keyserver spam

Jerome Baum jerome at
Sat Dec 17 17:36:19 CET 2011

On 2011-12-17 17:15, MFPA wrote:
> Since you don't log into a keyserver when you post, and keyservers
> store data but do not perform cryptographic functions, this is pretty
> much inevitable. The "keyserver-no-modify" flag could, in theory,
> carry with it a requirement that modifications to a key were signed by
> that key. But, once again, increased complexity and server load. And
> what about propagating changes between keyservers?

I just thought about this and while the crypto overhead would always be
there, my thinking is: If we're only adding, wouldn't a signature (e.g.
of a hash of the sub-packet) be okay? This works fine in terms of

PGP: A0E4 B2D4 94E6 20EE 85BA E45B 63E4 2BD8 C58C 753A
PGP: 2C23 EBFF DF1A 840D 2351 F5F5 F25B A03F 2152 36DA
No situation is so dire that panic cannot make it worse.

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