deniability

[Jerome Baum]

"dan at geer.org" <dan at geer.org> writes:

> Ah.  Spam as a covert channel.  Tell me that this isn't already done?

You make  a point,  I should have  been clearer. Randomly  send messages
that can't be decrypted to  random recipients _from a list of recipients
that have agreed to this_ to obscure matters.

It  would be  a lot  of work  to try  decrypting with  each key  but the
recipient could have  a designated "trial" key with  no pass-phrase that
is used to decrypt some kind  of outer layer.  The adversary would still
need to steal that key only  to verify that _with high probability_, the
message was intended for this specific recipient.

-- 
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