for
the user. Significant enough for me that I would likely go back to the
1.4 branch (with regrets, since I like some of the functionality that is
provided in 2.x now).


Doug

-- 

	Nothin' ever doesn't change, but nothin' changes much.
			-- OK Go

	Breadth of IT experience, and depth of knowledge in the DNS.
	Yours for the right price.  :)  http://SupersetSolutions.com/



From wk at gnupg.org  Tue Aug  9 19:10:16 2011
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Tue, 09 Aug 2011 19:10:16 +0200
Subject: Problem with GPG
In-Reply-To: <alpine.LNX.2.00.1108091330060.30751@duinheks.nl> (lists
	gnupg-users's message of "Tue, 9 Aug 2011 13:34:40 +0200 (CEST)")
References: <alpine.LNX.2.00.1108081429360.25870@duinheks.nl>
	<87zkjju6uf.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<alpine.LNX.2.00.1108091330060.30751@duinheks.nl>
Message-ID: <8762m6tssn.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Tue,  9 Aug 2011 13:34, lists.gnupg-users at duinheks.nl said:

>   gpg (GnuPG) 2.0.18
>   libgcrypt 1.5.0

Okay, I only asked to make sure that we are really using the right
version.

It would be helpful if you could change this function in
gnupg/g10/pkglue.c:

  static gcry_mpi_t
  mpi_from_sexp (gcry_sexp_t sexp, const char * item)
  {
    gcry_sexp_t list;
    gcry_mpi_t data;
  
    list = gcry_sexp_find_token (sexp, item, 0);
    assert (list);
    data = gcry_sexp_nth_mpi (list, 1, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG);
    assert (data);
    gcry_sexp_release (list);
    return data;
  }

to  

  static gcry_mpi_t
  mpi_from_sexp (gcry_sexp_t sexp, const char * item)
  {
    gcry_sexp_t list;
    gcry_mpi_t data;
  
    list = gcry_sexp_find_token (sexp, item, 0);
    assert (list);
    data = gcry_sexp_nth_mpi (list, 1, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG);
    if (!data)
      gcry_sexp_dump (list);
    assert (data);
    gcry_sexp_release (list);
    return data;
  }

That is, insert the two extra lines and run again; you should notice
some debug output right before the assertion failure.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner


-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From gnupg at lists.grepular.com  Tue Aug  9 22:31:01 2011
From: gnupg at lists.grepular.com (Mike Cardwell)
Date: Tue, 09 Aug 2011 21:31:01 +0100
Subject: OpenPGP Card "CHV* failed: general error"
Message-ID: <4E419905.7020906@lists.grepular.com>

Hi,

My OpenPGP Card (v2) has been working fine for a couple of days now, but
it has stopped tonight.

Simply trying to sign some text gives the following error:

========================================================================
mike at Fuzzbutt:~$ date|gpg --clearsign
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

Tue Aug  9 21:19:53 BST 2011
gpg: detected reader `Lenovo Integrated Smart Card Reader 00 00'
gpg: signatures created so far: 32

Please enter the PIN
[sigs done: 32]
gpg: verify CHV1 failed: general error
gpg: signing failed: general error
gpg: [stdin]: clearsign failed: general error
mike at Fuzzbutt:~$
========================================================================

The output of "gpg --card-status" is:

========================================================================
mike at Fuzzbutt:~$ gpg --card-status
gpg: detected reader `Lenovo Integrated Smart Card Reader 00 00'
Application ID ...: D276000124010200000500000D580000
Version ..........: 2.0
Manufacturer .....: ZeitControl
Serial number ....: 00000D58
Name of cardholder: Mike Cardwell
Language prefs ...: en
Sex ..............: unspecified
URL of public key : [not set]
Login data .......: [not set]
Private DO 1 .....: [not set]
Private DO 2 .....: [not set]
Signature PIN ....: forced
Key attributes ...: 2048R 2048R 2048R
Max. PIN lengths .: 32 32 32
PIN retry counter : 3 0 3
Signature counter : 32
Signature key ....: 9845 7968 9D81 214F 1171  CDA2 9D26 2301 C1D1 E704
      created ....: 2011-07-22 12:24:32
Encryption key....: 5ACB CDDD 3FE6 C24D 0FDB  C157 FA37 2B88 0711 5CE9
      created ....: 2011-07-22 12:25:33
Authentication key: DF22 F678 083E 1025 5750  A4A0 124D 48BF 4D72 5086
      created ....: 2011-08-09 15:04:19
General key info..: pub  2048R/C1D1E704 2011-07-22 Mike Cardwell
<mike.cardwell at grepular.com>
sec#  4096R/0018461F  created: 2010-11-02  expires: 2015-11-01
ssb   4096R/01DE408F  created: 2010-11-02  expires: 2015-11-01
ssb>  2048R/C1D1E704  created: 2011-07-22  expires: 2012-07-21
                      card-no: 0005 00000D58
ssb>  2048R/07115CE9  created: 2011-07-22  expires: 2012-07-21
                      card-no: 0005 00000D58
mike at Fuzzbutt:~$
========================================================================

If I try to run any admin commands like "passwd" after doing a gpg
--card-edit, I get the same sort of error, eg:

gpg: verify CHV2 failed: general error

The only thing that I can think I've changed is that I added an
authentication subkey earlier. Previously, I was just using encryption
and signing subkeys. I'm sure it worked for at least a little while
after that though...

Any ideas what it could be? Here is some more info which might be useful:

========================================================================
mike at Fuzzbutt:~$ gpg --version|head -1
gpg (GnuPG) 1.4.11
mike at Fuzzbutt:~$ gpg-agent --version|head -1
gpg-agent (GnuPG) 2.0.14
mike at Fuzzbutt:~$ pcscd --version|head -1
pcsc-lite version 1.7.0.
mike at Fuzzbutt:~$ ps auxwww|egrep -i 'pcsc|gpg|gnupg'
mike      2239  0.0  0.0  13128  1056 pts/0    S+   21:26   0:00 egrep
--color=auto -i pcsc|gpg|gnupg
mike      4946  0.0  0.0  52072  1476 ?        Sl   20:50   0:00 pcscd
mike      6038  0.0  0.0  12092   284 ?        Ss   20:57   0:00
/usr/bin/ssh-agent /usr/bin/gpg-agent --daemon --sh
--write-env-file=/home/mike/.gnupg/gpg-agent-info-Fuzzbutt
/usr/bin/dbus-launch --exit-with-session gnome-session
--session=classic-gnome
mike      6039  0.0  0.0  18668  1220 ?        Ss   20:57   0:00
/usr/bin/gpg-agent --daemon --sh
--write-env-file=/home/mike/.gnupg/gpg-agent-info-Fuzzbutt
/usr/bin/dbus-launch --exit-with-session gnome-session
--session=classic-gnome
mike at Fuzzbutt:~$
========================================================================

-- 
Mike Cardwell https://grepular.com/  https://twitter.com/mickeyc
Professional  http://cardwellit.com/ http://linkedin.com/in/mikecardwell
PGP.mit.edu   0018461F/35BC AF1D 3AA2 1F84 3DC3 B0CF 70A5 F512 0018 461F


From htd at fritha.org  Tue Aug  9 22:40:13 2011
From: htd at fritha.org (Heinz Diehl)
Date: Tue, 9 Aug 2011 22:40:13 +0200
Subject: Problem with GPG
In-Reply-To: <87zkjju6uf.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <alpine.LNX.2.00.1108081429360.25870@duinheks.nl>
	<87zkjju6uf.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <20110809204013.GA2384@fritha.org>

On 08.08.2011, Werner Koch wrote: 

> >   echo "xxxxxxxxxxxx" | /usr/bin/gpg --batch --sign --armour --clearsig --passphrase-fd 0 $1
                                                         
>  gpg --batch --sign --armour --clearsig --passphrase-fd 0 --yes -o "$1".asc "$1"

Shouldn't this be "--armor" (and not "--armour")?!



From expires2011 at ymail.com  Wed Aug 10 02:37:20 2011
From: expires2011 at ymail.com (MFPA)
Date: Wed, 10 Aug 2011 01:37:20 +0100
Subject: Problem with GPG
In-Reply-To: <20110809204013.GA2384@fritha.org>
References: <alpine.LNX.2.00.1108081429360.25870@duinheks.nl>
	<87zkjju6uf.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<20110809204013.GA2384@fritha.org>
Message-ID: <1097403872.20110810013720@my_localhost>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

Hi


On Tuesday 9 August 2011 at 9:40:13 PM, in
<mid:20110809204013.GA2384 at fritha.org>, Heinz Diehl wrote:


> Shouldn't this be "--armor" (and not "--armour")?!

The output from gpg --dump-options shows that both spellings are valid
(for v 1.4.11 at least).

- --
Best regards

MFPA                    mailto:expires2011 at ymail.com

Editing is a rewording activity
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

iQE7BAEBCgClBQJOQdLRnhSAAAAAAEAAVXNpZ25pbmdfa2V5X0lEIHNpZ25pbmdf
a2V5X0ZpbmdlcnByaW50IEAgIE1hc3Rlcl9rZXlfRmluZ2VycHJpbnQgQThBOTBC
OEVBRDBDNkU2OSBCQTIzOUI0NjgxRjFFRjk1MThFNkJENDY0NDdFQ0EwMyBAIEJB
MjM5QjQ2ODFGMUVGOTUxOEU2QkQ0NjQ0N0VDQTAzAAoJEKipC46tDG5pDkwD/07y
5WDscq06yGqQRMFJhEHpoaAXxhi6P+mbsMEcsxRBB0oEmNNfeji0p5SUte2yc5GK
vcT4W1g2yJv1vQohubfambxzoSz0PhG1z0ZwJ+hlUbEgBcm41HAa7MuJWn6vQOto
WTHtibnBzyzp88x1iNRj3zL+VHcoEnlF5kB5/n0s
=Yj2b
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----



From wk at gnupg.org  Wed Aug 10 09:49:44 2011
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Wed, 10 Aug 2011 09:49:44 +0200
Subject: OpenPGP Card "CHV* failed: general error"
In-Reply-To: <4E419905.7020906@lists.grepular.com> (Mike Cardwell's message of
	"Tue, 09 Aug 2011 21:31:01 +0100")
References: <4E419905.7020906@lists.grepular.com>
Message-ID: <87zkjhso2v.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Tue,  9 Aug 2011 22:31, gnupg at lists.grepular.com said:

> gpg: verify CHV1 failed: general error
> gpg: signing failed: general error
> gpg: [stdin]: clearsign failed: general error

I suggest that you use gpg2 and not gpg.  You should also update GnuPG
to at least 2.0.17.  2.0.14 is quite problematic because it has a
regression which may lead to unaccessible keys created with that
version.  However, I don't think that is the cause of the problem.

Let's debug it.  Please put the lines

verbose
debug 2048
log-file /foo/scdaemon.log

into ~/.gnupg/scdaemon.conf and kill a running scdaemon.  Then run your
signing command again.  In the log file you should find output similar
to this:

  scdaemon[17805]: DBG: send apdu: c=00 i=20 p1=00 p2=81 lc=6 le=-1 em=0
  scdaemon[17805]: DBG:  raw apdu: 00 20 00 81 06 3x 3x 3x 3x 3x 3x

This is a command as send to the card.  The c=00 i=20 indicates the
verify command which fails for you.  If it works the next line would be
a

  scdaemon[17805]: DBG:  response: sw=9000  datalen=0

However your SW will be different.  What is it?

In this example above I redacted the actual pin using an 'x'.  You
should do the same if you want to mail the log snippet: Look at the raw
apdu:

   00 20 00 81 06 3x 3x 3x 3x 3x 3x
   !  !  !  !  !  !~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~!---- The PIN in hex format (redacted)
   !  !  !  !  !----------------------- The length of the PIN
   !  !  !  !-------------------------- Parameter P2 
   !  !  !----------------------------- Parameter P1
   !  !---------------------------------Instruction byte
   !------------------------------------Class byte

However, most important to see is the status word (sw) which is the
response of the card.


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From gnupg at lists.grepular.com  Wed Aug 10 11:23:41 2011
From: gnupg at lists.grepular.com (Mike Cardwell)
Date: Wed, 10 Aug 2011 10:23:41 +0100
Subject: OpenPGP Card "CHV* failed: general error"
In-Reply-To: <87zkjhso2v.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <4E419905.7020906@lists.grepular.com>
	<87zkjhso2v.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <4E424E1D.7050302@lists.grepular.com>

On 10/08/11 08:49, Werner Koch wrote:

> I suggest that you use gpg2 and not gpg.

I have now done this.

> Let's debug it.  Please put the lines
> 
> verbose
> debug 2048
> log-file /foo/scdaemon.log
> 
> into ~/.gnupg/scdaemon.conf and kill a running scdaemon.  Then run your
> signing command again.  In the log file you should find output similar
> to this:
> 
>   scdaemon[17805]: DBG: send apdu: c=00 i=20 p1=00 p2=81 lc=6 le=-1 em=0
>   scdaemon[17805]: DBG:  raw apdu: 00 20 00 81 06 3x 3x 3x 3x 3x 3x
> 
> This is a command as send to the card.  The c=00 i=20 indicates the
> verify command which fails for you.  If it works the next line would be
> a
> 
>   scdaemon[17805]: DBG:  response: sw=9000  datalen=0
> 
> However your SW will be different.  What is it?

6581:

2011-08-10 10:16:02 scdaemon[5153] DBG:  response: sw=6581  datalen=0

Regards,

-- 
Mike Cardwell https://grepular.com/  https://twitter.com/mickeyc
Professional  http://cardwellit.com/ http://linkedin.com/in/mikecardwell
PGP.mit.edu   0018461F/35BC AF1D 3AA2 1F84 3DC3 B0CF 70A5 F512 0018 461F


From wk at gnupg.org  Wed Aug 10 12:38:16 2011
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Wed, 10 Aug 2011 12:38:16 +0200
Subject: OpenPGP Card "CHV* failed: general error"
In-Reply-To: <4E424E1D.7050302@lists.grepular.com> (Mike Cardwell's message of
	"Wed, 10 Aug 2011 10:23:41 +0100")
References: <4E419905.7020906@lists.grepular.com>
	<87zkjhso2v.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<4E424E1D.7050302@lists.grepular.com>
Message-ID: <87vcu5sg9z.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Wed, 10 Aug 2011 11:23, gnupg at lists.grepular.com said:

> 2011-08-10 10:16:02 scdaemon[5153] DBG:  response: sw=6581  datalen=0

Ooops,

  SW_EEPROM_FAILURE = 0x6581,

it may be that you had no luck and got a faulty chip.  Contact the
supplier for a replacement.

Or did you run a series of automated tests and the eeprom wore out?
EEPROMs usually allow only for something in the range of 10000 write
cycles.  How many verify operations did you run on the card?  A verify
needs to write to the eeprom to decrement the bad pin counter before the
verification and increment it later (so that you can't mount power
glitch attacks).


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner


-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From gnupg at lists.grepular.com  Wed Aug 10 13:39:51 2011
From: gnupg at lists.grepular.com (Mike Cardwell)
Date: Wed, 10 Aug 2011 12:39:51 +0100
Subject: OpenPGP Card "CHV* failed: general error"
In-Reply-To: <87vcu5sg9z.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <4E419905.7020906@lists.grepular.com>
	<87zkjhso2v.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<4E424E1D.7050302@lists.grepular.com>
	<87vcu5sg9z.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <4E426E07.8060207@lists.grepular.com>

On 10/08/11 11:38, Werner Koch wrote:

>> 2011-08-10 10:16:02 scdaemon[5153] DBG:  response: sw=6581  datalen=0
> 
> Ooops,
> 
>   SW_EEPROM_FAILURE = 0x6581,
> 
> it may be that you had no luck and got a faulty chip.  Contact the
> supplier for a replacement.
> 
> Or did you run a series of automated tests and the eeprom wore out?
> EEPROMs usually allow only for something in the range of 10000 write
> cycles.  How many verify operations did you run on the card?  A verify
> needs to write to the eeprom to decrement the bad pin counter before the
> verification and increment it later (so that you can't mount power
> glitch attacks).

Damn. I didn't run any automated tests... What other operations can only
be performed a limited number of times with one of these cards? If I
were to PGP sign or decrypt 10,000 emails would that eventually kill the
card too?

-- 
Mike Cardwell https://grepular.com/  https://twitter.com/mickeyc
Professional  http://cardwellit.com/ http://linkedin.com/in/mikecardwell
PGP.mit.edu   0018461F/35BC AF1D 3AA2 1F84 3DC3 B0CF 70A5 F512 0018 461F


From wk at gnupg.org  Wed Aug 10 14:17:41 2011
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Wed, 10 Aug 2011 14:17:41 +0200
Subject: OpenPGP Card "CHV* failed: general error"
In-Reply-To: <4E426E07.8060207@lists.grepular.com> (Mike Cardwell's message of
	"Wed, 10 Aug 2011 12:39:51 +0100")
References: <4E419905.7020906@lists.grepular.com>
	<87zkjhso2v.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<4E424E1D.7050302@lists.grepular.com>
	<87vcu5sg9z.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<4E426E07.8060207@lists.grepular.com>
Message-ID: <87r54tsboa.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Wed, 10 Aug 2011 13:39, gnupg at lists.grepular.com said:

> Damn. I didn't run any automated tests... What other operations can only
> be performed a limited number of times with one of these cards? If I
> were to PGP sign or decrypt 10,000 emails would that eventually kill the
> card too?

Should not because those operations are all run in RAM.  Maybe except
for signing which bumps the signature counter.  To be sure, let me ask
the vendor...


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner


-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From luis at debethencourt.com  Wed Aug 10 13:29:04 2011
From: luis at debethencourt.com (Luis de Bethencourt)
Date: Wed, 10 Aug 2011 13:29:04 +0200
Subject: Problems with gnome-keyring et al. (was: Card only available to
	root user)
In-Reply-To: <87r54vt07y.fsf_-_@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <8762mc71po.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <20110805082533.GA7505@atlas>
	<20110805083147.GB7505@atlas> <871ux06xn9.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<20110806174658.GA9160@atlas.wlan.hu-berlin.de>
	<877h6owdx2.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<20110808145023.GF9160@atlas.wlan.hu-berlin.de>
	<87vcu7u6p3.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<20110809004453.GG9160@atlas.wlan.hu-berlin.de>
	<87r54vt07y.fsf_-_@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <20110810112904.GB28023@atlas.wlan.hu-berlin.de>

So I found a solution \o/

If I do:
unset GPG_AGENT_INFO

then the card works for my user, unfortunately it only does work in terminals.
It does launch pinentry-gtk-2 when I sign an email with mutt, and so that
covers my usecase :)

Thanks to all!
Luis
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From yyy at yyy.id.lv  Wed Aug 10 13:13:29 2011
From: yyy at yyy.id.lv (yyy)
Date: Wed, 10 Aug 2011 14:13:29 +0300
Subject: gpgsm recipient format
Message-ID: <1233256386.20110810141329@yyy.id.lv>

Hello!

When using gpgsm to encrypt a file, what is the primarily
intended recipient format?

gpgsm -e -r xxxx file_to_be_encrypted.ext

What to put in place of xxxx?

Certificate were imported using gpgsm --import cert.pem,
it shows in gpgsm --list-keys. Certificate is self signed and
the only filed containing useful information is CN, there are
some other fields containing junk. There is no e-mail address
specified. Tried to specify user-IDs as told here:
http://www.gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gnupg-devel/Specify-a-User-ID.html#how-to-specify-a-user-id
None of these methods worked, errors were as follows:

By key ID. (#1 in list)
Assumed that first entry in --list-keys, named ID is that, it was 0xD56CAEDD
executing: gpgsm -e -r 0xD56CAEDD file.ext
produced this error:
gpgsm: can't encrypt to `0xD56CAEDD': No value

By fingerprint. (#2 in list)
Fingerprint was last entry in --list-keys, and it was
81:4A:73:CC:AB:BC:41:D3:D7:99:0F:A3:C0:75:AB:E0:D5:6C:AE:DD
executing: gpgsm -e -r
81:4A:73:CC:AB:BC:41:D3:D7:99:0F:A3:C0:75:AB:E0:D5:6C:AE:DD file.ext
produced error:
gpgsm: can't encrypt to `0x81:4A:73:CC:AB:BC:41:D3:D7:99:0F:A3:C0:75:AB:E0:D5:6C
:AE:DD': Invalid name
removing 0x in beginnig of fingerprint, did change nothing

By exact match on OpenPGP user ID. (#3 in list)
Does not applies here, because does not applies to X509 certificates

By exact match on an email address. (#4 in list)
Does not applies here, because certificate does not
contains an email address.

By word match. (#5 in list)
Only rememberable word there were CN (cert), executing:
gpgsm -e -r +cert file.ext
produced error:
../../gnupg2-2.0.17/kbx/keybox-search.c:858: oops; should never get here
../../gnupg2-2.0.17/kbx/keybox-search.c:858: oops; should never get here
gpgsm: can't encrypt to `+cert': No public key

By exact match on the subject's DN. (#6 in list)
As specified in the list, subjects DN string was extracted from output
of: gpgsm --list-keys --with-colons
It was:
CN=cert,OU=key_usage,O=no_specified,L=bez_ca,ST=undefined_type,C=lv
executing:
gpgsm -e -r
/CN=cert,OU=key_usage,O=no_specified,L=bez_ca,ST=undefined_type,C=lv
file.ext
produced error:
gpgsm: can't encrypt to `/CN=cert,OU=key_usage,O=no_specified,L=bez_ca,ST=undef
ined_type,C=lv': No value

By exact match on the issuer's DN. (#7 in list)
Since this is a self signed certificate, DN string is the same.
(except for # in front of string)
Error was exactly the same as in previous case.

By exact match on serial number and issuer's DN. (#8 in list)
executing:
gpgsm -e -r
#01/CN=cert,OU=key_usage,O=no_specified,L=bez_ca,ST=undefined_type,C=lv file.ext
produced error:
gpgsm: can't encrypt to `#01/CN=cert,OU=key_usage,O=no_specified,L=bez_ca,ST=un
defined_type,C=lv': No value

By keygrip. (#9 in list)
Keygrip obtained by --dump-cert was:
3992799455D8CCCFECA75FE1BD7708D8A7E2EFD6
executing:
gpgsm -e -r &3992799455D8CCCFECA75FE1BD7708D8A7E2EFD6 file.ext
produced error:
gpgsm: missing argument for option "-r"
'3992799455D8CCCFECA75FE1BD7708D8A7E2EFD6' is not recognized as an internal or external command,
operable program or batch file.

By substring match. (#10 in list)
Tried on CN. Executing:
gpgsm -e -r cert file.ext
produced error:
gpgsm: can't encrypt to `cert': No value
If using partial substring (with * in beginning), error were the same:
gpgsm -e -r *cert file.ext
gpgsm: can't encrypt to `*cert': No value

These were all 10 specified methods.
Output of --list-keys:
           ID: 0xD56CAEDD
          S/N: 01
       Issuer: /CN=cert/OU=key_usage/O=no_specified/L=bez_ca/ST=undefined_type/C=lv
      Subject: /CN=cert/OU=key_usage/O=no_specified/L=bez_ca/ST=undefined_type/C=lv
     validity: 2010-12-04 18:14:32 through 2011-12-04 06:33:15
     key type: 1024 bit RSA
 chain length: none
  fingerprint: 81:4A:73:CC:AB:BC:41:D3:D7:99:0F:A3:C0:75:AB:E0:D5:6C:AE:DD

Output of --dump-cert:
           ID: 0xD56CAEDD
          S/N: 01
       Issuer: CN=cert,OU=key_usage,O=no_specified,L=bez_ca,ST=undefined_type,C=lv
      Subject: CN=cert,OU=key_usage,O=no_specified,L=bez_ca,ST=undefined_type,C=lv
     sha1_fpr: 81:4A:73:CC:AB:BC:41:D3:D7:99:0F:A3:C0:75:AB:E0:D5:6C:AE:DD
      md5_fpr: FB:F8:0D:AA:1F:2F:F9:F8:28:40:7E:B7:49:DB:7F:F3
       certid: 3A409A4E9141A06D70B234CC5716FAEF282A3477.01
      keygrip: 3992799455D8CCCFECA75FE1BD7708D8A7E2EFD6
    notBefore: 2010-12-04 18:14:32
     notAfter: 2011-12-04 06:33:15
     hashAlgo: 1.2.840.113549.1.1.5 (sha1WithRSAEncryption)
      keyType: 1024 bit RSA
    subjKeyId: [none]
    authKeyId: [none]
     keyUsage: [none]
  extKeyUsage: [none]
     policies: [none]
  chainLength: [none]
        crlDP: [none]
     authInfo: [none]
     subjInfo: [none]


     
Is there a way for recipient just specify a certificate file
in pem format? (Without using keyring.)
Is it possible to import pem format private keys?



From htd at fritha.org  Wed Aug 10 15:57:15 2011
From: htd at fritha.org (Heinz Diehl)
Date: Wed, 10 Aug 2011 15:57:15 +0200
Subject: Problem with GPG
In-Reply-To: <1097403872.20110810013720@my_localhost>
References: <alpine.LNX.2.00.1108081429360.25870@duinheks.nl>
	<87zkjju6uf.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<20110809204013.GA2384@fritha.org>
	<1097403872.20110810013720@my_localhost>
Message-ID: <20110810135715.GA17804@fritha.org>

On 10.08.2011, MFPA wrote: 

> The output from gpg --dump-options shows that both spellings are valid
> (for v 1.4.11 at least).

Yes, now I see it, after you mentioned it. However, the manpage doesn't know about
"armour", and that was the motivation for my mail.




From luis at debethencourt.com  Wed Aug 10 16:24:24 2011
From: luis at debethencourt.com (Luis de Bethencourt)
Date: Wed, 10 Aug 2011 16:24:24 +0200
Subject: Problems with gnome-keyring et al. (was: Card only available to
	root user)
In-Reply-To: <20110810112904.GB28023@atlas.wlan.hu-berlin.de>
References: <20110805082533.GA7505@atlas> <20110805083147.GB7505@atlas>
	<871ux06xn9.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<20110806174658.GA9160@atlas.wlan.hu-berlin.de>
	<877h6owdx2.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<20110808145023.GF9160@atlas.wlan.hu-berlin.de>
	<87vcu7u6p3.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<20110809004453.GG9160@atlas.wlan.hu-berlin.de>
	<87r54vt07y.fsf_-_@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<20110810112904.GB28023@atlas.wlan.hu-berlin.de>
Message-ID: <20110810142424.GB30300@atlas.wlan.hu-berlin.de>

On Wed, Aug 10, 2011 at 01:29:04PM +0200, Luis de Bethencourt wrote:
> So I found a solution \o/
> 
> If I do:
> unset GPG_AGENT_INFO
> 
> then the card works for my user, unfortunately it only does work in terminals.
> It does launch pinentry-gtk-2 when I sign an email with mutt, and so that
> covers my usecase :)
> 
> Thanks to all!
> Luis

So the way of having this fixed system wide is:

for just all terminals, include the unset GPG_AGENT_INFO in ~/.bashrc

If running GNOME, launch gnome-session-properties, look for "GPG Password Agent"
(which uses GNOME Keyring) and deactivate it.

Thanks,
Luis
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From Greg.E.Smith at kcc.com  Wed Aug 10 18:32:32 2011
From: Greg.E.Smith at kcc.com (Smith, Greg E)
Date: Wed, 10 Aug 2011 16:32:32 +0000
Subject: Scripting GPG Encryption
Message-ID: <687F0925A294D64F9206D8254335B47355AC5C29@USTWAX010.kcc.com>

Hello,

I am having an issue where we have set a custom home directory for GPG and configured the registry entry for HKCU\GNU\GNUPG\HomeDir=...  The script functions fine when someone is logged into the system with the user account executing the script.  However the script fails, when no one is logged in.  Other than setting the -homedir in the script, is there another solution?

Thanks,

Greg E. Smith

________________________________

This e-mail is intended for the use of the addressee(s) only and may contain privileged, confidential, or proprietary information that is exempt from disclosure under law. If you have received this message in error, please inform us promptly by reply e-mail, then delete the e-mail and destroy any printed copy. Thank you.


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From david at systemoverlord.com  Thu Aug 11 00:19:49 2011
From: david at systemoverlord.com (David Tomaschik)
Date: Wed, 10 Aug 2011 18:19:49 -0400
Subject: Scripting GPG Encryption
In-Reply-To: <687F0925A294D64F9206D8254335B47355AC5C29@USTWAX010.kcc.com>
References: <687F0925A294D64F9206D8254335B47355AC5C29@USTWAX010.kcc.com>
Message-ID: <4E430405.8020903@systemoverlord.com>

On 08/10/2011 12:32 PM, Smith, Greg E wrote:
>
> Hello,
>
>  
>
> I am having an issue where we have set a custom home directory for GPG
> and configured the registry entry for HKCU\GNU\GNUPG\HomeDir=...  The
> script functions fine when someone is logged into the system with the
> user account executing the script.  However the script fails, when no
> one is logged in.  Other than setting the --homedir in the script, is
> there another solution?
>
>
> Thanks,
>
>  
>
> Greg E. Smith
>
>
I don't use GPG on Windows, but I think

HKLM\Software\GNU\GnuPG\HomeDir will work for those cases.

David

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From nicholas.cole at gmail.com  Thu Aug 11 16:49:21 2011
From: nicholas.cole at gmail.com (Nicholas Cole)
Date: Thu, 11 Aug 2011 15:49:21 +0100
Subject: Trust model - trust level 1 and 2
Message-ID: <CAAu18hfSvPJ3_uB4niSExYHK6BvGDmAaMed2nyCfsbbzge0UWA@mail.gmail.com>

Dear List,

Is there any difference in the standard trust model between marking a
key level 1 ("I don't know or won't say") and level 2 ("I do NOT
trust")?

Best wishes,

Nicholas


From jerome at jeromebaum.com  Thu Aug 11 20:05:55 2011
From: jerome at jeromebaum.com (Jerome Baum)
Date: Thu, 11 Aug 2011 20:05:55 +0200
Subject: Trust model - trust level 1 and 2
In-Reply-To: <CAAu18hfSvPJ3_uB4niSExYHK6BvGDmAaMed2nyCfsbbzge0UWA@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAAu18hfSvPJ3_uB4niSExYHK6BvGDmAaMed2nyCfsbbzge0UWA@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <CABvAZ+Ep=SEQ0e-CE11a0u3v2tCCns_xs8-tyWFKWidzSY8Dkg@mail.gmail.com>

> Is there any difference in the standard trust model between marking a
> key level 1 ("I don't know or won't say") and level 2 ("I do NOT
> trust")?

There isn't really a "standard trust model". What you should really do
is have a key signing policy and embed the URL to that policy with
every signature (plus, obviously, sign the policy). e.g. pipe
<http://jeromebaum.com/jerome.asc> through "gpg --list-packets" and
you'll see that the link to my signing policy is
<http://jeromebaum.com/policy.html> and per the footnote there you can
find the signature at <http://jeromebaum.com/policy.html.asc>.

That said, I believe the standard says something like "0x11 means 'I
didn't really check' " -- read your own thing into that but to me it
means the level is useless. 0x12 is a moderate check and 0x13 an
in-depth check, which everyone interprets differently.

-- 
Jerome Baum

Hessenweg 222
48432 Rheine
GERMANY

tel +49-1578-8434336
email jerome at jeromebaum.com
web www.jeromebaum.com
--
Einigkeit und Recht und Modeerscheinung
--
PGP: A0E4 B2D4 94E6 20EE 85BA E45B 63E4 2BD8 C58C 753A
PGP: 2C23 EBFF DF1A 840D 2351 F5F5 F25B A03F 2152 36DA
--
http://five.sentenc.es


From dshaw at jabberwocky.com  Thu Aug 11 20:52:37 2011
From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw)
Date: Thu, 11 Aug 2011 14:52:37 -0400
Subject: Trust model - trust level 1 and 2
In-Reply-To: <CAAu18hfSvPJ3_uB4niSExYHK6BvGDmAaMed2nyCfsbbzge0UWA@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAAu18hfSvPJ3_uB4niSExYHK6BvGDmAaMed2nyCfsbbzge0UWA@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <983BA821-DDF8-40C0-B22F-E2CB9F1F11BD@jabberwocky.com>

On Aug 11, 2011, at 10:49 AM, Nicholas Cole wrote:

> Dear List,
> 
> Is there any difference in the standard trust model between marking a
> key level 1 ("I don't know or won't say") and level 2 ("I do NOT
> trust")?

Given the text strings you're quoting, I assume you're referring to ownertrust (i.e. "--edit-key ..... trust").  Ownertrust is how you express your confidence in how well the owner of the key checks other people's keys (or put another way, how much weight do you want to give key signatures made by that key).

There is really no practical difference between the two in the default trust model of GPG - either way, you're not giving key signatures made by that key any weight in your web of trust.

David



From nicholas.cole at gmail.com  Thu Aug 11 22:23:10 2011
From: nicholas.cole at gmail.com (Nicholas Cole)
Date: Thu, 11 Aug 2011 21:23:10 +0100
Subject: Trust model - trust level 1 and 2
In-Reply-To: <983BA821-DDF8-40C0-B22F-E2CB9F1F11BD@jabberwocky.com>
References: <CAAu18hfSvPJ3_uB4niSExYHK6BvGDmAaMed2nyCfsbbzge0UWA@mail.gmail.com>
	<983BA821-DDF8-40C0-B22F-E2CB9F1F11BD@jabberwocky.com>
Message-ID: <CAAu18heccaLpu0vM9Yq0=R1HYDPsDs53ZmV=u345ibE-=O-07w@mail.gmail.com>

On Thu, Aug 11, 2011 at 7:52 PM, David Shaw <dshaw at jabberwocky.com> wrote:
> On Aug 11, 2011, at 10:49 AM, Nicholas Cole wrote:
>
>> Dear List,
>>
>> Is there any difference in the standard trust model between marking a
>> key level 1 ("I don't know or won't say") and level 2 ("I do NOT
>> trust")?
>
> Given the text strings you're quoting, I assume you're referring to ownertrust (i.e. "--edit-key ..... trust"). ?Ownertrust is how you express your confidence in how well the owner of the key checks other people's keys (or put another way, how much weight do you want to give key signatures made by that key).
>
> There is really no practical difference between the two in the default trust model of GPG - either way, you're not giving key signatures made by that key any weight in your web of trust.
>
> David
>
>


From nicholas.cole at gmail.com  Thu Aug 11 22:24:18 2011
From: nicholas.cole at gmail.com (Nicholas Cole)
Date: Thu, 11 Aug 2011 21:24:18 +0100
Subject: Trust model - trust level 1 and 2
In-Reply-To: <983BA821-DDF8-40C0-B22F-E2CB9F1F11BD@jabberwocky.com>
References: <CAAu18hfSvPJ3_uB4niSExYHK6BvGDmAaMed2nyCfsbbzge0UWA@mail.gmail.com>
	<983BA821-DDF8-40C0-B22F-E2CB9F1F11BD@jabberwocky.com>
Message-ID: <CAAu18hc6znEcMqSgBH0r7EWcLLeWYNqLokYqLtv2cTc5tzQw9A@mail.gmail.com>

On Thu, Aug 11, 2011 at 7:52 PM, David Shaw <dshaw at jabberwocky.com> wrote:

> There is really no practical difference between the two in the default trust model of GPG - either way, you're not giving key signatures made by that key any weight in your web of trust.


Thanks, David.  I had wondered if there was some difference in the way
they interacted with some corner case or with trust signatures and the
like, but since I couldn't see any documentation I assumed that they
had the same practical effect on the way gpg calculates key validity.

Best wishes,

Nicholas


From aaron.toponce at gmail.com  Thu Aug 11 22:52:39 2011
From: aaron.toponce at gmail.com (Aaron Toponce)
Date: Thu, 11 Aug 2011 14:52:39 -0600
Subject: Trust model - trust level 1 and 2
In-Reply-To: <CABvAZ+Ep=SEQ0e-CE11a0u3v2tCCns_xs8-tyWFKWidzSY8Dkg@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAAu18hfSvPJ3_uB4niSExYHK6BvGDmAaMed2nyCfsbbzge0UWA@mail.gmail.com>
	<CABvAZ+Ep=SEQ0e-CE11a0u3v2tCCns_xs8-tyWFKWidzSY8Dkg@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <20110811205239.GC25123@poseidon.cocyt.us>

On Thu, Aug 11, 2011 at 08:05:55PM +0200, Jerome Baum wrote:
> > Is there any difference in the standard trust model between marking a
> > key level 1 ("I don't know or won't say") and level 2 ("I do NOT
> > trust")?
>
> There isn't really a "standard trust model". What you should really do
> is have a key signing policy and embed the URL to that policy with
> every signature (plus, obviously, sign the policy). e.g. pipe
> <http://jeromebaum.com/jerome.asc> through "gpg --list-packets" and
> you'll see that the link to my signing policy is
> <http://jeromebaum.com/policy.html> and per the footnote there you can
> find the signature at <http://jeromebaum.com/policy.html.asc>.

http://jeromebaum.com/policy.html.asc works, but .gpg, .pgp and .sig give
an error of page not found, even though the footer of your siging policy
says otherwise.

FYI.

--
. o .   o . o   . . o   o . .   . o .
. . o   . o o   o . o   . o o   . . o
o o o   . o .   . o o   o o .   o o o
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From mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de  Thu Aug 11 22:56:31 2011
From: mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de (Hauke Laging)
Date: Thu, 11 Aug 2011 22:56:31 +0200
Subject: Trust model - trust level 1 and 2
In-Reply-To: <CABvAZ+Ep=SEQ0e-CE11a0u3v2tCCns_xs8-tyWFKWidzSY8Dkg@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAAu18hfSvPJ3_uB4niSExYHK6BvGDmAaMed2nyCfsbbzge0UWA@mail.gmail.com>
	<CABvAZ+Ep=SEQ0e-CE11a0u3v2tCCns_xs8-tyWFKWidzSY8Dkg@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <201108112256.40667.mailinglisten@hauke-laging.de>

Am Donnerstag, 11. August 2011, 20:05:55 schrieb Jerome Baum:

> There isn't really a "standard trust model". What you should really do
> is have a key signing policy and embed the URL to that policy with
> every signature (plus, obviously, sign the policy).

For keys with "high" security requirements the policy should also be signed by 
the ones who signed the key as it would be easy to write and sign a high 
security policy for a compromised low security key.


Hauke
-- 
PGP: D44C 6A5B 71B0 427C CED3 025C BD7D 6D27 ECCB 5814
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From jerome at jeromebaum.com  Thu Aug 11 23:33:13 2011
From: jerome at jeromebaum.com (Jerome Baum)
Date: Thu, 11 Aug 2011 23:33:13 +0200
Subject: Trust model - trust level 1 and 2
In-Reply-To: <20110811205239.GC25123@poseidon.cocyt.us>
References: <CAAu18hfSvPJ3_uB4niSExYHK6BvGDmAaMed2nyCfsbbzge0UWA@mail.gmail.com>
	<CABvAZ+Ep=SEQ0e-CE11a0u3v2tCCns_xs8-tyWFKWidzSY8Dkg@mail.gmail.com>
	<20110811205239.GC25123@poseidon.cocyt.us>
Message-ID: <CABvAZ+F=6jjpd3+NM-ZzhnM9mSvbY5QRYHFdXR7Wnuc2Tn9p7Q@mail.gmail.com>

> http://jeromebaum.com/policy.html.asc works, but .gpg, .pgp and .sig give
> an error of page not found, even though the footer of your siging policy
> says otherwise.
>
> FYI.

Yeah, it says "try" -- I see the double-meaning now! -- which is meant
to say "when you check signing policies and <other stuff like this>,
try common signature extensions because you never know if something is
signed, even if it doesn't mention it."

I was going to change it (plus remove the image, which I totally
overlooked but is an unsigned external resource), however it's quite
tedious to access my secure key so I'll probably change it when I next
use my secure key for something else. Not like it's a significant
change. I'll probably switch to a plain-text policy while I'm at it,
clear-signed instead of a separate signature.

-- 
Jerome Baum

Hessenweg 222
48432 Rheine
GERMANY

tel +49-1578-8434336
email jerome at jeromebaum.com
web www.jeromebaum.com
--
Einigkeit und Recht und Modeerscheinung
--
PGP: A0E4 B2D4 94E6 20EE 85BA E45B 63E4 2BD8 C58C 753A
PGP: 2C23 EBFF DF1A 840D 2351 F5F5 F25B A03F 2152 36DA
--
http://five.sentenc.es


From jerome at jeromebaum.com  Thu Aug 11 23:00:49 2011
From: jerome at jeromebaum.com (Jerome Baum)
Date: Thu, 11 Aug 2011 23:00:49 +0200
Subject: Secure PIN entry
Message-ID: <CABvAZ+EXUN2K+iF9pufe0h1+oKu7xK7J7t4e67-vm2OKygaaZA@mail.gmail.com>

Hey,

I'm on Windows 7 with the latest gpg4win package, have an OpenPGP v2
smart-card and a Reiner-SCT cyberJack secoder.

Can I get the secure PIN entry (using built-in pin-pad) working for
this reader? For my homebanking software (i.e. HBCI card), it works
with CTAPI but now PC/SC. What settings can I fiddle with, and what
log/debug output is relevant?

If this isn't a configuration change, will I have to compile my own
gpg2 (per <https://bugs.g10code.com/gnupg/msg3385>)?

Thanks!

-- 
Jerome Baum

Hessenweg 222
48432 Rheine
GERMANY

tel +49-1578-8434336
email jerome at jeromebaum.com
web www.jeromebaum.com
--
Einigkeit und Recht und Modeerscheinung
--
PGP: A0E4 B2D4 94E6 20EE 85BA E45B 63E4 2BD8 C58C 753A
PGP: 2C23 EBFF DF1A 840D 2351 F5F5 F25B A03F 2152 36DA
--
http://five.sentenc.es


From jerome at jeromebaum.com  Thu Aug 11 23:07:21 2011
From: jerome at jeromebaum.com (Jerome Baum)
Date: Thu, 11 Aug 2011 23:07:21 +0200
Subject: Trust model - trust level 1 and 2
In-Reply-To: <CABvAZ+FETLDdVQK-PFhBvN+mNuCSgLSW-WA+AAX3ST2H584Xfg@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAAu18hfSvPJ3_uB4niSExYHK6BvGDmAaMed2nyCfsbbzge0UWA@mail.gmail.com>
	<CABvAZ+Ep=SEQ0e-CE11a0u3v2tCCns_xs8-tyWFKWidzSY8Dkg@mail.gmail.com>
	<201108112256.40667.mailinglisten@hauke-laging.de>
	<CABvAZ+FETLDdVQK-PFhBvN+mNuCSgLSW-WA+AAX3ST2H584Xfg@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <CABvAZ+F5Vimyk2f0RLgYXeUyJuA7GvZN7KT+8UCsb5o=dYK6FA@mail.gmail.com>

> Hmm I guess my policy has a dual-purpose -- key policy (how secure is
> it etc.) and signing policy (how well do I check other keys). The
> latter needs only a self-signature, the former is another matter. I
> don't think someone else can vouch for the facts about how I store my
> key, as they have no way to check -- even if I use a smart-card, how
> do they know I didn't generate off-card and keep a backup somewhere?

Oh, and this also poses the question: Is it better to have two
separate documents, or a single policy with all that information?

-- 
Jerome Baum

Hessenweg 222
48432 Rheine
GERMANY

tel +49-1578-8434336
email jerome at jeromebaum.com
web www.jeromebaum.com
--
Einigkeit und Recht und Modeerscheinung
--
PGP: A0E4 B2D4 94E6 20EE 85BA E45B 63E4 2BD8 C58C 753A
PGP: 2C23 EBFF DF1A 840D 2351 F5F5 F25B A03F 2152 36DA
--
http://five.sentenc.es


From jerome at jeromebaum.com  Thu Aug 11 23:06:28 2011
From: jerome at jeromebaum.com (Jerome Baum)
Date: Thu, 11 Aug 2011 23:06:28 +0200
Subject: Trust model - trust level 1 and 2
In-Reply-To: <201108112256.40667.mailinglisten@hauke-laging.de>
References: <CAAu18hfSvPJ3_uB4niSExYHK6BvGDmAaMed2nyCfsbbzge0UWA@mail.gmail.com>
	<CABvAZ+Ep=SEQ0e-CE11a0u3v2tCCns_xs8-tyWFKWidzSY8Dkg@mail.gmail.com>
	<201108112256.40667.mailinglisten@hauke-laging.de>
Message-ID: <CABvAZ+FETLDdVQK-PFhBvN+mNuCSgLSW-WA+AAX3ST2H584Xfg@mail.gmail.com>

> For keys with "high" security requirements the policy should also be signed by
> the ones who signed the key as it would be easy to write and sign a high
> security policy for a compromised low security key.

Hmm I guess my policy has a dual-purpose -- key policy (how secure is
it etc.) and signing policy (how well do I check other keys). The
latter needs only a self-signature, the former is another matter. I
don't think someone else can vouch for the facts about how I store my
key, as they have no way to check -- even if I use a smart-card, how
do they know I didn't generate off-card and keep a backup somewhere?

-- 
Jerome Baum

Hessenweg 222
48432 Rheine
GERMANY

tel +49-1578-8434336
email jerome at jeromebaum.com
web www.jeromebaum.com
--
Einigkeit und Recht und Modeerscheinung
--
PGP: A0E4 B2D4 94E6 20EE 85BA E45B 63E4 2BD8 C58C 753A
PGP: 2C23 EBFF DF1A 840D 2351 F5F5 F25B A03F 2152 36DA
--
http://five.sentenc.es


From Amarjeet.Yadav at gs.com  Thu Aug 11 15:47:40 2011
From: Amarjeet.Yadav at gs.com (Yadav, Amarjeet)
Date: Thu, 11 Aug 2011 09:47:40 -0400
Subject: How to validate encryption
Message-ID: <053B33C4C3ABEB4CA1D9869FDBCF631C01A2B07046@GSCMAMP26EX.firmwide.corp.gs.com>

Hi ,
We have requirement where we would like to check for encrypted file its valid or not before decrypting it.
Thanks
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From zxq_yx_007 at 163.com  Fri Aug 12 08:41:05 2011
From: zxq_yx_007 at 163.com (=?GB2312?B?1dTQoce/?=)
Date: Fri, 12 Aug 2011 14:41:05 +0800
Subject: how can i generate a keypair without reading anwsers from stdin?
Message-ID: <4E44CB01.3030800@163.com>

 Hi there:
I want to generate a keypair . But i dont want to type "gpg --gen-key"
and then answer questions.
I want to write all the answers in a file and then let gpg read the
answer from the file in batch mode.
What the format of the file should be? Any help?



From mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de  Fri Aug 12 13:45:31 2011
From: mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de (Hauke Laging)
Date: Fri, 12 Aug 2011 13:45:31 +0200
Subject: How to validate encryption
In-Reply-To: <053B33C4C3ABEB4CA1D9869FDBCF631C01A2B07046@GSCMAMP26EX.firmwide.corp.gs.com>
References: <053B33C4C3ABEB4CA1D9869FDBCF631C01A2B07046@GSCMAMP26EX.firmwide.corp.gs.com>
Message-ID: <201108121345.32340.mailinglisten@hauke-laging.de>

Am Donnerstag, 11. August 2011, 15:47:40 schrieb Yadav, Amarjeet:
> Hi ,
> We have requirement where we would like to check for encrypted file its
> valid or not before decrypting it. Thanks

Why? In order to prevent the usability of GnuPG exploits?

If you trust the sender (and his systems) then the simple answer is: Have the 
sender sign the encrypted file. I hope that would not result in "we would like 
to check its validity before we check the signature"...


Hauke
-- 
PGP: D44C 6A5B 71B0 427C CED3 025C BD7D 6D27 ECCB 5814
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From wk at gnupg.org  Fri Aug 12 12:49:16 2011
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Fri, 12 Aug 2011 12:49:16 +0200
Subject: How to validate encryption
In-Reply-To: <053B33C4C3ABEB4CA1D9869FDBCF631C01A2B07046@GSCMAMP26EX.firmwide.corp.gs.com>
	(Amarjeet Yadav's message of "Thu, 11 Aug 2011 09:47:40 -0400")
References: <053B33C4C3ABEB4CA1D9869FDBCF631C01A2B07046@GSCMAMP26EX.firmwide.corp.gs.com>
Message-ID: <87liuyq503.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Thu, 11 Aug 2011 15:47, Amarjeet.Yadav at gs.com said:

> We have requirement where we would like to check for encrypted file
> its valid or not before decrypting it.

You mean whether it has been tampered with?  You can't do that without
decrypting it.  GPG checks that the decrypted file is valid - usually
by checking the signature but if it is not signed gpg checks the MDC
(modification check code - a kind of checksum).

Of course you could use a detached signature (or a hash digest of the
file convoyed via a second channel) to detect modification before
processing the file.  However the entire file needs to be processed in
any case.  Thus if modifications are rare it would take longer to check
the file first and then do the encryption which does yet another check.


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From wk at gnupg.org  Fri Aug 12 12:50:27 2011
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Fri, 12 Aug 2011 12:50:27 +0200
Subject: Secure PIN entry
In-Reply-To: <CABvAZ+EXUN2K+iF9pufe0h1+oKu7xK7J7t4e67-vm2OKygaaZA@mail.gmail.com>
	(Jerome Baum's message of "Thu, 11 Aug 2011 23:00:49 +0200")
References: <CABvAZ+EXUN2K+iF9pufe0h1+oKu7xK7J7t4e67-vm2OKygaaZA@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <87hb5mq4y4.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Thu, 11 Aug 2011 23:00, jerome at jeromebaum.com said:

> Can I get the secure PIN entry (using built-in pin-pad) working for
> this reader? For my homebanking software (i.e. HBCI card), it works
> with CTAPI but now PC/SC. What settings can I fiddle with, and what
> log/debug output is relevant?

No, it is not implemented for PC/SC - only if use the internal driver
which is not available under Windows.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From wk at gnupg.org  Fri Aug 12 12:40:00 2011
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Fri, 12 Aug 2011 12:40:00 +0200
Subject: how can i generate a keypair without reading anwsers from stdin?
In-Reply-To: <4E44CB01.3030800@163.com> (=?utf-8?B?Iui1teWwj+W8uiIncw==?=
	message of "Fri, 12 Aug 2011 14:41:05 +0800")
References: <4E44CB01.3030800@163.com>
Message-ID: <87pqkaq5fj.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Fri, 12 Aug 2011 08:41, zxq_yx_007 at 163.com said:

> I want to write all the answers in a file and then let gpg read the
> answer from the file in batch mode.
> What the format of the file should be? Any help?

See the chapter "Unattended GPG key generation" in the manual, for
example online at 

<http://gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gnupg/Unattended-GPG-key-generation.html>


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From jerome at jeromebaum.com  Fri Aug 12 17:30:00 2011
From: jerome at jeromebaum.com (Jerome Baum)
Date: Fri, 12 Aug 2011 17:30:00 +0200
Subject: Secure PIN entry
In-Reply-To: <87hb5mq4y4.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <CABvAZ+EXUN2K+iF9pufe0h1+oKu7xK7J7t4e67-vm2OKygaaZA@mail.gmail.com>
	<87hb5mq4y4.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <CABvAZ+G7VkOSOhYOGnvv_+_tT_6N1eXOy0bYu0_Vm0JGRXQ0wQ@mail.gmail.com>

> No, it is not implemented for PC/SC - only if use the internal driver
> which is not available under Windows.

How much work is it to implement this -- either by using the internal
driver or otherwise maybe using the CTAPI? Is this a very far away
target, or just "there's lots of stuff and little time"?

-- 
Jerome Baum

Hessenweg 222
48432 Rheine
GERMANY

tel +49-1578-8434336
email jerome at jeromebaum.com
web www.jeromebaum.com
--
Einigkeit und Recht und Modeerscheinung
--
PGP: A0E4 B2D4 94E6 20EE 85BA E45B 63E4 2BD8 C58C 753A
PGP: 2C23 EBFF DF1A 840D 2351 F5F5 F25B A03F 2152 36DA
--
http://five.sentenc.es


From lists at binarywings.net  Fri Aug 12 12:40:06 2011
From: lists at binarywings.net (Florian Philipp)
Date: Fri, 12 Aug 2011 12:40:06 +0200
Subject: how can i generate a keypair without reading anwsers from stdin?
In-Reply-To: <4E44CB01.3030800@163.com>
References: <4E44CB01.3030800@163.com>
Message-ID: <4E450306.5000500@binarywings.net>

Am 12.08.2011 08:41, schrieb ???:
>  Hi there:
> I want to generate a keypair . But i dont want to type "gpg --gen-key"
> and then answer questions.
> I want to write all the answers in a file and then let gpg read the
> answer from the file in batch mode.
> What the format of the file should be? Any help?
> 

You can simply write the answers down like you would in an interactive
session with gpg. Then feed this file with `gpg --gen-key ... < file`

gpg just reads from standard input. There is no difference between a
user pressing return and a newline character in a text file.

If you want to generate multiple key from one file, try something like
`while gpg --gen-key ...; do true; done < file`

Hope this helps,
Florian Philipp

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From Amarjeet.Yadav at gs.com  Fri Aug 12 14:18:53 2011
From: Amarjeet.Yadav at gs.com (Yadav, Amarjeet)
Date: Fri, 12 Aug 2011 08:18:53 -0400
Subject: How to validate encryption
In-Reply-To: <201108121345.32340.mailinglisten@hauke-laging.de>
References: <053B33C4C3ABEB4CA1D9869FDBCF631C01A2B07046@GSCMAMP26EX.firmwide.corp.gs.com>
	<201108121345.32340.mailinglisten@hauke-laging.de>
Message-ID: <053B33C4C3ABEB4CA1D9869FDBCF631C01A2B07118@GSCMAMP26EX.firmwide.corp.gs.com>

Thanks.

-----Original Message-----
From: Hauke Laging [mailto:mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de] 
Sent: Friday, August 12, 2011 5:16 PM
To: gnupg-users at gnupg.org
Cc: Yadav, Amarjeet [Tech]
Subject: Re: How to validate encryption

Am Donnerstag, 11. August 2011, 15:47:40 schrieb Yadav, Amarjeet:
> Hi ,
> We have requirement where we would like to check for encrypted file 
> its valid or not before decrypting it. Thanks

Why? In order to prevent the usability of GnuPG exploits?

If you trust the sender (and his systems) then the simple answer is: Have the sender sign the encrypted file. I hope that would not result in "we would like to check its validity before we check the signature"...


Hauke
--
PGP: D44C 6A5B 71B0 427C CED3 025C BD7D 6D27 ECCB 5814


From jerome at jeromebaum.com  Fri Aug 12 18:34:10 2011
From: jerome at jeromebaum.com (Jerome Baum)
Date: Fri, 12 Aug 2011 18:34:10 +0200
Subject: how can i generate a keypair without reading anwsers from stdin?
In-Reply-To: <4E450306.5000500@binarywings.net>
References: <4E44CB01.3030800@163.com> <4E450306.5000500@binarywings.net>
Message-ID: <CABvAZ+FX20TAXLbvUyqnmys28J0c+2thhcjt23Xk2Z8s3Ni0Qg@mail.gmail.com>

> You can simply write the answers down like you would in an interactive
> session with gpg. Then feed this file with `gpg --gen-key ... < file`
>
> gpg just reads from standard input. There is no difference between a
> user pressing return and a newline character in a text file.
>
> If you want to generate multiple key from one file, try something like
> `while gpg --gen-key ...; do true; done < file`

I certainly think the batch solution is more appropriate. The batch
interfaces will be more consistent across different gpg versions,
while the numbers/letters you enter at the prompt can quickly change
if different algorithms are supported in a new version etc.

So stick with the batch and with-colons interfaces whenever you can.
They are also easier to script -- computer-readable and all that.

-- 
Jerome Baum

Hessenweg 222
48432 Rheine
GERMANY

tel +49-1578-8434336
email jerome at jeromebaum.com
web www.jeromebaum.com
--
Einigkeit und Recht und Modeerscheinung
--
PGP: A0E4 B2D4 94E6 20EE 85BA E45B 63E4 2BD8 C58C 753A
PGP: 2C23 EBFF DF1A 840D 2351 F5F5 F25B A03F 2152 36DA
--
http://five.sentenc.es


From sandals at crustytoothpaste.net  Fri Aug 12 21:27:50 2011
From: sandals at crustytoothpaste.net (brian m. carlson)
Date: Fri, 12 Aug 2011 19:27:50 +0000
Subject: Implementation question: validating left two of signatures
Message-ID: <20110812192750.GE3495@crustytoothpaste.ath.cx>

I have a quality-of-implementation question (more in general than
specifically about GnuPG).  I am writing an implementation of OpenPGP
that verifies signatures, among other things.

Signatures contain the left two bytes of the hash as a quick check.
I've noticed that a small number of signatures are in fact valid even
though this quick check does not match the hash.  Is it considered
acceptable to fix up this value if it is wrong?  If not, is it
acceptable to treat two signatures as the same signature if they are
identical but for the left two?  Does GnuPG (or any other
implementation) actually give any credence to the left two whatsoever?

If there's an OpenPGP implementers' list or another, more appropriate
forum, please feel free to point me in that direction.  I couldn't find
one, so I posted here.

-- 
brian m. carlson / brian with sandals: Houston, Texas, US
+1 832 623 2791 | http://www.crustytoothpaste.net/~bmc | My opinion only
OpenPGP: RSA v4 4096b: 88AC E9B2 9196 305B A994 7552 F1BA 225C 0223 B187
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From dshaw at jabberwocky.com  Fri Aug 12 23:11:16 2011
From: dshaw at jabberwocky.com (David Shaw)
Date: Fri, 12 Aug 2011 17:11:16 -0400
Subject: Implementation question: validating left two of signatures
In-Reply-To: <20110812192750.GE3495@crustytoothpaste.ath.cx>
References: <20110812192750.GE3495@crustytoothpaste.ath.cx>
Message-ID: <1D4CBC6B-9BF0-4169-8E02-7A1626A3A093@jabberwocky.com>

On Aug 12, 2011, at 3:27 PM, brian m. carlson wrote:

> I have a quality-of-implementation question (more in general than
> specifically about GnuPG).  I am writing an implementation of OpenPGP
> that verifies signatures, among other things.
> 
> Signatures contain the left two bytes of the hash as a quick check.
> I've noticed that a small number of signatures are in fact valid even
> though this quick check does not match the hash.  Is it considered
> acceptable to fix up this value if it is wrong?  If not, is it
> acceptable to treat two signatures as the same signature if they are
> identical but for the left two?  Does GnuPG (or any other
> implementation) actually give any credence to the left two whatsoever?

I can't speak for other implementations, but GnuPG does not look at the left two at all, and jumps right into checking the whole signature. It *generates* the quick check bytes, of course, as that is mandated by the standard, but it does not look at them itself.

I think that behavior is fine - the real check is the signature itself.

> If there's an OpenPGP implementers' list or another, more appropriate
> forum, please feel free to point me in that direction.  I couldn't find
> one, so I posted here.

You might also try the ietf-openpgp list: http://www.imc.org/ietf-openpgp/

David



From wk at gnupg.org  Sat Aug 13 11:04:31 2011
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Sat, 13 Aug 2011 11:04:31 +0200
Subject: how can i generate a keypair without reading anwsers from stdin?
In-Reply-To: <4E450306.5000500@binarywings.net> (Florian Philipp's message of
	"Fri, 12 Aug 2011 12:40:06 +0200")
References: <4E44CB01.3030800@163.com> <4E450306.5000500@binarywings.net>
Message-ID: <87vcu1of6o.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Fri, 12 Aug 2011 12:40, lists at binarywings.net said:

> You can simply write the answers down like you would in an interactive
> session with gpg. Then feed this file with `gpg --gen-key ... < file`

                           *Don't do this* !

The interface presented there is for humans only and may change at any
time.  In fact, it depends on certain options and has changed several
times in the past.

> gpg just reads from standard input. There is no difference between a
> user pressing return and a newline character in a text file.

There is one: gpg reads directly from the TTY unless you use --batch.
This allows the use of readline features and to disable echo during
passphrase entry.

Please use a parameter file as described in the manual.  This is a well
defined interface and the way to control key generation. 


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From wk at gnupg.org  Fri Aug 12 17:42:24 2011
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Fri, 12 Aug 2011 17:42:24 +0200
Subject: Secure PIN entry
In-Reply-To: <CABvAZ+G7VkOSOhYOGnvv_+_tT_6N1eXOy0bYu0_Vm0JGRXQ0wQ@mail.gmail.com>
	(Jerome Baum's message of "Fri, 12 Aug 2011 17:30:00 +0200")
References: <CABvAZ+EXUN2K+iF9pufe0h1+oKu7xK7J7t4e67-vm2OKygaaZA@mail.gmail.com>
	<87hb5mq4y4.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<CABvAZ+G7VkOSOhYOGnvv_+_tT_6N1eXOy0bYu0_Vm0JGRXQ0wQ@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <878vqyprfj.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Fri, 12 Aug 2011 17:30, jerome at jeromebaum.com said:

> How much work is it to implement this -- either by using the internal

With all testing I estimated 2 days.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From sndbbbl at gmail.com  Sun Aug 14 07:19:44 2011
From: sndbbbl at gmail.com (Jean-Philippe Charpentier)
Date: Sun, 14 Aug 2011 13:19:44 +0800
Subject: Open Password Protected ZIP File
Message-ID: <AE1BA2E2-8762-4A5C-867F-8D729A9D65A8@gmail.com>

Does anybody know how to open a ZIP file, password protected? I forgot the password.

Google brings me to various password attack tools - any recommendation?

Thanx,
JPC

From peter at digitalbrains.com  Sun Aug 14 13:26:26 2011
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Sun, 14 Aug 2011 13:26:26 +0200
Subject: Extract numbers from a key
In-Reply-To: <4E3AB756.7030405@digitalbrains.com>
References: <4E383D9A.5050204@yahoo.fr>	<CABvAZ+HeaDA=SYYq7WFz+sOEzujTWrE2KwuDirHpvyC4TGeMcQ@mail.gmail.com>	<4E392645.2020208@yahoo.fr>
	<4E3AB756.7030405@digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <4E47B0E2.1050603@digitalbrains.com>

On 04/08/11 17:14, Peter Lebbing wrote:
> On 03/08/11 12:43, S?bastien wrote:
>> I know that gpg is an hybrid system. I want to know these numbers to check 
>> with a mathematica-like program that numbers supposed to be primes are 
>> actually real prime numbers.
> 
> And suppose GnuPG accidentally picked a composite. What would be the security
> implications of that? I am supposing that the adversary does *not* know your key
> isn't actually based on 2 primes.

I still think this is an interesting academic question. Does anybody have some
insight to offer on this?

The conditions as I envision them are:

- An OpenPGP implementation uses heuristic methods to determine if the numbers
used in key generation are prime. I.e., there is an (extremely small) chance of
accidentally picking a composite number.
- The adversary doesn't know whether the implementation has a higher than normal
chance of accidentally picking composites.
- The adversary is trying to solve the RSA problem for a key where key
generation accidentally used a composite where a prime was intended.

Will the adversary likely have a better chance of solving the RSA problem
because key generation went "wrong"?

The reason for this scenario, is that I suppose that GnuPG uses heuristics as
mentioned above, and that there are no known weaknesses in these heuristics.
That is, either they have no weaknesses, or nobody has found them yet. So you
can't use knowledge of the weaknesses in your attack.

Again, this is purely academic. I won't push for GnuPG to adopt deterministic
PRIME algorithms or something :). I just wonder.

Greets,

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at http://wwwhome.cs.utwente.nl/~lebbing/pubkey.txt


From hka at qbs.com.pl  Sun Aug 14 13:41:24 2011
From: hka at qbs.com.pl (Hubert Kario)
Date: Sun, 14 Aug 2011 13:41:24 +0200
Subject: Extract numbers from a key
In-Reply-To: <4E47B0E2.1050603@digitalbrains.com>
References: <4E383D9A.5050204@yahoo.fr> <4E3AB756.7030405@digitalbrains.com>
	<4E47B0E2.1050603@digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <2666664.Fab2LAsHi0@bursa22>

On Sunday 14 August 2011 13:26:26 Peter Lebbing wrote:
> On 04/08/11 17:14, Peter Lebbing wrote:
> > On 03/08/11 12:43, S?bastien wrote:
> >> I know that gpg is an hybrid system. I want to know these numbers to
> >> check with a mathematica-like program that numbers supposed to be
> >> primes are actually real prime numbers.
> > 
> > And suppose GnuPG accidentally picked a composite. What would be the
> > security implications of that? I am supposing that the adversary does
> > *not* know your key isn't actually based on 2 primes.
> 
> I still think this is an interesting academic question. Does anybody have
> some insight to offer on this?
> 
> The conditions as I envision them are:
> 
> - An OpenPGP implementation uses heuristic methods to determine if the
> numbers used in key generation are prime. I.e., there is an (extremely
> small) chance of accidentally picking a composite number.
> - The adversary doesn't know whether the implementation has a higher than
> normal chance of accidentally picking composites.
> - The adversary is trying to solve the RSA problem for a key where key
> generation accidentally used a composite where a prime was intended.
> 
> Will the adversary likely have a better chance of solving the RSA problem
> because key generation went "wrong"?
> 
> The reason for this scenario, is that I suppose that GnuPG uses heuristics
> as mentioned above, and that there are no known weaknesses in these
> heuristics. That is, either they have no weaknesses, or nobody has found
> them yet. So you can't use knowledge of the weaknesses in your attack.
> 
> Again, this is purely academic. I won't push for GnuPG to adopt
> deterministic PRIME algorithms or something :). I just wonder.
> 
> Greets,
> 
> Peter.

>From what I learned, RSA cracking is basically an exaustive search. 
If your "prime" is composite, it is at most half as long as a real prime would 
be.

So, instead of a ~1024 bit prime you have a ~512 bit prime, which are tryvial 
to crack.

Mind that I learned RSA 5 years ago during 2 hours of a 20 hours course on 
cryptography, so it may be even easier to crack encryption using composite 
numbers.

Regards,
-- 
Hubert Kario
QBS - Quality Business Software
02-656 Warszawa, ul. Ksawer?w 30/85
tel. +48 (22) 646-61-51, 646-74-24
www.qbs.com.pl


From peter at digitalbrains.com  Sun Aug 14 14:05:02 2011
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Sun, 14 Aug 2011 14:05:02 +0200
Subject: Extract numbers from a key
In-Reply-To: <2666664.Fab2LAsHi0@bursa22>
References: <4E383D9A.5050204@yahoo.fr> <4E3AB756.7030405@digitalbrains.com>
	<4E47B0E2.1050603@digitalbrains.com> <2666664.Fab2LAsHi0@bursa22>
Message-ID: <4E47B9EE.40102@digitalbrains.com>

On 14/08/11 13:41, Hubert Kario wrote:
> From what I learned, RSA cracking is basically an exaustive search. 
> If your "prime" is composite, it is at most half as long as a real prime would 
> be.
> 
> So, instead of a ~1024 bit prime you have a ~512 bit prime, which are tryvial 
> to crack.

Yes [1], but it depends on your search space (and the route through it). You are
trying to find two 1024 bits long primes, not shorter ones.

The most na?ve method would be:

pick a 1024-bit random number a
pick a 1024-bit random number b
n = a*b? yes -> done!
  no -> again

Now, there is no reason why you would find 'a' quicker if a were composite. It's
still just one of those 1024-bit long random numbers. This na?ve method doesn't
use the fact that a and b are prime at all.

If, however, you *know* 'a' is composite, you can speed up, yes. But you do not
know.

By the way, if 'a' is composite, there is nothing which says that it has ~512
bit prime factors. The degenerate case is a 1023-bit prime times two :).

> Mind that I learned RSA 5 years ago during 2 hours of a 20 hours course on 
> cryptography, so it may be even easier to crack encryption using composite 
> numbers.

Or harder :).

I have also learned a piece of the underlying mathematics, but it is long enough
ago that I happily postulate that I'm pretty sure that given n and e, d can only
be one value. And then I grab the Handbook of Applied Cryptography and learn
that you can use both phi and lambda to determine it, and lambda might give a
smaller d. Which obviously means d is not unique. And that I'm wrong.

Peter.

[1] Actually, a 1024-bit RSA key is considered secure, and that consists of two
512-bit primes. Now, a 512-bit RSA key, yes, those are crackable, but not
512-bit primes. But it's the thought that counts, not the actual numbers, so
this is just a footnote.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at http://wwwhome.cs.utwente.nl/~lebbing/pubkey.txt


From thajsta at gmail.com  Sun Aug 14 15:19:23 2011
From: thajsta at gmail.com (Jonathan Ely)
Date: Sun, 14 Aug 2011 09:19:23 -0400
Subject: Open Password Protected ZIP File
In-Reply-To: <AE1BA2E2-8762-4A5C-867F-8D729A9D65A8@gmail.com>
References: <AE1BA2E2-8762-4A5C-867F-8D729A9D65A8@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <4E47CB5B.8070208@gmail.com>

I strongly suggest Ultimate ZIP Cracker at vdgsoftware.com/uzc.html if I
recall correctly. It is undoubtedly the most complete and promising
software I have ever used and trust me when I say I have used many of
the kind. Beware that it is resource intensive if you configure it as such.

On 14/08/2011 01:19 AM, Jean-Philippe Charpentier wrote:
> Does anybody know how to open a ZIP file, password protected? I forgot the password.
> 
> Google brings me to various password attack tools - any recommendation?
> 
> Thanx,
> JPC
> _______________________________________________
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
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From hka at qbs.com.pl  Sun Aug 14 16:39:10 2011
From: hka at qbs.com.pl (Hubert Kario)
Date: Sun, 14 Aug 2011 16:39:10 +0200
Subject: Extract numbers from a key
In-Reply-To: <4E47B9EE.40102@digitalbrains.com>
References: <4E383D9A.5050204@yahoo.fr> <2666664.Fab2LAsHi0@bursa22>
	<4E47B9EE.40102@digitalbrains.com>
Message-ID: <2280319.hFMuMkvzKK@bursa22>

On Sunday 14 August 2011 14:05:02 Peter Lebbing wrote:
> On 14/08/11 13:41, Hubert Kario wrote:
> > From what I learned, RSA cracking is basically an exaustive search.
> > If your "prime" is composite, it is at most half as long as a real prime
> > would be.
> > 
> > So, instead of a ~1024 bit prime you have a ~512 bit prime, which are
> > tryvial to crack.
> 
> Yes [1], but it depends on your search space (and the route through it). You
> are trying to find two 1024 bits long primes, not shorter ones.

looking through full 512bit space will take 8192 less time than checking all 
numbers between 2^525 and 2^526.

as we're talking about 512 and 1024, it will be "few" orders of magnitude 
longer.

Checking "just in case" for such situation in the grand scheme of things will 
make your cracking algorihm only marginally slower.

> 
> The most na?ve method would be:
> 
> pick a 1024-bit random number a
> pick a 1024-bit random number b

Ah, the EMACS Ctrl+Alt+Meta+Top+P 1024 command! ;)

>From what I tried myself, checking all numbers as they go produced faster 
algorithms than finding primes and then checking them.

Prime numbers are quite common, testing for primality is expensive, prime 
number distribution is non deterministic.

> [1] Actually, a 1024-bit RSA key is considered secure, and that consists of
> two 512-bit primes. Now, a 512-bit RSA key, yes, those are crackable, but
> not 512-bit primes. But it's the thought that counts, not the actual
> numbers, so this is just a footnote.

I keep forgeting that people still use 1024bit RSA keys ;)
but, yes, I meant 1024 bit and 512 bit keys, which consist of two ~512 bit and 
~256 bit primes

Regards,
-- 
Hubert Kario
QBS - Quality Business Software
02-656 Warszawa, ul. Ksawer?w 30/85
tel. +48 (22) 646-61-51, 646-74-24
www.qbs.com.pl


From sndbbbl at gmail.com  Sun Aug 14 18:31:40 2011
From: sndbbbl at gmail.com (Jean-Philippe Charpentier)
Date: Mon, 15 Aug 2011 00:31:40 +0800
Subject: MacGPG does not ask for Password
In-Reply-To: <4E47CB5B.8070208@gmail.com>
References: <AE1BA2E2-8762-4A5C-867F-8D729A9D65A8@gmail.com>
	<4E47CB5B.8070208@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <03D620E6-DF7D-4715-B459-5217FC9122B2@gmail.com>

When I encrypt or decrypt a file on my MacOS 10.7 with MacGPG, my system does not ask me for my keys password - in either case.

Can someone tell me where I can change the settings and have the system ask for a password EACH TIME? I already checked in Keychain Access, but could not find the relevant input..

Thanx,
--JPC

From sndbbbl at gmail.com  Sun Aug 14 18:32:47 2011
From: sndbbbl at gmail.com (Jean-Philippe Charpentier)
Date: Mon, 15 Aug 2011 00:32:47 +0800
Subject: Open Password Protected ZIP File
In-Reply-To: <4E47CB5B.8070208@gmail.com>
References: <AE1BA2E2-8762-4A5C-867F-8D729A9D65A8@gmail.com>
	<4E47CB5B.8070208@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <4C22DE78-14BC-4480-918C-4B303573EF89@gmail.com>

Thank you Jonathan! I will give it a try.

--JPC


On 14.08.2011, at 21:19, Jonathan Ely wrote:

> I strongly suggest Ultimate ZIP Cracker at vdgsoftware.com/uzc.html if I
> recall correctly. It is undoubtedly the most complete and promising
> software I have ever used and trust me when I say I have used many of
> the kind. Beware that it is resource intensive if you configure it as such.
> 
> On 14/08/2011 01:19 AM, Jean-Philippe Charpentier wrote:
>> Does anybody know how to open a ZIP file, password protected? I forgot the password.
>> 
>> Google brings me to various password attack tools - any recommendation?
>> 
>> Thanx,
>> JPC
>> _______________________________________________
>> Gnupg-users mailing list
>> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
>> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
> <0xDA74EEF3.asc>_______________________________________________
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users



From peter at digitalbrains.com  Mon Aug 15 11:06:53 2011
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Mon, 15 Aug 2011 11:06:53 +0200
Subject: Extract numbers from a key
In-Reply-To: <2280319.hFMuMkvzKK@bursa22>
References: <4E383D9A.5050204@yahoo.fr> <2666664.Fab2LAsHi0@bursa22>
	<4E47B9EE.40102@digitalbrains.com> <2280319.hFMuMkvzKK@bursa22>
Message-ID: <4E48E1AD.7050702@digitalbrains.com>

On 14/08/11 16:39, Hubert Kario wrote:
> looking through full 512bit space will take 8192 less time than checking all 
> numbers between 2^525 and 2^526.

Or, equivalently, looking through full 512 bit space takes the same amount of
time as checking all numbers between 2^513 and 2^514. It's exactly the same
thing, with a 1 tacked on at the end. I don't understand what significance 2^525
has?

> as we're talking about 512 and 1024, it will be "few" orders of magnitude 
> longer.
> 
> Checking "just in case" for such situation in the grand scheme of things will 
> make your cracking algorihm only marginally slower.

I'm not sure I follow.

You propose to check for the public modulus not being a semiprime when trying to
solve the RSA problem, because this will only take a fraction of the time needed
for subsequently solving it when p and q are prime?

I wonder if that will pay off. I just don't know. It's one of the possible
answers to my original question. If it pays off, it means that, yes, the
adversary has a better chance to solve the RSA problem if p or q is composite,
because the adversary could first check for this possibility "just in case", as
you put it.

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at http://wwwhome.cs.utwente.nl/~lebbing/pubkey.txt


From ml at schoenitzer.de  Mon Aug 15 18:49:25 2011
From: ml at schoenitzer.de (Michael Florian =?iso-8859-1?q?Sch=F6nitzer?=)
Date: Mon, 15 Aug 2011 16:49:25 +0000 (UTC)
Subject: Program announce: gpgkeymgr
Message-ID: <j2biml$q9u$3@dough.gmane.org>

Hi,

I'd like to announce the first official version (0.2) of the new program 
gpgkeymgr.
It is an small tool for managing and cleaning up you're keyring, by 
removing old and unnecessary keys.
Currently if supports the following features:
  - remove expired keys
  - remove revoked keys
  - remove not-valid keys, optional with given level
  - remove not-trusted keys, optional with given level
  - remove key listed in a file
  - backup you keyring
  - AND or OR mode for key choosing
  - secret key will not be touched
  - multilingual (english & german for now)

You can find it here: http://nudin.github.com/GnuPGP-Tools/

I'm not an experienced developer, so I'm not sure about my code fitting 
Code-quality standards and would be glad about any feedback. Furthermore 
I'd also like to get feedback about features wishes, bug reports, etc.


 Michi

-- 
Michael F. Sch?nitzer
Mail: michael ?t schoenitzer.de
Homepage: http://www.schoenitzer.de
Jabber: Schoenitzer at jabber.piratenpartei.de



From jameel at thinkst.com  Tue Aug 16 15:34:38 2011
From: jameel at thinkst.com (Jameel Haffejee)
Date: Tue, 16 Aug 2011 15:34:38 +0200
Subject: Chrome Plugin for gmail/gpg
Message-ID: <74B94661-598B-4881-BCEF-1563794F30E8@thinkst.com>

Hi Everybody

If you already have gpg on your machine and use gmail, we have put 
together a quick chrome plugin to bring gpg into your gmail interface.

The (alpha) plugin can be grabbed from our site: (http://thinkst.com/tools/cr-gpg/)
> 
and the source code from here (https://github.com/RC1140/cr-gpg)

Please feel free to drop me a mail with any issues or suggestions.
Alternatively submit a issue here (https://github.com/RC1140/cr-gpg/issues).

Jameel Haffejee
http://thinkst.com/pgp/jameel.txt

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From vedaal at nym.hush.com  Wed Aug 17 17:16:08 2011
From: vedaal at nym.hush.com (vedaal at nym.hush.com)
Date: Wed, 17 Aug 2011 11:16:08 -0400
Subject: Extract numbers from a key
Message-ID: <20110817151608.E1FA9A6E3F@smtp.hushmail.com>



	Peter Lebbing peter at digitalbrains.com wrote on
_Mon Aug 15 11:06:53 CEST 2011_ : 

	> ... when trying to
solve the RSA problem ... 
	Here is a good overview (dated 1998, but not too many new RSA attack
approaches since then:-)  ) of 20 years of RSA attacks: 

	http://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/abstracts/RSAattack-survey.html 
	vedaal
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From mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de  Thu Aug 18 14:10:22 2011
From: mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de (Hauke Laging)
Date: Thu, 18 Aug 2011 14:10:22 +0200
Subject: OpenPGP parts and plain text in the same email
Message-ID: <201108181410.23371.mailinglisten@hauke-laging.de>

Hello,

probably all of you know the problem that users of that one ******* kind of 
mail client tell you that they cannot read your emails like the ones from 
other people. There was just an "attachment" which they have to open in order 
to read the text. And of course, that other one attachment with nonsense 
data...

This is more an email question than a GnuPG question: Mail clients are capable 
of sending both an HTML and a plain text version of the content within one 
email. I wonder whether it is possible to send emails in the same way with a 
plain text part and an alternative PGP/MIME part. "Solving" the outlook 
problem this way might increase the acceptance of OpenPGP.


Hauke
-- 
PGP: D44C 6A5B 71B0 427C CED3 025C BD7D 6D27 ECCB 5814
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From sattva at pgpru.com  Thu Aug 18 10:41:40 2011
From: sattva at pgpru.com (Vlad "SATtva" Miller)
Date: Thu, 18 Aug 2011 15:41:40 +0700
Subject: Working with a system-shared keyring
In-Reply-To: <4E4165AC.9080908@dougbarton.us>
References: <BANLkTi=r++WkENR3QiiGMGGQseBcHsR7nQ@mail.gmail.com>	<877h93z8jq.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>	<4DF12F55.2020707@dougbarton.us>	<87d3imtbs9.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>	<4DF265D6.8010507@dougbarton.us>	<87ipq6udpo.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<4E4165AC.9080908@dougbarton.us>
Message-ID: <4E4CD044.7070202@pgpru.com>

Doug Barton:
> On 08/09/2011 02:38, Werner Koch wrote:
>> On Fri, 10 Jun 2011 20:43, dougb at dougbarton.us said:
>>
>>>> But fixes a lot of problems.  The keyring is a database and if we
>>>> distribute this database to several files without a way to sync them;
>>>> this leads to problems.  You may have not been affected by such problems
>>>> but only due to the way you use gpg.
>>>
>>> Can you elaborate on those problems? I can think of several examples
>>> of databases whose contents are stored in multiple files without any
>>> difficulty, so I'm curious.
>>
>> But in those cases the files are either under the control of the
>> database or partitioned using a well defined scheme.  With the --keyring
>> option this is different: You may add several keyrings to GnuPG and
>> remove them later.  There is no way GPG can tell whether there are
>> duplicates or which instances of a duplicated entry it needs to update.
>> Sure, we could make this working but I it will get really complex.  Thus
>> it is far easier to have one file or set of files which are under the
>> sole control of GPG.
> 
> Easier to code maybe. But I still maintain that losing the ability to
> have multiple keyrings will be a significant loss of functionality for
> the user. Significant enough for me that I would likely go back to the
> 1.4 branch (with regrets, since I like some of the functionality that is
> provided in 2.x now).

Same here. Maybe i'm missing something, but it seems without the ability
to have multiple keyrings in GPG configuration one will lose an ability
to use detached subkeys (or actually any private keys) stored on a
removable USB drive for example. Does smartcards become the only
approved and *supported* way for non-local storage of private keys?


-- 
Vlad "SATtva" Miller
3d viz | security & privacy consulting
www.vladmiller.info | www.pgpru.com



From kloecker at kde.org  Thu Aug 18 20:39:08 2011
From: kloecker at kde.org (Ingo =?iso-8859-15?q?Kl=F6cker?=)
Date: Thu, 18 Aug 2011 20:39:08 +0200
Subject: OpenPGP parts and plain text in the same email
In-Reply-To: <201108181410.23371.mailinglisten@hauke-laging.de>
References: <201108181410.23371.mailinglisten@hauke-laging.de>
Message-ID: <201108182039.19088@thufir.ingo-kloecker.de>

On Thursday 18 August 2011, Hauke Laging wrote:
> Hello,
> 
> probably all of you know the problem that users of that one *******
> kind of mail client tell you that they cannot read your emails like
> the ones from other people. There was just an "attachment" which
> they have to open in order to read the text. And of course, that
> other one attachment with nonsense data...
> 
> This is more an email question than a GnuPG question: Mail clients
> are capable of sending both an HTML and a plain text version of the
> content within one email. I wonder whether it is possible to send
> emails in the same way with a plain text part and an alternative
> PGP/MIME part. "Solving" the outlook problem this way might increase
> the acceptance of OpenPGP.

It is certainly possible to do this, but
- I doubt that any existing mail client supports this out-of-the box
- it might not help because apparently this one mail client does not 
handle multipart-mime correctly, so why should it support something 
strange like a multipart/alternative message with a text/plain part and 
a PGP/MIME part.

I don't think it's worth the effort thinking about this. In fact, it 
might be better to ignore the problem because everytime a user of such a 
mail client asks you why you've sent him such a strange message you can 
tell him that his mail client is broken and that he'd be much better off 
with standard-compliant mail client <insert your favorite mail client>.

Apart from that I'm pretty sure that only very old versions of Outlook 
[Express] have those problems.


Regards,
Ingo
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From alex at gpgtools.org  Thu Aug 18 22:24:32 2011
From: alex at gpgtools.org (Alex (via GPGTools))
Date: Thu, 18 Aug 2011 22:24:32 +0200
Subject: OpenPGP parts and plain text in the same email
In-Reply-To: <201108182039.19088@thufir.ingo-kloecker.de>
References: <201108181410.23371.mailinglisten@hauke-laging.de>
	<201108182039.19088@thufir.ingo-kloecker.de>
Message-ID: <1F59B5D8-8B53-46C9-BEA1-A63FC9DDFCCC@gpgtools.org>

Hi there,

On 18.08.2011, at 20:39, Ingo Kl?cker wrote:
> why should it support something  strange like a multipart/alternative message with a text/plain part and  a PGP/MIME part.

isn't this what the message "This is an OpenPGP/MIME signed message (RFC 2440 and 3156)" is about? If this text is shown by an incompatible client it could be replaced by the original text.

> Apart from that I'm pretty sure that only very old versions of Outlook 
> [Express] have those problems.

Is there a (reliable) list of incompatible clients?

Best regards, Alex

--
http://gpgtools.org



From wk at gnupg.org  Fri Aug 19 06:41:44 2011
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Fri, 19 Aug 2011 06:41:44 +0200
Subject: Working with a system-shared keyring
In-Reply-To: <4E4CD044.7070202@pgpru.com> (Vlad Miller's message of "Thu, 18
	Aug 2011 15:41:40 +0700")
References: <BANLkTi=r++WkENR3QiiGMGGQseBcHsR7nQ@mail.gmail.com>
	<877h93z8jq.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4DF12F55.2020707@dougbarton.us>
	<87d3imtbs9.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4DF265D6.8010507@dougbarton.us>
	<87ipq6udpo.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4E4165AC.9080908@dougbarton.us>
	<4E4CD044.7070202@pgpru.com>
Message-ID: <87ty9e2et3.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Thu, 18 Aug 2011 10:41, sattva at pgpru.com said:

> Same here. Maybe i'm missing something, but it seems without the ability
> to have multiple keyrings in GPG configuration one will lose an ability
> to use detached subkeys (or actually any private keys) stored on a

I am using offline key parts for a long time and iirc, I even
implemeented that.

With 2.1 it is even much easier - there is no more secring.gpg.  All
secret keys are stored as separate files in .gnupg/private-key-v1.d.  If
you want to take a key offline, you only need to remove that.  It is way
easier than what we have now.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From dougb at dougbarton.us  Fri Aug 19 09:20:37 2011
From: dougb at dougbarton.us (Doug Barton)
Date: Fri, 19 Aug 2011 00:20:37 -0700
Subject: claws mail with PGP in-line?
Message-ID: <20110819002037.49883323@172-17-198-245.globalsuite.net>

Anyone using claws mail with PGP in-line? I have the addon loaded but
every time I try to verify an in-line message it says, "The signature
can't be checked - Unknown error." When I click the lock icon it says
"The signature can't be checked - No signature found." All the
searching I did seemed to indicate that with the plugin loaded it
should just work. The claws documentation is really slanted towards the
"in-line is deprecated" camp, so wasn't much help. 

Pointers, including URLs for TFM are welcome. 


Thanks,

Doug

-- 

	Nothin' ever doesn't change, but nothin' changes much.
			-- OK Go

	Breadth of IT experience, and depth of knowledge in the DNS.
	Yours for the right price.  :)  http://SupersetSolutions.com/



From peter at digitalbrains.com  Fri Aug 19 14:06:53 2011
From: peter at digitalbrains.com (Peter Lebbing)
Date: Fri, 19 Aug 2011 14:06:53 +0200
Subject: Extract numbers from a key
In-Reply-To: <20110817151608.E1FA9A6E3F@smtp.hushmail.com>
References: <20110817151608.E1FA9A6E3F@smtp.hushmail.com>
Message-ID: <4E4E51DD.3060404@digitalbrains.com>

On 17/08/11 17:16, vedaal at nym.hush.com wrote:
> Here is a good overview (dated 1998, but not too many new RSA attack approaches
> since then:-)  ) of 20 years of RSA attacks:
> 
> http://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/abstracts/RSAattack-survey.html

Thanks for the link!

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at http://wwwhome.cs.utwente.nl/~lebbing/pubkey.txt


From grosr.romain at gmail.com  Fri Aug 19 15:24:44 2011
From: grosr.romain at gmail.com (Acristal)
Date: Fri, 19 Aug 2011 06:24:44 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: How to decrypt a message only with a specific recipient?
Message-ID: <32295220.post@talk.nabble.com>


Hi,

I am making an application, and i have a little problem.

There is an interface where i can put a message in a text box, and after
entering the passphrase, I ask gpg to decrypt this message. 

My problem is that there are multiple secret key, and i cannot say if 2 keys
have the same passphrase.
So i would try to decrypt the message using only the secret key with the
good recipient.

Sorry for my english, i'm french, it's hard to explain :(

A small example:
I have 2 secret key: Toto (toto) toto at toto.toto and Titi (titi)
titi at titi.titi.
Imagine they have the same passphrase.

If someone encrypt a message using Toto public key, Titi will be able to
decrypt the message because he has the same passphrase, and gpg think that
Titi is Toto.

I tried to use the option --recipient Titi, --local-user Titi, but it
doesn't work. In all cases, Titi can decrypt Toto message. 
I made some searchs, but i only found this 2 options.

I don't know if you understand my problem, but if you can help me :)

Thank you,
-- 
View this message in context: http://old.nabble.com/How-to-decrypt-a-message-only-with-a-specific-recipient--tp32295220p32295220.html
Sent from the GnuPG - User mailing list archive at Nabble.com.



From grosr.romain at gmail.com  Fri Aug 19 15:26:01 2011
From: grosr.romain at gmail.com (Acristal)
Date: Fri, 19 Aug 2011 06:26:01 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: How to decrypt a message only with a specific recipient?
Message-ID: <32295220.post@talk.nabble.com>


Hi,

I am making an application, and i have a little problem.

There is an interface where i can put a message in a text box, and after
entering the passphrase, I ask gpg to decrypt this message. 

My problem is that there are multiple secret key, and i cannot say if 2 keys
have the same passphrase.
So i would try to decrypt the message using only the secret key with the
good recipient.

Sorry for my english, i'm french, it's hard to explain :(

A small example:
I have 2 secret key: Toto (toto) toto at toto.toto and Titi (titi)
titi at titi.titi.
Imagine they have the same passphrase.

If someone encrypt a message using Toto public key, Titi will be able to
decrypt the message because he has the same passphrase, and gpg think that
Titi is Toto.

I tried to use the option --recipient Titi, --local-user Titi, but it
doesn't work. In all cases, Titi can decrypt Toto message. 
I made some searchs, but i only found this 2 options.

I am using gpg4win 2.1.0.

I don't know if you understand my problem, but if you can help me :)

Thank you,
-- 
View this message in context: http://old.nabble.com/How-to-decrypt-a-message-only-with-a-specific-recipient--tp32295220p32295220.html
Sent from the GnuPG - User mailing list archive at Nabble.com.



From expires2011 at ymail.com  Sat Aug 20 12:52:54 2011
From: expires2011 at ymail.com (MFPA)
Date: Sat, 20 Aug 2011 11:52:54 +0100
Subject: How to decrypt a message only with a specific recipient?
In-Reply-To: <32295220.post@talk.nabble.com>
References: <32295220.post@talk.nabble.com>
Message-ID: <419764108.20110820115254@my_localhost>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

Hi


On Friday 19 August 2011 at 2:24:44 PM, in
<mid:32295220.post at talk.nabble.com>, Acristal wrote:


> A small example: I have 2 secret key: Toto (toto)
> toto at toto.toto and Titi (titi) titi at titi.titi. Imagine
> they have the same passphrase.

> If someone encrypt a message using Toto public key,
> Titi will be able to decrypt the message because he has
> the same passphrase,

If "Titi" and "Toto" are both yourself. why is this an issue?

If "Titi" and "Toto" are not the same person but are sharing a secret
keyring, they should both change their passphrase and (ideally) stop
sharing a secret keyring.



> and gpg think that Titi is Toto.

GPG makes no guess at who is there, it only knows if the correct
passphrase was entered for the key it wants to use.



> I tried to use the option --recipient Titi,
> --local-user Titi, but it doesn't work. In all cases,
> Titi can decrypt Toto message.  I made some searchs,
> but i only found this 2 options.

- --local-user defines which key to sign with.
- --recipient specifies which key to encrypt to.


- --
Best regards

MFPA                    mailto:expires2011 at ymail.com

Raining cats and dogs is better than hailing taxis.
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iQE7BAEBCgClBQJOT5ITnhSAAAAAAEAAVXNpZ25pbmdfa2V5X0lEIHNpZ25pbmdf
a2V5X0ZpbmdlcnByaW50IEAgIE1hc3Rlcl9rZXlfRmluZ2VycHJpbnQgQThBOTBC
OEVBRDBDNkU2OSBCQTIzOUI0NjgxRjFFRjk1MThFNkJENDY0NDdFQ0EwMyBAIEJB
MjM5QjQ2ODFGMUVGOTUxOEU2QkQ0NjQ0N0VDQTAzAAoJEKipC46tDG5ptO4D+QED
AhwXmnWlIVrhTH1PFKJ/ipAQozkMQgYsbsjRt187keDNui8QWdMhmXpoE7CaAvej
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CIETFC3fMPmGKXrrLcLBU/hnCgd33AUcnxbvzdFX
=Sjmf
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----



From markr-gnupg at signal100.com  Mon Aug 22 04:54:53 2011
From: markr-gnupg at signal100.com (Mark Rousell)
Date: Mon, 22 Aug 2011 03:54:53 +0100
Subject: Location of GnuPG 1.4.11 Windows binary
Message-ID: <4E51C4FD.80500@signal100.com>

I just thought the following might be helpful for Windows users of GnuPG
1.x.

I had been running 1.4.10 on Windows for some time and I thought it was
time I checked for an upgrade so I visited
http://www.gnupg.org/download/ to see if there was a new version. I
found that 1.4.11 was available but that the binary download links had
disappeared! The only reference to Windows binaries is now via Gpg4win
but that project only provides Windows binaries of 2.x and not 1.x.

Happily however I found that the traditional standalone Windows binary
installer is still in available via FTP. It's simply not linked from the
GnuPG website as far as I can see. Here's the link:
ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/binary/

Thank goodness for that.

If anyone from GnuPG is reading this, please don't stop building (and
providing links to) Windows binaries for GnuPG 1.x. I'm sure I can't be
the only user of it. :-)

I'm sure it wouldn't be the end of the world for me to learn how to
compile it for Windows but I know that the GnuPG developers will
probably do a better job of it than me. ;-)






From thajsta at gmail.com  Mon Aug 22 05:59:59 2011
From: thajsta at gmail.com (Jonathan Ely)
Date: Sun, 21 Aug 2011 23:59:59 -0400
Subject: Location of GnuPG 1.4.11 Windows binary
In-Reply-To: <4E51C4FD.80500@signal100.com>
References: <4E51C4FD.80500@signal100.com>
Message-ID: <4E51D43F.6010500@gmail.com>

You must have missed my enquiry from some time in July. I was looking
for it as well only to copy the link location of one of the FTP links
and do some self-searching. It would be useful if they announce 1.x.x
upgrades so people will not have to randomly decide when to check the
directory for an upgrade. I installed GPG4WIN and uninstalled it because
it was just too much for me and the 1.x.x branch is more simple for me
anyway since I only need it for the Enigmail extension.

On 21/08/2011 10:54 PM, Mark Rousell wrote:
> I just thought the following might be helpful for Windows users of GnuPG
> 1.x.
> 
> I had been running 1.4.10 on Windows for some time and I thought it was
> time I checked for an upgrade so I visited
> http://www.gnupg.org/download/ to see if there was a new version. I
> found that 1.4.11 was available but that the binary download links had
> disappeared! The only reference to Windows binaries is now via Gpg4win
> but that project only provides Windows binaries of 2.x and not 1.x.
> 
> Happily however I found that the traditional standalone Windows binary
> installer is still in available via FTP. It's simply not linked from the
> GnuPG website as far as I can see. Here's the link:
> ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/binary/
> 
> Thank goodness for that.
> 
> If anyone from GnuPG is reading this, please don't stop building (and
> providing links to) Windows binaries for GnuPG 1.x. I'm sure I can't be
> the only user of it. :-)
> 
> I'm sure it wouldn't be the end of the world for me to learn how to
> compile it for Windows but I know that the GnuPG developers will
> probably do a better job of it than me. ;-)
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
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From dougb at dougbarton.us  Mon Aug 22 09:06:35 2011
From: dougb at dougbarton.us (Doug Barton)
Date: Mon, 22 Aug 2011 00:06:35 -0700
Subject: gpgme problem with claws mail
In-Reply-To: <20110821235422.26d156af@172-17-198-245.globalsuite.net>
References: <20110821235422.26d156af@172-17-198-245.globalsuite.net>
Message-ID: <4E51FFFB.8020008@dougbarton.us>

The nice folks at the claws list helped me narrow down my problem, as
you can see below. I'm using gnupg 2 normally, but I tried switching to
gnupg 1 and that didn't help. I'm using gpgme-1.3.1.

Any suggestions on how I can debug why gpgme is not recognizing that
there is a signature in the message?


Thanks,

Doug



Begin forwarded message:

Date: Mon, 22 Aug 2011 01:28:51 +0200
From: Michael Rasmussen <mir at miras.org>
To: users at lists.claws-mail.org
Subject: Fw: Verifying PGP-Inline signatures not working




Begin forwarded message:

Date: Mon, 22 Aug 2011 01:27:31 +0200
From: Michael Rasmussen <mir at miras.org>
To: Doug Barton <dougb at dougbarton.us>
Subject: Re: Verifying PGP-Inline signatures not working


On Sun, 21 Aug 2011 15:32:59 -0700
Doug Barton <dougb at dougbarton.us> wrote:

> mimeview.c:481:signed mail
Claws detects the email to be signed
> sgpgme.c:78:no signature found
Claws is calling a library routine in gpgme:
status = gpgme_op_verify_result(ctx);
        if (status && status->signatures == NULL) {

So either the call fails to find the signature or the gpgme library is
not proper initialized.

In both cases the error resides outside off claws.




-- 

	Nothin' ever doesn't change, but nothin' changes much.
			-- OK Go

	Breadth of IT experience, and depth of knowledge in the DNS.
	Yours for the right price.  :)  http://SupersetSolutions.com/



From wk at gnupg.org  Mon Aug 22 10:16:37 2011
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Mon, 22 Aug 2011 10:16:37 +0200
Subject: Location of GnuPG 1.4.11 Windows binary
In-Reply-To: <4E51C4FD.80500@signal100.com> (Mark Rousell's message of "Mon,
	22 Aug 2011 03:54:53 +0100")
References: <4E51C4FD.80500@signal100.com>
Message-ID: <87sjot274q.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Mon, 22 Aug 2011 04:54, markr-gnupg at signal100.com said:

> If anyone from GnuPG is reading this, please don't stop building (and
> providing links to) Windows binaries for GnuPG 1.x. I'm sure I can't be

I deliberately removed the link.  For those who really really need 1.4
for Windows, they should just read the announcement to see where you can
find a binary.  After all it has been there for more than a decade and
the README files on the FTP server tell that as well.

New users on Windows shall not use 1.4 thus it is not anymore linked
from the web page.  Whether there will be future 1.4 binaries has not
yet been decided.


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From yyy at yyy.id.lv  Mon Aug 22 11:07:11 2011
From: yyy at yyy.id.lv (yyy)
Date: Mon, 22 Aug 2011 12:07:11 +0300
Subject: gpgsm certificate validity
Message-ID: <4E521C3F.2000906@yyy.id.lv>

Hello!

How to verify if a certificate (in keyring) is valid?

I tried to encrypt  file using gpgsm and no key specifiying methods worked
(http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/2011-August/042580.html)

Could that be caused by invalid certificate?


From papillion at gmail.com  Mon Aug 22 10:29:05 2011
From: papillion at gmail.com (Anthony Papillion)
Date: Mon, 22 Aug 2011 03:29:05 -0500
Subject: Which release should we be using?
Message-ID: <4E521351.7010706@gmail.com>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256

So I'm currently running 1.4.10 for GNU/Linux even though I know that
2.0 has been out for a while. I chose to stick with 1.4.10 and 1.4.11
because I don't like having to use pinentry since it doesn't support cut
and paste. My questions are these:

1) Is there any real reason why I *shouldn't* be using the 1.4.x branch
of GPG?

and

2) If I should be using 2.0, is there a way to disable pinentry so gpg
can work the way the 1.4.x releases do?

Thanks!
Anthony

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.4.10 (GNU/Linux)
Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/
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=6ELm
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


From MarshallAbrams at comcast.net  Mon Aug 22 00:10:50 2011
From: MarshallAbrams at comcast.net (MarshallAbrams)
Date: Sun, 21 Aug 2011 15:10:50 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: Trying to convert from PGP on XP to a GUI on Win 7
Message-ID: <32307468.post@talk.nabble.com>


I've been using PGP 8.1 under Windows XP, but have to find a new GUI to use
under Windows 7. I found Gpg4win and figured out how to import my keyrings
bu changing the extension to gpg.  I was able to decrypt a previously
encrypted file using gpg2.exe. There didn't seem to be a GUI.  Reading thru
the manual, I see that there is supposed to be an extension/plug-in on the
Windows Explorer menu for GpgEX, but I don't see it.  What should I do?

I also found Cryptophane 0.7.0.  It has a GUI that is very remincent of PGP
8.1.  It seems to interface with the keyrings already imported, but I can't
use it to encrypt a file.  Although I signed the public key (and the program
shows that it has been signed), when I try to encrypt and/or sign a file, it
complains that the key is not signed.  Again, what should I do?

I'd be happy getting either program to work, or to use another program. 
Recommendations appreciated. Also, what is recommended to replace the secure
erase in PGP?
-- 
View this message in context: http://old.nabble.com/Trying-to-convert-from-PGP-on-XP-to-a-GUI-on-Win-7-tp32307468p32307468.html
Sent from the GnuPG - User mailing list archive at Nabble.com.



From wk at gnupg.org  Mon Aug 22 14:01:33 2011
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Mon, 22 Aug 2011 14:01:33 +0200
Subject: Which release should we be using?
In-Reply-To: <4E521351.7010706@gmail.com> (Anthony Papillion's message of
	"Mon, 22 Aug 2011 03:29:05 -0500")
References: <4E521351.7010706@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <87fwkt1wpu.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Mon, 22 Aug 2011 10:29, papillion at gmail.com said:

> because I don't like having to use pinentry since it doesn't support cut
> and paste. My questions are these:

That is on purpose.  If you have your passphrase on file for c+p you may
as well use no passphrase at all.  gpg-agent caches your passphrase; set
the caching time to whatever you l; this is far safer than to use c+p.


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From wk at gnupg.org  Mon Aug 22 14:03:17 2011
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Mon, 22 Aug 2011 14:03:17 +0200
Subject: gpgsm certificate validity
In-Reply-To: <4E521C3F.2000906@yyy.id.lv> (yyy@yyy.id.lv's message of "Mon, 22
	Aug 2011 12:07:11 +0300")
References: <4E521C3F.2000906@yyy.id.lv>
Message-ID: <87bovh1wmy.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Mon, 22 Aug 2011 11:07, yyy at yyy.id.lv said:

> How to verify if a certificate (in keyring) is valid?

  gpgsm -k --with-validation USERID

without USERID all certifciates are validated.  In case you want to skip
CRL checks, add the option --disable-crl-checks.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From yyy at yyy.id.lv  Mon Aug 22 14:18:45 2011
From: yyy at yyy.id.lv (yyy)
Date: Mon, 22 Aug 2011 15:18:45 +0300
Subject: gpgsm certificate validity
In-Reply-To: <87bovh1wmy.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <4E521C3F.2000906@yyy.id.lv> <87bovh1wmy.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <4E524925.40204@yyy.id.lv>

On 2011.08.22. 15:03, Werner Koch wrote:
> On Mon, 22 Aug 2011 11:07, yyy at yyy.id.lv said:
>
>> How to verify if a certificate (in keyring) is valid?
>   gpgsm -k --with-validation USERID
>
> without USERID all certifciates are validated.  In case you want to skip
> CRL checks, add the option --disable-crl-checks.

This produced error:
 [certificate is bad: No value]
Rest of data about certificate, were fine (ID, S/N, Issuer, Subject,
validity, key type, chain length, fingerprint)

What does it means? Attempts to encrypt to this USERID also produced
error "No value"



From dpmcgee at gmail.com  Mon Aug 22 15:27:04 2011
From: dpmcgee at gmail.com (Dan McGee)
Date: Mon, 22 Aug 2011 08:27:04 -0500
Subject: Which release should we be using?
In-Reply-To: <87fwkt1wpu.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <4E521351.7010706@gmail.com> <87fwkt1wpu.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <CAEik5nPjEKEbVxbOYyMm5q6r3+M+CRDctMHO87zY1jTjDh+PsA@mail.gmail.com>

On Mon, Aug 22, 2011 at 7:01 AM, Werner Koch <wk at gnupg.org> wrote:
> On Mon, 22 Aug 2011 10:29, papillion at gmail.com said:
>
>> because I don't like having to use pinentry since it doesn't support cut
>> and paste. My questions are these:
>
> That is on purpose. ?If you have your passphrase on file for c+p you may
> as well use no passphrase at all. ?gpg-agent caches your passphrase; set
> the caching time to whatever you l; this is far safer than to use c+p.

So you're enforcing policy via disabling copy and paste? This is
extremely shortsighted. Any password management program like Keepass
makes transfer via the clipboard easy and relatively safe (clearing it
after 10 seconds), so that doesn't sound like the safety of "no
passphrase at all".

-Dan


From yyy at yyy.id.lv  Mon Aug 22 15:27:45 2011
From: yyy at yyy.id.lv (yyy)
Date: Mon, 22 Aug 2011 16:27:45 +0300
Subject: gpgsm certificate validity
In-Reply-To: <4E524925.40204@yyy.id.lv>
References: <4E521C3F.2000906@yyy.id.lv> <87bovh1wmy.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<4E524925.40204@yyy.id.lv>
Message-ID: <4E525951.9050805@yyy.id.lv>

On 2011.08.22. 15:18, yyy wrote:
> On 2011.08.22. 15:03, Werner Koch wrote:
>> On Mon, 22 Aug 2011 11:07, yyy at yyy.id.lv said:
>>
>>> How to verify if a certificate (in keyring) is valid?
>>   gpgsm -k --with-validation USERID
>>
>> without USERID all certifciates are validated.  In case you want to skip
>> CRL checks, add the option --disable-crl-checks.
> This produced error:
>  [certificate is bad: No value]
> Rest of data about certificate, were fine (ID, S/N, Issuer, Subject,
> validity, key type, chain length, fingerprint)
>
> What does it means? Attempts to encrypt to this USERID also produced
> error "No value"
Few more updates.

If using gpgsm -k --with-validation
(without providing an USERID), it also provides

  fingerprint: 81:4A:73:CC:AB:BC:41:Dgpgsm: dirmngr cache-only key
lookup failed
: Not found
3:D7:99:0F:A3:C0:75:AB:E0:D5:6C:AE:DD

That certificate is a self signed certificate and it seems, that gpgsm
is trying to find it in some external file (not in keyring)

In addition to --with-validation, used --disable-crl-checks,
--disable-policy-checks, but these did not change anything


Also, searching google for "[certificate is bad: No value]", produced
one result from this list, from 2006
http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-devel/2006-September/023160.html
(google result)
further in that thread, there were a message
http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-devel/2006-September/023175.html
This certificate does not have  BasicConstraints, maybe this is a cause
of error?

Imported another root certificate, this had BasicConstraints set, import
of it went differently,
there were popup asking if i want to trust it (when importing first
certificate, it did not ask anything)

For that certificate, gpgsm -k --with-validation --disable-crl-checks
went without errors
Encryption using such IDs, worked.

So, the main problem seems to be (lack of) presence of BasicConstraints
in certificate.
Is it possible to override check for BasicConstraints? Is it a bug?
--ignore-cert-extensions <> cannot be used, because the problem is lack
of presence of extension, not presence of extension.



From wk at gnupg.org  Mon Aug 22 16:25:51 2011
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Mon, 22 Aug 2011 16:25:51 +0200
Subject: Which release should we be using?
In-Reply-To: <CAEik5nPjEKEbVxbOYyMm5q6r3+M+CRDctMHO87zY1jTjDh+PsA@mail.gmail.com>
	(Dan McGee's message of "Mon, 22 Aug 2011 08:27:04 -0500")
References: <4E521351.7010706@gmail.com> <87fwkt1wpu.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<CAEik5nPjEKEbVxbOYyMm5q6r3+M+CRDctMHO87zY1jTjDh+PsA@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <87wre5zfo0.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Mon, 22 Aug 2011 15:27, dpmcgee at gmail.com said:

> extremely shortsighted. Any password management program like Keepass
> makes transfer via the clipboard easy and relatively safe (clearing it
> after 10 seconds), so that doesn't sound like the safety of "no
> passphrase at all".

You may not understand for what the passphrase in GPG is used: It is a
fail-stop mechanism to mitigate the compromise of a secret key.  In that
it is similar to the master passphrases of all these password managers.

Anyway, if you want to enable cut+paste just go ahead and implement it
in a pinentry version (to be exact, disable the the secure text entry
widget).  Please don't ask me to do that: I consider it as false
security.  BTW, pinentry is a separate package from GnuPG and easy to
hack.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From wk at gnupg.org  Mon Aug 22 16:31:29 2011
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Mon, 22 Aug 2011 16:31:29 +0200
Subject: gpgsm certificate validity
In-Reply-To: <4E525951.9050805@yyy.id.lv> (yyy@yyy.id.lv's message of "Mon, 22
	Aug 2011 16:27:45 +0300")
References: <4E521C3F.2000906@yyy.id.lv> <87bovh1wmy.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<4E524925.40204@yyy.id.lv> <4E525951.9050805@yyy.id.lv>
Message-ID: <87sjotzfem.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Mon, 22 Aug 2011 15:27, yyy at yyy.id.lv said:

> This certificate does not have  BasicConstraints, maybe this is a cause
> of error?

Quite likely.  That is required for CA certifciates.

> Is it possible to override check for BasicConstraints? Is it a bug?

Try adding the relax keyword to the entry in ~/.gnuypg/trustlist.txt .


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From gnupg at lists.grepular.com  Mon Aug 22 16:48:14 2011
From: gnupg at lists.grepular.com (gnupg at lists.grepular.com)
Date: Mon, 22 Aug 2011 15:48:14 +0100
Subject: Which release should we be using?
In-Reply-To: <87wre5zfo0.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <4E521351.7010706@gmail.com> <87fwkt1wpu.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<CAEik5nPjEKEbVxbOYyMm5q6r3+M+CRDctMHO87zY1jTjDh+PsA@mail.gmail.com>
	<87wre5zfo0.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <4E526C2E.9000904@lists.grepular.com>

On 22/08/11 15:25, Werner Koch wrote:

> BTW, pinentry is a separate package from GnuPG and easy to hack.

On this note, if anybody is interested, I recently wrote a pinentry
wrapper for password protecting a smartcard pin:

https://grepular.com/Protecting_PGP_Smartcards_from_Observation_Attacks

It's open source, and written in Perl, so it might be a good starting
point for people who want to hack similar things together.

-- 
Mike Cardwell https://grepular.com/  https://twitter.com/mickeyc
Professional  http://cardwellit.com/ http://linkedin.com/in/mikecardwell
PGP.mit.edu   0018461F/35BC AF1D 3AA2 1F84 3DC3 B0CF 70A5 F512 0018 461F

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From Mike_Acker at charter.net  Mon Aug 22 16:39:37 2011
From: Mike_Acker at charter.net (Mike Acker)
Date: Mon, 22 Aug 2011 10:39:37 -0400
Subject: supersede key on key-server
In-Reply-To: <mailman.27838.1314021277.2574.gnupg-users@gnupg.org>
References: <mailman.27838.1314021277.2574.gnupg-users@gnupg.org>
Message-ID: <4E526A29.7080008@charter.net>

some of us use more than one email address. with GPG it is simple to add 
a secondary ID to a key and this seems to work quite well.

when a change like this is made it is desirable to update the keyserver. 
what happens when you re-upload a key to the keyserver? I hate to think 
the keyserver gets loaded up with old junk keys no one want used anymore...

-- 
/MIKE



From thajsta at gmail.com  Mon Aug 22 18:03:08 2011
From: thajsta at gmail.com (Jonathan Ely)
Date: Mon, 22 Aug 2011 12:03:08 -0400
Subject: supersede key on key-server
In-Reply-To: <4E526A29.7080008@charter.net>
References: <mailman.27838.1314021277.2574.gnupg-users@gnupg.org>
	<4E526A29.7080008@charter.net>
Message-ID: <4E527DBC.7040809@gmail.com>

I was wondering something similar. I have a few keys which I have
invalidated and disabled but there is no way to delete them. I am using
this new key which I have not uploaded because if something happens and
I must re-create the key that will too become just clutter on the server.

On 22/08/2011 10:39 AM, Mike Acker wrote:
> some of us use more than one email address. with GPG it is simple to add
> a secondary ID to a key and this seems to work quite well.
> 
> when a change like this is made it is desirable to update the keyserver.
> what happens when you re-upload a key to the keyserver? I hate to think
> the keyserver gets loaded up with old junk keys no one want used anymore...
> 
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From yyy at yyy.id.lv  Mon Aug 22 18:05:07 2011
From: yyy at yyy.id.lv (yyy)
Date: Mon, 22 Aug 2011 19:05:07 +0300
Subject: gpgsm certificate validity
In-Reply-To: <87sjotzfem.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <4E521C3F.2000906@yyy.id.lv> <87bovh1wmy.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<4E524925.40204@yyy.id.lv> <4E525951.9050805@yyy.id.lv>
	<87sjotzfem.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <4E527E33.1030804@yyy.id.lv>

On 2011.08.22. 17:31, Werner Koch wrote:
> On Mon, 22 Aug 2011 15:27, yyy at yyy.id.lv said:
>
>> This certificate does not have  BasicConstraints, maybe this is a cause
>> of error?
> Quite likely.  That is required for CA certifciates.
>
>> Is it possible to override check for BasicConstraints? Is it a bug?
> Try adding the relax keyword to the entry in ~/.gnuypg/trustlist.txt .
>
That eventually fixed it. Thanks. There were some errors, along the way,
though:

Trustlist.txt initially contained only hash of second certificate (with
BasicConstraints). Added hash of other certificate (the one without
BasicConstraints) and now on ALL certificates gpgsm -k --with-validation
--disable-crl-checks
produces error [certificate is bad: Line too long]. In this case, first
line in trustlist.txt was for second certificate in keyring and second
line was for first certificate in keyring. Swapping these lines in
trustlist.txt, fixed it.

So, order of certificate hashes, relative of certificate order in
keyring, is critically important?



From ben at adversary.org  Mon Aug 22 18:06:10 2011
From: ben at adversary.org (Ben McGinnes)
Date: Tue, 23 Aug 2011 02:06:10 +1000
Subject: supersede key on key-server
In-Reply-To: <4E526A29.7080008@charter.net>
References: <mailman.27838.1314021277.2574.gnupg-users@gnupg.org>
	<4E526A29.7080008@charter.net>
Message-ID: <4E527E72.1090906@adversary.org>

On 23/08/11 12:39 AM, Mike Acker wrote:
> some of us use more than one email address. with GPG it is simple to
> add a secondary ID to a key and this seems to work quite well.
> 
> when a change like this is made it is desirable to update the
> keyserver.  what happens when you re-upload a key to the keyserver?
> I hate to think the keyserver gets loaded up with old junk keys no
> one want used anymore...

That is exactly what happens.  Updated keys have the new information
(e.g. UIDs, signatures and revocations) added, but the old data
remains.  Old data should be indicated as such by revoked information
(UIDs, signatures or whole keys), but that doesn't always happen.


Regards,
Ben


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From wk at gnupg.org  Mon Aug 22 18:12:41 2011
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Mon, 22 Aug 2011 18:12:41 +0200
Subject: Which release should we be using?
In-Reply-To: <87wre5zfo0.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> (Werner Koch's message of
	"Mon, 22 Aug 2011 16:25:51 +0200")
References: <4E521351.7010706@gmail.com> <87fwkt1wpu.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<CAEik5nPjEKEbVxbOYyMm5q6r3+M+CRDctMHO87zY1jTjDh+PsA@mail.gmail.com>
	<87wre5zfo0.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <87bovhzapy.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Mon, 22 Aug 2011 16:25, wk at gnupg.org said:

> Anyway, if you want to enable cut+paste just go ahead and implement it
> in a pinentry version (to be exact, disable the the secure text entry
> widget).  Please don't ask me to do that: I consider it as false

However if people here think that such a pinentry version is useful, I
see no problem to put it as an additional pinentry into the standard
pinentry package.  Make sure to build it similar to the other ones.


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From wk at gnupg.org  Mon Aug 22 18:15:48 2011
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Mon, 22 Aug 2011 18:15:48 +0200
Subject: Trying to convert from PGP on XP to a GUI on Win 7
In-Reply-To: <32307468.post@talk.nabble.com> (MarshallAbrams@comcast.net's
	message of "Sun, 21 Aug 2011 15:10:50 -0700 (PDT)")
References: <32307468.post@talk.nabble.com>
Message-ID: <877h65zakr.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Mon, 22 Aug 2011 00:10, MarshallAbrams at comcast.net said:

> encrypted file using gpg2.exe. There didn't seem to be a GUI.  Reading thru
> the manual, I see that there is supposed to be an extension/plug-in on the
> Windows Explorer menu for GpgEX, but I don't see it.  What should I do?

If you are using a 64 bit Windows7 you are out of luck.  We have not yet
ported GpgEx.  If you are using older 64 bit Windows version you have
the option to install a 32 bit version of the explorer.  Please do that
and you will be able to use GpgEX.  You might need to re0install
Gpg4win - I am not sure.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From Mike_Acker at charter.net  Mon Aug 22 18:44:51 2011
From: Mike_Acker at charter.net (Mike Acker)
Date: Mon, 22 Aug 2011 12:44:51 -0400
Subject: supersede key on key-server
In-Reply-To: <4E527DBC.7040809@gmail.com>
References: <mailman.27838.1314021277.2574.gnupg-users@gnupg.org>
	<4E526A29.7080008@charter.net> <4E527DBC.7040809@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <4E528783.9070109@charter.net>

On 08/22/2011 12:03, Jonathan Ely wrote:
> I was wondering something similar. I have a few keys which I have
> invalidated and disabled but there is no way to delete them. I am using
> this new key which I have not uploaded because if something happens and
> I must re-create the key that will too become just clutter on the server.
>
> On 22/08/2011 10:39 AM, Mike Acker wrote:
>> >  some of us use more than one email address. with GPG it is simple to add
>> >  a secondary ID to a key and this seems to work quite well.
>> >  
>> >  when a change like this is made it is desirable to update the keyserver.
>> >  what happens when you re-upload a key to the keyserver? I hate to think
>> >  the keyserver gets loaded up with old junk keys no one want used anymore...
>> >  

you could upload a revoke certificate. hopefully they keyserver is smart 
enough to discover multiple hits on a given fingerprint as a result of a 
search... it would need to first search for the key by whatever search 
text was provided, and then search for hits on the fingerprint... if 
there is a revoke cert then you want to return that.  if they key was 
superseded by a later update it should provide the last updated copy.

interestingly they keys have a valid from/to date range, but no revision 
date... we may have to just carry out some experiments

--
  /MIKE
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From papillion at gmail.com  Tue Aug 23 03:47:00 2011
From: papillion at gmail.com (Anthony Papillion)
Date: Mon, 22 Aug 2011 20:47:00 -0500
Subject: Which release should we be using?
In-Reply-To: <87fwkt1wpu.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <4E521351.7010706@gmail.com> <87fwkt1wpu.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <4E530694.6030904@gmail.com>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256

On 08/22/2011 07:01 AM, Werner Koch wrote:
> On Mon, 22 Aug 2011 10:29, papillion at gmail.com said:
> 
>> because I don't like having to use pinentry since it doesn't support cut
>> and paste. My questions are these:
> 
> That is on purpose.  If you have your passphrase on file for c+p you may
> as well use no passphrase at all.  gpg-agent caches your passphrase; set
> the caching time to whatever you l; this is far safer than to use c+p.

Hi Werner,

I'm not sure I can see how being able to cut and paste a passphrase is
in any way like not having a passphrase at all. My passphrases are
stored in a Keepass database that resides in a TrueCrypt container. It's
protected well. My actual key is protected by a 62 character passphrase
that I'd like to cut and paste into GPG. Considering all of that, I
think it's a bit extreme to say cutting and pasting a passphrase from
two heavily encrypted containers is such that you may as well not have a
passphrase at all.

Still, thanks for your input. I suppose I could always implement c+p in
my version of pinentry or I'll just stick with 1.4.x for a while.

Thanks!
Anthony
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.4.10 (GNU/Linux)
Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/

iQIcBAEBCAAGBQJOUwaUAAoJEFMVikTZRCu/MEYP/36u1JOBc0OjeO7Ti+NDszII
ho2RPGzqnLhP0QiBsjvDNXdxCr4y8u7LWFhkHtcpKvdrmUwqminSvm2Fgv3Jxw6o
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XQve2O8L1vegnGfxatE1
=nsTK
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


From wk at gnupg.org  Tue Aug 23 09:04:52 2011
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Tue, 23 Aug 2011 09:04:52 +0200
Subject: Which release should we be using?
In-Reply-To: <4E530694.6030904@gmail.com> (Anthony Papillion's message of
	"Mon, 22 Aug 2011 20:47:00 -0500")
References: <4E521351.7010706@gmail.com> <87fwkt1wpu.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<4E530694.6030904@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <87k4a4y5ez.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Tue, 23 Aug 2011 03:47, papillion at gmail.com said:

> stored in a Keepass database that resides in a TrueCrypt container. It's
> protected well. My actual key is protected by a 62 character passphrase

... as long as the box is pwoered down.  Hard disk encryption does not
help if the box is up and you are attacked by malware.

> that I'd like to cut and paste into GPG. Considering all of that, I
> think it's a bit extreme to say cutting and pasting a passphrase from

Spying on X windows is pretty easy and thus Pinentry tries to make it
harder.

If you store your passphrase elsewhere; feed it directly to gpg-agent
(gpg-preset-passphrase or a custom pinentry) without that manual c+p.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From wk at gnupg.org  Tue Aug 23 09:07:49 2011
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Tue, 23 Aug 2011 09:07:49 +0200
Subject: gpgsm certificate validity
In-Reply-To: <4E527E33.1030804@yyy.id.lv> (yyy@yyy.id.lv's message of "Mon, 22
	Aug 2011 19:05:07 +0300")
References: <4E521C3F.2000906@yyy.id.lv> <87bovh1wmy.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<4E524925.40204@yyy.id.lv> <4E525951.9050805@yyy.id.lv>
	<87sjotzfem.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4E527E33.1030804@yyy.id.lv>
Message-ID: <87fwksy5a2.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Mon, 22 Aug 2011 18:05, yyy at yyy.id.lv said:

> So, order of certificate hashes, relative of certificate order in
> keyring, is critically important?

No.  You need to make sure to not use lines of more than ~255
characters.  Check that your editor didn't reflow a comment block or
similar.


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From wk at gnupg.org  Tue Aug 23 09:20:32 2011
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Tue, 23 Aug 2011 09:20:32 +0200
Subject: supersede key on key-server
In-Reply-To: <4E528783.9070109@charter.net> (Mike Acker's message of "Mon, 22
	Aug 2011 12:44:51 -0400")
References: <mailman.27838.1314021277.2574.gnupg-users@gnupg.org>
	<4E526A29.7080008@charter.net> <4E527DBC.7040809@gmail.com>
	<4E528783.9070109@charter.net>
Message-ID: <87bovgy4ov.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Mon, 22 Aug 2011 18:44, Mike_Acker at charter.net said:

> result of a search... it would need to first search for the key by
> whatever search text was provided, and then search for hits on the
> fingerprint... if there is a revoke cert then you want to return that.

Keyservers store one copy of a key.  A revocation certifciate is nothing
but another copy of the key with an recocation signature.  The keyserver
merges both of them to one key (in OpenPGP parlance a keyblock).

A basic keyblock looks like this:

     Primary_key
     User-Id-1
     Self-signature  -- to bind Primary Key to User-Id-1
     User-Id-2
     Self-signature  -- to bind Primary Key to User-Id-2
     Sub-Key-1
     Self-signature  -- to bind Orimary key to Sub-Key-1

etc.  Now a minimal revocation certificate for the entire key is

     Primary_key
     Recovation-signature -- actually a self-signature bound to
                             Primary-Key ewith a special attribute.

After import, a keyserver of gpg will merge them to this:

     Primary_key
     Recovation-signature -- actually a self-signature bound to
                             Primary-Key ewith a special attribute.
     User-Id-1
     Self-signature  -- to bind Primary Key to User-Id-1
     User-Id-2
     Self-signature  -- to bind Primary Key to User-Id-2
     Sub-Key-1
     Self-signature  -- to bind Orimary key to Sub-Key-1

Keyservers deliver that Keyblock.  It doesn't matter whether you ask for
the keyid or fingerprint of the primary key or of one of the Sub-Keys -
you will always get the above keyblock back.  GPG check all
self-signatures and revocation-signatures and acts upon them.

You may also revoke just one user Id using this revocation certifciate

     Primary_key
     User-Id-1
     Self-signature  -- to bind Primary Key to User-Id-1
     Revocation-Signature -- revoking User-Id-1

After merging this is

     Primary_key
     User-Id-1
     Self-signature  -- to bind Primary Key to User-Id-1
     Revocation-Signature -- revoking User-Id-1
     User-Id-2
     Self-signature  -- to bind Primary Key to User-Id-2
     Sub-Key-1
     Self-signature  -- to bind Orimary key to Sub-Key-1

and GPG would mark User-Id-1 as revoked but still allow the use of the
key.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner


-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From papillion at gmail.com  Tue Aug 23 09:19:30 2011
From: papillion at gmail.com (Anthony Papillion)
Date: Tue, 23 Aug 2011 02:19:30 -0500
Subject: Which release should we be using?
In-Reply-To: <87k4a4y5ez.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <4E521351.7010706@gmail.com>
	<87fwkt1wpu.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>	<4E530694.6030904@gmail.com>
	<87k4a4y5ez.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <4E535482.2010906@gmail.com>

On 08/23/2011 02:04 AM, Werner Koch wrote:
> On Tue, 23 Aug 2011 03:47, papillion at gmail.com said:
> 
> Spying on X windows is pretty easy and thus Pinentry tries to make it
> harder.

Werner,

Since I've never used Pinentry, I'm obviously missing something here.
While I'm aware that spying on X-Window is not too complicated, how does
manually entering a passphrase into Pinentry make snooping harder.
Admittedly, I've never looked at the code so I probably don't know the
whole story. Is entry into Pinentry vulnerable to traditional keylogging?

Anthony


From yyy at yyy.id.lv  Tue Aug 23 09:39:39 2011
From: yyy at yyy.id.lv (yyy)
Date: Tue, 23 Aug 2011 10:39:39 +0300
Subject: gpgsm certificate validity
In-Reply-To: <87fwksy5a2.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <4E521C3F.2000906@yyy.id.lv> <87bovh1wmy.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<4E524925.40204@yyy.id.lv> <4E525951.9050805@yyy.id.lv>
	<87sjotzfem.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4E527E33.1030804@yyy.id.lv>
	<87fwksy5a2.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <4E53593B.2040207@yyy.id.lv>

On 2011.08.23. 10:07, Werner Koch wrote:
> On Mon, 22 Aug 2011 18:05, yyy at yyy.id.lv said:
>
>> So, order of certificate hashes, relative of certificate order in
>> keyring, is critically important?
> No.  You need to make sure to not use lines of more than ~255
> characters.  Check that your editor didn't reflow a comment block or
> similar.
>
Re-tested today and it worked in more than one order. Probably issues in
yesterday were some sort of temporary glitch.

So, currently, importing a root certificate into gpgsm's keyring is a 2
stage process:
1. gpgsm --import _certificate_
2. edit trustlist.txt file, to add imported certificates hash (to make
it trusted (useable)).

For some certificates gpgsm asks during import, whether to trust them
(and if confirmed, add entry to trustlist.txt automatically). Is it
possible to make gpgsm to ask whether to trust it, for any certificate?


From wk at gnupg.org  Tue Aug 23 10:02:30 2011
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Tue, 23 Aug 2011 10:02:30 +0200
Subject: gpgme problem with claws mail
In-Reply-To: <4E51FFFB.8020008@dougbarton.us> (Doug Barton's message of "Mon, 
	22 Aug 2011 00:06:35 -0700")
References: <20110821235422.26d156af@172-17-198-245.globalsuite.net>
	<4E51FFFB.8020008@dougbarton.us>
Message-ID: <877h64y2qx.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Mon, 22 Aug 2011 09:06, dougb at dougbarton.us said:

> Any suggestions on how I can debug why gpgme is not recognizing that
> there is a signature in the message?

That is not enough information to help you.

To look at what gpgme is doing you may set an envvar before starting
claws like here:

  GPGME_DEBUG=5:/foo/bar/gpgme.log  claws-mail

A debug level of 5 yields a lot of output.  Have a look into the log
file.


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From wk at gnupg.org  Tue Aug 23 10:36:23 2011
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Tue, 23 Aug 2011 10:36:23 +0200
Subject: gpgsm certificate validity
In-Reply-To: <4E53593B.2040207@yyy.id.lv> (yyy@yyy.id.lv's message of "Tue, 23
	Aug 2011 10:39:39 +0300")
References: <4E521C3F.2000906@yyy.id.lv> <87bovh1wmy.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<4E524925.40204@yyy.id.lv> <4E525951.9050805@yyy.id.lv>
	<87sjotzfem.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4E527E33.1030804@yyy.id.lv>
	<87fwksy5a2.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4E53593B.2040207@yyy.id.lv>
Message-ID: <8739gsy16g.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Tue, 23 Aug 2011 09:39, yyy at yyy.id.lv said:

> For some certificates gpgsm asks during import, whether to trust them
> (and if confirmed, add entry to trustlist.txt automatically). Is it
> possible to make gpgsm to ask whether to trust it, for any certificate?

It does that for all proper certificates.  We can't handle all kinds of
bogus root certificates; there is a reason why PKIX demands certain
certificate attributes.

Actually we do handle another kind of those certs: For qualified
signatures, some countries issue root certificates which would not pass
the usual checks - thus if such a root certificate is listed in the
qualified.txt file, we do the relaxed checking but OTOH annoy you with
additional prompts.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From dougb at dougbarton.us  Tue Aug 23 11:09:52 2011
From: dougb at dougbarton.us (Doug Barton)
Date: Tue, 23 Aug 2011 02:09:52 -0700
Subject: gpgme problem with claws mail
In-Reply-To: <877h64y2qx.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <20110821235422.26d156af@172-17-198-245.globalsuite.net>
	<4E51FFFB.8020008@dougbarton.us>
	<877h64y2qx.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <20110823020952.77885ca8@172-17-198-245.globalsuite.net>

On Tue, 23 Aug 2011 10:02:30 +0200
Werner Koch <wk at gnupg.org> wrote:

> On Mon, 22 Aug 2011 09:06, dougb at dougbarton.us said:
> 
> > Any suggestions on how I can debug why gpgme is not recognizing that
> > there is a signature in the message?
> 
> That is not enough information to help you.
> 
> To look at what gpgme is doing you may set an envvar before starting
> claws like here:
> 
>   GPGME_DEBUG=5:/foo/bar/gpgme.log  claws-mail
> 
> A debug level of 5 yields a lot of output.  Have a look into the log
> file.

Awesome, thanks! The problem turned out to be the fingerprint option in
my gpg.conf file. Changing that to with-fingerprint fixed it. I have
logs for with and without if you're interested. That option was showing
up in red in vim so maybe I should have paid more attention to it. :)


Thanks again,

Doug

-- 

	Nothin' ever doesn't change, but nothin' changes much.
			-- OK Go

	Breadth of IT experience, and depth of knowledge in the DNS.
	Yours for the right price.  :)  http://SupersetSolutions.com/



From wk at gnupg.org  Tue Aug 23 11:44:32 2011
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Tue, 23 Aug 2011 11:44:32 +0200
Subject: gpgme problem with claws mail
In-Reply-To: <20110823020952.77885ca8@172-17-198-245.globalsuite.net> (Doug
	Barton's message of "Tue, 23 Aug 2011 02:09:52 -0700")
References: <20110821235422.26d156af@172-17-198-245.globalsuite.net>
	<4E51FFFB.8020008@dougbarton.us> <877h64y2qx.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<20110823020952.77885ca8@172-17-198-245.globalsuite.net>
Message-ID: <87y5ykwjgf.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Tue, 23 Aug 2011 11:09, dougb at dougbarton.us said:

> Awesome, thanks! The problem turned out to be the fingerprint option in

Right, fingerprint is a command and may thus not be combined with other
commands. 


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From dougb at dougbarton.us  Tue Aug 23 11:47:47 2011
From: dougb at dougbarton.us (Doug Barton)
Date: Tue, 23 Aug 2011 02:47:47 -0700
Subject: gpgme problem with claws mail
In-Reply-To: <87y5ykwjgf.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <20110821235422.26d156af@172-17-198-245.globalsuite.net>
	<4E51FFFB.8020008@dougbarton.us>
	<877h64y2qx.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<20110823020952.77885ca8@172-17-198-245.globalsuite.net>
	<87y5ykwjgf.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <4E537743.5090808@dougbarton.us>

On 08/23/2011 02:44, Werner Koch wrote:
> On Tue, 23 Aug 2011 11:09, dougb at dougbarton.us said:
> 
>> Awesome, thanks! The problem turned out to be the fingerprint option in
> 
> Right, fingerprint is a command and may thus not be combined with other
> commands. 

Well sure, it makes sense when you say it that way. :)  I've had it in
my gpg.conf for ages though, so I didn't suspect it immediately.


Doug

-- 

	Nothin' ever doesn't change, but nothin' changes much.
			-- OK Go

	Breadth of IT experience, and depth of knowledge in the DNS.
	Yours for the right price.  :)  http://SupersetSolutions.com/



From MarshallAbrams at comcast.net  Mon Aug 22 20:14:01 2011
From: MarshallAbrams at comcast.net (MarshallAbrams)
Date: Mon, 22 Aug 2011 11:14:01 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: Trying to convert from PGP on XP to a GUI on Win 7
In-Reply-To: <877h65zakr.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <32307468.post@talk.nabble.com>
	<877h65zakr.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <32313231.post@talk.nabble.com>


I have 64-bit Windows 7. But there may be a hope. Microsoft has an
emulator/virtual machine called Windows XP Mode THAT runs many older Windows
XP programs and that are "not natively compatible with Windows 7".  Do you
know if Gpg4win will install GpgEX running in Windows XP Mode?


Werner Koch wrote:
> 
> On Mon, 22 Aug 2011 00:10, MarshallAbrams at comcast.net said:
> 
>> encrypted file using gpg2.exe. There didn't seem to be a GUI.  Reading
>> thru
>> the manual, I see that there is supposed to be an extension/plug-in on
>> the
>> Windows Explorer menu for GpgEX, but I don't see it.  What should I do?
> 
> If you are using a 64 bit Windows7 you are out of luck.  We have not yet
> ported GpgEx.  If you are using older 64 bit Windows version you have
> the option to install a 32 bit version of the explorer.  Please do that
> and you will be able to use GpgEX.  You might need to re0install
> Gpg4win - I am not sure.
> 
> 
> Shalom-Salam,
> 
>    Werner
> 
> -- 
> Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
> 
> 

-- 
View this message in context: http://old.nabble.com/Trying-to-convert-from-PGP-on-XP-to-a-GUI-on-Win-7-tp32307468p32313231.html
Sent from the GnuPG - User mailing list archive at Nabble.com.



From email at sven-radde.de  Tue Aug 23 12:42:24 2011
From: email at sven-radde.de (Sven Radde)
Date: Tue, 23 Aug 2011 12:42:24 +0200
Subject: Which release should we be using?
In-Reply-To: <4E530694.6030904@gmail.com>
References: <4E521351.7010706@gmail.com> <87fwkt1wpu.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<4E530694.6030904@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <4E538410.8050104@sven-radde.de>

Hi!

Am 20:59, schrieb Anthony Papillion:
> My passphrases are
> stored in a Keepass database that resides in a TrueCrypt container. It's
> protected well. My actual key is protected by a 62 character passphrase
One could argue that this is equivalent to having a passphrase-less
keyring within the Truecrypt container.
To take Keepass's additional encryption into account, the key within the
container could have the Keepass-passphrase.

cu, Sven


From david at systemoverlord.com  Tue Aug 23 15:12:49 2011
From: david at systemoverlord.com (David Tomaschik)
Date: Tue, 23 Aug 2011 09:12:49 -0400
Subject: Smartcard PIN may be shorter than passphrase?
Message-ID: <CAOy4Vzffz7o4bK54b6jULDqYe=c1T7KoBVZywwD=WWxrDs3YNQ@mail.gmail.com>

Would it be reasonable to say that you may use a significantly smaller
PIN for your smartcard than would be required of a passphrase, since
the smartcard locks itself after 3 tries?

Since I don't use a reader with a pinpad, I must type my PIN in, and
thus have about 8 alpha-numeric characters for my regular PIN.  (The
admin PIN is somewhat longer.)  Would this be considered a reasonable
length?

(Someone who can read the memory on a smart card by opening it up is
NOT in my threat model -- if they can do that, they have much easier
ways to coerce me into giving up my PIN.)

-- 
David Tomaschik, RHCE, LPIC-1
System Administrator/Open Source Advocate
OpenPGP: 0x5DEA789B
http://systemoverlord.com
david at systemoverlord.com


From wk at gnupg.org  Tue Aug 23 15:56:47 2011
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Tue, 23 Aug 2011 15:56:47 +0200
Subject: Smartcard PIN may be shorter than passphrase?
In-Reply-To: <CAOy4Vzffz7o4bK54b6jULDqYe=c1T7KoBVZywwD=WWxrDs3YNQ@mail.gmail.com>
	(David Tomaschik's message of "Tue, 23 Aug 2011 09:12:49 -0400")
References: <CAOy4Vzffz7o4bK54b6jULDqYe=c1T7KoBVZywwD=WWxrDs3YNQ@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <87ty98w7s0.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Tue, 23 Aug 2011 15:12, david at systemoverlord.com said:
> Would it be reasonable to say that you may use a significantly smaller
> PIN for your smartcard than would be required of a passphrase, since
> the smartcard locks itself after 3 tries?

Yes.  It is up to 6 tries because an attacker may also try to open the
card using the admin PIN.

> Since I don't use a reader with a pinpad, I must type my PIN in, and
> thus have about 8 alpha-numeric characters for my regular PIN.  (The

Better use only digits - if you need to use a keypad you can't do that
instantly.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner


-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From MichaelQuigley at TheWay.Org  Tue Aug 23 15:51:59 2011
From: MichaelQuigley at TheWay.Org (MichaelQuigley at TheWay.Org)
Date: Tue, 23 Aug 2011 09:51:59 -0400
Subject: Conflicting commands error?
Message-ID: <OF0A17418E.AB2B1CB9-ON852578F5.00457690-852578F5.004C2B92@TheWay.ORG>

Hello,

I use this syntax to sign files in a script--it works without problems, 
but when trying to manually sign a file, I'm receiving the following 
result:

> gpg --batch --armor -keyring /Publib/.../ARP_pubring.gpg 
--secret-keyring /Prodlib/.../ARP_secring.gpg --local-user 55EC3D41\! 
--output S0004458.asc --clear-sign S0004458
  gpg: conflicting commands
  $

I'm sure I'm overlooking something simple, but I'm just not seeing it 
today.

Thanks,
Michael Quigley
Computer Services
The Way International
www.TheWay.org
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From wk at gnupg.org  Tue Aug 23 17:07:27 2011
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Tue, 23 Aug 2011 17:07:27 +0200
Subject: Conflicting commands error?
In-Reply-To: <OF0A17418E.AB2B1CB9-ON852578F5.00457690-852578F5.004C2B92@TheWay.ORG>
	(MichaelQuigley@theway.org's message of "Tue, 23 Aug 2011 09:51:59
	-0400")
References: <OF0A17418E.AB2B1CB9-ON852578F5.00457690-852578F5.004C2B92@TheWay.ORG>
Message-ID: <87mxf0w4i8.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Tue, 23 Aug 2011 15:51, MichaelQuigley at TheWay.Org said:


>> gpg --batch --armor -keyring /Publib/.../ARP_pubring.gpg 
                       ^^^^^^^^

This is the same as -k -e -y -r -i -n -g - thus you are asking for a key
lising and encryption ...  - Use two dashes.

Back to the fingerprint problem: For historic reasons --fingerprint acts
as a command if no other command has been given but similar to
--with-fingerprint if a command has been given.  Thus it works if you
put it into gpg.conf and use an explicit command.  However if you want
to use gpg's default operation (decrypt/verify) it will instead to a key
listing with fingerprints.


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From MichaelQuigley at TheWay.Org  Tue Aug 23 17:15:27 2011
From: MichaelQuigley at TheWay.Org (MichaelQuigley at TheWay.Org)
Date: Tue, 23 Aug 2011 11:15:27 -0400
Subject: Conflicting commands error?
Message-ID: <OFF6884025.722E192B-ON852578F5.00535900-852578F5.0053CFE8@TheWay.ORG>

Michael Quigley/TheWay wrote on 08/23/2011 09:51:59 AM:

> Hello,
> 
> I use this syntax to sign files in a script--it works without 
> problems, but when trying to manually sign a file, I'm receiving the
> following result:
> 
> > gpg --batch --armor -keyring /Publib/.../ARP_pubring.gpg --secret-
> keyring /Prodlib/.../ARP_secring.gpg --local-user 55EC3D41\! --
> output S0004458.asc --clear-sign S0004458
>   gpg: conflicting commands
>   $
> 
> I'm sure I'm overlooking something simple, but I'm just not seeing it 
today.
> 
> Thanks,
> Michael Quigley
> Computer Services
> The Way International
> www.TheWay.org

Okay -- I found the dash in "clear-sign"--which should read "clearsign".

Of course I find it shortly after sending the first request--sorry.
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From remco at webconquest.com  Tue Aug 23 17:21:18 2011
From: remco at webconquest.com (Remco Rijnders)
Date: Tue, 23 Aug 2011 17:21:18 +0200
Subject: Conflicting commands error?
In-Reply-To: <OFF6884025.722E192B-ON852578F5.00535900-852578F5.0053CFE8@TheWay.ORG>
References: <OFF6884025.722E192B-ON852578F5.00535900-852578F5.0053CFE8@TheWay.ORG>
Message-ID: <Eq.M|^@r78.nl>

On Tue, Aug 23, 2011 at 11:15:27AM -0400, MichaelQuigley at TheWay.Org wrote:
>>   gpg: conflicting commands
>>   $
>>
>> I'm sure I'm overlooking something simple, but I'm just not seeing it
>today.
>>
>Okay -- I found the dash in "clear-sign"--which should read "clearsign".
>
>Of course I find it shortly after sending the first request--sorry.

But if you wouldn't have sent it, you never would have found it... that's 
to be expected :-)
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From fladerer at fnb.tu-darmstadt.de  Tue Aug 23 16:56:35 2011
From: fladerer at fnb.tu-darmstadt.de (Michael Fladerer)
Date: Tue, 23 Aug 2011 16:56:35 +0200
Subject: Conflicting commands error?
In-Reply-To: <OF0A17418E.AB2B1CB9-ON852578F5.00457690-852578F5.004C2B92@TheWay.ORG>
References: <OF0A17418E.AB2B1CB9-ON852578F5.00457690-852578F5.004C2B92@TheWay.ORG>
Message-ID: <20110823145634.GB2938@fnb.tu-darmstadt.de>

On Tue Aug 23, 2011 at 09:51:59 -0400, MichaelQuigley at TheWay.Org wrote:
> Hello,
> 
> I use this syntax to sign files in a script--it works without problems, 
> but when trying to manually sign a file, I'm receiving the following 
> result:
> 
> > gpg --batch --armor -keyring /Publib/.../ARP_pubring.gpg 
> --secret-keyring /Prodlib/.../ARP_secring.gpg --local-user 55EC3D41\! 
> --output S0004458.asc --clear-sign S0004458
>   gpg: conflicting commands
>   $
> 
> I'm sure I'm overlooking something simple, but I'm just not seeing it 
> today.
> 
Try using --keyring instead of -keyring.

Regards,
 Michael



From david at systemoverlord.com  Tue Aug 23 18:43:20 2011
From: david at systemoverlord.com (David Tomaschik)
Date: Tue, 23 Aug 2011 12:43:20 -0400
Subject: Smartcard PIN may be shorter than passphrase?
In-Reply-To: <87ty98w7s0.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <CAOy4Vzffz7o4bK54b6jULDqYe=c1T7KoBVZywwD=WWxrDs3YNQ@mail.gmail.com>
	<87ty98w7s0.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <CAOy4VzdBzbLWG99dvQ64mraqwvgR00oXPCHf6yUXCPA4MO2oDw@mail.gmail.com>

On Tue, Aug 23, 2011 at 9:56 AM, Werner Koch <wk at gnupg.org> wrote:
> On Tue, 23 Aug 2011 15:12, david at systemoverlord.com said:
>> Would it be reasonable to say that you may use a significantly smaller
>> PIN for your smartcard than would be required of a passphrase, since
>> the smartcard locks itself after 3 tries?
>
> Yes. ?It is up to 6 tries because an attacker may also try to open the
> card using the admin PIN.

So even a 4-digit PIN would ensure a less than 1% chance of guessing
the PIN.  (Assuming that the user does not select obvious pins like
birthdates, anniversaries, etc.)  At 8 digits, the probability becomes
something like 6*10^-8, if I do the basic math correctly.  Seems
pretty secure.

>> Since I don't use a reader with a pinpad, I must type my PIN in, and
>> thus have about 8 alpha-numeric characters for my regular PIN. ?(The
>
> Better use only digits - if you need to use a keypad you can't do that
> instantly.
>
>
> Shalom-Salam,
>
> ? Werner

Thanks Werner!

David


-- 
David Tomaschik, RHCE, LPIC-1
System Administrator/Open Source Advocate
OpenPGP: 0x5DEA789B
http://systemoverlord.com
david at systemoverlord.com


From kgo at grant-olson.net  Tue Aug 23 18:56:45 2011
From: kgo at grant-olson.net (Grant Olson)
Date: Tue, 23 Aug 2011 12:56:45 -0400
Subject: Smartcard PIN may be shorter than passphrase?
In-Reply-To: <CAOy4VzdBzbLWG99dvQ64mraqwvgR00oXPCHf6yUXCPA4MO2oDw@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAOy4Vzffz7o4bK54b6jULDqYe=c1T7KoBVZywwD=WWxrDs3YNQ@mail.gmail.com>
	<87ty98w7s0.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<CAOy4VzdBzbLWG99dvQ64mraqwvgR00oXPCHf6yUXCPA4MO2oDw@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <4E53DBCD.1080601@grant-olson.net>

On 8/23/11 12:43 PM, David Tomaschik wrote:
> 
> So even a 4-digit PIN would ensure a less than 1% chance of guessing
> the PIN.  (Assuming that the user does not select obvious pins like
> birthdates, anniversaries, etc.)  At 8 digits, the probability becomes
> something like 6*10^-8, if I do the basic math correctly.  Seems
> pretty secure.
> 

The minimum normal PIN is 6 characters, and the minimum admin PIN is 8.


-- 
Grant

"I am gravely disappointed. Again you have made me unleash my dogs of war."

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From kloecker at kde.org  Tue Aug 23 22:22:56 2011
From: kloecker at kde.org (Ingo =?iso-8859-1?q?Kl=F6cker?=)
Date: Tue, 23 Aug 2011 22:22:56 +0200
Subject: OpenPGP parts and plain text in the same email
In-Reply-To: <1F59B5D8-8B53-46C9-BEA1-A63FC9DDFCCC@gpgtools.org>
References: <201108181410.23371.mailinglisten@hauke-laging.de>
	<201108182039.19088@thufir.ingo-kloecker.de>
	<1F59B5D8-8B53-46C9-BEA1-A63FC9DDFCCC@gpgtools.org>
Message-ID: <201108232222.57475@thufir.ingo-kloecker.de>

On Thursday 18 August 2011, Alex (via GPGTools) wrote:
> Hi there,
> 
> On 18.08.2011, at 20:39, Ingo Kl?cker wrote:
> > why should it support something  strange like a
> > multipart/alternative message with a text/plain part and  a
> > PGP/MIME part.
> 
> isn't this what the message "This is an OpenPGP/MIME signed message
> (RFC 2440 and 3156)" is about? If this text is shown by an
> incompatible client it could be replaced by the original text.

Maybe. Maybe not. It depends on where this message occurs. If it occurs 
in the body of the multipart/* message part before the first message 
part boundary then it is probably only shown by mail clients which do 
not support MIME at all.


Regards,
Ingo
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From faramir.cl at gmail.com  Wed Aug 24 00:52:34 2011
From: faramir.cl at gmail.com (Faramir)
Date: Tue, 23 Aug 2011 19:52:34 -0300
Subject: Extract numbers from a key // wrong pgpdump link :-(
In-Reply-To: <20110803134025.42EDAE6739@smtp.hushmail.com>
References: <20110803134025.42EDAE6739@smtp.hushmail.com>
Message-ID: <4E542F32.5080806@gmail.com>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256

El 03-08-2011 9:40, vedaal at nym.hush.com escribi?:
> Sorry, wrong link extension,
> 
> here is the correct one: http://www.pgpdump.net/

  By the way, what would be required to run pgpdump locally? I guess
there is no compiled version for windows...

  Best Regards
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (MingW32)
Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/

iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJOVC8yAAoJEMV4f6PvczxALS8IAI9zmVAzU4/rg0903m3iCIlx
0YO+xYaeoZ62Z7PdMg5gJKuttWm/WXWDjdjM52R5yOHMg4YLi8dcU+dckU2m0rE3
1J1yLE06PN10fM8EglyyL1CpzHeE5nrKRPxw8STOo5aULy6qYJdvDU0/iW62t4We
rXZiUMieiwrxRsvL9LDxA3CgUMmfK83iG6ve+ivw4LVYWaJa0TXxn0o/gYpZPG4F
KBUd+uGJjbketBHg+TzihHcmmqhvUFEQjJ6RLDNQtdAPNMP+rihaTIsIqbCEvQKT
QHj5DXVMsdijcswwQG1yPjJUAICmqlZl7ZWosBtJFxVCxFYGirlEA4LfQrQOQJo=
=2r4m
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


From david at systemoverlord.com  Wed Aug 24 03:14:14 2011
From: david at systemoverlord.com (David Tomaschik)
Date: Tue, 23 Aug 2011 21:14:14 -0400
Subject: Extract numbers from a key // wrong pgpdump link :-(
In-Reply-To: <4E542F32.5080806@gmail.com>
References: <20110803134025.42EDAE6739@smtp.hushmail.com>
	<4E542F32.5080806@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <4E545066.7040302@systemoverlord.com>

On 08/23/2011 06:52 PM, Faramir wrote:
> El 03-08-2011 9:40, vedaal at nym.hush.com escribi?:
> > Sorry, wrong link extension,
>
> > here is the correct one: http://www.pgpdump.net/
>
>   By the way, what would be required to run pgpdump locally? I guess
> there is no compiled version for windows...
>
>   Best Regards
I don't see a windows binary, but it looks to be written in pure C with
no external dependencies, so I would assume you could easily build it
under Cygwin.

David



From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Wed Aug 24 06:52:33 2011
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Wed, 24 Aug 2011 00:52:33 -0400
Subject: Extract numbers from a key // wrong pgpdump link :-(
In-Reply-To: <4E545066.7040302@systemoverlord.com>
References: <20110803134025.42EDAE6739@smtp.hushmail.com>
	<4E542F32.5080806@gmail.com> <4E545066.7040302@systemoverlord.com>
Message-ID: <4E548391.9060201@sixdemonbag.org>

On 8/23/11 9:14 PM, David Tomaschik wrote:
> I don't see a windows binary, but it looks to be written in pure C with
> no external dependencies, so I would assume you could easily build it
> under Cygwin.

Cygwin isn't necessary: it compiles just fine under plain MinGW.  I've
got a native Win32 version I've cross-compiled from an x64 Fedora 15 box.


From Mike_Acker at charter.net  Wed Aug 24 17:47:41 2011
From: Mike_Acker at charter.net (Mike Acker)
Date: Wed, 24 Aug 2011 11:47:41 -0400
Subject: a Question about Key Servers
In-Reply-To: <mailman.27891.1314110746.2574.gnupg-users@gnupg.org>
References: <mailman.27891.1314110746.2574.gnupg-users@gnupg.org>
Message-ID: <4E551D1D.4020309@charter.net>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256
 
given that I have loaded my public key to a key-server ( e.g.
keys.gnupg.net )
 
when i upload information to be merged into my keyblock (e.g. a new user
ID, revocate certificate, or new expiration date )
 
what will cause other GPG users to refresh their copy of my key in their
keyring?
 
should I send them a notice?
 
- --   
/MIKE
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v2.0.17 (MingW32)
Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/
 
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From Mike_Acker at charter.net  Wed Aug 24 17:50:20 2011
From: Mike_Acker at charter.net (Mike Acker)
Date: Wed, 24 Aug 2011 11:50:20 -0400
Subject: a Question about Key Servers
In-Reply-To: <4E551D1D.4020309@charter.net>
References: <mailman.27891.1314110746.2574.gnupg-users@gnupg.org>
	<4E551D1D.4020309@charter.net>
Message-ID: <4E551DBC.8010603@charter.net>

given that I have loaded my public key to a key-server ( e.g.
keys.gnupg.net )
 
when i upload information to be merged into my keyblock (e.g. a new user
ID, revocate certificate, or new expiration date )
 
what will cause other GPG users to refresh their copy of my key in their
keyring?
 
should I send them a notice?

-- 
/MIKE

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From kgo at grant-olson.net  Wed Aug 24 19:46:08 2011
From: kgo at grant-olson.net (Grant Olson)
Date: Wed, 24 Aug 2011 13:46:08 -0400
Subject: a Question about Key Servers
In-Reply-To: <4E551D1D.4020309@charter.net>
References: <mailman.27891.1314110746.2574.gnupg-users@gnupg.org>
	<4E551D1D.4020309@charter.net>
Message-ID: <4E5538E0.60400@grant-olson.net>

On 8/24/11 11:47 AM, Mike Acker wrote:
> 
> given that I have loaded my public key to a key-server ( e.g.
> keys.gnupg.net )
>  
> when i upload information to be merged into my keyblock (e.g. a new user
> ID, revocate certificate, or new expiration date )
>  
> what will cause other GPG users to refresh their copy of my key in their
> keyring?

No.  Users need to manually refresh their keys periodically to get changes.

But people can be lazy about this.  One way to force them to refresh is
to have an expiration date that you bump up (for example) every year.
Then after your key expires, they'll need to refresh and get any other
changes as well.

>  
> should I send them a notice?
>  

It depends.

If you revoked the key because it's compromised, then you probably want
to notify important contacts.

If you add a new UID, for example your new work email, and an existing
associate only contacts you on your personal email, things will keep on
working even if they don't have the new UID.

If the key expires on someone's local keyring, they'll need to re-fetch
it to get updates.  So you could probably do nothing  Some people will
refresh automatically when they see the key is expired.  Others will
tell you your key is expired, in which case you can tell them they need
to refresh.


-- 
Grant

"I am gravely disappointed. Again you have made me unleash my dogs of war."

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From expires2011 at ymail.com  Wed Aug 24 20:39:52 2011
From: expires2011 at ymail.com (MFPA)
Date: Wed, 24 Aug 2011 19:39:52 +0100
Subject: Extract numbers from a key // wrong pgpdump link :-(
In-Reply-To: <4E545066.7040302@systemoverlord.com>
References: <20110803134025.42EDAE6739@smtp.hushmail.com>
	<4E542F32.5080806@gmail.com> <4E545066.7040302@systemoverlord.com>
Message-ID: <1305724493.20110824193952@my_localhost>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

Hi


On Wednesday 24 August 2011 at 2:14:14 AM, in
<mid:4E545066.7040302 at systemoverlord.com>, David Tomaschik wrote:


> On 08/23/2011 06:52 PM, Faramir wrote:
>> El 03-08-2011 9:40, vedaal at nym.hush.com escribi?:
>> > Sorry, wrong link extension,

>> > here is the correct one: http://www.pgpdump.net/

>>   By the way, what would be required to run pgpdump
>> locally? I guess there is no compiled version for
>> windows...

>>   Best Regards
> I don't see a windows binary,


Try http://www.alles.or.jp/~spiegel/tools/pgpdump/

it has no documentation there ;-(


to use it, unzip it into whatever directory you want,
and doublick on the (only one) file: pgpdump.exe

a dos window will open,

paste the pgp key, private or public, into the dos window
(be sure to include the header and footer lines)
and pgpdump will automatically give its analysis in the same dos
window




Some further instructions (for the Ubuntu version) at
http://manpages.ubuntu.com/manpages/karmic/man1/pgpdump.1.html



- --
Best regards

MFPA                    mailto:expires2011 at ymail.com

The One with The Answer is seldom asked The Question
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From me at davidmanouchehri.com  Thu Aug 25 03:40:26 2011
From: me at davidmanouchehri.com (David Manouchehri)
Date: Wed, 24 Aug 2011 21:40:26 -0400
Subject: a Question about Key Servers
In-Reply-To: <4E5538E0.60400@grant-olson.net>
References: <mailman.27891.1314110746.2574.gnupg-users@gnupg.org>
	<4E551D1D.4020309@charter.net> <4E5538E0.60400@grant-olson.net>
Message-ID: <4E55A80A.7010401@davidmanouchehri.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
 
Just to add to what Grant said, if you decide to set a expiration date,
make sure it isn't too often.  Anywhere from six months to two years is
a good range if you ask me, but it's totally up to you; I've set my
subkeys to six months.
 
I personally try to update my keyring every few weeks.       
 
David Manouchehri
 
 
On 8/24/2011 1:46 PM, Grant Olson wrote:
> On 8/24/11 11:47 AM, Mike Acker wrote:
>> given that I have loaded my public key to a key-server ( e.g.
>> keys.gnupg.net )
>>
>> when i upload information to be merged into my keyblock (e.g. a new user
>> ID, revocate certificate, or new expiration date )
>>
>> what will cause other GPG users to refresh their copy of my key in their
>> keyring?
> No. Users need to manually refresh their keys periodically to get changes.
>
> But people can be lazy about this. One way to force them to refresh is
> to have an expiration date that you bump up (for example) every year.
> Then after your key expires, they'll need to refresh and get any other
> changes as well.
>
>>
>> should I send them a notice?
>>
> It depends.
>
> If you revoked the key because it's compromised, then you probably want
> to notify important contacts.
>
> If you add a new UID, for example your new work email, and an existing
> associate only contacts you on your personal email, things will keep on
> working even if they don't have the new UID.
>
> If the key expires on someone's local keyring, they'll need to re-fetch
> it to get updates. So you could probably do nothing Some people will
> refresh automatically when they see the key is expired. Others will
> tell you your key is expired, in which case you can tell them they need
> to refresh.
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Gnupg-users mailing list
> Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
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From dkg at fifthhorseman.net  Thu Aug 25 14:27:48 2011
From: dkg at fifthhorseman.net (Daniel Kahn Gillmor)
Date: Thu, 25 Aug 2011 08:27:48 -0400
Subject: a Question about Key Servers
In-Reply-To: <4E55A80A.7010401@davidmanouchehri.com>
References: <mailman.27891.1314110746.2574.gnupg-users@gnupg.org>
	<4E551D1D.4020309@charter.net> <4E5538E0.60400@grant-olson.net>
	<4E55A80A.7010401@davidmanouchehri.com>
Message-ID: <4E563FC4.1090504@fifthhorseman.net>

On 08/24/2011 09:40 PM, David Manouchehri wrote:
> I personally try to update my keyring every few weeks.       

This sort of situation is one which a better toolset could automate.

If you have suggestions about how/when gpg could automatically refresh
keys, you might consider adding them to this bug report:

 https://bugs.g10code.com/gnupg/issue1235

	--dkg

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From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Thu Aug 25 15:00:51 2011
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Thu, 25 Aug 2011 09:00:51 -0400
Subject: a Question about Key Servers
In-Reply-To: <4E563FC4.1090504@fifthhorseman.net>
References: <mailman.27891.1314110746.2574.gnupg-users@gnupg.org>
	<4E551D1D.4020309@charter.net> <4E5538E0.60400@grant-olson.net>
	<4E55A80A.7010401@davidmanouchehri.com>
	<4E563FC4.1090504@fifthhorseman.net>
Message-ID: <4E564783.9030003@sixdemonbag.org>

On 8/25/11 8:27 AM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> This sort of situation is one which a better toolset could automate.

It would seem the proper place for this is to leverage existing system
automation tools, not inventing something new.

proverbs:~ rjh$ crontab -l
30  2  *  *  *  gpg --refresh-keys >/dev/null 2&>1

You can do equivalent things on Windows with Task Scheduler.

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From dkg at fifthhorseman.net  Thu Aug 25 15:36:50 2011
From: dkg at fifthhorseman.net (Daniel Kahn Gillmor)
Date: Thu, 25 Aug 2011 09:36:50 -0400
Subject: a Question about Key Servers
In-Reply-To: <4E564783.9030003@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <mailman.27891.1314110746.2574.gnupg-users@gnupg.org>
	<4E551D1D.4020309@charter.net> <4E5538E0.60400@grant-olson.net>
	<4E55A80A.7010401@davidmanouchehri.com>
	<4E563FC4.1090504@fifthhorseman.net>
	<4E564783.9030003@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <4E564FF2.3080800@fifthhorseman.net>

On 08/25/2011 09:00 AM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> On 8/25/11 8:27 AM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
>> This sort of situation is one which a better toolset could automate.
> 
> It would seem the proper place for this is to leverage existing system
> automation tools, not inventing something new.
> 
> proverbs:~ rjh$ crontab -l
> 30  2  *  *  *  gpg --refresh-keys >/dev/null 2&>1
> 
> You can do equivalent things on Windows with Task Scheduler.

Yes, i do this myself, but with a large keyring, a full --refresh-keys
takes ages and thrashes my machine.  Also, some people may care that
requesting a specific set of keys from a single keyserver providing a
way for that keyserver to track them.

Having gpg (or some other tool) keep track of when it last updated a
given key (and when the key is about to expire) and choose smart times
to do updates against a configured pool of keyservers would be a nice thing.

Folks interested in this topic may also be interested in parcimonie,
which is under active recent development:

 https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/code/parcimonie/

	--dkg

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From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Thu Aug 25 16:04:11 2011
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Thu, 25 Aug 2011 10:04:11 -0400
Subject: a Question about Key Servers
In-Reply-To: <4E564FF2.3080800@fifthhorseman.net>
References: <mailman.27891.1314110746.2574.gnupg-users@gnupg.org>
	<4E551D1D.4020309@charter.net> <4E5538E0.60400@grant-olson.net>
	<4E55A80A.7010401@davidmanouchehri.com>
	<4E563FC4.1090504@fifthhorseman.net>
	<4E564783.9030003@sixdemonbag.org>
	<4E564FF2.3080800@fifthhorseman.net>
Message-ID: <4E56565B.7050406@sixdemonbag.org>

On 8/25/11 9:36 AM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> Yes, i do this myself, but with a large keyring, a full --refresh-keys
> takes ages and thrashes my machine.

Define 'large keyring', please: I mean no offense, but that's a pretty
vague word.

proverbs:~ rjh$ gpg --list-keys|grep "^pub"|wc -l
     288
proverbs:~ rjh$ time gpg --refresh-keys

[output snipped]

real	2m0.274s
user	0m40.273s
sys	0m0.972s

Now, maybe you have thousands of keys on your keyring and it takes a
ridiculous amount of time, but I suspect you're a bit of an outlier.  At
almost 300 keys I suspect I'm still well beyond the average user's
use-case.  (Note these are suspicions: I haven't polled users.)

The problem for any system of automated certificate refreshment is
making it general enough to accommodate power users with thousands of
certificates, and yet simple enough for the 95% of users who have
X-or-fewer certificates (where I suspect X < 50).  That's a very
difficult problem and I'm happy for GnuPG to kick this one to the users
and say "refreshing the keyrings is your problem."

Alternately, it might be a good thing to add certificate refreshment
into GPGME.  That way GnuPG, instead of forcing a One True Way on the
end users, could make it possible for other people to write their own
certificate refreshment utilities, with whatever policies and actions
they want.

Absent hooks in GPGME, I don't think there's much opportunity for third
parties to write certificate refreshers.  Doing so would require support
from GnuPG (adding a "last refreshed field" to each certificate on the
keyring) and some way to parse the GnuPG keyring independently of
GnuPG/GPGME, which is ... problematic.

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From dkg at fifthhorseman.net  Thu Aug 25 16:28:40 2011
From: dkg at fifthhorseman.net (Daniel Kahn Gillmor)
Date: Thu, 25 Aug 2011 10:28:40 -0400
Subject: a Question about Key Servers
In-Reply-To: <4E56565B.7050406@sixdemonbag.org>
References: <mailman.27891.1314110746.2574.gnupg-users@gnupg.org>
	<4E551D1D.4020309@charter.net> <4E5538E0.60400@grant-olson.net>
	<4E55A80A.7010401@davidmanouchehri.com>
	<4E563FC4.1090504@fifthhorseman.net>
	<4E564783.9030003@sixdemonbag.org>
	<4E564FF2.3080800@fifthhorseman.net>
	<4E56565B.7050406@sixdemonbag.org>
Message-ID: <4E565C18.3080407@fifthhorseman.net>

On 08/25/2011 10:04 AM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:

> Now, maybe you have thousands of keys on your keyring and it takes a
> ridiculous amount of time, but I suspect you're a bit of an outlier.

Yes, it's true, and yes, i'm an outlier.  At the moment.

> The problem for any system of automated certificate refreshment is
> making it general enough to accommodate power users with thousands of
> certificates, and yet simple enough for the 95% of users who have
> X-or-fewer certificates (where I suspect X < 50).  That's a very
> difficult problem and I'm happy for GnuPG to kick this one to the users
> and say "refreshing the keyrings is your problem."

Except that, quite clearly, most users have no idea it is their problem
and the problem remains unsolved.

Why not try to solve the problem, or at least enable users to choose one
of a pre-defined set of reasonable refresh heuristics for gpg to
implement on their behalf?

Please read https://bugs.g10code.com/gnupg/issue1235 for decent
arguments about why this is the right thing to do.

> Absent hooks in GPGME, I don't think there's much opportunity for third
> parties to write certificate refreshers.  Doing so would require support
> from GnuPG (adding a "last refreshed field" to each certificate on the
> keyring) and some way to parse the GnuPG keyring independently of
> GnuPG/GPGME, which is ... problematic.

I agree that handling it within gpg is the best option -- gpg is in the
best position to do key management.  However, tools like parcimonie show
that it's possible for a third-party to handle certificate refresh.
It's just a lot of overhead and tracking outside of gpg itself.

	--dkg

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From rjh at sixdemonbag.org  Thu Aug 25 17:22:41 2011
From: rjh at sixdemonbag.org (Robert J. Hansen)
Date: Thu, 25 Aug 2011 11:22:41 -0400
Subject: a Question about Key Servers
In-Reply-To: <4E565C18.3080407@fifthhorseman.net>
References: <mailman.27891.1314110746.2574.gnupg-users@gnupg.org>
	<4E551D1D.4020309@charter.net> <4E5538E0.60400@grant-olson.net>
	<4E55A80A.7010401@davidmanouchehri.com>
	<4E563FC4.1090504@fifthhorseman.net>
	<4E564783.9030003@sixdemonbag.org>
	<4E564FF2.3080800@fifthhorseman.net>
	<4E56565B.7050406@sixdemonbag.org>
	<4E565C18.3080407@fifthhorseman.net>
Message-ID: <4E5668C1.8070101@sixdemonbag.org>

On 8/25/2011 10:28 AM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> Except that, quite clearly, most users have no idea it is their problem
> and the problem remains unsolved.

Now that you mention it, I'd like to reject the premise outright: that
this is a problem.  How do we know it's a problem?  I don't doubt that
for some people it's a serious problem, but does the average user have a
problem with certificates that need refreshing?

I'm willing to stipulate that it is good that certificates be
periodically refreshed, but I'm unconvinced we need much in the way of
customization here.  It would be fairly simple for GnuPG to keep a
"last-refreshed" file in the ~/.gnupg dir, and upon invocation check to
see if more than 30 days had passed since refreshing.  Pop up a small
dialog box (ala pinentry) and say, hey, it's been six months since we've
refreshed your certificates, would you like to do this now? (or click
here to disable reminders).

Even if it's computationally intensive and takes an hour to run, a
process that runs in the background once every six months isn't all that
onerous.  In fact, by moving to just checking a file's touchdate, it
makes it possible for third parties to write solutions without relying
on GnuPG at all.

So, yeah -- I don't really see the problem, nor why this needs to be
solved within GnuPG.  It appears to me (at my current levels of
ignorance and prejudice) that it's possible to hit the 95% usecase
without very much effort at all.  Given the choice of hitting the 99.9%
usecase, or hitting the 95% usecase with only a tenth the effort, I
think the latter is the way to go.

Heck, if people want I'd be happy to take a stab at writing a Windows
service to do this.

> Please read https://bugs.g10code.com/gnupg/issue1235 for decent
> arguments about why this is the right thing to do.

I have.  I'm unconvinced.


From aaron.toponce at gmail.com  Thu Aug 25 18:50:21 2011
From: aaron.toponce at gmail.com (Aaron Toponce)
Date: Thu, 25 Aug 2011 10:50:21 -0600
Subject: Signing multiple keys
Message-ID: <4E567D4D.8070009@gmail.com>

According to the gnupg(1) manpage, I see "--multifile" for encryption,
decryption and verification. Is it possible to use this to sign multiple
keys simultaneously? I don't have any keys to sign, or I would give this
a try (I guess I could manually create a bunch of keys, and give it a
go, but I'm not up for that amount of work).

Is there a better way to sign multiple keys? Suppose I received a public
keyring of all attendees at a keysigning party. I know that signing the
keyring would not sign all keys, so I guess I'm just looking for an
efficient way to get this done.

Thanks,
-- 
. o .   o . o   . . o   o . .   . o .
. . o   . o o   o . o   . o o   . . o
o o o   . o .   . o o   o o .   o o o

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From lance at thehaverkamps.net  Thu Aug 25 17:22:11 2011
From: lance at thehaverkamps.net (Lance W. Haverkamp)
Date: Thu, 25 Aug 2011 09:22:11 -0600
Subject: gpg: invalid item `BZIP2' in preference string
Message-ID: <4E5668A3.7090104@TheHaverkamps.net>

I compiled both the stock 1.4.11 & the Ubuntu 1.4.10.  Both ways I get
the following error:


$ gpg --gen-key
gpg (GnuPG) 1.4.10; Copyright (C) 2008 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.

gpg: invalid item `BZIP2' in preference string
gpg: invalid default preferences
gpg: invalid item `BZIP2' in preference string
gpg: invalid personal compress preferences

------------------------


I have never seen this with any distro binary, just this source (as I'm
changing from 4096 to 8192 bit)
I know the message is coming from gpg.conf, but that's a very normal
thing to have in gpg.conf.
Any idea what's going on here?




-- 



Thanks!
Lance W. Haverkamp
719-357-5745 (office)
Lance at TheHaverkamps.net

Contact & encryption info:
http://thehaverkamps.net/?Lance:Contact_Me
http://facebook.com/LanceHaverkamp

<>< <>< <><


From dkg at fifthhorseman.net  Thu Aug 25 19:26:33 2011
From: dkg at fifthhorseman.net (Daniel Kahn Gillmor)
Date: Thu, 25 Aug 2011 13:26:33 -0400
Subject: Signing multiple keys
In-Reply-To: <4E567D4D.8070009@gmail.com>
References: <4E567D4D.8070009@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <4E5685C9.2000807@fifthhorseman.net>

On 08/25/2011 12:50 PM, Aaron Toponce wrote:
> According to the gnupg(1) manpage, I see "--multifile" for encryption,
> decryption and verification. Is it possible to use this to sign multiple
> keys simultaneously? I don't have any keys to sign, or I would give this
> a try (I guess I could manually create a bunch of keys, and give it a
> go, but I'm not up for that amount of work).
> 
> Is there a better way to sign multiple keys? Suppose I received a public
> keyring of all attendees at a keysigning party. I know that signing the
> keyring would not sign all keys, so I guess I'm just looking for an
> efficient way to get this done.

if you have a list of fingerprints and the signing-party package
installed, you can do:

 caff $FPR1 $FPR2 ...

hth,
	--dkg

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From aaron.toponce at gmail.com  Thu Aug 25 19:37:35 2011
From: aaron.toponce at gmail.com (Aaron Toponce)
Date: Thu, 25 Aug 2011 11:37:35 -0600
Subject: Signing multiple keys
In-Reply-To: <4E5685C9.2000807@fifthhorseman.net>
References: <4E567D4D.8070009@gmail.com> <4E5685C9.2000807@fifthhorseman.net>
Message-ID: <4E56885F.6010405@gmail.com>

On 08/25/2011 11:26 AM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> if you have a list of fingerprints and the signing-party package
> installed, you can do:
> 
>  caff $FPR1 $FPR2 ...

Well, if I need to provide each key ID/fingerprint, then I might as well
write a simple loop:

	for KEYID in <ID1> <ID2> <ID3> ...; do
		gpg --sign $KEYID
		gpg --armor --export $KEYID > ${KEYID}.asc
	done

I was hoping more for a solution where I would not have to provide the
keys, but everything in the public keyring, or passing multiple files,
would do the trick. I guess not?

-- 
. o .   o . o   . . o   o . .   . o .
. . o   . o o   o . o   . o o   . . o
o o o   . o .   . o o   o o .   o o o

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From wk at gnupg.org  Thu Aug 25 19:37:11 2011
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Thu, 25 Aug 2011 19:37:11 +0200
Subject: gpg: invalid item `BZIP2' in preference string
In-Reply-To: <4E5668A3.7090104@TheHaverkamps.net> (Lance W. Haverkamp's
	message of "Thu, 25 Aug 2011 09:22:11 -0600")
References: <4E5668A3.7090104@TheHaverkamps.net>
Message-ID: <87liuhv1dk.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Thu, 25 Aug 2011 17:22, lance at thehaverkamps.net said:
> I compiled both the stock 1.4.11 & the Ubuntu 1.4.10.  Both ways I get

> gpg: invalid item `BZIP2' in preference string

You build gpg without bzip2 support.  Install the libbz2-dev before
configuring.

> changing from 4096 to 8192 bit)

DON'T.


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From dpmcgee at gmail.com  Thu Aug 25 19:42:46 2011
From: dpmcgee at gmail.com (Dan McGee)
Date: Thu, 25 Aug 2011 12:42:46 -0500
Subject: Marking a key as "don't export"?
Message-ID: <CAEik5nM8Eqe+apwGG6=HCni8390sFy_9-X+toQWze5w7+DpCxQ@mail.gmail.com>

Is there any way to mark a key as local-only, similar to an
lsign-created local signature?

I'm asking because I plan on generating a master key to be used by a
piece of software where ultimate trust can be rooted, and there is
really no need to have even the public half of this key ever leave the
machine. The only operation it will ever be used in is lsigning
various other public keys.

-Dan


From aaron.toponce at gmail.com  Thu Aug 25 20:02:52 2011
From: aaron.toponce at gmail.com (Aaron Toponce)
Date: Thu, 25 Aug 2011 12:02:52 -0600
Subject: Signing multiple keys
In-Reply-To: <87bovde5ne.fsf@servo.factory.finestructure.net>
References: <4E567D4D.8070009@gmail.com> <4E5685C9.2000807@fifthhorseman.net>
	<4E56885F.6010405@gmail.com>
	<87bovde5ne.fsf@servo.factory.finestructure.net>
Message-ID: <4E568E4C.8080907@gmail.com>

On 08/25/2011 11:56 AM, Jameson Graef Rollins wrote:
> Do you want to sign every key in your keyring?  If so, it's not hard to
> get gpg to enumerate all of your keys in a machine-parsable format (see
> --with-colons output).  If you just want to sign a subset then you
> obviously have to enumerate all the keys yourself, so either of the
> above solutions seems pretty easy to me.

If I have a public keyring of all the attendees of the party, then I
will want to sign every key in that keyring.

-- 
. o .   o . o   . . o   o . .   . o .
. . o   . o o   o . o   . o o   . . o
o o o   . o .   . o o   o o .   o o o

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From remco at webconquest.com  Thu Aug 25 20:18:39 2011
From: remco at webconquest.com (Remco Rijnders)
Date: Thu, 25 Aug 2011 20:18:39 +0200
Subject: Signing multiple keys
In-Reply-To: <4E568E4C.8080907@gmail.com>
References: <4E567D4D.8070009@gmail.com> <4E5685C9.2000807@fifthhorseman.net>
	<4E56885F.6010405@gmail.com>
	<87bovde5ne.fsf@servo.factory.finestructure.net>
	<4E568E4C.8080907@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <E=.!D3@r78.nl>

On Thu, Aug 25, 2011 at 12:02:52PM -0600, Aaron wrote in
<4E568E4C.8080907 at gmail.com>:
>On 08/25/2011 11:56 AM, Jameson Graef Rollins wrote:
>> Do you want to sign every key in your keyring?  If so, it's not hard to
>> get gpg to enumerate all of your keys in a machine-parsable format (see
>> --with-colons output).  If you just want to sign a subset then you
>> obviously have to enumerate all the keys yourself, so either of the
>> above solutions seems pretty easy to me.
>
>If I have a public keyring of all the attendees of the party, then I
>will want to sign every key in that keyring.

Or do you? People will submit their keys to the keyring up front but won't 
be at the party as their dog got sick, their boss didn't approve of them 
taking a day off after all, etc.

Furthermore, perhaps you don't feel comfortable signing the key of someone 
because you have no idea what a valid Nigerian passport looks like, etc.

Remco
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From dougb at dougbarton.us  Thu Aug 25 20:21:18 2011
From: dougb at dougbarton.us (Doug Barton)
Date: Thu, 25 Aug 2011 11:21:18 -0700
Subject: Signing multiple keys
In-Reply-To: <4E568E4C.8080907@gmail.com>
References: <4E567D4D.8070009@gmail.com> <4E5685C9.2000807@fifthhorseman.net>
	<4E56885F.6010405@gmail.com>
	<87bovde5ne.fsf@servo.factory.finestructure.net>
	<4E568E4C.8080907@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <4E56929E.2080503@dougbarton.us>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256

On 08/25/2011 11:02, Aaron Toponce wrote:
> On 08/25/2011 11:56 AM, Jameson Graef Rollins wrote:
>> Do you want to sign every key in your keyring?  If so, it's not
>> hard to get gpg to enumerate all of your keys in a
>> machine-parsable format (see --with-colons output).  If you just
>> want to sign a subset then you obviously have to enumerate all
>> the keys yourself, so either of the above solutions seems pretty
>> easy to me.
> 
> If I have a public keyring of all the attendees of the party, then
> I will want to sign every key in that keyring.

The script below is designed for generating challenges as opposed to
doing the signing, but you may find the bits that iterate the keys on a
ring interesting.

BTW, this is another one of the reasons that I find the ability to have
multiple keyrings useful, and would very much miss that functionality if
it disappeared from gnupg 2.1.


http://dougbarton.us/PGP/gen_challenges.html




- -- 

	Nothin' ever doesn't change, but nothin' changes much.
			-- OK Go

	Breadth of IT experience, and depth of knowledge in the DNS.
	Yours for the right price.  :)  http://SupersetSolutions.com/

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Version: GnuPG v2.0.18 (FreeBSD)

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bt+toUYyVcqr0wPypCZNddYO+UhThs2HKbwU1hm8iDgkYY0lHEmDRTuUrM0EaSEe
pj46EHkQuBfmKrgY+qBjmq5Fb1Amuxk2uusHWLAM4NN11PCGNiCqXrHxjpS202Hm
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=AMS5
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


From expires2011 at ymail.com  Thu Aug 25 20:35:09 2011
From: expires2011 at ymail.com (MFPA)
Date: Thu, 25 Aug 2011 19:35:09 +0100
Subject: Signing multiple keys
In-Reply-To: <4E568E4C.8080907@gmail.com>
References: <4E567D4D.8070009@gmail.com> <4E5685C9.2000807@fifthhorseman.net>
	<4E56885F.6010405@gmail.com>
	<87bovde5ne.fsf@servo.factory.finestructure.net>
	<4E568E4C.8080907@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <531058786.20110825193509@my_localhost>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

Hi


On Thursday 25 August 2011 at 7:02:52 PM, in
<mid:4E568E4C.8080907 at gmail.com>, Aaron Toponce wrote:


> If I have a public keyring of all the attendees of the
> party, then I will want to sign every key in that
> keyring.

You could have a keyring that purported to be all the public keys from
the signing party. Unless you checked the fingerprint of each key before
signing it, how would you spot any extra or substituted keys for which
you had not verified the ID?

- --
Best regards

MFPA                    mailto:expires2011 at ymail.com

Wait. You think I'm right?
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

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OEVBRDBDNkU2OSBCQTIzOUI0NjgxRjFFRjk1MThFNkJENDY0NDdFQ0EwMyBAIEJB
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9tlHU1daqIrjfK9b9NPSM7iyBGK8Pmx5zIHVMw/K
=8Agz
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----



From jrollins at finestructure.net  Thu Aug 25 20:22:44 2011
From: jrollins at finestructure.net (Jameson Graef Rollins)
Date: Thu, 25 Aug 2011 11:22:44 -0700
Subject: Signing multiple keys
In-Reply-To: <4E568E4C.8080907@gmail.com>
References: <4E567D4D.8070009@gmail.com> <4E5685C9.2000807@fifthhorseman.net>
	<4E56885F.6010405@gmail.com>
	<87bovde5ne.fsf@servo.factory.finestructure.net>
	<4E568E4C.8080907@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <874o15e4gb.fsf@servo.factory.finestructure.net>

On Thu, 25 Aug 2011 12:02:52 -0600, Aaron Toponce <aaron.toponce at gmail.com> wrote:
> If I have a public keyring of all the attendees of the party, then I
> will want to sign every key in that keyring.

This should be very easy to script.  See the following options:

--keyring FILE
--list-public-keys
--with-colons

and the DETAILS file included with the gpg documentation
(/usr/share/doc/gnupg/DETAILS.gz in Debian).

hth.

jamie.
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From remco at webconquest.com  Thu Aug 25 20:49:32 2011
From: remco at webconquest.com (Remco Rijnders)
Date: Thu, 25 Aug 2011 20:49:32 +0200
Subject: Signing multiple keys
In-Reply-To: <531058786.20110825193509@my_localhost>
References: <4E567D4D.8070009@gmail.com> <4E5685C9.2000807@fifthhorseman.net>
	<4E56885F.6010405@gmail.com>
	<87bovde5ne.fsf@servo.factory.finestructure.net>
	<4E568E4C.8080907@gmail.com>
	<531058786.20110825193509@my_localhost>
Message-ID: <E^.tZP@r78.nl>

On Thu, Aug 25, 2011 at 07:35:09PM +0100, MFPA wrote in
<531058786.20110825193509 at my_localhost>:
>Hi
>
>
>On Thursday 25 August 2011 at 7:02:52 PM, in
><mid:4E568E4C.8080907 at gmail.com>, Aaron Toponce wrote:
>
>
>> If I have a public keyring of all the attendees of the
>> party, then I will want to sign every key in that
>> keyring.
>
>You could have a keyring that purported to be all the public keys from
>the signing party. Unless you checked the fingerprint of each key before
>signing it, how would you spot any extra or substituted keys for which
>you had not verified the ID?

The party I was at last weekend (and the first one I ever attended) [1] 
had all the keys with the signatures on a textfile and requested 
participants to compute hashes for that document up front and write that 
down on the print of that file. At the start of the party the hashes were 
read out aloud so we all knew we were working from the same list of keys.

Then everyone present announced their listed fingerprint was correct for 
their key.

After that, we checked ID's and verified each others keys.

Remco

[1] http://ksp.froscon.org/
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From aaron.toponce at gmail.com  Thu Aug 25 21:14:58 2011
From: aaron.toponce at gmail.com (Aaron Toponce)
Date: Thu, 25 Aug 2011 13:14:58 -0600
Subject: Signing multiple keys
In-Reply-To: <E=.!D3@r78.nl>
References: <4E567D4D.8070009@gmail.com> <4E5685C9.2000807@fifthhorseman.net>
	<4E56885F.6010405@gmail.com>
	<87bovde5ne.fsf@servo.factory.finestructure.net>
	<4E568E4C.8080907@gmail.com> <E=.!D3@r78.nl>
Message-ID: <4E569F32.8010804@gmail.com>

On 08/25/2011 12:18 PM, Remco Rijnders wrote:
> Or do you? People will submit their keys to the keyring up front but
> won't be at the party as their dog got sick, their boss didn't approve
> of them taking a day off after all, etc.

I did say "a public keyring of all the attendees of the party", not "a
public keyring of those who submitted keys wishing to attend".

> Furthermore, perhaps you don't feel comfortable signing the key of
> someone because you have no idea what a valid Nigerian passport looks
> like, etc.

Then delete their key out of the keyring, and sign the rest.

-- 
. o .   o . o   . . o   o . .   . o .
. . o   . o o   o . o   . o o   . . o
o o o   . o .   . o o   o o .   o o o

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From jrollins at finestructure.net  Thu Aug 25 19:56:53 2011
From: jrollins at finestructure.net (Jameson Graef Rollins)
Date: Thu, 25 Aug 2011 10:56:53 -0700
Subject: Signing multiple keys
In-Reply-To: <4E56885F.6010405@gmail.com>
References: <4E567D4D.8070009@gmail.com> <4E5685C9.2000807@fifthhorseman.net>
	<4E56885F.6010405@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <87bovde5ne.fsf@servo.factory.finestructure.net>

On Thu, 25 Aug 2011 11:37:35 -0600, Aaron Toponce <aaron.toponce at gmail.com> wrote:
> >  caff $FPR1 $FPR2 ...
> 
> Well, if I need to provide each key ID/fingerprint, then I might as well
> write a simple loop:
> 
> 	for KEYID in <ID1> <ID2> <ID3> ...; do
> 		gpg --sign $KEYID
> 		gpg --armor --export $KEYID > ${KEYID}.asc
> 	done
> 
> I was hoping more for a solution where I would not have to provide the
> keys, but everything in the public keyring, or passing multiple files,
> would do the trick. I guess not?

Do you want to sign every key in your keyring?  If so, it's not hard to
get gpg to enumerate all of your keys in a machine-parsable format (see
--with-colons output).  If you just want to sign a subset then you
obviously have to enumerate all the keys yourself, so either of the
above solutions seems pretty easy to me.

jamie.
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From me at davidmanouchehri.com  Fri Aug 26 08:38:56 2011
From: me at davidmanouchehri.com (David Manouchehri)
Date: Fri, 26 Aug 2011 02:38:56 -0400
Subject: gpg: invalid item `BZIP2' in preference string
In-Reply-To: <4E5668A3.7090104@TheHaverkamps.net>
References: <4E5668A3.7090104@TheHaverkamps.net>
Message-ID: <4E573F80.7050801@davidmanouchehri.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
 
Run "sudo apt-get install bzip2" and see if that helps.  Have you
changed your kernel at all?
 
David Manouchehri
 
 
On 8/25/2011 11:22 AM, Lance W. Haverkamp wrote:
> gpg: invalid item `BZIP2' in preference string
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v2.0.17 (MingW32)
Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/
 
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yjw8JxHThbB1i7zgDQKe
=WyQM
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----



From ben at adversary.org  Fri Aug 26 11:00:10 2011
From: ben at adversary.org (Ben McGinnes)
Date: Fri, 26 Aug 2011 19:00:10 +1000
Subject: Keys over 4096-bits (was: gpg: invalid item `BZIP2' in preference
	string)
In-Reply-To: <87liuhv1dk.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <4E5668A3.7090104@TheHaverkamps.net>
	<87liuhv1dk.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <4E57609A.1000800@adversary.org>

On 26/08/11 3:37 AM, Werner Koch wrote:
> On Thu, 25 Aug 2011 17:22, lance at thehaverkamps.net said:
> 
>> changing from 4096 to 8192 bit)
> 
> DON'T.

I understand the reasons for this, but is there any reason for not
using an 8kb (or larger) master/certification key with more normal
subkeys (e.g. a 2048-bit signing subkey and a 4096-bit encryption
subkey)?


Regards,
Ben

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From marco+gnupg at websource.ch  Fri Aug 26 10:58:17 2011
From: marco+gnupg at websource.ch (Marco Steinacher)
Date: Fri, 26 Aug 2011 10:58:17 +0200
Subject: Troubles with scim and pinentry
Message-ID: <4E576029.1010507@websource.ch>

Hi,

I have the problem that the process 'scim-bridge' crashes (segfault)
from time to time on my system. After that, keyboard input doesn't work
anymore and I have to kill and restart scim in a console outside of X. I
suspect that this problem is related to pinentry (gtk2) because it
happens just after having entered the pin, although I'm not 100% sure
and it doesn't happen every time.

Has anybody experienced similar problems or are there any ideas for a
workaround or to debug this?

Thanks,
Marco

P.S. Im using Debian Squeeze with
- gnupg 2.0.14
- pinentry-gtk2 0.8.0
- scim 1.4.9
-- 
OpenPGP Key ID: 0x62937F7F

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From wk at gnupg.org  Fri Aug 26 15:05:07 2011
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Fri, 26 Aug 2011 15:05:07 +0200
Subject: Keys over 4096-bits
In-Reply-To: <4E57609A.1000800@adversary.org> (Ben McGinnes's message of "Fri, 
	26 Aug 2011 19:00:10 +1000")
References: <4E5668A3.7090104@TheHaverkamps.net>
	<87liuhv1dk.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4E57609A.1000800@adversary.org>
Message-ID: <87bovctjb0.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Fri, 26 Aug 2011 11:00, ben at adversary.org said:

> I understand the reasons for this, but is there any reason for not
> using an 8kb (or larger) master/certification key with more normal
> subkeys (e.g. a 2048-bit signing subkey and a 4096-bit encryption

Actually the primary keys are the most worry some.  I have a one 8k key
in my keyring and checking the key signatures made but that key takes a
noticeable time.  Imagine everyone would use such keys and also consider
that nowadays more and more low-processing power devices are used.

Such keys are at best a political statement and a good laugh for some
NSA folks.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From ben at adversary.org  Fri Aug 26 15:36:17 2011
From: ben at adversary.org (Ben McGinnes)
Date: Fri, 26 Aug 2011 23:36:17 +1000
Subject: Keys over 4096-bits
In-Reply-To: <87bovctjb0.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <4E5668A3.7090104@TheHaverkamps.net>
	<87liuhv1dk.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<4E57609A.1000800@adversary.org>
	<87bovctjb0.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <4E57A151.3000905@adversary.org>

On 26/08/11 11:05 PM, Werner Koch wrote:
> Actually the primary keys are the most worry some.

That's a shame.

> I have a one 8k key in my keyring

So do I, but it's mine and it is not used for correspondence at all.

> and checking the key signatures made but that key takes a noticeable
> time.

I had hoped that it would only be the subkeys that resulted in the
performance hit (when checking message/file signatures, encrypting and
decrypting).

> Imagine everyone would use such keys and also consider that nowadays
> more and more low-processing power devices are used.

A good point.

> Such keys are at best a political statement and a good laugh for
> some NSA folks.

Probably not just the NSA.  ;)


Regards,
Ben

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From david at systemoverlord.com  Fri Aug 26 15:39:26 2011
From: david at systemoverlord.com (David Tomaschik)
Date: Fri, 26 Aug 2011 09:39:26 -0400
Subject: Keys over 4096-bits
In-Reply-To: <87bovctjb0.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <4E5668A3.7090104@TheHaverkamps.net>
	<87liuhv1dk.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<4E57609A.1000800@adversary.org>
	<87bovctjb0.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <CAOy4VzecSSH+RbQUdpWTmQmzPbPN4uyQ34HdL54Wx=-v-ERXyw@mail.gmail.com>

XKCD says it best: https://www.xkcd.com/538/

On Fri, Aug 26, 2011 at 9:05 AM, Werner Koch <wk at gnupg.org> wrote:
> On Fri, 26 Aug 2011 11:00, ben at adversary.org said:
>
>> I understand the reasons for this, but is there any reason for not
>> using an 8kb (or larger) master/certification key with more normal
>> subkeys (e.g. a 2048-bit signing subkey and a 4096-bit encryption
>
> Actually the primary keys are the most worry some. ?I have a one 8k key
> in my keyring and checking the key signatures made but that key takes a
> noticeable time. ?Imagine everyone would use such keys and also consider
> that nowadays more and more low-processing power devices are used.
>
> Such keys are at best a political statement and a good laugh for some
> NSA folks.
>
>
> Shalom-Salam,
>
> ? Werner



-- 
David Tomaschik, RHCE, LPIC-1
System Administrator/Open Source Advocate
OpenPGP: 0x5DEA789B
http://systemoverlord.com
david at systemoverlord.com


From johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl  Fri Aug 26 15:56:56 2011
From: johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl (Johan Wevers)
Date: Fri, 26 Aug 2011 15:56:56 +0200
Subject: Keys over 4096-bits
In-Reply-To: <87bovctjb0.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <4E5668A3.7090104@TheHaverkamps.net>	<87liuhv1dk.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<4E57609A.1000800@adversary.org>
	<87bovctjb0.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <4E57A628.10203@vulcan.xs4all.nl>

On 26-08-2011 15:05, Werner Koch wrote:

> and also consider
> that nowadays more and more low-processing power devices are used.

Does that mean we can expect GnuPG versions for mobile systems? I can't
wait to install a Symbian or Android port.

-- 
Met vriendelijke groet,

Johan Wevers



From jerome at jeromebaum.com  Fri Aug 26 16:05:07 2011
From: jerome at jeromebaum.com (Jerome Baum)
Date: Fri, 26 Aug 2011 16:05:07 +0200
Subject: Keys over 4096-bits
In-Reply-To: <4E57A628.10203@vulcan.xs4all.nl>
References: <4E5668A3.7090104@TheHaverkamps.net>
	<87liuhv1dk.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<4E57609A.1000800@adversary.org> <87bovctjb0.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<4E57A628.10203@vulcan.xs4all.nl>
Message-ID: <CAHWDNx5-4ALuXrRCGhSj8uGPxOs1=50VxegThA_Qd2BhrohDEw@mail.gmail.com>

> Does that mean we can expect GnuPG versions for mobile systems? I can't
> wait to install a Symbian or Android port.

There's APG for Android right now.


From aaron.toponce at gmail.com  Fri Aug 26 16:10:54 2011
From: aaron.toponce at gmail.com (Aaron Toponce)
Date: Fri, 26 Aug 2011 08:10:54 -0600
Subject: Keys over 4096-bits
In-Reply-To: <CAHWDNx5-4ALuXrRCGhSj8uGPxOs1=50VxegThA_Qd2BhrohDEw@mail.gmail.com>
References: <4E5668A3.7090104@TheHaverkamps.net>
	<87liuhv1dk.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<4E57609A.1000800@adversary.org>
	<87bovctjb0.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<4E57A628.10203@vulcan.xs4all.nl>
	<CAHWDNx5-4ALuXrRCGhSj8uGPxOs1=50VxegThA_Qd2BhrohDEw@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <20110826141054.GD31008@poseidon.cocyt.us>

On Fri, Aug 26, 2011 at 04:05:07PM +0200, Jerome Baum wrote:
> > Does that mean we can expect GnuPG versions for mobile systems? I can't
> > wait to install a Symbian or Android port.
>
> There's APG for Android right now.

Coupled with the K9 client, it works quite well.

--
. o .   o . o   . . o   o . .   . o .
. . o   . o o   o . o   . o o   . . o
o o o   . o .   . o o   o o .   o o o
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From jerome at jeromebaum.com  Fri Aug 26 15:07:49 2011
From: jerome at jeromebaum.com (Jerome Baum)
Date: Fri, 26 Aug 2011 15:07:49 +0200
Subject: Which release should we be using?
In-Reply-To: <4E538410.8050104@sven-radde.de>
References: <4E521351.7010706@gmail.com> <87fwkt1wpu.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<4E530694.6030904@gmail.com> <4E538410.8050104@sven-radde.de>
Message-ID: <CAHWDNx5wsscVnC0mPhG9ij-zESCOBBXk=c8a8Uz=Bk+n2gz+6Q@mail.gmail.com>

> > My passphrases are
> > stored in a Keepass database that resides in a TrueCrypt container. It's
> > protected well. My actual key is protected by a 62 character passphrase
> One could argue that this is equivalent to having a passphrase-less
> keyring within the Truecrypt container.

Keepass is also (usually) protected. I think you could choose not to
encrypt it but what would be the point?

> To take Keepass's additional encryption into account, the key within the
> container could have the Keepass-passphrase.

What do you mean?


From aaron.toponce at gmail.com  Fri Aug 26 17:25:10 2011
From: aaron.toponce at gmail.com (Aaron Toponce)
Date: Fri, 26 Aug 2011 09:25:10 -0600
Subject: Which release should we be using?
In-Reply-To: <87k4a4y5ez.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <4E521351.7010706@gmail.com>
	<87fwkt1wpu.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>	<4E530694.6030904@gmail.com>
	<87k4a4y5ez.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <4E57BAD6.4030505@gmail.com>

On 08/23/2011 01:04 AM, Werner Koch wrote:
> On Tue, 23 Aug 2011 03:47, papillion at gmail.com said:
>> stored in a Keepass database that resides in a TrueCrypt container. It's
>> protected well. My actual key is protected by a 62 character passphrase
> 
> ... as long as the box is pwoered down.  Hard disk encryption does not
> help if the box is up and you are attacked by malware.

Oh, you can own an encrypted filesystem, even if the box is down. The
Evil Maid attack makes this trivial. And it doesn't matter the
encryption software used either.

-- 
. o .   o . o   . . o   o . .   . o .
. . o   . o o   o . o   . o o   . . o
o o o   . o .   . o o   o o .   o o o

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From wk at gnupg.org  Fri Aug 26 17:31:49 2011
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Fri, 26 Aug 2011 17:31:49 +0200
Subject: Keys over 4096-bits
In-Reply-To: <4E57A628.10203@vulcan.xs4all.nl> (Johan Wevers's message of
	"Fri, 26 Aug 2011 15:56:56 +0200")
References: <4E5668A3.7090104@TheHaverkamps.net>
	<87liuhv1dk.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4E57609A.1000800@adversary.org>
	<87bovctjb0.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de> <4E57A628.10203@vulcan.xs4all.nl>
Message-ID: <87y5ygrxy2.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Fri, 26 Aug 2011 15:56, johanw at vulcan.xs4all.nl said:

> Does that mean we can expect GnuPG versions for mobile systems? I can't
> wait to install a Symbian or Android port.

Kmail (Kontact Touch) runs on the N900 (Linux based) and the HTC Touch
pro 2 (WindowsMobile 6.5).  With full GnuPG crypto support of course.


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From aaron.toponce at gmail.com  Fri Aug 26 17:35:06 2011
From: aaron.toponce at gmail.com (Aaron Toponce)
Date: Fri, 26 Aug 2011 09:35:06 -0600
Subject: Which release should we be using?
In-Reply-To: <4E530694.6030904@gmail.com>
References: <4E521351.7010706@gmail.com> <87fwkt1wpu.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<4E530694.6030904@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <4E57BD2A.1080800@gmail.com>

On 08/22/2011 07:47 PM, Anthony Papillion wrote:
> My passphrases are
> stored in a Keepass database that resides in a TrueCrypt container. It's
> protected well. My actual key is protected by a 62 character passphrase
> that I'd like to cut and paste into GPG.

Personally, I use https://passwordcard.org. The passwords are stored in
plaintext, on a card, in my wallet. It's protected well, 100% portable,
and should it fall into the wrong hands, it's useless.

Also, 62-character passphrase might be a bit extreme, giving you a
false-sense of security. Using a truly random sequence of characters
from the 94-printable ASCII pool of characters, a 12-character
passphrase provides you with about 78-bits of entropy. If you think
that's crackable in relatively short time, head over to
http://stats.distributed.net. They are working on cracking a 72-bit key,
at over 311 billion keys per second. In order to exhaust the entire
pool, it will take them nearly 500 years.

Of course, http://xkcd.com/538 says it best.

-- 
. o .   o . o   . . o   o . .   . o .
. . o   . o o   o . o   . o o   . . o
o o o   . o .   . o o   o o .   o o o

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From faramir.cl at gmail.com  Fri Aug 26 18:31:01 2011
From: faramir.cl at gmail.com (Faramir)
Date: Fri, 26 Aug 2011 13:31:01 -0300
Subject: Which release should we be using?
In-Reply-To: <4E57BD2A.1080800@gmail.com>
References: <4E521351.7010706@gmail.com> <87fwkt1wpu.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<4E530694.6030904@gmail.com> <4E57BD2A.1080800@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <4E57CA45.1090508@gmail.com>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256

El 26-08-2011 12:35, Aaron Toponce escribi?:
...
> Also, 62-character passphrase might be a bit extreme, giving you a 
> false-sense of security. Using a truly random sequence of characters 
> from the 94-printable ASCII pool of characters, a 12-character 
> passphrase provides you with about 78-bits of entropy. If you think

  According to keepass strength measurer, you can get more than 128 bits
with just 30 characters (including some symbols of course).

  Usually we want strong passphrases to keep things safe while stored on
not-so-safe places, like attached to an email message on a mail server.

  Best Regards
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (MingW32)
Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/

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=AB0f
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


From david at systemoverlord.com  Fri Aug 26 20:08:55 2011
From: david at systemoverlord.com (David Tomaschik)
Date: Fri, 26 Aug 2011 14:08:55 -0400
Subject: Which release should we be using?
In-Reply-To: <4E57CA45.1090508@gmail.com>
References: <4E521351.7010706@gmail.com> <87fwkt1wpu.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<4E530694.6030904@gmail.com> <4E57BD2A.1080800@gmail.com>
	<4E57CA45.1090508@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <CAOy4Vzenf1j+WoKEoxbdy0T3-L8FEr+CDGqHrCqesSLxW95WuA@mail.gmail.com>

On Fri, Aug 26, 2011 at 12:31 PM, Faramir <faramir.cl at gmail.com> wrote:
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA256
>
> El 26-08-2011 12:35, Aaron Toponce escribi?:
> ...
>> Also, 62-character passphrase might be a bit extreme, giving you a
>> false-sense of security. Using a truly random sequence of characters
>> from the 94-printable ASCII pool of characters, a 12-character
>> passphrase provides you with about 78-bits of entropy. If you think
>
> ?According to keepass strength measurer, you can get more than 128 bits
> with just 30 characters (including some symbols of course).
>
> ?Usually we want strong passphrases to keep things safe while stored on
> not-so-safe places, like attached to an email message on a mail server.
>
> ?Best Regards

I really like KeePass, but the strength measure it provides is nearly
meaningless.  It assumes 8 bits of entropy per symbol, which is, as
Aaron pointed out, wrong.  Suggested readings:
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Entropy_%28information_theory%29,
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Password_strength and
NIST publication 800-63.


-- 
David Tomaschik, RHCE, LPIC-1
System Administrator/Open Source Advocate
OpenPGP: 0x5DEA789B
http://systemoverlord.com
david at systemoverlord.com


From papillion at gmail.com  Fri Aug 26 22:07:11 2011
From: papillion at gmail.com (Anthony Papillion)
Date: Fri, 26 Aug 2011 15:07:11 -0500
Subject: Which release should we be using?
In-Reply-To: <4E57BAD6.4030505@gmail.com>
References: <4E521351.7010706@gmail.com>	<87fwkt1wpu.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>	<4E530694.6030904@gmail.com>	<87k4a4y5ez.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<4E57BAD6.4030505@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <4E57FCEF.7050705@gmail.com>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256


On 8/26/2011 10:25 AM, Aaron Toponce wrote:
> 
> Oh, you can own an encrypted filesystem, even if the box is down. The
> Evil Maid attack makes this trivial. And it doesn't matter the
> encryption software used either.

I read about this attack a few years ago on Bruce Scheiner's blog. It
scared the crap out of me then and it still worries me quite a bit. Of
course, it's just a variant of what we've been telling people forever
now: if the system is compromised, encryption is useless. Still, it's
pretty scary stuff.

Anthony
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From dougb at dougbarton.us  Fri Aug 26 22:41:41 2011
From: dougb at dougbarton.us (Doug Barton)
Date: Fri, 26 Aug 2011 13:41:41 -0700
Subject: Which release should we be using?
In-Reply-To: <CAOy4Vzenf1j+WoKEoxbdy0T3-L8FEr+CDGqHrCqesSLxW95WuA@mail.gmail.com>
References: <4E521351.7010706@gmail.com> <87fwkt1wpu.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<4E530694.6030904@gmail.com> <4E57BD2A.1080800@gmail.com>
	<4E57CA45.1090508@gmail.com>
	<CAOy4Vzenf1j+WoKEoxbdy0T3-L8FEr+CDGqHrCqesSLxW95WuA@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <4E580505.7040904@dougbarton.us>

Actually I think https://www.xkcd.com/936/ says it better. :)

On 08/26/2011 11:08, David Tomaschik wrote:
> On Fri, Aug 26, 2011 at 12:31 PM, Faramir <faramir.cl at gmail.com> wrote:
>> El 26-08-2011 12:35, Aaron Toponce escribi?:
>> ...
>>> Also, 62-character passphrase might be a bit extreme, giving you a
>>> false-sense of security. Using a truly random sequence of characters
>>> from the 94-printable ASCII pool of characters, a 12-character
>>> passphrase provides you with about 78-bits of entropy. If you think
>>
>>  According to keepass strength measurer, you can get more than 128 bits
>> with just 30 characters (including some symbols of course).
>>
>>  Usually we want strong passphrases to keep things safe while stored on
>> not-so-safe places, like attached to an email message on a mail server.
>>
>>  Best Regards
> 
> I really like KeePass, but the strength measure it provides is nearly
> meaningless.  It assumes 8 bits of entropy per symbol, which is, as
> Aaron pointed out, wrong.  Suggested readings:
> https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Entropy_%28information_theory%29,
> https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Password_strength and
> NIST publication 800-63.
> 
> 



-- 

	Nothin' ever doesn't change, but nothin' changes much.
			-- OK Go

	Breadth of IT experience, and depth of knowledge in the DNS.
	Yours for the right price.  :)  http://SupersetSolutions.com/



From gnupg at lists.grepular.com  Fri Aug 26 23:00:53 2011
From: gnupg at lists.grepular.com (gnupg at lists.grepular.com)
Date: Fri, 26 Aug 2011 22:00:53 +0100
Subject: Which release should we be using?
In-Reply-To: <4E57FCEF.7050705@gmail.com>
References: <4E521351.7010706@gmail.com>	<87fwkt1wpu.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>	<4E530694.6030904@gmail.com>	<87k4a4y5ez.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<4E57BAD6.4030505@gmail.com> <4E57FCEF.7050705@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <4E580985.4010900@lists.grepular.com>

On 26/08/11 21:07, Anthony Papillion wrote:

>> Oh, you can own an encrypted filesystem, even if the box is down. The
>> Evil Maid attack makes this trivial. And it doesn't matter the
>> encryption software used either.
> 
> I read about this attack a few years ago on Bruce Scheiner's blog. It
> scared the crap out of me then and it still worries me quite a bit. Of
> course, it's just a variant of what we've been telling people forever
> now: if the system is compromised, encryption is useless. Still, it's
> pretty scary stuff.

I've taken a number of steps to make evil maid and cold boot style
attacks against my new laptop much more difficult. It's funny this
should come up just now, because I wrote it up earlier today. It's the
latest article on my blog (first url in my sig). But yeah, if an
attacker gets physical access to your machine, and they're determined
enough, they can probably get in.

-- 
Mike Cardwell https://grepular.com/  https://twitter.com/mickeyc
Professional  http://cardwellit.com/ http://linkedin.com/in/mikecardwell
PGP.mit.edu   0018461F/35BC AF1D 3AA2 1F84 3DC3 B0CF 70A5 F512 0018 461F

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From papillion at gmail.com  Fri Aug 26 23:06:25 2011
From: papillion at gmail.com (Anthony Papillion)
Date: Fri, 26 Aug 2011 16:06:25 -0500
Subject: Passphrase length and security. Am I reading this right?
Message-ID: <4E580AD1.7040508@gmail.com>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256

So in the course of another discussion on this group, I was told that I
might not actually need my 160+ random character passphrase for good
security. A few URL's were included, including this one
(https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Password_strength) on
password strength.

If I'm reading the article correctly, I would really only need a 13 to
16 random character password to achieve the 100+ year protection against
brute force attacks. Is that right? Am I really wasting THAT much effort
or am I reading this wrong?

Thanks,
Anthony
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From nicholas.cole at gmail.com  Fri Aug 26 23:18:11 2011
From: nicholas.cole at gmail.com (Nicholas Cole)
Date: Fri, 26 Aug 2011 22:18:11 +0100
Subject: Signing multiple keys
In-Reply-To: <4E56929E.2080503@dougbarton.us>
References: <4E567D4D.8070009@gmail.com> <4E5685C9.2000807@fifthhorseman.net>
	<4E56885F.6010405@gmail.com>
	<87bovde5ne.fsf@servo.factory.finestructure.net>
	<4E568E4C.8080907@gmail.com> <4E56929E.2080503@dougbarton.us>
Message-ID: <CAAu18hcRq76SDxKv7Df00n4q74mzv4PdMD3u_1_3KAunHVdW8w@mail.gmail.com>

On Thu, Aug 25, 2011 at 7:21 PM, Doug Barton <dougb at dougbarton.us> wrote:
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA256
>
> On 08/25/2011 11:02, Aaron Toponce wrote:
>> On 08/25/2011 11:56 AM, Jameson Graef Rollins wrote:
>>> Do you want to sign every key in your keyring? ?If so, it's not
>>> hard to get gpg to enumerate all of your keys in a
>>> machine-parsable format (see --with-colons output). ?If you just
>>> want to sign a subset then you obviously have to enumerate all
>>> the keys yourself, so either of the above solutions seems pretty
>>> easy to me.
>>
>> If I have a public keyring of all the attendees of the party, then
>> I will want to sign every key in that keyring.
>
> The script below is designed for generating challenges as opposed to
> doing the signing, but you may find the bits that iterate the keys on a
> ring interesting.
>
> BTW, this is another one of the reasons that I find the ability to have
> multiple keyrings useful, and would very much miss that functionality if
> it disappeared from gnupg 2.1.
>
>
> http://dougbarton.us/PGP/gen_challenges.html

Dear Doug,

I don't mean this in a negative way, but I struggle to see the point
of such challenges.  The whole point of OpenPGP is the medium across
which email is transmitted is insecure, and there is a possibility of
a MITM attack.  I don't see how this sort of challenge-response does
anything other than confirm that the controller of a key that claims
to belong to a particular email address is also able to intercept and
send messages to and from that address.

The only scenario that it would protect against is where key A claimed
to belong to email address B, but actually did not, and the owner of
key A was actually unable to read messages sent to address B.

In that case, OpenPGP would be providing no security, but the security
of the email system itself would be such that OpenPGP was unnecessary.

To put it another way: if you trust the email network sufficiently for
your challenge to be useful, doesn't that mean you don't need
encryption.

Have I missed something?

Best wishes,

Nicholas


From nicholas.cole at gmail.com  Fri Aug 26 23:29:04 2011
From: nicholas.cole at gmail.com (Nicholas Cole)
Date: Fri, 26 Aug 2011 22:29:04 +0100
Subject: Multiple Keyrings WAS Signing multiple keys
Message-ID: <CAAu18hdFztMyqaBHa+z=q+XPuobFVra7C+P7mhbgNx1_ed3NCg@mail.gmail.com>

On Thu, Aug 25, 2011 at 7:21 PM, Doug Barton <dougb at dougbarton.us> wrote:
>> BTW, this is another one of the reasons that I find the ability to have
> multiple keyrings useful, and would very much miss that functionality if
> it disappeared from gnupg 2.1.

I know Warner has said all this before, but I sometimes think that too
few people chime in to say, "yes I agree".

The problem with multiple keyrings is that they introduce all sorts of
corner cases and unpredictable, ambiguous behaviour.  And actually,
gpg itself is very quick at handling even very large keyrings.

I know that their removal would mean that some people have to adjust
how they use gpg, but I am sure that the end of multiple keyrings
would actually be for the best, and I think removing them is right
thing to do.

In fact, just as at the moment the handling of multiple files needs to
be explicitly enabled, I would favour seeing an option to explicitly
enable or disable multiple keyrings in the current versions, just
because I think that unless users take particular care they can be
harmful.

I *do* see the uses for them.  The debian keyring, for example is
huge, and it is useful to be able to selectively include it or not in
the gpg.conf file.  But there more I've thought about this, the more I
think that it would be better just to have entirely separate gpg home
directories for this sort of purpose.

For the case in question, there would be nothing to stop you having a
home directory made specifically for a key-signing party, for example,
importing your signing key into it and using it as your working
directory.  '--homedir', not multiple keyrings, seems to me to solve
the problem addressed by multiple keyrings for almost all real-world
cases.

Best wishes,

Nicholas


From dougb at dougbarton.us  Fri Aug 26 23:34:05 2011
From: dougb at dougbarton.us (Doug Barton)
Date: Fri, 26 Aug 2011 14:34:05 -0700
Subject: Signing multiple keys
In-Reply-To: <CAAu18hcRq76SDxKv7Df00n4q74mzv4PdMD3u_1_3KAunHVdW8w@mail.gmail.com>
References: <4E567D4D.8070009@gmail.com> <4E5685C9.2000807@fifthhorseman.net>
	<4E56885F.6010405@gmail.com>
	<87bovde5ne.fsf@servo.factory.finestructure.net>
	<4E568E4C.8080907@gmail.com> <4E56929E.2080503@dougbarton.us>
	<CAAu18hcRq76SDxKv7Df00n4q74mzv4PdMD3u_1_3KAunHVdW8w@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <4E58114D.7070706@dougbarton.us>

On 08/26/2011 14:18, Nicholas Cole wrote:
> On Thu, Aug 25, 2011 at 7:21 PM, Doug Barton <dougb at dougbarton.us> wrote:

>> http://dougbarton.us/PGP/gen_challenges.html
> 
> Dear Doug,
> 
> I don't mean this in a negative way, but I struggle to see the point
> of such challenges. 

So feel free not to use them. :)

> The whole point of OpenPGP is the medium across
> which email is transmitted is insecure, and there is a possibility of
> a MITM attack.  I don't see how this sort of challenge-response does
> anything other than confirm that the controller of a key that claims
> to belong to a particular email address is also able to intercept and
> send messages to and from that address.

Yes, that is entirely the point.

> The only scenario that it would protect against is where key A claimed
> to belong to email address B, but actually did not, and the owner of
> key A was actually unable to read messages sent to address B.

2 for 2.

> In that case, OpenPGP would be providing no security, but the security
> of the email system itself would be such that OpenPGP was unnecessary.
> 
> To put it another way: if you trust the email network sufficiently for
> your challenge to be useful, doesn't that mean you don't need
> encryption.
> 
> Have I missed something?

Well the only thing you seem to have missed is the context in which I
use the script, which is my signing other people's keys. It's part of my
signing policy that I do not sign a uid unless I'm sure that the holder
of the key still has access to it. Similarly this process allows me to
verify that they still have access to the key(s).

One could certainly argue that my doing this is verification step is
overly fussy (and you wouldn't be the first), but that's my policy.


Doug

-- 

	Nothin' ever doesn't change, but nothin' changes much.
			-- OK Go

	Breadth of IT experience, and depth of knowledge in the DNS.
	Yours for the right price.  :)  http://SupersetSolutions.com/



From nicholas.cole at gmail.com  Fri Aug 26 23:56:17 2011
From: nicholas.cole at gmail.com (Nicholas Cole)
Date: Fri, 26 Aug 2011 22:56:17 +0100
Subject: Signing multiple keys
In-Reply-To: <4E58114D.7070706@dougbarton.us>
References: <4E567D4D.8070009@gmail.com> <4E5685C9.2000807@fifthhorseman.net>
	<4E56885F.6010405@gmail.com>
	<87bovde5ne.fsf@servo.factory.finestructure.net>
	<4E568E4C.8080907@gmail.com> <4E56929E.2080503@dougbarton.us>
	<CAAu18hcRq76SDxKv7Df00n4q74mzv4PdMD3u_1_3KAunHVdW8w@mail.gmail.com>
	<4E58114D.7070706@dougbarton.us>
Message-ID: <CAAu18heY1E05JA41r7yF9Ok8apwcsevpNsRP4fQv1=mtSoo3mg@mail.gmail.com>

On Fri, Aug 26, 2011 at 10:34 PM, Doug Barton <dougb at dougbarton.us> wrote:

> One could certainly argue that my doing this is verification step is
> overly fussy (and you wouldn't be the first), but that's my policy.

I honestly did not mean to be critical.  I was just struggling to see
the security benefit.  After all, all security brings inconvenience,
but not all inconvenience brings security. :-)

Do you have a particular concern about orphan keys?

Best wishes,

Nicholas


From faramir.cl at gmail.com  Fri Aug 26 23:53:21 2011
From: faramir.cl at gmail.com (Faramir)
Date: Fri, 26 Aug 2011 18:53:21 -0300
Subject: Which release should we be using?
In-Reply-To: <CAOy4Vzenf1j+WoKEoxbdy0T3-L8FEr+CDGqHrCqesSLxW95WuA@mail.gmail.com>
References: <4E521351.7010706@gmail.com> <87fwkt1wpu.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<4E530694.6030904@gmail.com> <4E57BD2A.1080800@gmail.com>
	<4E57CA45.1090508@gmail.com>
	<CAOy4Vzenf1j+WoKEoxbdy0T3-L8FEr+CDGqHrCqesSLxW95WuA@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <4E5815D1.8000509@gmail.com>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256

El 26-08-2011 15:08, David Tomaschik escribi?:
> On Fri, Aug 26, 2011 at 12:31 PM, Faramir <faramir.cl at gmail.com>
> wrote:
....
>> According to keepass strength measurer, you can get more than 128
>> bits with just 30 characters (including some symbols of course).
...
> I really like KeePass, but the strength measure it provides is
> nearly meaningless.  It assumes 8 bits of entropy per symbol, which
> is, as Aaron pointed out, wrong.  Suggested readings:

  Maybe in past it did that, but version  it assigns different values to
different symbols. I just tried it, and from a to z, it gives 5 bits
each symbol, but ? gives 7 bits. / gives 4, = gives 5, ! gives 4 bits.

  But, while a = 5 bits, and != 4 bits, a!= 11 bits. I don't know how it
does the calculations, but clearly it has become a lot more complex
(which doesn't mean it has become more accurate). Another check: qwerty=
4 bits, but qytrwe= 29 bits. Unfortunately, I couldn't find any detail
about the algorithm used to measure the password quality. Anyway,
probably some quality checking is better than not checking at all, even
if the calculated bits are wrong.

  Best Regards
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Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/

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=Sbtk
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


From sandals at crustytoothpaste.net  Sat Aug 27 00:46:36 2011
From: sandals at crustytoothpaste.net (brian m. carlson)
Date: Fri, 26 Aug 2011 22:46:36 +0000
Subject: Multiple Keyrings WAS Signing multiple keys
In-Reply-To: <CAAu18hdFztMyqaBHa+z=q+XPuobFVra7C+P7mhbgNx1_ed3NCg@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAAu18hdFztMyqaBHa+z=q+XPuobFVra7C+P7mhbgNx1_ed3NCg@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <20110826224636.GA16158@crustytoothpaste.ath.cx>

On Fri, Aug 26, 2011 at 10:29:04PM +0100, Nicholas Cole wrote:
> I *do* see the uses for them.  The debian keyring, for example is
> huge, and it is useful to be able to selectively include it or not in
> the gpg.conf file.  But there more I've thought about this, the more I
> think that it would be better just to have entirely separate gpg home
> directories for this sort of purpose.

There is a lot of infrastructure in Debian that depends on the ability
to have read-only keyrings using a command-line option.  If that
functionality were to disappear, somebody would patch it in because the
breakage would be too great (and needless).  If an additional option
were required to use multiple keyrings, I would submit a patch to make
it the default because otherwise it would break existing functionality.

Besides the several different programs that handle key signing parties,
dpkg-source would lose the ability to verify packages before unpacking
them.  apt's archive verification would break.  That doesn't include
dak, the Debian Archive Kit, which also uses GnuPG and would also break.

I expect that most GNU/Linux distributions would also use those patches
for the same reasons.  Removing the capability from GnuPG would not have
the effect of removing the functionality, but only on shifting the
maintenance burden.

> For the case in question, there would be nothing to stop you having a
> home directory made specifically for a key-signing party, for example,
> importing your signing key into it and using it as your working
> directory.  '--homedir', not multiple keyrings, seems to me to solve
> the problem addressed by multiple keyrings for almost all real-world
> cases.

Creating a separate directory and populating it seems silly and
wasteful, plus it prevents the storage of multiple, separate keyrings in
one directory (like /usr/share/keyrings).  If you would like to use the
--homedir method, nothing is preventing you from doing that.  But
breaking existing infrastructure will go over like a lead balloon.

-- 
brian m. carlson / brian with sandals: Houston, Texas, US
+1 832 623 2791 | http://www.crustytoothpaste.net/~bmc | My opinion only
OpenPGP: RSA v4 4096b: 88AC E9B2 9196 305B A994 7552 F1BA 225C 0223 B187
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From dougb at dougbarton.us  Sat Aug 27 02:03:18 2011
From: dougb at dougbarton.us (Doug Barton)
Date: Fri, 26 Aug 2011 17:03:18 -0700
Subject: Signing multiple keys
In-Reply-To: <CAAu18heY1E05JA41r7yF9Ok8apwcsevpNsRP4fQv1=mtSoo3mg@mail.gmail.com>
References: <4E567D4D.8070009@gmail.com> <4E5685C9.2000807@fifthhorseman.net>
	<4E56885F.6010405@gmail.com>
	<87bovde5ne.fsf@servo.factory.finestructure.net>
	<4E568E4C.8080907@gmail.com> <4E56929E.2080503@dougbarton.us>
	<CAAu18hcRq76SDxKv7Df00n4q74mzv4PdMD3u_1_3KAunHVdW8w@mail.gmail.com>
	<4E58114D.7070706@dougbarton.us>
	<CAAu18heY1E05JA41r7yF9Ok8apwcsevpNsRP4fQv1=mtSoo3mg@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <4E583446.8010808@dougbarton.us>

On 08/26/2011 14:56, Nicholas Cole wrote:
> On Fri, Aug 26, 2011 at 10:34 PM, Doug Barton <dougb at dougbarton.us> wrote:
> 
>> One could certainly argue that my doing this is verification step is
>> overly fussy (and you wouldn't be the first), but that's my policy.
> 
> I honestly did not mean to be critical. 

I didn't take it that way, and wouldn't have cared if you did in any
case. :)

> I was just struggling to see
> the security benefit.  After all, all security brings inconvenience,
> but not all inconvenience brings security. :-)
> 
> Do you have a particular concern about orphan keys?

I have a particular concern that if I sign a key with "I checked
carefully" that I really did. Moreover, I have a philosophical prejudice
that if I *can't* say "I checked carefully," why bother?

That said, I have in the past run across people who still have old
e-mail addresses that they no longer have access to on their keys, so
it's more than a theoretical issue, for me at least.


Doug

-- 

	Nothin' ever doesn't change, but nothin' changes much.
			-- OK Go

	Breadth of IT experience, and depth of knowledge in the DNS.
	Yours for the right price.  :)  http://SupersetSolutions.com/



From dougb at dougbarton.us  Sat Aug 27 02:25:48 2011
From: dougb at dougbarton.us (Doug Barton)
Date: Fri, 26 Aug 2011 17:25:48 -0700
Subject: Multiple Keyrings WAS Signing multiple keys
In-Reply-To: <CAAu18hdFztMyqaBHa+z=q+XPuobFVra7C+P7mhbgNx1_ed3NCg@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAAu18hdFztMyqaBHa+z=q+XPuobFVra7C+P7mhbgNx1_ed3NCg@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <4E58398C.7090206@dougbarton.us>

[some snippage]

On 08/26/2011 14:29, Nicholas Cole wrote:
> On Thu, Aug 25, 2011 at 7:21 PM, Doug Barton <dougb at dougbarton.us> wrote:
>>> BTW, this is another one of the reasons that I find the ability to have
>> multiple keyrings useful, and would very much miss that functionality if
>> it disappeared from gnupg 2.1.
> 
> I know Warner has said all this before, but I sometimes think that too
> few people chime in to say, "yes I agree".
> 
> The problem with multiple keyrings is that they introduce all sorts of
> corner cases and unpredictable, ambiguous behaviour. 

This not meant as an attack in any way, shape, or form; but I don't find
"It's hard to do right" a compelling argument. The question is whether
or not the effort to do it right is worth it relative to the benefits
that using multiple keyrings brings.

> And actually,
> gpg itself is very quick at handling even very large keyrings.

Apologies if I haven't made it clear that this isn't even close to being
a factor for me.

> I *do* see the uses for them.  The debian keyring, for example is
> huge, and it is useful to be able to selectively include it or not in
> the gpg.conf file.  But there more I've thought about this, the more I
> think that it would be better just to have entirely separate gpg home
> directories for this sort of purpose.
> 
> For the case in question, there would be nothing to stop you having a
> home directory made specifically for a key-signing party, for example,
> importing your signing key into it and using it as your working
> directory.  '--homedir', not multiple keyrings, seems to me to solve
> the problem addressed by multiple keyrings for almost all real-world
> cases.

That would (sort of) solve the problem of dealing with new keys from a
keysigning party, but in other ways it makes things more complex as well
(I know, I've tried it).

So why do I care so much about multiple keyrings? Let me describe my
setup. First the caveat (that I've already offered, but for completeness
sake I will offer again). This is WAY more complex than the vast
majority of users would need, want, or be able to work with; and I
recognize that. But that being said ...

I have the following keyrings:

1. My public keys
2. Keys that have signed my key (including cross signatures)
3. Keys that I have signed publicly
4. Keys that I have signed locally

I always want to have these keys available, forever.

Then in decreasing order of importance I also have:

5. Keys for important contacts
6. The FreeBSD project keyring
7. Keys used to sign software and other stuff that I care about
8. The keyring for the PGPNET and PGPMIMENET groups
9. My pubring

6 and 8 are interesting in this context because while I do strive to
keep them up to date manually on a day-to-day basis it's really really
easy (using a shell alias) to recreate them by downloading the key file
and just creating a new ring with the same name as the old one.

As for my pubring, I have the auto-key-retrieve option in gpg.conf so
that when I'm reading mailing lists I don't have to be bothered about
doing that manually. When it gets too bloated and/or full of wacky stuff
I just do 'rm pubring.gpg~ && > pubring.gpg' then refresh what's left.

When I go to a keysigning party I either add or create a keyring to
represent the new keys, and then migrate them to the appropriate
existing ring as I get/send signatures. As I already pointed out my
script to generate challenge messages relies primarily on having a
keyring to work with, although I did add functionality to do individual
keys.

Could I find ways to do all of this in a "one keyring to rule them all"
world? Sure, with enough effort and creativity. But as Brian already
pointed out I'm not the only one who has built functionality around the
idea of multiple keyrings, and I suspect that there are a lot more use
cases than ours.


Doug

-- 

	Nothin' ever doesn't change, but nothin' changes much.
			-- OK Go

	Breadth of IT experience, and depth of knowledge in the DNS.
	Yours for the right price.  :)  http://SupersetSolutions.com/



From dougb at dougbarton.us  Sat Aug 27 02:32:11 2011
From: dougb at dougbarton.us (Doug Barton)
Date: Fri, 26 Aug 2011 17:32:11 -0700
Subject: Which release should we be using?
In-Reply-To: <20110826234526.GA3321@straylight.m.ringlet.net>
References: <4E521351.7010706@gmail.com> <87fwkt1wpu.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<4E530694.6030904@gmail.com> <4E57BD2A.1080800@gmail.com>
	<4E57CA45.1090508@gmail.com>
	<CAOy4Vzenf1j+WoKEoxbdy0T3-L8FEr+CDGqHrCqesSLxW95WuA@mail.gmail.com>
	<4E580505.7040904@dougbarton.us>
	<20110826234526.GA3321@straylight.m.ringlet.net>
Message-ID: <4E583B0B.7020909@dougbarton.us>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256

On 08/26/2011 16:45, Peter Pentchev wrote:
> On Fri, Aug 26, 2011 at 01:41:41PM -0700, Doug Barton wrote:
>> > Actually I think https://www.xkcd.com/936/ says it better. :)
> Yep, I was just going to comment that it's obvious that Randall Munroe
> reads this list :)

Well, like most of us I'm sure, I'm a big fan. So I would be thrilled to
know that my post about that was the germ of an idea for him. OTOH that
link was around for quite a while before I posted it here, so I'm
perfectly satisfied chalking it up to GMTA.


Doug

PS, Randall if you *are* lurking here, congratulations to you and yours
re https://www.xkcd.com/943/ :)

- -- 

	Nothin' ever doesn't change, but nothin' changes much.
			-- OK Go

	Breadth of IT experience, and depth of knowledge in the DNS.
	Yours for the right price.  :)  http://SupersetSolutions.com/

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From me at davidmanouchehri.com  Sat Aug 27 03:16:10 2011
From: me at davidmanouchehri.com (David Manouchehri)
Date: Fri, 26 Aug 2011 21:16:10 -0400
Subject: Which release should we be using?
In-Reply-To: <4E58095B.8030300@gmail.com>
References: <4E521351.7010706@gmail.com>	<87fwkt1wpu.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>	<4E530694.6030904@gmail.com>	<87k4a4y5ez.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<4E57BAD6.4030505@gmail.com> <4E57FCEF.7050705@gmail.com>
	<4E5807D1.7090608@davidmanouchehri.com>
	<4E58095B.8030300@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <4E58455A.8000804@davidmanouchehri.com>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
 
Actually Anthony, you are correct.  It can't be defeated, or at least as
far as I know.  What I was suggesting was to move the vulnerable part
(bootloader and kernel) of the system off to a portable storage device,
so it would be easier to keep an eye on.  You can just bring it with you
wherever you go.  Obviously if somebody gets the storage device that
contains the unencrypted bootloader and kernel, they can modify it.
 
It's just much easier to bring a tiny flash drive with you compared to a
15.4" laptop.  Check out the USB flash drives made by Ironkey, you could
even take those in the shower with you! ;)
 
Hope that clears it up,
 
David Manouchehri   
 
 
On 8/26/2011 5:00 PM, Anthony Papillion wrote:
>
> On 8/26/2011 3:53 PM, David Manouchehri wrote:
>
> > The Evil Maid attack can't really be defeated, but what you can do to
> > help prevent it is encrypt everything, including your /boot. Then,
> > start up from a flash drive that contains a LiveUSB with kexec and
> > whatever encryption program you used; after that you can load the "real"
> > kernel with kexec. Of course, if somebody gets that flash drive it's
> > still the same thing.
>
> Interesting. From what I read on Scheiner's blog and a few other places
> at the time, it seemed like a pretty decent attack and it didn't look
> like it could be defeated since it was a system attack rather than a
> direct attack on the cryptography itself. Of course, we have to look at
> risk too: how likely are most of us to have agents sneaking into our
> house to secretly install software? Some of us might be pretty likely
> though.
>
> So an Evil Maid attack is even possible if your entire hard disk is
> encrypted using TruCrypt isn't it since the bootloader is still exposed
> on an unprotected part of the volume. I see Scheiner suggests using a
> trusted computing model but then that's easy to defeat if they have
> physical access to your machine. So, ultimately, the only real way to
> protect from it is the method you're describing. And, since it's much
> easier to protect a flash drive than an entire computer, it's almost
> infallible.
>
> Thanks for the info!
>
> Anthony
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From roam at ringlet.net  Sat Aug 27 01:45:26 2011
From: roam at ringlet.net (Peter Pentchev)
Date: Sat, 27 Aug 2011 02:45:26 +0300
Subject: Which release should we be using?
In-Reply-To: <4E580505.7040904@dougbarton.us>
References: <4E521351.7010706@gmail.com> <87fwkt1wpu.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
	<4E530694.6030904@gmail.com> <4E57BD2A.1080800@gmail.com>
	<4E57CA45.1090508@gmail.com>
	<CAOy4Vzenf1j+WoKEoxbdy0T3-L8FEr+CDGqHrCqesSLxW95WuA@mail.gmail.com>
	<4E580505.7040904@dougbarton.us>
Message-ID: <20110826234526.GA3321@straylight.m.ringlet.net>

On Fri, Aug 26, 2011 at 01:41:41PM -0700, Doug Barton wrote:
> Actually I think https://www.xkcd.com/936/ says it better. :)

Yep, I was just going to comment that it's obvious that Randall Munroe
reads this list :)

> On 08/26/2011 11:08, David Tomaschik wrote:
> > On Fri, Aug 26, 2011 at 12:31 PM, Faramir <faramir.cl at gmail.com> wrote:
> >> El 26-08-2011 12:35, Aaron Toponce escribi?:
> >> ...
> >>> Also, 62-character passphrase might be a bit extreme, giving you a
> >>> false-sense of security. Using a truly random sequence of characters
> >>> from the 94-printable ASCII pool of characters, a 12-character
> >>> passphrase provides you with about 78-bits of entropy. If you think
> >>
> >>  According to keepass strength measurer, you can get more than 128 bits
> >> with just 30 characters (including some symbols of course).
> >>
> >>  Usually we want strong passphrases to keep things safe while stored on
> >> not-so-safe places, like attached to an email message on a mail server.
> >>
> >>  Best Regards
> > 
> > I really like KeePass, but the strength measure it provides is nearly
> > meaningless.  It assumes 8 bits of entropy per symbol, which is, as
> > Aaron pointed out, wrong.  Suggested readings:
> > https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Entropy_%28information_theory%29,
> > https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Password_strength and
> > NIST publication 800-63.

G'luck,
Peter

-- 
Peter Pentchev	roam at ringlet.net roam at FreeBSD.org peter at packetscale.com
PGP key:	http://people.FreeBSD.org/~roam/roam.key.asc
Key fingerprint	FDBA FD79 C26F 3C51 C95E  DF9E ED18 B68D 1619 4553
I had to translate this sentence into English because I could not read the original Sanskrit.
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From wk at gnupg.org  Sat Aug 27 12:03:20 2011
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Sat, 27 Aug 2011 12:03:20 +0200
Subject: Multiple Keyrings WAS Signing multiple keys
In-Reply-To: <20110826224636.GA16158@crustytoothpaste.ath.cx> (brian
	m. carlson's message of "Fri, 26 Aug 2011 22:46:36 +0000")
References: <CAAu18hdFztMyqaBHa+z=q+XPuobFVra7C+P7mhbgNx1_ed3NCg@mail.gmail.com>
	<20110826224636.GA16158@crustytoothpaste.ath.cx>
Message-ID: <874o13rx1z.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Sat, 27 Aug 2011 00:46, sandals at crustytoothpaste.net said:

> dpkg-source would lose the ability to verify packages before unpacking
> them.  apt's archive verification would break.  That doesn't include

Wrong.  It uses gpgv which is a verification only tool; is uses a list
of trusted keys (i.e. the debian keyring).  That is the simplest and
most straightforward way for verification.  I actually developed it for
debian.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From dougb at dougbarton.us  Sat Aug 27 12:28:22 2011
From: dougb at dougbarton.us (Doug Barton)
Date: Sat, 27 Aug 2011 03:28:22 -0700
Subject: Any news on a gpg4win update?
Message-ID: <4E58C6C6.4060003@dougbarton.us>

I use gpg4win on my windows systems, and I can live with the gnupg
version being a little stale. But I'm trying really hard to like
claws-mail, and they just release a new version today making the one in
gpg4 win 2 versions behind the curve. Maybe you were just waiting for
today's claws release? :)


Doug

-- 

	Nothin' ever doesn't change, but nothin' changes much.
			-- OK Go

	Breadth of IT experience, and depth of knowledge in the DNS.
	Yours for the right price.  :)  http://SupersetSolutions.com/



From nicholas.cole at gmail.com  Sat Aug 27 15:12:20 2011
From: nicholas.cole at gmail.com (Nicholas Cole)
Date: Sat, 27 Aug 2011 14:12:20 +0100
Subject: Signing multiple keys
In-Reply-To: <4E583446.8010808@dougbarton.us>
References: <4E567D4D.8070009@gmail.com> <4E5685C9.2000807@fifthhorseman.net>
	<4E56885F.6010405@gmail.com>
	<87bovde5ne.fsf@servo.factory.finestructure.net>
	<4E568E4C.8080907@gmail.com> <4E56929E.2080503@dougbarton.us>
	<CAAu18hcRq76SDxKv7Df00n4q74mzv4PdMD3u_1_3KAunHVdW8w@mail.gmail.com>
	<4E58114D.7070706@dougbarton.us>
	<CAAu18heY1E05JA41r7yF9Ok8apwcsevpNsRP4fQv1=mtSoo3mg@mail.gmail.com>
	<4E583446.8010808@dougbarton.us>
Message-ID: <CAAu18hdUX-csNWuwJYxN3HHGUEw+4dS1tx6AReExrF5AOutVTQ@mail.gmail.com>

On Sat, Aug 27, 2011 at 1:03 AM, Doug Barton <dougb at dougbarton.us> wrote:

> I have a particular concern that if I sign a key with "I checked
> carefully" that I really did. Moreover, I have a philosophical prejudice
> that if I *can't* say "I checked carefully," why bother?
>
> That said, I have in the past run across people who still have old
> e-mail addresses that they no longer have access to on their keys, so
> it's more than a theoretical issue, for me at least.

I see. So your procedure is to check that the name on the key matches
some ID, and THEN check separately that the key at least appears to
control the email addresses it claims.

Which does make a certain sense, I can see. :-)

Thank you for explaining.

Best wishes,

Nicholas


From bjh21 at cam.ac.uk  Wed Aug 24 19:58:48 2011
From: bjh21 at cam.ac.uk (Ben Harris)
Date: Wed, 24 Aug 2011 18:58:48 +0100 (BST)
Subject: Understanding --status-fd output
Message-ID: <alpine.LNX.2.00.1108241800370.6181@soup.linux.pwf.cam.ac.uk>

I'm trying to write a program that (among other things) validates GPG 
signatures on Git tags.  Git runs "gpg" internally, and I can manipulate 
its environment to point GNUPGHOME at somewhere with an options file 
containing a "status-fd" option so I can get machine-readable output. 
This is good, but I'm having some trouble working out what that output 
means.

As I understand it, the process of verifying a signature conceptually 
goes:

1: Is the signature cryptographically valid (i.e. does it match the signed 
data and the purported key)?

2: What UIDs are associated with that key?

3: Can we form a chain of trust from an ultimately-trusted key to that 
UID/key relation?

4: Does that UID name the person whom we expected to be signing this 
message?

As far as I can tell, GOODSIG corresponds to steps 1 and 2 above -- it 
indicates that we've found a key in the keyring and the signature matches 
it.  TRUST_* corresponds to step 3, and obviously it's my job to deal 
with step 4.  The problem I've got is to understand how the UID in GOODSIG 
relates to the trust in TRUST_*.  As far as I can tell from my testing, 
GOODSIG always includes the primary UID of the key, but TRUST_* reflects 
the trust in the most trusted UID.

In consequence, I can't from parsing the --status-fd output work out 
what valid UID is associated with a signature.  I can only tell that the 
key in question has _a_ valid UID.  Is this correct?  So if I want to know 
which of the UIDs on the key are trusted, I have to resort to --list-keys 
--with-colons or similar?

-- 
Ben Harris, University of Cambridge Computing Service.


From IHachem at lb.path-solutions.com  Fri Aug 26 08:18:34 2011
From: IHachem at lb.path-solutions.com (Imad Hachem)
Date: Fri, 26 Aug 2011 09:18:34 +0300
Subject: MISC; gnupg-2.0.18 compilation Error on Solaris during make command
Message-ID: <D35B5097707A9841BED11F75BC3CEE36019A530085E3@LBMAIL.lb.path-solutions.com>

Dear Team,

I am trying to install gnupg-2.0.18 on Solaris (version: Solaris 10 10/08 s10x_u6wos_07b X86) and using the C compiler "/usr/ccs/bin".

Appreciate your help to solve below error generated after running the "make" command:

Making all in openpgp
echo '#!/bin/sh' >./gpg_dearmor
echo "../../g10/gpg2 --no-options --no-greeting \
             --no-secmem-warning --batch --dearmor" >>./gpg_dearmor
chmod 755 ./gpg_dearmor
./gpg_dearmor > ./pubring.gpg < ./pubring.asc
ld.so.1: gpg2: fatal: libassuan.so.0: open failed: No such file or directory
Killed
*** Error code 137
make: Fatal error: Command failed for target `pubring.gpg'
Current working directory /EBNK_FTP/TEMP_INSTALALTION_FILES/gnupg-2.0.18/tests/openpgp
*** Error code 1
The following command caused the error:
fail= failcom='exit 1'; \
for f in x $MAKEFLAGS; do \
  case $f in \
    *=* | --[!k]*);; \
    *k*) failcom='fail=yes';; \
  esac; \
done; \
dot_seen=no; \
target=`echo all-recursive | sed s/-recursive//`; \
list='openpgp . pkits'; for subdir in $list; do \
  echo "Making $target in $subdir"; \
  if test "$subdir" = "."; then \
    dot_seen=yes; \
    local_target="$target-am"; \
  else \
    local_target="$target"; \
  fi; \
  (CDPATH="${ZSH_VERSION+.}:" && cd $subdir && make  $local_target) \
  || eval $failcom; \
done; \
if test "$dot_seen" = "no"; then \
  make  "$target-am" || exit 1; \
fi; test -z "$fail"
make: Fatal error: Command failed for target `all-recursive'
Current working directory /EBNK_FTP/TEMP_INSTALALTION_FILES/gnupg-2.0.18/tests
*** Error code 1
The following command caused the error:
fail= failcom='exit 1'; \
for f in x $MAKEFLAGS; do \
  case $f in \
    *=* | --[!k]*);; \
    *k*) failcom='fail=yes';; \
  esac; \
done; \
dot_seen=no; \
target=`echo all-recursive | sed s/-recursive//`; \
list='m4 gl include jnlib common kbx  g10 keyserver sm agent scd tools po doc tests'; for subdir in $list; do \
  echo "Making $target in $subdir"; \
  if test "$subdir" = "."; then \
    dot_seen=yes; \
    local_target="$target-am"; \
  else \
    local_target="$target"; \
  fi; \
  (CDPATH="${ZSH_VERSION+.}:" && cd $subdir && make  $local_target) \
  || eval $failcom; \
done; \
if test "$dot_seen" = "no"; then \
  make  "$target-am" || exit 1; \
fi; test -z "$fail"
make: Fatal error: Command failed for target `all-recursive'
Current working directory /EBNK_FTP/TEMP_INSTALALTION_FILES/gnupg-2.0.18
*** Error code 1
make: Fatal error: Command failed for target `all'




Best Regards,


Imad Hachem | Manager S/W Eng -Dev
e-Banking Department
Path Solutions
Tel: +961 1 697444 ext. 222
Fax: +961 1 696744
www.path-solutions.com<http://www.path-solutions.com>

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From Mike_Acker at charter.net  Sun Aug 28 15:29:26 2011
From: Mike_Acker at charter.net (Mike Acker)
Date: Sun, 28 Aug 2011 09:29:26 -0400
Subject: Understanding --status-fd output
In-Reply-To: <alpine.LNX.2.00.1108241800370.6181@soup.linux.pwf.cam.ac.uk>
References: <alpine.LNX.2.00.1108241800370.6181@soup.linux.pwf.cam.ac.uk>
Message-ID: <4E5A42B6.9020005@charter.net>

On 14:59, Ben Harris wrote:
> As far as I can tell, GOODSIG corresponds to steps 1 and 2 above -- it
> indicates that we've found a key in the keyring and the signature
> matches it.  TRUST_* corresponds to step 3, and obviously it's my job
> to deal with step 4.  The problem I've got is to understand how the
> UID in GOODSIG relates to the trust in TRUST_*.  As far as I can tell
> from my testing, GOODSIG always includes the primary UID of the key,
> but TRUST_* reflects the trust in the most trusted UID.
>
> In consequence, I can't from parsing the --status-fd output work out
> what valid UID is associated with a signature.  I can only tell that
> the key in question has _a_ valid UID.  Is this correct?  So if I want
> to know which of the UIDs on the key are trusted, I have to resort to
> --list-keys --with-colons or similar? 
there are definitely some confusing terms in play here

from using GPG4WIN I note: a signature may be marked:

    valid|not valid
    Trusted|not Trusted

from my observations: "vaid" should really read "recognized"

the signature is "recognized" IF:

    I signed it
    someone whose key i have marked fully trusted signed it
    two or more parties i have marked marginally trusted have signed it

"Trust" or "owner trust" refers to whether I trust the owner of a key
sent to me.  this trust can be

    ultimate ( I only trust myself "ultimately" )
    full: I trust this party to thoroughly vet any keys he signs
    marginal: I'm not sure about this guy; he's probably OK
    unknown: I havn't got a clue

Clearly: you cannot establish a Trust Model in a large population which
is the fundamental error made in x.509

IN ADDITION: you will note that on an x.509 certificate there is a
second trust flag: for software. This is CRITICAL to the security of
Authenticode which is used for software updates

Good post!!

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From wk at gnupg.org  Mon Aug 29 11:22:49 2011
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Mon, 29 Aug 2011 11:22:49 +0200
Subject: Understanding --status-fd output
In-Reply-To: <alpine.LNX.2.00.1108241800370.6181@soup.linux.pwf.cam.ac.uk>
	(Ben Harris's message of "Wed, 24 Aug 2011 18:58:48 +0100 (BST)")
References: <alpine.LNX.2.00.1108241800370.6181@soup.linux.pwf.cam.ac.uk>
Message-ID: <87ippgr2qe.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Wed, 24 Aug 2011 19:58, bjh21 at cam.ac.uk said:

> signatures on Git tags.  Git runs "gpg" internally, and I can
> manipulate its environment to point GNUPGHOME at somewhere with an
> options file containing a "status-fd" option so I can get
> machine-readable output. This is good, but I'm having some trouble

Please consider to use gpgme.  It takes care of all the fairy details.

> 1: Is the signature cryptographically valid (i.e. does it match the
> signed data and the purported key)?

Right.

> 2: What UIDs are associated with that key?

No.  You can't tell which UID made the signature.  This signature is
made by a key and the key have have several associated UIDs.

> 3: Can we form a chain of trust from an ultimately-trusted key to that
> UID/key relation?

Or in short:  Is the key valid.

> 4: Does that UID name the person whom we expected to be signing this
> message?

Obvioulsy the person in front of the display has to decide this.

> As far as I can tell, GOODSIG corresponds to steps 1 and 2 above -- it
> indicates that we've found a key in the keyring and the signature
> matches it.  TRUST_* corresponds to step 3, and obviously it's my job
> to deal with step 4.  The problem I've got is to understand how the

Right.

> UID in GOODSIG relates to the trust in TRUST_*.  As far as I can tell
> from my testing, GOODSIG always includes the primary UID of the key,

The UID is merely a hint.  You may better use the VALIDSIG status line
which gives more detailed information.

> the key in question has _a_ valid UID.  Is this correct?  So if I want
> to know which of the UIDs on the key are trusted, I have to resort to
> --list-keys --with-colons or similar?

Right.  You need to do a key listing for that.  Thus the fingerprint
printed with VALIDSIG comes handy.  See gpgme/src/verify.c implements
what we know about the gpg output; use it as an example.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner


-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From expires2011 at ymail.com  Mon Aug 29 12:24:55 2011
From: expires2011 at ymail.com (MFPA)
Date: Mon, 29 Aug 2011 11:24:55 +0100
Subject: Understanding --status-fd output
In-Reply-To: <alpine.LNX.2.00.1108241800370.6181@soup.linux.pwf.cam.ac.uk>
References: <alpine.LNX.2.00.1108241800370.6181@soup.linux.pwf.cam.ac.uk>
Message-ID: <1576356608.20110829112455@my_localhost>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

Hi


On Wednesday 24 August 2011 at 6:58:48 PM, in
<mid:alpine.LNX.2.00.1108241800370.6181 at soup.linux.pwf.cam.ac.uk>, Ben
Harris wrote:

> In consequence, I can't from parsing the --status-fd
> output work out  what valid UID is associated with a
> signature.  I can only tell that the key in question
> has _a_ valid UID.  Is this correct?  So if I want to
> know which of the UIDs on the key are trusted, I have
> to resort to --list-keys --with-colons or similar?

Does it make any difference to the --status-fd output if you include
"verbose" up to three times in the options file?

- --
Best regards

MFPA                    mailto:expires2011 at ymail.com

There is no job so simple that it cannot be done wrong
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-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----



From wk at gnupg.org  Mon Aug 29 14:07:09 2011
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Mon, 29 Aug 2011 14:07:09 +0200
Subject: Understanding --status-fd output
In-Reply-To: <1576356608.20110829112455@my_localhost> (MFPA's message of "Mon, 
	29 Aug 2011 11:24:55 +0100")
References: <alpine.LNX.2.00.1108241800370.6181@soup.linux.pwf.cam.ac.uk>
	<1576356608.20110829112455@my_localhost>
Message-ID: <87ei04qv4i.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Mon, 29 Aug 2011 12:24, expires2011 at ymail.com said:

> Does it make any difference to the --status-fd output if you include
> "verbose" up to three times in the options file?

It should not make any difference.


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From wk at gnupg.org  Mon Aug 29 14:17:48 2011
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Mon, 29 Aug 2011 14:17:48 +0200
Subject: Understanding --status-fd output
In-Reply-To: <4E5A42B6.9020005@charter.net> (Mike Acker's message of "Sun, 28
	Aug 2011 09:29:26 -0400")
References: <alpine.LNX.2.00.1108241800370.6181@soup.linux.pwf.cam.ac.uk>
	<4E5A42B6.9020005@charter.net>
Message-ID: <87aaasqumr.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Sun, 28 Aug 2011 15:29, Mike_Acker at charter.net said:

> from using GPG4WIN I note: a signature may be marked:
>
>     valid|not valid
>     Trusted|not Trusted

It should be "valid".  However gpg4win is collection of different tools
all with a different history.

> "Trust" or "owner trust" refers to whether I trust the owner of a key
> sent to me.  this trust can be

This is a misconception.  You assign an "owner trust" to indicate your
estimation on how faithful someone signs other keys.

> IN ADDITION: you will note that on an x.509 certificate there is a
> second trust flag: for software. This is CRITICAL to the security of
> Authenticode which is used for software updates

It basically says, the malware authors spend a few bugs on buying a
compromised key for the certificate.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From Mike_Acker at charter.net  Mon Aug 29 14:29:10 2011
From: Mike_Acker at charter.net (Mike Acker)
Date: Mon, 29 Aug 2011 08:29:10 -0400
Subject: Understanding --status-fd output
In-Reply-To: <87aaasqumr.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <alpine.LNX.2.00.1108241800370.6181@soup.linux.pwf.cam.ac.uk>
	<4E5A42B6.9020005@charter.net> <87aaasqumr.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <4E5B8616.1040407@charter.net>

On 08/29/2011 08:17, Werner Koch wrote:
> On Sun, 28 Aug 2011 15:29, Mike_Acker at charter.net said:
>
>> > from using GPG4WIN I note: a signature may be marked:
>> >
>> >     valid|not valid
>> >     Trusted|not Trusted
> It should be "valid".  However gpg4win is collection of different tools
> all with a different history.
>
>> > "Trust" or "owner trust" refers to whether I trust *the owner of* a key
>> > sent to me.  this trust can be
> This is a misconception.  You assign an "owner trust" to indicate your
> estimation on how faithful someone signs other keys.
>
>> > IN ADDITION: you will note that on an x.509 certificate there is a
>> > second trust flag: for software. This is CRITICAL to the security of
>> > Authenticode which is used for software updates
> It basically says, the malware authors spend a few bucks on buying a
> compromised key for the certificate.
>
>
> Shalom-Salam,
>
>    Werner
>
> -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.
thanks for the note.

 I have a post on the problem with SSL posted on IEv this week,--
see
http://www.internetevolution.com/messages.asp?piddl_msgthreadid=241163&piddl_msgid=442824#msg_442824

-- 
/MIKE

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From dennisn at dennisn.dyndns.org  Tue Aug 30 04:23:30 2011
From: dennisn at dennisn.dyndns.org (Dennis Nezic)
Date: Mon, 29 Aug 2011 22:23:30 -0400
Subject: Manually compute key fingerprint
Message-ID: <20110829222330.64a0e921.dennisn@dennisn.dyndns.org>

How can I manually compute the fingerprint for a key? "sha1sum
pubkeybinary" doesn't match "gpg --with-fingerprint pubkeybinary" ...
isn't the fingerprint simply supposed to be the sha1 hash of it?



From sandals at crustytoothpaste.net  Tue Aug 30 04:39:04 2011
From: sandals at crustytoothpaste.net (brian m. carlson)
Date: Tue, 30 Aug 2011 02:39:04 +0000
Subject: Manually compute key fingerprint
In-Reply-To: <20110829222330.64a0e921.dennisn@dennisn.dyndns.org>
References: <20110829222330.64a0e921.dennisn@dennisn.dyndns.org>
Message-ID: <20110830023904.GA18432@crustytoothpaste.ath.cx>

On Mon, Aug 29, 2011 at 10:23:30PM -0400, Dennis Nezic wrote:
> How can I manually compute the fingerprint for a key? "sha1sum
> pubkeybinary" doesn't match "gpg --with-fingerprint pubkeybinary" ...
> isn't the fingerprint simply supposed to be the sha1 hash of it?

The fingerprint is a hash of certain data in the public key packet, not
the entire file itself.  This makes sense if you think about it, because
the file containing the public key also contains user IDs, signatures,
and potentially subkeys.  If you were to just hash the file, then the
fingerprint would change every time you added a new ID or signature,
which would not be hhelpful.

If you need to be able to compute the fingerprint independently, you'll
need to parse the public key packet and follow the formula specified in
RFC 4880.  It's not terribly difficult.

-- 
brian m. carlson / brian with sandals: Houston, Texas, US
+1 832 623 2791 | http://www.crustytoothpaste.net/~bmc | My opinion only
OpenPGP: RSA v4 4096b: 88AC E9B2 9196 305B A994 7552 F1BA 225C 0223 B187
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From nicholas.cole at gmail.com  Tue Aug 30 10:59:31 2011
From: nicholas.cole at gmail.com (Nicholas Cole)
Date: Tue, 30 Aug 2011 09:59:31 +0100
Subject: --min-cert-level and --auto-check-trustdb
Message-ID: <CAAu18hfdG4siVc3X+1tkKreeZg84BB8vVjq-3Mbz79pWSWh4MA@mail.gmail.com>

Dear list,

Why is changing the --min-cert-level not enough to trigger an update
of the trust-db?  Should it be?

Supposing a scenario in which a user is prepared to accept lower-level
certifications for low value communications, but requires higher level
certifications for others.

At present the user can specify --min-cert-level on the command line,
but the trust database itself will not be updated for the purposes of
listing/editing keys, verifying signatures or encryption.

The user interface can become easily out of sync with the user's
explicit trust model settings.

The only solution is to explicitly order --check-trustdb.

However, this creates further problems and possible security risks,
because there is no guarantee that a temporary change will be reverted
when the user stops specifying the --cert-level on the command line.

I suspect this is little-used feature of gpg.  On the other hand, it
does look like an excellent way for the user to shoot himself in the
foot without even realising it.  (Senario to verify the problem at the
end of this email)

Best wishes,

Nicholas

=================================================================
To verify problem:

1. Sign a key with a level 1 certification
2. Do gpg --min-cert-level=1 --check-db
3. Edit the key you have just signed, or try to encrypt to it, and the
listing will show the uid as trusted EVEN if you do not specify the
low cert level on the command line, and are therefore using the gpg
default --min-cert-level=2.

This is looks a security risk to me.
(problem identified with gpg 1.4.11)


From richard at r-selected.de  Tue Aug 30 17:54:32 2011
From: richard at r-selected.de (Richard)
Date: Tue, 30 Aug 2011 17:54:32 +0200
Subject: Migrating to Smartcards
Message-ID: <CA+WmQonz0AssSNXzh4FGQrofEvHqZ2Gj9XW5P0a0eq55mU--pA@mail.gmail.com>

Hello,

for security reasons, I have decided to migrate my most important
subkeys to smartcards. I have a number of questions regarding the
transfer/migration.

a) I've bought two OpenPGP smartcards (v2). Their overprint says they
support "RSA with up to 3072 bit". In the GnuPG 2.0.18 release notes
one change was to "Allow generation of card keys up to 4096 bit". Does
that apply to the OpenPGP v2 card?

b) As far as I know, the cards can only store subkeys, i.e. no primary
key. That way, only decryption, singing and authenticaion will be
possible. If I want to sign other keys, will I have to keep the
primary key somewhere safe off-card?

c) For convenience, I bought two cards which are supposed to store the
same keys. I want to carry one card around with me every day for
mobile use (I also bought an SCR3500 reader for that purpose) and
leave the other one at home in the card reader on my desk. Now the
problem is that the keytocard command can only be issued once, since
it deletes the key from the computer. To copy the keys to both cards,
I would have to backup my secret keys, insert card #1, issue
keytocard, restore the backup, insert card #2, issue keytocard again.
Will that cause any problems in later GnuPG use as the cards' IDs are
different?

Thanks!

    Richard


From wk at gnupg.org  Tue Aug 30 20:40:05 2011
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Tue, 30 Aug 2011 20:40:05 +0200
Subject: Migrating to Smartcards
In-Reply-To: <CA+WmQonz0AssSNXzh4FGQrofEvHqZ2Gj9XW5P0a0eq55mU--pA@mail.gmail.com>
	(richard@r-selected.de's message of "Tue, 30 Aug 2011 17:54:32 +0200")
References: <CA+WmQonz0AssSNXzh4FGQrofEvHqZ2Gj9XW5P0a0eq55mU--pA@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <87vctepwu2.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Tue, 30 Aug 2011 17:54, richard at r-selected.de said:

> a) I've bought two OpenPGP smartcards (v2). Their overprint says they
> support "RSA with up to 3072 bit". In the GnuPG 2.0.18 release notes
> one change was to "Allow generation of card keys up to 4096 bit". Does
> that apply to the OpenPGP v2 card?

Yes.

> b) As far as I know, the cards can only store subkeys, i.e. no primary
> key. That way, only decryption, singing and authenticaion will be
> possible. If I want to sign other keys, will I have to keep the
> primary key somewhere safe off-card?

The default is to create a complete new key.

> c) For convenience, I bought two cards which are supposed to store the
> same keys. I want to carry one card around with me every day for

You need to create the keys off-card and then export them to the card.
"keytocard" in the --edit-key menu is what you want.  

> problem is that the keytocard command can only be issued once, since
> it deletes the key from the computer. To copy the keys to both cards,

Don't run "save" after "keytocard" and the key should stay on the disk.

> keytocard, restore the backup, insert card #2, issue keytocard again.
> Will that cause any problems in later GnuPG use as the cards' IDs are

Possible.  It will be easy to disable the check or - if the second
card is used as a backup - to generate a new key -stub with the new
serial number.  It is not cryptographically locked.


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de  Tue Aug 30 20:44:28 2011
From: mailinglisten at hauke-laging.de (Hauke Laging)
Date: Tue, 30 Aug 2011 20:44:28 +0200
Subject: Migrating to Smartcards
In-Reply-To: <CA+WmQonz0AssSNXzh4FGQrofEvHqZ2Gj9XW5P0a0eq55mU--pA@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CA+WmQonz0AssSNXzh4FGQrofEvHqZ2Gj9XW5P0a0eq55mU--pA@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <201108302044.33843.mailinglisten@hauke-laging.de>

Am Dienstag, 30. August 2011, 17:54:32 schrieb Richard:

> b) As far as I know, the cards can only store subkeys, i.e. no primary
> key.

Citing the documentation (--edit-key):

keytocard
Transfer  the selected secret subkey (or the primary key if no subkey has been 
selected) to a smartcard.


> Will that cause any problems in later GnuPG use as the cards' IDs are
> different?

At least no serious ones. You will probably have to make gpg read the card 
content by --card-status or --card-edit. At worst you would have to "delete" 
the secret key before.


Hauke
-- 
PGP: D44C 6A5B 71B0 427C CED3 025C BD7D 6D27 ECCB 5814
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From david at systemoverlord.com  Tue Aug 30 20:49:34 2011
From: david at systemoverlord.com (David Tomaschik)
Date: Tue, 30 Aug 2011 14:49:34 -0400
Subject: Migrating to Smartcards
In-Reply-To: <CA+WmQonz0AssSNXzh4FGQrofEvHqZ2Gj9XW5P0a0eq55mU--pA@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CA+WmQonz0AssSNXzh4FGQrofEvHqZ2Gj9XW5P0a0eq55mU--pA@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <CAOy4Vzc0kwvSQqsQd-6Ly+XUZJChkTrz2c=M7t1defFp0t6kBQ@mail.gmail.com>

On Tue, Aug 30, 2011 at 11:54 AM, Richard <richard at r-selected.de> wrote:
> Hello,
>
> for security reasons, I have decided to migrate my most important
> subkeys to smartcards. I have a number of questions regarding the
> transfer/migration.
>
> a) I've bought two OpenPGP smartcards (v2). Their overprint says they
> support "RSA with up to 3072 bit". In the GnuPG 2.0.18 release notes
> one change was to "Allow generation of card keys up to 4096 bit". Does
> that apply to the OpenPGP v2 card?

No, the OpenPGP v2 card can only handle up to RSA-3072.  Presumably
the change in 2.0.18 was made for future compatibility with other
cards.  (My guess, not based on any research.)


> b) As far as I know, the cards can only store subkeys, i.e. no primary
> key. That way, only decryption, singing and authenticaion will be
> possible. If I want to sign other keys, will I have to keep the
> primary key somewhere safe off-card?

No, you can store a primary key.  And you can use the 3 slots for any
purpose (though I believe they must all tie to the same primary key.).
 It would be common to combine signing & certification into one key
(and I believe that is the default).

> c) For convenience, I bought two cards which are supposed to store the
> same keys. I want to carry one card around with me every day for
> mobile use (I also bought an SCR3500 reader for that purpose) and
> leave the other one at home in the card reader on my desk. Now the
> problem is that the keytocard command can only be issued once, since
> it deletes the key from the computer. To copy the keys to both cards,
> I would have to backup my secret keys, insert card #1, issue
> keytocard, restore the backup, insert card #2, issue keytocard again.
> Will that cause any problems in later GnuPG use as the cards' IDs are
> different?

I don't think that would be an issue, but I can't be sure.  Keep in
mind that as long as the card is left in the reader, it would be
considered unlocked -- do you want to leave that laying around?  (It
depends on your threat model, of course.)

>
> Thanks!
>
> ? ?Richard




-- 
David Tomaschik, RHCE, LPIC-1
System Administrator/Open Source Advocate
OpenPGP: 0x5DEA789B
http://systemoverlord.com
david at systemoverlord.com


From richard at r-selected.de  Tue Aug 30 20:56:21 2011
From: richard at r-selected.de (Richard)
Date: Tue, 30 Aug 2011 20:56:21 +0200
Subject: Migrating to Smartcards
In-Reply-To: <CAOy4Vzc0kwvSQqsQd-6Ly+XUZJChkTrz2c=M7t1defFp0t6kBQ@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CA+WmQonz0AssSNXzh4FGQrofEvHqZ2Gj9XW5P0a0eq55mU--pA@mail.gmail.com>
	<CAOy4Vzc0kwvSQqsQd-6Ly+XUZJChkTrz2c=M7t1defFp0t6kBQ@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <CA+WmQomimEkaT01Euj1A6bB11MvaA1+4hiMNZHiw59TROs-zrA@mail.gmail.com>

On Tue, Aug 30, 2011 at 20:49, David Tomaschik <david at systemoverlord.com> wrote:

> No, you can store a primary key. ?And you can use the 3 slots for any
> purpose (though I believe they must all tie to the same primary key.).
> ?It would be common to combine signing & certification into one key
> (and I believe that is the default).

So it is impossible to use a separate signing subkey if I want to
retain the possibility to sign other keys without keeping an off-card
backup of the primary key? In the past I switched my singing subkeys
every couple of years, keeping my primary key in place.

    Richard


From richard at r-selected.de  Tue Aug 30 21:14:16 2011
From: richard at r-selected.de (Richard)
Date: Tue, 30 Aug 2011 21:14:16 +0200
Subject: Migrating to Smartcards
In-Reply-To: <CAOy4Vzez6QiA8jzq6sw8WjjDq_C27-yLMBYy0rZt_dU7uXffkw@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CA+WmQonz0AssSNXzh4FGQrofEvHqZ2Gj9XW5P0a0eq55mU--pA@mail.gmail.com>
	<CAOy4Vzc0kwvSQqsQd-6Ly+XUZJChkTrz2c=M7t1defFp0t6kBQ@mail.gmail.com>
	<CA+WmQomimEkaT01Euj1A6bB11MvaA1+4hiMNZHiw59TROs-zrA@mail.gmail.com>
	<CAOy4Vzez6QiA8jzq6sw8WjjDq_C27-yLMBYy0rZt_dU7uXffkw@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <CA+WmQo==z-xJZqm1iRvDj5o6B8+qiMmHAgWPSFYp8vJ2Z0OrGw@mail.gmail.com>

Hello,

On Tue, Aug 30, 2011 at 21:08, David Tomaschik <david at systemoverlord.com> wrote:
> No, I was just stating common practice. ?You could do a
> certification/primary key, a signing key, and an encryption key in the
> 3 slots.

are you sure about that? Everywhere I read the slots can only be used
for: signing, decryption, authentication. If the signing slot is
filled with the primary key, there is no more room for a singing
subkey...

    Richard


From gollo at fsfe.org  Tue Aug 30 20:40:22 2011
From: gollo at fsfe.org (Martin Gollowitzer)
Date: Tue, 30 Aug 2011 20:40:22 +0200
Subject: Migrating to Smartcards
In-Reply-To: <CA+WmQonz0AssSNXzh4FGQrofEvHqZ2Gj9XW5P0a0eq55mU--pA@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CA+WmQonz0AssSNXzh4FGQrofEvHqZ2Gj9XW5P0a0eq55mU--pA@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <20110830184022.GD29413@wingback.gollo.at>

Dear Richard,

* Richard <richard at r-selected.de> [110830 20:30, 
  mID <CA+WmQonz0AssSNXzh4FGQrofEvHqZ2Gj9XW5P0a0eq55mU--pA at mail.gmail.com>]:

> Hello,
> 
> for security reasons, I have decided to migrate my most important
> subkeys to smartcards. I have a number of questions regarding the
> transfer/migration.

I think this is a good decision.

> a) I've bought two OpenPGP smartcards (v2). Their overprint says they
> support "RSA with up to 3072 bit". In the GnuPG 2.0.18 release notes
> one change was to "Allow generation of card keys up to 4096 bit". Does
> that apply to the OpenPGP v2 card?

AFAIR, 3072 bit keys have to be generated on the card. If you use
off-card generation, you are limited to 2048 bits.

> b) As far as I know, the cards can only store subkeys, i.e. no primary
> key. That way, only decryption, singing and authenticaion will be
> possible. If I want to sign other keys, will I have to keep the
> primary key somewhere safe off-card?

Both is possible. IMHO the best way is to use subkeys. If you want to
sign a key, you can use the backup of your main key as long as you
follow the howto at [1] which I happen to be a co-author of.

> c) For convenience, I bought two cards which are supposed to store the
> same keys. I want to carry one card around with me every day for
> mobile use (I also bought an SCR3500 reader for that purpose) and
> leave the other one at home in the card reader on my desk. Now the
> problem is that the keytocard command can only be issued once, since
> it deletes the key from the computer. To copy the keys to both cards,
> I would have to backup my secret keys, insert card #1, issue
> keytocard, restore the backup, insert card #2, issue keytocard again.
> Will that cause any problems in later GnuPG use as the cards' IDs are
> different?

This should not be a problem if you follow the howto mentioned. You can
use a copy of your backup and transfer the keys to the second card. It
is however important to have the "right" secret keyring on the PC you
are using the card with as the ID of the card which has the subkeys is
being stored. 

I hope this is helpful for you, but if you have any questions, don't
hesitate to ask :-)

[1] http://wiki.fsfe.org/Card_howtos/Card_with_subkeys_using_backups

All the best, 
Martin 
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From david at systemoverlord.com  Tue Aug 30 21:08:30 2011
From: david at systemoverlord.com (David Tomaschik)
Date: Tue, 30 Aug 2011 15:08:30 -0400
Subject: Migrating to Smartcards
In-Reply-To: <CA+WmQomimEkaT01Euj1A6bB11MvaA1+4hiMNZHiw59TROs-zrA@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CA+WmQonz0AssSNXzh4FGQrofEvHqZ2Gj9XW5P0a0eq55mU--pA@mail.gmail.com>
	<CAOy4Vzc0kwvSQqsQd-6Ly+XUZJChkTrz2c=M7t1defFp0t6kBQ@mail.gmail.com>
	<CA+WmQomimEkaT01Euj1A6bB11MvaA1+4hiMNZHiw59TROs-zrA@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <CAOy4Vzez6QiA8jzq6sw8WjjDq_C27-yLMBYy0rZt_dU7uXffkw@mail.gmail.com>

On Tue, Aug 30, 2011 at 2:56 PM, Richard <richard at r-selected.de> wrote:
> On Tue, Aug 30, 2011 at 20:49, David Tomaschik <david at systemoverlord.com> wrote:
>
>> No, you can store a primary key. ?And you can use the 3 slots for any
>> purpose (though I believe they must all tie to the same primary key.).
>> ?It would be common to combine signing & certification into one key
>> (and I believe that is the default).
>
> So it is impossible to use a separate signing subkey if I want to
> retain the possibility to sign other keys without keeping an off-card
> backup of the primary key? In the past I switched my singing subkeys
> every couple of years, keeping my primary key in place.
>
> ? ?Richard

No, I was just stating common practice.  You could do a
certification/primary key, a signing key, and an encryption key in the
3 slots.



-- 
David Tomaschik, RHCE, LPIC-1
System Administrator/Open Source Advocate
OpenPGP: 0x5DEA789B
http://systemoverlord.com
david at systemoverlord.com


From kgo at grant-olson.net  Tue Aug 30 20:58:38 2011
From: kgo at grant-olson.net (Grant Olson)
Date: Tue, 30 Aug 2011 14:58:38 -0400
Subject: Migrating to Smartcards
In-Reply-To: <201108302044.33843.mailinglisten@hauke-laging.de>
References: <CA+WmQonz0AssSNXzh4FGQrofEvHqZ2Gj9XW5P0a0eq55mU--pA@mail.gmail.com>
	<201108302044.33843.mailinglisten@hauke-laging.de>
Message-ID: <4E5D32DE.50101@grant-olson.net>

On 8/30/11 2:44 PM, Hauke Laging wrote:
> Am Dienstag, 30. August 2011, 17:54:32 schrieb Richard:
> 
>> Will that cause any problems in later GnuPG use as the cards' IDs are
>> different?
> 
> At least no serious ones. You will probably have to make gpg read the card 
> content by --card-status or --card-edit. At worst you would have to "delete" 
> the secret key before.
> 
> 

I actually found this to be really annoying in day-to-day use when I
tried to use two cards with the same key.  gpg really wants you to have
one card tied to one set of keys per computer.

If you're only using one on the road, and one at home, I guess that
wouldn't come up though.

-- 
Grant

"I am gravely disappointed. Again you have made me unleash my dogs of war."

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From richard at r-selected.de  Tue Aug 30 22:56:02 2011
From: richard at r-selected.de (Richard)
Date: Tue, 30 Aug 2011 22:56:02 +0200
Subject: Migrating to Smartcards
In-Reply-To: <CA+WmQonz0AssSNXzh4FGQrofEvHqZ2Gj9XW5P0a0eq55mU--pA@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CA+WmQonz0AssSNXzh4FGQrofEvHqZ2Gj9XW5P0a0eq55mU--pA@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <CA+WmQo=wAVpuAjJwUWW+8m5576iL9519iEB=-yniBOQSDDYetw@mail.gmail.com>

Thanks for all your help!

I just noticed that on my mobile computer (running Mac OS X) I am
still stuck with GnuPG 2.0.17 since MacGPG2 has not yet been updated.
I will have to wait for an updated package before I can start moving
my keys to smartcards.

Best,

    Richard


From wk at gnupg.org  Wed Aug 31 08:36:41 2011
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Wed, 31 Aug 2011 08:36:41 +0200
Subject: Migrating to Smartcards
In-Reply-To: <4E5D32DE.50101@grant-olson.net> (Grant Olson's message of "Tue, 
	30 Aug 2011 14:58:38 -0400")
References: <CA+WmQonz0AssSNXzh4FGQrofEvHqZ2Gj9XW5P0a0eq55mU--pA@mail.gmail.com>
	<201108302044.33843.mailinglisten@hauke-laging.de>
	<4E5D32DE.50101@grant-olson.net>
Message-ID: <87ippeoznq.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Tue, 30 Aug 2011 20:58, kgo at grant-olson.net said:

> tried to use two cards with the same key.  gpg really wants you to have
> one card tied to one set of keys per computer.

2.1 will make this much simpler by separating the key material (or the
key stub) from the actual keyblock/certificate.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From wk at gnupg.org  Wed Aug 31 08:43:01 2011
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Wed, 31 Aug 2011 08:43:01 +0200
Subject: Migrating to Smartcards
In-Reply-To: <20110830184022.GD29413@wingback.gollo.at> (Martin Gollowitzer's
	message of "Tue, 30 Aug 2011 20:40:22 +0200")
References: <CA+WmQonz0AssSNXzh4FGQrofEvHqZ2Gj9XW5P0a0eq55mU--pA@mail.gmail.com>
	<20110830184022.GD29413@wingback.gollo.at>
Message-ID: <877h5uozaa.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Tue, 30 Aug 2011 20:40, gollo at fsfe.org said:

> AFAIR, 3072 bit keys have to be generated on the card. If you use
> off-card generation, you are limited to 2048 bits.

Really? That would be a bug.

In case it really does not work the workaround is to first create a key
with 3072 bits on the card and then overwrite it by importing a 3072 bit
key.  The background is that we need to switch the card into an n-bit
mode before we generate or import a key.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From wk at gnupg.org  Wed Aug 31 08:40:36 2011
From: wk at gnupg.org (Werner Koch)
Date: Wed, 31 Aug 2011 08:40:36 +0200
Subject: Migrating to Smartcards
In-Reply-To: <CAOy4Vzc0kwvSQqsQd-6Ly+XUZJChkTrz2c=M7t1defFp0t6kBQ@mail.gmail.com>
	(David Tomaschik's message of "Tue, 30 Aug 2011 14:49:34 -0400")
References: <CA+WmQonz0AssSNXzh4FGQrofEvHqZ2Gj9XW5P0a0eq55mU--pA@mail.gmail.com>
	<CAOy4Vzc0kwvSQqsQd-6Ly+XUZJChkTrz2c=M7t1defFp0t6kBQ@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <87ei02ozh7.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>

On Tue, 30 Aug 2011 20:49, david at systemoverlord.com said:

> No, the OpenPGP v2 card can only handle up to RSA-3072.  Presumably

OpenPGP v2 card is just a spec; you need to look at the specific
implementation which most likely will be the Zeitcontrol card.  That
card support up to 4096 bits.  Right, we printed 3072 on the back matter
but only to tell people that GnuPG does not support more than 3072 bit
with this card.


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.



From gollo at fsfe.org  Wed Aug 31 20:29:51 2011
From: gollo at fsfe.org (Martin Gollowitzer)
Date: Wed, 31 Aug 2011 20:29:51 +0200
Subject: Migrating to Smartcards
In-Reply-To: <877h5uozaa.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
References: <CA+WmQonz0AssSNXzh4FGQrofEvHqZ2Gj9XW5P0a0eq55mU--pA@mail.gmail.com>
	<20110830184022.GD29413@wingback.gollo.at>
	<877h5uozaa.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Message-ID: <20110831182951.GA4336@wingback.gollo.at>

* Werner Koch <wk at gnupg.org> [110831 08:45, 
  mID <877h5uozaa.fsf at vigenere.g10code.de>]:

> On Tue, 30 Aug 2011 20:40, gollo at fsfe.org said:
> 
> > AFAIR, 3072 bit keys have to be generated on the card. If you use
> > off-card generation, you are limited to 2048 bits.
> 
> Really? That would be a bug.

I had this problem back in 2009. 

> In case it really does not work the workaround is to first create a key
> with 3072 bits on the card and then overwrite it by importing a 3072 bit
> key.  The background is that we need to switch the card into an n-bit
> mode before we generate or import a key.

This sounds like a good reason for what I experienced. If I find the
time, I'll try it out and maybe switch to bigger subkeys. 

Martin
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From m.aflakparast at ut.ac.ir  Tue Aug 30 19:24:11 2011
From: m.aflakparast at ut.ac.ir (m.aflakparast at ut.ac.ir)
Date: Tue, 30 Aug 2011 21:54:11 +0430 (IRDT)
Subject: How to install gnupg-2.0.18 and decrypt gpg files
Message-ID: <34272.69.31.50.32.1314725051.squirrel@utservm.ut.ac.ir>


Dear Madame/Sir,

I have downloaded gnupg-2.0.18 to decrypt some files formatted .gz.gpg
(e.g. 70195_B11_WTCCCT444825.CEL.gz.gpg).

I'm using a Windows 7 on  my PC.
I open CMD from start menu,
Then cd to the gnupg-2.0.18 address, then I type INSTALL but no
installation begins!

I read the readme file but again at the first step I have problem with the
command "./configure"
It is mentioned in readme file to cd to the gnupg-2.0.18 address in CMD
then...
, but it doesn't work.

I can't figure out how to insert commands in order to install the program
and decrypt my files.

Any help will  be highly appreciated.

Best regards,
Mehran Aflakparast





From m.aflakparast at ut.ac.ir  Tue Aug 30 20:47:51 2011
From: m.aflakparast at ut.ac.ir (m.aflakparast at ut.ac.ir)
Date: Tue, 30 Aug 2011 23:17:51 +0430 (IRDT)
Subject: [Fwd: Re: Decryption error]
Message-ID: <58230.69.31.50.32.1314730071.squirrel@utservm.ut.ac.ir>


Dear Madame/Sir,

I have downloaded gnupg-2.0.18 to decrypt some files formatted .gz.gpg
(e.g. 70195_B11_WTCCCT444825.CEL.gz.gpg).

I'm using a Windows 7 on  my PC.
I open CMD from start menu,
Then cd to the gnupg-2.0.18 address, then I type INSTALL but no
installation begins!

I read the readme file but again at the first step I have problem with the
command "./configure"
It is mentioned in readme file to cd to the gnupg-2.0.18 address in CMD
then...
, but it doesn't work.

I can't figure out how to insert commands in order to install the program
and decrypt my files.

Any help will  be highly appreciated.

Best regards,
Mehran Aflakparast




---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------
Subject: Re: Decryption error
From:    "Werner Koch" <wk at gnupg.org>
Date:    Tue, August 30, 2011 11:08 am
To:      m.aflakparast at ut.ac.ir
--------------------------------------------------------------------------

On Mon, 29 Aug 2011 21:39, m.aflakparast at ut.ac.ir said:

> I need to decrypt .gz.gpg files (e.g. 70195_C1_WTCCCT442627.CEL.gz.gpg)
and I have already downloaded "gpg4win-2.1.0" and installed it and a GPA
file was made and so on.

I don't understand your problem.  Maybe it is not an OpenPGP encrypted
file.  You may try to open a command shell and enter on the command line:

  gpg -v 70195_C1_WTCCCT442627.CEL.gz.gpg

this should ask you for the passphrase or tell you why it can't decrypt
the above file.

Please send further support requests to a mailing list
(gnupg-users at gnupg.org).


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.