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[Faramir]

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El 26-02-2011 20:07, Aaron Toponce escribió:
...
> Thoughts?
> 
> http://eprint.iacr.org/2010/023.pdf

In this section, the attack assumptions are described.
² Correct and faulty ciphertexts calculated from the
same plaintext are known.
² One pair of correct plaintext and ciphertext is known.

  But GnuPG uses a randomly generated session key each time it encrypts
something, so if an attacker has plaintext and ciphertext, he already
has what he wants, and retrieving the key is useless, since it won't be
used again.

  Best Regards
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