Primary Key Security, Old DSA Key

[Robert J. Hansen]

On 7/23/11 10:19 AM, Edmond wrote:
> But since AFAIK both 1024 bit DSA and SHA1 hashes are not recommended
> for use anymore (at least in new systems), I was wondering if I should
> issue a new primary key.

This is impossible to answer, since we don't know exactly what threats
you're facing.  However, it's worth pointing out that you're correct:
most of us no longer recommend DSA-1K or SHA-1 *for new systems*.

Speaking personally, just for myself, I have not seen any instances
where I thought someone who used DSA-1K needed to switch algorithms
immediately.

It's probably a good idea to migrate to a new certificate *sometime*.
If right now is a convenient time for you to do it, then sure, go for
it.  But there's no rush.

With respect to which algorithms to use... use GnuPG's defaults (RSA-2K
right now, I believe).  You don't need to tweak GnuPG in order to get a
very high level of assurance from it.  :)

> I.e., the worst thing that could happen is that someone
> issues new subkeys that claim to belong to my primary key when they
> actually don't. Is that correct?

Almost.  The worst that could happen is someone could issue signatures
and pretend they're from you.  But if SHA-1 falls that far, well, we're
all going to have a whole lot of problems above and beyond just that.  :)



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