Deniability

[Jerome Baum]

David Shaw <dshaw at jabberwocky.com> writes:

> Probably the easiest way is  to not send messages with speculative key
> IDs encrypted to more than one recipient. :)

> That ensures  that Alice knows as  little as possible  about the other
> recipients (including whether  there are any in the  first place).  It
> does put an additional burden on  the sender, though, as they now need
> to send out more messages (which might be hard for some senders).

So assuming that's done, or assuming that _Mallory_ ;) is not in CC, are
there  other problems?   Obviously, from  the perspective  of  a thought
experiment and assuming a world-wide destruction of lead pipes.

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